Knowledge and Wealth in the Islamic Tradition

By: Dr Yusuf Progler
One of the key mythological constructs of Western scientific and economic development is embodied in the often cited but little understood phrase 'knowledge is power." Francis Bacon, European philosopher and would-be statesman, spoke these infamous words in the early 17th century CE. Nowadays, Bacon is often credited as the "father of modern science," yet his celebrated dictum is rarely situated in the context he intended. Bacon believed that "human knowledge and human power meet as one" so that nature can be "forced out of her natural state and squeezed and moulded" in order to "establish and extend the power and dominion of the human race over the universe." Bacon insisted that this knowledge of power over nature remains the exclusive trust for elite corps, later to be known as "scientists," and who must "take an oath of secrecy for the concealing of that which we think fit to keep secret." From an Islamic perspective, there are grave errors in Bacon's thinking. First of all, since only Allah has dominion over the universe, its fatal flaw—and that which exposes it as a Satanic temptation—is the insistence that humankind use its knowledge to extend "dominion of the human race over the universe." Nevertheless, this has not stopped the West from forging itself upon Bacon's dictum.
Bacon's conspiracy of silence, thought, and action fueled Western civilization for 400 years. Knowledge was indeed power, but only for those who already possessed power. The Baconian vision allowed the West to establish a stranglehold on nature, wringing from it the minerals and other resources to fuel its civilization at the expense of the rest of the world. Today, that legacy means that barely 20% of the world's population consume over 80% of all the natural resources. Americans are on the vanguard of the Baconian vision, with their meagre 5% of the world's population consuming a full one-third of all resources. And compared to the world averages of consumption, Americans use over three times the arable land, five times the energy resources, three times the fresh water, and over seven times the paper, to name only a few areas of use. Not only is the Western system wasteful and destructive, but it is apparent from such statistics that it is impossible for the rest of humanity to enjoy the opulent lifestyles lived by those privileged segments of Western society, who are precisely those people trying to normalize the Western relationship to wealth and the environment for the rest of humanity.
The idea of "knowledge is power" has well served the Western world elite over the centuries, and some of the most brutal wars have been fought to protect its exclusivity. It still underwrites the international system of recolonization we are calling Western development. But this just makes it more difficult to see why Bacon's dictum is today splattered all over the mental environment. From internet commercials to school logos, in advertising and entertainment, "knowledge is power" has become commonplace and is repeated on the tips of people's tongues from all walks of life. Bacon's dictum is no longer secret. In fact, now everyone is encouraged to buy the latest computer technology or pay for high priced schooling precisely because "knowledge is power."
It is clear that Bacon and his successors knew that the real power lie in the exclusivity of knowledge, so how is it that the West now wants everyone to know its secret? The answer is that "knowledge is power" is no longer the driving force behind Western civilization, so it is no longer necessary to keep it secret. While the West certainly still enjoys, and jealously guards, the fruits of implementing four centuries of the Baconian dictum, it is no longer useful or even relevant in and of itself. A new dictum is dethroning "knowledge is power." In Bacon's day, the Church and the feudal establishment were the benefactors and beneficiaries of the "knowledge is power" apparatus. Today's universities and corporations have taken over that role, so one can find evidence of the new dictum in corporate boardrooms and elite educational establishments.
"Knowledge is wealth" is replacing "knowledge is power" as the generative force behind Western civilization. Glimpses of the new dictum can be uncovered if one knows where to look. For instance, the National Centre on Education and Economy (NCEE), a Washington DC think-tank funded by big business and the Carnegie and other large foundations, has taken a leading role in school reform in the US. The NCEE mission statement reads: "Knowledge and the capacity to put knowledge to good use is now the only dependable source of wealth all over the world. The people, organizations and nations that succeed will be those that make the most of the human desire and capacity for never-ending learning." What is carried over from Bacon's day, though not as successfully, is the necessity for secrecy, or for some other way of assuring that, just as knowledge was power only for the powerful, knowledge will be wealth only for the wealthy.
For now, what we have here is a faint glimpse at the blueprint for the new world order of globalize corporate power emanating from Western based institutions and fueled by Western science. Building on their exclusive domination over the fruits of the Baconian dictum, the West is now moving into the realm of knowledge and intellect. Think of what this means. While the results of four centuries of the Baconian order, besides the gross inequities cited above, are seen in an increasingly strained natural environment, the West's habit of consumption, its venerated "way of life," is putting a terrible strain on global ecosystems, with many now at the point of collapse. Meanwhile, the old and the new dictums of the West are intertwined when one looks at issues of "intellectual property rights" in the context of food, botany, and genetics. If the Baconian dictum of the past means the environmental destruction of today, then it is not too far a leap to see that the new dictum of today may be the "mental" destruction of tomorrow.
Reconfiguring knowledge as "the only dependable source of wealth all over the world" has many severe implications, among them being the specter of patenting various forms of life, such as seeds and genes. An advantage of knowing this is that it may enable some kind of pre-emptive measures to disallow the West from making the transition from imperial control over natural resources to imperial control over natural and mental resources. While Muslims have largely bought into the Baconian dictum of knowledge is power, with mixed results and with little sense of how this contributes to environmental destruction, we may want to think hard and twice about the emerging dictum. For instance, what does the Islamic tradition say about the relationship between knowledge and wealth? Is it possible to develop an Islamic alternative before the new Western paradigm shift is complete, and before its fruits and mechanisms are too hard to resist?
The Prophet Muhammad (S) once declared: "There are two kinds of greedy people who cannot be satisfied: the seeker of knowledge (ilm) and the seeker of this world (dunya). While the seeker of knowledge receives an increase in Allah's pleasures, the seeker of this world extends deeply into tyranny." The profound wisdom of this hadith becomes more apparent the more one spends time in reflection. In one aspect, it suggests that knowledge and wealth are separate, yet linked. But how are they linked? Does the Islamic tradition support the emerging vision of knowledge as wealth? What are the alternatives? The books of history and tradition are full of wisdom to help sort out this emerging dilemma. In answering such questions, Muslims need to develop some Islamic grounded criteria for making distinctions between knowledge and wealth, and the subtle interplay therein. It is well beyond the scope of this short article to present an exhaustive account of the Islamic traditions on these matters, but it is possible to point the way in a few directions, from history and tradition.
The Prophetic recognition cited above, that the seeker of both knowledge and wealth is insatiable, was born out on several occasions in early Islamic history. For example, when Imam 'Ali ( 'a) was the leader of the Muslims, he faced a severe problem with the emergence of dynastic rule within Bani Umayyah. The Imam had first-hand experience with the relationship between knowledge and wealth, and this became more acute as dynastic rule solidified under the Abbasids. During that period, the great Muslim scholars and Imams, like Imam Ja'far Sadiq ('a) and other Muslim jurists and traditionists, such as Ibn Hanbal, languished in prisons because they exhorted people to knowledge—as defined by the Prophet-while the dynastic regimes exhorted people to wealth and superfluity. This legacy is worth a closer look.
During the time of the Imams, they had knowledge and the Abbasid rulers had wealth. The rulers feared the popularity of the Imams among the people, who respected them for their knowledge. Fearing a threat to their legitimacy, the Abbasids under Harun al- Rashid and Ma'mun decided to use their wealth to buy what they thought was knowledge. They could not buy the Imams, just like the Quraysh could not buy the Prophet, so they turned to other sources of knowledge besides the blessed Imams. This led to a massive, well-funded, and indiscriminate translation movement from Greek, Sanskrit and other languages, the products of which Ma'mun put in his newly endowed library called Bayt al-Hikmah, which was intended to compete with the Ahl al-Bayt. This crystallizes the confusion about the definition of knowledge, and about the relationship between knowledge and wealth. In other words, they used their wealth to redefine knowledge, and this confusion remains with us today, as does the tendency to intermingle knowledge and wealth. But the Prophet is quite clear on the definition of knowledge, and the Imam is quite clear on the relationship between knowledge and wealth. Seen in this historical framework, it is safe to assume that these are taghuti tendencies that have been with us for quite some time. Standard histories of the Bayt al-Hikmah celebrate it as the introduction of science into the Muslim world, as an altruistic quest for knowledge and as beneficent for the people. It is none of these. It is a political act by a shrewd ruler. Ma'mun also tried to co-opt Imam Reza ('a) into his sphere, by offering him leadership succession, but when the Imam put haqq before expediency—breaking the cardinal rule of wealth driven politics—he was promptly poisoned by Ma'mun. This was part of the Abbasids three-part plan to maintain the rule of wealth in the lands of Islam: redefine knowledge, co-opt the Shi'ite Imams, and imprison the Sunni jurists.
The reign of Imam 'Ali ('a), upon whom be peace, lies at the crossroads of this shift from Prophetic wisdom and frugality to dynastic superfluity and greed, so his deeds and sayings are instructive in our study. It is also necessary to consider the Imam's teachings because the corrupted tendencies in Muslim thought embodied in the dynastic shift are precisely those which seem to allow Western development schemes to make sense in the present day Islamic world. Providing a warning, the Imam is recorded as having said to his companion Kumayl: "Knowledge is better than wealth sevenfold. First, knowledge is the heritage of the Prophets, while wealth is the heritage of the Pharaohs. Second, wealth decreases by spending, while knowledge multiplies. Third, wealth is in need of protection, while knowledge protects those who have it. Fourth, knowledge enters into the burial cloth, while wealth stays behind. Fifth, wealth happens to disbelievers and believers alike, whereas knowledge does not happen except to the believers especially. Sixth, everyone is in need of knowledge in matters of religion, whereas no one needs the owner of wealth. Seventh, knowledge empowers humankind to pass within the straight path, whereas wealth blocks it." In such a view, knowledge cannot be construed as wealth. Wealth is a corrupting influence, and its intermingling may have a corrupting effect on world knowledge systems, thus preventing people from finding true alternatives to Western scientific and economic development schemes.
It is this capacity of wealth and the dunya to lead people astray that is of major concern for our purposes here. Western economic development schemes rely on a love of the dunya in order to perpetuate themselves. As Muslims are well aware, in the Islamic tradition worldly possessions are looked upon with careful suspicion. In the Nahj al'Balaghah, there is a profound and complex hadith from Imam 'Ali ( 'a), that offers relevant guidance on some of these issues. The Imam addresses the nass in this hadith, so it is not only intended for the believers. He is reported to have said: "Worldly possessions are poisonous weeds, so avoid grazing among them. Tearing them out is favorable to seeking satisfaction, and sustenance is better than opulence. Poverty has been ordained upon whoever seeks riches, while comfort is destined for those who stay away. The eyes of those who are attracted by worldly possessions will be blinded. And for those who display eagerness toward wealth, the deepest recesses of their hearts will be filled with alternating grief, some of which causes worry, and others causing pain. This continues until the suffocation of death overwhelms them, at which point their hearts will be flung open and severed. It is easy for Allah to cause their death, and for their companions to bury them. Believers see this world with eyes that derive instruction, taking from it food enough for their barest needs, while they hear of this world only with ears of enmity. If it is said that someone has become rich, it is also said that they have become destitute, and if pleasure is felt in living then grief will be felt at death. This is the situation, and the day has not yet come when people will be disheartened."
And, in a similar set of teachings recorded by Shaykh al- Mufid in Kitab al-Irshad, the Imam warns: 'The world is just like a snake, soft to the touch but vicious in its sting. Therefore, avoid those things which please you in it because of the short time which they will be with you there. Be as familiar as you can with what is there while being as wary as you can of its possessions. For whenever one who possesses the world seeks to take ease from it, it diverts him toward what is hateful." And on another occasion, the Imam exhorts the children of Adam to take heed: "Let not the greatest of your concerns be what happens to you today. For if it passes you by, it was not meant for you. Your concern should be now and on every day which comes to you, that Allah will provide you with provision for it. You should know that you will never acquire anything beyond your own sustenance, save as one who looks after things on behalf of others. If your share of wealth in this world is abundant, then soon your heir will take it over and together with him your account on the Day of Resurrection will be lengthy. So be happy with what you have and make provision for the day of your return to Allah, which is ahead of you. The journey is long, the appointment is the Resurrection, the destiny is Heaven or Hell." Commentary on such teachings can easily exceed this
brief study, but in general they warn Muslims to take heed of the trappings of the dunya, to not be seduced by schemes that promise to fulfill their worldly desires, no matter how tempting.
For whoever gives into the temptation to develop along Western scientific and economic lines, the results will be as the Imam has warned: 'The people of this world (dunya) are excessive in eating, laughing, sleeping, and anger. They find little satisfaction, and do not apologize to whomever they offend, nor do they accept apologies from whoever has offended them. They are lazy in their obedience but courageous in their disobedience. They are not responsible for their inner wants and desires. They are of little advantage to anyone, yet they are excessive in their speech. They have no piety or fear, and show great enthusiasm in consuming. The people of this world are not thankful for their prosperity, nor are they patient in distress. They praise themselves about that which they do not deserve, and speak often about that which they desire. They expose other people's shortcomings but conceal their positive attributes. And they are not modest to those they meet." The Western world seeks to normalize a system of thought and action the outcome of which is producing "people of the dunya." Though disguised as a program to eradicate poverty, the Western economic development scheme is implanting a wasteful and destructive culture of consumption. And, in the true sense of the word, consumption is a disease characterized by wasting away. Western development wastes away both the natural resources upon which humanity subsists, and the cultural resources that once formed healthy, prosperous, and meaningful lives for all.
The noble Islamic tradition, from the Qur'an and hadith to the teachings of the great Imams and scholars, are resplendent with such relevant wisdom, especially on the endeavour of seeking knowledge. It is necessary to study this corpus and derive from it an authentically Islamic way of understanding the relationships between knowledge, information, and wealth, and which operates outside the Satanic Western order and its concomitant systems of thought and practice as embodied in programs such as the Western development described herein. With "knowledge is power" exposed as the spinner of inequality, greed, and destruction in the environmental health of humanity, and with "knowledge is wealth" potentially being wielded by the same powers, the mental health of humanity may depend on the abilities of Muslims to configure another way, which is rooted in the Islamic tradition. This will be necessary to avoid Western colonial schemes, and to regenerate healthy and prosperous communities, societies, and civilizations.
Reference: ImamReza.net

Causality and Freedom

By: Mohsen Araki
Abstract
According to Mulla Sadra’s theory of necessity, a determined causal law governs the relationship between cause and effect, a relationship that encompasses human behavior. There is no contrast between this determined causal law and free will. This theory will be examined and contrasted with Sayyed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s exposition on free will. Al-Sadr’s theory of al-satfana or mastery suggests that free will is not compatible with the determined casual law. Free action and moral agency is led by the power of mastery. In this study, these two theories will be explained briefly. We shall attempt to evaluate which one of the two is more reasonable and preferable as a theory of human agency.
One of the earliest problems in philosophy that has occupied minds of great philosophers and has been debated in different philosophical ages is the problem of causality and its relation to freedom.
Depth of philosophical problems pertaining to causality and freedom on the one hand and the close relation between these two notions, theoretical and practical systems of man and also many problems in philosophy, theology and humanities such as law, ethics and psychology on the other hand, has made this discussion very important and vital.
In Islamic philosophy, the great Muslim philosopher, Sadrul Muta’llihin, known as Sadra, has made one of the most profound studies of "causality" and its relation to "human freedom".
One of the controversial problems among Muslim philosophers and theologians that led to some of the most heated debates in philosophy and theology is the very problem of "causality" and interpretation of "freedom" on its basis. These debates were marginalized after the decline of traditional theology and its inclusion in philosophy, mostly after the appearance of transcendental philosophy of Sadra. For a short period Sadra’s philosophy managed to be the dominant and governing trend in the history of Islamic thought. This situation did not last for a long time, because simultaneous to the decline of "theological thought", the science of the principles of jurisprudence tremendously developed in Shi‘a thought and replaced "the theological current" in its intellectual debates with the philosophical thought. In this way, some of the earlier disputes between Muslim theologians and philosophers were revived in another form and a new school with a new way of thinking merged against the philosophical thought, which was embodied in the transcendental philosophy of Sadra. This new school can be called, "The School of Modern Usuliyyun", those who became experts in the principles of jurisprudence.
Among the modern usuliyun, Akhund Mulla Muhammad Kazim Khurasani represents Sadrian Islamic thought. Defending principles of "Sadrian philosophy", Akhund greatly supported the Sadrean view in the interpretation of causality and its relation to freedom.
On the other side, his intelligent and insightful pupil, i.e. Mirza Na‘ini was one of the strong critics of Sadrian view. In a new way and method, he criticized the Sadrian philosophical thought and presented a new viewpoint on the relation between causality and human freedom.
Na‘ini can be considered as the one who started a new way of dealing with the problem of causality and its relation to human freedom. Although his idea was not developed into a complete theory, it opened the way for a new and complete theory that was developed by the great contemporary thinker and philosopher Ayatullah Sayyed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. This theory was called the theory of Saltanah, sovereignty.
In this essay, after explaining briefly the philosophical theory of Sadra on the relation between causality and freedom which we shall call later the theory of necessity (wujub) and martyr Sadr’s theory of sovereignty (saltanah), we will compare these two theories with each other. We will also criticize and analyze them.
The Theory of Necessity (Sadra’s theory in the interpretation of causality and its relation to human freedom)
Before explaining the theory of necessity, it is noteworthy that the reason beyond calling this theory "The Theory of Necessity" lies in the fact that according to this theory the relation between cause and effect is both the relation of existence and that of necessity.
The dispute between Muslim philosophers and theologians on all types of cause on one hand and between philosophers and modern usuliyyun on voluntary agent or cause on the other hand does not concern bringing of the effect into existence by the cause, but rather granting necessity to the effect by the cause. According to the theory of necessity, the effect not only depends on the cause for its existence, but also for its necessity.
Early theologians took the cause in a general sense and the mainstream of modern usuliyyun take the voluntary agent in a particular sense just as the originator of the effect and not as the necessitating.
To give a comprehensive account of "necessity" containing its philosophical grounds in Sadra’s view requires a long and broad discussion, which is beyond the scope of this short essay. Here we are concerned with three subjects that we will study in the following order:
Short explanation of "The Theory of Necessity" in Sadra’s thought
An account of the hypotheses of philosophical contradiction between this theory and the principle of free will
Method of philosophical solution of the above-mentioned contradiction according to Sadra and the theory of necessity.

1- Short Explanation of the Theory of Necessity
According to the theory of asalat al-wujud (principality of existence), natures (quiddities) are conventions of our mind and what is really there is just "being" or "existence". In other words, among all concepts and mental images, the only concept that can describe the external world and can genuinely represent the reality outside our mind is the concept of "being". Therefore, the key to know the universal laws and rules that govern the universe is the universal principle of asalat al-wujud. The general structure of philosophical knowledge of the world is based on this principle, from which the universal philosophical laws governing the world have to be derived.
The most important philosophical principles of cosmology derived from asalat al-wujud are:
A- Graduation (hierarchical structure) of Being
According to asalat al-wujud, the differences that we understand among things in the world are all rooted in their "being" and can have no root other than the reality of ‘being’. Therefore, all things in the world differ in "being", just as they share ‘being’.The reality of being [in contrast to the concept of being] is a reality that admits differences and multicity of types and every type of being is a level of being which is different from other beings in intensity and weakness, and unlimitedness and limitedness.Different types of being differ from each other in that one is weaker, that is, more dependent and more needy and the other is more intense, that is, more independent and less needy. The difference of being in degrees of dependence on and need for the other which is the same as the difference in weakness and intensity is the source for all differences and varieties in the world.
The peak and the most intense being is the self-independent being, which is absolutely free from need, that is, the eternal self-necessary being. The self-necessary being has no need for any condition and is the absolute being and enjoys the ultimate existential actuality. The self-necessary being is the originator of the hierarchy of being. All other levels of being are manifestations of self-necessary being, on whom they entirely depend. Despite its total dependence on the self-necessary being, the first being created by the self-necessary being has no need to other levels of being and therefore in relation to other levels of being enjoys independence, freedom from need and absoluteness. Other levels of being depend for their existence on self-necessary being and on the first creature as well, since through it the grace of being extends to other levels. Thus, the highest being is the completely actual independent absolute self-necessary being and the lowest is the being that has nothing other than potentiality of being.
In his Mabda’ wa Ma‘ad, Mulla, Sadra says:
And beings do not differ in their essence except in intensity and weakness, perfection and imperfection, priority and posteriority. Being accidentally differs because of those notions that are subordinate to them, i.e. their different natures.
Also in the discussion on potentiality and actuality in his Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, Mulla Sadra says:
Surely the thing, which is liable to movement, is potential either in this aspect or in all aspects, and the mover is actual either in this aspect or in all aspects. Inevitably, those aspects of actuality will end in something, which is actual in all aspects; otherwise it would lead to vicious circle or infinite regress. Similarly, those aspects of potentiality will end in something, which is potential in all aspects except in being potential, since it has this potentially in actuality and this is what make it distinguishable from absolute nothingness. So it is proved that there are two sides for the being: one side is the first real and the absolute being, May His name be glorified, and the other side is the materia prima. The former is absolutely good and the latter is bad and has nothing good except accidentally. It is accidentally good, because it is the potentiality for all beings, in contrast to nothingness which is absolutely bad.

B- Independent Being and Relational Being
According to what was said earlier, the difference among beings is the difference in levels and degrees of existence starting with the self-necessary being and ending with the potential being.Reflection on the reality of "being" leads to the conclusion that apart from self-necessary being which itself is "the reality of being" and the peak of the hierarchy of being, other levels of being have no reality other than belonging and relation to self-necessary being. Any thing apart from the divine essence is nothing other than relation and belonging to Him.
Therefore, the universe of being consists in an independent and self-necessary being; other levels of being are His manifestation and belongings. Manifestations and belonging of necessary being or levels of dependent beings have no being without relation to the necessary being. If someone thinks that in addition to the source of the being which is the self-necessary there are or may be other beings that have reality more than belonging and relation to self-necessary being he has made a mistake and has not understood the reality of being and asalat al-wujud.
The being which essentially and by itself deserves existence is the self-necessary being which is the reality of being itself. From this necessary being, another being emerges which is His amr (command) and is nothing other than relation to and dependence on him. This relational (dependent) and command-based being is just one, since it is originated by the Absolute One ("and our command is not but single"-the Qur’an) and since Divine grace is infinite and all are simply relation and belonging to the One Necessary being. Mulla Sadra says:
O you who are seeking for the truth! The truth has appeared from this account that you have heard: the reality of being because of its simplicity and having no nature, no constituent and no limiting part is the necessary being itself that deserves ultimate and infinite perfection, since every other level of being lower that than level in intensity is not absolute reality of being". 1
Elsewhere he says:
Therefore, the effect by itself, since it is effect, has no reality other than reliance and dependence and has no meaning other than being effect and subordinate, without having an essence subject to these meanings, as the absolutely originating cause has no essence and reality other than being the principle and source of everything and all relations and dependence go back to him. So if it is proved that the chain of beings -including both causes and effects- originates from an essence which is a simple luminous primary existential reality free from multiplicity, deficiency, contingency, short coming and unclarity, free from anything accidental or additional to Him, internally or externally and it is also proved that He is gracious by Himself and luminous by His reality and illuminating heavens and earth by His entity and the source of the origin of the universe of creation and command by His existence, the conclusion is that all beings have the same origin and are of the same kind which is the reality and the rest is His affairs. He is the essence and the rest is His names and attributes. He is the principle and the rest is His states and affairs. He is the being and the rest is His aspects and features.2

C- Cause and Effect
From what has been said before, the concepts of causation, cause and effect become clear. Cause is an independent being which has no need for its effect, originating and necessitating the effect. Effect is a totally dependent being, which is nothing other than relation to and dependence on its effect and has no identity other than this. Causality is not apart from the essence of the effect and the cause. The essence of cause in the context of influence and origination is its causality and the effect itself is nothing other than causality in the context of receptivity.In a mental analysis, there are three concepts: 1-the cause, i.e. the originator 2-the effect, i.e. the originated 3-causality, i.e. the origination. These three concepts can only be separated by a mental assumption or metaphor. They are not separable from each other even in the mind and with an intellectual analysis, except in an intellectual metaphor.
Cause, causality and effect are interrelated concepts that are not detachable from each other neither in reality nor in our understanding. Mulla Sadra says:
The effect by itself is a simple thing like the cause by itself and that is when the attention is limited to them. When we abstract the cause from whatever does not bear on its causation and influence, that is, when the cause is considered as such and when we abstract the effect from whatever does not bear on its causedness it becomes clear and certain that what is called as effect has no reality other than the reality of its originating cause so the intellect cannot refer to the entity of effect disregarding the entity of it originator… Therefore, the effect by itself has no reality in its causedness except that it is dependent and relational and has no meaning other than being an effect a-subordinate without having an essence exposed to those meanings, just as in the case of the absolute originating cause being principle, source, origin and followed is the same as its essence.3
Causality in the way explained above implies certain principles and rules, whose denial would be equal to the denial of the principle of causality itself. The first principle implied by the principle of causality is the principle of necessitation of effect or the relation of necessity between the cause and effect. Mulla Sadra says:
Having proved that no contingent comes into existence without something making its existence outweighing its nothingness and does not become annihilated without something making its nothingness outweighing its existence, so both sides have to be preponderated by an external cause, now we say: that preponderator will not be preponderator unless its preponderance reaches the level of necessity. Therefore, unlike what most theologians have thought if the preponderance caused by an external cause does not reach the level of necessity it will not be sufficient for the existence of the contingent, because as long as the contingent conveys both possibilities it will not exist. Is this not the case that if its existence is not made necessary by something else its both existence and non-existence would be possible, so no side is determined and to would still need something to preponderate either existence or non-existence.4
In this way, Mulla Sadra takes the principle of necessitation of effect as a result of the principle of causality itself and its denial to be identical with the denial of causality, because the principle of causality is based on needs of the contingent for a cause that puts an end to the state of equality of both existence and non-existence which is implied by causedness. As long as the cause does not necessitate its effect, it has not removed the state of equality.
Principles such as impossibility of separation of the effect from its cause and necessity of resemblance of cause and its effect in their generic reality are some other important principles derived from the principle of causality.
On the basis of asalat al-wujud, to conclude the above-mentioned principles from the principle of causality is more obvious and more decisive. For example, to draw the necessary relation between cause and effect from the principle of causality on the basis of asalat al-wujud a little reflection is enough to understand the concept of causality and necessity of originating effect by cause.
According to asalat al-wujud necessity is an inevitable implication of ‘being’ and all its levels, states and belongings. The essence of the first cause and whatever is created by it is being and necessity. Dependence on the self-subsistent is the essence of effect and also causation, influence, generosity and graciousness of the first cause is its essence, so the necessity of the existence of the effect is the same as its essence on the one hand, and the same as the essence of the cause on the other hand. According to this fact, cause necessarily and essentially requires creation of effect and effect also necessarily and essentially requires dependence on cause and creation by cause. Thus, the principle of necessity of creation of effect by cause is a necessary and inevitable result of the principle of causality.
Another important philosophical law, which is derived in the light of causality from asalat al-wujud, is the problem of criterion of need for a cause. This problem is one of the supreme problems discussed in Islamic philosophy and is exclusive to it. Muslim theologians take non-eternity (huduth) as the criterion of need for cause, that is, they believe the reason for having need for a cause is non-being and then coming to be. Since the existence is preceded by non-existence, there must be a cause that led to this transition from nothingness into being.
Muslim philosophers prior to Mulla Sadra developed strong arguments against the theory of theologians and proved that non-eternity cannot be the reason for need, because it is possible to suppose a being which is eternal and at the same time in need of a cause on which it eternally depends. Philosophers before Sadra held that the criterion is contingency. In other words, the main reason for having need for a cause is the fact that the thing by itself possesses no necessity for existence and non-existence and has equal relation to both existence and non-existence. This logically results in the necessary relation of effect to cause, because as mentioned above as long as the main reason of need for cause is contingency (non-necessity of existence and non-necessity of non-existence), what the cause of existence has to grant the effect is necessity of existence and what the cause nothingness has to grant is the necessity of nothingness.
Mulla Sadra in his excellent studies viewed the theory of his predecessors imperfect and appropriate for the universe of natures. In his studies, he proved that when we consider the relation between nature of something and existence or non-existence the view of previous philosophers is true, because nature of a contingent being has equal relation to both existence and non-existence and none of them is necessary for it. Therefore, to become existent or non-existent it needs a cause that grants necessity of existence or necessity of non-existence to it.
However, according to asalat al-wujud and subjectivity of nature, what is created by the cause is the existence of effect. Existence has no equal relation to existence and non-existence, so the view of previous philosophers cannot be true. Therefore, the criterion of need of being of effect for cause is not the equal relation of existence and non-existence to the existence of effect or contingency. The criterion is existential poverty or in other words dependence or relationality of existence. If we reflect on the existence of effect we will find it dependent and subordinate. This dependence and non-self- subsistence have made the effect in need of the cause. Therefore, need for cause is the same as the essence of effect and identified with its existence.
As mentioned earlier, the essential dependence of effect on its cause results in the necessary relation between cause and effect. According to this philosophical analysis, the essence of effect is an inseparable result and outcome of the essence of cause and impossibility of separation of effect from cause is another expression of necessitation of effect by cause.
2- An Account of Hypothesis of Philosophical Contradiction between the Theory of Necessity and Free Will
Early theologians and modern usuliyyun who seriously oppose the theory of necessity or necessitation of effect by cause or in other words the necessary relation of cause and effect, take this theory in conflict with free will and believe that even if we accept its truth in respect to non-voluntary causes, it cannot be accepted in respect to voluntary causes, because voluntariness of an act in voluntary causes contradicts necessity of that act and since voluntariness of acts in voluntary causes is admitted necessity of effect in voluntary causes must be wrong.
To explain the alleged philosophical contradiction between the theory of necessity and freedom or free-will in the case of voluntary agents we will clarify the main point of contradiction analyzing briefly two sides of the alleged conflict:
Causality
If we limit the principle of causality to the ‘need of effect in its existence for a cause’ and consider the effect as something that depends in its existence on the originator there seems no contradiction between causality and free will. In the first sight it seems possible to have something dependent on something else without any necessary relation between them. This means that cause would have equal relation to existence and non-existence of its effect and effect would remain contingent and unnecessary. This type of relation between voluntary cause and effect is in accordance with the viewpoint of early theologians and modern usuliyyun. In this way, there would be no contradiction between causality of a voluntary agent and his freedom and free will.
However, as we discussed earlier, causality in the way presented by philosophers cannot be limited to the existential relation between cause and effect. It rather involves necessary relation as well. Existence and necessity of the effect are not separable. Cause cannot bring the effect into existence without necessitating it; otherwise it would lead to groundless preponderance and we know that impossibility of such preponderance is the basis of the principle of causality.
The core of the alleged conflict between causality and free will is the very necessitation of effect by cause. It has been assumed that if the existence of effect is preceded by necessity of existence there would remain no place for free will. In other words, free will or freedom is only possible when the effect has the possibility of both being originated and not originated by the cause. Necessitation of effect is equal to determinism.
Free Will
There are three elements involved in every voluntary (free) act:
Prerequisites of willing the act .
Willing the act .
The act itself.
There are two relations between these three: the relation between (a) and (b) and between (b) and (c).
It is usually assumed that after the completion of all factors bearing on the existence of a voluntary act its existence becomes necessary as soon as the agent wills it. Thus, there is a necessary relation between willing the act and act itself.
Not only there is no conflict among this necessary relation between act and will of the agent and free will, but also there can be no free will without this necessary relation. To suppose that there can be will of agent and all requisites without having the act would contradict the free will and power of the agent. For the same reason, it seems that the dispute between philosophers and modern usuliyyun (and also some early theologians) mostly concerns the first relation, i.e. the relation between prerequisites of willing the act and willing the issuance of act from the voluntary agent and not the relation between act and the will. Modern usuliyyun and some early theologians believe that relation between willing the act in the voluntary agent and its prerequisites is necessary there would be no free will and it would result in absolute determinism.
In any case, the debate between philosophers and their opponents on the necessary relation of cause and effect can be conceived in both aspects of the relation of a voluntary act to its prerequisites, i.e. the relation of the essence of act and will of the agent and the relation of will of the agent and prerequisites of its existence.
Among modern usuliyyun, Mirza Na‘ini (d. 1355 A.H) distinguished four main elements in a voluntary act:
Prerequisites of will
Will (iradah)
Decision (ikhtiyar)
Essence of the act.
He meant by ikhtiyar the instant movement of the soul towards the act (the embarking of the soul on the act) and took it as a result of iradah, will.
Mirza Na‘ini takes the first two elements to be involuntary subject to the necessary relation of cause and effect, but he takes the third element, i.e. ikhtiyar that sits in between will and the act to be outside the domain of cause-effect necessity. He takes this to be the key point in voluntariness of act.5
In any case, for Muslim philosophers, especially for Mulla Sadra, the relation of a voluntary act to its prerequisites (iradah or ikhtiyar) and the relation of iradah (will) to its prerequisites is a relation of necessity and the principle of necessary relation of cause and effect is exceptionalness. Mulla Sadra says:
The criterion for willingness is to have the will as the cause for the act or non-act. And surely a willing agent is the one that if he wills he acts and if he does not feel he does not act, even if the will [itself] is necessitated by itself or by the other or is impossible by itself or by the other.6
Modern usuliyyun believe that the relation between voluntary act and its prerequisites is by no means a necessary and determined one and that the cause-effect necessity does not include the relation between the voluntary act and its prerequisites. Therefore, even if all prerequisites of a voluntary act were available the act still would not be necessary to be issued by the voluntary agent and it still remains contingent. This contingency or the possibility of acting and not acting or the equal relations of the agent to act and non-act is the core of will and voluntariness in a voluntary agent. Na’ini says:
If you say: is the fourth idea on which you built al-amr bayn al-amray (the state between two states) and the negation of determinism and made it something between the will and the movement of the muscles contingent or necessary?
I would say: No doubt, it is created and contingent, but it is the ikhtiyar itself, an act of the soul and the soul itself bears on its existence, so there is no need for a necessitating cause whose effect is never detached from it, because causality of this type is only there for non-voluntary acts.7
Some modern usuliyyun have noticed a problem here and tried to solve it. The problem is that if after completion of all prerequisites of a voluntary act including the will itself the act still remains unnecessary it would imply denial of power and will of the agents since the will of the agent would have no role in the emergence of the act and origination of the act falls out of agent’s power. Therefore, if ikhtiyar is taken to mean contingency and unnecessity of existence and non-existence it would imply negation of ikhtiyar.
To respond to this problem usuliyyun have distinguished between two types of necessity: (a) the necessity prior to ikhtiyar, i.e. the necessity which is source of decision or in other words necessity of cause of ikhtiyar (b) necessity after ikhtiyar, i.e. the necessity whose source is ikhtiyar or in other words the necessary relation between ikhtiyar itself and its effect: the voluntary act. They maintain that the former is in conflict with ikhtiyar and they deny it, but not only do they accept the latter, but they also take it to be compulsory, because there will be no ikhtiyar without it and there is no conflict between necessity which is caused by ikhtiyar and the ikhtiyar itself.
3-Philosophical Solution of Contradiction between Necessary Causality and Free Will according to
Sadra and the Theory of Necessity
The solution relies on three main points:
A- To distinguish between necessity and determinism and between contingency and free will. According to Sadra, critics of the theory of necessity have failed to distinguish between ikhtiyar and contingency or between determinism and necessity and therefore they have thought that necessary relation of cause and effect would lead to determinism, so to deny determinism which is against our conscience and rational arguments, one has to deny the theory of necessity. However, necessity does not imply determinism and has no conflict with ikhtiyar, just as contingency does not mean ikhtiyar and is not implied by voluntariness of the act.
Necessity and contingency are two mental concepts that are abstracted by mind from the relation between the thing and existence, while determinism and free will are two real qualities attributed to the act outside mind.
Acts of a voluntary agent are characterized as necessary whether or not they are voluntary; because if the voluntary agent is a self-necessary existent his acts also are necessary and if he is self-contingent he and his acts are necessary by the other. Therefore, voluntariness does not imply contingency, just as necessity does not imply determinism.
B- The reality of free will and freedom consists in choosing out of consent and not under an external force imposing an unpleasant choice. Accordingly, every act arising from agent’s consent that is not chosen because of an imposing external factor is a free and voluntary act. Therefore, the main criterion for voluntariness is not contingency; rather it is the consent of the agent and lack of an imposing external factor. Mulla Sadra says:
When the source of originating something is knowledge and will of the agent, whether knowledge and will are the same or different and whether knowledge and will are the same as the essence of the agent in the case of God or different in other cases, the agent is voluntary and the act is issued from the agent because of his will, knowledge and consent. Such agent is not called by the public or by the elite "involuntary agent". Neither its act is said to be issued out of determinism, though it is necessarily issued from the agent out of his will and knowledge.8
The criterion for qualifying a voluntary agent as a free agent is that whenever he wills he acts and whenever he does not will he does not act. According to this definition, it makes no difference whether the agent necessarily or unnecessarily wills, because truth of a conditional proposition is compatible with the necessity of the condition or the conditioned. Therefore, although will of the agent is subject to the principle of necessary relation of cause and effect and its realization or non-realization is necessary, the agent is still voluntary and enjoys complete freedom.
Mulla Sadra rejects the theologians’ definition of the free agent as the one who may act or not. This definition implies the possibility of voluntary act. He says:
There are two well-known definitions for power, al-qudrah: First, possibility of act and its opposite, i.e. non-act, and second a state for the agent in which he acts if he wills and does not act if he does not will. The first interpretation belongs to theologians and the second to philosophers.9
He also says:
The criterion for willingness is to have the will as the cause for the act or non-act. And surely a willing agent is the one that if he wills he acts and if he does not feel he does not act, even if the will [itself] is necessitated by itself or by the other or is impossible by itself or by the other.10
C- A voluntary act is the one whose existence derives from the free-will of the agent, but free-will itself is voluntary in essence, that is by definition. Voluntariness of free will is not separable from it, though the free will may be caused by causes, which are the origins of the necessity of its existence. In other words, the fact that ikhtiyar itself is governed by the principle of necessary relation of cause and effect and its existence is necessitated by its cause does not turn it into non-ikhtiyar… Ikhtiyar is ikhtiyar by definition, whatever its cause might be and however it is issued from its cause.
On the basis of the above three points, there is no conflict between free will and the principle of necessity. Although the act of the voluntary agent is subject to the principle of necessity and the will of the agent becomes necessary after the completion of perquisites, the act of the voluntary agent is free because it derives from his will.
The Theory of Sovereignty in the Interpretation of Causality and its Relation to Human Freedom
Mirza Na’ini, one of the founders of modern principles of jurisprudence, was the first one to develop and defend this theory. According to an exposition of the lectures of Na’ini (Ajwad al-Taqrirat), this theory can be traced back to Mirza Muhammad Taqi Isfahani, the author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin (a commentary work on Ma‘alim Al-Usul). After Na’ini, our great master, the martyr Sadr, reconstructed this theory to meet the problems raised against the theory and, in an innovative way, developed it and called it "The Theory of Sovereignty". In what follows, we will briefly present the ideas of Na’ini and then will focus on the theory of sovereignty.
Na’ini starts his argument with two common sense laws that both can be affirmed after a short reflection:
First Law: Will (iradah) of the free agent itself is not voluntary. Reflecting on the process of decision-making inside ourselves, we realize that after conceiving the act and affirming its benefit our will automatically comes into existence. Will is an inevitable outcome of conceiving the act and affirming its benefit. Na’ini says:
Surely, all those qualities that belong to the soul such as will, conception and affirmation are not voluntary.11
In respect to God, it can be demonstrated that His will is not voluntary, because his essence is simple and free from any attributes accidental and additional to it. Therefore, will cannot be accidental to His essence, since it is in conflict with the simplicity of the essence. Will of God is identical with His essence and this implies that the Divine will is essential and it is self-evident that essential attributes are not voluntary. We find in an exposition of Na’ini’s lectures that:
Surely the will that is the complete cause of the existence of the effects is the same as His essence, and self-evidently His essence, the Exalted and the Glorified, is not voluntary for Him.12
Second Law: Human soul has complete sovereignty and authority upon its voluntary acts. In other words, man always feels very clearly that has complete power to make his decisions regarding his voluntary acts. Na’ini writes:
Surely, the soul has complete effect and authority on muscles without facing any obstacle in exercising its sovereignty.13
Na’ini concludes that there must be something between the will (iradah) and act. He calls this element "ikhtiyar". Ikhtiyar is an act of soul that takes place after the formation of iradah and its prerequisites. In this way, Na’ini argues for his position and adds that it is the only solution for the well-known objection of Fakhr al-Razi, who asserted that voluntariness of an act implies its involuntariness, since voluntariness of an act means to be caused by the will, but the will itself is determined by causes that produce it necessarily. Na’ini responds to this objection by saying that the voluntary act is not caused by the will; rather it is caused by something, which occurs between the will and act, i.e. ikhtiyar (or talab). Ikhtiyar is not caused by the will; it is originated from the essence of the soul.
Na’ini believes that there is no necessary relation between ikhtiyar and the soul. Human soul in making ikhtiyar just needs some preponderating factor. For this it would suffice that the agent purses an end or goal in the act.
There are many objections to Na’ini’s theory. First, the difference between iradah and ikhtiyar is not known. If the ikhtiyar can escape cause-effect necessity why cannot iradah do this?
Second, Na’ini has not solved the problem in relation to the Divine acts, because ikhtiyar also cannot be additional to His essence and according to Na’ini himself the Divine essence is not voluntary for God. Now the question is: Does Na’ini believe that Divine acts are voluntary?! How does he treat the decisive and certain belief in His power and His willingness?
Third, is ikhtiyar or talab, which is the basis of Na’ini’s theory on voluntariness of acts contingent or necessary? Na’ini does not accept its necessity and takes it to be contingent. Therefore, it must have equal relations to both existence and non-existence and according to the law of impossibility of preference without a preponderant; it would be impossible for ikhtiyar to exist. There is no solution for this problem in Na’ini’s account.
Sadr and the Theory of Sovereignty
The difficulties in Na’ini’s theory led the great Ayatullah Sadr to reconstruct the theory and revive Na’ini’s claim with a new argument. To develop his theory of sovereignty Sadr first mentions some premises:
First premise- Equal relation of act to existence and non-existence is a clear fact that no intuition or argument can disprove it. Every one of us clearly feels that after the completion of all prerequisites he still may or may not act. This is something that we understand clearly by our conscience and no argument can bring it into question.
Second premise- Necessity of prerequisites of an act leads to denial of free will and philosophers’ answers are not able to solve the problem. Their answers are just some linguistic rationalizations (such as saying that ikhtiyar means the agent’s consent or that the voluntary agent is the one that acts whenever he is willing and does not act whenever he is willing to do so) that cannot solve the conflict between reality of necessity and reality of ikhtiyar.
Third premise - The principle of causality is not demonstrated. So it cannot be said that it cannot have any exception, because it is rationally proved. This principle is indeed an intuitive and evident principle. To find the scope and extent of it we have to investigate its origins in our conscience.14
Based on the above premises, he argues that rationally any contingent being to come into existence needs an external factor. This factor can be either a cause that necessitate its existence or a voluntary agent that makes the act by his sovereignty. Having such an agent besides the act does rationally justify its existence. It is certain that the essential contingency does not suffice the existence of something. However, there might be something other than necessity that can preponderate the existence of a contingent being such as sovereignty.
The Definition of Sovereignty
Sovereignty or salatanah is an internal quality that we all understand. It is what we know by presence (‘ilm huduri). To conceptualize it we can use the expression: "The agent may or may not act". There is no necessity to act or not to act.
Sovereignty is similar to any of necessity and contingency from one aspect and different from each from the other. Sovereignty similar to necessity in being is rationally enough to justify the existence of a contingent being and leaving no need to look for something else. The difference between sovereignty and necessity is that with necessity an act loses its equal relations to existence and non-existence and necessity of existence takes its place, while with sovereignty the contingency remains the same. Necessity consists in the fact that the agent has to act or not to act, but sovereignty means that the agent may or may not act.
Sovereignty is similar to contingency in preserving the equal relations of the contingent to both existence and non-existence, but sovereignty is different from contingency in being rationally enough to justify the existence of a contingent being while with contingency the question remains why it must come into existence.
Having known that the sovereignty of the agent may substitute necessity and suffice the existence of a voluntary act which is the question at issue, reflection on our conscience and the way voluntary acts are issued from us shows clearly that the relation between us and our voluntary acts is one of sovereignty and not necessity. We as voluntary agents find that we have sovereignty upon our acts. We clearly understand the fact that even in circumstances in which all prerequisites and conditions of a voluntary act exist, it is not necessary to act. What we find deep in ourselves is this sovereignty upon our acts. It is up to us to act or not act and we are not compelled to do so.15
Evaluation
The theory of Na’ini as explained above seems to suffer fatal problems. It seems also that the martyr Sadr’s theory of sovereignty despite its beauties and firmness still has very important problems. Of course, this does not mean that Sadra’s theory of necessity is free from fundamental problems. In what follows, I will explain problems of both theories of Sadr and Sadra and then there will be a conclusion.
Objections on the Theory of Sovereignty:
Granted that sovereignty suffices the existence of the act, would that also suffice its non-existence as well? If so, the problem would be that it leads to having both the existence and non-existence of the act at the same time. And if not, it would mean that the non-existence of the act must be impossible and its existence must be necessary, because non-sufficiency of sovereignty for non-existence and its sufficiency for existence damage the state of equality of existence and non-existence in the essence of the contingent and change contingency into the necessity of existence.
To interpret sovereignty as "may or may not act" is just a linguistic account that does not solve the real problem. In any case, with sovereignty the existence of the act as a contingent effect either remains possible or becomes necessary. If it remains possible, the question still remains why will it exist? Why did not contingency suffice the existence of the act in the first place? If it becomes necessary the problem with the theory of necessity would repeat.
Although the principle of impossibility of preponderance without a preponderating factor is not demonstrated and it is just self-evident, there must be a reason why something becomes self-evident. The reason here is the essential need of the contingent for a cause, that is the contingent as such is rationally impossible to exist or not to exist. The impossibility of existence and non-existence for the contingent as such is an essential judgment of our reason whose subject matter is non-necessity of existence and non-existence. This is a universal and essential judgment of the reason that has no exception like any other proved universal and absolute judgments.
What is the meaning of sufficiency in saying that the sovereignty is sufficient for the existence of a voluntary act? Our master, Sadr, uses the expression "may or may not act". If it means possibility of existence the problem is that this is something, which has been already there, and if it means necessity the problem is that this is the same idea involved in the theory of necessity.
Objections on the Theory of Necessity:
This theory is against our intuitive feeling that both sides of the act even after the completion of all prerequisites are still equal to us as voluntary agents. We feel no necessity. This can be replied by saying that it is indeed an essential feature of ikhtiyar that at no stage the agent feels compelled or forced from outside, but this does not mean that his decisions are made arbitrarily and are not subject to any rational rules.
If our will and decision and all prerequisites are subject to the principle of cause-effect necessity how can we justify Divine reward and punishment. The answer to this is that in any case our acts are voluntary and this is rationally enough to make Divine reward and punishment just. There is no evidence for our reason or conscience that demands ikhtiyar it self must be voluntary. The other way to answer is to say that volunatriness of acts depend on their emergence from a voluntary agent (an agent that has ikhtiyar), but the voluntariness of ikhtiyar is essential and cannot be removed. Even if a superior cause originates ikhtiyar cannot remove its voluntariness. Thus, ikhtiyar is ikhtiyar, even if it is necessarily brought into existence by its cause. The essence of ikhtiyar (like any other thing) neither can be given to it nor can be negated.
Therefore, a voluntary act is voluntary, though all its prerequisites are governed by the principle of causal necessity, and has all the characteristics of voluntary acts, such as appropriateness of reckoning and punishment.
Conclusion
There is no way to deny the universality of the principle of causality and cause-effect necessity just as voluntarinees of our acts cannot be denied. What Muslim philosophers, especially Mulla Sadra, have argued for the universality of the principle of causality and its necessity and their responses to the objections are sound, but further points have to be made.
1. The relation of the essence of cause to its effect is a comparative contingency, imkan-e bil-qiyas. Cause cannot be made necessary by its effect.
As explained before, the effect is nothing other than belonging to and dependence on its cause. The effect receives necessity of existence from its cause and, therefore, the relation of the essence of effect to its cause is necessity caused by the other, darurate bil-ghayr.
2. In the material world there is no real originating cause (al-‘illah al-fa‘iliyyah) that grants existence. All material causes are preparatory causes (‘illat- i‘dadi) or material causes (i.e. potentiality for existence or recipients of existence). In immaterial world all originating causes are voluntary.
3. In the immaterial world where the voluntary originating causality exists the relation of the essence of cause to the effect is that of a comparative contingency, while the relation of the effect to its originating cause is that of necessity, since the effect is nothing other than belonging to and dependence on its cause.
4. Our mind abstracts the notion of sovereignty from the mutual relation of cause and effect, which is from one side imkane bil-qiyas and from the other side darurate bil-ghayr.
Therefore, the theory of sovereignty can be somehow reduced to the above-mentioned mutual relation. According to this account, there is a special relation between a voluntary agent and its effect that is a combination of comparative contingency of the cause and necessity (caused) by the other of the effect. This very relation is the one from which notions of sovereignty and ikhtiyar are abstracted. It is also the same relation that accounts for the appropriateness of reckoning, punishment and reward.
In this way the problems raised against the theory of necessity or the theory of sovereignty as discussed above or more generally against the relation of cause and freedom can be solved. Further explanation of this point needs a separate discussion.
Notes:
1-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 6, pp. 23,24.
2-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 2, p. 300.
3-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 2, pp.229-30.
4-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 1, pp. 221,222.
5-Mirza Na‘ini, Ajawad al-Taqrirat, p. 91.
6-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 6, p. 319.
7-Mirza Na‘ini, Ajawad al-Taqrirat, p. 91
8-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 6, p. 332
9-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 6, p. 307.
10-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 6, p. 319.
11-Mirza Na‘ini, Ajwad al-Taqrirat, vol. 1, p. 91.
12-Mirza Na‘ini, Ajwad al-Taqrirat, vol. 1, p. 91.
13-Mirza Na‘ini, Ajwad al-Taqrirat, vol. 1, p. 91.
14-Sadr, Mabahith al-dalil al-Lafzi , Vol. 2, p. 36 and handwritings of his lectures by Ayatullah Sayyid Kazim Ha’iri, P. 418.
15-Sadr, Mabahith al-dalil al-Lafzi, Vol. 2, p. 37 and handwritings of his lectures by Ayatullah Sayyid Kazim Ha’iri, pp. 419 & 420.
Reference: ImamReza.net

Nature of Society: Homogeneity or Heterogeneity?

Nature of Society: Homogeneity or Heterogeneity?
By: Martyr Murtuda Mutahhari
An answer to this problem, too, as indicated earlier, is essential for every school of thought; because only a discussion of this problem can throw light on an important issue: whether all human societies can follow one and the same ideology, or if there must be a multiplicity of ideologies based upon various types of societies; i.e. should each nation, community, civilization, and culture necessarily possess a particular ideology? Ideology means the sum total of the general schemes and means which can lead a society towards the attainment of perfection and its summum bonum (the highest good). We also know that every species calls for specific qualities, conditions, and capacities; that which represents the `highest good' in the case of a horse is not identical with that of a sheep or a man.
Hence, if all societies‑assuming their objective existence‑‑should share the same essence and nature, they could also, possibly, share a single ideology. Their mutual differences being like those among members of the same species, any living ideology can be applied to them, allowing within its framework adjustments for individual diffe­rence according to the varying aptitudes of its members. But if societies have different natures and essences, they naturally call for different programmes, plans, ideals, and varying summum bonums particular to each. In this case, one single ideology cannot be applied to all of them.
A similar problem applies to the changes and mutations of societies over long periods of time. Do societies change their nature and essence in the course of changes and mutations, in the same way as species are transformed in the process of evolution? Does such a process of transformation occur on the level of societies? Or if the social changes are like changes in the circumstance of an individual of a certain species, whose nature and generic characteristics are preserved in the midst of all changes and transitions?
The first issue is related to sociology, whereas the second one is connected with history. We shall discuss the first problem at present and postpone the discussion of the second until we take into account the nature of history.
Can sociological studies reveal whether or not there are some common characteristics among various societies? Are the differences among them only secondary and superficial, resulting from factors extraneous to the essence and nature of society, which itself remains unchanged? Or is it true that human societies are basically different in essence and nature, and even if supposedly similar from the point of view of external conditions, they function in intrinsically different ways? These alternative views are suggested by philosophy in its effort to disentangle obscurities surrounding the formal unity or plurality of things.
There is a shorter route also, and that is man himself. It is an established fact about man that homo sapiens is the only species that has not shown any biological mutation from the very beginning of its emergence. Some thinkers say that as the process of evolution of living organisms culminated in the emergence of human being, nature altered its course and diverted the movement of evolution from the biological to the social course, and from the process of physiological evolution to that of spiritual and intellectual development.
In an earlier chapter, while discussing the question "Is man gre­garious?" we came to the conclusion that man‑who is a single species­ is ordained by nature itself to be gregarious and sociable. That is man's intrinsic and inherent gregariousness that manifests itself in the form of society and the collective spirit, is derived from the essential nature of the human species. Man has social inclinations because through them he can attain the kind of perfection of which he is capable. His gregarious propensity secures for him the ground for the collective spirit, which is itself a means to attain the end: self‑perfection. Accordingly, it is human nature itself that determines the course taken by the collective spirit. In other words, the collective spirit serves human nature. As long as man exists, human nature would carry on its activity, supporting and encouraging his social spirit. The collective spirit is derived, there­fore, from the individual spirit, which in turn is effused from human nature. Man is a single species, so human societies, also, have the same nature, substance, and essence.
However, as in case of individual, who can deviate from the course of nature and is occasionally even dehumanized, a society may also be diverted from its natural course and be dehumanized. The variety in societies is quite similar to diversity in individual morals, which are, in any case, not outside the sphere of human nature. Thus, societies, civilizations, cultures, and, finally, social spirits that govern societies, in spite of the differences in characters and forms, have ultimately a human character and not a non‑human nature.
If we agree with the fourth theory about the synthesis of society, and consider individual as only passive, receptive matter, an empty container without any content, it would be tantamount to a negation of the human nature. We may propound a hypothesis concerning diver­sity of nature and essence among societies, but this point of view in the form of Durkheimian theory is not at all acceptable; because it leaves the very fundamental question unanswered. If the origin of the collective or social spirit does not lie inside individuals, and if it does not spring from the natural and biological aspect of human beings, then where does it come from? Does the social spirit come from absolute nothingness? Is it sufficient for the explanation of the social spirit to say that society has existed as long as man has existed? In addition to this, Durkheim believes that social phenomena such as religion, mora­lity, crafts, art etc. are the products of its social spirit, which have been, are and would remain the expressions of the social spirit, and thus have `temporal durability' and `spatial extensibility.' This itself is a proof that Durkheim implicitly believes that all societies have a singular essence and nature, which manifests itself in the social spirit.
The teachings of Islam emphasize absolute unity of religion, and consider difference in religious codes and traditions as secondary, and not essential and primary. We also know that religion is nothing except a programme for perfection of the individual and society. It also reveals that foundation of these teachings have been laid upon an assumption of the unity of societies. If there were various `species' of societies, then the ends of perfection and their respective means would have been also diverse, necessitating a diversity and plurality of religions.
The Quran repeatedly stresses that there is not more than one single faith throughout the world. There has been one religion in all regions, in all societies and at all times. According to the Quran, religions‑in the plural form‑have had no existence; only "Religion" (in its singular form) has existed. All prophets preached and taught the same faith, the same path, and the same purpose:
He has ordained for you the religion that He charged Noah with, and that We have revealed to thee, and that We charged Abraham with, Moses and Jesus, (saying), Establish the religion and be not divided therein. (42:13)
The verses of the Quran which prove that the faith remains the same at all times, in all regions, and in the scriptures of all true prophets of God, are numerous. The difference lies only in certain rules and ordinances, according to the relative stages of development or back­wardness of societies. The logic that there is essentially no more than one religion, is based on the outlook about man and society that mankind is one and a single species and that men are not different in their human essence. In the same way, human society, as an objective entity, represents a single species, not a plurality of kinds.
Societies of the Future
If the present societies, civilizations, and cultures are not to be considered as belonging to diverse species, it cannot be denied that they have different forms and colours. What about their future? Will these cultures, civilizations, societies, and nations continue to exist in their present form, or is humanity moving towards a certain unified culture, civilization, and society? Will they abandon their own specific indivi­duality in the future, in order to assume one common character‑a character that is closer to their real human nature?
This problem is also associated with the problem of nature and essence of society, and the type of relationship between the collective and the individual spirits. Evidently, on the basis of the theory of man's primordial nature‑according to which his social existence, his social life and, as a result, the social spirit are the means chosen by human nature to attain its own ultimate perfection it may be said that societies, cultures, and civilizations are moving towards homogeneity and unifica­tion, and ultimately would merge into one another. The future ol human societies lies in a highly developed, single and universal society, in which all positive human values shall be realized. Man shall attain true perfection and shall finally realize his own authentic humanity.
According to the Quran, it is evident that the ultimate rule shall be the rule of righteousness, which would lead to complete annihila­tion of falsehood and evil. Eternity belongs to the pious and the God­-fearing (muttaqun).
In his Quranic exegesis, Al Mizan [10], `Allamah Tabataba'i holds that:
Any profound examination of the conditions of the universe shows that man, as a part of the universe, shall realize his ultimate perfection in the future. The statement of the Quran that establishment of Islam in the world is a necessary and an inevitable matter, is just another way of saying that man shall ultimately attain to complete perfection. The Quran says:
Whosoever of you turns from his religion, (know that in his stead) God will assuredly bring a people He loves and who love Him (for the purpose of communicating and for establishing God's religion). (5:54)
Here the Quran aims to describe the purpose of creation of man and his ultimate future, which, in another verse, is explained in the following words:
God has promised those of you who believe and do righteous deeds that He will surely make you successors in the earth, even as He made those who were before them successors, and that He will surely establish their religion for them which He has approved for them, and will give them in exchange safety after fear ( by destroying their enemies). They shall serve Me, not ascribing with me anything (as partners)...(24:55)
Similarly in another place it states:
....My righteous servants will inherit the earth. (21:105)
In the same book, under the title "The Frontiers of the Islamic World are Faith, not Conventional or Geographical Borders", it is said:
Islam has annulled the role of tribal and national distinctions, and denied them any effective role in the evolution of [the structure] of human society. There are two main factors responsible for these divisions. One is the primi­tive tribal life, which is based on genealogical associations, and the other is geographical and regional diversity. These two main factors are responsible for division of humanity into various nations and tribes, giving rise to racial, linguistic, and colour differences. Also, these two factors are responsible for a nation's loyalty to a particular region; every nation calls its territory its homeland and is prepared to defend it in the name of `the motherland'.
Though it is a natural human urge to be identified with one's group, but it is, at the same time, opposed to the demand of man's nature that mankind should live as a `whole' or as a single unit. The laws of nature are based on bringing together scattered elements by creating harmony and establishing unity in place of diversity. By means of this, nature achieves its ends. This fact is evident from the natural course of evolution, which shows how pri­mordial matter is transformed into different elements ....and then how elements are combined together to evolve plants, and then animals, and finally culminate in the emergence of man. Although the regional and tribal diversity unifies members of a particular region or tribe and imparts them unity, it also brings one unit into confrontation against other such units. As a result, although the members of a nation have the feeling of fraternity among themselves, they tend to regard other peoples ‑who are treated as `things' and not as human beings‑with hostility; to them the outsiders are mere means whose value lies only in their practical utility. This is the reason why Islam abrogated tribal and national diversity of men (which divides humanity into sections), and laid the foundation of human society on conviction and belief (in which the opportunity to discover the truth is equal for every individual), and not on race, nationality, or native soil. Even in affairs of matrimony and inheritance, Islam made common belief and conviction the criterion for human relations. [11]
In the same book, under the title "The Religion of Truth is Ultimately Victorious", `Allamah Tabataba'i says:
Mankind, which has been endowed by nature with an urge to attain self­perfection and true felicity, strives collectively to achieve the highest stages of material and spiritual evolution, which it would, positively, achieve some day. Islam, the religion of tawhid (monotheism), is in fact a programme of attain­ment of such an end or summum bonum (sa`adah). The diviations that hinder man from traversing his long path, should not lead us to a negation of his nature and of his humanity. It is the sole natural law that actually governs human nature. The deviations and faults should be considered as a kind of error in application of the natural law. The objective of attaining perfection for which man aspires, is directed by his restless, perfection‑loving nature itself‑an end which he is likely to attain sooner or later one day. Some verses in Surat al‑Rum (30‑41), which start with the verse:
and end with lead us to the same conclusion that the demand of the law shall ultimately be fulfilled, and man, after wandering in different directions and experimenting with different ways, shall finally discover his own path and adhere to it. One should not pay any attention to the opinions of those who say that Islam, like other cultural movements, has fulfilled its function as a phase in the development of human culture and is now an out­dated part of history. Islam, as we know it and as we have already discussed it, aims at the ultimate perfection of man, which in accordance with the laws of nature, has to be achieved one day. [12]
Contrarily, some people claim that Islam has never favoured the unity and unification of human culture and human societies. Islam has always, they say, favoured diversity and variety in cultures and socie­ties, and this diversity and plurality is not only recognized, but it is also reinforced by Islam. They say: the personality, the nature, and the `self' of a nation are synonymous with its culture, which is the manifes­tation of its social spirit. And this social spirit is moulded by the specific history of that nation, which distinguishes it from other nations, who do not share it. Nature has moulded man's specific essence; history shapes his culture, and, in reality, moulds his personality, character, and his `selfhood.' Every nation possesses a particular culture compatible with its particular nature, taste, perfume, and essence. This culture not only affirms the personality of that nation, but also safeguards its distinct identity. As in the case of individuals, whose individuality and personality is an inseparable part of his self, the loss of which means distortion of personality and alienation from one's own self, so also imposition of any other culture except the one evolved by a nation through the course of history and which affirms its selfhood, causes self‑alienation. The fact that every nation has a particular sensibility, vision, orientation, preferences, tastes, literature, music, customs, eti­quette and rituals, and prefers certain ways, contrary to those ac­cepted by other nations; is an outcome of its history, during which, due to various causes arising from its successes, failures, achievements, frus­trations, climate, migrations, contacts, connections, and its eminent personalities and geniuses, develops a specific culture of its own. This particular culture moulds the national and social spirit in a particular form and in special proportions. Philosophy, science, literature, art, religion, and ethics are the sum total of various features, which through centuries of common history, have become common characteristics of a particular group, and are synthesized in a special form, which distinguishes it from other human groups and renders it a particular identity. Due to this synthesis `the social spirit' is born, which integ­rates the individuals of a certain group with the whole, in the same way as different parts of the body are organically interrelated and are responsible for its life. The same `spirit' not only gives a nation its independent, specific, and individual existence, but also gives it a `life' that distinguishes it in the course of history from other cultural and spiritual forms of expression. It is because of this spirit that a particular culture and its social orientation, thought, customs, and behaviour are distinguished from those of other cultures. It is reflected in its approach to nature, life, historical events, feelings, preferences, ideals, beliefs, and even in its scientific, artistic, and technical products and achievements. The impact and imprint of its spirit is manifested in all the material and spiritual manifestations of a nation's life.
It is said that religion is a type of ideology. It is a faith which affirms certain feelings and approaches. But nationality means 'perso­nality,' which brings into existence specific distinguishing characteris­tics that are common in the spirit of the individuals who share the same social destiny. According to this view, the relationship between nationality and religion is the relationship between personality and belief.
It is said that Islam's opposition to racial discrimination and national prejudice should not be taken to mean that Islam does not accept diversity of nations in human society. The proclamation of equality by Islam does not amount to a negation of plurality of nations. On the contrary, it implies that Islam accepts the existence of various nations as undeniable natural realities. The following verse of the Quran:
O, mankind, indeed We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that you may know one another. Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of Allah, is the most God‑fearing among you...(49:13)
contrary to the argument of those who use it for a denial and nega­tion, actually approves and affirms the diversity of nations. Because, they say, the above‑mentioned verse, firstly, accepts the division of mankind according to sex (male and female), which is of course the natural division; then it immediately goes on to refer to national and tribal divisions. It shows that grouping of individuals in nations and tribes is also a natural, God‑willed phenomenon, like their grouping as men and women. This proves that in the same way as Islam favours a specific relationship between man and woman, and does not intend to eliminate sexuality and its manifestations, so also it favours relations between various nations on an equal level and does not intend to negate nationalities, which are regarded as a ‑natural phenomenon inherent in the process of creation. Further, the fact that the Quran considers ta'druf (to know one another) as the purpose and philosophy of the existence of differences among, nations, suggests that a community identifies itself and discovers itself in comparison and contrast with other nations, and it realizes its individuality and vitality vis‑a‑vis other nations.
Hence, they say, contrary to the unduly propagated general belief, Islam affirms nationalism in the sense of cultural heritage, and it is not opposed to cultural pluralism. What Islam negates is nationalism in the sense of racialism.
The theory (which aims at an Islamic justification of nationalism) is inconsistent for several reasons. It is primarily based upon a particular outlook of man and a specific view with regard to the essence and cons­tituents of human culture, that is philosophy, science, art, morals, etc. Both of these views lack soundness.
It is presumed with regard to man that his essence is potentially blank. It is supposed to be devoid of any prior intellectual and emotional content or perceptual disposition to view his world, himself, and his role in it, even on the level of potentiality. It is assumed that human essence is equally neutral towards all modes of thought and emotion, purposes and goals. Man is assumed to be an empty container devoid of form and colour, totally subservient to that which fills it. He acquires his `egohood,' his personality, his path, and his goal from the content that is poured into the empty vessel of his essence. He assumes any form or personality and adopts any path and goal that is bestowed upon him by the content. His content‑in fact the first thing that is poured into this vacuum‑moulds man in any form, colour, and charac­ter; his `real' personality and essence being actually identical with the characteristics bestowed upon him by this content. That is so because his `ego' or `self' is shaped and affirmed by his acquired content. What­ever is offered to him after this, which would suggest a change in his personality, colour, or shape, is only borrowed and alien stuff, because it contradicts with his first personality formed by historical accident. In other words, this theory is inspired by the fourth theory regarding the nature of individual and society. It maintains the idea of absolute primariness of society, and has been critically examined earlier.
From both philosophical and Islamic points of view, such a judge­ment regarding human nature cannot be justifiable. Man, according to his own special nature‑although only potentially has a definite perso­nality, path and goal that is determined by his God‑given nature. It is his very nature that determines his real self. Distortion and dehumaniza­tion of human existence are measurable only on the basis of man's essential nature, and not according to criteria based on historical fac­tors. Every system of education and culture which is in harmony with the human nature and is helpful for its development, is man's real culture, though it may not be the first culture imposed upon him by historical conditions. Any culture that does not suit human nature is alien to him, and, in a way, distorts and deforms his real nature and converts his `self' into `non‑self,' even though it may be the product of national history. For instance, the ideas of dualism and the sanctity of fire were distortions imposed on the human nature of ancient Persians, although these notions are considered products of Iranian history. But belief in the unity of God (tawhid) and rejection of all forms of wor­ship of non‑Gods signifies man's return to his real nature, even though this faith is not the product of Iranian soil and history.
Also, it has been wrongly presumed regarding human cultural material that it is a colourless and formless stuff to be moulded and shaped by history. It means that, according to this view, philosophy, science, religion, morality, and art, whatever form and colour they may assume, are genuine. But as to what colour, mode, type, or form these should have is relative, and dependent upon history. It is the history and the culture of every nation which necessitate its own special philosophy, its own system of education, religion, morality and art.
In other words, as man himself is considered as being without any specific essence and form, and who draws his identity subsequently from culture, in the same way, the principles and basic materials of human culture are also devoid of any form, colour, and expression. It is history which gives them an identity, a form, and an expression, and stamps them with its particular seal. Some have gone further to the extent of claiming that even "mathematical thinking is influenced by the particular approach of a culture." [13]
This conception is based upon the theory of relativism of human culture. We, in the Principles and Method of the Philosophy of Realism" have dealt with absolutism and relativism in regard to the principles of thought. There, we have proved that whatever is relative is concerned with subjective and practical perceptions of reality. It is these perceptions of reality which are different in different cultures, according to the changing conditions of space and time. These percep­tions do not provide us with any test of truth or falsehood, and right or wrong, regarding the reality lying beyond them, to which they refer. But the theoretical sciences, scientific thought, and theoretical prin­ciples, which provide secure ground for philosophical and theoretical knowledge of man‑like the principles of religious world outlook and the primary principles of ethics‑are absolute, permanent, and non­relative. Here, I am sorry to say, we shall abstain from further prolonga­tion of this discussion.
Secondly, the claim that religion is belief and nationality is perso­nal identity, that the relation between the two is determined by the relation of faith and personality, and that Islam affirms national iden­tities as they are, and officially recognizes them, amounts to a total negation of the most important mission of religion. The most important mission of religion, and above all that of Islam, lies in offering a world outlook on the basis of a universal system‑whose central idea is the belief in the unity of God (tawhid)‑and in moulding the spiritual and moral personality of man on the basis of this world outlook. It seeks to cultivate and develop a new relation between the individuals and society. Such a project necessitates the foundation of a radically new culture‑a culture which is human and not national. The culture which Islam offered to the world, and which is known as the Islamic culture today, was not aimed to be a culture similar to those cultivated by other religions by assimilating more or less the elements of the previous culture of the people. Such religions were influenced by the pre‑existing culture, and in their turn influenced the society. The culture that Islam developed was peculiar in the sense that culturalization was inherent in the basic message of this religion. The message of Islam is dissociation of man from cultures unworthy of him and association with a culture worthy of him. It affirms only that which is essentially positive in an existing culture. A religion which has nothing to do with various types of cultures, and which adjusts with varied cultures, is a religion which feeds itself upon the cultural leftover, and is satisfied with a casual, once‑in‑a‑week visit to the church.
Thirdly, the meaning of the verse (49:13) that says:
is not that `We have created you as two sexes,' so as to substantiate the claim that mankind is classified in various groups on the basis of sex, and is similarly divided into different nations and nationalities, and, in this way, to justify the conclusion that the verse means to say that, as the difference of the sexes is natural, an ideology should be based on affirmation of such differences and not their negation, and the dif­ferences of nationality are of the same kind as those of sex!
In fact what the verse wants to say is that `We have created you from a male and a female.' This either means that all human beings are genealogically related to and originate from one man and woman (Adam‑ and Eve), or it means that all people are equal since they are the progeny of the same father and mother, and there should not be any discrimination.
Fourthly, the phrase , which has‑been used in the verse to refer to the purpose of creation, doesn't mean that nations are diversified so that `they may be distinguished from one another,' so as to justify the conclusion that all the nations should retain their specific character permanently in order to be identifiable as compared with other nations. If the Quranic verse aimed at emphasizing this point, it should have used the word (that they may know their identity) instead of the word (that you may know one another). As those who are addressed are the individuals, the Quran tells them that `the divi­sions that have taken place in such a manner are inherent in the process of creation, so that you individuals may know each other by means of the national and tribal associations.' We know that the purpose of this I verse is not to preach that different nations and communities should necessarily retain their individualities, remaining independent of one another forever.
Fifthly, whatever we have described in the last chapter concerning the Islamic point of view regarding homogeneity and heterogeneity of societies is sufficient to prove that, according to Islam, the natural and creative process itself leads different societies towards the establishment of a unified society and culture, and the main programme of Islam is to establish such a culture and such a society. It is also sufficient to reject the above‑mentioned view.
The concept of Mahdism (the belief in the coming of the promised Mahdi) in Islam is based upon such a view of the future of Islam, mankind, and the world. Here, we conclude our discussion on society to initiate the discussion about history.
[1]. Jahan bini‑ye tawhidi ("The World‑view of Tawhid") is another of Martyr Murtada Mutahhari's books which also, like the present work, is a part of Muqad­dameh a bar jahan bini‑ye Islami ("Introduction to the World Outlook of Islam"). (Tr. )
Notes:
[10]. Al‑Mizan, vol. IV, p. 106.
[11]. Ibid, pp. 132, 133.
[12]. Ibid, p. 14.
[13]. Spengler, the well‑known sociologist, as quoted by Raymond Aron's Main Currents in sociological Thought, vol. I, p. 107.
Reference: ImamReza.net

The Political Philosophy of Islam

The Political Philosophy of Islam
By: Ayatullah Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
If we want to make a balanced comparison between Islamic and other views in the field of polity and form of government we should make a review of the important issues in the philosophy of politics, and on every issue find out what is the view of Islam, comparing it with the other views. We must make a detailed investigation of the basic differences between them. Very briefly, we will now mention some issues and explain the views of Islam pertaining to them in order that it may be possible to make a comparison.
The first issue is the importance of social life. Islam, like the other schools of thought, emphasizes social life. But more than this it considers it a duty to attend to social problems and to struggle for the benefit of all human beings. Being indifferent to such problems is considered in Islam to be a grave sin.
This attention is so important that it sometimes becomes necessary to spend all of one's property and even to endanger one's own life to save others from worldly and other-worldly afflictions and harms, from going astray and from spiritual corruption, and from misfortune in the next life. It is unlikely that any school of thought other than Islam has advanced this idea so far. Of course, we believe that none of the heavenly religions have any disagreement on basic principles and rules. Naturally, they hold this view in common with Islam.
The second issue is the necessity of law for social life, since no society can survive without rules and social regulations, for otherwise it would soon succumb to chaos, deterioration and destruction. The view of Islam on this matter is also clear and does not Stand in need of an explanation. We should however, mention two points. The first point is that from the perspective of Islam, the goal of law is not only to bring about social order and discipline, but beyond this to maintain social justice; because, firstly, without justice the order would not be durable and the masses of the people would not tolerate injustice and oppression for ever; and secondly, in a society not governed by justice most people would not have the opportunity for desired growth and development and hence, the goal of man's creation and social life would not be realized.
Another point is that, from the Islamic viewpoint, social laws should be such as to prepare the ground and context for the spiritual growth and eternal felicity of the people. At the very least they should not be inconsistent with spiritual development, for, in the view of Islam, the life of this world is but a passing phase of the entire human life which despite its short duration, has a fundamental role in human destiny. That is, it is in this phase that with his conscious behaviour the human being should prepare for himself his everlasting felicity or wretchedness. Even if a law could maintain the social order in this world but would cause eternal misfortune for humans, from this Islamic view it would not be a desirable law, even if it were to be accepted by the majority.
The third issue is how and by whom the law should be legislated. The accepted theory in most current societies is that the laws should be legislated and approved by the people themselves or their representatives. Since the consensus of all the people or of their representatives is practically impossible, the view of the majority (even if merely half plus one) is the criteria for the validity of the law.
This theory, first of all, is based on the idea that the goal of law is to satisfy the people's needs, not to provide that which would truly benefit them. Secondly, since it is impossible to have unanimous agreement, we should suffice with the opinion of the majority. However, the first idea mentioned is not accepted by Islam, for many people wish to satisfy their bestial instincts and temporary lusts without thinking of their disastrous consequences.
Usually the number of such people is at least one half plus one, so the social laws would be dictated by the desires of such people.
It is obvious that the schools which believe in a goal beyond animal lust and base desire will not be able to condone this idea.
With regard to the second idea, that is, the validity of the vote of the majority in the absence of unanimity, it should be said that only in absence of a deciding divine and intellectual criterion can the majority be the criterion for preferring an opinion. However, in the Islamic system there do exist such divine and intellectual criteria.
In addition, usually a powerful minority, by using the facilities for widespread propaganda, has an important role in channelling the thoughts and beliefs of others, and in fact what is approved is only the desire of a limited but powerful minority, not the true desire of the majority or of all the people. Furthermore, if the criterion is that the people's choice would be valid for themselves, why shouldn't we also accept the choice of a minority as valid for itself, even if it would result in a type of autonomy? In this case, what would be the logical justification for governments to oppose the wishes of some social groups which they rule by force?!
From the perspective of Islam with regard to this problem, laws should be legislated in such a way that they procure the benefits of the members of the society, particularly of those who desire to improve themselves and to gain eternal felicity. It is obvious that such law should be legislated by one who has enough knowledge about the real and eternal benefits of humans, and, secondly, who does not sacrifice the benefits of others for his personal interests and vain desires. It is obvious that there is no one wiser than Almighty God, Who has no need of His servants or their works, and Who has provided divine legislation only for the sake of benefitting them.
Certainly, the social laws described in the heavenly revealed books do not explicitly state all the social rules which are necessary for every time and place, but religious law does provide a general framework for the derivation of regulations necessary for changing conditions of time and place, and, at least by observing the limits delineated by this framework it may be possible to avoid falling into the deadly valley of eternal perdition.
The fourth issue is that of who should enforce social law.
Islam, like most other political schools, requires the existence of a State as a power which is able to prevent violations of the law, and the lack of the State is equivalent to the suspension of law, chaos, and the violation of the rights of the weak.
It is obvious that there are two fundamental qualifications for administrators of the law, particularly for the one at the top of the pyramid of power: first, sufficient knowledge of the law in order to prevent infringement of it due to ignorance; and second, self-control over his desires in order to prevent the intentional misapplication of the law. Other qualifications, like administrative acumen, courage, and so on, can be considered as supplementary requirements.
Naturally, the ideal is that the administrator of the law should generally be without ignorance, selfishness, and other vices, and such a person is one who, in religious terminology, is called ma'sum (infallible). All Muslims believe in the infallibility of the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him and upon his progeny, and the Shi'ites also believe in the infallibility of the Imams, peace be upon them. In the absence of an infallible one, these criteria should be observed, to the extent possible, for the selection of the leader as well as for lower positions in the official hierarchy in a proportionate manner.
Basically, the basis of the thesis of Vilayat-e- Faqih (lit., guardianship of the jurisprudent meeting all the requisite requirements) is the proposition that a person who is nearer to the station of infallibility should occupy the position of the infallible one, i.e. on top of the pyramid of power, in order that this position may be occupied by one with the best knowledge of the precepts and laws and their fundamental bases, one who has the most piety and self-control. By means of these two basic qualifications (jurisprudence and piety) it is at least possible that he will be less likely intentionally or unintentionally to transgress against the law of Islam.
Another point which may be raised here is that from an Islamic perspective no human has any intrinsic right to rule over another, even if he issues valid and just decrees, for all people, like other creatures, have been created and are the property of Almighty God, and no one may interfere with another's property without his permission. A human being has no right even to use his own bodily parts in a manner contrary to God's will and consequently he cannot allow others to do so. Hence, the only one Who Himself has an absolute right to govern and to depose of anyone and anything is Almighty God. Every authority and wilD.yah should be from Him or at least with His sanction. It is obvious that Almighty God would never permit anyone to execute the law without having the necessary knowledge of His laws, or without there being a guarantee of the correctness of his deeds and obedience to the divine laws, or without piety and the necessary moral qualifications.
On the other hand, we know that except for the prophets and their selected successors, no one else was specifically designated by Almighty God to execute the law and to govern. So, people must try to find persons who resemble the prophets and the Ma'sR.mR.n (infallible ones) as closely as possible. It seems that the best way is first to select committed experts of religion (pious jurists), and then to allow them to select from among themselves the best one, for the experts may more correctly identify the best.
Such selection is safer from defects of an intentional or unintentional character.
It also has become clear that the political features of Islam derive from the basic elements of the world view of Islam and its view of man. That is, the emphasis on the just character of law and its harmony with human spiritual development derives from the view that God Almighty created all mankind in order that people may follow the way of development toward nearness to . God and eternal felicity by their meritorious conduct in life. The right of all humans to happiness and the enjoyment of the blessings of this world exists in order that all may advance on the way of their development in a better and speedier manner.
The legislation of the divine laws and religious principles, whether they apply to the individual or society, is for determining the basic outlines of this path. The conditions of expertise in law and piety, in addition to other necessary administrative qualifications, is for securing the necessary conditions for the general development of the people, for reaching eternal felicity and for preventing intentional and unintentional deviation from the correct way of social life.
We are hopeful that God Almighty will grant all of us Ibis opportunity to thank Him for all His blessings, and for the blessing of His law and guidance toward the life of felicity which we seek.
Reference: ImamReza.net

Society and Tradition

Society and Tradition
By:
Martyr Murtuda Mutahhari
If society has real existence, it should naturally possess laws peculiar to it. If we accept the first theory about the nature of society (which we have already discussed) and reject the existence of society as a real entity, naturally we have to admit that society lacks laws which may govern it. And if we accept the second theory and believe in artifi­cial and mechanical composition of society, then we would have to admit that society is governed by laws but that its laws are confined to a series of mechanical and causal relationships between its various parts, without the distinguishing features and particular characteristics of life and living organisms. And if we accept the third point of view, we shall have to accept, firstly, that society itself has a comparatively more permanent existence independent of the existence of individuals­ although this collective life has no separate existence, and is distributed and dispersed among its individual members, and incarnates itself in their existence. It has discoverable laws and traditions more permanent and stable than those of the individuals, who are its components.
Secondly, we shall have to accept also that the components of society, which are human individuals, contrary to the mechanistic point of view, lose their independent identity‑although in a relative fashion‑to produce an organically composite structure. But at the same time the relative independence of the individual is preserved; because individual life, individual nature, and individual achievements are not dissolved totally in the collective existence. According to this point of view, man actually lives with two separate existences, two souls, and two "selves." On the one hand, there are the life, soul, and self of the human being, which are the products of the processes of his essential nature; on the other, there are the collective life, soul, and self which are the products of social life, and pervade the individual self. On this basis, biological laws, psychological laws, and sociological laws, together, govern human beings. But according to the fourth theory, only a single type of laws govern man, and these are the social laws alone.
Among the Muslim scholars `Abd al‑Rahman ibn Khaldun of Tunisia was the first and the foremost Islamic thinker to discuss clearly and explicitly the laws governing the society in independence from the laws governing the individual. Consequently he asserted that the society itself had a special character, individuality, and reality. In his famous introduction to history, he has discussed this theory in detail. Among the modern scholars and thinkers Montesquieu (the French philosopher of the eighteenth century A.D.) is the first to discuss the laws which control and govern human groups and societies. Raymond Aron says about Montesquieu:
His purpose was to make history intelligible. He sought to understand histori­cal truth. But historical truth appeared to him in the form of an almost limit­less diversity of morals, customs, ideas, laws, and institutions. His inquiry's point of departure was precisely this seemingly incoherent diversity. The goal of the inquiry should have been the replacement of this incoherent diversity by a conceptual order. One might say that Montesquieu, exactly like Max Weber, wanted to proceed from the meaningless fact to an intelligible order. This attitude is precisely the one peculiar to the sociologist. [7]
It means that a sociologist has to reach beyond the apparently diverse social forms and phenomena, which seem to be alien to one another, to reveal the unity in diversity in order to prove that all the diverse manifestations refer to the one and the same reality.
In the same way, all the similar social events and phenomena have their origin in a similar sequence of analogous causes. Here is a passage from the observations on the causes of the rise and fall of the Romans:
It is not fortune that rules the world. We can ask the Romans, who had a constant series of success when they followed a certain plan, and an uninter­rupted sequence of disasters when they followed another. There are general causes, whether moral or physical ....which operate in every monarchy, to bring about its rise, its duration and its fall. All accidents are subject to these causes, and if the outcome of a single battle, i.e. a particular cause, was the ruin of a state, there was a general cause which decreed that that state was des­tined to perish through a single battle. In short, the main impulse carries all the particular accidents along with it. [8]
The Holy Quran explains that nations and societies qua nations and societies (not just individuals living in societies) have common laws and principles that govern their rise and fall in accordance with certain historical process. The concept of a common fate and collective destiny implies the existence of certain definite laws governing the society. About the tribe of Bani Israel, the Quran says:
And We decreed for the Children of Israel in the scriptures: You varily will work corruption in the earth twice, and you will become great tyrants. So when the time for the first of the two came We roused against you slaves of Ours of great might who ravaged [your] country, and it was a threat per­formed.' [After you had regretted your sins and became pious again] Then we gave once again your turn against them, and We aided you with wealth and children and mode you more in soldiery. [saying] If ye do good, ye do good for your own souls, and if ye do evil, it is for them. (i.e. Our laws and customs are fixed and constant, it is by this covenant that people are bes­towed with power, might, honour and constancy or subjected to humiliation and abjectness). So when the time for the second [of the judgements] came, because of your acts of tyranny and despotism, We aroused against you others [of Our slaves] to ravage you, and to enter the temple even as they entered it the first time, and to lay waste all that they conquered with an utter wasting. It may be that your Lord will have mercy on you[if ye mend your ways], but if you repeat [the crime] We shall repeat [the punishment], and We have appointed hell a dungeon for the disbelievers. (17:4‑8)
The last sentence, i.e. "But if you repeat [ the crime] We shall repeat [the punishment]" shows that the Quran is addressing all the people of the tribe and not an individual.
It also implies that all the societies are governed by a universal law.
Notes:
[7]. Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, vol. I, p. 14.
[8]. Ibid.
Determinism or Freedom
One of the fundamental problems discussed by philosophers, particularly in the last century, is the problem of determinism and freedom of individual as against society, or, in other words, deter­minism and freedom of the individual spirit vis-à-vis the social spirit. If we accept the first theory regarding the nature of society, and consider social structure to be merely a hypostatized notion, and believe in the absolute independence of the individual, then there will be no place for the idea of social determinism. Because, there will be no power or force except that of the individuals, and no social force that may rule over the individual. Hence, in this theory, there is no room for the idea of social determinism. If there is any compulsion or determinism it is of the individual and operates through the individuals. The society has no role in this matter.
Hence, there can be no social determinism as emphasized by the advocates of social determinism. In the same way, if we accept the fourth theory, and consider the individual and indivi­dual's personality as a raw material or an empty pot, then the entire human personality of the individual, his intellect, and his free will would be reduced to nothing but an expression of the collective intelligence and the collective will, which manifest themselves, as an illusion, in the form of an individual to realize their own social ends. Accordingly, if we accept the idea of the absolute essentiality and primariness of the society, there will be no place left for the idea of the freedom and choice of the individual.
Emile Durkheim, the famous French sociologist, emphasizes the importance of society to the extent of saying that social matters (in fact all the human matters, as against the biological and animal urges and needs, like eating and sleeping) are the products of society, not the products of individual thought and will, and have three characteristics: they are external, compulsive, and general. They are considered to be external, because they are alien to individual existence and are imposed from without upon the individual by society. They existed before the individual came into existence and the individual accepted them under the‑influence of society. Acceptance of the moral, social, and religious traditions, customs, and values by the individual comes under this category. They are compulsive, because they impose themselves upon the individual and mould the individual's conscience, feelings, thoughts, and preferences according to their own standards.
Because of being compulsive, they are necessarily general and universal. However, if we accept the third theory and consider both the individual and the society as fundamental entities‑although admitting the power of the society as dominating that of the individual‑it does not necessi­tate any compulsion or determinism for the individual either in human or social affairs. Durkheimian determinism arises due to the failure to recognize the essential nature of the human being. Man's nature gives him a kind of freedom and liberty that empower him to revolt against social compulsions. On this basis, we may say that there is an inter­mediary relationship between the individual and the society that lies between the extremes of absolute freedom and absolute compulsion (amr bayn al‑'amrayn).
Although the Holy Quran attributes character, personality, reality, power, life, death, consciousness, obedience, and disobedience to society, it also explicitly recognizes the possibility of violation of social law by an individual. The Quran in this matter relies on what is termed as the (Fitrat Allah)‘Divine nature’. In Surat al Nisa ; the verse 97 refers to a group of people who called themselves "mustad'afun" (the oppressed and the weak) in the society of Mecca, and took shelter in their `weakness and being oppressed' as an excuse for shirking their natural responsibilities. In fact, they considered themselves helpless as against the social compulsion and pressures. The Quran says that their excuse cannot be condoned on any ground, because at least they were free to migrate from the Meccan society to another one better suited for the fulfilment of their aspirations. Elsewhere it states:
O believers! You have‑ charge of your own souls. He who goes astray cannot injure you if you are rightly guided.(5:105)
The famous verse (7:172) regarding human nature states that man is bound by the Divine covenant to believe in monotheism (tawhid), and it has been made inherent in human nature. The Quran says further that it is ordained in this way so that people should not say on the Day of Judgement that "our fathers were idolaters and we did not have any other alternative except helplessly adhering to the faith of our fore­fathers." (7:1709 With such a nature gifted to man by God, there is no compulsion to accept any faith contrary to the Divine will and to human nature itself.
The teachings of the Quran are entirely based upon the notion of human responsibility‑man is responsible for himself and for society. The dictum: al‑'amr bil ma`ruf wa al‑nahy `an al‑munkar (commanding others to do what is commanded by God and forbidding them from that which is prohibited by Him), is a command to the individual to revolt against social corruption and destructiveness. This is the Quranic code of conduct prescribed for the individual to save society from chaos, disorder, and destruction. Tales and stories embodied in the text of the Quran deal mostly with the theme of the individual's revolt against a corrupt social order. The stories of Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Prophet Muhammad, the Companions of the Cave (Ashab al­-Kahf), the believer of the tribe of the Pharaoh, etc. deal with the same theme.
The notion of social determinism is rooted in the misconception that society in its real composition needs complete merger of its constituent parts into one another and dissolution of their plurality into the unity of the `whole'. This process is considered to be respon­sible for the emergence of a new reality. Either one has to accept that the personality, freedom, and independence of the individual are real, and so negate the reality of society and social structure (as in the case of the first and the second theories regarding the nature of society and the individual), or the reality of society is to be affirmed at the cost of the individual and his freedom and independence (as in the case of Durkheim's theory). A reconciliation between these two opposite view­points is impossible. As all the conjectures and arguments of sociology support the supremacy of society, the opposite view is necessarily rejected.
In fact, from a philosophical point of view, all forms of syntheses cannot be regarded similar. On the lower levels of nature, i.e. minerals and inorganic substances, which in philosophical terms are governed by a `simple force,' and as interpreted by the philosophers, act according to one and the same law, are synthesized in a way that they completely merge into one another and lose their individuality in the whole. For example, in the composition of water, two atoms of Hydrogen and one atom of Oxygen are merged together, and both lose their individual properties. But at the higher level of synthesis, the parts usually retain a relative independence with respect to the whole. A kind of plurality in unity and unity in plurality manifests itself at higher levels of existence. As we see in man, despite his unity, a unique plurality is manifested. Not only his lower faculties and powers preserve their plurality to some extent, but, at the same time, there is also a kind of continuous inherent opposition and conflict between his internal powers. Society is the strangest natural phenomenon in which all its constituent parts retain their individual independence to a maximum possible degree.
Hence, from this point of view, we have to accept that human beings, who are the constituent parts of a society in intellectual and volitional activity, retain their individual freedom, and, therefore, their individual existence precedes their social existence. In addition to this
fact, in the synthesis at the higher levels of nature, the generic character of the parts is preserved. The individual human being or the individual spirit is not determined by the social spirit; it rather preserves its right to think and act freely.
Social Divisions and Polarization
Although society has a kind of unity, it is divided from within into different groups, strata and classes, which are occasionally opposite to one another. If not all, some of societies are divided into different and occasionally conflicting poles despite their apparent unity. Thus, in the words of Muslim philosophers, a specific type of `unity in plurality and plurality in unity' governs societies. In earlier chapters, while discussing the nature of the unity of society, we have elaborated what type of unity it is. Now we shall discuss the nature of its inherent plurality.
There are two well‑known theories with regard to this problem. The first is the philosophy of historical materialism and dialectical contradictions. This theory, which would be discussed in detail later, is based upon the origin of private property. The societies in which the conception of private property does not exist are basically uni­polar, such as the primitive communist societies or those communist societies which are likely to be formed in the future. A society in which the right to private property. exists is, of necessity, bipolar: Hence, society is either unipolar or bipolar. There is no third alternative possible. In bipolar societies, human beings are divided into two groups, viz. the exploiters and the exploited. Except these two opposite camps, i.e. the group of the rulers and the group of the ruled, any third group does not exist. All the social modes, such as philosophy, morality, religion, and art, may also be divided according to the class character of the two groups. There are, therefore, two types of philosophy, mora­lity, religion, etc., each of which bears the specific economic class character of each group. Hypothetically, if there were only one philo­sophy, one religion, and one morality prevalent in a society, it too represents the character of any one of these two classes and is imposed on the other. But it is impossible to imagine the existence of a philo­sophy, art, religion or morality without having a character independent of the economic structure of society.
According to the other theory, the unipolar or multipolar charac­teristic of society has nothing to do with the principle of private ownership. The social, ideological, cultural, and racial factors, too, are responsible for giving rise to multipolar societies. The cultural and ideological factors, in particular, play the basic role; they are not only capable of producing bipolar or multipolar societies‑with occasionally contradictory poles‑but can also create a unipolar society without necessarily abolishing the institution of private ownership.
Now we have to discuss the view of the Quran regarding the plurality of society. Does the Quran affirm or negate social plurality? And if it affirms, what is its point of view about the polarization of society? Does the Quran affirm the bipol4rization of society on the basis of ownership and exploitation, or does it forward some other view? The best or at least a good method for determining the Quranic point of view seems to be that we should first of all extract the social terminology used in the Quran. In the light of the nature and meaning of the Quranic idiom we can infer the position of the Quran concerning this matter.
The social terminology used in the Quran is of two types: some of the words are related with a particular social phenomenon such as, millah (community), shari `ah (Divine Law), shir`ah (custom), minhaj (method), sunnah (tradition), and the like. These terms are not relevant to the present discussion. But a number of terms which refer to all or some human groups may be taken into account for discovering the Quranic viewpoint.
These words can reveal the point of view of the Quran. Such terms as: qawm (folk), ummah (community), nas (mankind), shu`ub (peoples), qaba'il (tribes), rasul (messenger, apostle), nabi (prophet), imam (leader), wali (guardian), mu'min (believer), kafir (unbeliever), munafiq (dissenter or hypocrite), mushrik (polytheist), mudhabdhab (hesitant), muhajir (emigrant), mujahid (warrior), sadiq (truthful), shahid (witness), muttaqi (pious), salih (righteous), muslih (reformer), mufsid (corrupter), amir bil ma'ruf (one who orders to obey God's command), nahi `an al‑munkar (one who forbids indecent or illegitimate deeds), `alim (learned), nasih (admonishes), zalim (cruel, oppressive, unjust), khalifah (deputy), rabbani (Divine), rabbi (rabbi), kahin (priest), ruhban (monks), ahbar (Jewish scribes), jabbar (tyrant), `ali (sublime), mustali (superior), mustakbir (tyrant, proud), mustad`af (tyrannized, oppressed), musrif (lavish, prodigal), mutraf (affluent), taghut (idols), mala ` (chieftains), muluk (kings), ghani (rich), faqir (poor, needy), mamluk (the ruled), malik (owner, master), hurr (free, liberated), `abd (slave, servant), rabb (master, lord), etc. Furthermore, there are other words which are apparently similar to these words, such as: musalli (one who prays), mukhlis (sincere, devoted), sadiq (loyal, true), munfiq (charitable), mustaghfir (one who asks for God's forgiveness), ta'ib (penitent), abid (adorer), hamid (one who praises), etc.
But these words have been used only for the purpose of describing kinds of behaviour and not to refer to certain social groups, poles, or classes.
It is essential to study the connotation and meaning of the verses in which the terms referred to earlier are used, in particular the words related to social orientations. It is also to be seen whether the above mentioned terms can be divided into two distinct groups. And suppos­ing that these terms refer to two distinct groups, it should be deter­mined who are their referents; for example, can all of them be classified in two groups of believers and unbelievers, according to a classification based on religious belief, or into two groups of the rich and the poor according to their economic position? In other words, it is to be analysed whether these divisions are ultimately based on any one primary classification, and whether or not all the other sub‑divisions are essentially secondary and relative. If there is only one principle of division, it has to be determined.
Some people claim that the Quranic view suggests a bipolar society. They say: according to the Quran, society is divided into two classes: one is the ruling, dominating, and exploiting class, and the other consists of the ruled, exploited, and subjugated people. The ruling class consists of those whom the Quran calls `mustakbirun', i.e. the arrogant oppressors and exploiters. The subjugated class is of those who are called by the Quran `mustad'afun' (the weakened). All other divi­sions, such as mu'min (believer) and kafir (unbeliever), muwahhid (monotheist) and mushrik (polytheist), salih (righteous) and fasid (corrupt) are secondary in nature. It means that it is tyranny and exploitation that leads to infidelity, idolatry, hypocrisy and other such evils, whereas, on the other hand, subjugation to oppression and ex­ploitation leads towards iman (faith), hijrah (migration), jihad (struggle), salih (righteousness), islah (reform) and other such qualities. In other words, all such things which are regarded by the Quran as deviation and aberration in religion, morality, and deeds are rooted in the practice of exploitation and the economic privileges of a class. Similarly, the source and root of the attitudes and acts morally, religiously, and practically approved and emphasized by the Quran, lie in the condition of being exploited. Human consciousness is naturally determined by the material conditions of life. Without changing the material life of a people, it is not possible to bring about any change in their spiritual, moral and psychic life. According to this viewpoint, the Quran perceives social conflicts as basically class‑conflicts. It means that the Quran gives essential priority to social and economic struggle over moral struggle. According to this interpretation, in the Quran, infidels, hypocrites, idolaters, the morally corrupt and the tyrants arise from among the groups whom the Quran names as mutraf (the affluent), musrif (extravagant and wasteful), mala' (ruling clique), muluk (kings), mustakbir (arrogant) and so on. It is not possible for these groups to arise from among the opposite class.
In the same way, they say, the prophets (anbiya'), messengers (mursalun), leaders (a'immah), upholders of truth (siddiqun), martyrs (shuhada'), warriors (mujahidun), emigrants (muhajirun) and believers (muminun) emerge from among the class of the oppressed and the weak. It is not possible that they may arise from the opposite class. So it is mainly istihbar (tyranny and arrogance) or istid`af (weakness, or condition of being oppressed) that mould and direct the social consciousness of the people. All the other social modes are products and manifestations of the struggle between the exploiters and the exploited, and the oppressors and the oppressed.
According to this viewpoint, the Quran not only considers the two above‑mentioned groups of people as manifestation and expression of the division of society into two classes of the mustakbirun and the mustad'afun, but it also divides human attributes and dispositions into two sets. Truthfulness, forgiveness, sincerity, service, insight, vision, compassion, mercy, pity, generosity, humility, sympathy, nobility, sacrifice, fear of God, etc. constitute one set of positive values; on the other hand, falsehood, treachery, debauchery, hypocrisy, sensuality, cruelty, callousness, stupidity, avarice and pride etc. constitute another set of values, which are negative. The first set of attributes are ascribed to the oppressed class and the second set is considered to characterize the oppressors.
Hence, they say, oppression and subjugation not only give rise to opposite groups, but they are also the fountainheads of conflicting moral qualities and habits. The position of a class either as oppressor or oppressed is the basis and foundation not only of all human attitudes, loyalties, and preferences, but also of all cultural and social phenomena and manifestations. The morality, philosophy, art, literature, and religion originating in the class of oppressors always manifest and represent its character and social attitude. All of them support and justify the status quo, and cause stagnation and decadence by arresting social progress. On the other hand, the philosophy, art, literature, and religion originating from the class of the oppressed are dynamic and revolutionary, and generate new awareness. The class of the oppressors, i.e. the mustakabirun, because of its hegemony over social privileges, is obscurantist, traditionalist, and seeks shelter under the shadow of conservatism; whereas the class of the oppressed is endowed with vision, and is anti-traditionalist, progressive, zealous, active, and is always in the vanguard of revolution.
In brief, according to the advocates of this theory, the Quran affirms the view that it is actually the economic structure of a society which makes a man, determines his group‑identity and his attitudes, and lays down the foundation of his thinking, morality, religion, and ideology. They quote a number of verses from the Quran to show that what they teach is, on the whole, based upon the Quran.
According to this view, commitment to a particular class is the measure and test of all things. All the beliefs are to be evaluated by this standard. The claims and assertions of a believer, a reformer, and even a prophet or a spiritual leader, can be confirmed or rejected only through this test.
This theory is in fact a materialistic interpretation of both man and society. No doubt the Quran gives a special importance to the social allegiances of individuals, but does it mean that the Quran inter­prets all distinctions and classifications on the basis of social classes? In my view such an interpretation of society, man, and the world is not consistent with the Islamic world‑view. It is a conclusion drawn from a superficial study of the problems discussed in the Quran. However, since we shall discuss this matter fully in a later chapter dealing with history under the title "Is History Materialistic in Nature?" I shall abstain from further elaboration at this point.
Reference: ImamReza.net

Man and Evolution

Man and Evolution
By:
Martyr Ayatullah Dr Muhammad Husayni Behishti &
Martyr Dr Muhammad Jawad Bahonar

Man and Evolution
Out of all the natural phenomena with which we are a conversant, the living beings have a comparatively more complex and marvelous mechanism. It may be said that life is the apex of perfection on the scale of natural motion.
Life
No thinker belonging to any school of thought has any doubt about the fact that‑ living beings have characteristics which are not found in the non‑living beings.
The main' characteristics of a living being are self‑defense, adaptation to the environment, growth and pro­creation. The living beings of higher categories move from one place to another and those of still higher category are gifted with feeling and consciousness. That is why the laws of organic chemistry are different from those of inorganic chemistry, or for that matter of geology.
So far as observation and scientific experiments show, a living being is born only by another living being and not by lifeless matter. Similarly no living being is born suddenly and automatically. At the same time it also cannot be doubted that a living being appeared only at a special stage of the evolution of nature, which was naturally that of the beginning of life. Hence a question arises as to what is the origin of life?
In this respect various theories have been put forward. Some of them are as follows:
a. At first, life came to the earth from some other planet in the form of living cells.
b. The material necessary to form a living cell conse­quent on receiving the required energy under certain conditions, was accidentally transformed into a living being and from that life spread to the whole earth.
c. The first living being appeared suddenly by the will of God. Now all the developed living beings are His progeny.
d. Every species of the living beings appeared on the earth independently. Life to each one of them was granted by God. There are some other theories also.
We do not want to involve ourselves into the discussion as to which of these theories is correct, for a very extensive scientific investigation is necessary to come to a definite conclusion in this respect.
What we would like to point out is that the life of every living being, whether it is the result of any evolutionary process or not, is a sign of Allah. That is what has been emphasized by the Qur'an.
"There are significant signs in your own selves. Can you not see?"(Surah al‑Zariyat, 51:21).
"Allah sends down water from the sky and it brings the dead earth to life. Indeed in this there is a sign for those who pay attention" . (Surahal‑Nahl 16:65).
Manufacture of living cell
if one day the scientists succeed in manufacturing a living cell, the doctrine of those who believe in Allah will not be affected, just as the flight of man to other planets, the making of artificial rain, the grafting of one man's limbs to another, the manufacture of an electronic brain and so many other small and big inventions do not mean a clash or a rivalry with Allah. Such things only mean fructifying the human creative power and exploitation of natural material and its hidden forces. The Qur'an itself urges to make use of ideas and skills and to utilize the gifts of nature.
As we have repeatedly said, scientific progress is a move­ment in the direction of divine guidance and is not in conflict with it.
Anyhow, it should not be forgotten that human creativity does not mean the invention of a totally new phenomenon or a norm. It only means the exploitation of the material and energy available in nature and the bringing about of the conditions necessary for the utilization of the laws and norms relating to them.
If really there is a possibility of the production of life by combining natural material under certain conditions still not known to man, then he may in future discover the law of the origination of life and the conditions and norms pertaining to it. If that happens, this discovery will‑ not be different from the discovery and utilization of so many other laws already made in the fields other than that of life.
Obviously the discovery of a law and its utilization does not in any way lower the position of the law‑maker.
At a lower level we see that the pair of a male and a female pave the way for the birth of a child. But do they affect Allah as the creator? A farmer cultivates his land. But does he replace Allah as the real creator of the crop?
If it is discovered that life can be produced from matter under certain conditions, that will only mean that matter in its evolutionary motion can go to the extent where it receives life and then can go further to a higher stage.
It is interesting to note that the Qur'an, describing the birth of man, expressly says:
"One of His signs is that He created you o f clay" . (Surah al‑Rum, 30:20).
In fact clay becomes man, the highest living being, after passing through so many developments.
The Qur'an also talks of the birth of man from `black clay' and Mastic clay'. (Surah al‑Hijr, 15:28 and Surah al-­Saffat, 37:11).
It also says:
" We made every living thing o f water". (Surah al‑Anbiya, 21:30).
When the Qur'an has such a wide horizon, there is no reason why a Muslim who follows it, should be narrow-­minded.
Life, a Divine phenomenon
It may be pointed out that the Qur'an expressly ascribes life to Allah. "It is He who created death and life" . (Surah al‑Mulk, 67:2). "It is He who created you to die". (Surah al‑Hajj, 22:66).
Do such verses mean that no one else can make a living being? In reply it may be said:
Firstly, the Qur'an ascribes to Allah all natural changes, from coming down of rain and taming rivers and mountains to the birth of a man.
On some other ‑occasions it ascribes these very changes to natural factors also. These two groups of verses are not contradictory, but corroborate each other, because the scientific laws which govern natural changes are simply the norms prescribed by Allah. His will does not mean that He directly brings about all changes and natural events. In fact he has created a system of natural changes. That is His will.
Secondly, if in the case of life we find that the Qur'an has given special attention to it, that is only a sign of its importance and high value. Allah describes it as the infusion of divine spirit. While discussing man, we will explain what is meant by that.
Thirdly, every evolutionary movement is a manifestation of Allah's will and His creative design, especially if the change is such that a material organism reaches a stage where it may receive life, become a living being and may at last attain human life.
Man and Evolution
The theory of evolution on the whole has a long history. Lamarck enunciated certain principles in this connection. But it was Charles Darwin, who carried out extensive studies of the living organisms and the way of their birth, and gathered enough scientific evidence to show that evolution has taken place actually. He held that:
(a) Every living being, wherever it may be, gradually adapts itself to its environment, and meets its natural needs, such as obtaining food and defending itself in accordance with the conditions prevailing in that environ­ment. This effort sometimes causes changes in its body, like the appearance of the web uniting the toes of the duck when it was forced by its environment to swim in order to look for its food in the lakes, or the lengthening of the neck of the giraffe when it was forced to make use of the branches of lofty trees.
(b) Though these organic changes take place gradually over many generations, they later pass from parents to offspring.
(c) Among the living beings there is a severe struggle for the continuation of their life, for procuring food and for selecting a suitable mate. This struggle for existence, that is a clash with the factors of the environment of life and rivalry with other living beings, is a firm principle in the life of the animals and the plants and is one of the factors which lead to the change of their form.
(d) As the result of this struggle only those organisms survive which can adapt themselves better to their environ­ment and can obtain the conditions necessary for their life in their natural abode. The weaker and the less suitable organisms gradually die out.
This way gradually the various species are transformed, and only the fittest ones among them survive. That is how the evolution of the species takes place.
The dissemination of the theory of the development of the living organisms, including man, on the basis of these principles, roused a great deal of controversy during the time of Darwin and afterwards, and views in support of it and against it were openly expressed. At some times the tone of the debate in this connection was scientific but on other occasions it was rooted in religious or anti‑religious prejudices, for it was said that what Darwin had asserted was in conflict with the Biblical account of the beginning of the world and the birth of man as given in the book of Genesis.
Anyhow, with new discoveries in archaeology and the expansion in the field of experiments, the theory of evolution has been considerably modified since the time of Darwin, especially in regard to the questions relating to anthropology.
Many new questions in regard to almost every principle mentioned by Darwin have arisen. For example, it is asked whether the appearance of a new organ or for that matter any other organic change, always results from the use of that organ and the attempt to adapt it to one's environment or it may be due to mutation or any other cause?
The acquired qualities are hereditable as a principle or genetic investigations have rejected this theory?
The organic changes, whatever may be their cause, are always aimed at survival and evolution or sometimes they may be due to the inconsistency with the environmental conditions and may culminate in death and extinction?
Natural selection is or is not like artificial selection which leads the existing generation to evolution? We find that the wild animals and plants are alike and of average type, whereas the artificial selection gives the animals and plants more variety and leads them to better evolution.
There are many other questions of this sort.
Anyhow, in spite of all the objections raised to discredit it, the theory of evolution has been accepted by the scientists as an objective principle of natural sciences. At the same time it is also certain that prominent and unbiased naturalists do not consider this theory to be final and incontrovertible. The way to further scientific investi­gation is not closed. All that they say is that the scientific inquiry has not so far discovered any new principles which may take the place of the principle of evolution.
Now it may be said that if an unbiased investigator care­fully examines the results of the observations in regard to the genesis of the living organisms, he will come to the following conclusions:
Principles which may be discovered
(1) The living organisms in accordance with their degree of evolution have a historical succession. In other words, the more developed species have usually appeared over history after the less developed ones.
(2) This historical succession is similar to that found in all other things of the world. The entire cosmos has evolved from a simple state and gradually galaxies and solar systems have been formed in the environment devoid of all traces of life. Conditions conducive to the appearance of life have developed gradually. Similarly development has taken place successively from the plants to the developed animals. On the whole, the more complex organism have followed the simple ones.
(3) There exists complete organic similarity between the first living organism and the most developed living organism known to us.
(4) The stages through which a human embryo passes during its embryonic development are fully akin to the stages through which living organisms have passed over history.
When we put all this evidence together, we can scientifi­cally presume that the various species of the living organisms are the progeny of one another (transformism) and have not come into existence independently (fixism).
Scientific presumption, not incontrovertible principle
Anyhow, it would be fair to say that the conclusions at which we have arrived are no more than a scientific guess corroborated by some evidence. They cannot be regarded as decisive and final, for if an unbiased investigator looks carefully at the history of the origin of machinery, he will find that the development of various machines is not incongruous with the four conclusions mentioned above, though the origin of the machines was not on the basis of transformism in its modern sense, and the various kinds of machines have not been born of one another.
In fact the scientific study of the origin of machinery also leads to the following conclusions:
(1) The machines in accordance with their evolution have historical succession, for the more developed ones appeared after the less developed.
(2) This historical succession is akin to the origination of all other things of the cosmos.
(3) There is complete organic resemblance between the first machine and the most developed machine.
(4) The stages of the manufacture of the latest developed machine on the whole resemble those of the development of other machines, though in a compressed form.
In spite of all these four points, everybody knows that the origination of the more developed machines in the wake of the simple ones has not come about on the basis of transformism. In other words the more developed machines are not the progeny of the more simple ones.
The evolution of the machines is the result of man's initiative, his efficiency and the evolution of his thinking. It is the outcome of the experience he has gained. But the machines of superior kind are not born of those that existed before them.
It is true that in the case of machines basically it is not possible that a more developed one is born of a simpler one, but in the case of living beings such a possibility does exist. But this possibility can only support a scientific guess. It is no proof that such a thing has actually happened, for mere possibility of a thing is not a proof of its actual occurrence.
We come across some other cases of evolution, in which the historical succession of their stages is related to the evolution of the thinking of the maker, and is the result of the gradual increase in an already existing ability.
An example of such an evolution is the gradual attainment of knowledge from childhood to later years.
In contrast, the evolution of the power of learning a foreign language is connected with the development of the capability of him who learns it, and not with that of the person who teaches him.
Conclusion
An unbiased investigator, whether he supports the theory of evolution or opposes it, has to admit that:
(1) As far as we know, all the existing things of the world, including the living organisms, have a historical succession in accordance with the degree of their evolution.
(2) We are aware of many cases in which a more developed organism is the progeny of a less developed one.
(3) There are indications on the basis of which it may be presumed that this is a general rule applicable to all existing things.
(4) But still this is no more than a mere scientific guess, and the way to further investigation on the basis of contrary evidence, as mentioned above, is still open.
(5) On the basis of the doctrine, that the world has an Almighty Creator, who has brought the universe into existence and who manages it, there is a complete possibility that certain developed species might have come into existence independently in the same way as we have described the case of the machines. Of course, in this case the creation of the developed species is not to be the outcome of any mental development of the Creator or His gaining any experience. It is to be only on the basis that evolutionary motion exists in the creative design of the world. In other words, it is the will of Allah that gradually more and more developed species should come into being, in the same way as there exists an evolutionary motion in the development of an embryo.
Emergence of man
According to their general line of thinking, the scientists hold that man has evolved from the primates, which existed before him. We leave the study and evaluation of this evidence and other indications to the anthropologists, and confine ourselves to making a few general remarks in regard to the origin of man.
(1) What we have said about the theory of evolution is also applicable to what has been or is being said on the basis of this theory about the ancestors of the first man, but as we have already pointed out, this theory is no more than a scientific guess. It is still subject to further investi­gation and should not be considered to be one hundred per cent final.
(2) Anyhow, it is important to note that the emergence of man on the basis of evolution from other primates is not in conflict with the teachings of the revealed religions, especially with the belief of an Almighty Creator of the world. We have repeatedly mentioned in Islamic Teachings that Allah, as described by the Qur'an, is the Creator and Disposer of nature. Therefore the perfect system of nature is one of His signs and not an arrangement parallel to Him or negating Him. All the scientific discussions and efforts are aimed at only finding out this system of nature as it actually exists.
(3) The only point which has given rise to the conception that there is a contradiction between religion and the general principles of evolution is that the book of Genesis of Old Testament and certain verses of the Qur'an apparently indicate that all men existing on the earth are the progeny of Adam, who was created independently and not evolved from any previous living beings.
In this connection the following points are worth con­sideration:
(a) What, in this respect, is mentioned in the book of Genesis cannot be taken seriously from religious point of view, because the genuineness of many parts of Old Testament is historically doubtful.
(b) The Qur'anic verses connected with the birth of Adam generally emphasize the point that his birth was an important event and that Divine spirit was infused in his material body made of clay. This kind of birth may only be described as mutation.
Thus a being made of clay came into existence. He was destined to be the master of the earth and no other visible or invisible being could place a total restriction on his leaning towards Allah or towards his base desires.
(c) There is only one verse in the whole Qur'an which describes the birth of Adam as somewhat miraculous. This verse says: "Surely Isa is like Adam in the sight of Allah. He created him of clay, then said to hire: `Be! and he was". (Surah Ale Imran, 3: 59)
This verse has come in the wake of other verses relating to the Prophet Isa. The Qur'an invariably stresses that Isa was created by Allah and that he was not His son. The fact that he was born of Virgin Maryam and had no father is no proof of his being the son of Allah. His birth was a super­natural event, which took place by Allah's will, in the same way as another supernatural event, that is the birth of Adam, the living being having Divine spirit, occurred earlier.
It may be observed . that this very verse shows that the birth of Adam and that of Isa are alike.
Can anybody claim that what the Qur'an has said concerning the birth of Isa repudiates the general procedure of the birth of men all over history? Does it deny that they are normally born of father and mother. Not at all.
In dozens of verses the Qur'an declares the system of reproduction and procreation to be a sign of the power and the wisdom of the Creator of the cosmos.
Hence from the Qur'anic point of view the miraculous birth of Adam, the first living being gifted with Divine spirit, should not be construed to mean that the Qur'an is opposed to the theory of the emergence of the existing things of the world or the birth of living organisms on the basis of evolution. All that it means is that the emergence of man in an extraordinary way was a special favor of Allah.
Exceptional Organisms
Irrespective of all that relates to the birth of Isa or Adam, a naturalist may be asked whether it is possible or not that in the course of the emergence of usual organisms, some exceptional ones also come into existence?
We all know that as a rule every hand and foot of a man has five fingers; but we also know that some children are born with six.
Similarly we know that every human child is born with one head, but you must have read in newspapers that there have been some exceptional cases in which children were born with two heads.
When you put up such exceptional cases to the naturalists, they do not deny their existence, but explain them away simply as freaks of nature.
The credulous people easily accept this explanation, but those who have a critical mind ask: If it is true that the evolutionary emergence of the world and man is the result of the domination of the laws of nature over all the particles of this world and if these laws hold good everywhere, what is that factor which disturbs them?
Does an outside factor disturb the working of nature and the system of its laws, or the laws of nature themselves disturb their own working? In the first case, we must acknowledge that there exists some superpower trans­cending nature. In the case of the second alternative, a question arises as to why the possibility of the occurrence of some exceptional events, sometimes called miracles, should be so vehemently denied and considered to be contrary to the system of nature?
The above discussion shows that there is not the least contradiction between the general principle of evolution in respect of the world and man, and the teachings of the revealed religions, and what the Qur'an says concerning the birth of Adam and man. Incidentally the principles of evolution are still subject to further scientific investigation, for they are faced with much criticism especially as they were enunciated by Darwin.
As we have now finished the discussion of the origin of man, we take up a more basic question. The most impor­tant question, which is being overlooked in our times is: What is the true nature of man, what is his value and what way he should go?
First we refer briefly to the position of man in the West and then we propose to study the man of the Qur'an, so that keeping in mind the views of the contemporary schools, we may know the approach of Islam in this respect.
Reference: ImamReza.net