Immigration and Jihad

In the Name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful
Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds, the Creator of all beings, and may peace be with the servant of God, His Messenger, friend, the chosen one, the trustee of His secret and the transmitter of His Message, our master and prophet, Mohammad and his pure and infallible progeny.
I seek refuge in God from the reviled Satan,
“He who forsakes his home in the cause of God, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious: Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God: And God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” (4/100).
Immigration and jihad are two cornerstones on which Islam relies on in the social field. As is evident, the Holy Qur’an has, out of reverence for their sanctity, held them in high regard, wherever they are mentioned. Similarly, it has conferred great veneration and grandeur on the rank of immigrants and mujahideen (the fighters back).
Immigration (hijra), means leaving one’s home, people, and homeland, for a new place of abode, with a view to saving one’s faith from being compromised. In many Qur’anic verses, you will notice that both words are mentioned beside each other:
“Those who believe, and adopt exile, and fight for the Faith, in the cause of Allah as well as those who give (them) asylum and aid, - these are (all) in very truth the Believers: for them is the forgiveness of sins and a provision most generous.” (8/74).
In the early days of Islam, Muslims used to be divided into two groups: al-Muhajiroon (The migrants) and al-Ansar (The supporters or helpers). Al-Ansar were the inhabitants of Medina, previously know as Yetherb, who gave Al-Muhajiroon haven and aid. The latter were the ones who fled their homes and travelled to Medina in order to preserve their faith.
In common with jihad, immigration is an Islamic sharia rule that is not constant. That is, it becomes a performable religious obligation on Muslims when certain circumstances emerge and certain conditions are met.
To avoid misunderstanding and contradictions in understanding the rules of both jihad and immigration, we set out here to discuss the subject in some detail.
For both jihad and immigration different interpretations have been put forward, i.e. different from the one we have just mentioned. Immigration has been taken to mean, “the abandonment of misdeeds and sinning”; thus, “the immigrant is the person who emigrated from the camp of disobedience”.
How precise is this interpretation? Would the person, whose soul has been tainted with sins, he then repented a true repentance, become a deserter of misdeeds? If we accept this interpretation, all people of the world who repented would fit this description for they forsook the vile deeds they were committing, such as Faheel bin Ayyadh, Bishr al-Hafi and others.
Ibn Ayyadh, used to be a thief. He turned his back to this type of wrongdoing and turned to God in a true penitence. Having mended his ways, he became a great man, turning into a famous teacher and educationalist for many people. In the spell when he had taken to stealing, Ibn Ayyadh was in the process of breaking into a house with the intent to steal. While he was scaling the fence of the house, he noticed that the owner of the house was in the middle of a devotional prayer, reciting the Holy Qur’an in a submissive voice. He heard the man recite,
“Has not the time arrived for the believers that their hearts in all humility should engage in the remembrance of Allah..” (57/16).
While listening to this Qur’anic verse being recited, he somehow felt that as though he were being addressed with those words. The words shocked him to the core, so much so that he retorted, “O Lord! Yea. O Lord! Yea. It is high time. And it’s up.” He then came down the fence, after he had been dissuaded from carrying out his raid. This was the last time he carried out an offending, be it a criminal activity, consuming alcohol or gambling, and all other sins. He made a clean break with his unsavoury past. And in order to wipe the slate clean and forget about his past, he made amends with the victims of his crimes and reached a settlement with them, i.e. compensating them for what he stole from them and asking their forgiveness. He further made amends with his Creator. Therefore, Ibn Ayyadh fits the definition of immigration, in that he abandoned the vile deeds he was hooked on.
In Baghdad, and during the lifetime of Imam Mousa al-Kadhim (a.s.), there was a well know man called Bishr al-Hafi. One-day, al-Kadhim was passing by the house of Bishr. It happened that one of his maids opened the door to leave a bag of rubbish in front of the house. The Imam asked her if the owner of the house was a slave or a freeman. She answered, without hiding her bewilderment at his question, that he was a freeman. The Imam said, “You are right. Had he been a slave he would have feared his Lord”.
The Imam then left the scene. When the maid went back into the house, Bishr, who was in a drinking session, asked her as to what kept her so late. She told him the story. It seems that the words of the Imam descended on him like a thunderbolt waking him up from his deep slumber and forgetfulness. After the maid had told him of the direction the Imam continued his walk in, he quickly set off trying to catch up with the Imam, so much so that he forget to wear his slippers. While he was in hot pursuit, he was saying to himself that the man who uttered those words must have been Imam Mousa bin Ja’far al-Kadhim (a.s.).
Indeed, he went to the house of the Imam and apologised to him. And while still weeping, declared in his presence that he wanted to repent and become a slave, not to any one, but to God. He went on saying that he did not want any more the type of freedom he was used to, i.e. that which imprisoned in him his humanity and set forth the animal base instigations; that he did not want any more to chase lofty positions and repute; that he did not want to wade in the mire of sins and become their hostage; that he did not want to suffocate inside him the good innate nature and sound mind. He concluded that he wanted to be a true slave to God and a freeman when dealing with others.
Thus, Bishr announced his repentance at the hands of Imam al-Kadhim. From that point in time onward, he was never to relapse in his previous bad ways, i.e. he discarded his sins (hajara thunubah) and began a clean sheet, destroying all objects and symbols of wrongdoings, and turning to submission to and worship of God. Accordingly, Bishr met the criterion of immigration for he turned his back to all misdeeds and immoralities.
This definition of immigration (hijra) is similar to that of jihad for the mujahid (lit. maker of a great effort) which is “the one who is at odds with the inclinations of his tempting self”, especially its bad suggestions. It is a known fact that the internal struggle is ever present between the soul and its preferences on the one hand and reason on the other; in other words, a constant warring between heart and mind.
Imam Ali (a.s.) has been quoted as saying, “The bravest of people is he who overcomes his leanings”. The real courage is demonstrated in this incident, which took place during the time of the Messenger of God, Mohammad (s.a.w.). He was passing by a place where he saw a group of youth competing with one another over who could lift the heaviest rock.
Aiming to make use of the occasion to preach to the youngsters, he approached them and offered to act as a referee between them in their contest. They accepted his offer. He said to them, “No one of you should be in need to lift any rock so that they can be judged the strongest. Instead, I have a proposition for you, in that whoever among you can muster the strength and plug the courage to overpower his soul and prevent it from committing sins should be declared the strongest.” It therefore follows that the mujahid is the one who could win over his self and the brave is the one who could overcome his desires.
There is another example and lesson, which demonstrates true bravery, and which we could draw from the story of Purya Wali, a famous wrestling champion. He sets a parable for what a true champion should be. He was the epitome of gentlemanly conduct and magnanimity. The story goes like this: One day, our champion arrived in a town where he was scheduled to meet in a contest with the top wrestler of that town. While he was on a tour in that town, he came across an old woman who was giving out pieces of sweets to passers by. She gave him a piece of chocolate and asked him for a prayer.
He asked her whether there was anything in particular she wanted him to pray for. She said to him that her son was the wrestling champion of their town and that he was going to meet later in the week, another wrestler who came from another town. She added that she felt apprehensive about her son’s chances of winning, in that he might lose, and that his defeat would not only be considered a setback for her son, but it would mean that their source of income would dry up. In short, his defeat would spell disaster for the family. Our champion told her to have peace of mind, in that he would pray for her son to win the match.
After that conversation with the old woman, he was in a reflective mood, calling to mind that “he who overcomes his inclinations is the bravest of people”. At the appointed time of contest between him and his opponent and as the contest progressed, he came to know that his opponent was much weaker than him and that if he wanted to, he could have defeated him in no time. However, having reached a decision that he would let his opponent defeat him, he overindulged in evasive movements to give the impression that the contest was proceeding normally, and in the opportune time, he gave way and let his opponent defeat him. The storyteller went on to say that at the moment of defeat, our champion felt that his heart became wide open for God, as though he were in His dominion. And because that man did battle with his soul and scored a victory over its inclinations, he had become among the friends of God. You might ask, why? The answer is because “the true mujahid is the one who does battle with his soul”, the “bravest of people is he who overcomes his desires”, and lastly, because he demonstrated the kind of courage and magnanimity that made him excel over all champions.
More significant of the previous story is that of Imam Ali (a.s.) and Amr bin Abdwad, a battle-hardened fighter, who earned the nickname of “the Knight of Yelyel. This story goes like this: At the battle of Khandaq (the Trench) the army of Muslims was on one side of the trench and that of the polytheists (mushrikeen) was on the other side. A group of infidels, among them Amr bin Wid, managed to cross over to the side of the Muslim army. Ibn Wid, mounting his horse, started yelling and challenging the Muslim fighters to fight him in a duel. The Prophet (s.a.w.) turned to his companions, enquiring whether anyone of them was willing to fight the challenger.
All were quiet, apart from Ali, who stood up and said, “I am his match.” The Prophet said, “He is Amr. Sit down.” Ibn Wid grew more vociferous, taunting the Muslims and making fun of their assertion that whoever was killed among Muslims would go to heaven. For the second time, Ali stood up and volunteered to face him in combat. He was asked by the Prophet to sit down. Amr bin Wid shouted for the third time, throwing down the gauntlet. Ali picked up the gauntlet and asked the Prophet to give him permission to fight Ibn Wid.
The result of the swordfight was in favour of Ali. The high point of the combat came when Ali overcame Ibn Wid, by seriously wounding him, and wanted to deal him the last blow. Ibn Wid spat in the face of Ali who was sitting on his chest, prior to beheading him. Ali let go of him and moved away to have a stroll before returning to finish him off. While Ali was in the process of doing just that, Ibn Wid asked him as to why he moved away and came back. Ali replied that he was hurt and offended when Ib Wid spat at him, preferring to move away as not to let his dealing him the last blow be considered as though it were for taking personal revenge. That is, killing him would not count in the cause of God. So, the short time Ali took between the incident of spitting and moving away from the fallen foe and coming back to finish him off was for suppressing his anger, so that his killing him would be deemed in the cause of God, and not for Ali’s personal vendetta.
In summation, the second definition of hijra (immigration) is forsaking sins and misdeeds and the second interpretation for jihad is battling with one’s own self, with a view to deterring it from driving one to committing that which is vile or improper. However, is this interpretation correct? The answer to this question is yes, in that in itself it is correct and, yet, it has been misunderstood. Our statement, “The immigrant is he who departs wrongdoings, and the mujahid (the battler) is he who is at odds with his tempting self”, can be found in the traditions (hadith) of the Infallibles (a.s.). The Prophet (s.a.w.) describes battling one’s soul (jihadun nafs) as “the major jihad”.
And yet, the mix-up and misinterpretation has come about as a result of some people’s resorting to annulling the first meaning by suggesting that the import of hijra is departing one’s misdeeds by mending their ways, and that the meaning of jihad is battling with oneself to dissuade it from committing what is unlawful, implying that there is no need for man to leave his home and kin when it becomes necessary. That is, there is no point in fleeing to other countries when needs be. We should, instead, stay put; it would suffice that we abandon the crooked ways that leads to the commissioning of sins and would therefore be eligible for the definition of muhajir (immigrant).
As regards jihad, some would like to argue that since jihad is doing battle with oneself, there remains no necessity for entering in war with the enemies of Islam; it would, they further allege, suffice that we stay at home and busy ourselves with wrestling with our internal struggle. This, in their view, is the jihad in the cause of God (aljihadu fi sabilillah). In their judgement, this type of jihad is far superior to the other one because it is “the major jihad” (aljihadul akbar) as opposed to the other one, which is “the minor jihad” (aljihadul asghar).
As is evident, interpreting hijra, as abandoning committing what is vile, has been taken as an alleged reason for dismissing as irrelevant hijra (immigration) according to the first meaning. Similarly, interpreting jihad as doing battle with oneself as an excuse for rejecting as redundant the jihad according to the first meaning. This is where deviation from the right reading of both the concepts has occurred. It goes without saying that there are two types of hijra (immigration) in Islam; the same goes for jihad. Choosing [for convenience] any type at the expense of the other, i.e. in both the cases – jihad and immigration would entail departure from Islam and its injunctions.
Our great leaders of religion – the Prophet (s.a.w.), Imam Ali and the rest of the Imams (a.s.) were all among the immigrants (muhajir) in the Way of God in the sense of both types of hijra (immigration). And the same goes for jihad. However, tackling the subject from a semantic standpoint, we would come across gradations that cannot be reached without going through both the categories of jihad as well as immigration. That is, it is implausible that someone attains the rank of mujahid (fighter) before experiencing combat in the battlefield. Likewise, one cannot be deemed “immigrant” without going through the process of real immigration, in the manifest meaning of term.
This is God’s law with His creation; He has made man’s attaining maturity and advancement contingent on his passing educational/training courses. For example, in the view of Islam, marriage is a sacred institution for a number of reasons, unlike contemporary Christianity that considers celibacy, [perhaps a reference to the institution of bachelorhood of the Catholic priesthood] as a sacred deed. So, why does Islam regard marriage a sanctified practice? The secret of attaching great importance to this tradition lies in its immense influence in cultivating man’s spirit.
For man’s soul to attain a sublime position of wisdom and perfection, marriage would contribute immeasurably to reaching that rank. Conversely, if men preferred to stay bachelor and women spinster till death, they would remain lacking in spiritual prosperity. The reason for this is the absence of the educational dimension of marriage. Such men and women will not be able to overcome this inadequacy even if they spent their entire lives in worship, meditation, and battling with their tempting selves. Islam has, therefore, considered the institution of wedlock among its traditions, being one of positive influences on man’s education and his pursuit of perfection. Thus, any effect of any factor that contributes in shaping man’s character is limited to the area where it can be effective. Equally, any alternative factor would not have the same effect, if it were to be hoped to give the same results. And by the same token, any of these factors that are collectively taking part in the process of man’s cultivation cannot be used interchangeably.
Immigration and jihad are among the factors that have a say in man’s development towards perfection. It therefore follows that no other factor can replace them. Using the same rationale, jihad, in the sense of man’s struggle with oneself, has its place, so does immigrating, i.e. turning one’s back to committing sins. And yet, practical immigration is one of the educational factors that cannot be superseded by the type of immigration in the sense of abandoning committing sins. Similarly, jihad, in the sense of fighting back the enemies of God, can never be replaced by the second type of jihad, i.e. doing battle with one’s tempting self and vice versa. In the eye of Islam, both are in the same rank of importance in Islamic education.
Here one may say that the living circumstances vary from one individual Muslim to another and that a certain Muslim individual may not be required to embark on either immigration or jihad against the enemies of God. What would become of such an individual, given the important positive influence of upholding these two tenets? The Noble Messenger (s.a.w.) provides the answer for this question, saying that the religious duty on such a Muslim in such circumstances should be that he always has a true and sincere intention to embark on such a duty should circumstances change, in that there may arise the need for embarking on immigration or engaging in jihad as the case may be. Thus, provided there is such intention and determination, such an individual should be able to meet the requirements of attaining the rank of immigrant (muhajir) and fighter (mujahid). This meaning can be gleaned from this prophetic tradition, “Whomever did not take part in battle [against the infidels] or did not contemplate such an eventuality, would die a hypocrite.”
The Holy Qur’an has this to offer in this regard:
“Not equal are those believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of God with their goods and their persons. God hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than to those who sit (at home). Unto all (in Faith) hath God promised good: But those who strive and fight hath He distinguished above those who sit (at home) by a special reward, - Ranks specially bestowed by Him, and Forgiveness and Mercy. For God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” (4/95-96).
It is clear from this Qur’anic text that in its discussion, it does not talk about those who preferred not join the fight [out of choice, and not for a good reason]. The reference to those “who sit at home” is confined to those believers who did not join others in the strife and fight because there is a sufficient number of mujahidin (fighters). So, when it comes to allotting ranks, the fighters are given loftier positions or ranks over those who stayed behind for a reason. However, in the same vein, the Qur’anic verse confirms that this classification does not cover ”Those who sit (at home) by a special reward”, i.e. those who stayed behind by virtue of their physical disabilities – such as blindness, paralysis, and illness. The Qur’an reiterates that those too may attain the rank of the fighters. They may as well overtake the fighters, should they have harboured sincere intentions and true determination to join in the fight. That is, if their valid reasons for not joining were lifted, they would have joined the war effort in person and wealth. This principle is sound, when its conditions are fulfilled.
On the return of Imam Ali (a.s.) from the battle of Siffeen [fought against Mu’awiyah], a man, among the rank and file of his army, asked him, “O Commandar of the Faithful! I have a brother whom I would have loved that he be among us, so that he could achieve the favour of your companionship.” The Imam replied, “What was the intention of your brother, his resolution, the inclination of his heart? Had he a valid reason that prevented him from joining us?” The Imam then provided the answers for all these questions, saying, “Had he no valid reason and did not join us, his not being with us is better for us. Had he a good reason for not being with us and yet his heart was with us and his resolution was to join us once the reasons that had prevented him from joining us were lifted, he would be judged as though he were with us.” The man answered in the affirmative.
The Imam (a.s.) said, “Not only your brother alone was with us. Verily, other men who are still in the wombs of their mothers; rather, those unborn men [who are still, in the form of sperm in the semen] of their fathers, are with us.” This is an unshakeable truth till the Day of Judgement, that any person who is intent on wishing that he were at the time of Ali and that he would have, with firm will, joined him in his army in Siffeen, he must rest assured that he would be deemed among his supporters, even though he did not witness the battle.
Awaiting relief from suffering
What does waiting for the happy ending mean? And what does the statement, “The best of works is looking forward to the happy ending” mean? Some people mistakenly believe that waiting for relief from suffering (faraj), which is the best of deeds, means that we should look forward to the reappearance of the Awaited Imam, al-Mahdi (May God hasten his reappearance) who would do so with a group of his disciples, totalling 313 men, with scores of followers. And once they appeared on the scene, they would wage war against the enemies of Islam, cleanse the earth of their uncleanness and vile deeds, establish the rule of justice and security in the land, and make available freedom and prosperity for all. And once this is done, they would invite us to enjoy their toil!! It seems that some people would like us to believe that this is what is meant by “Waiting for the happy ending (faraj)”, describing it as the best of good deeds.
However, the true waiting for faraj is that we should expect the reappearance of Imam al-Mahdi and be drafted in his army and fight under his command even if we get martyred in the process. The genuine waiting is in man’s whole aspiration to be party to the jihad in the cause of God. That is, not the kind of waiting that entails dependency on the Imam to solve our problems by performing all the intractable tasks, and once these are out of the way and the time for reaping the fruit of the toil comes we would then emerge to enjoy the harvest. This is not the right approach. This is the reasoning of the followers of Prophet Moses (a.s.). As for the followers of Prophet Mohammad (s.a.w.), they said to him: O Messenger of God! We are not going to address you in the same manner the Israelites did with Moses when they got to the approaches of Jerusalem, Palestine and found out that there was an army waiting for them:
“..O Moses! We shall never enter it as long as they are in it. Gof thou, and thy Lord, and fight ye two, while we sit here.” (5/24).
To that, Moses (a.s.) retorted: What is your responsibility then? You should be liable to drive out the transgressors who occupied your land and sent you into exile. In contrast, the followers of Mohammad (s.a.w.), such as al-Miqdad, did not replicate the position of Moses’ followers. They said: We believed in you and bore witness that what you call for is the truth, and swore allegiance to you to be obedient. Therefore, set forth to wherever you have decided and we will be with you. We swear by Him Who sent you with the truth, should you decide to push your way in this sea we would have done so with you, without a single one of us turning back. We are not averse to the orders to engage in combat an enemy tomorrow.
As such, genuine “waiting for the happy ending” is that we should be full of hope and determination to succeed in joining the army of the Awaited Imam (May God hasten his reappearance), so that we be in a position to contribute to reforming the world.
“We wish we were with you, so that we could have achieved a great victory”. We always repeat this statement, addressing Imam Hussain (a.s.). Yet, do we really pay attention to its actual meaning? It simply means, “O Aba Abdillah! We wish we were with you so that we could have attained the rank of martyrdom fighting on your side and under your standard, and thus we would have achieved a great victory.” Are these just words or do they underline a sincere intension and a true desire? Although there are people who utter the words and truly mean what they are talking about, yet the majority of us recite these words in the book of visitations, paying lip service to them.
Imam Hussain (a.s.) uttered these words, in commendation of the sincerity of his companions, “I am not aware of any companions who are better than my companions both in kindness and loyalty.”
An outstanding Shia scholar used to cast doubt over the authenticity of the statement, in that it might have not emanated from Imam Hussain. His rationale for dismissing it as unauthentic goes thus, “Having pondered the question, I have reached this conclusion: The companions of Imam Hussain did not do an exceptional deed. It was the enemy who demonstrated debased attitude and practice.
Knowing that Imam Hussain is the grandson of the Prophet, the son of Imam Ali and Fatima, the Imam of his Age, etc., it goes without saying that any ordinary Muslim would have come to his rescue, seeing him in that situation. So, the band of people who fought beside him did not do anything out of the ordinary. On the contrary, those who did not come to his aid were very bad people”. He went on to say, “It seems that Allah wanted to deliver me from this inattention, ignorance, and misguidance.
In my dream, I saw myself witnessing the battle of at-Taf, i.e. Kerbala. In response to his appeal for support, I declared to Imam Hussain my readiness to side with him against his enemy. The Imam asked me to wait for his instructions. In the meantime, the time for prayer became due. The Imam said: We want to say our prayer. You are required to keep a vigil in that corner, so that you can forestall any attack by the enemy that could be coming from there. I said: Go ahead O son of the Messenger of God! He started saying the prayer. I stood in front of him. After a short while I saw an arrow coming in my direction. I, unconsciously, ducked it. The arrow crashed into the Imam. I said: I seek forgiveness from God and repent to Him, what a preposterous act I have just committed.
This incident happened on three more occasions, where I, time and again, took evasive action to avoid the arrow hitting me and instead let it hit the Imam every time. On turning my head towards the Imam, I noticed that he was looking at me with a smile on his face and said: (I have never seen any companions better than my companions both in kindness and loyalty)”.
The Imam then added, and the narrative is still that of the Shia scholar was relating, “Sitting at home repeating the words: (We wish we were with you, so that we would achieve a great victory) is worthless if you do not put it into practice. Are you like this? My companions were people whose actions spoke louder than words. They were not mincing their words.”
[Going back to that part of the story of the martyrdom of Imam Hussain (a.s.)], on the tenth of Muharram (Aashoura’), the Imam said the last Dhuhr (noon) prayer before he was martyred. Most of his comrades in arms were martyred earlier that day, in the exchanges of volleys of arrows between the combatants. Thus, he was left with the immediate members of his family and a small band of his companions. The fighting force of the Imam totalled some seventy-two warriors.
And yet, despite their small number, they were enjoying high morale and showing exemplary gallantry. Being the commander of this small army, Imam Hussain did not show any sign of weakness or despondency. He planned for the showdown with the enemy by positioning three main groups of his soldiers into a central segment (the heart), right and left flanks, as any other regular army did in those circumstances. Zuhair bin al-Qayn was appointed commander of the right flank, Habib bin Mudhahir was charged with the responsibility of defending the left flank. His brother al-Abbas (a.s.) was made the standard-bearer.
The companions of Imam Hussain (a.s.) were eager to start the fight. However, the Imam was insistent on not launching the first strike, leaving it to the enemy to do so. That starting shot came at the hands of Omar bin Sa’ad.
Ibn Sa’ad was keen on holding both the spiritual and the materialistic at the same time. He was aspiring to securing Ibn Ziyad’s offer of appointing him the governor of Ray, but without staining his hands with the blood of al-Hussain. Because of this soul-searching and struggle to subdue his inclinations, he embarked on a string of letters to Imam Hussain with a view to avoiding the bloodshed. When the news reached Ibn Ziyad, he wrote to him a stern letter, ordering him to quickly kill the Imam. He threatened him that he would sack him and appoint someone else in his place, should he choose to ignore his instructions. Ibn Sa’ad could not rid himself of his bondage to the materialistic world. So, since he was given a choice between this world and the next, he opted for the former, selling his faith in return.
Thus, he acquiesced to the order of Ibn Ziyad. In so doing, he demonstrated dishonourable qualities and treachery and committed one of the most heinous crimes in the history of mankind. Ibn Ziyad’s justifications for committing some of those atrocities was that he was seeking to be seen taking a position of neutrality, i.e. by not siding with Imam Hussain (a.s.).
In order to show his loyalty to Ibn Ziyad, especially in the light of the latter’s receiving many reports accusing him of showing reluctance in fighting the Imam, he embarked on a killing spree, massacring the Progeny of the Prophet (a.s.). When the two adversarial armies pitched their fighters opposite one another, Ibn Ziyad took a bow and arrow from one of his bowmen, or archers, placed an arrow in the bow and shot in the direction of al-Hussain’s camp, remarking, “Bear witness for me with the Prince [Ibn Ziyad] that I was the first one to shoot]”.
Another of the Imam’s companions was Aabis bin Shibeeb ash-Shakiri, who was filled with high spirit and valour. He took the centre stage of the battlefield and issued a challenge to the army of Ibn Ziyad, if there was any one among them who was prepared to fight him in one-to-one combat. No one dared to respond to his challenge. Having repeated his call several times, but to know avail, and realizing that the coat of arms and headgear he was wearing were proving cumbersome, he parted with them. Thus, he mounted attacks on the enemy soldiers who were fleeing before him. They were not able to kill him, only by stoning him and shooting him with torrents of arrows. Thus, he was martyred.
On the day of the Battle of Kerbala, all the companions of Imam Hussain (a.s.), men and women, depicted the most vivid portraits of gallantry and sacrifice. They left their indelible marks in the chapters of history of mankind, only to be revered and emulated. Had their equivalent been found in the history of the West, they would have held them in a very high regard.
Abdullah bin Omeir al-Kalbi was another of the companions of Imam Hussain. In his company were his wife and mother. He was a gallant warrior. When he wanted to join the battle, his wife, a newly wed woman, tried to prevent him and pleaded with him, “With whom you are going to leave me? Who is going to take care of me? Please do not leave me behind for bereavement.” On hearing her, his mother intervened, “O my son!
Do not listen to her. Go and fight in defence of the son of the Messenger of God, so that he would tomorrow, on the Day of Judgement, be your intercessor. I will not be pleased with you until you got killed fighting with al-Hussain.” He assaulted the enemy and got killed in the process. His mother plucked the courage, arming herself with a pole, and embarked on attacking the enemy. Al-Hussain prevented her from doing so, saying, “May all members of your family be rewarded with that which is best. Go back and join the rest of the women. May God have mercy on you. Being a woman, you are not required to do jihad.”
As the battle progressed, more massacres took place. The enemy beheaded Abdullah bin al-Hussain, [who was just an infant], hurling the severed head towards his mother. She held it and wiped the dirt off it, hugging and kissing it, and saying, “O my son! I am pleased with you, I am pleased.” She then tossed the baby’s head towards the camp of the enemy, saying, “What we give away in the Way of God, we do not reclaim.”
Among the other supporters of al-Hussain was a boy, aged either ten or twelve years, whose father was killed earlier on in the fighting. Armed with his sword, he approached the Imam and asked for permission to enter the fight. The Imam did not grant him permission out of sympathy for his mother who had just been bereaved of her husband, saying, “The father of this boy was killed in the first campaign, and maybe his mother does not like him to be killed.” The boy replied that his mother had agreed to his taking part in the fighting and that she would be pleased with him, if he got killed in defence of al-Hussain.
That boy was of an outstanding character, demonstrating his moral fibre in the battle. His way of joining the battle was different from the manner the rest of the fighters, who were coming forward for their debut in the battle. They introduce themselves and their lineage by way of reciting war poetry in a roaring style (rajz). That boy did not follow in the footsteps of the fighters who preceded him and introduced themselves in that pattern. Instead, he recited a couplet, singing the praise of his connection with al-Hussain (a.s.) and being one of his soldiers per se,
“My lord is Hussain, the pleasure that descended on the heart of the bearer of good tidings, the warner [Prophet Mohammad]. Ali and Fatima are his parents. Do you know of anyone thus pure-bred?”
[Approaching the end of the lecture, it is customary to end it on this note, i.e. a supplication],
“O Lord! Grant us the success to be submissive to You, keep our distance from committing what is vile, be truthful in our intensions, and make us recognise that Your Mercy knows no bounds. Be gracious to us by bestowing on us guidance and straightforwardness. Guide our speech towards that which is right and wise. Fill our hearts up with knowledge and mindfulness.
O Lord! Illuminate our hearts with the light of faith. Make us among the true immigrants (muhajirs) and fighters (mujahids) in the way of striving to make the word of Thy religion rule supreme.
O Lord! Grant the Muslims victory over their enemies in all the fronts.”
Introduction to lecture two
In the Name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful
Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds, the Creator of all beings, and may peace be with the servant of God, His Messenger, friend, the chosen one, the trustee of His secret and the transmitter of His Message, our lord and prophet, Mohammad and his pure and infallible progeny.
“He who forsakes his home in the cause of God, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious: Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God: And God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” (4/100).
In the last lecture we discussed immigration and jihad, which have been mentioned repeatedly in the Holy Qur’an almost together. In this lecture we aim to continue the discussion about the significance of both these tenets, not least for their influence in cultivating man’s character in his progress towards perfection and particularly in the moral domain. However, we may, as the discussion develops, discuss the social dimension of these principles.
As you may recall, we have already examined the misinterpretation of the concept of immigration and jihad and explained their true meaning and parameters. Should we aim for the spirit, [not the letter], of both the concepts in all fields, be they materialistic or moral, we should conclude that by immigration (hijra), we mean forsaking the things that became part of man or he became attached to them. The immigrant (muhajir) is the person who is capable of turning his back to any practice he has become hooked on, should the sharia law make it incumbent on him to do so.
By jihad, we mean struggle, strife, and exertion, be it external, i.e. against the enemies of God, or internal, i.e. against one’s own tempting self. Without immigration and jihad man’s lot would be nothing other than degradation and misery. For man to be free in the full sense of the word, he has to free himself from all the shackles of humiliation that surround him. He should not let himself be enslaved by anything he might feel very close to his heart. Otherwise, he who submits to the circumstances that may govern his living and show weakness in getting rid of them cannot be deemed free at all. Rather, he is a prisoner of that state of affairs.
Embarking on discussing the semantics of immigration, especially its core constituent, i.e. travel, we would soon find ourselves confronted by this question: Which is better for man: travel or staying put? Of course, one should not infer from this question that man should always be on the move, i.e. without permanent abode or home. Perhaps, we should paraphrase the question thus: Is it better for man to reside in his hometown/country without ever travelling abroad, or is taking to travel beneficial to him, being a kind of immigration? From an Islamic standpoint travel, in itself, is praiseworthy.
Although Islam discouraged wandering aimlessly in the land(14), yet this does not mean that man should spend all his life in his village or town without venturing outside them, to other towns and countries. This status quo is liable to weaken one’s spirit, making it subservient to the conditions being lived.
In contrast, the person who takes to travelling, travel is bound to broaden his horizons and sharpen his wit, especially when the aim is aspiring for personal advancement, acquiring new virtues and that which is capable of contributing to perfectly shaping one’s personality. Travel has five benefits:
1. Releasing the pressure: Travel provides the tourist with an opportunity to unwind by relieving tension, grief and sorrow. As long as man stays put in the climate he has got used to, it would make him live and remember all the bad things and regrettable incidents. This is bound to put him under immense pressure. So, by venting out such pressure, the person would be able to recharge their batteries.
2. Looking for work: The smart among people is he who can win his bread by relocating. New opportunities will certainly arise where immigrants could better their lot in their host countries.
3. Pursuit of knowledge: This is yet another valuable benefit that comes with travel. Setting out in search of knowledge and scholarship beyond your hometown or country should provide you with new experiences. [When it comes to religious learning], each and every scholar [alim, plural ulema] is unique in his own right. No doubt, the ulema in your town are great, and yet each flower has its own distinctive scent, in that the alim of a particular town could not be as knowledgeable as the one in your town. Nevertheless, he could have his own area of expertise. Should you decide to meet with him, you would find out that he has a brand of knowledge the alim of your town does not possess.
4. Attainment of moral excellence: You cannot acquire all morals depending entirely on abstract sciences and by staying in the same environment. By the same token, shorn of any foundation of knowledge, travel alone is not going to prove a panacea for claiming the high moral ground. Getting a blend of both would lead to good results. A traveller is bound to see and experience new situations he was not used to in his own hometown or homeland. The spiritual maturity gained through travel cannot be had by any other means, including reading.
There may be people who could claim that they can gain new knowledge and expertise without travelling abroad. In their judgement, reading books about the intended countries, for example, should provide them with the required information. Without a shadow of a doubt, reading is beneficial. And yet, it cannot make the same impact travel and witnessing things first hand can. In the Holy Qur’an reference is made to “touring the land”, such as “Travel through the earth” (3/137) and “Say: travel through the earth” (6/11). Historians are unanimous in their interpretation of these holy verses, in that they suggest the familiarization with and drawing lessons from historical events. However, the Holy Qur’an does not confine achieving this objective to reading history annals. Rather, it calls on us to do that which is more tangible, i.e. to experience first hand the historical relics on the ground and draw the lessons thereof. In these two lines of poetry, which are attributed to Imam Ali (a.s.), he says:
Emigrate from your native country in pursuit of loftier positions, for there are five benefits to be had from travel:
Alleviating anxiety, working for a living, acquiring knowledge, attaining moral excellence and the companionship of distinguished people.
So, travel far and wide and do not be like a caged bird. Travel and let your goal be gaining knowledge about the people and the countries you are heading for. For sure, you are going to experience new sets of morals and social norms, which you may sometimes find superior than your own and which you can make use of, or at least be in a position to compare between the two and, maybe, be in a position to select the more superior.
5. The companionship of distinguished people: In travel, you may come across more illustrious people and forging relationships with such distinguished people may benefit you, not least in shaping your character through the positive influences such associations would leave. Friendship here does not necessarily mean that of imparting knowledge by someone and receiving it by the other, i.e. teaching/learning relationship. Rather, it means good companionship and what would come out of it, i.e. gaining practical experience.
When the Imam (a.s.) establishes the aim of travel by “seeking higher status”, this should not mean that, in travel, one should restrict one’s attention to finding the best food, hotels and the like. The aim should be attaining moral excellence, learning, knowledge, human consummate conduct and intellectual maturity. So, let these be the fruits of travel and migration.
History tells us that the scholars who made journeys or emigrated to other countries, especially after they had gone through the early stages of their maturity, gained new experiences in their progress towards perfection. Examples of such luminaries abound. Ash-Sheikh al-Baha’ie, for instance, occupies a special place among the ulema. He was an encyclopaedic scholar who excelled in various disciplines. Among outstanding poets, the name of Sa’adi features high. He stood out in the different departments of poetry – love, mysticism, and heroism to name but a few. The secret of his brilliance in all those poetry genres is attributed to his vast mine of education and knowledge.
Sa’adi lived some ninety years. He spent thirty years of his life in schooling, education and acquiring knowledge. The second thirty years, he spent in travel, and the third thirty years witnessed the stages of his intellectual and literary maturity, prowess, and achievements.
In his divan, or collection of poems, Bustan, he has this to say about his globe trotting and the benefits he had reaped from it, “I travelled all over the world and enjoyed the company of each person I met a number of days. I benefited something from every corner I happened to be in and garnered from every field a spike of grain.”
In his short stories, Gulstan and Bustan, he said, “I was in a mosque in Baalbek, [ancient Heliopolis, village in East Lebanon], when such and such happened.” In another place, he said, “I was in Kashmir when so and so took place.” So, you may ponder the distance that separates the two places. In a third place, he said, “I was in India when thus and thus occurred.” In a fourth place, he said, “I came across a man whose behaviour was such and such. We were in each other’s company on the way to Hijaz [modern day Saudi Arabia].”
Most of this imagery found its way to Sa’adi’s poetry. No doubt, the poet’s spirit would roam in new heights with these experiences. Indeed, this is true in Sa’adi’s case, in that his travels contributed to his poetic and literary genius. This characteristic, you find in Mawlawi’s poetic works. This was made possible by his wide travels that netted him diverse knowledge and experiences about other nations. Some of these were reflected in his poems, which boast some of those nations culture, expressions and impressions. Thanks to his travels, he learned several languages.
In contrast with this, you do not find this quality in Hafiz’s poetry. In spite of the fact that we hold him in high regard, as he was a mystic and notwithstanding his excellence in divine love poetry, so much so that, compared to him in this poetic genre, Sa’adi could not match him; his skill shined in that type of poetry. Maybe, this was because Hafiz stayed put in his hometown and never left it because he was attached to it. He even admits that attachment to his hometown, Shiraz, “Although Isfahan is the spring of life, yet Shiraz is far superior.”
In his poetry, he often sings the praise of Shiraz and the beauty of its places. Although, he lived almost the entire of his life in Shiraz, it is reported that he ventured out of it once by travelling to Yezd. Yet, he was melancholic and felt homesick only to hurry back to Shiraz. He recorded his feelings in one of his poems where he expresses a wish to return to his hometown where he equates his seat there with the seat of Solomon, and expresses a wish to free himself from the prison of Alexander. Hafiz borrowed this metaphor from history. Fables have it that when he invaded Iran, Alexander, the Macedonian [Great] made Yezd a dumping ground for his prisoners, whereas, of old, Shiraz used to be described as the Seat of Power of Solomon.
This may exert some light on both the feelings of the poet vis-à-vis Yezd and Shiraz. Some of his poems bear witness to the fact that the poet’s dislike for Yezd had nothing to do with its inhabitants; rather, it was to do with his affection for his hometown, Shiraz. The evidence is found in his poetry where he spoke highly of Yezd’s people and their hospitality. However, when Hafiz was offered a trip to India to stay somewhere close to the seaside, he declined it outright.
No doubt a scholar as famous as ash-Sheikh al-Baha’ie, who travelled the world over, stands head and shoulders above others who did not venture out of Najaf, [in Iraq, the well known seat of Shia Muslim learning and scholarship] all of their lives. Sheikh al-Baha’ie got in touch with the followers of different faiths and schools of thought and came to know a lot about their beliefs, cultures, and customs. There are others of our ulema (scholars), like al-Baha’ie, who came in contact with people of other faiths, persuasions, men of letters, professors, and other disciplines.
History books tell us that those who took to travel and in the process came into contact with other people of different backgrounds benefited a lot from this cross germination of experiences and ideas, so much so that it enriched their knowledge, sharpened their wit, and broadened their intellectual horizon. In contrast, there had been great ulema, who were as erudite, genius, and loyal as the aforesaid group of ulema, if not more superior, and yet they did not avail themselves of journeying outside the boundaries of their usual domicile. It goes without saying that members of the latter group were less experienced than the former.
This should lead us to conclude that there is another meaning for immigration (hijra) that is different from the patent one. This meaning has come out in the hadith (traditions) of the Infallibles (a.s.). It can be found in these words, “The immigrant is he who has turned his back (hajara) to committing that which is vile”. And yet, one should not get the wrong end of the stick. That is, this interpretation does not, by any way, make the manifest meaning of hijra redundant. On the contrary, the second meaning corroborates the fact that, in Islam, there are two types of hijra (immigration), one is patent and the other latent. In other words, the Islamic immigration is not restricted to leaving behind your family and homeland for a new destination as is dictated by the interest of Islam or for the aim of freeing oneself from becoming enslaved by one’s own circumstances; should it be the latter, this could encroach on one’s sole servitude to God Almighty, and thus one must break free from the clutches of circumstance.
Thus, the second type of immigration is getting rid of the yoke of [bad] customs and traditions on which one is brought up from a tender age, so much so that they become part of their very being. Insomuch as one should not become prisoner to one’s own spiritual climate, they should not be held hostage to the surrounding spiritual climate. Consequently, freeing oneself from this form of captivity is the type of immigration that should be gleaned from the second meaning, i.e. that which has been talked about in the hadith.
Man may become used to certain norms of personal habits or conduct as a result of the influence of social custom. He may become so attached to what he acquired from society that the acquired habits become part and parcel of his personality. Let us, for example, take smoking as a habit of a personal choice. Although the dangers of smoking to one’s health are well known, yet when some people become ill as a result and are advised by their doctor to kick the habit, they find it difficult to do so, because they got addicted on it and that giving it up would exasperate the situation. Off course, this is some sort of idle talk. Nevertheless, “The immigrant is he who has turned his back (hajara) to committing that which is vile”. That is, a real person is he who could give up that which they got used to doing, including smoking.
The late Ayatollah Hujjat, May God elevate his station, could be described as a chain smoker. When he fell ill and was taken to hospital in Tehran, the doctors advised him to quit smoking because he was diagnosed with chest infection and continuing smoking would complicate matters for him. He jokingly remarked, “I need my chest for smoking. If I stop smoking what need will there be for a chest!?” He enquired, “Is it true that smoking is bad for my health?” The doctors answered him in the affirmative. He then said that he would never smoke again. Thus, in a word, he turned his back to a habit of almost a lifetime.
It has been reported that al-Ma’moun [the Abbasid Caliph] was suffering from the habit of devouring dust. Conventional remedies were doomed to failure. In a gathering, people were talking about al-Ma’moun’s habit and how he could not give it up. Among those present was a dervish who shouted that he had the remedy for al-Ma’moun’s habit. The people turned their eyes in his direction and asked him as to what could this magic potion be. He answered, “A firm will of the sort kings are capable of.” When the story of the dervish reached al-Ma’moun, he said that the man was right and took a decision to give the habit up completely and forthwith.
Therefore, it is incumbent on man not to become a hostage to any [bad] habit. It is regrettable to say that this is more widespread among women. They cling vehemently, i.e. more so than men, to social customs relating to ceremonies of marriage and memorial services. Whenever they are told off, in that it is not right, they, without any hesitation, answer that they cannot trample social norms and practices. And when they are asked about the benefit that could be reaped from those norms and practices, they say that they just cannot abandon those social customs.
This simply means blind following and submission to those customs and entails a lack of willpower and sheer enslavement. Man ought not acquiesce to these impositions. Sensible people should subject their behaviour and the positions they take to the judgement of their intellect and common sense. It is noteworthy, at this juncture, to point out that it is not right, of some people, to dismiss outright as irrelevant all social customs and therefore the necessity to rebel against them. This is a kind of extremist view. We do not reject all social customs; rather, some of them, i.e. those which go against the sensibility of the human mind and common sense.
Islam, therefore, looks upon immigration (hijra) as a fundamental pillar in the life of people, the objective of which is the revival and the shaping of man’s character. The other aim is to combat one of the most salient factors which could thrust man into slavery, humiliation, and submission to the environment he lives in, or materialistic or abstract things he becomes used to doing. It is not expected of man to become a slave to the environment in which he was born and brought up.It is incumbent on him, instead, to preserve his integrity, freedom and independence. In so doing, he would ensure that he would never become a slave to immoral practices and be shackled to bad social norms. That is, “The immigrant is he who has turned his back (hajara) to committing that which is vile”. And immigration means breaking clean with all the unsavoury things that surrounds man, worldly or non-figurative. Thus, immigration is an important educational tool in moulding man’s personality.
Jihad
Jihad means struggle (or battling with someone). However, the other definition of jihad is that of doing battle with one’s tempting self. In as much as man should not fall under the sway of his own environment, he should not surrender to the impediments and difficulties, found in such an environment as a matter of course, which may encounter him in his life. Man has been created with an built-in mechanism to deal with these barriers and overcome them to reach maturity and perfection.
The Holy Qur’an says:
”He who forsakes his home in the cause of God, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious..” (4/100).
However, in the same verse, the above-quoted statement is immediately followed by this one:
”Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God: And God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” (4/100).
The Holy Qur’an’s approach to this subject is unique, in that it talks, in verse 98 of the same Chapter, i.e. just three verses ahead of the aforesaid verse, about those who were deemed weak (mustadh’afeen):
“When angels take the souls of those who die in sin against their souls. They say: In what (plight) were ye? They reply: Weak and oppressed were we in the earth. They say: Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from evil)?” (4/97).
This discusses, in a dialogue mode, the pretexts of those who went astray of the path of right and guidance by condoning the status quo, i.e. of staying in the climate of injustice and vice.When the angels of death come to take their souls away, they find out that their records have turned black with the vile deeds and when they ask such people as why their balance sheets are full of debits, they reply, “Weak and oppressed were we in the earth.” That is, they were living in conditions conducive to misconduct and since they were deemed weak, they could not do anything to alleviate their situations. The angles’ reply comes in no time, “Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from evil)?”
This sort of excuse given by those people may, for a good reason, be accepted from trees whose environment became polluted, so much so that their leaves withered away and eventually died, having no choice of moving away since they were deep rooted. However, this cannot be accepted from man. Even animals do not entertain such excuses. There are great numbers of migrating animals, such as birds, that got used to moving away from their natural habitat when the weather changes. There are some species of fish which migrate twice a year pursuant to the change of climate, i.e. from summer to winter and vice versa, covering thousands of kilometres in the process. Locust is yet another example of migrating animals. So, animals refuse to get bogged down in their habitat, taking to migration instead.
Thus, it is repugnant of man to give as pretext the unbecoming surroundings to justify his staying in the mire and falling prey to the temptations and immoral practices that engulf him, blaming the sins he has committed on the environment he has become part of, rather than himself. This goes against the divine logic, ”He who forsakes his home in the cause of God, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious..” (4/100). That is, you can get to the land where you would be able to fight back (or wage jihad) against the enemies of God in the same way they fight you to deny you your beliefs and principles. You should fight back against the enemy’s beliefs and principles; in other words, you engage them in struggle (or jihad).
The other definition or interpretation for the concept of jihad is governed by the same principle of struggle. The difference being that you are battling with your tempting self, i.e. the enemy within. Some people have become compulsive liars and when you take issue with them as to why they do it, they say: Is there any one who does not lie? No doubt, man can, sometimes, be driven to lying. Among other examples are those who you turn to and ask them to lower their gaze, i.e. not to look at that which God has ordained haraam (unlawful). They reply in astonishment, “Can any person not do that?”
You counsel another person among the faithful to set their hearts and minds towards God in prayer, and not to be distracted by mundane issues. They reply that it is impossible. And yet, should this appeal have been far-fetched, God would have not ordained it. The problem is that some people have become used to paying lip service to some devotional acts, especially prayer, not even trying to concentrate on the job in hand, and do away with inattention, while they are in audience with their Creator. If they had tried they would have said their prayer in complete submission, humility and attention.
Provided that you remain watchful for your own self and battle with it against its temptations, you should be in control of your intellectual capacity and conscience. Imagination is a transient state of mind and thus is not capable of overcoming your intellect, if you did not want that and make it possible. Should you be in control, you would be able to restrain your mental power and prevent it from becoming victim to lack of concentration. Why should man become a slave to others while God has created him free from any bondage to any one? God has endowed man with power, freedom and independence. Consequently, if he so desires, he would be able to set himself free from everything; rather, it is in his power to control everything. Yet, this requires genuine willpower and jihad (struggle), not least with the enemy within, i.e. one’s own self, which is inclined to beautify committing what is evil. It requires going against one’s love for comfort, good living and the enslavement to lust.
He who is not prepared to engage in such a struggle is not worthy of acceptance and respect. God has bestowed on man the gift of reason. Thus, it is incumbent on him to choose one of two paths – either battling with his tempting self, which is often inclined to lure you to do what is vile, and put it under the control of your intellect, and this is the road of perfection and advancement. The second alternative is giving up that struggle in return for leaving the tempting soul rule supreme where the result would inevitably be that you become subservient to its own whims. This is the road that leads to the lowest point of the low. If you do not keep it preoccupied, it will engage you and keep you on your toes and at its service.
What was the philosophy of Imam Ali’s (zuhd) asceticism (or indifference to worldly things)? It revolves around activating the power of freedom man enjoys and controlling his ego. Imam Ali (a.s) hated to be defeated in combat by external foes, such as Amr bin Wid and Marhab. Similarly, he hated to give in to the enemy within, i.e. his own ego and inclinations. That is, he did not want his desires to achieve a victory over him. It is related that one day the Imam (a.s.) was going through a marketplace when he passed a butcher’s shop. The butcher said to him that he had fresh meat that day and pressed him to buy some of it. The Imam answered that he did not have money on him then. The butcher said that he would sell him the meat on credit. The Imam said, “Rather, I would say to my stomach to be patient. And if I cannot do that to my stomach, I would rather ask you to be patient until I got the money. Nevertheless, I shall say to my stomach to be patient.” Speaking of his philosophy of asceticism (zuhd), he had this to say, “If I wanted, I would have found the way to enjoying the best produce of honey, wheat, and linen.”
Thus, Ali (a.s.) could, if he wanted, acquire the best of this world’s enjoyments, for he knew the way to them, and yet he did not want to. Why? This is his answer to this question, “How preposterous! I am not going to let my inclination win over my resoluteness.” He then turned his attention to the life of this world and addressed it, thus, “O Life of this World! Leave me alone. I have given you free rein. I have managed to extricate myself from your clutches and slip away from your snares.”
[This is an epilogue to the lecture, i.e. going back to telling part of the story of the Kerbala tragedy – the martyrdom of Imam Hussain (a.s.)]:
The eleventh of Muharrram, 61 AH. [Circa 680 CE.] was one of the worst days that the Progeny of the Prophet (a.s.) had witnessed. Examining the tragedy of Kerbala from its both ends, i.e. the shining side that is full of vivid images of bravery, patience and sacrifice in the cause of God and the dark side that teems with the ugliest imagery of treachery, vileness, and crime, the implications of the dialogue between God and the angels when He was informing them of Adam’s creation, would become manifestly clear,
“Behold, thy Lord said to the angels; I will create a vicegerent on earth. They said: Wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood? Whilst we do celebrate Thy praises and glorify Thy holy (name)? He said: I know what ye know not.” (2/30).
All that which the angels saw of the nature of man and his ability to do mischief, his capacity for going astray and arrogance, was demonstrated at the battle of Kerbala. And yet, alongside that evil, the epitomes of virtue and sublimity were also established. The angels did not see these luminous aspects of man, when God Almighty addressed them, thus, “I know what ye know not.”
Indeed, Kerbala was a strange battleground for trials. The criminals committed the most heinous crimes. Among those was the act of violence perpetrated against children and young people, beheading them and tearing their corpses to pieces before the eyes of their mothers. Those who were massacred in this way on that day in Kerbala were eight, three youth and five children.
Al-Qassim, son of Imam al-Hassan (a.s.) was another of the Kerbala martyrs, whose killing, in that gruesome way, was witnessed by his mother.
Awn bin Abdulla bin Ja’far was another martyr who was killed in the same way. His mother, Zeinab, [daughter of Imam Ali (a.s.)], witnessed his killing. Zeinab had demonstrated a noble character and sublime upbringing, in that historians are almost unanimous in confirming that she did not mention any thing about her son, be it before or after his martyrdom, as she must have been aware of what was going to happen to her brother, Imam Hussain (a.s.). So, she treated the sacrifice of her son as a small contribution towards defending her brother and the principles he stood for. This self-denial was evident when she came out of her tent in the wake of the martyrdom of her nephew, Ali al-Akbar, lamenting his death.
Another of the martyrs of Kerbala was a boy, aged ten. Historiographers have it that the boy came out of his tent disorientated after the martyrdom of Imam Hussain. He was distraught because the events, which were unfolding before his eyes, overwhelmed him. He was spotted by one of the enemy camp who descended upon him, beheaded him and snatched two earrings he was wearing. This happened in the presence of his mother, who went out to look for him.
Another young boy met his death that day in a shocking manner. It was Abdullah bin Imam al-Hassan (a.s.), who was around ten years old. It is said that when his father died he was either still in his mother’s womb or a suckling sibling. He was brought up by his uncle, Imam Hussain (a.s.). That is why there was a strong bond between uncle and nephew.
Although Imam Hussain ordered members of his family not to venture out of their tents, yet he could not bear staying put after his uncle fell to the ground having been fatally wounded in the battle. He broke free from her aunt’s hands, Zeinab, who was trying to restrain him, and ran towards his uncle, shouting, “By God! I am not going to part with my uncle.” Having reached the place where his uncle fell, he threw himself on his uncle’s chest. Imam Hussain (a.s.) showed utmost forbearance and hugged the boy.
In the meantime, a soldier of the enemy’s camp was about to drive his sword into the body of Imam Hussain when the boy yelled at him, saying, “O son of the evil one! Are you killing my uncle?” He then raised his arm to prevent the sword blow from reaching the body of his uncle. The full force of the blow fell on his arm, severing it. The boy shouted, “O Uncle! Help!” [While still lying, suffering from his wounds], the Imam embraced his nephew tighter, saying to him, “O my newphew! Show patience for what has befallen you. God will soon unite you with your pure fathers and forefathers – The Messenger of God, Ali, Hamza, Ja’far and al-Hassan.”
[It is customary to conclude lectures, such as this one, given to big gatherings, with the following prayer (supplication)]:
O God! Fill our hearts up with the light of faith. Fill them up with Your love and the love of your friends. O God! Increase our faith and make our hearts fast set on Your religion. O God! Grant the sick among the faithful a speedy recovery and shower our dead with Your forgiveness and mercy. O God! Accept our works and the works of those who seek, with effort and/or money, to hold commemorative assemblies for the martyrdom of Imam Hussain (a.s.) and glorify Your worship and propagate His injunctions. O God! Out of Your Grace, give us of the sustenance of this world and the next. There is neither power nor refuge except with God Almighty. And may peace be with Mohammad and his Pure Progeny.
Lecture three
In the Name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful
Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds, the Creator of all beings, and may peace be with the servant of God, His Messenger, friend, the chosen one, the trustee of His secret and the transmitter of His Message, our lord and prophet, Mohammad and his pure and infallible progeny.
I seek refuge in God from the reviled Satan,
“He who forsakes his home in the cause of God, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious: Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God: And God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” (4/100).
Among the subjects that the Holy Qur’an paid attention to, as did Islamic jurisprudence, is the question of immigration (hijra). In the opinion of the majority of us, hijra revolves around a special historical incident that took place in the early days of Islam. That event was the migration of the Great Messenger (s.a.w.) and his companions from Mecca to Medina. That event marked the Hijri calendar [For those who want to have some idea of the date according to the Western dating system, a rough guide is to add some 620 years to the Islamic date.].
No doubt this event is very significant because it represents a milestone in the history and development of Islam. However, is the importance of hijra limited to this event? Do all the references made in the Holy Qur’an to hijra and deeming the muhajirs (migrants) in rank on a par with the mujahideen (fighters), such as “Those who believe, and emigrate, and fight for the Faith, in the cause of Allah..” (8/74), belong to that particular historical event and that there is left no other signification to be inferred after that event? Is this really the situation with hijra, or is it not, in common with belief and jihad, governed by any particular time or place? No doubt, there is no way the meaning of hijra (immigration), like jihad and belief, can be confined to what happened in the early days of Islam. Whatever meaning was attached to hijra in those days, and in the same measure was true of jihad, makes both general and constant rulings. That is, they are not the exclusive preserve of a particular time or place.
Imam Ali (a.s.) has discussed this topic in Nahjul Balagha (The Path of Eloquence). [A collection of his sermons, letters, and axioms] and said, “Hijra is commensurate with its first meaning.” (al-hijra qa’ima ala haddihal awwal), meaning that hijra is not restricted to a particular time or place. And as the Prophet (s.a.w.) found it necessary to emigrate from Mecca to Medina, his followers must do the same, should circumstances make it necessary for them to emigrate. Our reading of Imam Ali’s statement is that we cannot argue that there are no practical expressions for hijra post the Prophet era.
Now, let us dwell on the definition and significance of hijra. As we have already mentioned, immigration means moving away from home, family and friends in order to preserve one’s faith. What is self-evident is that since this is the definition of the concept, you cannot restrict it to a particular time or space. This is the Islamic standpoint of hijra. Taking the cue from the definition, it becomes obligatory on the person to flee his place of abode where they may endanger their religious life if they stayed. So, if you are presented with one of two alternatives, in that you either lose your faith, or find somewhere else to practice it freely, Islam obligates his followers to embark on hijra to protect their religion.
In the Holy Qur’an, there is a verse that discusses “force majeure”, [or power that cannot be acted or fought against]. Many among our people, who have grown accustomed to doing what is vile, seem to cite this principle as an excuse for their going astray and being overwhelmed by social custom. That is, even though some social norms go against the grain of religion. So, when you take issue with someone and ask them why they do not seem embarrassed by joining in parties where, for example, alcohol is being served and consumed, an act that is unlawful (haraam), their answer comes ready, “Society’s customs push us to do so. There is nothing we can do. Society is afflicted with corruption and deviant practices.”
Indeed, the pretext of “force majeure” has become a scapegoat for many sinners. Islam rejects these reasons, on the whole and in detail. Islam outlines for us clearly defined positions vis-à-vis corrupt societies, making it a religious duty of the Muslim to do his level best to reverse the decadence and degeneration of society and rehabilitate its members to live a moral life in accordance with the path and ideals that have been mapped out by Islam. Nevertheless, should it prove that we are facing an uphill struggle, in that there is no hope in making the profligate society in which we live mend its ways, that we reached a conclusion that our present and future generation might be adversely affected, Islam offers us a way out – immigration to some other place where we can safeguard our religion.
It is noteworthy that immigration could prove sufficient if one moves out from one’s usual place of abode to some other neighbourhood. That is, you do need to contemplate moving out from your own hometown or homeland, for that matter. This is particularly true of metropolises like Tehran, for example, where you can find neighbourhoods where children can be brought up in an Islamic climate. This is in contrast to other areas within the same city where you can hardly come across any hint of Islamic life. Families who moved houses to such districts would be confronted with unsavoury scenes, let alone the absence of Islamic institutions, such as mosques and seminaries.
It is quite possible that such unbecoming environments might not negatively influence the adult population among us, especially those who have been brought up in Islamic climates and who have become immune to such influences. Nevertheless, what would the consequences for young children be? Those children will open their eyes on climates plagued with deviation and corruption. So, there is a risk that such children will not emerge true young Muslims. Here, there is a question that begs for an answer. What is the religious duty vis-à-vis this issue?
The answer is that in the beginning every effort should be made towards turning those societies into Muslim ones. For example, if there was no mosque in that neighbourhood, a real effort should be made to build one. However, the mosque alone is not an end in itself. It should be a hub for religious activity, i.e. in the form of acts of worship, giving lectures, and holding preaching sessions.
Whoever discharged their duty in this regard, they will be deemed among the propagators of Islam. However, if we cannot succeed in our mission, what should our religious duty be? At this juncture, Islam orders us to run away from that society that has become accustomed to immoral practices, for we might get caught up in the state of things as they are, if not become part of it. The Qur’anic logic rejects seeing us remorseful, by hiding under the umbrella of “force majeure”, for losing our religion. This has been made manifestly clear by this Qur’anic verse:
“When angels take the souls of those who die in sin against their souls. They say: In what (plight) were ye? They reply: Weak and oppressed were we in the earth. They say: Was it not Allah’s earth spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from evil)?” (4/97).
The holy verse talks about that group of people, whose records the angel found appalling, not least by doing themselves injustice, asking them: What has happened to you? Why did the records of your deeds become so disgraceful? Since they have nothing of substance to come up with, they resort to the same old excuses: “we were deemed weak in the land”.
They go on to say, “We were living in corrupt societies, where it was not possible for us to know about pristine Islam and what it stands for; we lacked knowledge; there were no teachers of Islam we could turn to, ” The angelic answer comes crisp and clear, ”Was it not Allah’s earth spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from evil)?” You have yourself only to blame, not least for condoning those corrupt climates. Not all the corners of the world were as bad as the environments you allowed yourselves to be hostage to. There were places that were conducive to that which is good and commendable. So, why did not you emigrate to them?
Just to reiterate that Islam attaches great importance to immigration, in the sense of abandoning family and homeland, with a view to preserving one’s religion and practicing it in freedom. According to this meaning, immigration is a constant law, in that it is not limited to a particular time or place and that it is not confined to the immigrants of the early Islamic era.
However, it seems that some people have gone to extremes in interpreting the meaning and the concept of hijra (immigration) as is mentioned in the above-quoted verse. They argue that the verse has it, “Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger”. That is, while the verse mentions the point where the hijra takes place, it does not mention the destination where the immigrant intends to go, mentioning instead “God and His Messenger”.
They further maintain that the latter is an abstract destination and not material, i.e. it is in the mind and the conscience. Thus, they conclude that the significance of the word entails that this type of hijra is a notional one in which man exerts himself towards attaining that which is sublime and which brings him closer to God; in other words, it is a journey towards God that does not require actual physical travel away from family and homeland. That is, man could make this journey from the cosiness of his home through striving with his tempting self to reaching perfection, not least by keeping up prayer, fast, supplication, and other forms of worship that are capable of bringing him closer to his Creator.
Yet, when the exponents of this brand of interpretation are asked as to the objective of such a journey, they say God and his proximity, for whose purpose man does battle with his own self and tries to cultivate his spiritual life in order to be nearer to God. They, therefore, maintain that there is no need to cover the distances, leaving behind family and home, as, to their mind, the home mentioned in the verse is not the real home; rather, a figurative one, i.e. the abode of the soul and the boundaries of the ego. To sum up, their interpretation of the verse can be put thus: Whoever breaks free from the bondage of his own inclinations and emigrates to God, his reward would come from Him. This, of course, is a misconception and an erroneous reading of the verse.
In this verse, the Holy Qur’an talkes about the two types of hijra (immigration). Here, there is an example of the inimitable style of the Qur’an; the home (house) which the Qur’an mentions in the verse is the physical structure we all know. And yet, it wants to say to us: O you who emigrate from your home! Be it from one neighbourhood to another, from one hometown to another, or from one homeland to another, let it be known to you that your objective (final destination) should be God alone. Otherwise, your immigration will not be of any value, even if you travel from one end of the globe to the other, and sacrifice everything in the process, i.e. your home, family and worldly possessions, and were contented with poverty instead. This is the Qur’anic logic that is corroborated by the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) in this hadith, “Who intended his immigration for God and His Messenger, then it would be deemed so. And yet, whoever embarked on immigration, seeking a financial benefit or a [heart of a] woman he wanted to win, his immigration would be judged by the intended end. ” (al-Bukhari Authentic Compendia of Hadith, p.22, vol. 1).
It looks as though the Prophet (s.a.w.) wanted to say, “I welcome the immigrant who had a covenant with God that what he did was for His sake. Physical migration of a group of people to the target destination, i.e. Medina, shorn of good and pure intentions that their migration was in His Cause alone, is worthless.”
This is true of the concept of jihad, for it is not sufficient for man to brandish his sword and fight the enemies of God. This should go hand in hand with the intent and purpose of seeking the pleasure of God and in His Cause. It is possible that you find, in the ranks of Muslims, a combatant who shows unparalleled zeal in the battle, and yet if you divulge his secret you would find that his real purpose behind showing that fervour was driven by self-aggrandizement; he sought to gain personal fame, in that he aspired for his picture to be circulated and history sings his praise. Another example is that of him who takes part in the war effort in the hope that they do not get killed, only to enjoy the materialistic privileges, and thus they would score victory on both the tracks, i.e. that of this life and the hereafter.
All these appearances do not count as jihad in the cause of God. Of course, man could win in this world by virtue of jihad, provided that his ultimate end is not securing a place in it.
In one of the battles, some companions of the Prophet (s.a.w.) commended the effort of one of the combatants, called Qazman, i.e. how good, brave and sincere he was. The Prophet did not pay attention to such commendations. He used to say, “He is among the inmates of hellfire.” When the news of his death in the battle came to the Prophet, he remarked, “God does whatever He wills.” Another version of the story of how he was killed reached the prophet. It was reported that he committed suicide. The Prophet said, “I am the Messenger of God!” This is how the story was told: He fought very valiantly, so much so that he killed some seven people among the infidels. Having sustained serious injuries, he managed to stagger as far as the neighbourhood of Bani Dhafar. The Muslims spoke good of his “heroism” and that he would be rewarded. He retorted: I fought only in pursuit of personal fame and in defence of the honour and pride of my kinsmen. Had it not been for that, I would have never joined in the battle. Having, experienced severe pain due to his serious wounds, he reached out for his arrow kit, pulled an arrow and killed himself with it. (Ibn Hisham’s Prophetic Biography, vol. 2, p. 88).
After the people heard about the fate of Qazman, they realized why the Prophet was not impressed by all the reports about his heroism in the battle. This should reinforce the true meaning of jihad, i.e. it has to be purely in the cause of God. By the same token, immigration (hijra) has to be so. In other words, immigration, in the sense of physically removing oneself from their roots and moving away, should go hand in hand with the intention of moving towards God to achieve His pleasure and be closer to Him. Islam encourages both types of hijra, and the Holy Qur’an mentions them both, “Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger..”
This verse talks about immigration on two levels, one in body and the other in spirit. The immigrant travels in body from one place to the other, while his spirit departs from the phase of egotism to the phase of sincere loyalty to God Almighty. A refugee of this type is the one whom God has promised with reward, “His reward becomes due and sure with God.” How profound this description is! God means that the reward of this refugee is far greater than that which the intellect can comprehend; it is far greater than words can explain.
In one of the commentaries on this particular verse, it has been said that a good example of the immigrant meant by the verse is a theology student who leaves behind family and friends and travels to a new place in pursuit of Islamic knowledge and scholarship. The aim of this theology trainee is to attain new levels of learning, so that he becomes better equipped to impart religious knowledge, revive the faith and spread the Word of God, doing away with personal gain, fame, and looking down on others. The said student is deemed an immigrant in the cause of God, so long as his objective behind travel was God, and for the sake of meeting the needs of Islam and Muslims.
That said, this is not confined to theology students; rather, it covers the students in other fields, such as medicine and engineering, provided the aim is discharging one’s religious duty, i.e. by way of wajibun kifa’ie (A collective obligation imposed on the Muslim community, and yet if any of its members discharged it, other Muslims become absolved from the responsibility). For example, a person moves out of his homeland to some other foreign country to train to become a physician out of his feeling the need of society for Muslim doctors and also out of a sense of duty (wajibun kifa’ie). This student is deemed an immigrant in the cause of God, provided that earning His pleasure was his intention, and not worldly gains of this sort or the other, “Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God.” So, should they meet their death while in the host town/country, their reward would come from God, and their rank would be close to that of mujahideen (fighters).
As we have already mentioned, the Holy Qur’an speaks about the two types of immigration in the same breath. Now, let us pose this question: When would the person qualify for both the descriptions, i.e. an immigrant and a mujahid at the same time? The answer to this question is that the description is true of the person who takes to immigration in the way of God and whose aim is to come to the rescue of the faith and the spiritual life of society. Thus, such a person would meet the criteria set in this Qur’anic verse, “Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God.”
By the same token such a person would be covered by all the Qur’anic verses that talk about jihad, such as:
“Allah hath purchased of the believers their persons and their goods; for theirs (in return) is the Garden (of Paradise): They fight in His Cause, and slay and get slain: A promise binding on Him in Truth, through the Torah, the Gospel, and the Qur’an: And who is more faithful to his covenant than Allah.” (9/111).
Imam Hussain (a.s.) is the best of examples of a muhajir (immigrant)/mujahid (fighter), in that he moved away from his hometown and waged genuine jihad in the cause of God, i.e. in defence of Islam not to undergo deviation and the faith of the Islamic umma (community), lest it should be lost. Moses, son of Imran (a.s.), was another immigrant in the cause of God for he left his country, Egypt, and headed for Medyen. The same goes for Abraham, “He said: I will go to my Lord! He will surely guide me!” (37/99). He left his homeland of his own accord. However, what puts Imam Hussain (a.s.) in a different league is that in his immigration, he was both an immigrant and a mujahid (fighter).
The immigrants of the early days of Islam were immigrants per se. That is, before the Divine order of jihad was issued, they were only immigrants. However, after the Divine instruction, the description of “mujahid – fighter” was applied to those of them who took part in jihad.
In a dream, the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) said to his grandson, al-Hussain (a.s.) that God has promised him with a rank that was not going to be achieved only with martyrdom by way of getting slain in His cause”.
En route from Mecca [in present day Saudi Arabia] to Kerbala [in Iraq], Imam Hussain [and members of his family and some companions] spent twenty-three days travelling. Before his departure from Mecca, he gave a sermon to the people mentioning in it his immigration and jihad and said, “The similitude of the inevitability of man’s death is that of a necklace worn by a young woman. I therefore yearn to have reunion with my predecessors in the same way Jacob was yearning to be united with [his son] Joseph.”
What the lord of the free wanted to say is that he did not fear death and getting martyred in the cause of God and His religion, and that faith is a source of pride for man in as much as the necklace that adorns a woman’s neck, and that he could not wait to join his predecessors. The Imam went on to tell them about how he was going to be martyred, “It is better to meet my death, as I have a feeling that I will be torn to pieces by the desert beasts between Nawawees and Kerbala.”
The Imam (a.s.) moved to another topic to talk about how he, and members of his household had been immersed in God’s love and said, “Seeking our, i.e. the Progeny of the Prophet’s, pleasure is seeking the Pleasure of God. We forbear His affliction, only to reward us with the recompense of the forbearing. What He loved we love, what He allotted to us, we accepted. Should He have chosen for us safety, we would love it. Yet, should He have afflicted us with hardships and illness, we would accept. Should He have chosen for us to keep silent, we would oblige. Should He have wanted for us to talk, we would oblige. Should He have chosen for us stillness, we would oblige, and yet, should He have decreed that we should move around, we would oblige.”
After that, he declared that he was intent on emigrating in the way of God, calling on the people to join him, if they had resolved that they were doing it for God, provided that they were prepared for jihad and sacrificing their blood for His cause, “Those of you who have reached a conclusion that they are going to sacrifice themselves for our cause, making their mind up that they will reunite with God, let them join us, as I am determined to set forth tomorrow morning, God willing!”
In the beginning huge crowds accompanied the convoy of Imam Hussain (a.s.), among whom some who were still reluctant to accept the statement of the Imam about what would be in store for him and his companions, and that there was still hope that they would scrape through. On the way through his journey, other groups of people joined him. As he had made it clear to everyone that whoever chose to accompany him in his fateful journey should be ready for the ultimate sacrifice and the hope to meet with one’s Lord, he did not want in his company any of the fainthearted, who were not ready for martyrdom.
Accordingly, he used to remind everybody who was with him, on different occasions and stages of the journey, as to the gigantic task ahead. This was with the aim of winnowing the wheat from the chaff, giving the chance for those who were not up to the responsibility to melt away. In so doing, the Imam had wanted to ensure that those who would remain with him to the end were those whose hearts God had tried with true faith, so much so that they submit to His Will, come what may. When it reached the crunch, none stuck it out with him other than a band of loyal companions among the true believers, to whose bravery and integrity he had these words of praise, “I do not know of any companions who are more superior to mine.” This testimony of the Imam means that he was trying to say to his companions: If I were given an option to choose between you and the companions of the Prophet in the battle of Badr, I would have chosen you over them. Were I given a choice between you and the companions of Ali in the battle of Siffeen, I would have preferred you to them. You are the lords, and the crowns over the heads, of all martyrs.
On the eve of the tenth of Muharram [62 AH, 680 CE] Imam Hussain (a.s.) gave permission to his companions to leave him under the cover of darkness, saying to them, “I think our appointment with those (the enemy) is tomorrow. So, I give you leave to go away, having no liability on you. Darkness is spreading and engulfing you; so, why do you not make use of it and slip away. And let each one of you take a man of my household with them. May God compensate you with the best of rewards. Scatter among the masses and in the towns. Indeed, the enemy is after me; thus, if they were successful in getting me, they would forget about you. Bring to mind the killing of Muslim [bin Aqeel, his cousin, and emissary to Kufa], which would be sufficient. Please leave.”
This was the last test the Imam put the loyalty and truthfulness of his companions through. He absolved them from the covenant of allegiance they made with him; he set them free from their religious obligation, in that it was incumbent on them to be on his side in the war. However, they all refused to accede to his request, insisting that they preferred to die defending him. The first to declare that position was his brother al-Abbas, who said, “May God let us not ever witness that!” These were reassuring words for Imam Hussain for they demonstrated the fact that they shared his aim, vision, belief and determination. At that juncture, Imam Hussain (a.s.), once again made clear to them as to what he was expecting to happen come tomorrow, “Tomorrow, I will be killed, so will you. No one will be spared, even al-Qassim and Abdullah, the infant.”
On the tenth of Muharram, Imam Hussain (a.s.) awarded his comrades in arms medals and honour whose memory would not go away. In the dying moments of the battle of Kerbala and the last throws of his life, after almost all male members of his family alongside his companions were martyred, the Imam stood, amid the multitudes of the enemy, turning his eyes around, only to see that there was neither a supporter nor a helper, apart from the grisly sight of dead bodies strewn all over the battlefield. At that point in time, he was reported as saying something like this:
I do not see on this ground a living person except those mutilated bodies, in reference to the dead bodies of his companions. Thus, the Imam considered those dead bodies the truly living beings that were worthy of his cry for help, thus, “O heroes of Safa! And knights of war! Rise from your sleep, O sons of the honourable ones! Fend off the thugs from encroaching upon the noble ladies among the Progeny of the Prophet.” That cry for help was made after the enemy attacked and ransacked the tents where members of Imam Hussain’s family, mostly women, were sheltering. And yet, the Imam responded to his own call for help and apologised for them on their behalf, “How could they answer, when they were turned into headless corpses.”
Murtaza Mutahhari
Imam reza network

The Rulers are the People's Trustees Not Their Lords

In the last chapter, we said that a dangerous and misleading view became current in the thought of some modern European thinkers interlinking in an unnatural fashion the belief in God on the one hand and negation of peoples rights on the other. This correlation played a significant role in inducing a group to incline towards materialism. Duty and responsibility to God was assumed to necessarily negate the duty and responsibility to the people. Divine obligations completely displaced human obligations. The belief and faith in God (Who, according to the Islamic teachings, created the universe on the principles of truth and justice) was considered to conflict with and contradict the belief in innate and natural human rights, instead of being regarded as their basis. Naturally, belief in the right of people\'s sovereignty was equated with atheism.
From Islamic point of view the case is actually the reverse. In the Nahj al-balaghah, which is the subject of our discussion, the main topics are tawhid and \'irfan; throughout the talk is about God, whose Name occurs repeatedly everywhere in its pages. Nevertheless, it not only does not neglect to discuss the rights of the people and their privileges vis-a-vis the ruler, in fact regarding the ruler as the trustee and protector of their rights, but also lays great emphasis on this point. According to the logic of this noble book, the imam and the ruler is the protector and trustee of the rights of the people and responsible to them. If one is asked as to which of them exists for the other, it is the ruler\' who exists for the people and not vice versa. Sa\'di has a similar idea in his mind when he says:
It\'s not the sheep who are to serve the shepherd, But it is the shepherd who is for their service.
The word ra\'iyyah (lit. herd), despite that it gradually acquired an abominable meaning in the Persian language, has an original meaning which is essentially good and humanitarian. The word ra\'i for the ruler and ra\'iyyah for the masses first appears in the speech of the Prophet (\'s) and is literally used thereafter by \'Ali (\'a).
This word is derived from the root ra\'a, which carries the sense of \'protection\' and \'safeguarding\'. The word ra\'iyyah is applied to the people for the reason that the ruler is responsible for protecting their lives, property, rights, and liberties.
A tradition related from the Holy Prophet (\'s) throws full light on the meaning of this word:
Truly, everyone of you is a raii responsible for his rai\'yyah. The ruler is the ra\'i of his people and responsible for them; the woman is the ra\'i of her husband\'s house and responsible for it; the slave is the ra\'i of his master\'s property and responsible for it; indeed all of you are ra\'i and responsible [for those under your charge]. [1]
In the preceding pages we cited some examples from the Nahj al-balaghah which illustrated \'Ali\'s outlook regarding the rights of the people. Here we shall give sample quotes from other sources, beginning with the following verse of the Holy Quran:
God commands you to deliver trusts back to their owners; and that when you judge between the people, judge with justice ... (4:58)
Al-Tabarsi, in his exegesis Majma\' al-bayan, commenting upon this verse, remarks:
There are several opinions regarding the meaning of this verse; firstly, that it is about trusts in general, including the Divine and the non Divine, the material and the non-material trusts; secondly, that it is addressed to the rulers, and that God, by making the returning of the trusts an obligation, is commanding them to observe the rights of the people.
Then he further adds:
This is corroborated by the verse immediately following it:
O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you ... (4:59)
According to this verse the people are bound to obey the commands of God, His Messenger and those in authority (wulat al-\'amr). While the preceding verse mentions the rights of the people, this one reiterates the complementary rights of those in authority. It has been related from the Imams (\'a) that \'one of these two verses is ours (i.e. it establishes our rights in relation to you), and the other is yours (i.e. it outlines your rights in relation to us)\' ... Al-Imam al-Baqir (\'a) said that the performanee of salat, zakat, sawm, and Hajj are some of the trusts (mentioned in 4:58). One of the trusts (amanat) is that the wulat al-\'amr have been commanded to justly distribute the ghana\'im, sadaqat, and whatever is a part of the rights of the people, among them.
In the exegesis al-Mizan, in the part of the commentary upon this verse which deals with tradition, the author relates a tradition from al-Durr al-manthur from \'Ali (\'a) that he said:
It is incumbent on the imam to rule according to the decrees revealed by God, and to discharge the trusts that he has been charged with. When he does that, it is incumbent upon the people to pay attention to the Divine command (about obeying the wali al-\'amr), to obey him and respond to his call.
As noticed earlier, the Holy Quran considers the ruler and the head of the State as a trustee and a guardian; it regards just government as a fulfillment of a trust entrusted to the ruler. The approach of the Imams(\'a), in particular that of Amir al-Mu\'minin \'Ali (\'a), corresponds with the view which can be inferred from the Holy Quran.
Now that we know the Quran\'s view of this matter, we may go on to examine the statements of the Nahj al-balaghah on this issue. More than anything else, we must study \'Ali\'s letters to his governors, especially those which were meant to be official circulars. It is in these letters that we would find glimpses of the teachings of Islam regarding the functions of the ruler and his duties towards the people as well as their rights. Ali (\'a), in his letter to the governor of Adharba\'ijan, reminds him of his duties towards the people in these words:
Beware lest you consider this assignment as a bait [for acquiring personal gain]; rather, it is a trust lying on your neck. You have been charged with caretaking [of the people] by your superior. It is not for you to betray your duties with respect to the people (ra\'iyyah). (Kutub 5)
In another letter written as a circular to tax collectors, after a few words of advice and admonition, \'Ali (\'a) says:
Fulfill the demands of justice in your relationship with the people and be patient in matters regarding their needs; because you are treasurers of the people (ra\'iyyah), representatives of the community (Ummah), and envoys of your imams. Kutub 51
In the famous epistle to Malik al-\'Ashtar, which contains elaborate instructions about various aspects of government, he writes:
Awaken your heart to kindness and mercy for the people (ra\'iyyah) and love and tenderness for them. Never, never act with them like a predatory beast which seeks to be satiated by devouring them, for the people fall into two categories: they are either your brethren in faith or your kindred in creation ... Do not ever say, \'I have been given authority\' or \'My command should be obeyed.\' Because it corrupts the heart, consumes one\'s faith, and invites calamities.
In another letter sent as a circular to army commanders, he says:
It is an obligation that an official should not behave differently with the people (ra\'iyyah) on account of a distinction he receives or material advantage that he may achieve. Instead these favours from Allah should bring him nearer to God\'s creatures and increase his compassion towards his brethren. Kutub 50
\'Ali (\'a) shows an amazing sensitivity to justice and compassion towards the people and a great respect for them and their rights, which, as reflected in his letters, is an exemplary and unique attitude towards this issue.
There is another letter in the Nahj al-balaghah consisting of instructions to the collectors of zakat, and is entitled: \'To the officials assigned to the job of collecting zakat\'. The title indicates that it was not addressed to any particular official but sent either as a general instruction in writing or delivered as a routine oral instruction. Al-Sayyid al-Radi has included it in the section of kutub, or letters, with the clarification that he is placing this letter here to show to what extent \'Ali was meticulous in matters pertaining to justice and rights of the people, being attentive not only to main points but also to minute details. Here are \'Ali\'s instructions:
Set out with the fear of God, Who is One and has no partner. Do not intimidate any Muslim. Do not tresspass upon his land so as to displease him. Do not take from him more than Allah\'s share in his property. When you approach a tribe, at first come down at their watering place, stay there instead of entering their houses. Approach them with calm dignity and salute them when you stand amongst them, grudge not a proper greeting to them. Then say to them "O servants of God, the Wali and Khalifah of God has sent me to you to collect from you Allah\'s share in your property. Is there anything of His share in your property? If there is, return it to His Wali. " If someone says \'No\', then do not repeat the demand. If someone answers in the affirmative, then go with him without frightening, threatening, or compelling him. Take whatever gold and silver he gives you. If he has cattle or camels, do not approach them save with his permission, because the major part belongs to him. When you arrive (into the cattle enclosure), do not enter upon them in a bossy and rude manner ... Kutub 25, also see 26, 27 and 46
The passages quoted above are sufficient to throw light on \'Ali\'s attitude as a ruler toward the people under his rule.
Notes:
[1] Bukhari, Kitab al Nikah, vol. VIII
Murtaza Mutahhari
Imam reza network

Why Wilayat al-Faqih?

In the previous chapter, we encountered the absolute priority of God as a fundamental component of Imami political doctrine. After all, it is He who has accorded the Holy Prophet and the Imams (peace be upon them) the authority to lead and govern the Islamic society (ummah), and ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ is an extension of this authority. However, while the Wilayat of the Imams has traditionally been verified according to Islamic theology (kalam), the guardianship of the jurists (Wilayat al-Faqih) is almost exclusively discussed within the sphere of jurisprudence (fiqh). Hence the universal authority of the faqih (Wilayat al- amma) must be substantiated according to ijtihad (juridical reasoning).
This method shall be referred to as an “internal justification” as it is intended to convince those who already accept the basic principals of the Shi’a creed. On the other hand, Wilayat al-Faqih, as a political model of guardianship, must be able to justify itself amongst other political ideologies; especially the democratic theories that essentially criticize any guardianship form of state. This approach is what we shall refer to as the “external justification” for the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih, and we shall return to it later.
The internal justification relies primarily on religious traditions narrated from the Holy Prophet and Imams, although some jurists also refer to rational arguments as well. Consequently, from the basis of Islamic jurisprudence, the authority of the faqih may be established according to sunnah (traditions) and reason (daleel al-aql).
Traditional Evidences for Wilayat al-Faqih
Imami jurists usually refer to a set of reports from the Prophet Muhammad and the Imams to establish Wilayat al- amma for the fuqaha. We shall examine a few of them here.
A Signet Letter (Tuqih)[63]from the Absent Imam
One of the most reliable traditions adduced by scholars[64] for the purpose of this discussion is a report from the twelfth and absent Imam (May God hasten his reappearance). Shaykh al-Sadiq transmits in his book ‘Ikmal al-Deen wa itmam an-Ni\'ma’ that Ishaq ibn Yaqub wrote a letter to the absent Imam asking him about some concerns that he had. The Imam\'s deputy (Muhammad ibn Uthman al-Umari) conveyed the letter to him. The Imam replied:
As for events that may occur (al-hawadith al-waqi\'a) [when you may need guidance] refer to the transmitters (ruwat) of our teachings who are my Hujjah (proof) to you and I am the proof of God (Hujjatullah) to you all[65].
Shaykh al-Tusi also transmits the narration in the book ‘al- Qayba’[66] and other collections of Imami ahadith report the tradition from the books mentioned above.
Advocates of Wilayat al-Faqih often refer to the second part of the tradition, namely, “they are my proof to you, and I am the proof of God to you all” to establish the authority of the fuqaha. However, some scholars (such as Imam Khomeini) maintain that the first part of the hadith may also be used to establish the authority of the faqih. The first section of this narration encourages people to ask those who relate the traditions of the Imams (peace be upon them) about any new occurrences that they encounter. It is highly unlikely that Ishaq ibn Yaqub asked the Imam about what was to be done regarding religious questions; even ordinary Shi’a would know that in these cases of fiqh (jurisprudence) one should refer to the fuqaha (jurists). In fact, according to some narrations, people would recourse to the students of an Imam during his lifetime. Therefore, Ishaq must have been referring to something other than this by his question about ‘al-hawadith al-waqi’a’, Imam Khomeini says:
What is meant by hawadith al-waqi\'a is rather the newly arising problems that affect the people and Muslims. The question Ishaq ibn Yaqub was implicitly posing was this: now that we no longer have access to you, what should we do with respect to social problems? What is our duty?[67]
It is necessary to establish what the Imam meant by ‘ruwat’ (narrators), when he commands his followers to refer to the narrators of traditions with respect to these new circumstances. After all, it is self evident that people who merely transmit traditions and narrate what they have seen and heard, without a comprehensive understanding of the science of ahadith or jurisprudence, are not qualified to undertake this duty. Therefore the Imam must have been referring to the fuqaha (jurists) who are experts in the interpretation and explanation of Islamic sources.
We mentioned earlier that most Imami jurists usually refer to the second part of this tradition to establish the guardianship of the jurists. The statement makes clear that fuqaha (ruwat) act as the proof (Hujjah) of the Imam in all matters in which the Imam acts as the proof of Allah. Imam Khomeini describes a ‘proof of God’ (or Hujjah) as someone who God has designated to conduct affairs; all his deeds, actions and sayings constitute a proof for the Muslims. If the proof commands you to perform a certain act and you fail to obey him, or if despite the existence of the proof, you turn to oppressive authorities for the solution of your affairs, then God almighty will advance a proof against you on the Day of Judgment[68].
In summary, being a hujjat implies the authority of one over his followers, and hence the injunctions of the holder of such a status must be complied with. Since the Imam as God\'s hujjat (the ‘proof’ that Allah will not accept any excuses for disobeying) has designated the fuqaha as his Hujjah, the commands and directives of the fuqaha are as those of the Imam.
With regards to its chain of transmission (sanad), the only issue that arises is the existence of Ishaq ibn Yaqub. There is no particular attestation of him found in the Imami books of biography (Ela al-Rejal). Hence the question may be raised, how can we be certain that the letter was really issued by the Imam and that Ibn Yaqub received the letter? There is a difference between reporting an ordinary transmission and the claim that one has received a special letter from the Imam in the era of the minor occultation, during which, access to him is only possible through his appointed deputy. The key point, however, is that many great Imami scholars such as Shaykh Sadiq, Shaykh Tusi and specially Shaykh Kolayni, who were alive during the era of the minor occultation (and were experts in ahadith) mention the tradition as ‘tuqih’ which is sufficient evidence for a valid chain of transmission[69].
Maqbula of Umar ibn Hanzala
According to the science of ahadith, the ‘maqbula’ is a narration that has been accepted by fuqaha as a valid tradition without examining the authenticity or weakness of its chain of transmission. In other words, even though some of those who appear as its transmitters may be weak and unreliable, some evidences that support the soundness of the text compel the fuqaha to ignore such weakness.
Umar ibn Hanzala, who was a disciple of Imam as-Sadiq (pbuh) said[70]:
I asked Imam Sadiq whether it was permissible for two of the Shi’a who had a disagreement concerning a debt or an inheritance to seek the verdict of the ruler or judge. He replied: \'anyone who has recourse to taghut [i.e. The illegitimate ruling power], whatever he obtains as a result of their verdict, he will have obtained by forbidden means, even if he has a proven right to it. For he will have obtained it through the verdict and judgment of the taghut, the power that almighty God has commanded him to disbelieve in.
“They wish to seek justice from illegitimate powers, even though they have been commanded to disbelieve therein”. [Al-Qur’an, Chapter 4, Verse 60]
Umar ibn Hanzala then asked what was the correct action for two the Shi’a to take under such circumstances. Imam Sadiq replied:
They must seek out one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well acquainted with our laws and ordinances, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as hakim [judge][71].
No Imami jurist disputes that this tradition firmly establishes the authority of a faqih with regards to the administration of justice (Wilayat al-qada). However, many leading scholars such as Mirza al-Nayini, Sayyid Mohammad Reza Gulpaayigani, Shaykh al-Ansari[72]and Imam Khomeini believe that the text does not confine the authority of a faqih to Wilayat al-qada. They assert that the Imam designated the faqih as trustees of universal authority (Wilayat al-amma) when he said: “I appoint him [faqih] as hakim [judge]”.
However, a judge\'s role is not limited to merely resolving disagreements amongst the people; their conflicts and disagreements compel them to not only recourse to judges, but also to possessors of political power. The tradition of Imam Sadiq (pbuh) unconditionally prohibits any referral to illegitimate authorities (taghut) and there is no reason to assume that the Imam solely commanded his followers not to refer to judges appointed by an illegitimate government, while allowing them to recourse to the same government for the regulation of their affairs. By appointing the faqih as hakim, the Imam made it incumbent upon all Shi’a to refuse any kind of recourse to illegitimate authority. Hence in all aspects of disagreement it is necessary for them to refer to a faqih, whether it is in a governmental or judicial capacity.
There are no problems surrounding this hadith’s chain of transmission. All of the transmitters (Muhammad ibn Yahya, Muhammad ibn al-Hussain, Muhammad ibn Isa, Safvan ibn Yahya and Dawood ibn al-Husayn) are reliable. And although there is no specific confirmation that Umar ibn Hanzala himself existed, fuqaha generally accept this and other transmissions from him.
The Tradition of Abu Khadija
Fuqaha such as Imam Khomeini and Shaykh Muhammad Hassan[73] appeal to a famous transmission that was narrated by Abu Khadija (who was one of Imam Sadiq\'s companions), to argue in favor of Wilayat al-amma. The tradition is mentioned by Shaykh Tusi, Shaykh Sadiq, and Shaykh Kolayni. According to them, Abu Khadija said:
I was commanded by the Imam [Ja\'far as-Sadiq (pbuh)] to convey the following message to our friends [Shi’a]: \'when enmity and dispute arise among you, or you disagree concerning the receipt or payment of a sum of money, be sure not to refer the matter to one of these malefactors for judgment. Designate as judge and arbiter someone amongst you who is acquainted with our junctions concerning what is permitted and what is prohibited, for I appoint such a man as judge over you. Let none of you take your complaint against another of you to the tyrannical ruling power[74].
The explanation of the argument here is similar to the previous narration. Even though the Imam says: “I appoint such a man as judge”, a statement that explicitly concerns Wilayat al-qada, it is essential to recognize that the final section of this transmission is not merely a repetition. Rather it is a prohibition of recourse to tyrannical authorities in matters relating to the executive. In the first instance, the Imam has commanded his followers to turn away from illegitimate judges, while in the second he has prohibited them from referring to other illegitimate powers with regard to non-judicial issues. This indicates that the appointment of a faqih is necessary in all matters of judgment and of government.
Many experts in the field of biography (Elm al-Rejal) testify that Abu Khadija is a trustworthy narrator. In addition, the hadith is well known amongst the fuqaha and classified as mashureh (famous), consequently there is no problem regarding its chain of transmission.
One might suppose that the designations issued by Imam Sadiq in the previous two traditions are temporal and limited to his lifetime. This possibility is based on the assumption that his successors may have dismissed the fuqaha from authority, just as the successors of a ruler may dismiss his previous commands. However, this supposition obviously overlooks the status of Imams within Imami Shi’ism; their commands and instructions are not equitable to those of an average ruler and their orders must be obeyed both during their lifetime and after their death. Furthermore, Imam as- Sadiq referred to a verse of the Qur’an (4:60), which ordains disbelief in taghut (oppressive authority) and prohibits any recourse to illegitimate government as a ground for his designation of the fuqaha as ‘hakim’. This is a strong indication that his edict is not restricted to a specific time, and that it is forever obligatory for people to turn away from tyrannical authorities.
These three traditions are considered reliable and act as solid foundations for the establishment of Wilayat al-amma. Nevertheless there are some disagreements amongst Imami jurists pertaining to the transmission and interpretation of the texts. Most critics maintain that the above-mentioned traditions confirm little more than the administration of justice (Wilayat al-qada) by the fuqaha.
Aside from the three aforementioned traditions, advocates of Wilayat al-amma also appeal to a set of transmissions that, although too weak to prove the universal guardianship of the faqih by themselves, certainly reinforce and verify the doctrine.
The First Tradition: The Sound Transmission of Qadah
Ali bin Ibrahim, from his father, from Hamad bin Eisa from Qadah (Abd al-Allah bin Maimun) from Imam Sadiq (pbuh), who narrated the Prophet (pbuh) as saying:
The superiority of the learned man over the mere worshipper is like that of the full moon over the stars. Truly the ulema (scholars) are the heirs of the Prophet (pbuh); the prophets bequeathed not gold (dinar) and silver (dirham) instead they bequeathed knowledge, and whoever acquires it has indeed acquired a generous portion of their legacy[75].
According to this tradition, the just and pious religious scholars (ulema) are the heirs of the Prophet; consequently, they must fulfil all the attributes and responsibilities that Allah designated for him (aside from receiving the divine revelation). Hence they are entrusted with maintaining his authority (Wilayat) and the integrity of Islam. And, as has become clear from previous discussions, the Prophet has been appointed as the guardian and leader of the ummah. As the Qur’an says:
The Prophet has higher claims over the believers than their own selves. [Chapter 33, Verse 6]
So his right to rule and govern over the believers is also entrusted to the scholars.
Critics believe that the tradition discusses the knowledge rather than the status of the prophets. So the scholars are the heirs of the Prophet in the field of knowledge. The hadiths’ chain of transmission is sound and the fuqaha usually accept it.
The Second Tradition: Saduqs’ Morsala[76]
Shaykh Saduq in several of his many books mentions the following hadith:
Imam Ali narrated the Prophet (pbuh) saying: “O God! Have mercy on those that succeed me” [Kholaphayi]. He repeated this twice and was then asked: “O Messenger of Allah, who are these that succeed you?” He replied: “They are those that come after me, transmit my traditions and practice and teach them to the people after me[77].”
The interpretation of this tradition is similar to the previous one. Those who are successors of the Prophet (pbuh) should have his status (in all areas apart from those such as receiving divine revelation), as Imam Khomeini says:
To be a successor means to succeed to all the functions of Prophethood. In this respect, what is implied by the sentence, ‘O God! Have mercy on my successors’ is not less than what is implied by the sentence: ‘Ali is my successor’, since the meaning of successorship is the same in both cases[78].
The Third Tradition: The Fuqaha are the Trustees of the Prophets
Shaykh Kolayni mentions the following hadith from the Prophet (pbuh): The fuqaha are the trustees of the Prophets, as long as they do not concern themselves with the world (dunya). The Prophet was asked: ‘what is the sign with their concern to this world?’ He replied: ‘By seeing whether they follow Kings (sultans). If they do that, then fear for your religion’[79].
The argument is that the fuqaha are trustees of the Prophet not merely with respect to deducing Islamic laws, but with all the duties and functions of the Prophet (pbuh) and this encompasses the establishment of a religious government and a just social system.
The Fourth Tradition: The Ulema are the Rulers
Amody transmits a tradition from the Commander of the faithful, Ali (pbuh): The ulema [scholars] are the rulers [hakim] over people[80].
The meaning of this tradition explicitly supports Wilayat al- amma, but the chain of transmission is weak.
The Fifth Tradition: Imam Hussain’s Sermon
During a sermon about enjoining good and forbidding evil, Imam Hussein (pbuh) addressed the scholars and said:
…The disaster that has befallen you is greater than what has befallen others, for the true rank and degree ulema has been taken away from you. The administration of the country and the issuing of orders should actually be entrusted to religious scholars (ulema) who are guardians of the rights of God and knowledgeable about Gods ordinances concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden. But your position has been usurped from you, for no other reason than you have abandoned the pivot of truth and have disagreed about the nature of the sunnah, despite the existence of clear proofs. If you were strong in the face of torturing and suffering and prepared to endure hardship for God’s sake, then all proposed regulations would be brought to you for your approval and for you to issue[81].
If it were not for the weakness of its chain of transmission, the tradition would have been the most explicit verification Wilayat al-amma.
The Sixth Hadith: The Fuqaha are the Fortress of Islam
Shaykh Kolayni mentions the tradition from Imam Kazim (pbuh):
Believers who are fuqaha are the fortresses of Islam, like the encircling walls that protect a city[82].
The statement, which is that the fuqaha are the fortresses of Islam, means that fuqaha have a duty to protect Islam. They must do whatever is necessary to fulfil that duty hence they need to follow the Prophet as a good example for every believer. The Qur’an says:
Certainly there is for you in them a good example, for him who fears Allah and the last day. [Chapter 60, Verse 6]
The Prophet (pbuh) as the fortress of Islam did not restrict himself for training and teaching to protect Islam, rather he undertook socio-political duties and functions as well, hence all the tasks entrusted to the Prophet Muhammad must also be fulfilled by the well qualified fuqaha, as a matter of duty to become the true fortresses of Islam.
Wilayat al-amma as Hisbah
By referring to textual evidences (the Qur’an and ahadith), advocates of universal authority (Wilayat al-amma) intend to illustrate that well qualified fuqaha not only have priority over others to govern the believers, but are also explicitly designated as guardians (Wali) of the Muslim community. However, some Imami jurists maintain that even when you overlook the traditional proofs of Wilayat al-Faqih, one can establish the same authority for the faqih by considering ‘hisbah’. Although this method of reasoning cannot confirm the designation of the faqih as Wali, it does emphasize the priority of the fuqaha to undertake these social duties and makes clear that their authority is legitimate.
‘Hisbah’ as a word literally means reward or spiritual wage, and it is usually applied to deeds that are done to please God and seek heavenly reward (thawab). In Islamic jurisprudence, this term refers to something that God is not willing to ignore or overlook. For instance, there are people who are minors or suffer from insanity, who are unable to discharge their own affairs and need someone to take care of them. If they have no father or grandfather, someone else should undertake their responsibilities and since these who prepare themselves to be in charge of their affairs do that for the sake of God, it is called ‘hisbah’.
There is an important difference between ‘hisbah’ and what is referred to as sufficient necessity (wajib al-kefai). Sufficient necessity is an obligation that everyone one can fulfil, but if undertaken by a sufficient number of individuals, other people are relieved of their duty, whereas ‘hisbah’ should be undertaken by the faqih. If a qualified jurist is not available, then only the just believers (mumineen adil) have the right to be in charge of such affairs.
Having clarified the meaning of ‘hisbah’, we will now examine an argument that presupposes the extension of its denotation. People who adopt this line of reasoning argue that ‘hisbah’ is not restricted to its traditional examples such as in the case of minors and the insane. Rather, the philosophy and reasoning behind such a role demand its extension to social and political affairs. This argument has two major premises:
(a) Muslims are obliged to observe the instructions and prohibitions of Islam in all areas of their personal and social lives, and some of these realistically require the authority and apparatus of a state in order to be practically implemented. Furthermore, it is impermissible for the believers to allow illegitimate and unjust rulers to govern their society, while they have the potential to manage their own affairs independently. From a juridical perspective, this premise is universally accepted.
(b) A just faqih must undertake the duty of social and political guardianship for two reasons: either that the traditional evidences supporting Wilayat al-amma are sound, or the just faqih has priority over others to undertake this duty. The reason behind this is that no one has the right to establish his authority over another unless they are qualified to undertake the duty of ‘hisbah’ (guardianship). And the protection of Islam and Islamic society is an instance of ‘hisbah’, which means God is not willing to ignore or overlook it, consequently well-qualified fuqaha have priority over ordinary people to bear this responsibility. In other words, necessarily someone has to undertake the function. We have two options; either to delegate the authority to those who have no professional knowledge about Islam or approve the authority of a just faqih. We have natural misgivings about the former when the later is feasible. Therefore, the fuqaha have a duty and a right to fulfil it[83].
Despite the traditional arguments illustrating that the fuqaha have been designated as Wali, this argument merely establishes the priority of a faqih to be in charge of governmental affairs similar to other cases of hisbah.
The Rational Argument
Recourse to rational argument has a long history amongst Shi’a scholars. Some believe that the rational theory was first adopted by the Zaydi Shi’a, al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim (785 - Medina 860), who argued that divinely appointed political authority is necessary due to the imperfections of human nature[84].
Mullah Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1829), the author of ‘Avaed al-Ayyam’, was the first Imami jurist who appealed to logical reasoning to support the concept of universal authority (Wilayat al-amma).
This approach adopts a similar structure to those rational arguments upon which Shi’a scholars base the necessity of Prophethood and Imamate; that it was necessary for God to appoint some people as Prophets and Imams in order to provide divine guidance to mankind. Therefore it is only reasonable to assume that in the absence of such infallible guidance, God would entrust the responsibilities of religious and political leadership to those people best qualified to undertake it as deputies of the absent, infallible Imam.
Two strands of argument are presented as a justification of Wilayat al-Faqih. The first of which is an argument consisting entirely of rational premises without reference to the Qur’an or traditions, while the second is an argument established by a combination of reasoning and textual evidences. However, purely rational arguments are generally unable to definitively establish the prophecy or leadership of a particular person. Rational arguments must typically consist of universal, certain and necessary premises, and consequently, pure reasoning can prove the necessity of Prophethood and Imamate, although these rational arguments often encompass an explanation of qualifications that the ideal leader should have (e.g. sinless or just). Although there are many different lines of reasoning, it will suffice here to mention a few of them. In his volume concerning theology, Avecina (Ibn Sina) presents a discussion based on the necessity of a well-organised social order in order to establish the necessity of prophets[85].
Although this argument has naturally been appealed to by Muslim scholars and philosophers in order to establish and define Prophethood, the addition of some premises gives it the potential to confirm the necessity of its continuation in the vicegerency of the fuqaha. The structure of modified version of the proof is as follows:
(a) Man is a social being and therefore necessarily needs social order to overcome many of his conflicts and affairs.
(b) Human social life and order should be designed so that it provides individual social happiness.
(c) A set of adequate and perfect laws and the existence of one who is capable of executing these laws and leading society are two necessary conditions for the establishment of an ideal society.
(d) It is not in the power of human beings to establish an ideal, just, and truly well-ordered society without the aid of God and His divine laws.
(e) To avoid any deficiency, interference or possession of God’s message (revelation), the Prophets who delivers His message must be infallible.
(f) The explanation of the contents of the perfect religion and the execution of its laws prerequisite the appointment of infallible Imams.
(g) When there is no access to infallible Imams for attaining the above-mentioned aim (3), the leaders who are just and are expert in religious knowledge (Just faqih)[86].
The first four premises prove the necessity of prophecy and that it is necessary for God to send prophets. The sixth one extends the reasoning to the question of Imamate and the necessity of an infallible Imam. And the final premise establishes the necessity of a qualified religious leader in the era of the absent Imam.
Another rational argument has been presented by Ayatollah Borujerdi who applied some historical and religious premises in his reasoning.
(1) The leader and ruler of a society must be entrusted with the protection of social order and meet the essential needs of the people.
(2) Islam has paid attention to those essential needs and has legislated suitable laws. The ruler (Wali) of Islamic society is responsible for the execution of these laws.
(3) Within the early period of Islam, the Prophet (pbuh) and the Imams (pbut) were the legitimate political leaders and the organisation of political and social affairs was their duty.
(4) The need to regulate social relationships according to divine laws and values is not confined to a specific period of time. Rather it is a crucial need for every age and generation. Certainly when infallible Imams were present amongst people, they appointed reliable people as their representatives to undertake Shi’a social affairs and prevent their followers from recourse to tyrannical governments (taghut) for their affairs. The assumption that Imams encouraged people to avoid referring to taghut without presenting an alternative solution to their problems is illogical.
Considering the previous premise, it is also logical that just fuqaha should be appointed as their representatives and deputies in the era of greater absence because there are only three possibilities:
(1) A non-faqih (one who is not a just faqih) is designated as the Imam’s deputy. This supposition is obviously unwise and impractical, as a person lacking the essential knowledge or qualifications would be unable to provide guidance.
(2) In the era of occultation, Imami have a duty to avoid any recourse to illegitimate government for their social affairs, however the Imams did not introduce any alternative point of reference. This theory is equally impractical.
(3) The Imam has designated the just faqih as his deputy to undertake these affairs and that is what we are seeking[87].
Before concluding the internal justifications of Wilayat al-faqih, it is necessary for the sake of our discussion to examine what qualifications a deputy of the Imam must have. Although we have previously mentioned that only a well-qualified jurist may be considered the Imam’s deputy (neyab), we have not yet discussed what qualifications he requires according to Islamic sources, i.e. Qur’an and Sunnah.
The Characteristics of Wali al-Faqih and the Problem of ‘A‘lamiya’
When compared to other political doctrines, Imami political thought has some significant advantages. For example, when it insists that the ruler of the society must possess specific characteristics. In modern democratic systems, factors such as popularity, being telegenic and having the support of a powerful party and large corporations are the most important factors, while individual virtues and qualifications are often neglected. Shi’a political thought, on the other hand, makes the personal characteristics of a political leader an essential factor. Some of these are as follows.
Ijtihad (Proficiency in Islamic Jurisprudence)
Since the implementation of Islamic laws and values in the various aspects of social life are one of the most important aims of an Islamic state, the ruler must naturally have expertise and knowledge in Islamic thought in order to be able to make socio-political decisions and issue orders according to the Islamic point of view. Many traditional proofs of Wilayat al-amma insist that the Wali (hakim) must be a faqih: In maqbula of Umar ibn Hanzala, Imam Sadiq (pbuh) says:
They must seek out one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well acquainted with our laws and ordinance, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as hakim[88].
In the tradition of Abu Khadija too, Imam says:
Designate as judge and arbiter someone among you who is acquainted with our injunctions concerning what is permitted and prohibited[89].
In a signed letter the Absent Imam (may Allah hasten his reappearance) writes:
As for events that may occur, refer to the transmitters of our teachings[90].
As we have already discussed, these titles and attributes correspond with a just and competent faqih’s (mujtahid) abilities, and not those who merely transmit traditions.
Justice
Justice is a quality required of all forms of authority and leadership in Imami political doctrine; judges and prayer leaders must all be considered fair and capable, and their roles are considerably less than those who rule an entire state. In addition, the Qur’an teaches Muslims to have no inclination and cooperation with unjust people and tyrannical authorities:
And do not incline to those who are unjust, lest the fire shall touch you, and you have no guardians beside Allah, then shall you not be helped. [Chapter 11, Verse 113]
In some verses of the Qur’an Allah Almighty invites the believers to show their disobedience to unjust people, those who commit great sins:
And do not obey the bidding of the extravagant, (those) who make mischief in the land and do not act right. [Chapter 26, Verses 151-152]
Do not follow him whose heart we have made unmindful to our remembrance and he follows his low desires and his case is one in which due bounds are exceeded. [Chapter 18, Verse 28]
Although justice has not been stipulated in the traditional proofs of Wilayat al-Faqih examined in the course of this subject, the Qur’an and a number of transmissions criticize unjust rulers and those who are obedient to tyrannical governors. They also maintain that a community founded on Islamic laws and teachings, cannot be run by someone who does not believe in or behave in accordance to justice. To cite an example, Imam Muhammad al-Baqir (A) said to Muhammad b. Muslim:
O Muhammad, surely the unjust rulers and those who follow them are separated from God’s religion. Certainly they went astray, and led many astray[91].
Prudence, Trustworthiness, Administrative Facilities, and Courage
Such qualities are obvious requirements of any appropriate political leader, thus there is no need to mention evidences regarding them.
Knowledge
Many evidences stipulate that a trustee of Islamic political authority must be amongst the most knowledgeable (‘alem), competent and qualified of Islamic scholars. This criterion is somewhat contentious however, as many of the traditions mentioned in it’s support have weak chains of transmission.
According to the book of Solaim b. Qais, Ali (p) says:
Does anyone deserve to be the ruler (caliph) over the ummah except one who is most knowledgeable of God’s book (Qur’an) and the Prophet (pbuh)’s traditions (sunnah). Allah says in the Qur’an (10:35), “Is he then, who guides to the truth, more worthy to be followed, or he who himself does not go aright unless he is guided?[92]
It is transmitted from the Prophet (pbuh) that he said:
One who leads his people, while there are among them more knowledgeable than he, their sovereignty (the people’s) would begin to decline forever[93].
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, a just faqih has various functions. Some of them like the administration of justice (qada) and ‘hisbah’ are categorized as ‘Wilayat’, whilst others such as ‘ifta’ do not require a designation from the Imam. In the context of the present subject, it is essential to determine which of these functions is dependant on ‘alamiyat’ (being the most knowledgeable).
Reference to Imami jurists’ decrees shows that those who consider ‘alamiyat as a condition have merely concentrated on ‘ifta’. Ayatollah Sayyid Kazim Yazdi, the author of ‘al- ‘urwat ul-wuthqa’ writes:
With regard to a mujtahid’s functions, none of them are restricted by al-‘alamiya but taqleed (ifta). The matter of his Wilayat however, is not conditioned by al-‘alamiya[94].
Many great Imami jurists who have commented upon this important book (al-urwat ul-wuthqa), such as Ayatollahs Haery, Mirza al-Nayini, Aqa Ziya al-Araki, Sayyid Abul- Hassan al-Esfahani, Burujerdi, Khomeini, Khui, Milani, and Gulpaayigani, do not add any marginal notes to this decree of Yazdi, which means they agree with him that the functions of the faqih that exercises his authority (Wilayat) are not conditioned by being the most knowledgeable.
Shaykh al-Ansari also maintains that ‘alamiya is not necessary in the designation of a faqih as Wali (hakim)’. Every just faqih has the right to undertake affairs which require justified authority (Wilayat). He believes that only when fuqaha have different decrees (fatwa) the decree of the one who is most knowledgeable (‘alam) has priority over others[95].
Shaykh Muhammad Hassan, the author of ‘Jawahir al- Kalam’, also believes that the traditional proofs, which state that the fuqaha are designated as ‘Wali’ and the deputies of the Imam, emphasize on the professional knowledge about Islam (fiqahat) and not upon the ‘most knowledgeable’ as the condition of a faqih’s Wilayat[96].
Essentially with regards to some functions of the faqih such as ‘qada’, it seems incredible if one supposes that it is conditioned on ‘alamiya because this implies on a very large scale that the Shi’a community has only one faqih who has legitimate authority to judge.
Finally, we have indicated that ‘Ijtihad’ has various aspects and therefore it is quite reasonable to assume ‘X’ is the most knowledgeable (a’lem) in chapters of Islamic jurisprudence concerning worship (such as praying and fasting), while ‘Y’ is a’lem in the chapters of transactions (moamelat) and ‘Z’ is the most knowledgeable in the context of the administration of justice and punishment (hudud). Consequently, we have to take into account the relationship between a function that a faqih wants to undertake and the kind of knowledge that is a prerequisite to that function. There is no sufficient reason to convince us that one who is the most knowledgeable in chapters of worship would be able to perform the function of ‘qada’ better than a faqih who is most knowledgeable in administration of justice.
On the other hand, ijtihad and fiqahat are but one characteristic that a leader of the Islamic society should have. There is no reason to concentrate on the priority of ‘a’lem’ and thereby ignore other qualifications that Walis (fuqaha) must possess, which might provide them with the necessary abilities and characteristics of a ruler. Certainly, in a situation wherein a few faqih are completely equal in all qualifications of leadership except ijtihad, one might claim that the authority of a’lem has priority over others, especially when he is the most knowledgeable in social- political aspects of Islamic law. But it should be noted that even this is merely a ‘rational preference’, because as the author of Jawaher al-Kalam indicated, the traditional proofs of Wilayat al-Faqih are silent about alamiya as a condition of Wilayat.
The External Justification
Many political theories are known as ‘guardianship’ in spite of the profound differences they have with one another. By guardianship, we mean a political system in which the state is governed by qualified rulers (guardians).
The ruler or rulers are not subject to election and do not come to office through free election. They deserve to govern the people due to their specific qualifications and abilities. Therefore, the delegation of authority in a guardianship model of state is not due to a democratic process, but rather to the qualities of a guardian. Advocates of guardianship commonly believe that the entrustment of political power to a highly qualified minority, who has exceptional expertise, guarantees the interests and good of the people. Although the followers of guardianship disagree about the qualifications the guardians must have, or about the interpretation of happiness and people’s good. This is why the guardianship supported by Plato is rationally different from the Marxist Leninist interpretation of it. Plato’s guardians are a minority of well- qualified philosophers, whereas the latter’s are an organized group of revolutionaries.
There are many arguments to justify guardianship over democracy. Although on the other hand, guardianship in turn faces many criticisms, especially from advocates of democracy. So if we admit that ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ is a political doctrine belonging to the guardianship model of state, it must be able to overcome its critics and eventually establish itself as a reasonable, rational and legitimate political doctrine. That is what is meant by ‘external justification’, which, contrary to ‘internal justification’, does not rely on religiously accepted reasoning.
First of all, we must assess why and how ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ poses as a guardianship regime. According to this theory of state, a just, capable and pious jurist, who possesses a number of qualities, has legitimate authority to govern the society in the era of occultation (ghaibat). This obviously indicates that other kinds of experts and average people have no equal access to the highest political office and only specific experts (jurists) have the right and the opportunity to attain the highest level of political leadership. Moreover, they are not elected by people, but are instead designated by Imams as ‘Wali’ and possessors of the authority.
On the other hand, the unique example of this political system, whose detailed blueprints are embedded in the constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran, does not adopt a pure system of guardianship. After all, it’s constitution respects a limited democratic processes in that the majority of governmental institutions, even the political leadership is chosen through elections. According to article 107, a group of elected experts (a few jurists are elected by people every seven years) shall elect a well-qualified faqih as the political leader. Both the authority of Shari’ah (Wilayat al-Faqih) and the sovereignty of the people in this political regime make it a mixture of democracy and guardianship. Hence it should be categorized as a ‘meritocracy’, because it does not go hand in hand with all the standards of guardianship.
What distinguishes this model of ‘meritocracy’ from guardianship is the role of the people in participating in the distribution of political power and in shaping political decisions through their representatives. However, people and their representatives are not religiously free to delegate the political authority to a non-faqih or those who have no tendency to rule, legislate and execute within the framework of divine laws and Islamic values and teachings. Consequently, in this meritocracy, a just Imami jurist as ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and a group of fuqaha as the ‘guardian council’, supervise and control the decisions and functions of representatives and bureaucrats, who are themselves subject to the democratic process. The central discussion here concerns the relationship between ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and what traditionally are stated as the foundation and justification of the guardianship. We must now evaluate whether these foundations are adequate to cite as justifications of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and how could this doctrine overcome the critiques of guardianship.
Some advocates of guardianship hold that ordinary people lack the necessary qualifications for ruling. They seem to lack much understanding of their own basic needs, interests and good. Many of them are unable or unwilling to do whatever may be necessary to attain deep knowledge about their own needs and good as well as the appropriate means to achieve these needs and goods. In conclusion, people have no political competence to govern themselves. Their deficiency is partly in knowledge, partly in virtue i.e. strong tendencies to seek good ends; hence they are not qualified to govern. This approach undermines the fundamental ground of democracy and supports the idea that guardians who have sufficient political competence should govern people.
Obviously, the doctrine of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ does not rely on the political incompetence of people to justify the priority of the faqih’s authority. Neither in traditional proofs of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ nor in the rational ones, do Imami scholars stress on people’s deficiencies. Some rational proofs of ‘Wilayat al-faqih’ depend on the belief that it is not in the power of human beings to establish an ideal, ordered society with no aid of God’s revelation. Clearly, this premise expresses the deficiency of human beings as such, and not simply the imperfection of ordinary people, confirming the competence of a small minority as guardians. Indeed, this deficiency justifies man’s need of religion, and its important role in organizing social relationships.
The second foundation mentioned as a reason for guardianship consists of a specific conception of governing. For them, ruling people is an art. Therefore, rulers must be experts of a certain type, meaning experts in the art of governing. They as guardians would be specialists whose specialization would make them superior in the art of leadership, not only in comparison with ordinary people but also with other kinds of experts such as economists, physicists, engineers and so on.
Although most people are potentially capable of acquiring the qualifications needed for leadership, they lack the time to acquire them. A society needs many different types of experts. The need for acquiring different skills and then implementing them, makes it impossible for each and every person to spend the time they would need to gain the moral and instrumental competence for ruling. To suppose that a large number of people each have the capacity to acquire and use numerous specialized skills is not realistic. Consequently, in a well ordered society some persons should be rigorously trained and selected to function well as rulers (guardians). Because leadership is so crucial nothing could be of greater importance than the education of our rulers[97].
Apart from the fact that many scholars have misgivings about the actual existence of the art of governing, this argument exclusively supports the Platonic version of guardianship. There is no single art or science that can provide us with the moral and technical knowledge and abilities required for being an ideal leader. Many versions of guardianship, including ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’, do not look at guardians as specialists in the art of governing. Instead, they believe that the duty of governing should delegate to a few qualified persons, because of some certain qualifications and abilities that they have. Guardians have a advantage over others in matters of leadership, such as their in depth knowledge of ideological, great commitment to the ambitions of specific party, being vanguard and leader in revolution or possession the knowledge that is necessary for shaping particular social formation.
The unique reason that justifies (apart from traditional religious reasons) the ruling of the fuqaha as guardians, pertains to their knowledge about Shari’a which must be accompanied with personal virtues and moral competence. It is true that moral competence is not confined to a small minority and that many people have the capacity to gain moral competence and become just and pious. However, what distinguishes the just fuqaha and render them the unique group who has legitimate authority to rule over the believers is their expertise in Islamic jurisprudence. The justification of the guardianship of fuqaha is owed to the fundamental role of Islamic law in the lives of Muslims. Islam obliges Muslims to adopt Islamic laws and values in both their individual as well as public lives. Consequently, one who has the ability (as a jurisprudent) that is necessary for undertaking this task must be in charge of ruling the people. Therefore, the question of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ is not a question of having a specific art. It has roots in a religious belief that sees a crucial role for Shari’ah in Islamic society.
The distinction between the general good and personal interests could provide the advocates of guardianship the third reason for justification. The case of guardianship sometimes rest on assumption that the composition of the general good (general interest) and how the knowledge of what composes the general good may be acquired. If the general good were only composed of individual interests and if we were to believe that everyone could pursue his personal interests without guardians, then the guardianship model of state would be unnecessary and undesirable.
But if the general good and interest of society consists of something more than an aggregation of personal interests, then to achieve it will require more than this. To bring about the general good would then require an understanding of the ways in which the general good differs from a combination individual interests. If it is also true that most people are mainly concerned with their own individual interests instead of that of the general public, then the task of deciding on the general good should be entrusted to those especially trained to understand what the general good consists of. Obviously, that depends on what is meant by the general good[98].
Although the followers of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ do not fully accept this argument, however, a modified version of it would sufficiently justify this model of guardianship. Islam as a perfect religion aims for real human happiness, hence, its laws and teachings are necessarily established for the ultimate self-realization of the human being and for gaining true salvation. From this point of view both the good of the individual as well as the general public are harmonized with the contents of Islam. Concepts such as public interest should not be defined without considering of the crucial role played by Islam in both the public and private spheres. When one acknowledges this fact, which is especially true in a society where most people believe that Islam is the ultimate way to salvation, the following argument could be supposed as external justification for the doctrine of ‘Willayat al-Faqih’:
(1) General interest and public good are not merely a composition of individual interests and they must be determined through a higher source.
(2) Within an Islamic society the real public good and interest cannot be known while neglecting Islamic laws and values. It does not mean that other kinds of expertise play no role in the process of determining public good, rather, the key point is that all political and economic decisions, various legislations as well as government orders must take Islamic teachings (especially jurisprudence) seriously and harmonize themselves with the demands of Islam.
(3) eople are mostly concerned with their own individual interests so the task of deciding the public interest, at least in cases that are specifically dealt with by Islam should not be entrusted to the ups and downs of public opinion.
(4) Technocrats and those who are experts in the various sciences are often more concerned than average people with the good and interest of the public. However, as mentioned in the second premise, in an Islamic society technocrats as policymakers can not have a full understand of the public good, unless they are experts in Islamic thought.
Policymaking, legislation, organizing the system of rights and duties and other significant functions of government must be done under the supervision and authority of a well qualified faqih (or fuqaha) who is just, brave, honest, intelligent, knowledgeable about social and political issues, and an expert in Islamic ideology.
This external justification seems quite convincing within a specific context, that is, for those who pursue Islamic culture and support the establishment of an Islamic society. For those who do not believe in Islam, the premises of this justification (particularly the second and fourth) need further evidence.
Criticism of Guardianship
Advocates of democracy usually criticize guardianship and its justifications. We have to consider briefly a few of these criticisms to assess how the connection between the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and these critiques might be? In my view the three following criticisms are more significant than the others:
(i) Adversaries of guardianship insist that the keystone of this theory that tries to justify the deserts of guardians to rule based on their knowledge is disputable. The possession of this religious knowledge is not sufficient enough to prove that political power should be entrusted to a fagih to protect and promote public welfare and prosperity. How can we know that the guardian is not seeking his own interests rather than that of the general public? Is there any system of control over them to prevent hem from abusing his authority? In the guardianship model of state, since the people do not delegate authority to the guardian, they cannot legally or constitutionally withdraw political power from the guardian. The guardians are free of popular controls.
(ii) Unlike democracy that provides people with the opportunity to engage in governing themselves and to improve their moral-political experiences, the guardianship system of rule prevents an entire population from developing their social, political and moral capacities. This is essentially because only a few people (guardians) are engaging in governing. Therefore, only a few people have the opportunity to learn how to act as morally responsible human beings. Only guardians can exercise the freedom of participating in the process of making laws, while in democratic states the whole population enjoys that freedom. Even though in many democratic states, the cooperate and political elite are far more powerful than ordinary citizens, however, they cannot be compared to guardians. These elites are not despots and people can still play a role in the distribution of political power and in making political decisions.
(iii) Guardianship is based upon the idea that there is a set of truths, objective propositions and valid knowledge that can determine public good or true social interests. The second pillar of guardianship rests on the point that only those who have this knowledge[99] (what does public good consist of and by what means can we achieve it?) are exclusively competent to hold political authority. Some critics of guardianship criticize the first pillar of the argument. They emphasize that there is no such thing as rational, unquestionable, or objective knowledge. There are no determined truths as ‘science of ruling’ that can justify the authority of a few people as guardians. In addition, they believe advocates of guardianship face the problem of validation because they can not establish why their understanding of public good and social interests is objectively true. Robert Dahl writes:
In judging the validity of statements about the general good we can and should employ reason and experience. Nonetheless, no assertion that ‘the public good definitely consists of such and such’ can be shown to be ‘objectively true’ in the same sense that many statements in mathematics, logic, or the natural sciences are understood to be objectively true[100].
To clarify the relationship between these critiques and the Imami political doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih we have to keep in mind that these criticisms are targeting ‘pure guardianship’, a political theory that leaves no room for people in political affairs while entrusting complete political authority to non-elected minority (guardians). In the next chapter it will be explained that Wilayat al-Faqih is compatible with a specific version of democracy called ‘religious democracy’. In any case the mixture between the authority of a just faqih who represents both the authority of Islamic jurisprudence as well as the authority of the people, renders some of these criticisms essentially irrelevant to the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih. For example the second critique mentioned above is absolutely inapplicable to the guardianship of the faqih. Moreover, according to what has been discussed in the previous chapter about the meaning of absolute authority of a just faqih, the first criticism is also irrelevant, because the guardianship of a faqih is not beyond the control of a group of elected experts who supervise and control his usage of power and authority. In addition, it is the religious responsibility of all Muslims to be not neutral about the behavior of their governors and leaders.
In the previous pages it is clear that the guardianship of the faqih is not base on the assumption that leadership is a specific art or knowledge that consists of a set of truths and skills. Therefore, the final criticism cannot undermine this version of guardianship either. Almost all Shi’a scholars believe in rationalism, hence, the problem of validation is very important in their eyes. This is true not only with regards to fundamental Islamic beliefs, but also in other aspects of Islamic thought including political thought. They attempt to justify their system of beliefs through rational arguments, as well as through traditional evidences. As a result, Shi’a political thought is based upon a set of true, valid and objective doctrines about human nature, the philosophy of life, and morality. It consists of a set of philosophical-theological statements that produce an Islamic world ‘s view. Indeed, this theory of state like other political theories is rested upon a comprehensive philosophy and the justification of this political thought is due to the justification of its moral-philosophical foundations as well. However, we do not believe in ‘hard rationalism’, which demands that all religious statements and beliefs must be verified by decisive rational proofs, exactly as with mathematics. Obviously, religious statements and beliefs should be categorized according to their own appropriate methods of justification. Islam consists of objective truths and valid statements; however, one can not prove its validation by recourse to a unique methodology (rational proofs). Unlike the fundamental doctrines of Islam (usul al- Din) that can largely be validated and justified through rational arguments, the validation of Islamic law is, to a large extent, based upon trust in the commands of God, which in turn can be established by appealing to rational proof.
The key point is that the validity of this model of guardianship (Wilayat al-Faqih) does not acquire its approbation from the assumption that there is an objective art or science for ruling people or a specific knowledge used for understanding public good and finding the means for achieving them. Its verification is due to the validation of Islam’s moral, philosophical and theological foundations including the importance of Shari’ah for our ultimate happiness.
The external justification of Wilayat al-Faqih consists of two independent sides, the positive and the negative. Positive justification aims to justify the validation of this theory directly and through the emphasis on the necessity of the Islamic legal system and the implementation of its laws for the establishment of an ideal social and personal existence. However, the negative side refers to any efforts undertaken to prove the priority of this doctrine over its alternatives. Since the doctrine of democracy in general and the theory of liberal democracy in particular is the most important alternative theory facing guardianship, the external justification of our political theory would be insufficient if we fail to assess the relationship between the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih and democracy. The next chapter will attempt to make complete the external justification of this political doctrine by evaluating the nature of democracy and its possible connections to this version of guardianship.
There is another significant reason why we should discuss democracy. Some Muslim thinkers maintain that Islam fundamentally disagrees with democracy. Hence, in their eyes our interpretation of imami political thought that mixes the guardianship of the faqih with elements of democracy is totally wrong and is against the foundations of Islam.
Notes:
[63] Tuqih as a word means seal and signature and in Islamic historical books and in the history of Hadith the term applies to the letters issued by Imams especially letters and decrees of the absent Imam declared through his four particular deputies.
[64] For example, Shaikh Muhammad Hassan in Jawaher al-Kalam, Volume 15, p. 422, Shaikh Morteza Ansari in al-Aada wa al-Shahadat, p. 46, Shaikh Morteza Haeri in Salat al-Jum’a, p. 154, Kashif al-Qeta in al- Ferdus al-A’la, p. 54.
[65] Shaikh al-Saduq, Ikmal al-Din, Ali Akbar al-Qafari (ed), Qom, 1405AH, Volume 2, Chapter 45, p. 483.
[66] Muhammad ibn Hassan al-Tusi, Kitab al-Qayba, Qom, 1411AH, p. 290.
[67] Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 85.
[68] Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 86.
[69] Seyed Kazim Haeri, Wilayat al-Amr fi asr al-Qayba, Qom, Majma al- Fikr al-Islami, 1415AH, pp. 123-124.
[70] Shaikh al-Kolayni reports the tradition in Al-Kafi, Kitab al-Fazl al-Elm, Chapter of Ekhtelaf al-Hadith, Volume 1, p. 67 also Al-Tusi, Tahzib al- Ahkam , Kitab al-Qada, Volume 6, p. 218, Hadith 514.
[71] Translated in Islam and Revolution, p. 93.
[72] In Kitab al-Qada wa al-Shahadat, p. 48.
[73] In Jawaher al-Kalam, Volume 21, p. 395 and Volume 40, p. 17.
[74] Al-Kolayni, Al-Foru’ men al-Kafi, Kitab al-Qada, Volume 7, p. 412; Al-Tusi, Al-Tahzib, Kitab al-Qada, Volume 6, p. 303; Shaikh al-Saduq, Man la Yahzoruhu al-Faqih, Volume 3, p. 2.
[75] Shaikh al-Kolayni, Al-Kafi, The Book of Virtue of Knowledge, Volume 1, p. 34.
[76] In the study of hadith the terminology for a transmission in which the name of the first transmitter or a number of them has not been mentioned is called ‘morsal’.
[77] Uyun al-Akhbar al-Reda, volume 2, chapter, 31, p. 37 also Ma‘ani al- Akhbar, p. 374 also Man la Yahzurohu al-Faqih, Volume 4, p. 420.
[78] Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 72.
[79] Kolayni, al-Kafi, Volume 1, p. 46.
[80] Amodi, Qorar al-Hekam, Volume 1, p. 137, 506.
[81] Harrani Iibn Shobeh, Tohaf al-Huqul, Qom, 1404 A.H. Volume 1, p.238.
[82] Al-Kolayni, Al-Kafi, Volume 1, p. 38.
[83] Seyed Kazim Haeri, Wilayat al-Amr fi Asr al-Qayba, p. 96.
[84] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p. 40.
[85] Ibn Sina, Al-Shefa, The book of Al-Elahiyat, The 10th Article, Chapter 2, p. 487.
[86] Abdullah Javadi Amoli, Wilayat ul-Faqih, Qom: Esra Publication, 1378 AH, pp. 151-152.
[87] Hussain Borujerdi, Al-Badr al-Zaher fi Salat ul-Jom‘a wal-Mosafer, Qom, 1367AH, pp. 72-78.
[88] Muhammad Hassan Hor al-A’meli, Wasael al-Shi°a, Qom: Ahl ul-Bait Institution, 1412AH, Volume 27, p. 137.
[89] Al-Kafi, Volume 7, p.412.
[90] Sheikh al-Saduq, Ikmal al-Din, Volume 2, p.483.
[91] Al-Kafi, Volume 1, p. 184.
[92] Solaim ibn Qais Al-Helali, Kitab al-Solaim, Tehran: Dar al-Kotob al- Islamiya, p. 118.
[93] Barqi, Al-Mahasin, Volume 1, p. 93.
[94] Al-Urvat ul-Wosqa, The Chapter of Ijtihad wal-Taqlid, Question 68.
[95] Shaikh al-Ansari, Taqlid, Published by International Congress of Shaikh al-Ansari publications, p. 67.
[96]Jawahir al-Kalam, Volume 40, pp. 44-45.
[97] Democracy and its Critics, pp. 62-63.
[98] Democracy and its Critics, pp. 70-71.
[99] There is no agreement among advocates of guardianship about the nature of this knowledge therefore they disagree about the qualifications of this small minority of rulers (guardians). For instance, in the eyes of Plato this knowledge consists of a set of propositions about what is best for the community. This knowledge is based on rational certainty that ordinary people have no access to. Unlike true philosophers, ordinary people just have opinions (uncertainties) instead of knowledge (rational certainty). From an entirely different perspective, Marxist-Leninists maintain that this knowledge consists of the laws of historical development based on ‘historical materialism’ as a rigorous methodological approach rooted in the belief that the structure of society and human relations in all their forms are the product of material conditions and circumstances rather than of ideas, thought or consciousness. Consequently, for them the guardians are a few revolutionaries who know the laws and material conditions that rule over these historical developments.
[100] Democracy and its Critics, p. 71.
Ahmed Vaezy
Imam reza network

The Rational Argument for Wilayat al-Faqih

Recourse to rational argument has a long history amongst Shi’a scholars. Some believe that the rational theory was first adopted by the Zaydi Shi’a, al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim (785 - Medina 860), who argued that divinely appointed political authority is necessary due to the imperfections of human nature[84].
Mullah Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1829), the author of ‘Avaed al-Ayyam’, was the first Imami jurist who appealed to logical reasoning to support the concept of universal authority (Wilayat al-amma).
This approach adopts a similar structure to those rational arguments upon which Shi’a scholars base the necessity of Prophethood and Imamate; that it was necessary for God to appoint some people as Prophets and Imams in order to provide divine guidance to mankind. Therefore it is only reasonable to assume that in the absence of such infallible guidance, God would entrust the responsibilities of religious and political leadership to those people best qualified to undertake it as deputies of the absent, infallible Imam.
Two strands of argument are presented as a justification of Wilayat al-Faqih. The first of which is an argument consisting entirely of rational premises without reference to the Qur’an or traditions, while the second is an argument established by a combination of reasoning and textual evidences. However, purely rational arguments are generally unable to definitively establish the prophecy or leadership of a particular person. Rational arguments must typically consist of universal, certain and necessary premises, and consequently, pure reasoning can prove the necessity of Prophethood and Imamate, although these rational arguments often encompass an explanation of qualifications that the ideal leader should have (e.g. sinless or just). Although there are many different lines of reasoning, it will suffice here to mention a few of them. In his volume concerning theology, Avecina (Ibn Sina) presents a discussion based on the necessity of a well-organised social order in order to establish the necessity of prophets[85].
Although this argument has naturally been appealed to by Muslim scholars and philosophers in order to establish and define Prophethood, the addition of some premises gives it the potential to confirm the necessity of its continuation in the vicegerency of the fuqaha. The structure of modified version of the proof is as follows:
(a) Man is a social being and therefore necessarily needs social order to overcome many of his conflicts and affairs.
(b) Human social life and order should be designed so that it provides individual social happiness.
(c) A set of adequate and perfect laws and the existence of one who is capable of executing these laws and leading society are two necessary conditions for the establishment of an ideal society.
(d) It is not in the power of human beings to establish an ideal, just, and truly well-ordered society without the aid of God and His divine laws.
(e) To avoid any deficiency, interference or possession of God’s message (revelation), the Prophets who delivers His message must be infallible.
(f) The explanation of the contents of the perfect religion and the execution of its laws prerequisite the appointment of infallible Imams.
(g) When there is no access to infallible Imams for attaining the above-mentioned aim (3), the leaders who are just and are expert in religious knowledge (Just faqih)[86].
The first four premises prove the necessity of prophecy and that it is necessary for God to send prophets. The sixth one extends the reasoning to the question of Imamate and the necessity of an infallible Imam. And the final premise establishes the necessity of a qualified religious leader in the era of the absent Imam.
Another rational argument has been presented by Ayatollah Borujerdi who applied some historical and religious premises in his reasoning.
(1) The leader and ruler of a society must be entrusted with the protection of social order and meet the essential needs of the people.
(2) Islam has paid attention to those essential needs and has legislated suitable laws. The ruler (Wali) of Islamic society is responsible for the execution of these laws.
(3) Within the early period of Islam, the Prophet (pbuh) and the Imams (pbut) were the legitimate political leaders and the organisation of political and social affairs was their duty.
(4) The need to regulate social relationships according to divine laws and values is not confined to a specific period of time. Rather it is a crucial need for every age and generation. Certainly when infallible Imams were present amongst people, they appointed reliable people as their representatives to undertake Shi’a social affairs and prevent their followers from recourse to tyrannical governments (taghut) for their affairs. The assumption that Imams encouraged people to avoid referring to taghut without presenting an alternative solution to their problems is illogical.
Considering the previous premise, it is also logical that just fuqaha should be appointed as their representatives and deputies in the era of greater absence because there are only three possibilities:
(1) A non-faqih (one who is not a just faqih) is designated as the Imam’s deputy. This supposition is obviously unwise and impractical, as a person lacking the essential knowledge or qualifications would be unable to provide guidance.
(2) In the era of occultation, Imami have a duty to avoid any recourse to illegitimate government for their social affairs, however the Imams did not introduce any alternative point of reference. This theory is equally impractical.
(3) The Imam has designated the just faqih as his deputy to undertake these affairs and that is what we are seeking[87].
Before concluding the internal justifications of Wilayat al-faqih, it is necessary for the sake of our discussion to examine what qualifications a deputy of the Imam must have. Although we have previously mentioned that only a well-qualified jurist may be considered the Imam’s deputy (neyab), we have not yet discussed what qualifications he requires according to Islamic sources, i.e. Qur’an and Sunnah.
The Characteristics of Wali al-Faqih and the Problem of ‘A‘lamiya’
When compared to other political doctrines, Imami political thought has some significant advantages. For example, when it insists that the ruler of the society must possess specific characteristics. In modern democratic systems, factors such as popularity, being telegenic and having the support of a powerful party and large corporations are the most important factors, while individual virtues and qualifications are often neglected. Shi’a political thought, on the other hand, makes the personal characteristics of a political leader an essential factor. Some of these are as follows.
Ijtihad (Proficiency in Islamic Jurisprudence)
Since the implementation of Islamic laws and values in the various aspects of social life are one of the most important aims of an Islamic state, the ruler must naturally have expertise and knowledge in Islamic thought in order to be able to make socio-political decisions and issue orders according to the Islamic point of view. Many traditional proofs of Wilayat al-amma insist that the Wali (hakim) must be a faqih: In maqbula of Umar ibn Hanzala, Imam Sadiq (pbuh) says:
They must seek out one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well acquainted with our laws and ordinance, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as hakim[88].
In the tradition of Abu Khadija too, Imam says:
Designate as judge and arbiter someone among you who is acquainted with our injunctions concerning what is permitted and prohibited[89].
In a signed letter the Absent Imam (may Allah hasten his reappearance) writes:
As for events that may occur, refer to the transmitters of our teachings[90].
As we have already discussed, these titles and attributes correspond with a just and competent faqih’s (mujtahid) abilities, and not those who merely transmit traditions.
Justice
Justice is a quality required of all forms of authority and leadership in Imami political doctrine; judges and prayer leaders must all be considered fair and capable, and their roles are considerably less than those who rule an entire state. In addition, the Qur’an teaches Muslims to have no inclination and cooperation with unjust people and tyrannical authorities:
And do not incline to those who are unjust, lest the fire shall touch you, and you have no guardians beside Allah, then shall you not be helped. [Chapter 11, Verse 113]
In some verses of the Qur’an Allah Almighty invites the believers to show their disobedience to unjust people, those who commit great sins:
And do not obey the bidding of the extravagant, (those) who make mischief in the land and do not act right. [Chapter 26, Verses 151-152]
Do not follow him whose heart we have made unmindful to our remembrance and he follows his low desires and his case is one in which due bounds are exceeded. [Chapter 18, Verse 28]
Although justice has not been stipulated in the traditional proofs of Wilayat al-Faqih examined in the course of this subject, the Qur’an and a number of transmissions criticize unjust rulers and those who are obedient to tyrannical governors. They also maintain that a community founded on Islamic laws and teachings, cannot be run by someone who does not believe in or behave in accordance to justice. To cite an example, Imam Muhammad al-Baqir (A) said to Muhammad b. Muslim:
O Muhammad, surely the unjust rulers and those who follow them are separated from God’s religion. Certainly they went astray, and led many astray[91].
Prudence, Trustworthiness, Administrative Facilities, and Courage
Such qualities are obvious requirements of any appropriate political leader, thus there is no need to mention evidences regarding them.
Knowledge
Many evidences stipulate that a trustee of Islamic political authority must be amongst the most knowledgeable (‘alem), competent and qualified of Islamic scholars. This criterion is somewhat contentious however, as many of the traditions mentioned in it’s support have weak chains of transmission.
According to the book of Solaim b. Qais, Ali (p) says:
Does anyone deserve to be the ruler (caliph) over the ummah except one who is most knowledgeable of God’s book (Qur’an) and the Prophet (pbuh)’s traditions (sunnah). Allah says in the Qur’an (10:35), “Is he then, who guides to the truth, more worthy to be followed, or he who himself does not go aright unless he is guided?[92]
It is transmitted from the Prophet (pbuh) that he said:
One who leads his people, while there are among them more knowledgeable than he, their sovereignty (the people’s) would begin to decline forever[93].
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, a just faqih has various functions. Some of them like the administration of justice (qada) and ‘hisbah’ are categorized as ‘Wilayat’, whilst others such as ‘ifta’ do not require a designation from the Imam. In the context of the present subject, it is essential to determine which of these functions is dependant on ‘alamiyat’ (being the most knowledgeable).
Reference to Imami jurists’ decrees shows that those who consider ‘alamiyat as a condition have merely concentrated on ‘ifta’. Ayatollah Sayyid Kazim Yazdi, the author of ‘al- ‘urwat ul-wuthqa’ writes:
With regard to a mujtahid’s functions, none of them are restricted by al-‘alamiya but taqleed (ifta). The matter of his Wilayat however, is not conditioned by al-‘alamiya[94].
Many great Imami jurists who have commented upon this important book (al-urwat ul-wuthqa), such as Ayatollahs Haery, Mirza al-Nayini, Aqa Ziya al-Araki, Sayyid Abul- Hassan al-Esfahani, Burujerdi, Khomeini, Khui, Milani, and Gulpaayigani, do not add any marginal notes to this decree of Yazdi, which means they agree with him that the functions of the faqih that exercises his authority (Wilayat) are not conditioned by being the most knowledgeable.
Shaykh al-Ansari also maintains that ‘alamiya is not necessary in the designation of a faqih as Wali (hakim)’. Every just faqih has the right to undertake affairs which require justified authority (Wilayat). He believes that only when fuqaha have different decrees (fatwa) the decree of the one who is most knowledgeable (‘alam) has priority over others[95].
Shaykh Muhammad Hassan, the author of ‘Jawahir al- Kalam’, also believes that the traditional proofs, which state that the fuqaha are designated as ‘Wali’ and the deputies of the Imam, emphasize on the professional knowledge about Islam (fiqahat) and not upon the ‘most knowledgeable’ as the condition of a faqih’s Wilayat[96].
Essentially with regards to some functions of the faqih such as ‘qada’, it seems incredible if one supposes that it is conditioned on ‘alamiya because this implies on a very large scale that the Shi’a community has only one faqih who has legitimate authority to judge.
Finally, we have indicated that ‘Ijtihad’ has various aspects and therefore it is quite reasonable to assume ‘X’ is the most knowledgeable (a’lem) in chapters of Islamic jurisprudence concerning worship (such as praying and fasting), while ‘Y’ is a’lem in the chapters of transactions (moamelat) and ‘Z’ is the most knowledgeable in the context of the administration of justice and punishment (hudud). Consequently, we have to take into account the relationship between a function that a faqih wants to undertake and the kind of knowledge that is a prerequisite to that function. There is no sufficient reason to convince us that one who is the most knowledgeable in chapters of worship would be able to perform the function of ‘qada’ better than a faqih who is most knowledgeable in administration of justice.
On the other hand, ijtihad and fiqahat are but one characteristic that a leader of the Islamic society should have. There is no reason to concentrate on the priority of ‘a’lem’ and thereby ignore other qualifications that Walis (fuqaha) must possess, which might provide them with the necessary abilities and characteristics of a ruler. Certainly, in a situation wherein a few faqih are completely equal in all qualifications of leadership except ijtihad, one might claim that the authority of a’lem has priority over others, especially when he is the most knowledgeable in social- political aspects of Islamic law. But it should be noted that even this is merely a ‘rational preference’, because as the author of Jawaher al-Kalam indicated, the traditional proofs of Wilayat al-Faqih are silent about alamiya as a condition of Wilayat.
The External Justification
Many political theories are known as ‘guardianship’ in spite of the profound differences they have with one another. By guardianship, we mean a political system in which the state is governed by qualified rulers (guardians).
The ruler or rulers are not subject to election and do not come to office through free election. They deserve to govern the people due to their specific qualifications and abilities. Therefore, the delegation of authority in a guardianship model of state is not due to a democratic process, but rather to the qualities of a guardian. Advocates of guardianship commonly believe that the entrustment of political power to a highly qualified minority, who has exceptional expertise, guarantees the interests and good of the people. Although the followers of guardianship disagree about the qualifications the guardians must have, or about the interpretation of happiness and people’s good. This is why the guardianship supported by Plato is rationally different from the Marxist Leninist interpretation of it. Plato’s guardians are a minority of well- qualified philosophers, whereas the latter’s are an organized group of revolutionaries.
There are many arguments to justify guardianship over democracy. Although on the other hand, guardianship in turn faces many criticisms, especially from advocates of democracy. So if we admit that ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ is a political doctrine belonging to the guardianship model of state, it must be able to overcome its critics and eventually establish itself as a reasonable, rational and legitimate political doctrine. That is what is meant by ‘external justification’, which, contrary to ‘internal justification’, does not rely on religiously accepted reasoning.
First of all, we must assess why and how ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ poses as a guardianship regime. According to this theory of state, a just, capable and pious jurist, who possesses a number of qualities, has legitimate authority to govern the society in the era of occultation (ghaibat). This obviously indicates that other kinds of experts and average people have no equal access to the highest political office and only specific experts (jurists) have the right and the opportunity to attain the highest level of political leadership. Moreover, they are not elected by people, but are instead designated by Imams as ‘Wali’ and possessors of the authority.
On the other hand, the unique example of this political system, whose detailed blueprints are embedded in the constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran, does not adopt a pure system of guardianship. After all, it’s constitution respects a limited democratic processes in that the majority of governmental institutions, even the political leadership is chosen through elections. According to article 107, a group of elected experts (a few jurists are elected by people every seven years) shall elect a well-qualified faqih as the political leader. Both the authority of Shari’ah (Wilayat al-Faqih) and the sovereignty of the people in this political regime make it a mixture of democracy and guardianship. Hence it should be categorized as a ‘meritocracy’, because it does not go hand in hand with all the standards of guardianship.
What distinguishes this model of ‘meritocracy’ from guardianship is the role of the people in participating in the distribution of political power and in shaping political decisions through their representatives. However, people and their representatives are not religiously free to delegate the political authority to a non-faqih or those who have no tendency to rule, legislate and execute within the framework of divine laws and Islamic values and teachings. Consequently, in this meritocracy, a just Imami jurist as ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and a group of fuqaha as the ‘guardian council’, supervise and control the decisions and functions of representatives and bureaucrats, who are themselves subject to the democratic process. The central discussion here concerns the relationship between ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and what traditionally are stated as the foundation and justification of the guardianship. We must now evaluate whether these foundations are adequate to cite as justifications of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and how could this doctrine overcome the critiques of guardianship.
Some advocates of guardianship hold that ordinary people lack the necessary qualifications for ruling. They seem to lack much understanding of their own basic needs, interests and good. Many of them are unable or unwilling to do whatever may be necessary to attain deep knowledge about their own needs and good as well as the appropriate means to achieve these needs and goods. In conclusion, people have no political competence to govern themselves. Their deficiency is partly in knowledge, partly in virtue i.e. strong tendencies to seek good ends; hence they are not qualified to govern. This approach undermines the fundamental ground of democracy and supports the idea that guardians who have sufficient political competence should govern people.
Obviously, the doctrine of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ does not rely on the political incompetence of people to justify the priority of the faqih’s authority. Neither in traditional proofs of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ nor in the rational ones, do Imami scholars stress on people’s deficiencies. Some rational proofs of ‘Wilayat al-faqih’ depend on the belief that it is not in the power of human beings to establish an ideal, ordered society with no aid of God’s revelation. Clearly, this premise expresses the deficiency of human beings as such, and not simply the imperfection of ordinary people, confirming the competence of a small minority as guardians. Indeed, this deficiency justifies man’s need of religion, and its important role in organizing social relationships.
The second foundation mentioned as a reason for guardianship consists of a specific conception of governing. For them, ruling people is an art. Therefore, rulers must be experts of a certain type, meaning experts in the art of governing. They as guardians would be specialists whose specialization would make them superior in the art of leadership, not only in comparison with ordinary people but also with other kinds of experts such as economists, physicists, engineers and so on.
Although most people are potentially capable of acquiring the qualifications needed for leadership, they lack the time to acquire them. A society needs many different types of experts. The need for acquiring different skills and then implementing them, makes it impossible for each and every person to spend the time they would need to gain the moral and instrumental competence for ruling. To suppose that a large number of people each have the capacity to acquire and use numerous specialized skills is not realistic. Consequently, in a well ordered society some persons should be rigorously trained and selected to function well as rulers (guardians). Because leadership is so crucial nothing could be of greater importance than the education of our rulers[97].
Apart from the fact that many scholars have misgivings about the actual existence of the art of governing, this argument exclusively supports the Platonic version of guardianship. There is no single art or science that can provide us with the moral and technical knowledge and abilities required for being an ideal leader. Many versions of guardianship, including ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’, do not look at guardians as specialists in the art of governing. Instead, they believe that the duty of governing should delegate to a few qualified persons, because of some certain qualifications and abilities that they have. Guardians have a advantage over others in matters of leadership, such as their in depth knowledge of ideological, great commitment to the ambitions of specific party, being vanguard and leader in revolution or possession the knowledge that is necessary for shaping particular social formation.
The unique reason that justifies (apart from traditional religious reasons) the ruling of the fuqaha as guardians, pertains to their knowledge about Shari’a which must be accompanied with personal virtues and moral competence. It is true that moral competence is not confined to a small minority and that many people have the capacity to gain moral competence and become just and pious. However, what distinguishes the just fuqaha and render them the unique group who has legitimate authority to rule over the believers is their expertise in Islamic jurisprudence. The justification of the guardianship of fuqaha is owed to the fundamental role of Islamic law in the lives of Muslims. Islam obliges Muslims to adopt Islamic laws and values in both their individual as well as public lives. Consequently, one who has the ability (as a jurisprudent) that is necessary for undertaking this task must be in charge of ruling the people. Therefore, the question of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ is not a question of having a specific art. It has roots in a religious belief that sees a crucial role for Shari’ah in Islamic society.
The distinction between the general good and personal interests could provide the advocates of guardianship the third reason for justification. The case of guardianship sometimes rest on assumption that the composition of the general good (general interest) and how the knowledge of what composes the general good may be acquired. If the general good were only composed of individual interests and if we were to believe that everyone could pursue his personal interests without guardians, then the guardianship model of state would be unnecessary and undesirable.
But if the general good and interest of society consists of something more than an aggregation of personal interests, then to achieve it will require more than this. To bring about the general good would then require an understanding of the ways in which the general good differs from a combination individual interests. If it is also true that most people are mainly concerned with their own individual interests instead of that of the general public, then the task of deciding on the general good should be entrusted to those especially trained to understand what the general good consists of. Obviously, that depends on what is meant by the general good[98].
Although the followers of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ do not fully accept this argument, however, a modified version of it would sufficiently justify this model of guardianship. Islam as a perfect religion aims for real human happiness, hence, its laws and teachings are necessarily established for the ultimate self-realization of the human being and for gaining true salvation. From this point of view both the good of the individual as well as the general public are harmonized with the contents of Islam. Concepts such as public interest should not be defined without considering of the crucial role played by Islam in both the public and private spheres. When one acknowledges this fact, which is especially true in a society where most people believe that Islam is the ultimate way to salvation, the following argument could be supposed as external justification for the doctrine of ‘Willayat al-Faqih’:
(1) General interest and public good are not merely a composition of individual interests and they must be determined through a higher source.
(2) Within an Islamic society the real public good and interest cannot be known while neglecting Islamic laws and values. It does not mean that other kinds of expertise play no role in the process of determining public good, rather, the key point is that all political and economic decisions, various legislations as well as government orders must take Islamic teachings (especially jurisprudence) seriously and harmonize themselves with the demands of Islam.
(3) eople are mostly concerned with their own individual interests so the task of deciding the public interest, at least in cases that are specifically dealt with by Islam should not be entrusted to the ups and downs of public opinion.
(4) Technocrats and those who are experts in the various sciences are often more concerned than average people with the good and interest of the public. However, as mentioned in the second premise, in an Islamic society technocrats as policymakers can not have a full understand of the public good, unless they are experts in Islamic thought.
Policymaking, legislation, organizing the system of rights and duties and other significant functions of government must be done under the supervision and authority of a well qualified faqih (or fuqaha) who is just, brave, honest, intelligent, knowledgeable about social and political issues, and an expert in Islamic ideology.
This external justification seems quite convincing within a specific context, that is, for those who pursue Islamic culture and support the establishment of an Islamic society. For those who do not believe in Islam, the premises of this justification (particularly the second and fourth) need further evidence.
Criticism of Guardianship
Advocates of democracy usually criticize guardianship and its justifications. We have to consider briefly a few of these criticisms to assess how the connection between the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and these critiques might be? In my view the three following criticisms are more significant than the others:
(i) Adversaries of guardianship insist that the keystone of this theory that tries to justify the deserts of guardians to rule based on their knowledge is disputable. The possession of this religious knowledge is not sufficient enough to prove that political power should be entrusted to a fagih to protect and promote public welfare and prosperity. How can we know that the guardian is not seeking his own interests rather than that of the general public? Is there any system of control over them to prevent hem from abusing his authority? In the guardianship model of state, since the people do not delegate authority to the guardian, they cannot legally or constitutionally withdraw political power from the guardian. The guardians are free of popular controls.
(ii) Unlike democracy that provides people with the opportunity to engage in governing themselves and to improve their moral-political experiences, the guardianship system of rule prevents an entire population from developing their social, political and moral capacities. This is essentially because only a few people (guardians) are engaging in governing. Therefore, only a few people have the opportunity to learn how to act as morally responsible human beings. Only guardians can exercise the freedom of participating in the process of making laws, while in democratic states the whole population enjoys that freedom. Even though in many democratic states, the cooperate and political elite are far more powerful than ordinary citizens, however, they cannot be compared to guardians. These elites are not despots and people can still play a role in the distribution of political power and in making political decisions.
(iii) Guardianship is based upon the idea that there is a set of truths, objective propositions and valid knowledge that can determine public good or true social interests. The second pillar of guardianship rests on the point that only those who have this knowledge[99] (what does public good consist of and by what means can we achieve it?) are exclusively competent to hold political authority. Some critics of guardianship criticize the first pillar of the argument. They emphasize that there is no such thing as rational, unquestionable, or objective knowledge. There are no determined truths as ‘science of ruling’ that can justify the authority of a few people as guardians. In addition, they believe advocates of guardianship face the problem of validation because they can not establish why their understanding of public good and social interests is objectively true. Robert Dahl writes:
In judging the validity of statements about the general good we can and should employ reason and experience. Nonetheless, no assertion that ‘the public good definitely consists of such and such’ can be shown to be ‘objectively true’ in the same sense that many statements in mathematics, logic, or the natural sciences are understood to be objectively true[100].
To clarify the relationship between these critiques and the Imami political doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih we have to keep in mind that these criticisms are targeting ‘pure guardianship’, a political theory that leaves no room for people in political affairs while entrusting complete political authority to non-elected minority (guardians). In the next chapter it will be explained that Wilayat al-Faqih is compatible with a specific version of democracy called ‘religious democracy’. In any case the mixture between the authority of a just faqih who represents both the authority of Islamic jurisprudence as well as the authority of the people, renders some of these criticisms essentially irrelevant to the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih. For example the second critique mentioned above is absolutely inapplicable to the guardianship of the faqih. Moreover, according to what has been discussed in the previous chapter about the meaning of absolute authority of a just faqih, the first criticism is also irrelevant, because the guardianship of a faqih is not beyond the control of a group of elected experts who supervise and control his usage of power and authority. In addition, it is the religious responsibility of all Muslims to be not neutral about the behavior of their governors and leaders.
In the previous pages it is clear that the guardianship of the faqih is not base on the assumption that leadership is a specific art or knowledge that consists of a set of truths and skills. Therefore, the final criticism cannot undermine this version of guardianship either. Almost all Shi’a scholars believe in rationalism, hence, the problem of validation is very important in their eyes. This is true not only with regards to fundamental Islamic beliefs, but also in other aspects of Islamic thought including political thought. They attempt to justify their system of beliefs through rational arguments, as well as through traditional evidences. As a result, Shi’a political thought is based upon a set of true, valid and objective doctrines about human nature, the philosophy of life, and morality. It consists of a set of philosophical-theological statements that produce an Islamic world ‘s view. Indeed, this theory of state like other political theories is rested upon a comprehensive philosophy and the justification of this political thought is due to the justification of its moral-philosophical foundations as well. However, we do not believe in ‘hard rationalism’, which demands that all religious statements and beliefs must be verified by decisive rational proofs, exactly as with mathematics. Obviously, religious statements and beliefs should be categorized according to their own appropriate methods of justification. Islam consists of objective truths and valid statements; however, one can not prove its validation by recourse to a unique methodology (rational proofs). Unlike the fundamental doctrines of Islam (usul al- Din) that can largely be validated and justified through rational arguments, the validation of Islamic law is, to a large extent, based upon trust in the commands of God, which in turn can be established by appealing to rational proof.
The key point is that the validity of this model of guardianship (Wilayat al-Faqih) does not acquire its approbation from the assumption that there is an objective art or science for ruling people or a specific knowledge used for understanding public good and finding the means for achieving them. Its verification is due to the validation of Islam’s moral, philosophical and theological foundations including the importance of Shari’ah for our ultimate happiness.
The external justification of Wilayat al-Faqih consists of two independent sides, the positive and the negative. Positive justification aims to justify the validation of this theory directly and through the emphasis on the necessity of the Islamic legal system and the implementation of its laws for the establishment of an ideal social and personal existence. However, the negative side refers to any efforts undertaken to prove the priority of this doctrine over its alternatives. Since the doctrine of democracy in general and the theory of liberal democracy in particular is the most important alternative theory facing guardianship, the external justification of our political theory would be insufficient if we fail to assess the relationship between the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih and democracy. The next chapter will attempt to make complete the external justification of this political doctrine by evaluating the nature of democracy and its possible connections to this version of guardianship.
There is another significant reason why we should discuss democracy. Some Muslim thinkers maintain that Islam fundamentally disagrees with democracy. Hence, in their eyes our interpretation of imami political thought that mixes the guardianship of the faqih with elements of democracy is totally wrong and is against the foundations of Islam.
Notes:
[84] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p. 40.
[85] Ibn Sina, Al-Shefa, The book of Al-Elahiyat, The 10th Article, Chapter 2, p. 487.
[86] Abdullah Javadi Amoli, Wilayat ul-Faqih, Qom: Esra Publication, 1378 AH, pp. 151-152.
[87] Hussain Borujerdi, Al-Badr al-Zaher fi Salat ul-Jom‘a wal-Mosafer, Qom, 1367AH, pp. 72-78.
[88] Muhammad Hassan Hor al-A’meli, Wasael al-Shi°a, Qom: Ahl ul-Bait Institution, 1412AH, Volume 27, p. 137.
[89] Al-Kafi, Volume 7, p.412.
[90] Sheikh al-Saduq, Ikmal al-Din, Volume 2, p.483.
[91] Al-Kafi, Volume 1, p. 184.
[92] Solaim ibn Qais Al-Helali, Kitab al-Solaim, Tehran: Dar al-Kotob al- Islamiya, p. 118.
[93] Barqi, Al-Mahasin, Volume 1, p. 93.
[94] Al-Urvat ul-Wosqa, The Chapter of Ijtihad wal-Taqlid, Question 68.
[95] Shaikh al-Ansari, Taqlid, Published by International Congress of Shaikh al-Ansari publications, p. 67.
[96]Jawahir al-Kalam, Volume 40, pp. 44-45.
[97] Democracy and its Critics, pp. 62-63.
[98] Democracy and its Critics, pp. 70-71.
[99] There is no agreement among advocates of guardianship about the nature of this knowledge therefore they disagree about the qualifications of this small minority of rulers (guardians). For instance, in the eyes of Plato this knowledge consists of a set of propositions about what is best for the community. This knowledge is based on rational certainty that ordinary people have no access to. Unlike true philosophers, ordinary people just have opinions (uncertainties) instead of knowledge (rational certainty). From an entirely different perspective, Marxist-Leninists maintain that this knowledge consists of the laws of historical development based on ‘historical materialism’ as a rigorous methodological approach rooted in the belief that the structure of society and human relations in all their forms are the product of material conditions and circumstances rather than of ideas, thought or consciousness. Consequently, for them the guardians are a few revolutionaries who know the laws and material conditions that rule over these historical developments.
[100] Democracy and its Critics, p. 71.
Ahmed Vaezy
Imam reza network

Islam and Democracy

Contemporary Islamic political thought has become deeply influenced by attempts at reconciling Islam and democracy. Muslim thinkers who deal with political debates cannot ignore the significance of the democratic system, as it is the prevailing theme of modern western political thought. Thus it is necessary for any alternative political system, whether it is religious or secular, to explore its position with regards to democratic government. In the past, prominent Islamic thinkers such as Imam Khomeini, Mirza Muhammad Hussain Nayini and al-Kawakibi maintained that a democratic Islamic form of government is a compatible and practical thesis, believing that a constitution could protect and guarantee both the essential Islamic as well as democratic aspects of government.
In contrast to this more optimistic approach, many fundamentalist thinkers argue that Islam and democracy are irreconcilably opposed, and that there exists a clear contradiction between Islamic and democratic principles. This opinion has emerged as a result of their perception of the source from which democracy came, the creed from which it emanated, the basis upon which it has been established as well as the ideas and systems of thought with which it is currently associated. However, opposition to religious democracy is not confined to fundamentalists; advocates of a secular state also believe that the concept of a democratic Islamic government is a paradoxical thesis, and they often refer to a selection of Islamic rulings and beliefs that they construe as antagonistic to the foundations and underlying values of the democratic system.
Other Muslim intellectuals maintain that any apparent incompatibility or conflict between the ideas of religion and democracy are caused by the misinterpretation of Islam. They maintain that there is no conflict between democracy and an understanding of religion, which is changing, rational and in harmony with accepted extra-religious criteria and values. They believe that by reinterpreting Islam and constantly reviewing and renewing its beliefs, the vision of a religious democracy would be completely feasible and indeed desirable.
Consequently the question of whether or not religious democracy is feasible has given rise to four major schools of thought amongst thinkers and Muslim political movements:
1. The implementation of Islamic laws (Shari’ah) and the establishment of an Islamic society based upon Islamic values is possible within a constitutionally Islamic and democratic political system. The participation of citizens in making political decisions can serve the socio- political aims of Islam and democracy merely acts as a system and method for the distribution of political power and a means by which citizens express their opinions.
2. There is an obvious conflict between the traditional juridical (fiqhi) based conception of Islam and democracy. The establishment of a religious democratic government is in need of a rethinking, reinterpretation and review of Islamic thought in order for it to become harmonious with contemporary global and philosophical foundations, values and implications of democracy. Therefore, the practicality of religious democracy rests upon the reformation of traditional religious knowledge.
3. Democracy is a system of disbelief (kufr) and is totally and completely irreconcilable with Islamic beliefs and principles. Commitment to Islam leaves no room for democracy.
4. The fourth approach arrives at the same conclusion as the third, that the idea of a democratic Islamic government is paradoxical. However, unlike advocates of the third approach, this group emphasizes the desirability and justification of democracy, and insists that religion cannot possibly satisfy the values and foundations that democracy requires.
These approaches shall be addressed in detail later in this Chapter, but first it is necessary to examine democracy, its various interpretations, its relationship to liberalism and some philosophical presuppositions that support this political doctrine. Many apprehensions surrounding the theory of religious democracy are caused by conceptional ambiguities concerning the description of democracy and its possible models. We must define what it is that democracy means, whether or not there is a unique and commonly agreed interpretation of democracy and what exactly distinguishes a democratic government from a non- democratic one. Without answering such questions it will be impossible to come to an objective and accurate conclusion regarding the issue of religious democracy.
What is Democracy?
The term democracy is derived from the Greek words ‘demos’ (people) and ‘kratia’ (rule), so democracy literally means ‘rule by the people’. In other words it is a political doctrine in which it is believed the people possess the capacity needed in order to govern and regulate society. This idea originally emerged towards the beginning of the fifth century B.C. in ancient Greece, primarily amongst the Athenians. The city-state of Athens referred to itself as a democracy (from 500 B.C to 330 B.C) because all citizens (excluding women, slaves and non-residents) could participate in political decisions. Abraham Lincoln’s famous definition of ‘Government for the people and by the people’[101]refers to this model of participatory democracy.
Throughout the long history of political thought, many different forms of democratic government have emerged and declined, they often came into being almost completely independently of one another, as Dahl writes:
It would be a mistake to assume that democracy was invented once and for all, as, for example, the steam engine was invented...democracy seems to have been invented more than once, and in more than one place. After all, if the conditions were favorable for the invention of democracy at one time and place, might not similar favorable conditions have existed elsewhere? I assume democracy can be independently invented and reinvented whenever the appropriate conditions exist[102].
Although the root meaning of the Greek term ‘demokratia’ is clear and straightforward (rule by the people), it is necessary to properly define what constitutes ‘demos’ (the people). Historically the criteria of who ought to be included in ‘demos’ to rule and participate in political decisions, as a citizen has been an ambiguous and contentious issue. In the most ancient models of democracy, ‘the people’ did not include all adults; women and slaves were not given the right to participate in the political system. And even today there are noticeable disagreements amongst modern interpretations of democracy about who should be included among the ‘demos’. For example, even though the principle of equality was firmly established in the American declaration of independence in 1776, the right for free men to vote on an equal basis was not granted until 1850. Black males were prevented from voting until the fifteenth constitutional amendment some twenty years later. And females, both free and enslaved, were not given the right to vote until the nineteenth constitutional amendment in 1920[103].
Democracy in the above mentioned forms, is an imaginary and inapplicable idea in large scale societies.
In general, both advocates and critics agree that ‘rule by the people’ - in the truest meaning of the people – never existed and is never likely to exist. It is impossible for any democratic regime to be fully democratic, as it will always fall short of the criteria that emanates from its self-evident meaning.
The virtues and advantages that are mentioned to justify democratic government undoubtedly require ‘participatory democracy’, which delegates decisions to citizens, so, in a single meeting or during an election, people are able to express their opinions. That is why the Greeks passionately supported ‘assembly democracy’. Obviously this system is inherently limited by practical considerations, in a small political unit such as a city, assembly democracy provides citizens with desirable opportunities for engaging in the process of governing themselves. This original conception of democracy, which was embodied in Greek city-states, is possibly the most appropriate to the true meaning of the term (excluding the fact that only a minority could vote). However modern democracies within nation- states exist on a much greater scale than before. Consequently, modern theories of democracy, despite their alleged efficiency when dealing with the problems of large- scale societies, effectively decrease the political participation of the people. In modern democratic theories ‘the people’ (demos) are replaced by ‘representatives’, so that a small proportion of the population are made responsible for looking after the affairs of the people, thus ‘rule by the people’ becomes ‘rule by representatives elected by a majority of the people’.
A significant cause for the confusion concerning the meaning of ‘democracy’ at present is due to the fact that it has developed over several thousand years and ultimately stems from a variety of sources. Our understanding of the term ‘democracy’ is not necessarily the same as an Athenian\'s understanding of the term. Greek, Roman, Medieval and Renaissance notions have intermingled with those of later centuries to produce a mosaic of theories and practices that are often deeply inconsistent[104].
If any attempt to apply the original meaning of democracy to the nation-state is impossibly absurd, and moreover if there is no commonly agreed definition of the democratic system amongst its advocates, it should be reasonable to concentrate on what at present are known as democratic states in order to recognize its major elements and what distinguishes them from a non-democratic state.
Even though, in theory, political philosophers and theorists have presented various models of democracy such as ‘elitism’, ‘participatory’, ‘pluralistic’ and ‘corporate’, in practice representative democracy is the prevailing norm among contemporary democratic systems. The major characteristics of modern democracy, according to Dahl are as follow:
Elected officials: control over government decisions concerning policy is constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens. Thus, modern, large-scale democratic governments are representative.
Free, fair and frequent elections: elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
Freedom of expression: citizens have a right to express themselves on political matters without danger of severe punishment; this includes criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socio-economic order and the prevailing ideology.
Access to alternative sources of information: citizens have a right to seek out alternative and independent sources of information from other citizens, experts, newspapers, magazines, books, etc.
Associational autonomy: citizens have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups in order to achieve their various rights.
Inclusive citizenship: No adult permanently residing in the country and subject to its laws can be denied the rights that are necessary for the five political institutions listed above[105].
These help explain the political reality of democracy as a political system in which people participate, and as a method and process for making collective political decisions. The key point is that democracy requires \'majority rule\', meaning that majority support should not only be necessary, but also sufficient for enacting laws. Some contemporary writers even go so far as to argue that majority rule is a definition, not a requirement of democracy[106]. Also numerous advocates of democracy do not confine the role of the people to the mere distribution of political power, or participation in the process of collective political decisions (via their representatives), rather, they have a right to control governors. Mayo writes:
In short, a political system is democratic to the extent that the decision makers are under effective popular control[107].
In summary, democracy is a political system, which acknowledges the right of the people to participate in political decisions, either directly or indirectly through elected representatives, to distribute and regulate the political power under the rule of a majority. Political prerequisites such as free, fair and frequent elections, freedom of expression, inclusive citizenship and so on, are necessary in order to insure the soundness of the process.
Democracy and Liberalism
Most contemporary democracies are liberal democracies: a combination of the democratic political system, and the liberal political ideology, that places emphasis upon specific rights and values such as private possession, negative freedom, individualism and toleration. Therefore, liberal democracies embody two distinct features; the first of these is the liberal conception of a limited government; this is that the individual should enjoy a degree of protection from arbitrary action of government officials. This limitation of government - which is often referred to as the theory of limited democracy – is rooted in the belief that fundamental rights and values supported by liberalism possess a moral standing and philosophical grounds, that are altogether independent of democracy and the democratic process. These rights and values serve as a limitation or restriction on what can be enacted by means of the political system. Citizens are entitled to exercise certain rights and should not be threatened by the powers of state and governmental processes. Liberals believe in protecting these rights from infringement, even though they may be by democratic means.
This is why liberal attitudes towards democracy have historically been distinctly ambivalent. In the nineteenth century, liberals often perceived democracy as something threatening or dangerous. The central concern for liberals has always been that democracy could evolve to become the enemy of individual liberty and pluralism. The rule of the majority is the \'democratic solution\' to conflicts that people have regarding their interests and opinions. This means that the will of the greatest number of people should prevail over that of the minority. In other words, democracy comes down to the rule of 51 percent, a prospect that Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) famously described as ‘the tyranny of the majority’. Individual liberty and minority rights can thus potentially be crushed in the name of the people[108].
Liberals have expressed particular reservation concerning democracy, and have crafted a network of checks and balances in order to reconcile the advantages of democracy and fundamental liberal rights and values. This combination creates a model of democracy that, as Heywood says, has three central features:
First, liberal democracy is an indirect and representative form of democracy. Political office is gained through success in regular elections, conducted on the basis of formal political equality – ‘one person, one vote; one vote, one value’. Second, it is based upon competition and electoral choice. This is ensured by political pluralism, a tolerance of a wide range of contending beliefs, conflicting social philosophies and rival political movements and parties. Third, liberal democracy is characterized by a clear distinction between the state and civil society. This is maintained both by internal and external checks on government power and the existence of autonomous groups and interests, and by the market or capitalist organization of economic life[109].
As far as our discussion – the relationship between Islam and democracy – is concerned, it is fundamental to distinguish between democracy just as a method to form a political system or as a process for making collective decisions opposed and liberal democracy as one of the possible models of democracy consisting of an ideological framework of beliefs and values. Many opponents of religious democracy have failed to distinguish between democracy as a method and liberal democracy, which in principal represents a particular political philosophy and doctrines with its own beliefs regarding human nature, human rights, ends and moral values.
Benefits of Democracy
There are many advantages that make democracy more desirable than any other feasible alternative political system. Even though to attain all of the potential benefits is beyond the capacity of current democracies, these ideal consequences cannot be overlooked. When properly implemented and regulated, the democratic political system should in theory produce a series of beneficial objectives.
Avoiding tyranny: Democracy reduces the likelihood of a tyrannical or autocratic government obtaining power. However, this does not mean that democracy can totally guarantee the prevention of oppressive or dictatorial rule, or that it is entirely capable of preventing injustice in society. For example, the Nazi party in Germany (1933-1945) obtained power through the manipulation of the democratic and free-electoral systems. Advocates of democracy argue, though, that in the long-term a democratic process is less likely to do harm to the interests of the citizens than a non- democratic one.
Protecting essential rights: Democracy guarantees its citizens a number of fundamental rights that undemocratic systems do not grant. These political rights are all necessary elements of democratic political institutions.
Human development: It is claimed that democracy fosters human development more fully than any practical alternative. This claim is controversial and very difficult to substantiate. The only way to test this assertion is by measuring human development in democratic and non- democratic societies.
Political equality: Only a democratic government can guarantee a high degree of political equality amongst citizens.
Protecting essential personal interests: Democracy assists people in protecting their own fundamental interests. It allows people to shape their life in accordance with their own goals, preferences, values and beliefs[110].
Perhaps the most common justification given for democracy is that it is essential for the protection of the general interests of the persons who are subject to a democratic state.
However, it is worth mentioning that this attempt to justify democracy has been attacked by some democratic theorists. For example, John Plamenatz argues that we cannot compare governments and, as a reasonable empirical judgment, conclude that “the policies of one have in general done more than those of the other to enable their subjects to maximize the satisfaction of their wants”. This is particularly true if the governments are not of the same type and the values and beliefs of the people concerned differ greatly. Moreover people do not and should not prefer democracy to its alternatives because they believe it is better at maximizing the satisfaction of their desires. They should instead favor it because it provides people with certain rights and opportunities or reject it because it does not[111].
Foundations of Democracy
It is widely believed that political theories have philosophical or metaphysical foundations that justify every political ethos or system amongst its alternatives. Referring to these foundations for the justification of political thought is considered important because they represent the basis from which the system has emanated. It is insufficient merely to examine publicly admitted elements and values that have emanated from this basis, as these have ultimately grown around a political doctrine and logically cannot prove the validity of that political theory. The prevalent approach maintains that the question of justification is also a question of truth. A valid and justified political system must be consistent with human nature, human common goods and ends and other related moral-philosophical truths.
This methodof political theorizing (also known as foundationalism) is omnipresent in the history of political thought, especially so during the age of enlightenment, when thinkers such as John Locke and Emmanuel Kant presented rational foundations as basic elements of contemporary western political culture. Political foundationalism presupposes that there is a correct answer to every fundamental political question, and through the appropriate method of thinking, political truths are made available.
Recently, some advocates of liberal democracy, in contrast to traditional supporters of democratic governments, have inclined to justify their political system without reference to a particular interpretation of human nature or any comprehensive moral, religious or philosophical doctrine as a basis. John Rawls (1921-2002) and Richard Rorty, the contemporary American philosopher, are to prominent figures of this modern anti-foundationalism movement in political thought. They present a ‘political’ democratic liberalism instead of a ‘philosophical’ one. Their justification for this model of political thought is not rooted in any specific philosophical or moral doctrine. John Rawls writes:
Political liberalism, then, aims for a political conception of justice as a freestanding view. It offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine beyond what is implied by the political conception itself[112].
This attitude, its influence and its relevance to our main debate (Islam and democracy), will be assessed later in the Chapter. It is now necessary to briefly refer to some philosophical foundations mentioned by some thinkers to justify democracy as the most desirable political system.
Intrinsic Equality
The belief that all humanity is made intrinsically equal by man’s own inherent nature and instincts is a concept supported by the great religions of Islam, Christianity and Judaism. For some, however, the idea of inherent equality provides a justification for democracy because it indicates that all human beings are of equal intrinsic worth and no person is naturally superior to another. Locke says:
Though I have said above...that all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue may give men a just precedence: excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level...and yet all this consists with equality, which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion over one another, which was the equality I there spoke of, as proper to the business in hand, being that equal right that every man hath, to his nature freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man[113].
The politically implicit meaning of the last sentence of this quotation is that the good or interests of each person must be given equal consideration, hence, people have a right to express their will and no one has the right to make a decision on behalf of them except with their permission. For advocates of democracy who refer to the intrinsic equality, every guardianship model of government, which entrusts the authority to a few people (guardians) instead of people themselves, must therefore be incompatible with the idea of the intrinsic equality of people. Locke ascribed the intrinsic quality to ‘men’ instead of ‘the people’ because in his own era the theory that men alone qualify as ‘active citizens’ was common (As indicated earlier, it was not until the twentieth century that women gained the right to vote).
It is also worth mentioning that Kant too firmly supported political freedom and according to his view, the legislative authority should be placed in the hands of a representative assembly, whose members are elected by a majority of voters in each district. However, Kant\'s franchise is restrictive. He assumes that it should extend only to adult males who own property and that these persons alone qualify as ‘active citizens’. Others are merely ‘passive citizens’ and while they must be assured the same civil rights and legal equality as everyone else, they should not be allowed to vote[114].
If we were to overlook this restriction and ascribe the intrinsic equality to all human beings (men and women), it could not justify democracy as the best desirable political system, as essentially there is no necessary connection between admitting intrinsic equality and the necessity of a democratic state. Robert Dahl states that intrinsic equality is quite compatible with guardianship as well. He writes:
As I have already said, nothing in the assumption of intrinsic equality implies that Able, Baker and Carr are the best judges of their own good or interests, suppose it were true that a few people like Eccles not only understood much better than the others what constitutes their individual and common good, and how best to bring it about, but could be fully trusted to do so. Then it would be perfectly consistent with the idea of intrinsic equality to conclude that these persons of superior knowledge and virtue, like Eccles, should rule over all the others. Even more: if the good of each person is entitled to equal consideration, and if a superior group of guardians could best ensure equal consideration, then it follows that guardianship would definitely be desirable and democracy just as definitely would be undesirable[115].
Priority of the Will of the Majority over Rightness
A rare conception of democracy supposes that the democratic system and the rule of the majority can guarantee correct decisions and right answers to political needs. People who individually are the best judge for their private, personal affairs also are the best judge in public affairs (policy decisions).
The political judgments of the majority reflect what is best and right for the community. According to this theory, there is no need for a few experts (guardians) with specific moral and scientific-philosophical knowledge to perform correct policy decisions, because the performance of the experts is no better than the people\'s choices. The choice of the majority would be based upon certainty and would achieve a correct result.
However, the practical and realistic approach to democracy, supported by its advocates, does not accept that the rule of the majority is a guarantee for right decisions. It admits that people have a right to decide, however it also accepts that voters and their representatives may not always make the correct decisions. The validity of the democratic political system is not owed to the knowledge that the will of the people (majority) reflects the correct outcomes and true social good. The political legitimacy of democracy, instead, rests upon the will and consent of the people, not upon their reason or rightness. This means that although there is no rational- philosophical certainty that democratic political decisions are right, it is simply sufficient that these decisions are outcomes of the will of the people and their exercising of their practical rights and freedoms. Michael Walzer writes:
Democracy rests, as I have already suggested, on an argument concerning freedom and political obligation. Hence it is not only the case that the people have a procedural right to make the laws. On the democratic view, it is right that they make the laws – even if they make them wrongly[116].
Since the legitimacy of the democratic system rests on people’s rights instead of their valid knowledge, there is no reason to suppose firstly that the power of the people must be limited by the rightness of what they decide, and secondly that a few experts ought to be empowered to review what the people do and step in when they move beyond those limits and make incorrect decisions. The presupposition of such a view is that there is a small group of people, in every society, that can recognize the truth better than society as a whole can, hence they must have a right to intervene. Democracy in principle absolutely disagrees with this procedure, for the people’s rule does not rest upon their knowledge of truth. If we admit that finding objective knowledge, true answers, and right decisions is possible and philosophers are those who can be presumed to attain the truth, then the tension between philosophy and democracy is inevitable because the democratic system fails to reconcile between the rule of majority and the authority of truth (philosophy). Walzer says:
Nor can the philosophical instrument be a majority amongst the people, for majorities in any genuine democracy are temporary, shifting and unstable. Truth is one, but the people have many opinions, truth is eternal, but the people continually change their minds. Here in its simplest form is the tension between philosophy and democracy. The people\'s claim to rule does not rest upon their knowledge of truth...the claim is most persuasively put, it seems to me, not in terms of what the people know, but in terms of what they are. They are the subjects of the law, and if the law is to bind them as free men and women, they must also be its makers[117].
Many advocates of the democratic system as the best desirable political system strive to justify the detachment between democracy and the issue of truth by stating misgivings about the possibility of attaining objective knowledge about public good and moral truths. For instance, Robert Dahl emphasizes that not only is the justification for democracy independent of any specific answer to the epistemological ontological questions about the nature of moral judgments, but also democracies should have misgivings about such claims. For him, we are entitled, indeed obliged, to look with the greatest suspicion on any claim that another possesses objective knowledge of the good of the self that is definitely superior to the knowledge possessed by the self[118].
General Freedom
Democracy, not only as an ideal, but in actual practice prerequires certain rights and liberties. A truly democratic government could only be established within a political culture that profoundly supports these rights and freedoms. That is why advocates of democracy always stress its relationship to freedom and view democracy as the best political system that maximizes and protects general freedoms such as freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of religion. Accordingly some liberties are preconditions for the emergence of a democratic state, whereas others (such as the freedom of self determination) are seen as results of such a state. Thus one can conclude that democracy is desirable because freedom in general and freedom of self-determination in particular is desirable.
In other words, to govern oneself, to obey laws that one has chosen for oneself, and to be able to determine ones destiny is a desirable state of affairs. On the other hand, however, human beings cannot exist in isolation from society, and it is essential for them to live in association with others and to live in association with others naturally requires that they must sometimes obey collective decisions that are binding upon all members of the association. Democracy maximizes the potential for self-determination amongst society because its members still govern themselves. Dahl claims that this justification for democracy has been endorsed by all those, from Locke onwards, who have believed that governments ought to be based upon the consent of the governed[119]
In a similar manner, democracy is also justified by the assumption that this political system maximizes ‘moral autonomy’. A morally autonomous person is one who defines his own moral principals. Dahl states a deeper reason for valuing self-determination; that the freedom to govern oneself is in fact an expression of the value of moral autonomy, but he neglects to discuss the arguments for why moral autonomy should be respected[120].
Dahl believes that the cornerstone of democratic beliefs is the presumption of personal autonomy, namely the assumption that no person is, in general, more likely than yourself to be a better judge of your own good and interests, or to act in order to bring them about. Consequently you should have the right to judge whether a policy is, or is not, in your best interest. On this assumption, then, no one else is more qualified than you to judge whether the results are in your interest[121]
It is quite clear that this justification, if any, merely supports the assembly model of democracy, which is appropriate for a small-scale society in which people have an opportunity to share directly in the process of making political decisions, whereas most present day democracies are representative. In the representative model of democracy, the choice of people about their goods and interests is confined to electing representatives. Dahl in his later book (On Democracy) refers to this dark side of representative democracy:
The dark side is this: under a representative government, citizens often delegate enormous discretionary authority over decisions of extraordinary importance. They delegate authority not only to their elected representatives, but, by an even more indirect and circuitous route, they delegate authority to administrators, bureaucrats, civil servants, judges and at a still further remove to international organizations...popular participation and control are not always robust, and the political and bureaucratic elites possess great discretion[122].
Even though the roots of democracy mentioned by advocates who believe in foundationalism are not restricted to what has been discussed above, these four principals are viewed as more significant than the others. In comparison with the second approach i.e. the political or pragmatic defense of the democratic state, which does not rest on any specific foundation or doctrine to justify this political system, foundationalism is significant because with a comparative discussion one can make judgment and recognize how compatible Islam and the foundations of democracy might be. Before further debate about these foundations, it would be appropriate to explore the modern approach to liberal democracy (anti-foundationalism). As indicated previously, John Rawls, one of the most influential political philosophers of the twenty century, in his latest works insists that we should present a political conception of liberal democracy – liberal justice – instead of the comprehensive conception that rests upon specific moral and philosophical doctrines. For him this new political liberalism is ‘free standing’ with no reference to any particular comprehensive doctrine or specific moral-philosophical foundation. He writes:
While we want a political conception to have a justification by reference to one or more comprehensive doctrines, it is neither presented as, nor derived from, such a doctrine applied to the basic structure of society…but as a distinguishing feature of a political conception is that it is presented as free standing and expounded apart from, or without reference to any such wider background[123].
By emphasis on a freestanding view of liberal democracy – a well ordered, just, democratic society, which does not rest on particular doctrines – he hopes that this conception can attain an overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The political conception of liberal democracy with its freestanding view supplies appropriate circumstances to be endorsed by citizens who belong to various comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines. He says:
The problem, then, is how to frame a conception of justice for a constitutional regime such that those who support, or who might be brought to support that kind of regime might also endorse the political conception provided it did not conflict to sharply with their comprehensive views. This leads to the idea of a political conception of justice as a freestanding view starting from the fundamental ideas of a democratic society and presupposing no particular wider doctrine, so that it can be supported by a reasonable and enduring, overlapping consensus[124].
Rawls’ starting point is the ideas and values that are latent in the public political culture of contemporary western liberal democracies. His political conception of a well-ordered democratic society based on the principles of justice, is formed upon western culture without any attempt to justify these ideas and values. Rawls writes:
In order to state what I have called political liberalism, I have started with a number of familiar and basic ideas implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society. These have been worked up into a family of conceptions in terms of which political liberalism can be formulated on understood[125].
Richard Rorty, a famous American philosopher, maintains that Rawls does not attempt to justify democratic institutions through philosophical foundations. Rorty writes:
Rawls is not attempting a transcendental deduction of American liberalism or supplying philosophical foundations for democratic institutions, but simply trying to systematize the principals and intuitions typical of American liberals[126].
For Rorty, the sources latent in the public political culture of liberal democracies seem to be all that is available, and so must be all that is required to justify the liberal democracy political system. Rorty says:
It is not evident that [liberal democratic institutions] are to be measured by anything more specific than the moral intuitions of the particular historical community that has created those institutions. The idea that moral and political controversies should always be ‘brought back to first principals’ is reasonable if it means merely that we should seek common ground in the hope of attaining agreement. But it is misleading if it is taken as the claim that some particular interlocutor has already discerned that order[127].
For many thinkers it is obvious, that this method of justifying a political system, which consists of merely invoking the basic elements of a public political culture, because these cultural elements and values grow and thrive around that political system, cannot logically support this argument. This anti-foundationalist approach to the contemporary democratic system comes to the conclusion that advocates of liberal democracies are free to ignore critics whose criticisms question the moral intuitions of western liberal democracies. Rorty, in principle, disagrees with any attempt to provide rational foundations for systems of values and concepts[128].
Obviously this form of justifying a democratic state does not provide an opportunity for comparative critical discussion between Islam and democracy. This anti-foundationalist approach as a first step and starting point wants us to completely admit all basic values of western liberal democratic culture while allowing no room for criticism or philosophical discussion concerning these values and foundations. As Rorty states “Rawls puts the democratic politics first and philosophy second.”[129]
Limited Democracy versus Pure Democracy
Pure democracy or unlimited democracy is a political system in which all political questions are settled directly, without any restrictions, by the majority vote of citizens. Early liberals were concerned about pure democracy for its potential harms, for instance Kant maintained that pure democracy that relies upon the majority vote in an assembly, without any constitutional restrictions, subjects the individual to the whims of the masses, as it contains no constitutional safeguards against the tyranny of the majority and, therefore, it cannot protect personal rights. Justice demands that a people be given the right to make its own laws, but the right must be constrained by constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. In Kant’s view, political freedom embodied in voting and democratic processes, alone does not ensure civil freedom. The majority may fail to respect the rights of the minority[130].
Conversely the idea of a limited democracy is based on the doctrine that there are many fundamental rights – including political rights – that possess a moral standing and a philosophical ontological basis that is independent of democracy and the democratic process. Since the validity and foundational justification of these rights does not depend on majority rule or the democratic process, they can serve as limits on what can be done by means of the democratic process. Citizens are entitled to exercise these rights, against the democratic process if need be, to preserve fundamental political rights and liberties and in order to protect themselves from infringement even by means of the democratic process itself[131].
The above-mentioned justification for limited democracy should not be restricted to fundamental rights; rather, it also embraces moral and religious values. According to this justification, whatever possesses a moral or philosophical standing – a reliable and valid foundation – independent of democracy and the democratic process, should be protected from possible democratic harms. Consequently the limits of democracy could be constitutional, moral or even religious. Theoretically, the limits of this type of democracy depend on what is crucial and most fundamental for citizens who choose democracy as their desirable political system.
For example, in the United States, since 1803 the Supreme Court, consisting of nine judges, has been assigned to declare whether legislation is ‘constitutional’ or not. Indeed they have the authority to review what the people and the people’s representatives enact via the democratic process. Of course, the constitutional role of the Supreme Court judges extends no further than the enforcement of a written constitution that is itself based on democratic consent and is subject to amendments through the democratic process. The tension between judicial review and democracy occurs within the framework of the constitution. Even when the judges act in ways that go beyond upholding the textual integrity of the constitution, they generally claim no special understanding of truth and rightness but refer instead to historical precedents, long-established legal principals or common values. Nevertheless, the place they hold and the power they wield make it possible for them to impose philosophical constraints on democratic choice[132].
Having referred to these primary points concerning democracy, it is now time to address the central purpose of this Chapter; that is the possibility of a religious (Islamic) democracy.
What is the Conception of a ‘Religious Democracy’?
It goes without saying that ‘pure democracy’, which delegates all dimensions of public affairs including legislation to majority rule without limitation, is absolutely incompatible with Islam. Essentially every school of thought, ideology and religion that follows a set of beliefs, values or rules independent of the will and desire of people cannot approve unlimited democracy. These values and rules must be protected and this cannot be insured by the will of the majority, as majorities in any form of democracy are shifting and unstable. Even political ideologies such as Liberalism and Socialism are in need of a constitution to control a purely democratic process and to protect their fundamental values and beliefs from possible harm from majority rule. On the other hand, democracy and the democratic process do not provide us with a comprehensive ideology, way of life or any substantial values. Democracy is but a method among other alternative methods for overcoming difficulties in decision making in an association or society.
The philosophical foundations mentioned to justify the democratic system, fail to uphold it as a reliable means to attain truth and righteous decisions. Majority rule is too weak to be presented as an alternative to comprehensive religious, moral and philosophical doctrines. In fact what gave democracy superiority over other alternative systems is far removed from any philosophical or ideological basis; instead the democratic system is made desirable in comparison to other political systems because of its practicality.
Democracy as a method does not contain fixed, unalterable or absolute moral and philosophical ideas and values. However, in order for a political regime to be democratic, it must meet some criteria. A democratic political system should provide the opportunity for the people to participate, at least in some significant political decisions, to express their ideas, orientations and needs, to distribute political power through free elections and be able to regulate and bring to account the governors. These political rights and duties of the people in a democratic regime could be dealt with within a fixed framework consisting of specific rights and values. In current limited democracies these frameworks are embodied in constitutions, and constitutions in turn are influenced by values and beliefs that people of each country respect and support. Muslim advocates of democracy cannot accept ‘pure democracy’ as Abu al-Ala Mawdudi says:
Islam is not democracy: for democracy is the name given to that particular form of government in which sovereignty ultimately rests with the people, in which legislation depends both in its form and content on the force and direction of public opinion and laws are modified and altered, to correspond to changes in that opinion[133].
Therefore the key issue concerning religious democracy is whether Islam has the capacity to draw an appropriate framework for a democratic government that meets the above-mentioned criteria. As I have indicated in the earlier pages of this Chapter, many Islamic thinkers believe that Islam has delegated significant political as well as social roles and duties to Muslims. In Islam, no conflict exists between the supreme authority of religion – the definite and unquestionable status of divine laws and Islamic values – and the political status of people in an ideal Islamic state. As there are limitations for the will and desire of the people, they have authority within the framework of Islamic rules and values. Hence, a majority of the people or their representatives have no power to legislate or make judgments that contradict Islam. At the same time the governors in an Islamic state must respect the rights, will, and authority of the people. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran during a meeting with the representative of Pope VI said:
I do not want to impose (my will) on my people, and Islam does not permit us to establish a dictatorship. We follow our nation’s votes and act according to their views. We have no right, God has not conferred such a right to us, and the Prophet (pbuh) never permitted us to impose our ideas upon Muslims[134].
Smoothing the Path to Religious Democracy
The advocates of Islamic democracy usually refer to the shura (consultation) as the most important Islamic teaching that supports and justifies the authority of people in an Islamic government. Rashid al-Ghannouchi (Tunisia, born 1941) writes:
The Islamic government is one in which:
1- Supreme legislative authority is for the Shari’ah, which is the revealed law of Islam, which transcends all laws. Within this context, it is responsibility of scholars to deduce detailed laws and regulations to be used as guidelines by judges. The head of the Islamic state is the leader of the executive body entrusted with the responsibility of implementing such laws and regulations.
2- Political power belongs to the community (ummah), which should adopt a form of ‘shura’ which is a system of mandatory consultation[135].
Thinkers like Sadek Sulaiman (Oman, born 1933) maintain that shura in Islam includes basic elements of democracy. He says:
As a concept and as a principle, shura in Islam does not differ from democracy. Both shura and democracy arise from the central consideration that collective deliberation is more likely to lead to a fair and sound result for the social good than individual preference[136].
The Holy Qur’an explicitly proposes and encourages that public affairs and the governance of the ummah should be based upon shura:
And those who respond to their Lord and keep up prayer, and their rule is to take counsel amongst themselves. (Chapter 42, Verse 38)
And ask pardon for them, and take counsel with them in the affair. (Chapter 3, Verse 159)
The second verse orders the Prophet (pbuh), who receives revelation and enjoys infallible knowledge, to take counsel with believers in management of public affairs. This command shows the fundamental significance of the participation of Muslims in social and political affairs. It is somewhat an exaggeration to suppose that the shura is the functional equivalent of western parliamentary democracy because there are some controversies amongst scholars about the political status of shura. For instance, those who believe in the theory of Caliphate, emphasize that members of the council only have a duty to express their opinion with no right to make political decisions. Accordingly if the Caliph refers to the assembly to take their opinion regarding rulings, which he wants to adopt, their opinion is not binding on him, even if it is a consensus of majority opinion.
What makes shura one of the basic elements of Islamic democracy, it seems, is the fact that shura refers to one of the significant essentials of democracy. Democracy in its long history has had evolutions and alterations, but matters such as public participation, the rule of law and the responsibility and accountability of governors can be recognized as essential to democracy. In conclusion, the assumption that the Islamic political system could be a democratic one, merely implies that Islamic teachings endorse and agree with the essentials of democracy. From this point of view, there is no doubt that the verses of the Holy Qur’an concerning shura along with some transmissions from the prophet and Imams emphasize on the necessity of public participation in political and social affairs. But the question concerning the political role of consultation (shura) in the process of making decisions still remains. Is consultation merely a religious duty of the ruler of the Islamic state, or is he bound by the decisions of those consulted?
The last verse of Surah Aale-Imran verifies the view that shura is not binding upon the ruler, for the Almighty God delegates the final decision, after consultation, to the Prophet (pbuh):
And take counsel with them in the affair, so when you have decided then place your trust in Allah. (Chapter 3, Verse 159)
However, the practice of the Holy Prophet, according to some traditions, testifies that he had implemented and respected the opinion of the believers even when it was against his own views. It is recorded that the Prophet not only consulted with his experienced or close companions, but sometimes he held open meetings in which all Muslims were invited. The consultation that took place about the battle of Badr and Uhud was one such example. In the case of Uhud he gave precedent to the opinion of the majority of Muslims over his own concerning the location of the battlefield and decided to fight outside the city of Madina. He also consulted the people concerning the treatment of prisoners of war following the battles of Badr and al- Khandaq[137].
Clearly, however, the Prophet did not consult the Muslims concerning religious affairs or divine matters. His consultations were restricted to war, peace and ordinary public affairs that were not determined by revelation and were not amongst the situations in which divine order determined must be done. For example, with regard to the treaty of al-Hudaybiyah the Prophet (pbuh) did not submit to the opinion of the majority of his companions who were in disagreement with the covenant, it was not in fact a consultation but a series of complaints made to the messenger regarding the terms of the peace. He rejected their suggestions to break his promises and continued to respect the agreement, which he had made because it was a command of Allah (swt). He told them: “Verily I am the servant of Allah and his messenger. I shall never disobey his order.”
In short, even though the shura in its historical function within the Islamic world does not totally overlap with the modern concept of democracy and the political status of parliament in contemporary representative democracies, it would be appropriate for shaping a limited democratic model for an Islamic state. The Qur’anic emphasis on the status of shura as an essential aspect of the Islamic political system – according to those who interpret the word for amr in both of the two verses relating to shura, as referring to governmental affairs – makes way for defining a determined systematic role for the people’s representatives (members of the shura) within the body of the Islamic state. The above- mentioned verses are silent about how the form and mechanism of shura in an Islamic political system might be, consequently the constitutional approach inclines to determine and stabilize the political status of shura (people’s authority) under the supreme authority of Islam does not confront any religious problem.
The second element, however, often mentioned by advocates of religious democracy as an appropriate approach to an Islamic democratic state is Bay’ah. In the first Chapter, the meaning of ‘Bay’ah’ has already been discussed. Here, the aim is to examine its legal nature, for it is supposed that its political function is the same as the function of an election in democratic systems. It should be noted that Bay’ah in the sense of adherence to a religion (as occurred between the Prophet and his supporters from Madina before Hijrah) or recognition of a pre-established authority by other means (such as the testamentary designation, such as the Bay’ah of people to the second caliph Umar) is irrelevant to our debate. Bay’ah as a means and method of designating a person as a ruler (caliph) among other legitimate methods is held to be the same as democratic election in its legal nature. This political view exclusively belongs to Sunni jurists, because Shi’a political thought, except that of the Zaydis, maintains that the Imamah is acquired by election within the Alid family. The Bay’ah has never been able to play this role, for the Shi’a recognize only one method of designating the Imam. He is appointed through the testament (nass) of one in the legitimate line of descent[138].
This sense of Bay’ah is a supposed contractual agreement between those who elect and he who has been designated as the ruler. As far as democracy is concerned, for at least two reasons, Bay’ah is not simply and solely a democratic election. Firstly, Bay’ah implies binding obedience to the ruler, and since it is a contractual agreement, like commercial agreements such as bao (to sell), the obedience of the elected ruler as a religious duty, would be obligatory. Secondly, this obligatory obedience is life long, whereas the democratic process of appointing a person as ruler is merely temporal with no religious implications.
One of the most important characteristics of a democratic government is its accountability to its people. A democratic state must be accountable and its citizens must have the right to criticize its policies and functions. Advocates of religious democracy maintain that al-amr bi\'l-maruf wal nahy\'an al- munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil) is one of the most significant Islamic duties placed upon Muslims and it should render the Islamic state accountable. Many Qur’anic verses emphasize on this fundamental injunction, which if Muslims take seriously would produce a healthy and healthy society that is far removed from tyranny, injustice and dictatorship. Almighty God says in the Holy Qur’an:
And from amongst you there should be a party who invite to good and enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong, and these it is that shall be successful. (Chapter 3, Verse 104)
And (as for) the believing men and believing women, they are guardians of each other, they enjoin good and forbid evil. (Chapter 9, Verse 71)
It is an Islamic duty, incumbent upon all Muslims, to concern themselves with the health and well being of society, to oppose injustice and immorality, and to scrutinize the actions of those who undertake governmental affairs. There exists a mutual responsibility between the rulers and those whom they rule to implement and uphold the Islamic Shari’ah and this provides a clear framework and basis upon which citizens may question the actions and policies of their governors with regards to their socio-religious duties. As the most-noble Messenger (pbuh) in a famous tradition says:
Every one of you is a shepherd (of the community), and all are responsible for their dependants and herd[139].
In order to fulfil this obligation (to monitor governmental functions) there is a requirement for certain conditions to be met, such as the freedom of speech and to criticize as well as access to accurate and objective information. Otherwise, the active participation of people in public-religious duties such as providing constructive feedback and criticisms toward the governors and standing for justice and truth would be impossible. It is obvious that Islam does not concur with individual freedom to the extent prevalent in western culture. However, the preconditions of an Islamic and democratic government that respects the rights of the people and their contribution in socio-political affairs, are outlined by the Qur’an and Sunnah (valid traditions). For example the Qur\'an encourages believers to listen to different opinions and to select the best of them:
Therefore give good news to my servant. Those who listen to the word, then follow the best of it; those are whom Allah has guided, and those it is who are men of understanding. (Chapter 39, Verses 17-18)
There are many narrations in historical and religious texts documenting dialogue and debate that occurred between Shi’a Imams and non-Muslim intellectuals in which disbelievers (even atheists) were able to express their ideological views so long as they were voiced as academic opinions and kept within the circles of scholarly debate, rather than attempting to propagate them. In a true Islamic state, it is the right granted to the people that they be kept aware of affairs in society and government.
Imam Ali (pbuh) once explained the mutual rights and duties that exist between an Imam (leader) and the people:
It is your right that I must not hide any secret, except that of war, from you. And that I should not take over matters (without your consultation or awareness) other than those concerning divine laws (hukm)[140].
Aside from the obvious distinction between religious democracy and western liberal democracy, the former holds the same essential advantages as any democratic government. These include the participation of citizens, the distribution of political power by election, political accountability of governors, constitutionalism and political transparency as well as mutual responsibility between the rulers and the ruled. Religious democracy however, is far more desirable for Muslims than any feasible alternative because of the supreme role of the Shari’ah in providing a basis for, and shaping the growth of, the contents of this political system. It is also desired because of the qualities and moral-religious commitments that the governor must have as the leader of Muslim society.
For instance, constitutionalism and accountability in secular, western democracies as Nathan Brown says, has expressed itself most frequently in human authored constitutional texts and rights, whereas religious constitutionalism is defined under the authority of the Shari’ah. Therefore, the religious government is not only accountable with regard to people\'s rights and needs, but also with regard to the Shari’ah and divine laws. He writes:
Many Muslims have come to believe that the crisis of political accountability can be solved by insisting that Muslim governments rule within the bounds fixed by the Islamic Shari’ah. In essence, this demand renders the Islamic Shari’ah as a kind of constitution. Governments may not cross the boundaries firmly established by the Islamic Shari’ah; rulers are held accountable to God\'s law[141].
In summary, although governments throughout history have often ignored the political teachings of Islam, the main purpose here is to show that these significant teachings smooth the path towards the establishment of a religious democracy.
Religious Democracy is Paradoxical
Critics of religious democracy maintain that there is an inherent antagonism between the fundamental aspects of the Islamic creed and the basis of democracy. According to this view, those who subscribe to the idea of religious democracy ignore the true nature of religion and overlook the epistemological foundations of democracy.
The democratic system is based upon pluralism that places emphasis upon freedom instead of regulation, diversity as opposed to homogeneity, and multiplicity rather than unity. According to pluralistic doctrine, no single person, group or school of thought can possess or claim to possess the absolute truth or that it\'s understanding and opinions are correct and that all others are false.
Truths are distributed amongst humanity, hence, every opinion is but a composition of truth and falsehood, and consequently no opinion has superiority over another, and cannot claim such. People are free to follow and support any opinion they decide upon, whether it be religious or secular, theistic or atheistic, moral or immoral. The unlimited freedom of choice is one of the most important foundations of democracy, a foundation that Islam is opposed to. Hamid Paydar writes:
One of the epistemological foundations of democracy is the obscurity of truth and its distribution amongst all human beings, however, if an ideology or religion should call itself the sample of truth, maintaining that other religions and opinions are manifestations of infidelity, polytheism and misleading, it would not be compatible with democratic government. Islam, according to some verses of the Qur’an introduces itself as a unique right and true religion. Verses such as “This then is Allah, your true lord; and what is there after the truth but error” (10:32) “And whoever desires a religion other than Islam, it should not be accepted from him” (3:85) and the opening verses of Surah Taubah (repentance) are in contradiction to man\'s freedom of choice[142].
This view emphasizes on the inflexibility of Islamic laws and the absolute authority of the Shari’ah as evidence of incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Obviously the interpretation of democracy stated above does not represent what exists in an ordinary democratic state. It is a particular version of democracy mixed with extreme liberalism, which asserts the absolute neutrality of a liberal democratic state. For this new approach a desirable political system should ignore any conception of good and should not based upon any particular philosophical-religious doctrine of life. As Galston says:
According to this view, the liberal state is desirable not because it promotes a specific way of life but precisely because it alone does not do so. The liberal state is ‘neutra’ amongst different ways of life. It presides benignly over them, intervening only to adjudicate conflict, to prevent any particular way of life tyrannizing over others, and to ensure that all adhere to the principals that constitute society\'s basic structure[143].
It is not our objective to discuss whether the neutrality of a political system is possible. However, the fact is that no form of political life can be justified without appealing to certain ideas and values concerning society and the individual. Some advocates of liberalism maintain that liberal theorists covertly employ theories concerning goodness. However, their adamant denial of any reference to a basis or foundation reduces the strength of their argument and leaves their theories vulnerable to criticism[144].
Regardless of whether a neutral government is feasible or not, there is no doubt that Islam is in complete disagreement with many underlying values of liberal democracy, including secularism, pluralism and radical individualism. Consequently the above-mentioned theory merely explains the general incompatibility of Islam with liberalism and specifically the new conception of a \'liberal state\'. This, nevertheless, does not in any way undermine other versions of limited democracy, including religious democracy.
Usurpation of God\'s Sovereignty
Some Muslim thinkers who emphasize on Islamic governance argue that democracy is contradictory to Islamic principals because it involves the legislation of laws, and there are may verses of Qur’an that demonstrate that legislation is reserved for Allah (swt).
Indeed judgment (hukm) is only for Allah. (Chapter 6, Verse 57)
And in whatever thing you disagree, the judgment thereof is with Allah. (Chapter 42, Verse 10)
And if you were in dispute in anything amongst yourselves, refer to Allah and His Messenger. (Chapter 4, Verse 59)
In conclusion, Islam holds that sovereignty is with God (Divine law = Shari’ah) and not with the ummah (people), thus the ummah does not possess the right to legislate on any matter. For example, even if all the Muslims were to gather together and agree to permit usury, usury would remain prohibited because it is a decree from Allah and Muslims have no choice in the matter. On the other hand, in democracy sovereignty is with the people, thus they are able to legislate according to their own free will and desires, either directly or indirectly via the representatives they have elected[145].
The Egyptian revivalist scholar, Sayyid Qutb holds that the essential doctrine of liberal democracy, namely the sovereignty of man, is a usurpation of God\'s sovereignty and a rebellion against His authority, for it subordinates the individual to the will of other individuals instead of God\'s governance on the earth[146].
Clearly this approach to religious government, in principal, should not ignore the administrative and executive role of the people in an Islamic state, because for them the problem of legislation is fundamental. This approach insists that the believers cannot frame any law for themselves, nor do they have the right to alter or modify God\'s laws. This assumption has emanated from the idea that it is incumbent upon Muslims to follow Shari’ah and to restrict all actions and principals to this basis. It is not allowed for them to undertake or leave anything except after understanding the rule of Allah regarding it. Furthermore, those who deny any legislative role for the people maintain that the Islamic Shari’ah contains rules for all past events, current problems, all possible incidents and that it encompasses the actions of man completely and comprehensively. Allah says:
And we have sent down to you the book as an exposition of everything, a guidance, a mercy and glad tidings to those who have submitted themselves to Allah. (Chapter 16, Verse 89)
Accordingly, Muslims are allowed to make use of the sciences and thoughts of human beings unless they contradict Islam. However, with regard to laws and legislation it is prohibited for Muslims to devise and obey un-Islamic rules because it is impossible to find a human action that does not have an evidence or a sign that indicates its rule in the Quran. This is due to the general meaning of His saying ‘exposition of everything’[147].
Since the above view is both influential and popular amongst Islamic revivalist movements, it would be both convenient and useful to examine its various aspects. In order to do this, one must first clarify the meaning of “God’s sovereignty”, then the assumption that all legislative authority rests with God and that believers and qualified jurists (fuqaha) cannot frame any laws for Muslim society should be examined. It should also be emphasized that there is a lack of knowledge concerning the Islamic model of democracy, which insists on the sovereignty of God as well as people’s authority in limited aspects of political affairs. The followers of this doctrine focus solely on a comparison between their conception of an Islamic state and a purely democratic (or liberal democratic) model.
By definition, sovereignty is the claim of ultimate political authority, subject to no higher power with regards to the legislation and enforcement of political decisions. In the international system, sovereignty is the claim by the state to independent self-government and the mutual recognition of claims to sovereignty is the basis of international society[148].
Through regarding sovereignty as the basis and foundation of the political power that a government relies upon in order to be able to exercise its power and organize its domestic and international relationships, the idea that sovereignty as a political term has no connection to God has come to being. Therefore those who attribute the quality to God confuse between the religious status of God amongst believers and the political power of a state referred to by the term ‘sovereignty’. Hence many thinkers such as Fazlur-Rahman essentially deny any attempt to translate the supremacy of Allah into political sovereignty.
The term ‘sovereignty’ as a political term is of a relatively recent coining and denotes definite and defined factors in a society to which rightfully belongs coercive force in order to obtain obedience to its will. It is absolutely obvious that God is not sovereign in this sense and that only people can be and are sovereign, since only to them belongs ultimatecoercive force i.e. Only their \'word is law\' in the politically ultimate sense[149].
As a matter of fact, every formed state has sovereignty regardless of how its political hegemony and power are established and shaped. So, all political models of government - democratic, dictatorship, guardianship and even a military government established by a coup d’etat - so long as it remains in power and can exercise ultimate political authority, possesses sovereignty. In the Islamic ideology, however, there is no unique origin for the establishment of political sovereignty and thus the fundamentally crucial question in this regard is one of ‘legitimacy’. Which form of political sovereignty is the legitimate one? Amongst political philosophers there are several answers to this significant question. The idea that ‘only people can be and are sovereign’, as Fazl ur-Rahman stated, represents the democratic approach to this question. Certainly, for philosophers who believe in ‘guardianship’ such as Plato, the rule of majority and the consent of the people does not legitimize the political sovereignty of a government.
Therefore, sovereignty as such could be created through a number of means and in different forms, but every political doctrine presents its own specific interpretation of legitimate sovereignty and emphasizes on one factor as an essential element of a legitimate state. In the view of those who support the doctrine of an Islamic state, the legitimacy of a government is strongly tied to the extent of that government\'s commitment to the Shari’ah as well as Islamic teachings and values. Muslim thinkers construe the phenomena as God\'s sovereignty because God\'s will is embodied in his legislations and His will and orders have priority over the will and orders expressed by the rulers of an Islamic government, who are obligated to rule in accordance with divine laws (Shari’ah).
With regards to this interpretation of God\'s sovereignty with its particular insistence on his supremacy in legislation, the key issue that arises is whether sovereignty prevents the believers from any form of legislation. This important question distinguishes between religious democracy and the above-mentioned doctrine that does not recognize any right for the believers to frame any law for themselves. Religious democracy, as emphasized before, is based firmly upon the belief in the ultimate authority of almighty God, including his legislative sovereignty. But it is essential to recognize that the unquestionable legislative superiority over dimensions of Muslim\'s life is one issue, and their frequent need for appropriate, fresh and temporal laws to handle new and unusual situations is another. Muslims society, like all other societies, is in need of new laws and regulations in order to adapt its legal system with the frequent alterations in social relationships, namely, new developments in human lifestyle, technological development and cultural– economical changes. Social change in its broad meaning regularly produces many fresh judicial questions, which often cannot be resolved without new legislation.
The conception that Islam is perfect, comprehensive and all- embracing with regards to the needs of human beings, particularly the judicial-legislative necessities that arise, andthat the Islamic legal system consequently includes all rules required for a desirable Islamic way of life, with no need to draft new legislation and laws, can be interpreted in two ways. The first notion incorporates a misinterpretation of the idea that Islam is indeed a perfect religion. This theory asserts that in every case in which mankind is in need of laws, there are appropriate rules that already exist in the Shari’ah that can be automatically applied. Islam contains every law that people require in order to handle their private and public affairs. In conclusion, there remains no legal vacuum to justify the existence of another legislative sovereignty to derive new laws. According to this view, Qur’anic verses such as “And we have sent down to you the book as an exposition of every thing” (16:89) should be interpreted as supporting this view, because the word ‘everything’ embraces all rules we need in the various dimensions of our life, at all times and in every model of social formation. Regarding the Islamic legal system, all judicial demands would be satisfied either by in advance prepared rules or through Ijtihad (fuqaha derive new laws by referring to Islamic sources), which in turn is not legislation. Through ijtihad the faqih recourse to the sources of Shari’ah to declare the position of Islam with regards to new questions and situations, this in its nature is completely separate from legislation. Islamic jurists have no right to legislate, they merely are able to understand and announce to believers what Almighty God has declared.
Small-scale societies have a relatively simple social structure that can be easily regulated by a basic set of rules. However, contemporary society is considerably larger and possesses a vast social structure permeated by many complex interrelationships. In such an environment, every circumstance and aspect of public life requires a flexible legal network, consisting of both fixed and changeable rules, in order to be able to stay in harmony with the demands of a growing and modern society. The existence of ahistorical, non-temporal and fixed laws is a significant characteristic that is common in many comprehensive legal systems, especially in the Islamic legal code, nevertheless, the importance of temporal, changeable rules that every government must legislate according to new economic, social and political situations cannot be ignored. These policies are required to protect the interests of society and to overcome different social difficulties concerning education, taxation, security, exports, immigration and so on. Therefore the adoption of policy is one of the most important functions of a government.
The Shari’ah is perfect, not because we do not need any kind of legislation or because all the rules needed have been previously prepared, rather it is because Islam is the most perfect of all legal systems. It consists of comprehensive and all-inclusive divine laws and Islamic jurisprudence also has specific elements, which render it a dynamic and flexible system that is capable of operating hand-in-hand with changes in society and reality. One of the most significant aspects of this structure is the right of a well-qualified jurist (Wali al-Faqih mujtahid a-adil) to issue rulings and commands. If the Shari’ah has already providing a verdict regarding a specific issue, it is an obligation upon the Islamic state to adopt the ruling of the Shari’ah.
If a situation arises in which the Shari’ah is ambiguous or there exists a difference of opinion concerning the divine law, the opinion and edict of the Wali Amr (who carries the responsibility of rulership in the absence of the infallible Imam) has precedence over all others. In the case where there exists no obligation or prohibition in the Shari’ah, it is permissible for the just faqih to issue a governmental order necessitated by the interest of Islam and Muslims. Since the just faqih has legitimate authority (wilayah) and legislative sovereignty other governors, including those elected by the people such as members of parliament and the president, should be appointed by the just faqih otherwise they would have no legitimate authority to make governmental rules and decisions. For instance Ayatollah Khomeini says:
In the absence of the guardianship of a faqih or divine ruler, the taghut (illegitimate authority) will prevail. If the president is not appointed by a just faqih, he would be illegitimate[150].
In letters appointing the members of the Islamic Revolutionary Council in Iran as well as the first premier, referring to the above points, he writes:
As a person who enjoys the wilayah of the sacred religion, I appoint him...any opposition to this government is tantamount to opposition of Shari’ah[151].
Therefore, being elected by the majority or obtaining public consensus does not automatically grant legislative sovereignty or legitimate religious authority to rule and govern Islamic society. And in cases that governors have been appointed by the just faqih – even elected officials – their authority for making decisions and orders cannot contradict the Shari’ah. Finally, in instances where there is noclear indication from the Shari’ah because the case is totally new, and without previous record, it is the responsibility of the fuqhaha (jurists) to deduce the appropriate rule from Islamic sources.
The legitimate status of the majority is what truly distinguishes religious democracy from all other conceptions of the democratic state, for religious democracy limits the authority of the people in accordance with the legislative sovereignty of God. Whereas in non-religious democratic states, the sovereignty of elected individuals is not restricted by Shari’ah, and the doctrine explicitly assumes democracy as a secular system detached from the authority and sovereignty of God. It thus fails to make a fair assessment of the religious model of democracy and the relationship between Islam and democracy.
The Problem of Legal Equality
Legal equality is often highlighted as one of the crucial foundations of democratic government. Consequently, every political theory that wishes to categorize itself as democratic must respect the legal equality of its citizens. Some critics of religious democracy maintain that Islam is not compatible with democracy on the grounds of some inequalities endorsed within the Islamic legal system.
Islam may be credited with having disseminated the spirit of equality and brotherhood amongst its followers, nevertheless the inferior status of three groups, namely non-Muslim citizens, slaves, and women, and their inequality before the law ascompared with free male Muslim citizens do not help in smoothing the path to a democratic system[152].
Even though the modern conception of democracy emphasizes on all embracing legal equality, democracy in its nature – as the history of political thought – testifies that it is compatible with legal inequalities. As discussed before, in ancient models of democracy only free male landowners had the right to participate in the process of making decisions for city-states. In modern democracies, the right for all free men to vote on an equal basis was not granted until 1850. Males of African origin were denied the right to vote until 1870, and females, both those who were free and the slaves, were not granted the right until the 19th constitutional amendment in 1920.
Moreover, even the modern conception of democracy does not rest upon a complete, unexceptional, and all-inclusive legal equality. Instead it relies upon the principal that all adult members of society are considered equal in political rights, and are able to participate in voting and the distribution of political power. Therefore the existence of non-political legal inequalities, in principal, is not incompatible with democracy. Suppose that according to a legal system, women have not been granted the right to become a judge or religious leader, or that they inherit less than males, obviously these non-political inequalities do not undermine the idea of establishing a democratic system.
No one can make a credible attack against the Islamic ideology because of its supposed endorsement of slavery, slavery was an age-old, and universally accepted institution, which was only officially abolished in the western world less than two centuries ago when emerged around the world.
However, when Islam was revealed, slavery was considered a completely natural aspect of human culture as well as an inseparable element of society. Islam moderated this institution and encouraged believers to emancipate their slaves. In fact, the concept of freeing slaves is an important element in the Islamic system of punishment. The acceptance of slavery by Islam should not, therefore, be considered an obstacle for democracy. In summary, there is no doubt that there are some differences in Shari’ah between Muslims and non-Muslims (for example in retribution), between men and women (for example in inheritance), but these legal inequalities have no connection to political equality and citizenship. For example, in the constitution of Iran as a model of Islamic democratic government, many articles emphasize the equal rights of citizens, men and women, Muslim and non-Muslim:
All people of Iran, whatever their ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; color, race, language and the like, do not bestow any privilege. (Article 19)
All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social and cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic criteria. (Article 20)
Reconciling Islam and Liberal Democracy
Muslim advocates of religious democracy strongly support the conception of a democratic political system possessing a religious framework drawn by Shari’ah. In other words, a judicial (fiqhi) based model of democracy that respects the authority of the people regarding God\'s sovereignty and Islamic law. They emphasize upon the accountability of the government, the participation of the people in political affairs and the implementation of the Shari’ah. According to their conception of religious democracy, the political power belongs to the people, but their authority is limited by the Shari’ah. Hence, it is not in the people\'s power to make political decisions that contradict Islamic rules and values. The basic structure of a fiqhi based society, namely the system of rights and duties, should be defined according to instructions and limitations set forth by Islamic teachings in general and Shari’ah in particular.
Some Muslim intellectuals attempt to present a model of Islamic democratic government, which in principle welcomes with open arms many underlying values of contemporary liberal democracies. As a notable sample of this modernist approach there is the conception of Abdul- Kareem Soroush (an Iranian intellectual born in 1945) regarding religious democracy. Here we will briefly explore a political approach that strives to reconcile Islam and the western conception of human rights, justice and rationality, by reducing the status of Shari’ah to juridical conflicts with no connection to the management of society or the regulation of social relationships. The basic elements of this doctrine are as follows:
* In contrast to the prevailing conception of a religious society and Islamic government, that is essentially fiqh based and defines a religious society as one wherein the implementation of Shari’ah is the ultimate aim and major function of the religious state, the above mentioned doctrine does not give Islamic jurisprudence such a crucial role. According to a fiqh-based interpretation of religious society and Islamic governance, the rights and responsibilities of people have been defined and determined by Islamic laws, in other words the issue of human rights is defined within a religious context, particularly jurisprudential arguments. However, the above doctrine insists that defining human rights, and thus human duties, belongs to the extra-religious area and should be determined outside the domain of religion and Shari’ah.
* “The first issue concerning human rights is that it is not a solely legal (fiqhi) inter religious argument. Discussion of human rights belongs to the domain of philosophical theology and philosophy in general. Furthermore, it is an extra-religious area of discourse. Like other debates on matters that are prior to religious understanding and acceptance such as the existence of God, and the election of the Prophets, human rights lies outside of the domain of religious”[153]
* Religious law (Shari’ah) is not synonymous with the entirely of religion; nor is the debate over the democratic religious government a purely jurisprudential argument, so we shouldn\'t define the religious society according to the extent of its adoption of Shari’ah. The prophets founded a society based on faith and spirituality, not on legality. The heart of a religious society is freely chosen faith, not coercion and conformity. Religious society is based upon free, invisible faith, and dynamic and varied religious understanding[154].
* The jurisprudential governing and attempt to resolve social and public difficulties by Islamic laws must be replaced by rationality and scientific magnanimity. Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) was a solution for simple, underdeveloped societies that had simple, uncomplicated relationships. Fiqh could handle and successfully organize such societies, but the problems of complicated modern societies would be resolved solely by rationality and science instead of jurisprudence[155].
* Democratic religious regimes need not wash their hands of religiosity nor turn their backs on God\'s approval. In order to remain religious, they, of course, need to establish religion as the guide and arbiter of their problems and conflicts. But, in order to remain democratic, they need dynamically to absorb an adjudicative understanding of religion in accordance with the dictates of collective reason. Furthermore, every democratic religious government must be mindful of both the inside and the outside of the religion in order to remain faithful to both of its foundations[156].
* Debates concerning justice, human rights and the methods of government cannot be resolved through intra-religious debate: these are extra-religious arguments that deeply influence the understanding and practice of religion. Religious understanding must constantly renew and correct itself according to philosophical-theological debate concerning human rights, the meaning and nature of justice, the effective method of government and so on. The legal and jurisprudential schools of thought should harmonize their achievements with these novel insights[157].
Having accepted these premises, one comes to the conclusion that many substantial changes of modern humankind in its ideas, attitudes, worldviews and lifestyle must be admitted and respected by religion. These profound and widespread alterations include the desirable political system, human rights, the structure of fundamental rights and duties and the limited role of religion in human life. According to this doctrine, these significant changes should be noticed as new realities and truths, hence, religious knowledge must try to acknowledge and adopt itself to these facts. Therefore Muslims should not strive to deduce their political system from Islamic sources or form their social relationships according to the Shari’ah, instead they have to shape the fundamental basics of their society (i.e. The system of rights and duties) to become consistent modern mankind\'s world views, ideas and perspectives. The keystone of this political approach consists of the concept that the traditional Islamic thought – religious knowledge – is temporally limited and must therefore undergo a drastic metamorphosis in order that it be brought into line according to the views of “modern mankind”.
This political doctrine suffers from three major categories of weakness. The first of these is that the fundamental aspects of this theory, presupposed by a specific doctrine about the nature of religious knowledge, rests on a subjective approach to the interpretation of texts. This subjective approach, called by Soroush “theoretic evolution and devolution ofShari’ah”, insists that religious knowledge and the science of religion are relative to presuppositions, and in addition, that they are also temporal.
He states that since these presuppositions are varied and restricted by time, religious knowledge and the interpretation of religion is entirely human and this worldly. All of this implies that religion is constantly surrounded by a host of contemporaneous data and deliberations, thus the interpretation remains constant so long as these external elements are also constant. However, once they change, the change will be reflected in the understanding of religion as well. Consequently, religious texts (such as the Holy Qur’an and Islamic traditions or ahadith) do not carry their meaning on their own shoulders, instead it is necessary to situate them within a context. The interpretation of the text is in flux, and presuppositions are actively at work here. Therefore, the interpretation of religious texts is subject to expansion and contradiction according to the assumptions preceding them. These assumptions are part of the world’s view of an age, which need not and usually does not enter the mind through any formal education or conscious adoption, but rather are utilized inadvertently and fluently[158].
This approach to religious knowledge and the interpretation of texts has been strongly influenced by subjectivist schools of interpretation particularly the German philosopher Georg Gadamer (died 2001) and the philosophical hermeneutics of his famous book “Truth and Method” (First German edition 1960)[159].According to these, the horizon of the reader (his presuppositions, attitudes and expectations) share in the process of interpretation, thereby making the reader more than a passive observer who merely receives the message of the text, rather he is an active participant who creates the meaning of a text, or at least the horizon of the reader shares in the process of constructing a meaning around the text. Hence, according to this theory, admitting modern and popularly viewed and shared ideas as extra-religious presuppositions is acceptable, even if this should interfere in the interpretation of religion. Examples of such ideas include the western conception of human rights, political system and the social formation of rights and duties. Below are a few brief criticisms of this conception of the nature of religious knowledge and understanding religious texts.
à When referring to a religious text, the fundamental aim of interpretation for believers and religious scholars is to understand the \'intention\' of the author (for instance the intention of God in divine revelation and what the Prophet had in mind with regard to interpretation of his hadith). To achieve this understanding, they seek objective and valid interpretations of the texts. Obviously every form of interference originates from the reader\'s prejudices, presuppositions and expectations, which imposing a specific meaning upon the text, this is obviously harmful for any attempt to interpret religious texts.
à It is quite possible to subjectively interpret a religious text with no regard to the intentions of its author or its context. This form of interpretation is known as tafsir bi rai (interpretation by personal attitude and prejudice), and is criticized in many traditions originating from the Prophet and the Imams (peace be upon them). Developing a meaning according to the varied presuppositions and prejudices that exist in human society, is not a question of feasibility, rather it is a question of legitimacy.
à The assumption that religious texts do not carry their own meaning ignores the profound semantical relationship between words and meanings that is established in every natural language. This doctrine supposes that sentences of a text are empty vessels that a reader may place his own meaning within, as Soroush says:
Statements are hungry of meanings instead of being pregnant of them[160].(meaning a statement requires a meaning to be given to it, rather than providing a meaning from it).
Clearly anyone who wants to use or understand a language must respect its structure and limitations. Why aren\'t we free to apply and understand an English text as we wish? The point is that the pre-established connection between words (and their meanings) in this language prevent us from doing so and these limit the shape and framework of our linguistic activity. Therefore, statements in a text are not devoid of meaning, rather they contain their own meaning and play a crucial role in the process of understanding and transmitting the intention of their author, although this is not to say that other elements (such as the context of the text) are not important.
à This method of understanding in general, and understanding religious texts in particular, lends itself towards \'relativism\'. It emphasizes tha religious knowledge and the interpretation of text is a theory-laden, as Soroush writes:
Religious knowledge will be in continuous flux, and since it is only through those presuppositions that one can hear the voice of revelation. Hence the religion itself is silent[161].
This absolute relativism doesn\'t allow any room for the question of validity in interpretation of the text and religious knowledge. According to this approach, the validity of religious knowledge is connected to the validity of extra-religious knowledge, which consists of the presuppositions of each age, which in turn are varied and changeable. Whereas appealing to religious beliefs and knowledge based on reliability and validity of religious knowledge is undermined by this theory.
à As a matter of fact readers face a text through their horizons that means they cannot ignore their knowledge, mental abilities, backgrounds and personal experiences concerning the context and content of the text. In other words, it is quite impossible that someone can overlook his own horizon and keep his mind empty when confronting a text, because our knowledge, experiences and so on are inseparable parts of our identity. This reality would not excuse free and nonstandard interference of the reader ‘s horizon in the process of the interpretation of the text. Indeed, the horizon of every reader consists of several categories and some of them play a crucial role in understanding the text. For instance, those who know Arabic and have suitable background in Islamic philosophy understand philosophical texts that have been written by Muslim philosophers in Arabic language much better than others. On the other hand, there are some elements whose influence we have to control during the interpretation of text, such as our prejudices and expectations that tend to impose particular and prejudged meanings over the text. That is why even some great advocates of philosophical hermeneutics notice the danger of some pre-understandings that hold back the correct process of interpretation. Heidegger and Gadamer emphasize that we have to distinguish between ‘correct and incorrect’, ‘legitimate and illegitimate’ conceptions and prejudices that come into understanding[162]. Consequently we are not free to allow our prejudgments, attitudes and fore conceptions to be presented in the event of understanding. Substantial changes in ideas, lifestyle and attitudes among modern humankind should not decide the message of a religion. Certainly these radical alterations sometimes create challenges and conflicts between a religion and modernism that require solutions, but reinterpretation of religion in favour of these new ideas and attitudes is not an appropriate solution, especially when we know that there is no justification for many of these modern concepts and approaches. Values such as consumerism, individualism, the liberal concept of freedom, secularism, free market (capitalism) and technology that make the major paradigms of contemporary civilization and modern humankind ‘s lifestyle, have established themselves because of the personal preferences of the majority. However, most of these paradigms suffer from the problem of justification. Therefore, there is no reason for believers to blindly apply all modern values and conception to their religious texts and to reproduce their religious knowledge in accordance to them.
Another criticism of the above mentioned political doctrine concerns the ambiguous role of religion in this version of “religious” democratic government. The scope of political- social affairs concerns the practical aspect of Islam, which is largely embodied in Islamic law. Yet, this doctrine essentially denies the fiqhi based model of governing and, therefore, it remains ambivalent about the role (if any) of the Shari’ah with regards to the organization of social relationships and the process of making significant social- political decisions.
On the other hand, if we endorse the claim that religious understanding should constantly be renewed and corrected in light of extra-religious presuppositions and that Islamic jurisprudential thought must harmonize its achievements with these novel insights obtained by human sciences, then what reason would justify and obligate us to harmonize our political-social decisions with such dependent, relative and changeable religious knowledge? Why shouldn\'t we just directly trust these novel extra-religious sights and presuppositions and relinquish religion?
Soroush emphasizes that religious democracies in order to remain religious, need to establish religion as the guide and arbiter of their problems and conflicts[163].
However, by overlooking the role of the Shari’ah in resolving the problems of contemporary modern societies, he does not explicitly state the mechanism upon which Islam might be the guide and arbiter of conflicts in the modern world.
Also significant is the fact that this doctrine fails to demonstrate why the problem of human rights and the system of rights and duties are extra-religious and why we shouldn\'t respect the explanation of religious sciences from intra-religious contents. It seems that the only reason that could possibly justify this approach rests on an extremely subjective conception of the nature of religious knowledge and the interpretation of texts, which has been criticized previously. In spite of this, there is no justification for ignorance concerning Islamic teachings, conceptions and laws with regards to human rights and duties. In cases where extra-religious notions and values contrast some Islamic teachings first of all we have to assess their capacity for truth-valid objective reasons that support and justify them. Clearly many fundamental notions in the modern conception of human rights are deeply influenced by concepts and values of liberalism, which in turn suffer from absence of valid justification. For instance the liberal conception of freedom plays a very significant role in shaping modern conceptions of human rights, while advocates of Liberalism still have not presented a valid convincing rational argument for this conception of liberty.
Consider John Stuart Mill who tried to base and defend this freedom entirely on the principle of utility[164], which as many critics have pointed out is ill-equipped to bear the burden. If personal liberty is as valuable as Mill insists, liberals should at least attempt to find a more permanent foundation for it than the disputable proposition - the principle of utility. Classical liberals like Mill are not the only liberals whose defense of individual freedom have run into trouble. Recent defenders of the liberal conception of personal freedom such as Friedrich Hayek and Isaiah Berlin do not present a convincing rational justificatory basis for it. Hayek stakes his defense of personal liberty on skepticism about moral rationality, while Berlin resorts to a kindred species of moral relativism. For Hayek ‘reason’ is powerless to determine ‘ends’ and, therefore, cannot tell us what we ought to do. Human intellect cannot by itself settle questions concerning value, especially questions about moral values.
Consequently people personally must be absolutely free to choose[165],Berlin, on the other hand, emphasizes on ‘relativity of values’ and the subjective nature of values to conclude that there is no objective higher good than the arbitrary or relative good each individual sets for herself[166]. The weaknesses of these arguments seem plain. How is it possible to claim that there are no objective values and that all values are purely subjective, and yet simultaneously state that we should always hold personal liberty in such high regard as to make it one of the central pillars of human rights and political life. If they are right that there are no objective ends or values, then there can be no rational or objective grounds for valuating individual ends or liberty. In short, liberals must avoid the temptation to base their argument on relativistic or skeptical premises because it undercuts rather than supports their own arguments.
There are other points about the above mentioned political doctrine regarding the role of Islamic law (fiqh) in an Islamic government, which were discussed in the first chapter and do not need to be repeated again.
Notes:
[101] Daniel Webster in 1830 (thirty three years before Lincoln’s definition) said: people’s government, made for the people, made by the people and answerable to the people. Cf: Patterns of Democracy, p. 1.
[102] Robert Dahl, On Democracy, Yale University Press, 2000, p.9.
[103] Sulaiman Sadek Jawad, Democracy and Shura, Published in Liberal Islam, p. 97.
[104] Democracy and its Critics, p.2.
[105] On Democracy, pp. 85-86.
[106] Democracy and its Critics, p.135.
[107] H. .B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 60.
[108] Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies, Macmillan Press, 2nd Edition, 1998, p. 43.
[109] Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies, Macmillan Press, 2nd Edition, 1998, p. 46.
[110] On Democracy, pp. 45-57.
[111] John Plamenatz, Democracy and Illusion, Longman, 1973, pp. 164-168.
[112] John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1996, p.10.
[113] John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett (ed), Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 322
[114] Allen Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice, Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 34-35.
[115] Democracy and its Critics, p. 88.
[116] Michael Walzer, “Philosophy and Democracy”, in Political Theory, Volume 9, No 3, August 1981, p. 386.
[117] Michael Walzer, “Philosophy and Democracy”, in Political Theory, Volume 9, No 3, August 1981, p. 383.
[118] Democracy and its Critics, pp. 66, 101, 103.
[119] Democracy and its Critics, p.89.
[120] Democracy and its Critics, p.91.
[121] Democracy and its Critics, p.99.
[122] On Democracy, p. 113.
[123] Political Liberalism, p. 12.
[124] Political Liberalism, p. 40.
[125] Political Liberalism, p. 43.
[126] Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy”, in Reading Rorty, Alan R. Malachowski (ed), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. 289.
[127] Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy”, in Reading Rorty, Alan R. Malachowski (ed), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. 290.
[128] Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and communitarians, Blackwell, 2nd Edition, 1996, pp. 259-261.
[129] Reading Rorty, p. 291.
[130] Kant’s Theory of Justice, p. 34.
[131] Democracy and its Critics, p. 169.
[132] Walzer, “Philosophy and Democracy”, in Political Theory, Volume 9, No. 3, August 1981,pp. 387-388.
[133] Abu al-A’la Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam, Karachi: Maktaba-e Islami, p. 30.
[134] Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifa Nur, Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, Volume 10, p. 181.
[135] Rachid Ghannouchi, “Participation in Non-Islamic Government”, in Liberal Islam, p. 91.
[136] Liberal Islam, p. 98.
[137] Ibn Kathir, Umda, Volume 3, p. 63; Ibn Hisham, Sireh Ibn Hisham, Volume 2, pp. 272-273.
[138] Encyclopedia of Islam, Volume 1, p. 1113a.
[139]Sahih Muslim, Hadith 1829.
[140] Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh-e- Nahjul Balaqeh, Volume 16, p. 17.
[141] N athan Brown, “Islamic Constitutionalism in Theory and Practice”, in Democracy the Rule of Law and Islam, Eugene Cotran (ed), Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 491.
[142] H amid Paydar, “The Paradox of Islam and Democracy”, in Modara wa Modiriyat, Abdul Karim Surush (ed), Tehran: Serat Publication, 1997, pp. 525-526.
[143] William .A Galston, Liberal Purposes, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 80.
[144] William .A Galston, Liberal Purposes, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 79.
[145] Abdul Qadeem Zalloom, Democracy is a System of Kufr, London: Al- Khilafah Publication, p. 35-37.
[146] “Sayyid Qutb, Ideologue of Islamic Revival”, in Voices of Resurgent Islam, John Esposito (ed), Oxford University Press, 1983.
[147] Democracy is a System of Kufr, pp. 22-25.
[148] Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, p. 464.
[149] Fazlur-Rahman, “The Islamic Concept of State” in Islam in Transition, Ponohue and John Esposito (eds), Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 269.
[150]Sahifa Nur, Volume 9, p. 253.
[151] Sahifa Nur, Volume 5, p. 31.
[152] Forough Jahanbakhsh, Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran, Brill, 2001, p. 49.
[153] Abdul Karim Soroush, Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri (trs), Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 128.
[154] Abdul Karim Soroush, Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri (trs), Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 134-141.
[155] Abdul Karim Soroush, Qesseye Arbab-e Marefat, Tehran: Serat Publication, 1995, pp. 54-55
[156]Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, pp. 128-129.
[157]Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, p. 148.
[158] Abdul Karim Soroush, “The Evolution and Devolution of Religious Knowledge,” in Liberal Islam, pp. 245-246.
[159] I have written a few books and articles concerning the exploration and criticism of this hermeneutical approach for instance refer to:
“The Hermeneutical Reflection of Heidegger,” in Transcendental Philosophy, Volume 3, No. 3, September 2002.
An Introduction to Hermeneutics (Persian), Tehran, 2001, Chapters3&4.
The Alteration of Understanding Religion (Persian), Tehran, 1996
[160] Qabs wa Bast-e theory e Shari’a, Tehran, Serat Publication, 1995, 3rd Edition, p. 287.
[161] Liberal Islam, p. 245.
[162] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, John Maquarrie and Edward Robinson (trs), Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, p.195; Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, London: Sheet& Ward, 1999, p. 298.
[163]Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, p. 128.
[164] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Edited by Gertrude Himmglfarb, Penguin Books, 1984, p. 69-70
[165] Friedrich Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty, University of Chicago, 1973, pp. 32-34.
[166] Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. li, lvi, 172.
Ahmed Vaezy
Source: Imam reza network

What is a "Religious Government”?

The influence of religion upon politics is not a phenomenon that is confined solely to the Islamic world. However, it is impossible for any political theorist to ignore the role of Islam in the public lives of Muslims. Its considerable impact upon the politics of Muslim nations can be attributed to the strong inclination of the population towards it, and thus the powerful voice that it is given by them. Leaman writes:
One of the comments which writers on Islamic Political Philosophy often make is that it is irremediably conservative. Even the so-called modernizers have in mind some sort of theocracy, a state in which religion plays a leading role[1].
It is obvious that any legal system requires a government to adopt it and the apparatus of a state to implement and enforce it. Therefore, Islamic Law (Shari’ah) is also in need of a state for its sanction and application. However, the key concern then becomes whether or not all theories shaped in the history of Islamic political thought are actually seeking the establishment of an “Islamic state”. The two aforementioned factors; that Islam is a vital and necessary aspect of a Muslim’s culture, and that the Shari’ah requires political power and authority in order to be implemented, might bring one to the conclusion that all political systems in the Islamic world were historically religious governments.
Although there are obvious difficulties associated with finding a precise and agreed definition of a “religious government”, it is essential to distinguish between various levels of state commitment to a specific religion. The minimal degree of dedication would be that a government did not prevent its people from undertaking their religious rituals and practices. On the other hand, a maximized relationship between religion and politics requires the total commitment and adherence of a state to the contents of a specific religion. Obviously, many varying degrees of religious authority could be supposed between these two extremes.
Official definitions of a “religious state” focus on a series of prescribed characteristics and functions embodied by this model of political system. These may be related to individual characteristics, such as a governor necessarily belonging to a specific religion or social class, similar to the governments of European states throughout the Middle Ages. One might also define a religious government according to its partial or prejudicial favour towards a particular religion. Consequently, a religious state uses its military, political and economic power to promote and strengthen the position and followers of that specific faith.
This draws our attention to a few, specific aspects of a religious government. However, it fails to adequately introduce what most contemporary Islamic political movements and doctrines have in mind when they apply the term “Islamic State”, which is perhaps most effectively described as the maximum realization of a religious state.
An Islamic government’s primary aim is to establish a truly Islamic society. Islam does not consider society to be merely a collection of individuals. Rather, it deems that society also consists of their social relationships and the social order in which these individuals exist. These are perhaps the most definitive factors of a society, as different societies are categorized as being just or unjust, developed or undeveloped and complex or plain, according to their social formations and their systems of rights and duties. Financial sources, social advantages and the structure of the prevailing political system, are all part of the complex web of social relationships that contribute to the makeup of society. Therefore, an Islamic society, by definition, is an ideal society in which social order is established and regulated according to underlying Islamic values, teachings and rulings.
An Islamic government is one that accepts and admits the absolute authority of Islam. It seeks to establish an Islamic social order according to the contents of Islam, implementing the Shari’ah, while attempting to direct its political decisions and public functions according to the aims and values of Islam.
This understanding of an Islamic state obviously faces criticism, especially from those who adopt more secular political ideologies. The following pages will assess some of the contentious aspects surrounding this theory of Islamic governance.
Rejection of Islamic Government
Opponents of Islamic governance can be divided into two major categories: The first of these are the supporters of secularism, who contend that religion must be completely separate from worldly affairs. In their eyes, the concept of a religious state is backward and outdated. They maintain that this model of political system must be confined to a time when human beings lacked the knowledge or experience to organize their social order and were in need of religion to arrange their legal, economic and cultural relationships. However, secularism is not a doctrine that merely addresses the relationship between religion and politics. Essentially, it is a radical approach to the role of religion and revelation in shaping human knowledge. Secular rationality maintains that the human intellect is capable of forming its own knowledge independent of revelation. According to this, reason in itself is self-sufficient and autonomous. Hence, mankind is capable of constructing natural and human sciences as well as philosophy, law and ethics without the aid of God or religion.
Secular thinking, therefore, leaves very little scope for religion. According to secularist thought, every instance in which the human intellect is capable of gaining knowledge exists as part of the exclusive realm of the human being, without any need for faith or revelation. Such reasoning constrains the role of religion to regulating the individual relationship between man and his creator, while isolating it from the social and political order. This is because social relationships form part of “human” affairs and not “divine” affairs; they are “extra-religious” as opposed to “intra- religious”. Law, economy and political decisions as well as the formations of our social structures and systems of rights and duties are all considered as merely dealing with the relationship between man and man, not man and God. Therefore, religion in these cases must delegate everything to human reasoning and science.
This concise overview of secular thinking illustrates that the reduction of secularism to a political doctrine, which purely insists on the separation of faith from politics, is incorrect. The isolation of religion from politics is but one of the many accomplishments of secular rationality. Advocates of this view insist on the disengagement of religion, not only from politics, but also from ethics, art, law, philosophy and the sciences. Consequently, they advocate not only a secular state, but secular laws, a secular culture, a secular science and so on.
Whereas the first approach delegates a limited scope for religion, the second group of opponents have no argument with those who believe it cannot be restricted to merely having a limited, fixed or previously determined capacity. In principle, they agree that no one has the right to confine the contents and the implementation of Islam to private life, or more precisely, to the individual relationship between man and God. The central concern of the second group, however, is that although Islam embodies certain values and ideas, it is not composed of both spirituality and politics. Thus it has not specified any particular form of government and Muslims are free to support any regime they desire.
So the fundamental distinction that arises between these two groups is that, while secularists argue that religion and politics must remain separate, the second faction contend that Islam does not in any way oblige it’s followers to establish it in the political realm. They attempt to demonstrate that Islam has no connection to politics by concentrating on the Holy Qur’an and early Islamic history, arguing that it is a purely spiritual doctrine, as opposed to a spiritual and political one. Secularists, on the other hand, focus on the demands of modernity, the inability of religion to conduct and organize the contemporary world, and its failure to overcome the complications presented by modernism. Therefore, it is crucial to clarify whether or not Islam compelled its followers to establish an Islamic government, and whether or not Islam is indeed capable of regulating modern society.
No credible Muslim thinker advocates the segregation of religion from worldly affairs, as the secular tradition would insist, reducing it to little more than a personal relationship between man and God. In fact, very few Islamic intellectuals appeal to secular rationality other than to insist on the separation of religion from socio-political relationships (i.e. restricting the scope of religion and extending the role of reasoning in public life). Although these thinkers do not explicitly call themselves secular, their attitudes towards the issue of Islam and politics obviously have common characteristics with those of secularists.
Having introduced the two main critical attitudes towards Islamic government, the following pages will examine the central arguments presented by adherents to these two schools of thought, beginning with the reasons provided that reject any original connection between Islam and politics.
The First Argument
In his famous book “Islam and the Foundations of Government” (Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm) Shaykh Ali Abd al-Raziq[2] (1888-1966) sought to justify the separation of religion and political authority on the basis of religious evidences. He argued that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) did not intend to establish a political state in Madina and that Islam did not support the rise of any particular social system.
This assertion totally contradicted the traditional belief, which held that the Hijrah (migration to Madina in 622) marked the beginning of the Prophet’s political activity and the realization of Islamic governance. Abd al-Raziq argued that the Prophet was the bearer of a religious message; he did not have a government, nor did he seek to establish a kingdom in the political sense or anything synonymous with it. Rather, his authority was sacred, derived from God so that he could deliver the divine revelation. According to Abd al- Raziq, this did not entail political leadership; it was the mandate of a Prophet and not of a Sultan.
To justify his view, Abd al-Raziq refers to several verses of the Qur’an. He believes that according to these, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was only a messenger, commissioned to deliver God’s revelation to the people and nothing else.
We have sent you only to give good news and to warn. [Chapter 17, Verse 105]
The duty of the messenger is to convey the message clearly. [Chapter 27, Verse 54]
Yet we have sent you only to give good tidings and to warn. [Chapter 25, Verse 56]
Tell him: I am only a warner. [Chapter 27,Verse 92]
Abd al-Raziq argues that if the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) had other roles, such as that of a political leader, then the Qur’an would clearly have announced them[3].
In order to justify his position, he argues that every state requires a political structure that contains specific institutions and administrations, but that Muhammad’s leadership was devoid of these necessary elements of government. In fact, according to this point of view, political authority only appeared in the Islamic community following the demise of the Messenger of God. Consequently, striving for the establishment of a government is not considered part of Islamic teachings[4].
However, contrary to Abd al-Raziq’s opinion, there is a mass of historical evidence that clearly demonstrates the Prophet’s role as both a political and religious leader. In fact, many western thinkers, such as Anthony Black, agree that the Prophet’s objective was not merely to establish a new identity by replacing old tribal customs. According to these thinkers, he addressed political power as well as spiritual and cultural authority. Black writes:
His purpose was to construct out of tribal confederacies a new people driven by his own sense of moral mission. Judaism had preached an all- embracing (ethnic) law, While Christianity had preached spiritual (universal) brotherhood. But, neither seriously addressed the problem of military power and political authority; both had accepted life under alien, pagan rule. Muhammad preached spiritual brotherhood, plus an all-embracing law, and universal political control to be achieved[5].
The activities of the Prophet Muhammad following the Hijrah brought about revolutionary changes to the Arabian Peninsula. These cannot simply be interpreted as the ordinary behavior of a religious leader. Included here are concise examples of his political deeds, which could not have been issued without political authority.
He assembled a number of hostile tribes and forged them into a new community (ummah). This is essentially a political endeavor, which is embodied in what Montgomery Watt refers to as the “Constitution of Medina”, a document that outlines the nature of the state that the Prophet was intending to establish. The charter incorporates articles concerning the rights and duties of the various tribes and social groupings that formed this new society, including their obligations regarding one another, criminal events and the rights of non-Muslim members of this community[6].
He delegated both religious and political responsibilities to his companions. Some, such as Amr ibn Hazm, were sent to lead the prayers and teach the people about the Qur’an. Whilst others, such as Abu Musa al-Ashari and Saed ibn Aas, were dispatched as representatives to collect taxes (zakat), arbitrate disputes and punish criminals as well as to educate people about Islam. Sometimes, the Prophet would assign companions to exclusively governmental capacities, such as when he sent Abu Sufyan to gather taxes in Najran, while Amr ibn Hazm remained his religious representative in that region[7].
The Prophet (pbuh) was a general, a diplomat and a judge. He led the army, entered into treaties and agreements with various tribes, and passed judgment in criminal cases. Issues such war, diplomatic relations and legal arbitration are all obviously included in political authority and have no connection to a specifically spiritual mandate.
Furthermore, it is unreasonable to compare the structures of a modern state and the Prophet’s authority in Madina in order to determine whether he established a political state. Dr. Senhoury, for example, argues that the political order established in Madina adequately met the demands of a simple tribal community, thus there was no need to establish a complex social order when the Prophet’s political system was appropriate to the requirements of his age and society[8].
Some thinkers, such as Abid al-Jaberi, contend that because the word “dawlat” (state) was not adopted as a political term until the beginning of the Abbasid-era, the political concept of an Islamic state did not exist either. According to Al- Jaberi, the Prophet (pbuh) established an “ummah” as opposed to a state. However, although it may be true that the term dawlat was not prevalent in Arab vocabulary at the time of the Prophet, it is not the name that constitutes a state. Rather, it is the nature of the authority that establishes an Islamic government, thus it is irrelevant whether the term “state” was adopted or not.
Although Abd al-Raziq refers to several verses of the Qur’an in order to justify his opinion, which is that the Prophet (pbuh) had no role beside that of a messenger, the verses that he submits as evidence do not confine the character of the Prophet to a single attribute. A clear distinction must be made between a relative restriction and an absolute or definite restriction. The latter confines the character of a subject to one feature, whilst the former refers to a restriction in a limited scope of attributes. For example, someone supposes that x is both a writer and a poet. You correct his opinion by telling him that ‘x is only a writer’. However, this does not mean that x has no other qualities apart from being a writer, because your statement restricts his character in relation to only two attributes.
All the verses to which Abd al-Raziq refers fall into the first category, which is that of relative restriction. They are merely emphasizing that the Prophet has no responsibility towards those who disbelieve in his call. Certainly, the Prophet as a human being has many other qualities and duties. Therefore, emphasis upon one issue within a specific context does not nullify the possibility of other tasks or characteristics. Take, for example, following verses:
O Prophet, urge the believers to war. [Chapter 8, Verse 65]
And judge (rule) between them by what Allah has revealed, and do not follow their low desires. [Chapter 5, Verse 49]
Your Wali is none but Allah and his Messenger. [Chapter 5, Verse 55]
And We did not send a messenger except that he should be obeyed…. [Chapter 4, Verse 64]
Second Argument
Aside from those who subscribe to a view similar to that of Abd al-Raziq, other opponents of the Islamic state accept that the Prophet did, in fact, establish a political order following his migration to Madina. However, they also maintain that this does not constitute an intrinsic connection between Islam and politics. The emergence of the Prophet’s authority in Madina is considered as little more than a historical event; a specific situation in which the social and political circumstances necessitated this endeavor, rather than a religious duty that was included in divine revelation.
Dr. Haery seems to adopt a similar opinion in the following passage, in which he emphasizes that the Prophet’s government was formed upon the consensus of the people and then later endorsed by God. He writes:
Some previous Prophets, especially the Prophet of Islam, besides the exalted position of Prophethood had undertaken governing people and committing political affairs. We have to know that since people compelled them with no anticipate inclination, these political authorities and special circumstances forced them to accept, the Political authority cannot be taken into account as part of God’s revelation[9].
To support this point of view regarding the Prophet’s authority, Haery refers to the following verse of the Qur’an:
Certainly Allah was well pleased with the believers when they swore allegiance to you under the tree. [Chapter 48, Verse 18]
He, and others who adopt a comparable opinion, insist that although God endorsed the pledge of allegiance (bay’a) given to the Prophet, His approval is not enough to make the establishment of political authority an Islamic objective[10].
However, the relationship between Islam and politics and the historical events precluding the creation of an Islamic social order are two entirely separate and distinct topics. Studying the latter requires a precise analysis of the historical, social and cultural context in that era. Whereas the former necessitates a comprehensive evaluation of the Islamic ideology to determine whether or not it encompasses a political dimension and if it has the potential to be practically applied. Thus, the correlation of historical stages and circumstances to the process of forming a government is entirely separable from our present debate, which concerns the Islamic political system. Hence, many contemporary Muslim scholars, such as Muhammad Ammareh, who is an advocate of the Islamic state, come to the following conclusion:
Even though the generous Qur’an did not explicitly [make it] incumbent upon Muslims to form a religious government [it obliged them] with some duties [that] would be impossible to fulfil without the establishment of an Islamic State[11].
Both Dr. Haery and Muhammad Ammareh maintain that the pledge of allegiance (Bay’a) given by the tribal representatives of Madina to the Prophet, during the year prior to his emigration from Mecca, was the keystone of his government. However, this theory, which introduces the allegiance (Bay’a) of the people as the root of the Prophet’s political authority, confronts two difficulties. The first is that the contract of Bay’a was a prevailing custom amongst the Arabs, which occurred for a variety of reasons; the pledge of Bay’a to a political leader or tribal chief was only one of these. Accordingly, it is essential that we assess the content of these pledges used to support the arguments of Dr Haery and Muhammad Ammareh.
The pledge mentioned in Chapter 18 of the Qur’an, known as “Bay’a rezwan”, occurred at Hudaybiyah, near Mecca, in the sixth year after Hijrah. The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and a number of his followers were en-route to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca, when Meccan polytheists who wished to prevent them from entering the city confronted them. Under these dangerous circumstances, a number of believers pledged allegiance to the Prophet so as to reassure him that they would remain by his side and protect him from the enemies of Islam. This pledge was merely a reaffirmation of their loyalty in a difficult situation, rather than the acknowledgement of the Prophet’s political authority. Furthermore, it took place five years after the establishment of the Islamic state in Madina, thus it seems strange to consider this event the original root of his government.
What is often referred to as the second pledge of allegiance known as “Bay’a al-Aqabeh” also has no connection to the nomination of a ruler. Comparing it to the negotiations that took place at Saqifa, prior to the appointment of Abu Bakr, explicitly demonstrates that the pledge of al-Aqabeh was not a recognition of the Prophet’s political authority. The negotiations at Saqifa were concerned with leadership following the death of Muhammad (pbuh). Hence, the Bay’a at Saqifa merely served as an election, whereas the pledge of al-Aqabeh was regarding the protection and safety of the Prophet; the representatives of Madina promised to resist the polytheists and protect the Prophet as they would their own families.
The second difficulty confronted by the supporters of this argument, arises from several verses of the Holy Qur’an which delegate and approve the guardianship (Wilayat) of the Prophet over the believers, with no reference to any anticipated acceptance from the people; therefore indicating that his authority is indeed divine. These verses shall be discussed in greater detail later, but for now we shall mention a few:
The Prophet has a greater claim on the faithful that they have on themselves. [Chapter 33, Verse 6]
Only Allah is your guardian (Wali) and His Apostle. [Chapter 5, Verse 55]
The Third Argument
Another prevailing argument, employed by secularists to undermine the theory of a religious government focuses on the ambitions of those who support an Islamic state (i.e. the establishment of an ideal social order according to Islam and the application of the Shari’ah to all facets of society). Secularists, who adopt this line of reasoning, contend that a religious social order is an incompatible thesis because it is confronted by an inherent difficulty known as “the problem of accommodation”. To justify this argument, they rely on two premises:
Social, economic and cultural relationships undergo constant change and development: There is a significant difference between our contemporary lifestyles and the lifestyles of previous generations in areas such as transportation, commerce, education and so on. Thus social formation is essentially variable and no one can expect a society to remain stable for a prolonged period of time.
Religion is fixed, unchanging and stable: Every religion is confined to a specific period of history; as it was founded upon the demands, circumstances and problems of a particular age. Religion is an event that happened in a determined time and place, which cannot be repeated. Consequently, the message of every religion is inflexible and has no capacity for adaptation to new situations.
Thus, a secularist would argue that because religion is a fixed and unchanging set of ideas, it is entirely incapable of accommodating changes to social relationships, which are in turn fundamentally unfixed and variable. It is entirely reasonable to admit that religion is able to form a social order, which is influenced by its conventions and ethics, but only at a time when social circumstances would permit such an influence. For example, in the time when Islam emerged, it was able to adequately meet the demands of the historical period. Thus, Islam succeeded in establishing a civilization during that era. However, it seems paradoxical to suppose that Islam is capable of effectively shaping social order under any circumstances and at any time. The core of this reasoning is that social associations and relationships are fluid and open to regular changes; no one is able to prevent these social alterations and thereby narrow them to a fixed religious form and structure. In summary, secularists assert that although Shari’ah has within it the competence and capability to deal with social formations similar to those existing at the time when Islam appeared, there are serious obstacles for the application of Shari’ah to contemporary social configurations.
Such an assessment is based on the presupposition that the conception of a religious state leaves no room for adaptation or the endorsement of social changes. Therefore, the response to this argument will discuss three significant points;
(a) An evaluation of this interpretation of social changes.
(b) Aspects of the Islamic legal system, which have been overlooked by secularists who subscribe to this opinion, that render it both dynamic and flexible.
(c) A clarification of what is meant by the accommodation of Shari’ah and the precise definition of the establishment of “Islamic social order”.
Categorizing Social Alterations
No one can dispute the fluidity and variable nature of social relationships. Changes occur both radically over a short period of time, and gradually over a more prolonged period. They have numerous dimensions and affect various aspects of human life. As far as the present discussion is concerned, which is the role of religion in a well ordered society; the legal and moral dimensions are the most important ones that should be considered.
From a legal perspective, every social order and its assorted characteristics confront many questions. An efficient legal system must be able to overcome these problems and introduce a competent framework, which is able to respond to new developments that are the result of social alterations. In order to practically implement a religion that encompasses social interactions, it becomes crucial to institute a dynamic legal structure that is able to organize their juridical aspects. Because the aim of a religious state is to harmonize social order according to a religious legal system, it is therefore essential to understand the nature of the legal aspect of social alterations.
Establishing a truly Islamic society and regulating social relationships according to the Islamic ideology cannot, however, be confined to merely the legal aspects of this transformation. The moral and cultural outcomes of such a revolution are fundamental as well. An Islamic government must maximize the role of moral virtues, Islamic values and true humanity in social relationships. Advocates of the Islamic state believe that religious aims and values, stemming from moral virtues and true humanity, can lead human society towards a higher level of existence. However, the argument that denies the possibility of harmonizing social order according to Islamic laws and values usually attempts to reduce the discussion to a purely legal one, attempting to illustrate that the Islamic legal system is incapable of accommodating social changes.
Those who subscribe to this argument presuppose that social alterations result in entirely new legal problems that have no previous precedent. Hence, they argue that a religious legal system, because of its unchanging nature, cannot deal with the problems that it will be frequently confronted by.
Social changes ultimately give rise to two areas of legal discourse. The first stems from an entirely new social phenomenon, of which there is no previous record. Every legal system must define its position with regard to these. For instance, the invention of computers and the development of information technology require fresh legislation. Another example is transplantation, a new technique in medicine that requires jurists to clarify the legal aspect of this new medical ability, such as the laws regarding the exchange of natural organs between human beings. The significant factor with this first group, is that they require more than merely the application of old and current laws to new situations, rather, they require a set of absolutely new laws and up-to-date legislation.
Secondly, there are those social transformations that, despite the fact they are new, have emerged from pre-existing relationships and associations, consequently these social phenomena are new in form and not in content. Accordingly, they do not require totally new legislation or a fresh set of laws; jurists could and would categorize them according to previous legal precedents. For instance, previously there existed only a few types of companies, whereas at present there are many forms of commercial relationships. However, these are not new legal phenomena. They are distinguished from previous kinds of companies essentially in form, because they are merely new structural designs.
In short, with regard to analyzing social alterations, we must adopt the following conclusion. From a juridical perspective, social changes cannot be restricted to a single definition. Generally speaking, two streams of social transformation can be identified in this regard. On the one hand, there are the cases of completely new legal phenomena that are without previous record, while on the other there are those that possess obvious connections or similarities to previous and familiar elements within the existing legal framework, though they may have each adopted a partially, or entirely new form.
Flexibility of the Islamic Legal System
The precise criticism introduced by this argument against the concept of an “Islamic state”, when we are confined to the juridical aspect, is that the Islamic legal system is incapable of coping with social transformations. Hence, because it is inflexible and unable to meet the juridical requirements of new circumstances, it cannot possibly satisfy the legal demands of human society.
In order to efficiently cope with the various societal relationships it will inevitably encounter, every legal system prerequires the existence of flexible elements in its methodology and basic foundations. Although the Islamic legal system does not contain these factors, it is essential that we realize that it has aspects that provide it with the capacity to meet and fulfil all the juridical requirements presented by the two aforementioned categories of social change.
The Islamic legal system is fully equipped to deal with the first category of social changes. Even though the historical advent of Islam occurred during a specific time and in a specific place, it is quite reasonable to extrapolate a universal, ahistorical and timeless legal framework for different aspects of social relationships. Many legal aspects of social alterations can, in fact, remain stable in spite of their formal changes. This enables Islamic law (Shari’ah) to form a general juridical framework for the various categories of social associations. In reference to different sections of Islamic law, there exist a selection of unchanging, absolute and general rules that, at any time and place, all Muslims are obliged to respect; they are required to harmonize their public and private relationships with these rules. For example, in commercial affairs there are some general rules as follows:
It is incumbent upon believers to fulfil their contracts and obligations:
O you who believe! Fulfil the obligations. [Chapter 5, Verse 1]
Some types of contracts and commercial agreements are prohibited because they include unlawful profit such as usury:
Allah has allowed trading and forbidden usury. [Chapter 2, Verse 275]
Lawful commercial and financial contracts and covenants must fulfil some general conditions such as mutual consent without coercion and must not be subject to false methods of attaining wealth, for example, gambling:
O you who believe! Do not devour your property among yourselves falsely, except that it be trading by your mutual consent. [Chapter 4, Verse 29]
These examples of obligations, prohibitions and conditions concerning one aspect of social life, even though they do not embrace all the Islamic edicts in this field, help us to confront developing models of contracts. New forms of contracts, whether they are altered versions of familiar and prevailing models or entirely original ideas without previous record, can be categorized as either lawful or unlawful according to these three principals and so on. For instance, “insurance” is an example of an entirely new contract, while purchasing books via an online bookstore is merely a new method of trading which, although formally different, is a continuation of a particular category of business. When all these new forms of contracts adopt and fulfil the framework that has been drawn by Shari’ah, they are considered lawful.
The other important aspect concerning the flexibility of Islamic law emerges when we take into consideration the role of covenant and promise in this context. Some verses of the Qur’an order Muslims to fulfil their promises when they enter into a covenant or agreement:
And fulfil the promise, surely every promise shall be questioned about. [Chapter 17, Verse 34]
This Islamic principle enables an Islamic state to enter into international conventions, in order to make use of their advantages, even though some of these conventions are concerned with completely new forms of social relationships, such as maritime laws or laws governing airlines and international trade, of which there is no previous record in the Shari’ah.
The doctrine of “Ijtihad”, which is the deduction of laws through reference to Islamic sources, enables a qualified Jurist (faqih) to deduce responses to both old and new questions. Every qualified faqih is free to issue new decrees with regards to subjects that have no previous record amongst other Imami jurists; thereby providing the Islamic legal system with a high degree of flexibility, which enables it to confront new situations and circumstances. This potential is reinforced in view of jurists who subscribe to a doctrine that advocates the absolute guardianship of the well-qualified faqih (Wilayat-a-mutlaqih). This doctrine insists that the trustworthy jurist, who is responsible for Muslim society, has the right to legislate according to specific conditions. This subject will be discussed further in the next chapter.
Rational Management versus Juristic Management
Misconceptions surrounding the implementation of Shari’ah and the role of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in governing a state and it’s society, have given rise to two opposing groups, who erroneously come to the conclusion that the Islamic method of governance is completely incompatible with “rational management”, which prevails in most modern states. This group is divided into two categories; the first of which insists that Muslims in the modern world must submit to the organization of their economic, political, social and cultural affairs through rational and technical management. In this model of regulation, the human intellect, technology and the sciences have authority, while religion remains separate from worldly affairs. Therefore all public decisions and the organizing of the fundamental structures of society are fulfilled according to the rational form of authority.
The second group, however, advocates the total authority of religion and attempts to organize social affairs by presenting absolute “juristic management”. This model of management, according to them, ignores the role of humanistic sources of knowledge and instead insists that the solution to all problems must emanate solely from Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). In other words, this school of thought endeavours to replace rationality and reference to scientific means, with religion and purely juristic solutions.
It was indicated previously that this misleading interpretation for the role of Islamic jurisprudence with regards to social management and the making of political or economic decisions, arises from a misunderstanding of the term “religious state” and “religious social order”. This misconception of a religious society and state grants a foothold to the critics who wish to portray the Islamic state as backward and ignorant of the demands of the contemporary world and who depict Islam as a system that denies human knowledge, rationality and progress.
Adopting the Islamic ideology and applying its laws and aims in order to harmonize different aspects of life is one thing, and ignorance of human knowledge and rationality is another. Drawing such a sharp and distinctive line between juridical and rational management is purely fictitious, as it overlooks any possible cooperation between these two methods, while incorrectly assuming that a religious state’s model of government does not overlap with that of a non- religious state’s in any way, shape or form (When in fact all states are burdened with similar responsibilities). Consequently, this third model would enjoy the advantages of both methods of management and combine rationality with respect to the ultimate authority of religion. The unusual, and irrationally narrow distinction between the two models of management, fails to provide any definite reason to suppose that the integration of religious authority and rationality is either impossible or incompatible. According to the history of Islamic thought, the Shi’a and Mutazali schools have always believed in rationalism. They endorse the role of the human intellect as a significant source of religious knowledge alongside Islamic evidence (Qur’an and hadith).
Rationality is included with Islamic sources and reasoning is taken into account as a part of religious knowledge.
It is necessary to emphasize that organizing social relationships, in its full scope, involves many facets. These include legislation, politics and policymaking as well as industrial-economic planning, social services and education. It is incorrect to suppose that, under an Islamic government, these functions and tasks would be undertaken exclusively by jurists and that all types of social, economic and cultural difficulties would be resolvable by jurisprudence.
In fact, the fundamental distinction between an Islamic state and a secular one should be based on the acceptance or denial of the authority of Islam in social affairs, rather than the denial of rationality and scientific knowledge. An Islamic authority would address the needs of a society according to the criteria laid down by Islam; the extent to which jurisprudence and Shari’ah influence this depends on the depth to which Islam has defined the subject matter. For instance, the role of Shari’ah is greater in legislation than in policy making or international politics. The various elements of an Islamic government must harmonize and adapt their functions, policies and decisions to the contents of Islam, though they are able to employ their reasoning and scientific knowledge wherever it is required.
In conclusion, the allegation that Islam is somehow unable to cope with social progress or changes to various aspects of human existence is false. Islam cannot be confined to a specific time or set of circumstances, as it has within it the capacity to guide humanity towards happiness at all times. However, Islam’s ability to adapt to the demands of various social formations and situations should not be taken to mean that Islam has a passive attitude towards alternative lifestyles. It is illogical to assume that every kind of cultural, social or economic relationship can be universally endorsed by Islam, for it has timeless rules, values and objectives that disagree with certain types of associations and lifestyles. This approach is not the product of essential links to a specific model of social formation or a particular social order. Rather, it is an active and dynamic attitude that emerges from a set of unchanging rules and principals that are not restricted to a specific age or generation.
Objectives of an Islamic State
Ideological aims and functions are an essential part of any political system, as they serve to distinguish and separate it from alternative doctrines. Objectives such as creating a welfare state and extending education or promoting prosperity and defending a nation’s borders are not specific to any one model of political system. In fact, almost all political theories commonly emphasize upon these targets. Therefore, it is necessary that we define the unique objectives of a religious government and discuss how they set it apart from other political systems.
Implementation of the Shari’ah
The application of Islamic laws and rulings is a fundamental aspect of the religious state. A government that neglects the Shari’ah cannot be considered a legitimate Islamic authority; as such a notion is paradoxical and ultimately self- contradicting. The Holy Qur’an obliges the believers to implement, protect and respect Islamic laws in all spheres of their public and private lives. For example, take the following verses:
And we have revealed to you the Book with the Truth, verifying what is before it of the book and a guardian over it, therefore, judge between them by what Allah revealed. [Chapter 5, Verse 48]
And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed, they are the unbelievers. [Chapter 5, Verse 44]
Allah raised prophets as bearers of good news and warners, and He revealed with them the book with truth, that it might judge between people in that in which they differed. [Chapter 2, Verses 2 & 3]
These are the limits of Allah, so do no exceed them, and whoever exceeds the limits of Allah, these it is that are the unjust. [Chapter 2, Verse 229]
And if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to Allah and His messenger. [Chapter 4, Verse 59]
For the government and citizens of the Islamic state to fulfil this duty, it becomes essential for the state’s laws to be consistent with the Shari’ah and it’s ruling system to be founded upon the principals of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). As pointed out, many modern Muslim intellectuals have criticized this jurisprudential conception, insisting that Shari’ah must be separated from governance, public affairs and the shaping of the system of human rights and duties that regulate society. They maintain that these should be governed according to human sciences, rationality and an extra-religious conception of human rights, rather than through Islamic jurisprudence. This ultimately secular approach belittles the importance of the Shari’ah and its practical necessity in an Islamic state. This approach shall be further assessed in the final chapter when considering the arguments of those who seek to reconcile Islam with liberal democracy.
To Enjoin the Good and Forbid the Evil
Islam has made it incumbent upon believing men and women to establish a healthy society, which is purified of corruption and wrongdoing and conducts itself correctly and avoids injustice. This duty is embodied in the principal of “al-amr’ bi’l maruf’ wal-nahi an al-munkar” (Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil) that is mentioned in the following verses of the Qur’an:
And from among you there should be a party who invite to good and enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong and these it is that shall be successful. [Chapter 3, Verse 104]
And (as for) the believing men and the believing women, they are guardians of each other; they enjoin good and forbid evil. [Chapter 9, Verse 71]
Calling people to what is right and preventing injustice is the joint responsibility of the state and its citizens. An Islamic government cannot remain neutral concerning the moral- religious conditions of society. Also, as well as being accountable for affairs such as security, welfare and social order, the government is also charged with maintaining human virtues, common good, morality and religious commitment.
Unlike most contemporary political theories, especially those formed upon the traditions of liberalism, Islam does not support the concept of a ‘limited state’. According to this liberal approach, the authority of a government is limited by the scope and framework defined by liberalism and it’s interpretation of human rights and social justice, which are connected to the underlying values of liberal doctrine. Consequently, the government is rendered unable to adopt a partial position with regards to morality, religion or ethics. Whether someone is moral or immoral, religious or irreligious, these are regarded as individual matters that the individual is able to choose as he pleases. Only if the individual break the law or violates the rights of others is the liberal government allowed to interfere in their affairs.
However, it must be pointed out that the duty of a religious government, regarding the moral-religious position of society, does not allow Muslim rulers or citizens to impose Islamic beliefs and values upon others. Religious tolerance is a significant characteristic of the Islamic ideology; a fact to which history testifies. For example, the Jews and Christians of the Spanish Peninsula enjoyed the same rights, security and prosperity afforded to all citizens of the Islamic state, as did many other ethnic and religious minorities throughout the domain of Islam at that time.
The nature of a religious government’s responsibility regarding the moral condition of society is concerned primarily with decision-making, legislation and government policy. An Islamic state is obliged to maximize the opportunities to promote spirituality, moral values and individual virtues, while providing the people with a stable environment in which to attain a comfortable, safe and fruitful existence. Essentially, its role is to maintain a healthy social atmosphere. People are free to adopt their own beliefs and opinions, but in public they must respect and abide by Islamic laws. For instance, it is not the duty of an Islamic government to monitor the private lives of it’s people to discover whether or not they drink alcohol, but no one is allowed to publicly consume the substance, as this would damage the social environment, and it is the responsibility of an Islamic authority to protect society from corruption and immorality.
From the Islamic view the problem of happiness and wickedness eventually rests on the choice made by the individual. Almighty God says:
Surely we have shown him the way; he may be thankful or unthankful. [Chapter 76, Verse 3]
That is because those who disbelieve follow falsehood, and those who believe follow the truth from their Lord. [Chapter 47, Verse 3]
Therefore an individual is allowed to adopt his or her personal wishes and ideas in private, but these cannot be allowed to infringe upon the moral health and stability of society. Nothing must prevent the government and believers from striving to create desirable social circumstances, or promoting Islamic values in order to remove the obstacles in the path of a truly correct and fulfilling lifestyle.
Modern political doctrines tend to emphasize human rights, rather than human goods. For them, it would be more desirable and practical if we concentrated on defining the mutual duties of the rulers and the ruled according to the rights of human beings. This is because other concepts such as happiness, virtue and social good are often ambiguous, subjective and controversial. For example, there is a strong tradition in political thought that amongst the members of any polity there is a common good and the function of the government is to determine and actualize this. However, adversaries argue that there are a number of significant difficulties regarding the idea of a “common good”. Modernist political thinkers usually ask “what is a common good? and how are we to know what it is?” Robert Dahl says:
Every attempt I have seen to prescribe the common good is either too limited to be generally accepted or too general to be very relevant and helpful[12].
The Islamic doctrine approaches this problem of “common good” by extending it beyond the boundaries of a community. Not only do the members of a community have a common good but also all human beings have a common good. Islam believes that human beings share common inclinations and needs, which they are able to fulfil correctly through their own actions with the aid of a desirable, just and true Islamic government.
To Protect True Freedom of Human Beings
Liberty is arguably one of the most important underlying values upon which contemporary western political thought is founded. Although there are contending analyses regarding the nature of freedom amongst western thinkers, liberals traditionally recognize individual freedom as the most fundamental human value and they define and evaluate all other values according to their relationship with it[13].
Because most people, especially in the west, adopt a liberal conception of liberty, they often have reservations about whether a truly religious government can promote the freedom of its subjects. At a glance, it may seem strange to suppose that Islam, with its binding nature and limitations, could act as an effective safeguard of human freedom. But before proceeding with this discussion, it is appropriate to explore and assess the liberal theory of freedom.
Also known as the negative view of liberty, the liberal conception of freedom has come to be understood as the absence of coercion. This definition of freedom emanates from the works of thinkers such as Hobbes and Bentham, who envisaged it merely as the absence of external, physical or legal impediments. However, this theory fails to acknowledge less immediate or obvious obstacles to freedom, such as lack of awareness, false consciousness, repression or other inner factors of this kind. In fact, it insists that to speak of such inner factors as relevant to the issue of freedom, is to abuse words. The only clear meaning that can be given to this perception of freedom is the absence of external obstacles[14].
Alternatively, the positive view of liberty asserts that freedom involves the realization of some specific capacities, abilities and powers. And it implies that if these are not realized, then the individual is not truly free, even if he or she is not subject to external coercion. Whereas negative freedom is best described as ‘freedom from’ (compulsion), positive freedom can be termed as ‘freedom to’, meaning that an individual must be free to realize his capabilities. Therefore, it is necessary for positive freedom to adopt a theory concerning human nature and a set of ideas about human needs and abilities[15].
Taylor maintains that the positive perception of freedom concerns the exercising of control of ones life:
Doctrines of positive freedom are concerned with a view of freedom which involves essentially the exercising of control over one’s lives; one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of ones life. The concept of freedom here is an exercise-concept[16].
According to the Islamic conception of human nature, we are subject to various desires and capacities. Those who follow merely their natural instincts will remain in the prison of their low desires, unable to realize their potential. But those who exercise control over themselves and strive for self-purification, rather than merely obeying their impulses, are truly free. The Qur’an says:
Have you considered the one who takes his low desires as his Master; Allah has made him err having knowledge and has set a seal upon his ear, his heart and placed a covering upon his eyes. Who can then guide him after Allah? Will you not then be mindful? [Chapter 45, Verse 23]
Then know that they only follow their low desires, and who is more erring than he who follows his low desires without any guidance from Allah? Surely Allah does not guide the unjust people. [Chapter 28, Verse 50]
From this perspective, namely the positive interpretation of freedom, Islam should be recognized as a perfect form of guidance from Allah and a divine means to achieve true human freedom. The Qur’an says:
Those who follow the Apostle Prophet, the ummi, whom they find written down with them in the Taurat [Torah] and the Injeel [Gospel], (who) enjoins them good and forbids them evil, and makes things lawful to them the good things and makes unlawful to them impure things, and removes from their burden and the shackles which were upon them, so (as for) those who believe in him and honour him and help him, and follows the light which has been sent down with him, there is it that are the successful. [Chapter 7, Verse 157]
This verse among many others like it, state that the revelation received by the Prophet was sent as guidance to all mankind. That Islam is able to free human beings from the shackles placed upon them by their low desires, to raise them from a state of ignorance (concerning God and the hereafter) and to elevate them to a position of enlightenment and progress. By submitting oneself to the divine revelation and teachings of the Prophet, the individual is making an obvious commitment to worship and obey God, to control oneself and to accept certain limitations. In other words, Islam is a religion; a way of life that encompasses both spiritual and worldly aspects, thus obliging its followers to follow a specific lifestyle. This disagrees with the liberal ‘negative’ conception of human liberty, because it establishes boundaries and limitations upon freewill. But according to the Islamic point of view, these limitations help them to attain true freedom embodied in spiritual life and nearness to Allah.
In conclusion, one of the key objectives of an Islamic state is to prepare a desirable social condition, so that people are able to realize their full capacities, and thus free themselves from burdens. This self-realization means that people can promote their individual virtues and prepare themselves for the ultimate salvation.
Establishing a just society and respecting human equality Justice (Adl) and Equality (Qest) are two of the most important aspects of the Islamic ideology. There are many verses of the Qur\'an that oblige the believers to treat people equally and to deal with them justly.
Certainly we sent our apostles with clear arguments, and sent down with them the book and the balance that men may conduct themselves with equity. [Chapter 57, Verse 25]
Surely Allah commands you to make over trusts to their owners and that when you judge rule between people you judge with justice. [Chapter 4, Verse 58]
O you who believe, be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness of Allah\'s sake, though it may be against your own-selves or your parents or near relatives, if he be rich or poor, Allah is nearer to them in compassion; therefore, do not follow low desires, lest you deviate; and if your swerve or turn aside, then surely Allah is aware of what you do. [Chapter 4, Verse 135]
These concepts of justice and equality encompass many different aspects of individual and public affairs. With specific regard to politics, they require the government to ensure that all people are granted an equal entitlement to citizenship, protection, the rights granted by Islam, and the benefits that accompany it, regardless of their ethnicity, beliefs or talents.
However, the establishment of a society upon justice and equality does not require ‘legal equality’. Meaning that it does not need to adopt a legal system that endorses universal and indiscriminate rights and duties for all members of that society. In fact, in its most precise definition, legal equality is clearly impractical. All contemporary legal systems adopt legal inequalities within their structures of rights and duties. In politics for example, no democratic state allows children to vote, while in economics the salary of a qualified expert is greater than that of a labourer. Equally so, the Islamic legal system, which was revealed as divine law, includes legal inequalities. These arise in cases such as that of inheritance, where the share of a woman is less than that of a man. Therefore, social justice and fair governance cannot be defined as merely overlooking all categories of inequality. Instead, Islamic social justice is realized by the correct and complete implementation of the Islamic laws (Shari’ah) and values without exception.
Thus an Islamic state is distinguished by the objectives stated above, which have been laid down by the Qur’an and Islamic traditions. Other objectives include the eradication of tyranny, the promotion of tolerance and peaceful co- existence with non-Muslims in Islamic territory, the dissemination of knowledge amongst the people and the creation of a welfare society in order to decrease the economic divide between the rich and the poor. Finally, it is also essential that the Islamic government should be led by a just and well-qualified leader, so that it may realize it’s fundamental aims. This is emphasized in the following tradition of Imam Rida (peace be upon him):
Some of the reasons behind appointments of lawful amirs (holders of authority) by God and making their obedience obligatory are as follows: Firstly, people would feel duty bound to follow certain rulers that would rescue them from corruption. It is not possible to follow such rulers unless power is entrusted on a trustee ruler. Secondly, prosperity of nations depends on the existence of rulers who try to solve their temporal and spiritual problems. God, the Wise, never leaves His creatures without a guide. The third reason is that, in the absence of a right leader and guide, the religious commandments and orders would be ruined[17].
Spheres of Islamic Political Thought
At present, there is a significantly broad scope for political debates. Many scholars and intellectuals examine various spheres of political thought such as political philosophy, political ideology, political science and political systems. Thinkers who explore the relationship between Islam and politics are usually interested by what sort of political knowledge Islam provides, whether or not Islam supports political philosophy or advocates a specific political ideology and whether or not Islamic sources support a particular form of political system.
Historically, Islamic political thought has been concerned with leadership; the means of appointing a political authority and the qualities that a ruler must possess. One might suppose that Islam has restricted the discussion to a particular area of debate, and that it therefore overlooks many serious political concerns. However, it is necessary for us to distinguish between the political heritage of Muslim thinkers and what is provided by the contents of Islam. The political heritage of Muslims is embodied in the works of a selection of prominent Shi’a and Sunni jurists, philosophers and theologians, whose disciplines can be placed into four major categories: “political theology”, “political philosophy”, “political jurisprudence” and “political ethics”. It is essential that we briefly review these aspects of Islamic political thought in order to clarify the perspective and nature of the discussions in the following chapters.
i) Political Theology
The nature of Islamic political debates has been deeply influenced by a long history of theological (kalam) disagreement between Shi’a and Sunni scholars. Shi’a political thought, the original and oldest Islamic political theory, is essentially theological because its primary concern is leadership; the characteristics of the rightful leader and the correct method of identifying and appointing him. The Shi’a school of thought does not restrict these issues to a solely political or juridical (fiqh) discussion, rather they are considered a fundamental component of the Islamic ideology. Imamate is the focal point of this aspect of political thought and many books have been written by an assortment of thinkers from different sects on this topic.
ii) Political Philosophy
Political philosophy refers to a set of political consequences that are inferred from fundamental metaphysical-moral issues. The political writings of Al-Farabi are a typical example of Islamic achievements in this field. By definition, political philosophy should remain independent of any particular religious system or set of beliefs, as it is based upon metaphysical and rational foundations. However, Islamic political philosophers have formed deeply rational grounds for many Islamic doctrines before applying these as religious-philosophical premises in their political philosophy.
To deny the validity of Islamic political philosophy is to ignore the philosophical and ideological aspects of political issues. Many philosophical problems in politics have a close relationship with religion. And there are many Islamic teachings that offer, either directly or indirectly, suitable answers to some essential questions in political philosophy.
iii) Political Ethics
Political ethics (or the morals of politics) refers to a series of writings from Muslim scholars, who have attempted to advise and guide rulers to a successful and just method of government. These prescriptions were usually accompanied by stories of previous kings and rulers. They were collections of Islamic teachings, Greek philosophy and some elements of Persian literature. Examples of these include “Siyasat Nameh” (Book of Government) of Nidham al-Mulk (1020-1092), and “Nasihat al-Mulk” (Advice to King) of Ghazzali (1058-1111).
iv) Political Jurisprudence
Muslim jurists (fuqaha) adopted the method of political jurisprudence (or “fiqh ul-siyasi”) to explicate and define the Islamic political system and juridical aspects of political affairs. They discussed the duties of rulers over their subjects, the means for appointing and the grounds for dismissing of political leaders, the personal qualities that an Imam or Deputy (caliph) should possess, and the relationship between different elements of the government to one another. Political jurisprudence overlaps political theology in several areas, such as the discussion concerning leadership. However, political jurisprudence is distinguished by its methodology and the large scope of its subject matter.
“Al-ahkam as-sultaniyya”, written by the jurist Al-Mawardi between 1045 and 1058, is a good example of this facet of Islamic political heritage.
The assumption that Islam has a political ideology implies that it is impossible for one of these disciplines of political thought to illuminate its dimensions in isolation from the others. Ideology, as a political term, refers to a collection of ideas and instructions that are capable of directing political action. Every political ideology includes ultimate aims and offers a particular form of political regime that emphasizes upon specific norms, values and rights in order to draw a framework for all political affairs. In summary, a political ideology is a set of ideas that is considered as a decisive solution for the political aspects of human life. It attempts to adjust and arrange political relationships according to determined ideas and directives. Every political ideology ultimately relies upon political philosophy, because it must express its position according to fundamental political- philosophical issues, namely questions concerning human nature, the concept of justice, freedom and it’s limitation and the relationship between liberty and equality and so on.
From this brief exploration of political ideology, it becomes clear how extensive the dimensions of a comprehensive political theory might be. Thus, any explanation of Islamic political ideology must develop all four aspects of Islamic political heritage; especially regarding political philosophy and jurisprudence.
However, it is not the intention of this book to explicate the entire Islamic political system, including the wide disputes and disagreements amongst the various Islamic sects and movements. The focus of the following pages will be on Imami political theory, which is known as the doctrine of Imamate in the age of the present, infallible Imam, and as “Wilayat al-Faqih” in the age of the absent Imam. Although, in order to keep this book concise, the political ideology shall not be discussed in great depth, the most important aspects of it will be clarified. The content and debate of the next chapters will be a composition of theological, philosophical and mostly Islamic juridical (fiqh) discussions.
Notes:
[1] Oliver Leaman, A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, Polity Press, 1999, p. 134.
[2] Born in Egypt, a disciple of Shaykh Abduh, Abd al-Raziq studied at Oxford University and was a senior member of al-Azhar University, an authorative centre of Sunni learning. His short, but controversial book caused many debates in religious and political circles. Al-Azhar immediately condemned Abd al-Raziq’s work; he was thrown out of the university and dismissed from his position as a religious judge.
[3] Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, Cairo 1925, p. 73.
[4] Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, Cairo 1925, pp. 62-64.
[5] Anthony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 2001, p. 10.
[6] Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought, p. 5.
[7] Tabary, Tareekh al-Rasul wa al-Malik (History of Messengers and Kings), volume 3, p. 318.
[8] Ahmed Abd al-Razig al-Senhoury, Fiqh ul-Khilafah wa Tataworeha (The Jurisprudence of Caliphate and Development), Cairo, 2nd Edition, 1993, p. 82.
[9] Mehdi Haery Yazdi, Hekmat wa Hokumat, London: Shadi Publication, 1995, p. 143.
[10] Mehdi Haery Yazdi, Hekmat wa Hokumat, London: Shadi Publication, 1995, p. 152
[11] Muhammad Amareh, Al-Elmaniya wa Nehzatona, Cairo: Dar al- Shorugh, 1986, p. 35.
[12] Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, Yale University Press, 1989, p.283.
[13] For instance Immanuel Kant in ‘Theory and practice’ defines justice as ‘the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else’. For him justice is more than a condition in which external freedom is guaranteed to all, it is a condition of maximum liberty for all. Allen Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice, Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 9-11.
[14]Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” in Contemporary Political Philosophy, Robert E. Goodin (ed), Blackwell, 1997, p. 418.
[15] Rymond Plant, Modern Political Thought, Blackwell, 1991, p. 222-3.
[16] Charles Taylor, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Blackwell, 1997, p. 419.
[17] Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Babwayh (al-shaykh al-Saduq), Ellal al- Shariah, Qom: Maktiba Davari, p. 253.
Ahmed Vaezy
Source: Imam reza network

Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist

Foreword
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
All praise be to God; there is neither might nor strength but from God, the Exalted, the Sublime. May peace and blessings be upon the Messenger of God, Muhammad, the Seal of the Prophets, and his purified progeny.
The present book, Governance of the Jurist, including relevant footnotes and explanations, is the compendium of thirteen speeches of His Eminence Imām Khomeini delivered during his stay in Najaf from January 21 to February 8, 1970. Now, this book is presented to the knowledgeable researchers and those ardent of the works of Imām Khomeini. These speeches had been reproduced and disseminated then in various forms as lessons and instruction materials. Later, in autumn of 1970 the texts of the speeches were edited and prepared for printing. Following the approval of Imām Khomeini, it was printed in Beirut (Lebanon) by Imām Khomeini’s friends, then secretly sent to Iran, while copies of which were simultaneously sent to the revolutionary Muslims in Europe, United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In 1977, before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the book was published in Iran entitled, A Letter from Imām Mūsāwi Kāshif al-Ghitā and Jihād-i Akbar as its supplement. Like the other works of Imām Khomeini, the book Governance of the Jurist had been considered on top of the list of prohibited books for publication during the Shāh’s regime. So many people were imprisoned and tortured on the charge of publishing, possessing, or reading the book. However, despite all pressures exerted by the SAVAK (the Shāh’s notorious secret police) and restraints imposed by the Shāh’s regime, the notion to support the establishment of an Islamic government whose legislative principles are expounded here by Imām Khomeini, gained a widespread adherence among the revolutionary Muslim forces at the religious seminaries, universities and other notable centers; and with the 15th of Khurdād uprising and Imām Khomeini’s movement, the idea of establishing an Islamic government based on governance of the jurist was crystallized as a fundamental idea. The Islamic jurists (fuqahā) have generally been involved in the issue of governance of the jurist in different subject matters in fiqh, some briefly and some in details. However, no comprehensive and orderly discourse is found in the fiqh books of predecessors; the reason being the unfavorable political and social conditions prevailing over Islamic countries in the past and the dominance of tyrannical ruling cliques that had made it impossible to touch upon such discussions. But regardless of the difference among fuqahā on the extent of authorities and the case applicability of governance of the jurist during the period of Occultation,[1] there is unanimity among them in general as to the affirmation of a certain kind of guardianship authority for the fully competent faqīh. Opinions of fuqahā on the kind of guardianship and the extent of authorities of the Islamic jurists during the period of Occultation have been recently compiled and published in some books.
According to available sources, the late Āyatullāh Mullā Ahmad Narāqi[2] (one of the Qājār dynasty contemporary scholars) has dealt with this subject matter in his book ‘Awā’id al-Ayyām more detailed than the others. He first tried to seek evidence from numerous narrations proving that the faqīh is entrusted with guardianship rights during the Occultation period in the following areas:
In all instances, where the Prophet and the infallible Imāms (‘a) had been authorized and assigned as guardians except in cases, where this had been excluded due to religiously legal requirement.
In all instances related to religious and living duties of people that must be carried out.
By relying on Qur’anic verses, Prophetic traditions, and jurisprudential arguments, he continues the discourse by giving ten examples of applicable cases within the sphere of governance of the jurist such as iftā; administering punishment; protecting the properties of the orphans, insane, and the absent individuals; and taking possession of properties of the infallible Imāms.
Although it can be understood from the late Narāqi’s discussions that he has included governance within the same sphere, he has not openly stressed on it.
After the late Narāqi, Imām Khomeini was the only faqīh to deal tacitly with the governance of the jurist for the first time and proved the point. As indicated earlier, Imām Khomeini had once discussed the question of governance of the jurist in Najaf in thirteen instructional sessions of which the present book is the transcription and edited form of the same course instructions. He further discussed governance of the jurist in the second volume of his five-volume book entitled, Kitāb al-Bay‘ in the same profound style.
In the present book, Governance of the Jurist, Imām Khomeini has laid great emphasis on guardianship (wilāyat) as a principle, serving as the base and foundation for all duties. He especially examines guardianship from governmental and political points of view. Here, in addition to expounding the political and social factors causing the neglect of the most important Islamic issue, he has methodologically examined the question, and based on the same sturdy approach exercised in fiqh, proceeded with introductory practicable programs for realization of governance of the jurist in the government.
He begins by disclosing the plots and conspiracies made by the enemies to annihilate Islam. Then he continues logically to discuss insinuated misgivings, such as “Islam is not a competent religion to govern the society at the age of industrial civilization” or “legal provisions of Islam are inadequate to resolve the social problems, and to provide us with appropriate answers”.
In this regard Imām Khomeini points out that the misgivings suggested by the enemies to pave the way for the faulty notion of separation of religion from politics, have unfortunately been so much effective; even in the seminaries, one dares not to speak freely about the Islamic government. He further indicated the domestic shortcomings and infatuations for the new civilization, all of which are the souvenir of the devilish propaganda of imperialism. He warned the seminaries, the young clergy students, and the Muslim thinkers to endeavor enormously to carry out their political and social duties and be careful not to be deceived. Islam is not opposed to technological and industrial progress; but social problems require ethical and religious solution, and Islam is that all-embracing religion that can solve all problems, provided the thinkers and scholars of the Islamic world would face the challenge.
By expounding the indisputable historical fact that the Most Noble Messenger (s) had appointed a successor, Imām Khomeini posed the question of “whether the successor had been designed just to expound the religious precepts.” Of course not! Expounding religious precepts does not require to be done by the Prophet’s successor. Therefore the appointment had been for rulership, and for enforcement of laws and regulations. It is most important now to believe in the necessity to establish an Islamic government; thus, we can determine the position and role of the successor.
In this book Imām Khomeini has given some instances proving the necessity for establishing an Islamic government, as follows:
Action taken by the Holy Prophet (s) to establish a government;
The fact that divine precepts are to be enforced perpetually; they are enacted not only for the time of the Holy Prophet (s); they are meant for all time.
The nature and characteristic of Islamic laws and regulations like fiscal, national defense, and legal and penal precepts are such that they are not executable without a government.
After giving quite well-reasoned explanation on the necessity of Islamic government, Imām Khomeini refers to the historical background of deviation from this principle during the Umayyad period and its continuation during the Abbasids who had adopted un-Islamic rule, imitating the Iranian monarchical, Roman imperial and the Egyptian pharaonic systems. And the same way continued afterwards. He stresses on the logical demand for alteration of such systems, and that it is therefore necessary to stir up a political revolution. Accordingly, it is necessary to revolt against tyrannical governments to pave the way for the establishment of Islamic government and the enforcement of Islamic precepts, unification of Islamic ummah that have now fallen into the trap of disunity caused by various domestic elements as well as foreigners, and finally, to save the oppressed and the deprived people as a religious duty of all Muslims, especially the scholars. Imām Khomeini further continues emphasizing on the necessity of establishing an Islamic government, by relating the subject to a narration quoted by Fadl ibn Shādān on the philosophy of ordaining governments as provided for in the narration and traditions.
An important part of the book deals with the difference between an Islamic government and other types of governments, pointing out that the Islamic government is a special kind of constitutional government that is anchored on the Islamic laws. Imām Khomeini believes, therefore, that Islamic legislative power or law-making assemblies are bound to devise all governmental plans and programs within the framework of Islamic precepts; not according to regular procedures followed by other states.
Imām Khomeini further deals with the prerequisite qualities of the ruler, as derived directly from the nature of Islamic government. In addition to the regular requirement such as intelligence and prudence, there are two principal prerequisites for the ruler: his knowledge about the law and his justness.
Governance of the faqīh during the Occultation is the next to be dealt with. Following the previous discussion, Imām Khomeini says, “Now we live at the Occultation period. On the one hand, Islamic precepts are to be enforced, (and no one is designated by God Almighty to fulfill this task), and on the other hand, what should we do then?” He examines this subject matter and comes to the conclusion that “God Almighty has given the quality which is required for rulership to a great number of religious scholars from the very outset of Islam to the advent of the Imām of the Age (‘a). This quality is the knowledge about law and justice. A great number of our contemporary scholars (fuqahā) possess this quality and they should join hands. They will be able to establish a just government in the world.” He then points out that governance of the jurist is an extrinsic and rational issue, and the fully competent faqīh is entrusted with all the authorities; that the Prophet and the infallible Imāms (‘a) were entitled too, for governance; and that this guardianship cannot be realized except through entitlement and that it implies in itself no dignity and status, but only a means of carrying out one’s duty and enforcing religious precepts.
The exalted aims of government, and characteristics required for the ruler are then referred to. Relying on traditions, Imām Khomeini deduces that governance of the jurist implies entitlement to government as well as argumentation that constitutes the greater part of the book. The concluding part of the book deals with the necessity for a long-range planning to achieve this divine objective. Here, Imām Khomeini points out the importance of propagation and instructions, while saying, “Meetings must be directed to serve these two important tasks. Struggles must be stirred as ‘Āshūrā to create waves of crowds insisting on the establishment of Islamic government, and prepared for a long-term struggle while not bearing in mind an immediate achievement”.
The necessity for proper attention to instructions and propagations, moral and cultural reformation of seminaries, annihilation of the moral and cultural effects of imperialism, correction of the pseudo-saints, purging the seminaries of the court ‘ulamā, and finally, taking effective measures to overthrow the oppressive and tyrannical governments, are among the concluding discussions of the book.
Esteemed readers’ attentions are drawn to the fact that after his divine uprising, which, thanks to the divine grace, consciousness and unity of the Muslim people, gained victory over monarchical system in Iran on Bahman 22, 1358 Sh./February 11,1979, Imām Khomeini undertook the leadership of the Islamic Revolution and the guardianship function of the nation. It should, therefore, be taken into consideration that comprehending precisely Imām Khomeini’s viewpoints on governance of the jurist, which is explained in this book, can only be realized when full consideration is given to his personal manners and conducts in the course of his rule and his ideas about the extent of authorities and the station of guardianship as expressed through his speeches, messages and letters.[3]
“O God, foreshorten the arms of the oppressors that are stretched out against the lands of the Muslims and root out all traitors to Islam and the Islamic countries. Awaken the heads of the Muslims states from their deep sleep so that they may exert themselves on behalf of their people’s interests and renounce divisiveness and the quest for personal gain. Grant that the younger generation studying in the religious colleges and the universities may struggle to reach the sacred aims of Islam and strive together, with ranks united, first, to deliver the Islamic countries from the clutches of imperialism and its vile agents, and then to defend them. Grant that the fuqahā and the scholars may strive to guide and enlighten the minds of the people, to convey the sacred aims of Islam to all Muslims, particularly the younger generation, and to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic government. From You is success, and there is neither recourse nor strength except in God, the Exalted, the Sublime.”[4]
The Institute for Compilation and Publication
of Imām Khomeini’s Works
Notes:
[1] See n. 27 of the present volume.
[2] See n. 107 of the present volume.
[3] A collection of the viewpoints and stances on this argumentation is being compiled by this Institute.
[4] The written supplication at the end of the present volume.
Imām Khomeini - a Short Biography
Imām Rūhullāh al-Musawi al-Khomeini was born on September 24, 1902 into a family of strong religious traditions in Khumayn, a small town some hundred kilometers to the southwest of Tehran.[6] Both his grandfather and father were religious scholars. The former, Sayyid Ahmad, was known as al-Hindi because of a period he had spent in India, where a distant branch of the family is said still to exist. The latter, Āyatullāh Mustafā, was murdered by bandits only five months after the birth of Rūhullāh, so that his mother and an aunt were responsible for his early upbringing. At the age of sixteen, he lost both mother and aunt in the course of a single year, and the task of supervising his education then fell to an elder brother, Sayyid Murtadā (better known, in later years, as Āyatullāh Pasandīdeh). Āyatullāh Pasandīdeh recalls that, even in his youth, Imām Khomeini showed great piety, seriousness, and determination. It was the general consensus in Khumayn that a significant if turbulent career awaited him.[7]
At the age of nineteen, the young Khomeini was sent to study religious sciences in the nearby town of Arāk under the guidance of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karīm Hā‘iri[8] who had been a pupil of great scholars at the Shī‘i teaching centers in Iraq, most notably Mīrzā Hasan Shirāzi.[9] His studies under Hā’iri made Khomeini an heir to the traditions established by the great figures of the nineteenth century— traditions that included political activism as well as learning.
The following year, Hā’iri accepted an invitation from the people and scholars of Qum to settle there. Qum had always been a center of learning as well as pilgrimage, but Hā’iri’s arrival there, followed by his reorganization of the religious teaching institution, was the first in a series of development that elevated Qum to the status of spiritual capital of Islamic Iran. The final and decisive development would be the movement of nationwide opposition to the Pahlavi monarchy that Imām Khomeini was to initiate in Qum in 1962.
Indications of Imām Khomeini’s future role were already present in those early years. He attained prominence among the numerous students of Hā’iri, excelling in a wide variety of subjects, but especially ethics and the variety of spiritual philosophy known in Iran as ‘irfān. At the early age of twenty-seven, he wrote a treatise in Arabic on these subjects, Misbāh al-Hidāyah, which was well received by his teachers.[10] Many of Imām Khomeini’s important associates who came to be well known during the Revolution years—e.g. Āyatullāh Muntaziri[11]—recall that they were first attracted to him by his proficiency in ethics and philosophy and that the classes he taught on them twice a week in Qum were frequently attended by hundreds of people.[12]
Given the current fame of Imām Khomeini as a revolutionary leader who has achieved a rare degree of success in the purely political sphere, it may appear surprising that he first gained fame as a writer and teacher concerned with devotional and even mystical matters. For Imām Khomeini, however, spirituality and mysticism have never implied social withdrawal or political quietism, but rather the building up of a fund of energy that finds its natural expression on the sociopolitical plane. The life of Imām Khomeini is a clear indication that the Revolution wrought by Islam necessarily begins in the moral and spiritual realm.[13] The classes he taught at Qum in the 1930s bore witness to this; topics of an ethical and spiritual nature were constantly interwoven with evocations of the problems of the day and exhortations to his listeners to devote themselves to solving them as part of their religious duty.
The early years of Imām Khomeini’s activity in Qum coincided with the establishment of the Pahlavi state by Rizā Khān. Rizā Khān transformed the Iranian monarchy into a dictatorship of the modern, totalitarian kind and made its chief internal aim the elimination of Islam as a political, social, and cultural religion. Efforts directed towards this aim were directly witnessed by Imām Khomeini in Qum, and reports reached him regularly from other cities such as Mashhad, Isfahan and Tabriz. What he saw and heard in those years left a deep impression on him; the repressive measures directed against the religious institution in later years by the second and last of the Pahlavi shāhs, Muhammad Rizā, were for him a natural and direct continuation of what he had experienced in the period of Rizā Shāh; the father and the son were of a piece.
Imām Khomeini’s first public statement of a political nature came in a book published in 1941, Kashf al-Asrār.[14] The book is essentially a detailed, systematic critique of an anti-religious tract, but it also contains numerous passages that are overtly political and critics of the Pahlavi rule.
In 1937, Hā’iri died, and the religious institution was temporarily headed by a triumvirate of his closest senior associates: Āyatullāhs Sadr, Hujjat, and Khwansāri. Soon, however, a single leader succeeded to the role of Hā’iri, Āyatullāh Burūjirdi. Imām Khomeini was active in promoting the candidacy of Burūjirdi, whom he expected to utilize the potentialities of the position of supreme religious authority in order to combat the Pahlavi rule. He remained close to Burūjirdi until his death in 1962, but other influences prevailed on Burūjirdi; history regards him as a religious leader of great piety and administrative ability, but almost totally inactive in political matters.[15]
After the death of Burūjirdi, no single successor to his position emerged. Khomeini was reluctant to allow his own name to be canvassed, but he ultimately yielded to the urgings of close associates that a collection of his rulings on matters of religious practice be published, thus implicitly declaring his availability as leader and authority. It was not, however, primarily through technical procedures such as this that the prominence of Imām Khomeini spread first within Qum, and then throughout the country. Of greater importance was his willingness to confront the Shāh’s regime at a time when few dared to do so. For example, he was alone among the major religious scholars of Qum in extending support publicly to the students at the religious institution who were campaigning against the opening of liquor stores in the city.
Soon his attention was drawn to matters of greater significance. The first step came in October 1962, when the Shāh promulgated a law abolishing the requirement that candidates for election to local assemblies be Muslim and male. Imām Khomeini, joined by religious leaders elsewhere in the country, protested vigorously against the measure; it was ultimately repealed.[16] The measure itself was not intrinsically important, because elections to local assemblies were invariably corrupt and their functions were purely formal. But the campaign against it provided a point of departure for more comprehensive agitation against the regime as well as an opportunity to build a coalition of religious scholars that might be mobilized for more fundamental aims in the future.
The next step was taken in 1963, when the Shāh began to promulgate a series of measures for reshaping the political, social and economic life of Iran that were collectively designated the “White Revolution”. The appearance of popular approval was obtained by a fraudulent referendum held on January 26, 1963. However, the measures in question were correctly perceived by a large segment of Iranian society as being imposed on the country by the United States and designed to bring about augmentation of the Shāh’s power and wealth, as well as intensification of the United States dominance, which had been instituted with the CIA coup d’état against Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddiq in August 1953. Imām Khomeini moved immediately to denounce the fraudulent “revolution” and to expose the motives that underlay it, preaching a series of sermons from Fayziyyah Madrasah[17] in Qum that had a nationwide impact.
The Shāh’s regime responded by sending paratroopers to attack Fayziyyah Madrasah on March 22, 1963. A number of students were killed and the madrasah was ransacked. Far from intimidating Imām Khomeini, this event marked the beginning of a new period of determined struggle that was directed not only against the errors and excesses of the regime, but against its very existence. The attack on the madrasah had an almost symbolic value, exemplifying as it did both the hostility of the regime to Islam and Islamic institutions and the ruthless, barbaric manner in which it expressed that hostility.
Throughout the spring of 1963, Imām Khomeini continued to denounce the Shāh’s regime. He concentrated his attacks on its tyrannical nature, its subordination to the United States, and its expanding collaboration with Israel. The confrontation reached a new peak in June with the onset of Muharram, the month in the Muslim calendar when the martyrdom of Imām Husayn (‘a), the grandson of the Prophet (s), is commemorated and aspirations to emulate his example, by struggling against contemporary manifestation of tyranny, are awakened. On the tenth day of the month, Imām Khomeini delivered a historic speech in Qum, repeating his denunciations of the Shāh’s regime and warning the Shāh not to behave in such a way that the people would rejoice when he should ultimately be forced to leave the country.[18] Two days later, he was arrested at his residence and taken to confinement in Tehran.
The arrest of Imām Khomeini brought popular disgust with the Shāh’s regime to a climax, and a major uprising shook the throne. In Qum, Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad, Isfahan, Kashan, and other cities, unarmed demonstrators confronted the Shāh’s US-trained and -equipped army, which, upon the command to shoot to kill, slaughtered not less than 15,000 people in the space of a few days. The date on which this uprising began, Khurdād 15 according to the solar calendar used in Iran, marked a turning point in the modern history of Iran. It established Imām Khomeini as national leader and spokesperson for popular aspirations, provided the struggle against the Shāh and his foreign patrons with a coherent ideological basis in Islam, and introduced a period of mass political activity under the guidance of the religious leadership instead of the secular parties that had been discredited, with the overthrow of Musaddiq. In all of these ways, uprising of Khurdād 15 foreshadowed the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979.
The uprising was suppressed, but the general public and the religious scholars refused to tolerate the imprisonment of Imām Khomeini. Agitation persisted throughout the country, and numerous religious leaders converged on Tehran to press for Imām Khomeini’s release. It finally came on April 6,1964, accompanied by a statement in the government-controlled press that Imām Khomeini had agreed to refrain from political activity as a condition for his release. This was immediately refuted by the Imām,[19] who resumed his denunciation of the regime with undiminished vigor.
If further proof were needed of the Shāh’s tutelage to the US, it came in October 1964, when legal immunity was granted to American personnel for all offenses committed in Iranian territory. After learning that the Iranian rubber–stamp Majlis (Parliament) had agreed to this measure, Imām Khomeini spent a sleepless night, and the next day, October 27, he furiously denounced this open violation of Iranian sovereignty and independence.[20] It had by now become apparent to the Shāh and his foreign overlords that Imām Khomeini could not be intimidated into silence, and it was decided to exile him, in the vain hope of destroying his influence. Accordingly, on November 4,1964 Imām Khomeini was arrested again and sent into exile in Turkey, accompanied by agents of the Shāh’s secret police.
After a brief stay in Ankara, Imām Khomeini was obliged to take up residence in Bursa, a city in the west of Turkey. Continual pressure was brought on the Shāh’s regime to permit Imām Khomeini to leave Turkey for a more favorable place of exile, Najaf, one of the Shī‘i shrine cities of Iraq. In October 1965, consent was given, and Imām Khomeini proceeded to Najaf, which was to be his home for thirteen years.
In agreeing to this move, the Shāh’s regime had been motivated not only by the desire to free itself from popular pressure, but also by the assumption that Imām Khomeini would be overshadowed in Najaf by the religious authorities resident there. This assumption proved false. Imām Khomeini established himself as a major religious presence in Najaf. More importantly, he maintained his influence and popularity in Iran. He issued periodic proclamations concerning developments in Iran that were smuggled into the country and clandestinely circulated at great risk. In addition, his messages addressed to the Muslim world at large were distributed several times in Mecca during pilgrimage season of the year. In Najaf itself, he received visits during the long years of his exile from a number of important Iranian and other Muslim personalities.
The name and person of Imām Khomeini and the cause that he embodied were never forgotten in Iran. His example inspired a number of religious scholars and groups, which continued to build on the foundations laid in 1963 and 1964, and unnoticed by most foreign observers, an Islamic movement of unparalleled breadth and profundity came into being.
It was then entirely natural that Imām Khomeini should swiftly emerge as the leader of the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979. Notwithstanding his physical absence from the country, he was present in the hearts of his countrymen and infinitely more in tune with their aspirations than politicians who had suffered neither exile nor imprisonment.
On November 23, 1977, the elder son of Imām Khomeini, Hajj Mustafā, died suddenly in Najaf, assassinated by the Shāh’s US-instituted security police, SAVAK. Imām Khomeini bore this blow stoically, but the tragedy inflamed the public in Iran. Massive social corruption and economic dislocation as well as continuing political repression had already aroused universal discontent in Iran, and when the regime aimed its next blow against Imām Khomeini, discontent overflowed into rebellion, and rebellion, in turn, matured into revolution.
On January 8,1978, one week after President Carter had been in Tehran lauding the Shāh as a wise statesman beloved of his people,[21] the government-controlled press printed an article supplied by the Ministry of Court attacking Imām Khomeini as an agent of foreign powers. The public reaction was immediate outrage. The following day in Qum, demonstrations broke out that were suppressed with heavy loss of life. This was the first of a series of demonstrations that progressively unfurled across the country, until in the end barely a single region remained untouched by revolutionary fervor. Throughout the spring and summer of 1978, Imām Khomeini issued a series of proclamations and directives, congratulating the people on their steadfastness and encouraging them to persist until the attainment of the final objective—overthrow of the monarchy and institution of an Islamic republic.
The centrality of the Imām in the revolutionary movement was obvious from the beginning. His name was constantly repeated in the slogans that were devised and chanted in the demonstrations; his portrait served as a revolutionary banner; and his return from exile to supervise the installation of an Islamic government was insistently demanded. Acting under another of its erroneous assumptions, the Shāh’s regime requested the Ba’athist government in Iraq, in September 1978, to expel Imām Khomeini from its territory, in the hope of depriving him of his base of operations and robbing the Revolution of its leadership. Imām Khomeini had never enjoyed cordial relations with the various governments that had ruled Iraq since his arrival there in 1965, and he now informed the Ba’athists that he would be happy to leave Iraq for a country that was not subject to the Shāh’s dictates. Syria and Algeria were considered as possible destinations, but in the end, as Imām Khomeini testifies himself, no Muslim country offered him refuge with the assurance of his being able to continue his activity freely.[22] So, he went to France, taking up residence at the hamlet of Neauphle-le-Chāteau near Paris in early October 1978.
The move to France proved beneficial. Paradoxically, communication with Iran was easier from France than it had been from Iraq. The declarations and directives that were now being issued with increasing frequency were telephoned directly to Tehran, for further dissemination to a number of centers in the provinces. A never-ending stream of Iranians, from Europe and the United States as well as Iran itself, came to visit and pay homage to the Imām, and to consult with him. The world’s media also descended on the modest residence of the Imām at Neauphle-le-Chāteau, and his words began to reach a global audience.
The month of Muharram that coincided with December 1978 witnessed vast and repeated demonstrations in Tehran and other Iranian cities, demanding the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic republic under the leadership of Imām Khomeini. Despite all the savagery the Shāh had employed, including the slaughter of thousands of unarmed demonstrators, the torture and abuse of detainees, and massacres of the wounded on their hospital beds, and despite the unstinting support he had received from the United States and other foreign powers, the corrupt and murderous rule of the Shāh was approaching its end. His masters decided it was politic for him to leave, and when preparation had been made for the installation of a surrogate administration under Shāhpūr Bakhtiār, the Shāh left Iran for the last time on January 16, 1979. The outburst of joy that followed his departure was a fulfillment of the prophecy Imām Khomeini had made sixteen years earlier.
Once the Shāh left Iran, Imām Khomeini prepared to return to his homeland. When he did, on February 1, he was met with a tumultuous welcome. With his renewed presence in Iran, the fate of the Bakhtiār’s government was sealed. After a final outburst of savagery on February 10 and 11, the old regime collapsed in disgrace, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was born.
In the two eventful years that have elapsed since the triumph of the Revolution, Imām Khomeini has continued to play an indispensable role in consolidating its gains and guiding the destiny of the nation. In a formal sense, his role has been defined by Articles, 107 to 112 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,[23] which incorporate the key political principle of the “governance of the faqīh (vilāyat-i faqīh).[24] In a more general sense, however, he has continued to provide the Revolution with its very substance, acting as its highest instance of authority and legitimacy. Countless addresses to different groups of citizens that come to visit him, as well as public speeches to wider audiences on particular significant occasions, have confirmed Imām Khomeini as the teacher and guide of the Islamic Revolution.[25]
Throughout this long and remarkable career, Imām Khomeini has manifested a unique set of characteristics: spirituality and erudition, asceticism and self-discipline, sobriety and determination, political genius and leadership, compassion for the poor and deprived, and a relentless hatred of oppression and imperialism. Summarizing his assessment of Imām Khomeini, the late Āyatullāh Mutahhari[26] compared him with ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a), that high exemplar of Islamic courage, wisdom, and spirituality. All who had the privilege to come into the presence of the Imām will concur in his judgment.
Notes:
[5] The translator’s introduction in the English translation as part of an anthology titled Islam and Revolution, originally published by Al-Mizan Press, Berkeley, USA in 1981. Notes with “(Pub.)” at the end are that of, or modified by, the publisher. (Pub.)
[6]Some information about the early life of Imām Khomeini is to be found in the opening sections of two books that concern themselves chiefly with the events of 1962-1964: S.H.R. Barrasī va Tahlīlī az Nihzat-i Imām Khomeini (Najaf? n.d); and anon., Biyugrāfi-yi Pishvā, n.p, n.d. This Institute has recently published the first volume of The Life of Imām Khomeini, which elaborately deals on his early life up to matrimony. (Pub.)
[7] Interview of the translator with Āyatullāh Pasandīdeh, Qum, December 19, 1979.
[8] For detailed accounts of the life and achievements of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karīm Hā’iri, see Muhammad Sharif Rāzi, Āthār al-Hujjah (Qum 1332 A.H.S./1953), I, pp. 22-90; Ganjinā-yi Dānishmandān (Tehran, 1352 Sh./1973), I, pp. 283-304. His relations with Rizā Khān are discussed briefly in ‘Abd al-Karīm Hā’iri, Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran (Leiden, 1977), pp. 135-139.
[9] Concerning Mīrzā Hasan Shirāzi, see p. 124 and 162, note 155.
[10] For lists of Imām Khomeini’s writings, published and unpublished, see S.H.R., Barrasī va Tahlīlī az Nihzat-i Imām Khomeini, pp. 55-61, and anon., Biyugrāfī-yi Pīshvā, I, 52-53. Copies as well as lists of Imām Khomeini’s literary works can be obtained from the publisher, The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imām Khomeini’s Works, http://www.imam-khomeini.org, email: این آدرس ایمیل توسط spambots حفاظت می شود. برای دیدن شما نیاز به جاوا اسکریپت دارید. (Pub.)
[11] Āyatullāh Muntaziri, born to a family of peasant stock in Najafābād in 1301 A.H./1884, had for many years been closely associated with Imām Khomeini, who had described him as “the product of my life.” Not only a master of both law and philosophy, but also a militant leader, Āyatullāh Muntaziri played an important role in sustaining the struggle against the Shāh during Imām Khomeini’s years in exile.
[12] Rāzi, Āthār al-Hujjah, II, 45.
[13] See Imām Khomeini’s own remarks on the connection between spirituality and sociopolitical activity in lectures on Sūrah al-Fātiha published in the anthology of Imām Khomeini’s writings and declarations titled Islam and Revolution, Al-Mizan Press, Berkeley, USA, 1981, pp. 399-400. See Imām Khomeini, Ādāb as-Salāt: The Disciplines of the Prayer (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imām Khomeini’s Works, 1996), pp. 357-418, available online at: http://www.al-islam.org/adab. (Pub.)
[14] For an extract from this book, see ibid., pp.169-173.
[15] For a brief account of the achievements of Āyatullāh Burūjirdi, see Murtadā Mutahhari, “Mazāyā va Khadamāt-i Marhūm Āyatullāh Burūjirdi,” Bahsi dar bāreh-ye Marja‘iyyat va Rūhāniyyat (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 233-249.
[16] See p. 118 and p. 161, n. 151.
[17] Fayziyyah Madrasah, founded in Safavid times, has acquired particular fame among the teaching institutions in Qum because of the role it has played in the Islamic movement. Closed down in 1975 by the Shāh’s regime, it was ceremonially reopened after the triumph of the Revolution.
[18] For the text of this speech, see Islam and Revolution, pp. 177-180.
[19] See p. 127.
[20] For the text of this speech, see Islam and Revolution, pp. 181-188.
[21] Carter told the Shāh in Tehran on January 1, 1978: “Iran is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect, admiration and love which your people give to you.” New York Times, January 2, 1978.
[22] See Islam and Revolution, p. 238.
[23] See Hamid Algar, trans., The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Berkeley, 1980), pp. 66-69.
[24] This principle forms the central topic of the first session of this book. See especially pp. 62-125.
[25] It is important to understand that despite this centrality of Imām Khomeini to the Revolution, the Islamic Republic is not an authoritarian regime over which he presides. The notion of a “Khomeini regime,” as promoted by the Western media, is entirely fictitious. Repeated consultations of the popular will after February 1979 have resulted in the emergence of a new set of political institutions that function with demonstrable freedom.
[26] Āyatullāh Murtadā Mutahhari was a scholar of unusually wide learning, a writer and lecturer of great effectiveness, and a cherished pupil of Imām Khomeini. He was a leading member of the Revolutionary Council until his assassination on May 1, 1979 by the terrorist Furqān group.
Islamic Government (The Book)
Probably the best known of Imām Khomeini’s works, the book Islamic Government originated in a series of lectures given at Najaf between January 21 and February 8, 1970. The lectures were recorded and transcribed by a student, and then published in book form.
“Islamic Government” is an exact translation of the original Persian title, Hukūmat-i Islāmi. However, the reader should bear in mind that the book does not purport either a complete scheme of Islamic political philosophy or a detailed plan for the establishment and functioning of an Islamic state. Its purpose is narrower and more specific and geared to the audience to whom the lectures were delivered: students of the religious sciences, who might be expected later to assume positions of influence in Muslim society.
Three major points emerge from the lectures. The first is the necessity for the establishment and maintenance of Islamic political power for Islamic goals, precepts, and criteria. The second is the duty of the religious scholars (the fuqahā) to bring about an Islamic state, and to assume legislative, executive, and judicial positions within it—in short, the doctrine of “the governance of the faqīh” (vilāyat-i faqīh). The various texts that support this second point are subjected to lengthy review and examination. Finally, Imām Khomeini sets out a program of action for the establishment of an Islamic state, including various measures for self-reform by the religious establishment. All three themes are expounded against a backdrop of particular concern with Iran; hence the occurrence of numerous references to Iran in the course of the general and theoretical discussion.
Accurate translations of Hukūmat-i Islāmi exist in French, Arabic, Turkish, and Urdu. In the fall of 1978, the Joint Publications and Research Service, the translation branch of the US Central Intelligence Service, commissioned an English translation, not of the original Persian text, but of the translation in Arabic. The resulting version, crude and unreliable, was subsequently published in a vulgar and sensational format by Manor Books, a commercial publisher in New York. What follows is an integral and faithful translation of the third edition of the Persian text, published at Najaf in 1391 A.H./1971.
Introduction
In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
All Praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds
And may His blessings be upon the best of His creation,
Muhammad and His Descendants.
The subject of the governance of the jurist (vilāyat-i faqīh[27]) provides us with the opportunity to discuss certain related matters and questions. The governance of the faqīh is a subject that in itself elicits immediate assent and has little need of demonstration, for anyone who has some general awareness of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam will unhesitatingly give his assent to the principle of the governance of the faqīh as soon as he encounters it; he will recognize it as necessary and self-evident. If little attention is paid to this principle today, so that it has come to require demonstration, it is because of the social circumstances prevailing among the Muslims in general, and the teaching institution in particular. These circumstances, in turn, have certain historical roots to which I will now briefly refer.
From the very beginning, the historical movement of Islam has had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who first established anti-Islamic propaganda and engaged in various stratagems, and as you can see, this activity continues down to the present. Later they were joined by other groups, who were in certain respects, more satanic than they. These new groups began their imperialist penetration of the Muslim countries about three hundred years ago,[28] and they regarded it as necessary to work for the extirpation of Islam in order to attain their ultimate goals. It was not their aim to alienate the people from Islam in order to promote Christianity among them, for the imperialists really have no religious belief, Christian or Islamic. Rather, throughout this long historical period, and going back to the Crusades,[29] they felt that the major obstacle in the path of their materialistic ambitions and the chief threat to their political power was nothing but Islam and its ordinances, and the belief of the people in Islam. They therefore plotted and campaigned against Islam by various means.
The preachers they planted in the religious teaching institution, the agents they employed in the universities, government educational institutions, and publishing houses, and the orientalists who work in the service of the imperialistic states—all these people have pooled their energies in an effort to distort the principles of Islam. As a result, many persons, particularly the educated, have formed misguided and incorrect notions of Islam.
Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are committed to truth and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism. But the servants of imperialism have presented Islam in a totally different light. They have created in men’s minds a false notion of Islam. The defective version of Islam, which they have presented in the religious teaching institution, is intended to deprive Islam of its vital, revolutionary aspect and to prevent Muslims from arousing themselves in order to gain their freedom, fulfill the ordinances of Islam, and create a government that will assure their happiness and allow them to live, lives worthy of human beings.
For example, the servants of imperialism declared that Islam is not a comprehensive religion providing for every aspect of human life and has no laws or ordinances pertaining to society. It has no particular form of government. Islam concerns itself only with rules of ritual purity after menstruation and parturition. It may have a few ethical principles, but it certainly has nothing to say about human life in general and the ordering of society.
This kind of evil propaganda has unfortunately had an effect. Quite apart from the masses, the educated class—university students and also many students at the religious teaching institutions—have failed to understand Islam correctly and have erroneous notions. Just as people may, in general, be unacquainted with a stranger, so too they are unacquainted with Islam. Islam lives among the people of this world as if it were a stranger.[30] If somebody were to present Islam as it truly is, he would find it difficult to make people believe him. In fact, the agents of imperialism in the religious teaching institutions would raise a hue and cry against him.
In order to demonstrate to some extent, the difference between Islam and what is presented as Islam, I would like to draw your attention to the difference between the Holy Qur’an and the books of hadīth,[31] on the one hand, and the practical treatises of jurisprudence, on the other. The Holy Qur’an and the books of hadīth, which represent the sources for the commands and ordinances of Islam, are completely different from the treatises written by the mujtahīds[32] of the present age both in breadth of scope and in the effects they are capable of exerting on the life of society. The ratio of Qur’anic verses concerned with the affairs of society to those concerned with ritual worship is greater than a hundred to one. Of the approximately fifty sections[33] of the corpus of hadīth containing all the ordinances of Islam, not more than three or four sections relate to matters of ritual worship and the duties of man toward his Creator and Sustainer. A few more are concerned with questions of ethics, and all the rest are concerned with social, economic, legal, and political questions—in short, the gestation of society.
You who represent the younger generation and who, God willing, will be of service to Islam in the future must strive diligently all your lives to pursue the aims I will now set forth and to impart the laws and ordinances of Islam. In whatever way you deem most beneficial, in writing or in speech, instruct the people about the problems Islam has had to contend with since its inception and about the enemies and afflictions that now threaten it. Do not allow the true nature of Islam to remain hidden, or people will imagine that Islam is like Christianity (nominal, not true Christianity), a collection of injunctions pertaining to man’s relation to God, and the mosques will be equated with the church.
At a time when the West was a realm of darkness and obscurity—with its inhabitants living in a state of barbarism, and America still peopled by half-savaged redskins—and the two vast empires of Iran and Byzantium were under the rule of tyranny, class privilege, and discrimination, and the powerful dominated all without any trace of law or popular government, God, Exalted and Almighty, by means of the Most Noble Messenger (s), sent laws that astound people with their magnitude. He instituted laws and practices for all human affairs and laid injunctions for man extending from even before the embryo is formed until after he is placed in the tomb. In just the same way that there are laws setting forth the duties of worship for man, so too there are laws, practices, and norms for the affairs of society and government. Islamic law is a progressive, evolving, and comprehensive system. All the voluminous books that have been compiled from the earliest times on different areas of law, such as judicial procedure, social transactions, penal law,[34] retribution,[35] international relations, regulations pertaining to peace and war, private and public law—taken together, these contain a mere sample of the laws and injunctions of Islam. There is not a single topic in human life for which Islam has not provided instructions and established a norm.
In order to make the Muslims, especially the intellectuals, and the younger generation, deviate from the path of Islam, foreign agents have constantly insinuated that Islam has nothing to offer, that Islam consists of a few ordinances concerning menstruation and parturition, and that this is the proper field of study for the ākhūnds.[36]
There is something of truth here, for it is fitting that those ākhūnds who have no intention of expounding the theories, injunctions and worldview of Islam and who spend most of their time on precisely such matters, forgetting all the other topics of Islamic law, be attacked and accused in this manner. They too are at fault; foreigners are not the only ones to be blamed. For several centuries, as might be expected, the foreigners laid certain plans to realize their political and economic ambitions, and the neglect that has overtaken the religious teaching institution has made it possible for them to succeed. There have been individuals among us, the ‘ulamā,[37] who have unwittingly contributed to the fulfillment of those aims, with the result that you now see.
It is sometimes insinuated that the injunctions of Islam are defective, and said that the laws of judicial procedure, for example, are not all that they should be. In keeping with this insinuation and propaganda, agents of Britain were instructed by their masters to take advantage of the idea of constitutionalism in order to deceive the people and conceal the true nature of their political crimes (the pertinent proofs and documents are now available). At the beginning of the constitutional movement, when people wanted to write laws and draw up a constitution, a copy of the Belgian legal code was borrowed from the Belgian embassy and a handful of individuals (whose names I do not wish to mention here) used it as the basis for the constitution they then wrote, supplementing its deficiencies with borrowings from the French and British legal codes.[38] True, they added some of the ordinances of Islam in order to deceive the people, but the basis of the laws that were now thrust upon the people was alien and borrowed.
What connections do all the various articles of the Constitution as well as the body of Supplementary Law[39] concerning the monarchy, the succession, and so forth, have with Islam? They are all opposed to Islam; they violate the system of government and the laws of Islam.
Islam proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession wrong and invalid. When Islam first appeared in Iran, the Byzantine Empire, Egypt, and the Yemen, the entire institution of monarchy was abolished. In the blessed letters that the Most Noble Messenger (s) wrote to the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius and the Shāhanshāh of Iran,[40] he called upon them to abandon the monarchical and imperial form of government, to cease compelling the servants of God to worship them with absolute obedience, and to permit men to worship God, Who has no partner and is the True Monarch. Monarchy and hereditary succession represent the same sinister, evil system of government that prompted the Doyen of the Martyrs[41] (‘a) to rise up in revolt and seek martyrdom in an effort to prevent its establishment. He revolted in repudiation of the hereditary succession of Yazīd,[42] to refuse it his recognition.
Islam, then, does not recognize monarchy and hereditary succession; they have no place in Islam. If that is what is meant by the so-called deficiency of Islam, then Islam is indeed deficient. Islam has laid down no laws for the practice of usury, for banking on the basis of usury, for the consumption of alcohol, or for the cultivation of sexual vice, having radically prohibited all of these. The ruling cliques, therefore, who are the puppets of imperialism and wish to promote these vices in the Islamic world, will naturally regard Islam as defective. They must import the appropriate laws from Britain, France, Belgium, and most recently, America. The fact that Islam makes no provision for the orderly pursuit of these illicit activities, far from being a deficiency, is a sign of perfection and a source of pride.
The conspiracy worked out by the imperialist government of Britain at the beginning of the constitutional movement had two purposes. The first, which was already known at that time, was to eliminate the influence of Tsarist Russia in Iran, and the second was to take the laws of Islam out of force and operation by introducing Western laws.[43]
The imposition of foreign laws on our Islamic society has been the source of numerous problems and difficulties. Knowledgeable people working in our judicial system have many complaints concerning the existing laws and their mode of operation. If a person becomes caught up in the judicial system of Iran or that of analogous countries, he may have to spend a whole lifetime trying to prove his case. In my youth I once encountered a learned lawyer who said, “I can spend my whole life following a litigation back and forth through the judicial machinery, and then bequeath it to my son for him to do the same thing!” That is the situation that now prevails, except, of course, when one of the parties has influence, in which case the matter is examined and settled swiftly, albeit unjustly.
Our present judicial laws have brought our people nothing but trouble, causing them to neglect their daily task and providing the occasion for all kinds of misuse. Very few people are able to obtain their legitimate rights. In the adjudication of cases, it is necessary not only that everyone should obtain his rights, but also that correct procedure be followed. People’s time must be considered, as well as the way of life and profession of both parties, so that matters are resolved as swiftly and simply as possible.
A case that a sharī‘ah[44] judge in earlier times settled in one or two days cannot be settled now in twenty years. The needy, young, and old alike, must spend the entire day at the Ministry of Justice, from morning to evening, wasting their time in corridors or standing in front of some official’s desk, and in the end they will still not know what has transpired. Anyone who is more cunning, and more willing and able to give bribes, has his case settled expeditiously, but at the cost of justice. Otherwise, they must wait in frustration and perplexity until their entire lives are gone.
The agents of imperialism sometimes write in their books and their newspapers that the legal provisions of Islam are too harsh. One person was even so impudent as to write that the laws of Islam are harsh because they have originated with the Arabs, so that the “harshness” of the Arabs is reflected in the harshness of Islamic law!
I am amazed at the way these people think. They kill people for possessing ten grams of heroin and say, “That is the law” (I have been informed that ten people were put to death some time ago, and another person more recently, for possession of ten grams of heroin).[45] Inhuman laws like this are concocted in the name of a campaign against corruption, and they are not to be regarded as harsh. (I am not saying it is permissible to sell heroin, but this is not the appropriate punishment. The sale of heroin must indeed be prohibited but the punishment must be in proportion to the crime.)[46] When Islam, however, stipulates that the drinker of alcohol should receive eighty lashes, they consider it “too harsh.” They can execute someone for possessing ten grams of heroin and the question of harshness does not even arise!
Many forms of corruption that have appeared in society derive from alcohol. The collisions that take place on our roads, and the murders and suicides are very often caused by the consumption of alcohol. Indeed, even the use of heroin is said to derive from addiction to alcohol. But still, some say, it is quiet unobjectionable for someone to drink alcohol (after all, they do it in the West); so let alcohol be bought and sold freely.
But when Islam wishes to prevent the consumption of alcohol—one of the major evils—stipulating that the drinker should receive eighty lashes, or sexual vice, decreeing that the fornicator be given one hundred lashes (and the married man or woman be stoned[47]), then they start wailing and lamenting: “What a harsh law that is, reflecting the harshness of the Arabs!” They are not aware that these penal provisions of Islam are intended to keep great nations from being destroyed by corruption. Sexual vice has now reached such proportions that it is destroying entire generations, corrupting our youth, and causing them to neglect all forms of work. They are all rushing to enjoy the various forms of vice that have become so freely available and so enthusiastically promoted. Why should it be regarded as harsh if Islam stipulates that an offender must be publicly flogged[48] in order to protect the younger generation from corruption?
At the same time, we see the masters of this ruling class of ours enacting slaughters in Vietnam over fifteen years,[49] devoting enormous budgets to this business of bloodshed, and no one has the right to object! But if Islam commands its followers to engage in warfare or defense in order to make men submit to laws that are beneficial for them, and kill a few corrupt people or instigators of corruption, then they ask: “What’s the purpose for that war?”
All of the foregoing represent plans drawn up several centuries ago that are now being implemented and bearing fruit.
First, they opened a school in a certain place[50] and we overlooked the matter and said nothing. Our colleagues also were negligent in the matter and failed to prevent it from being established so that now, as you can observe, these schools have multiplied, and their missionaries have gone out into the provinces and villages, turning our children into Christians or unbelievers.
Their plan is to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands, and our human resources. They want us to remain afflicted and wretched, and our poor to be trapped in their misery. Instead of surrendering to the injunctions of Islam, which provide a solution for the problem of poverty, they and their agents wish to go on living in huge places and enjoy lives of abominable luxury.
These plans of theirs are so broad in scope that they have even touched the institutions of religious learning. If someone wishes to speak about an Islamic government and the establishment of Islamic government, he must observe the principle of taqiyyah[51] and count upon the opposition of those who have sold themselves to imperialism. When this book was first printed, the agents of the embassy undertook certain desperate measures to prevent its dissemination,[52] which succeeded only in disgracing themselves more than before.
Matters have now come to the point where some people consider the apparel of a soldier incompatible with true manliness and justice, even though the leaders of our religion were all soldiers, commanders, and warriors. They put on military dress and went into battle in the wars that are described for us in our history; they killed and they were killed. The Commander of the Faithful[53] (‘a) himself would place a helmet on his blessed head, don his coat of chain mail, and gird on a sword. Imām Hasan[54] and the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a), acted likewise. The later Imāms did not have the opportunity to go into battle, even though Imām Bāqir[55] (‘a) was also a warrior by nature. But now the wearing of military apparel is thought to detract from a man’s quality of justice,[56] and it is said that one should not wear military dress. If we want to form an Islamic government, then we must do it in our cloaks and turbans; otherwise, we commit an offense against decency and justice!
This is all the result of the wave of propaganda that has now reached the religious institution and imposed on us the duty of proving that Islam also possesses rules of government.
That is our situation then—created for us by the foreigners through their propaganda and their agents. They have removed from operation all the judicial processes and political laws of Islam and replaced them with European importations, thus diminishing the scope of Islam and ousting it from Islamic society. For the sake of exploitation they have installed their agents in power.
So far, we have sketched the subversive and corrupting plan of imperialism. We must now take into consideration as well certain internal factors notably the dazzling effect that the material progress of the imperialist countries has had on some members of our society. As the imperialist countries attained a high degree of wealth and affluence—the result both of scientific and technical progress and of their plunder of the nations of Asia and Africa—these individuals lost all their self-confidence and imagined that the only way to achieve technical progress was to abandon their own laws and beliefs. When the moon landings took place, for instance, they concluded that Muslims should jettison their laws! But what is the connection between going to the moon and the laws of Islam? Do they not see that countries having opposing laws and social systems compete with each other in technical and scientific progress and the conquest of space? Let them go all the way to Mars or beyond the Milky Way; they will still be deprived of true happiness, moral virtues and spiritual advancement and be unable to solve their own social problems. For the solution of social problems and the relief of human misery require foundations in faith and moral; merely acquiring material power and wealth, conquering nature and space, have no effect in this regard. They must be supplemented by, and balanced with, the faith, the conviction, and the morality of Islam in order truly to serve humanity instead of endangering it. This conviction, this morality, and these laws that are needed, we already possess. So, as soon as someone goes somewhere or invents something, we should not hurry to abandon our religion and its laws, which regulate the life of man and provide for his well being in this world and hereafter.
The same applies to the propaganda of the imperialists. Unfortunately some members of our society have been influenced by their hostile propaganda, although they should not have been. The imperialists have propagated among us the view that Islam does not have a specific form of government or governmental institutions. They say further that even if Islam does have certain laws, it has no method for enforcing them, so that its function is purely legislative. This kind of propaganda forms part of the overall plan of the imperialists to prevent the Muslims from becoming involved in political activity and establishing an Islamic government. It is in total contradiction with our fundamental beliefs.
We believe in government and believe that the Prophet (s) was bound to appoint a successor, as he indeed did.[57] Was a successor designated purely for the sake of expounding law? The expounding of law did not require a successor to the Prophet. He himself, after all, had expounded the laws; it would have been enough for the laws to be written down in a book and put into people’s hands to guide them in their actions. It was logically necessary for a successor to be appointed for the sake of exercising government. Law requires a person to execute it. The same holds true in all countries of the world, for the establishment of a law is of little benefit in itself and cannot secure the happiness of man. After a law is established, it is necessary also to create an executive power. If a system of law or government lacks an executive power, it is clearly deficient. Thus Islam, just as it established laws, also brought into being an executive power.
There was still a further question: who was to hold the executive power? If the Prophet (s) had not appointed a successor to assume the executive power, he would have failed to complete his mission, as the Qur’an testifies.[58] The necessity for the implementation of divine law, the need for an executive power, and the importance of that power in fulfilling the goals of the prophetic mission and establishing a just order that would result in the happiness of mankind—all of this made the appointment of a successor synonymous with the completion of the prophetic mission. In the time of the Prophet (s), laws were not merely expounded and promulgated; they were also implemented. The Messenger of God (s) was an executor of the law. For example, he implemented the penal provisions of Islam: he cut off the hand of the thief and administered lashings and stonings. The successor to the Prophet (s) must do the same; his task is not legislation, but the implementation of the divine laws that the Prophet (s) has promulgated. It is for this reason that the formation of a government and the establishment of executive organs are necessary. Belief in the necessity for these is part of the general belief in the Imamate, as are, too, exertion and struggle for the sake of establishing them.
Pay close attention. Whereas hostility toward you has led them to misrepresent Islam, it is necessary for you to present Islam and the doctrine of the Imamate correctly. You must tell people: “We believe in the Imamate; we believe that the Prophet (s), appointed a successor to assume responsibility for the affairs of the Muslims, and that he did so in conformity with the divine will. Therefore, we must also believe in the necessity for the establishment of government, and we must strive to establish organs for the execution of law and the administration of affairs.” Write and publish books concerning the laws of Islam and their beneficial effects on society. Improve your style and method of preaching and related activity. Know that it is your duty to establish an Islamic government. Have confidence in yourselves and know that you are capable of fulfilling this task. The imperialists began laying their plans three or four centuries ago; they started out with nothing, but see where they are now! We too will begin with nothing, and we will pay no attention to the uproar created by a few “xenomaniacs”[59] and devoted servants of imperialism.
Present Islam to the people in its true form, so that our youth do not picture the ākhūnds as sitting in some corner in Najaf or Qum, studying the questions of menstruation and parturition instead of concerning themselves with politics, and draw the conclusion that religion must be separate from politics. This slogan of the separation of religion from politics and the demand that Islamic scholars should not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them. Were religion and politics separate in the time of the Prophet (s)? Did there exist, on one side, a group of clerics, and opposite it, a group of politicians and leaders? Were religion and politics separate in the time of the caliphs—even if they were not legitimate—or in the time of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a)? Did two separate authorities exist? These slogans and claims have been advanced by the imperialists and their political agents in order to prevent religion from ordering the affairs of this world and shaping Muslim society, and at the same time to create a rift between the scholars of Islam, on the one hand, and the masses and those struggling for freedom and independence, on the other. They will thus been able to gain dominance over our people and plunder our resources, for such has always been their ultimate goal.
If we Muslims do nothing but engage in the canonical prayer, petition God, and invoke His name, the imperialists and the oppressive governments allied with them will leave us alone. If we were to say “Let us concentrate on calling the azān[60]and saying our prayers. Let them come and rob us of everything we own—God will take care of them! There is no power or recourse except in Him, and God willing, we will be rewarded in the hereafter!”—if this were our logic, they would not disturb us.
Once during the occupation of Iraq, a certain British officer asked, “ Is the azān I hear being called now on the minaret harmful to British policy?” When he was told that it was harmless, he said: “Then let him call for prayers as much as he wants!”
If you pay no attention to the policies of the imperialists, and consider Islam to be simply the few topics you are always studying and never go beyond them, then the imperialists will leave you alone. Pray as much as you like; it is your oil they are after—why should they worry about your prayers? They are after our minerals, and want to turn our country into a market for their goods. That is the reason the puppet governments they have installed prevent us from industrializing, and instead, establish only assembly plants and industry that is dependent on the outside world.
They do not want us to be true human beings, for they are afraid of true human beings. Even if only one true human being appears, they fear him, because others will follow him and he will have an impact that can destroy the whole foundation of tyranny, imperialism, and government by puppets. So, whenever some true human being has appeared they have either killed or imprisoned and exiled him, and tried to defame him by saying: “This is a political ākhūnd!” Now the Prophet (s) was also a political person. This evil propaganda is undertaken by the political agents of imperialism only to make you shun politics, to prevent you from intervening in the affairs of society and struggling against treacherous governments and their anti-national and anti-Islamic politics. They want to work their will as they please, with no one to bar their way.
Notes:
[27] Faqīh: one learned in the principles and ordinances of Islamic law, or more generally, in all aspects of the faith. For a full discussion of the term, see p. 69-70.
[28] Since mid-16th century, i.e., more than three centuries ago when the Portuguese and thereafter the Dutch, English, French, Italian, and the Spaniards colonized Muslim countries. At the beginning, newly discovered African countries and then, after finding the sea routes, Asian countries (whose link with the Europeans had been curtailed since the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453) fell under the sway of colonialism. (Pub.)
[29] Crusades is the name of a series of war campaigns waged by the European Christians against the Muslims (11th-13th centuries) for the control of the Holy Land, particularly Jerusalem. Waged in eight stages, these campaigns commenced with the religious edict of Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont (1096/489) and ended with the death of the French King, Saint Louis IX (1214-70) in 1270/669. Owing to the red-colored piece of cloth in the form of cross embedded on their right shoulders, the Christians became known as the Army of the Cross, or Crusaders. (Pub.)
[30] This is an allusion to the celebrated saying of the Prophet: “Islam will again become a stranger among men, as it was in the beginning, but blessed is the state of the stranger.”
[31] Hadīth: a tradition setting forth a saying or deed of the Prophet, or in Shī‘i usage, of one of the Twelve Imāms.
[32] Mujtahīd: an authority on divine law who practices ijtihād, that is, “the search for a correct opinion…in the deducing of the specific provisions of the law from its principles and ordinances” (Muhammad Sanglaji, Qazā dar Islam [Tehran, 1338 Sh./1959], p.14).
[33] The term kitāb (“book”) in the parlance of the Islamic jurists and traditionists means “section” in which Prophetic narrations (ahādīth) pertaining to a single topic are collected or particular laws of a topic, are discussed, such as Kitāb at-Tawhīd, Kitāb al-Īmān wa ’l-Fikr, Kitāb as-Salāh, and others. For instance, in the hadīth literature, Dūreh-ye Kāfi consists of 35 books, and in jurisprudence, Sharā’i ‘ul-Islām comprises 50 books. (Pub.)
[34] Hadd (literally means limit, boundary or limit) in the Islamic law is generally applied for penal law for punishments prescribed for particular crimes. The extent of these punishments is determined by law. (Pub.)
[35] Qisās (literally means retribution or retaliation) in the Islamic jurisprudence is to be executed against a criminal, according to the legal decree, who committed such crime as murder, amputation of a body limb, or laceration and beating in case the victim or his guardians are seeking retribution in lieu of receiving fine or blood money. (Pub.)
[36] Ākhūnd: a word of uncertain etymology that originally denoted a scholar of unusual attainment, but was later applied to lesser-ranking scholars, and then acquired a pejorative connotation, particularly in secularist usage.
[37] ‘Ulamā: the scholars of Islam.
[38] The draft of the first constitution was written by a commission from among the members of the Parliament and was approved with 51 articles. Kasravi, in this connection, writes: “It seems that Mashīr ad-Dawlah and Mu’tamīn al-Mulk and sons of Sadr A‘zam wrote it, or to be more appropriate, we say they translated [it].” Thereafter, a committee was formed so that a text called “Supplement” be appended in the constitution. By the way, this text was prepared in 107 articles. According to the narration of Mustafā Rahīmi, “With the use of the Belgian constitution and to some extent, the French constitution, and taking into account the laws of the Balkan states (in view of the newness of the supplementary laws under consideration), the committee embarked on the compilation of the Supplementary Constitutional Laws and on the omission of flaws of the former laws.” Concerning this influence of Belgian constitutional law on the six-man committee that drafted the Supplementary Constitutional Laws of 1907, see A.K.S. Lambton, “Dustur, iv: Iran,” Encyclopedia of Islam new ed., II, 653-654; Kasravi Tabrizi, Tārīkh-i Mashrūteh-yi Īrān (Constitutional History of Iran), pp. 170, 224; Mustafā Rahīmi, Qānūn-i Asāsi-yi Īrān va Usūl-i Demokrāsi (The Constitution of Iran and Democratic Principles) (Tehran, 1347 Sh./1968), p. 94; Qānūn-i Asāsi va Mutammin Ān (The Constituion and Its Supplement) (Tehran: National Consultative Assembly Press). (Pub.)
[39] Articles 35 through 57 of the Supplementary Constitutional Laws approved on October 7, 1906 relate to “the rights of the throne.” See E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge, 1911), pp. 337-379.
[40] In the seventh year of the Islamic era, Prophet Muhammad wrote not only to Heraclius and the ruler of Iran (probably Parvīz), but also to the rulers of Egypt and Abyssinia, inviting them all to embrace Islam and abandon unjust rule. Following is the text of the Most Noble Messenger’s letter to Khosroe Parviz:
“In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. From Muhammad, the Messenger of Allah, to the great Kisra of Iran. Peace be upon him, who seeks truth and expresses belief in Allah and in His Prophet and testifies that there is no god but Allah and that He has no partner, and who believes that Muhammad is His servant and Prophet. Under the Command of Allah, I inviteyou to Him. He has sent me for the guidance of all people so that I may warn them all of His wrath and may present the unbelievers with an ultimatum. Embrace Islam so that you may remain safe. And if you refuse to accept Islam, you will be responsible for the sins of the Magi.”
Text of his letter to Heraclius is as follows:
“In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. “(This is a letter) from Muhammad ibn ‘Abdullāh to the great Hercules of Rome. Peace be upon the followers of guidance. I invite you to the religion of Islam. Embrace Islam so that you may be safe. Allah will give you two rewards (reward for your own faith as well as reward for the faith of those who are your subordinates). In case, however, you turn away your face from Islam you will be responsible for the sins of the Arisiyans as well. “O people of the Scriptures! We invite you to a common basis i.e., we should not worship anyone except Allah. We should not treat anyone to be His partner. Some of us too should not accept others as their gods. And (O Muhammad! as and when) they become recalcitrant against the true religion say: “Be witness to the fact that we are Muslims [Q 3:64].” ”
See Makātib ar-Rasūl, vol. 1, pp. 90 and 105; Ja‘far Subhāni, The Message (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications, 1984), chap. 42, pp. 540-566, http://www.al-islam.org/message/43.htm; Muhammad Hamidullah, Le Prophète de l’Islam (Paris, 1959), I, 196-197, 212, 230, 241. (Pub.)
[41] The Doyen of the Martyrs: Imām Husayn, grandson of the Prophet. Concerning his biography, see Mīr Ahmad ‘Ali, Husain the Saviour of Islam (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1987); ‘Abdullāh Yūsuf ‘Ali, Imām Husain and His Martyrdom, http://www.al-islam.org/short/martyrdom/index.htm. (Pub.)
[42] In 60/680, Imām Husayn refused to swear allegiance to Yazīd, son of Mu‘āwiyah and second caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, since Yazīd did not possess legitimate authority and had succeeded to the caliphate by hereditary succession. The ensuing death of the Imām in battle at Karbala has always been commemorated by Shī‘ah Muslims as the supreme example of martyrdom in the face of tyranny. It served as an important point of both ideological and emotive reference throughout the Islamic Revolution in Iran. See Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Dīn, The Revolution of Al-Husayn, http://www.al-islam.org/revolution; Ibrāhīm Āyāti, A Probe into the History of Āshūrā (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications, 1984);Zākir, Tears and Tributes (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Yāsīn T. al-Jibouri, Kerbala and Beyond (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Sayyid Wāhid Akhtar, “Karbala: An Enduring Paradigm of Islamic Revivalism,” Al-Tawhīd Journal, http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/paradigm-akhtar.htm. (Pub.)
[43] No detailed study has yet been made of the British role in the early part of the constitutional movement. Some of the relevant documents, however, are to be found in General Report on Persia for the Year 1906 (file F.O. 416/30, Public Records Office, London).
[44] Sharī‘ah: the all-embracing law of Islam derived from the Qur’an, the normative practice and authoritative pronouncements of the Prophet, and a number of secondary sources.
[45] A law promulgated in July 1969 provided the death penalty for anyone in possession of more than two kilograms of opium or ten grams of heroin, morphine, or cocaine. The first ten executions were carried out in December 1969 and by 1974, 236 people had been executed on charges under this law. See Ulrich Gehrke, Iran: Natur, Bevolkerung, Geschichte, Kultur, Staat, Wirschaft (Tubingen and Basel, 1976), p. 281. It is also probable that the law was also used to provide a cover for the execution of political prisoners who had no involvement with narcotics. Concerning the royal family’s own involvement in the drug trade, see p. 117, n. 167.
[46] Imām Khomeini’s complain is referring to another point; that is, the absence of justice. (Pub.)
[47] Under the penal laws of Islam, proof of the married status is one of the indispensable requisites for stoning an adulterer. Married man or woman is one who is mature (bāligh), mentally sound, and has a permanent spouse. (Pub.)
[48] In Islamic law, the presence of a number of believers at the time of penal execution has been considered part of etiquettes of punishing the offender. Shī‘ah jurists have been emphasizing on the observance of this tradition at the time of penal execution for adultery, slandering, and pandering. Their religious edict regarding the first case is based on Sūrah an-Nūr (24:2): “And a number of believers must witness the punishment of adulterer men and women.” Another reason for it is that the attendants would take lesson from the requital, and anyone who is inclined to do so or is guilty of the same, would desist or cease from its performance. (Pub.)
[49] After many years of resistance against the French and Japanese colonizers, in 1960 Vietnam had once again engaged in a protracted war with the United States. This war that ended in 1973 with the defeat and withdrawal of the American forces, brought untold destructions and casualties on the Vietnamese people. As the official figures fall short of exactly describing the degree of casualties and damages wrought by this ruthless aggression, the realities of the bitter contemporary history can be gleaned to some extent: Up to early 1965 when the scope of the war extended to South Vietnam, the number of South Vietnamese who perished or were injured is as follows: 170,000 died, 800,00 wounded, and 400,000 imprisoned. During that time the number of persons who had been sent on concentration camps, which are called “agricultural units” exceeds 5 millions. According to the Voice of America (January 6, 1963), throughout 1962 US Air Force had attacked 50 thousand times villages beyond the realm of “state villages,” and based on the assertions of General Herkins(?), on the same year about 30 thousand villages perished. US Air Force operations in South Vietnam reached 30 thousand times a month. According to a news report of the New York Times, in a combined US and Saigon government air operations nearly 1,400 out of 2,600 villages in the South were totally ruined by napalm bombs and chemical weapons. A Red Cross report indicates that as the effect of using poisonous elements in the vast and populous areas, thousands of residents in the South have been afflicted with divergent diseases particularly skin-related ones and for a long time they have experienced sufferings and discomforts arising from the sickness. Moreover, many herds of cows and buffalos as well as other four-footed domesticated animals had died while leaves, flowers, and fruits of tree and rice fields were completely devastated. (Pub.)
[50] We have not been able to determine whether this is an allusion to a particular school established by foreigners. Before the Islamic Revolution, there were a number of foreign-run schools in Iran—secular and missionary—that in effect alienated their students from Islamic culture and society.
[51] Taqiyyah: prudential dissimulation of one’s true beliefs under conditions of acute danger, a practice based on Qur’an, 3:28. For a fuller discussion of taqiyyah, see ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’i, Shi‘ite Islam (Albany, N.Y., 1975), pp. 223-225, http://www.al-islam.org/anthology/index.htm; Al-Taqiyya/Dissimulation,http://al-islam.org/encyclopedia/chapter6b/1.html; and also p. 133 of the present work. (Pub.)
[52] This is a reference to an earlier and briefer series of talks given by Imām Khomeini on the subject of Islamic government. The Iranian embassy in Baghdad had sought to prevent the published text of those talks from being distributed.
[53] The Commander of the Faithful: ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, and first of the Twelve Imāms from the Prophet’s Progeny. He exercised rule from 35/656 until his martyrdom in 40/661. See Yousuf N. Lalljee, ‘Ali the Magnificent (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1987); Muhammad Jawād Chirri, The Brother of the Prophet Mohammad (Imām ‘Ali), (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); George Jordaq, The Voice of Human Justice, trans. M. Fazal Haq (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1990) (Pub.)
[54] Imām Hasan: son of Imām ‘Ali and second of the Imāms. He was poisoned in 50/670 after spending most of his life in seclusion in Medina. See Shaykh Rādi Āl-Yāsīn, Sulh al-Hasan: The Peace Treaty of Al-Hasan, trans. Jāsim al-Rasheed (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1998), http://www.al-islam.org/sulh/. (Pub.)
[55] Imām Bāqir: the fifth Imām. He was born in 57/675 and spent most of his life in Medina, until his martydom there in 114/732. See Bāqir Sharīf al-Qarashi, The Life of Imām Mohammed al-Bāqir, trans. Jāsim al-Rasheed (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1999). (Pub.)
[56] The “quality of justice” that is demanded of a religious scholar includes not only the practice of equity in all social dealings, but also complete abstention from major sins, the consistent performance of all devotional duties, and the avoidance of conduct incompatible with decorum. Justice is among the requisites for becoming a judge, rector (mufti), and congregational prayer leader (imām). At the margin of the book, Sharh-i Lum‘ah, vol. 1, chap. 11, p. 98, wearing of indecent clothes in the congregational prayers has been considered contrary to the spirit of magnanimity (muruwwah) and justice. (Pub.)
[57] The Most Noble Messanger (s) indicated in many instances the successorship of Imām ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) such as in Hadīth Yawm ad-Dār (Day of the Prophet’s invitation to his kinsmen); Hadīth Manzilah (The Prophet’s designation of ‘Ali as his deputy in Medina during the Tabuk expedition); Āyat al-Wilāyah (‘Ali’s offering of a ring to a beggar and the subsequent revelation of a pertinent verse); Event of Ghadīr Khumm; and Hadīth ath-Thaqalayn. See Tafsir Kabīr, vol. 12, pp. 28, 53 under Sūrah al-Mā’idah, verses 55, 67; Sīrah ibn Hisham, vol. 4, p. 520; Tārīkh Tabari, vol. 2, pp. 319, 322; Al-Ghadīr, vols. 1-3; Caliphate of Imām ‘Ali, http://www.al-islam.org/encyclopedia/chapter3/1.html. (Pub.)
[58] “O Messenger! Proclaim what has been revealed to you by your Lord, for if you do not, you will not have fulfilled the mission He has entrusted to you” (4:67). On the commentary of this verse, see Mīr Ahmad ‘Ali, Text, Translation and Commentary of the Holy Qur’an (Ehlmurst, NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, Inc., 1988), http://www.al-islam.org/quran. (Pub.)
[59] Xenomaniacs: those infatuated with foreign and especially Western models of culture. This is a translation of a Persian term, gharbzādeh-ha, popularized by Jalāl Āl-i Ahmad (d. 1969) in his book Gharbzādegi (“Xenomania”). See its English translation, R. Campbell (trans.) and Hamid Algar (ed. and anno.), Occidentosis: A Plague from the West (Berkeley: Al-Mizan Press, 1984). He was a writer of great influence and Imām Khomeini was acquainted with his work. See the commemorative supplement on Jalāl Āl-i Ahmad in the Tehran daily newspaper Jumhūri-yi Islāmi, Shahrīvar 20, 1359/October 12, 1980, p. 10. (Pub.)
[60] Azān: the call to prayer.
The Necessity for Islamic Government
A body of laws alone is not sufficient for a society to be reformed. In order for law to ensure the reform and happiness of man, there must be an executive power and an executor. For this reason, God Almighty, in addition to revealing a body of law (i.e., the ordinances of the sharī‘ah), has laid down a particular form of government together with executive and administrative institution.
The Most Noble Messenger (s) headed the executive and administrative institutions of Muslim society. In addition to conveying the revelation and expounding and interpreting the articles of faith and the ordinances and institutions of Islam, he undertook the implementation of law and the establishment of the ordinances of Islam, thereby, bringing into being the Islamic state. He did not content himself with the promulgation of law; rather, he implemented it at the same time, cutting off hands and administering lashings, and stonings. After the Most Noble Messenger (s), his successor had the same duty and function. When the Prophet (s) appointed a successor, it was not only for the purpose of expounding articles of faith and law; it was for the implementation of law and the execution of God’s ordinances. It was this function—the execution of law and the establishment of Islamic institutions—that made the appointment of a successor such an important matter that the Prophet (s) would have failed to fulfill his mission if he had neglected it. For after the Prophet (s), the Muslims still needed someone to execute laws and establish the institution of Islam in society, so that they might attain happiness in this world and the hereafter.
By their nature, in fact, laws and social institutions require the existence of an executor. It has always and everywhere been the case that legislation alone has little benefit: legislation by itself cannot assure the well-being of man. After the establishment of legislation, an executive power must come into being, a power that implements the laws and the verdicts given by the courts, thus allowing people to benefit from the laws and the just sentences the courts deliver. Islam has therefore established an executive power in the same way that it has brought laws into being. The person who holds this executive power is known as the valī-yi amr.[61]
The Sunnah[62] and path of the Prophet (s) constitute a proof of the necessity for establishing government. First, he himself established a government, as history testifies. He engaged in the implementation of laws, the establishment of the ordinances of Islam, and the administration of society. He sent out governors to different regions; both sat in judgment himself and also appointed judges; dispatched emissaries to foreign states, tribal chieftains, and kings; concluded treaties and pacts; and took command in battle. In short, he fulfilled all the functions of government. Second, he designated a ruler to succeed him, in accordance with divine command. If God Almighty, through the Prophet (s), designated a man who was to rule over Muslim society after him, this is in itself an indication that government remains a necessity after the departure of the Prophet from this world. Again, since the Most Noble Messenger (s) promulgated the divine command through his act of appointing a successor, he also, implicitly stated the necessity for establishing a government.
It is self-evident that the necessity for enactment of the law, which necessitated the formation of a government by the Prophet (s), was confined or restricted to his time, but continues after his departure from this world. According to one of the noble verses of the Qur’an, the ordinances of Islam are not limited with respect to time or place; they are permanent and must be enacted until the end of time.[63] They were not revealed merely for the time of the Prophet, only to be abandoned thereafter, with retribution and the penal code no longer be enacted, or the taxes prescribed by Islam no longer collected, and the defense of the lands and people of Islam suspended. The claim that the laws of Islam may remain in abeyance or are restricted to a particular time or place is contrary to the essential creedal bases of Islam. Since enactment of laws, then, is necessary after the departure of the Prophet from this world, and indeed, will remain so until the end of time, the formation of a government and the establishment of executive and administrative organs are also necessary. Without the formation of a government and the establishment of such organs to ensure that through enactment of the law, all activities of the individual take place in the framework of a just system, chaos and anarchy will prevail and social, intellectual and moral corruption will arise. The only way to prevent the emergence of anarchy and disorder and to protect society from corruption is to form a government and thus impart order to all the affairs of the country.
Both reason and divine law, then, demonstrate the necessity in our time for what was necessary during the lifetime of the Prophet (s) and the age of the Commander of the Faithful, ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a)—namely the formation of a government and the establishment of executive and administrative organs.
In order to clarify the matter further, let us pose the following question. From the time of the Lesser Occultation[64] down to the present (a period of more than twelve centuries that may continue for hundreds of millennia if it is not appropriate for the Occulted Imām to manifest himself), is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast aside and remain unexecuted, so that everyone acts as he pleases and anarchy prevails? Were the laws that the Prophet of Islam labored so hard for twenty-three years to set forth, promulgate, and execute valid only for a limited period of time? Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation? Anyone who believes so, or voices such a belief, is worse situated than the person who believes and proclaims that Islam has been superseded or abrogated by another supposed revelation.[65]
No one can say it is no longer necessary to defend the frontiers and the territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland; that taxes such as the jizyah, kharāj, khums, and zakāt[66] should no longer be collected; that the penal code of Islam, with its provisions for the payment of blood money and the exacting of requital, should be suspended. Any person who claims that the formation of an Islamic government is not necessary implicitly denies the necessity for the implementation of Islamic law, the universality and comprehensiveness of that law, and the eternal validity of the faith itself.
After the death of the Most Noble Messenger (s), none of the Muslims doubted the necessity for government. No one said: “We no longer need a government”. No one was heard to say anything of the kind. There was unanimous agreement concerning the necessity for government. There was disagreement only as to which person should assume responsibility for government and head the state. Government, therefore, was established after the Prophet (s), both in the time of the caliphs and in that of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a); an apparatus of government came into existence with administrative and executive organs.
The nature and character of Islamic law and the divine ordinances of the sharī‘ah furnish additional proof of the necessity for establishing government, for they indicate that the laws were laid down for the purpose of creating a state and administering the political, economic and cultural affairs of society.
Firstly, the laws of the sharī‘ah embrace a diverse body of laws and regulation, which amounts to a complete social system. In this system of laws, all the needs of man have been met: his dealings with his neighbors, fellow citizens, and clan, as well as children and relatives; the concerns of private and marital life; regulations concerning war and peace and intercourse with other nations; penal and commercial law; and regulations pertaining to trade, industry and agriculture. Islamic law contains provisions relating to the preliminaries of marriage and the form in which it should be contracted, and others relating to the development of the embryo in the womb, and what food the parents should eat at the time of conception. It further stipulates the duties that are incumbent upon them while the infant is being suckled, and specifies how the child should be reared, and how the husband and the wife should relate to each other and to their children. Islam provides laws and instructions for all of these matters, aiming, as it does, to produce integrated and virtuous human beings who are walking embodiments of the law, or to put it differently, the law’s voluntary and instinctive executors. It is obvious, then, how much care Islam devotes to government and the political and economic relations of society, with goal of creating conditions conducive to the production of morally upright and virtuous human beings.
The Glorious Qur’an and the Sunnah contain all the laws and ordinances man needs in order to attain happiness and the perfection of his state. The book al-Kāfi[67]has a chapter entitled, “All the Needs of Men Are Set Out in the Book and the Sunnah,”[68] the “Book” meaning the Qur’an, which is, in its own words, “an exposition of all things.”[69]According to certain traditions, the Imām[70] also swears that the Book and the Sunnah contain without a doubt all that men need.
Second, if we examine closely the nature and character of the provisions of the law, we realize that their execution and implementation depend upon the formation of a government, and that it is impossible to fulfill the duty of executing God’s commands without there being established properly comprehensive administrative and executive organs. Let us now mention certain types of provisions in order to illustrate this point; the others you can examine yourselves.
The taxes Islam levies and the form of budget it has established are not merely for the sake of providing subsistence to the poor or feeding the indigent among the descendants of the Prophet (s); they are also intended to make possible, the establishment of a great government and to assure its essential expenditures.
For example, khums is a huge source of income that accrues to the treasury and represents one item in the budget. According to our Shī‘i school of thought, khums is to be levied in an equitable manner on all agricultural and commercial profits and all natural resources whether above or below the ground—in short, on all forms of wealth and income. It applies equally to the greengrocer with his stall outside this mosque, and to the shipping or mining magnate. They must all pay one-fifth of their surplus income, after customary expenses are deducted, to the Islamic ruler, so that it enters the treasury. It is obvious that such a huge income serves the purpose of administering the Islamic state and meeting all its financial needs. If we were to calculate one-fifth of the surplus income of all the Muslim countries (or of the whole world, should it enter the fold of Islam), it would become fully apparent that the purpose for the imposition of such a tax is not merely the upkeep of the sayyids[71] or the religious scholars, but on the contrary, something far more significant—namely, meeting the financial needs of the great organs and institutions of government. If an Islamic government is achieved, it will have to be administered on the basis of the taxes that Islam has established—khums, zakāt (this, of course, would not represent an appreciable sum)[72] jizyah, and kharāj.
How could the sayyids ever need so vast a budget? The khums of the bazaar of Baghdad would be enough for the needs of the sayyids and the upkeep of the religious teaching institution, as well as all the poor of the Islamic world, quite apart from the khums of the bazaars of Tehran, Istanbul, Cairo, and other cities. The provision of such a huge budget must obviously be for the purpose of forming a government and administering the Islamic lands. It was established with the aim of providing for the needs of the people, for public services relating to health, education, defense, and economic development. Further, in accordance with theprocedures laid down by Islam for the collection, preservation, and expenditure of this income, all forms of usurpation and embezzlement of public wealth have been forbidden; so that the head of state and all those entrusted with responsibility for conducting public affairs (i.e., members of the government) have no privileges over the ordinary citizen in benefiting from the public income and wealth; all have an equal share.
Now, should we cast this huge treasury into the ocean, or bury it until the Imām returns,or just spend it on fifty sayyids a day until they have all eaten their fill? Let us suppose we give all this money to 500,000 sayyids; they would not know what to do with it. We all know that the sayyids and the poor have a claim on the public treasury only to the extent required for subsistence. The budget of the Islamic state is constructed in such a way that every source of income is allocated to specific types of expenditures. Zakāt, voluntary contributions and charitable donations, and khums are all levied and spent separately. There is a hadīth to the effect that at the end of the year, sayyids must return any surplus from what they have received to the Islamic ruler, just as the ruler must aid them if they are in need.
The jizyah, which is imposed on the ahl adh-dhimmah,[73] and the kharāj, which is levied on agricultural land, represent two additional sources of considerable income. The establishment of these taxes also proves that the existence of a ruler and a government is necessary. It is the duty of a ruler or governor to assess the poll tax to be levied on the ahl adh-dhimmah in accordance with their income and financial capacity, and to fix appropriate taxes on their arable lands and livestock. He must also collect the kharāj on those broad lands that are the “property of God” and in the possession of the Islamic state. This task requires the existence of orderly institutions, rules and regulations, and administrative procedures and policies; it cannot be fulfilled in the absence of order. It is the responsibility of those in charge of the Islamic state, first, to assess the taxes in due and appropriate measure and in accordance with the public good; then, to collect them; and finally, to spend them in a manner conducive to the welfare of the Muslims.
Thus, you see that the fiscal provisions of Islam also point to the necessity for establishing a government, for they cannot be fulfilled without the establishment of the appropriate Islamic institutions.
The ordinances pertaining to preservation of the Islamic system and defense of the territorial integrity and independence of the Islamic ummah[74] also demanded the formation of a government. An example is the command: “Prepare against them whatever force you can muster and horses tethered” (Qur’an, 8:60), which enjoins the preparation of as much armed defensive force as possible and orders the Muslims to be always on the alert and at the ready, even in time of peace.
If the Muslims had acted in accordance with this command, and after forming a government, made the necessary extensive preparations to be in a state of full readiness for war, a handful of Jews would never have dared to occupy our lands and to burn and destroy the Masjid al-Aqsā[75] without the people’sbeing capable of making an immediate response. All this has resulted from the failure of the Muslims to fulfill their duty of executing God’s law and setting up a righteous and respectable government. If the rulers of the Muslim countries truly represented the believers and enacted God’s ordinances, they would set aside their petty differences, abandon their subversive and divisive activities, and join together like the fingers of one hand. Then a handful of wretched Jews (the agents of America, Britain and other foreign powers) would never have been able to accomplish what they have, no matter how much support they enjoyed from America and Britain. All this has happened because of the incompetence of those who rule over the Muslims.
The verse: “Prepare against them whatever force you can muster” commands you to be as strong and well-prepared as possible, so that your enemies will be unable to oppress you and transgress against you. It is because we have been lacking in unity, strength, and preparedness that we suffer oppression and are at the mercy of foreign aggressors.
There are numerous provisions of the law that cannot be implemented without the establishment of a government apparatus; for example, blood money, which must be exacted and delivered to those deserving it, or the corporeal penalties imposed by the law, which must be carried out under the supervision of the Islamic ruler. All of these laws refer back to the institutions of government for it is the government power alone that is capable of fulfilling this function.
After the death of the Most Noble Messenger (s), the obstinate enemies of the faith, the Umayyads[76] (God’s curses be upon them), did not permit the Islamic state to attain stability with the rule of ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a). They did not allow a form of government to exist that was pleasing to God, Exalted and Almighty, and to His Most Noble Messenger (s). They transformed the entire basis of government, and their policies were, for the most part, contradictory to Islam. The form of government of the Umayyads and the Abbasids,[77] and the political and administrative policies they pursued, were anti-Islamic. The form of government was thoroughly perverted by being transformed into a monarchy, like those of the kings of Iran, the emperors of Rome, and the pharaohs of Egypt. For the most part, this non-Islamic form of government has persisted to the present day, as we can see.
Both law and reason require that we not permit governments to retain this non-Islamic or anti-Islamic character. The proofs are clear. First, the existence of a non-Islamic political order necessarily results in the non-implementation of the Islamic political order. Then, all non-Islamic systems of government are the systems of kufr[78] since the ruler in each case is an instance of tāghūt,[79] and it is our duty to remove from the life of Muslim society all traces of kufr and destroy them. It is also our duty to create a favorable social environment for the education of believing and virtuous individuals, an environment that is in total contradiction with that produced by the rule of tāghūt and illegitimate power. The social environment created by tāghūt and shirk[80] invariably brings about corruption such as you can observe now in Iran, the same corruption termed “corruption on earth.”[81] This corruption must be swept away, and its instigators should be punished for their deeds. It is the same corruption that the Pharaoh generated in Egypt with his policies, so that the Qur’an says of him, “Truly, he was among the corruptors” (28:4). A believing, pious, just individual cannot possibly exist in a socio-political environment of this nature, and still maintain his faith and righteous conduct. He is faced with two choices: either he commits acts that amount to kufr and contradict righteousness, or in order not to commit such acts and not to submit to the orders and commands of tāghūt, the just individual opposes him and struggles against him in order to destroy the environment of corruption. We have in reality, then, no choice but to destroy those systems of government that are corrupt in themselves and also entail the corruption of others, and to overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes.
This is a duty that all Muslims must fulfill, in every one of the Muslim countries, in order to achieve the triumphant political revolution of Islam.
We see, too, that together, the imperialists and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers have divided the Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic ummah from each other and artificially created separate nations. There once existed the great Ottoman State, and that, too, the imperialists divided. Russia, Britain, Austria, and other imperialist powers united, and through wars against the Ottomans, each came to occupy or absorb into its sphere of influence, part of the Ottoman realm. It is true that most of the Ottoman rulers were incompetent, that some of them were corrupt, and that they followed the monarchical system. Nonetheless, the existence of the Ottoman State represented a threat to the imperialists. It was always possible that righteous individuals might rise up among the people and, with their assistance, seize control of the state, thus putting an end to imperialism by mobilizing the unified resources of the nation. Therefore after numerous prior wars, the imperialists at the end of World War I divided the Ottoman State, creating in its territories about ten or fifteen petty states.[82] Then each of these was entrusted to one of their servants or a group of their servants, although certain countries were later able to escape the grasp of the agents of imperialism.
In order to assure the unity of the Islamic ummah, in order to liberate the Islamic homeland from occupation and penetration by the imperialists and their puppet governments, it is imperative that we establish a government. In order to attain the unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government of justice that will be in the service of the people. The formation of such a government will serve to preserve the disciplined unity of the Muslims; just as Fātimah az-Zahrā[83] (‘a) said in her address: “The Imamate exists for the sake of preserving order among the Muslims and replacing their disunity with unity”.
Through the political agents they have placed in power over the people, the imperialists have imposed on us an unjust economic order, and thereby divided our people into two groups: oppressors and oppressed. Hundreds of millions of Muslims are hungry and deprived of all forms of health care and education, while minorities comprised of the wealthy and powerful live a life of indulgence, licentiousness, and corruption. The hungry and deprived have constantly struggled to free themselves from the oppression of their plundering overlords, and their struggle continues to this day. But their way is blocked by the ruling minorities and the oppressive governmental structures they head. It is our duty to save the oppressed and deprived. It is our duty to be a helper to the oppressed, and an enemy to the oppressor. This is nothing other than the duty that the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) entrusted to his two great offspring[84] in his celebrated testament: “Be an enemy to the oppressor and a helper to the oppressed.”[85]
The scholars of Islam have a duty to struggle against all attempts by oppressors to establish a monopoly over the sources of wealth or to make illicit use of them. They must not allow the masses to remain hungry and deprived while plundering oppressors usurp the sources of wealth and live in opulence. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) says: “I have accepted the task of government because God, Exalted and Almighty, has exacted from the scholars of Islam a pledge not to sit silent and idle in the face of gluttony and plundering of the oppressors, on the one hand, and the hunger and deprivation of the oppressed, on the other.” Here is the full text of the passage we refer to:
“I swear by Him Who causes the seed to open and creates the souls of all living things that were it not for the presence of those who have come to swear allegiance to me, were it not for the obligation of rulership now imposed upon me by the availability of aid and support, and were it not for the pledge that God has taken from the scholars of Islam not to remain silent in the face of the gluttony and plundering of the oppressors, on the one hand, and the harrowing hunger and deprivation of the oppressed, on the other hand---were it not for all of this, then I would abandon the reins of government and in no way seek it. You would see that this world of yours, with all of its position and rank, is less in my eyes than the moisture that comes from the sneeze of a goat.”[86]
How can we stay silent and idle today when we see that a band of traitors and usurpers, the agents of foreign powers, have appropriated the wealth and the fruits of labor of hundreds of millions of Muslims—thanks to the support of their masters and through the power of the bayonet—granting the Muslim not the least right to prosperity? It is the duty of Islamic scholars and all Muslims to put an end to this system of oppression and, for the sake of the well-being of hundreds of millions of human beings, to overthrow these oppressive governments and form an Islamic government.
Reason, the laws of Islam, and the practice of the Prophet (s), and that of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), the purport of various Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions—all indicate the necessity of forming a government. As an example of the traditions of the Imāms, I now quote the following tradition of Imām Ridā[87] (‘a):
‘Abd al-Wāhid ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abdus an-Neyshābūri al-‘Attār said: “I was told by Abū ’l-Hasan ‘Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Qutayba an-Neyshābūri that he was told by Abū Muhammad al-Fadl ibn Shadhan an-Neyshābūri this tradition. If someone asks, ‘Why has God, the All-Wise, appointed the holders of authority and commanded us to obey them?’ then we answer, ‘For numerous reasons. One reason is this: Men are commanded to observe certain limits and not to transgress them in order to avoid the corruption that would result. This cannot be attained or established without there being appointed over them a trustee who will ensure that they remain within the limits of the licit and prevent them from casting themselves into the danger of transgression. Were it not for such a trustee, no one would abandon his own pleasure and benefit because of the corruption it might entail for another. Another reason is that we find no group or nation of men that ever existed without a ruler and leader, since it is required by both religion and worldly interest. It would not be compatible with divine wisdom to leave mankind to its own devices, for He, the All-Wise, knows that men need a ruler for their survival. It is through the leadership he provides that men make war against their enemies, divide among themselves the spoils of war, and preserve their communal solidarity, preventing the oppression of the oppressed by the oppressor.
“A further reason is this: were God not to appoint over men a solicitous, trustworthy, protecting, reliable leader, the community would decline, religion would depart, and the norms and ordinances that have been revealed would undergo change. Innovators would increase and deniers would erode religion, inducing doubt in the Muslims. For we see that men are needy and defective, judging by their differences of opinion and inclination and their diversity of state. Were a trustee, then, not appointed to preserve what has been revealed through the Prophet (s), corruption would ensue in the manner we have described. Revealed laws, norms, ordinances, and faith would be altogether changed, and therein would lie the corruption of all mankind.”[88]
We have omitted the first part of the hadīth, which pertains to prophethood, a topic not germane to our present discussion. What interests us at present is the second half, which I will now paraphrase for you.
If someone should ask you, “Why has God, the All-Wise, appointed holders of authority and commanded you to obey them?” you should answer him as follows: “He has done so for various causes and reasons. One is that men have been set upon a certain well- defined path, and commanded not to stray from it, nor to transgress against the established limits and norms, for if they were to stray, they would fall prey to corruption. Now men would not be able to keep to their ordained path and to enact God’s laws unless a trustworthy and protective individual (or power) were appointed over them with responsibility for this matter, to prevent them from stepping outside the sphere of the licit and transgressing against the rights of others. If no such restraining individual or power were appointed, nobody would voluntarily abandon any pleasure or interest of his own that might result in harm or corruption to others; everybody would engage in oppressing and harming others for the sake of his own pleasures and interests.
“Another reason and cause is this: we do not see a single group, nation, or religious community that has ever been able to exist without an individual entrusted with the maintenance of its laws and institutions—in short, a head or a leader; for such a person is essential for fulfilling the affairs of religion and the world. It is not permissible, therefore, according to divine wisdom that God should leave men, His creatures, without a leader and guide, for He knows well that they depend on the existence of such a person for their own survival and perpetuation. It is under his leadership that they fight against their enemies, divide the public income among themselves, perform Friday and other congregational prayers and foreshorten the arms of the transgressors who would encroach on the rights of the oppressed.
“Another proof and cause is this: were God not to appoint an Imām over men to maintain law and order, to serve the people faithfully as a vigilant trustee, religion would fall victim to obsolescence and decay. Its rites and institutions would vanish; the customs and ordinances of Islam would be transformed or even deformed. Heretical innovators would add things to religion and atheists and unbelievers would subtract things from it, presenting it to the Muslims in an inaccurate manner. For we see that men are prey to defects; they are not perfect, and must need to strive for perfection. Moreover, they disagree with each other, having varying inclinations and discordant states. If God, therefore, had not appointed over men one who would maintain order and law and protect the revelation brought by the Prophet (s), in the manner we have described, men would have fallen prey to corruption; the institutions, laws, customs, and ordinances of Islam would be transformed; and faith and its content would be completely changed, resulting in the corruption of all humanity.”
As you can deduce from the words of the Imām (‘a), there are numerous proofs and causes that necessitate formation of a government, and establishment of an authority. These proofs, causes, and arguments are not temporary in their validity or limited to a particular time, and the necessity for the formation of a government, therefore, is perpetual. For example, it will always happen that men overstep the limits laid down by Islam and transgress against the rights of others for the sake of their personal pleasure and benefit. It cannot be asserted that such was the case only in the time of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), and that afterwards, men became angels. The wisdom of the Creator has decreed that men should live in accordance with justice and act within the limits set by divine law. This wisdom is eternal and immutable, and constitutes one of the norms of God Almighty. Today and always, therefore, the existence of a holder of authority, a ruler who acts as trustee and maintains the institutions and laws of Islam, is a necessity—a ruler who prevents cruelty, oppression, and violation of the rights of others; who is a trustworthy and vigilant guardian of God’s creatures; who guides men to the teachings, doctrines, laws, and institutions of Islam; and who prevents the undesirable changes that atheists and the enemies of religion wish to introduce in the laws and institutions of Islam. Did not the caliphate of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) serve this purpose? The same factors of necessity that led him to become the Imām still exist; the only difference is that no single individual has been designated for the task.[89] The principle of the necessity of government has been made a general one, so that it will always remain in effect.
If the ordinances of Islam are to remain in effect, then, if encroachment by oppressive ruling classes on the rights of the weak is to be prevented, if ruling minorities are not to be permitted to plunder and corrupt the people for the sake of pleasure and material interest, if the Islamic order is to be preserved and all individuals are to pursue the just path of Islam without any deviation, if innovations and the approval of anti-Islamic laws by sham parliaments[90] are to be prevented, if the influence of foreign powers in the Islamic lands is to be destroyed—government is necessary. None of these aims can be achieved without government and the organs of the state. It is a righteous government, of course, that is needed; one presided over by a ruler who will be a trustworthy and righteous trustee. Those who presently govern us are of no use at all for they are tyrannical, corrupt, and highly incompetent.
In the past, we did not act in concert and unanimity in order to establish proper government and overthrow treacherous and corrupt rulers. Some people were apathetic and reluctant even to discuss the theory of Islamic government, and some went so far as to praise oppressive rulers. It is for this reason that we find ourselves in the present state. The influence and sovereignty of Islam in society have declined; the nation of Islam has fallen victim to division and weakness; the laws of Islam have remained in abeyance and been subjected to change and modification; and the imperialists have propagated foreign laws and alien culture among the Muslims through their agents for the sake of their evil purposes, causing people to be infatuated with the West. It was our lack of a leader, a guardian, and our lack of institutions of leadership that made all this possible. We need righteous and proper organs of government; that much is self-evident.
Notes:
[61] Valī-yi Amr: “the one who holds authority,” a term derived from Qur’an, 4:59: “O you who believe! Obey God, and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority
#363;li ’l-amr) from among you.” For commentary of this verse, see Mīr Ahmad ‘Ali, The Holy Qur’an (NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 1988), http://www.al-islam.org/quran (Pub.)
[62] Sunnah: the practice of the Prophet, accepted by Muslims as the norm and ideal for all human behavior.
[63] See, for example, Sūrah Ibrāhīm (14:52), Sūrah Yūnus (10:2), Sūrah al-Hājj (22:49), Sūrah al-Ahzāb (33:40), and Sūrah Yā-Sīn (36:70). (Pub.)
[64] Lesser Occultation: ghaybat-i sughrah, the period of about 70 years (260/872-329/939) when, according to Shī‘i belief, Muhammad al-Mahdi, the Twelfth Imām, absented himself from the physical plane but remained in communication with his followers through a succession of four appointed deputies, viz., ‘Uthmān ibn Sa‘īd, Muhammad ibn ‘Uthmān, Husayn ibn Rūh, and ‘Ali ibn Muhammad. At the death of the fourth deputies no successor was named, and the Greater Occultation (ghaybat-i kubrah) began, and continues to this day. See Muhammad Bāqir as-Sadr and Murtadā Mutahhari, Awaited Saviour (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications), http://www.islam.org/saviour/index.htm; Muhammad Bāqir as-Sadr, An Inquiry Concerning Al-Mahdi (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Jassim M. Husain, The Occultation of the Twelfth Imām: A Historical Background (London: Muhammadi Trust, 1982); Ibrāhīm Amīni, Al-Imām Al-Mahdī: The Just Leader of Humanity, trans. ‘Abdul ‘Azīz Sachedina (Qum: Ansariyan Publications), http://www.al-islam.org/mahdi/nontl/index.htm. (Pub.)
[65] The allusion is probably to the Bahā’is, who claim to have received a succession of post-Qur’anic revelations.
[66] Jizyah: a tax levied on non-Muslim citizens of the Muslim state in exchange for the protection they receive and in lieu of the taxes, such as zakāt, that only Muslims pay. Kharaj: a tax levied on certain categories of land. Khums: a tax consisting of one-fifth of agricultural and commercial profits (see p. 24 and Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, Khums, http://www.al-islam.org/beliefs/practices/khums.html). Zakāt: the tax levied on various categories of wealth and spent on the purposes specified in Qur’an, 9:60. (Pub.)
[67] Al-Kāfi: more fully, Al-Kāfi fī ’l Hadīth,one of the most important Shī‘i collections of hadīth, compiled by Shaykh Abū Ja‘far Muhammad ibn Ya‘qūb al-Kulayni (d. 329/941). This treatise consists of 34 books, 326 sections, and over 16,000 ahādīth. Two fascicules of this work have been translated into English by Sayyid Muhammad Hasan Rizvi and published by the Tehran-based World Organization for Islamic Services (WOFIS), http://www.wofis.com, e-mail: این آدرس ایمیل توسط spambots حفاظت می شود. برای دیدن شما نیاز به جاوا اسکریپت دارید. (Pub.)
[68] Usūl al-Kāfi, Book of “Virtues of Knowledge,” vol. 1, pp. 76-80. (Pub.)
[69] Qur’an, 16:89.
[70] The reference is probably to Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq, whose sayings on this subject are quoted by ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’i in al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān (Beirut, 1390/1979), XII, 327-328. First eight volumes of ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’i’s Al-Mīzān has been translated into English by Sayyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi and published by the WOFIS. (Pub.)
[71] Sayyids: the descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fātimah and son-in-law ‘Ali, the first of the Twelve Imāms.
[72] Zakāt would not represent an appreciable sum presumably because it is levied on surplus wealth, the accumulation of which is inhibited by the economic system of Islam.
[73] Ahl adh-Dhimmah: non-Muslim citizens of the Muslim state, whose rights and obligations are contractually determined.
[74] Ummah: the entire Islamic community, without territorial or ethnic distinction.
[75] Masjid al-Aqsā: the site in Jerusalem where the Prophet ascended to heaven in the eleventh year of his mission (Qur’an, 17:1); also the complex of mosques and buildings erected on the site. The chief of these was extensively damaged by arson in 1969, two years after the Zionist usurpation of Jerusalem.
[76] Umayyads: descendants of ‘Umayyah ibn ‘Abdu Shams ibn ‘Abdu Manāf from the Quraysh tribe, and members of the dynasty that ruled at Damascus from 41/632 until 132/750 and transformed the caliphate into a hereditary institution. Mu‘āwiyah, ibn Abū Sufyān frequently mentioned in these pages, was the first of the Umayyad line. This kingdom ended with the murder of Marwān II, the last Umayyad caliph. (Pub.)
[77] Abbasids: offspring of ‘Abbās ibn ‘Abdul Muttalib, uncle of the Holy Prophet (s), and the dynasty that replaced the Umayyads and established a new caliphal capital in Baghdad. This dynastic rule began in 132/750 with the caliphate of ‘Abdullāh as-Saffāh. With the rise of various local rulers, generally of military origin, the power of the Abbasids began to decline from the fourth/tenth century and it was brought to an end by the Mongol conquest in 656/1258. (Pub.)
[78] Kufr: the rejection of divine guidance; the antithesis of Islam.
[79] Tāghūt: one who surpasses all bounds in his despotism and tyranny and claims the prerogatives of divinity for himself, whether explicitly or implicitly. See also p. 78-79.
[80] Shirk: the assignment of partners to God, either by believing in a multiplicity of gods, or by assigning divine attributes and prerogatives to other-than-God.
[81] “Corruption on earth”: a broad term including not only moral corruption, but also subversion of the public good, embezzlement and usurpation of public wealth, conspiring with the enemies of the community against its security, and working in general for the overthrow of the Islamic order. See the commentary on Qur’an, 5:33 in Tabātabā’i’s, al-Mīzān, V, 330-332.
[82] It may be apposite to quote here the following passage from a secret report drawn up in January 1916 by Thomas E. Lawrence, the British organizer of the so-called Arab revolt led by Sharīf Husayn of Mecca: “Husayn’s activity seems beneficial to us, because it matches with our immediate aims, the breakup of the Islamic bloc and the defeat and disruption of the Ottoman Empire…. The Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. If properly handled they would remain in a state of political mosaic, a tissue of small jealous principalities incapable of political cohesion.” See Philip Knightley and Colin Simpson, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia (New York, 1971), p. 55.
[83] Fātimah az-Zahrā: Fātimah, the daughter of the Prophet and wife of Imām ‘Ali. For her biography, see Fātimah the Gracious (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[84] I.e., Hasan and Husayn.
[85] Nahj al-Balāghah, Letter 47. See English translation of Nahj al-Balāghah, Peak of Eloquence with commentary and its original Arabic text (Qum: Ansariyan Publications), http://www.al-islam.org/nahjul/index.htm. (Pub.)
[86] Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 3 (The famous Shaqshaqiyyah Sermon).See Nahj al-Balāghah, ed. Subhi as-Sālih. (Pub.)
[87] Imām Ridā: eighth of the Twelve Imāms, born in 148/765 and died in 203/817 in Tūs (Mashhad). He was poisoned by the Abbasid caliph Ma’mūn, who had appointed him as his successor at first, but then grew fearful of the wide following he commanded (see p. 137). His shrine in Mashhad is one of the principal centers of pilgrimage and religious learning in Iran. See Bāqir Sharīf al-Qarashi, The Life of Imām ‘Ali bin Mūsā al-Ridā, trans. Jāsim al-Rasheed (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Muhammad Jawād Fadlallāh, Imam al-Ridā: A Historical and Biographical Research, trans. Yāsīn T. al-Jibouri, http://www.al-islam.org/al-rida/index.html; Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Dīn, “Al-Imām ar-Ridā (‘a) and the Heir Apparency,” At-Tawhīd Journal, http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/heir.htm. (Pub.)
[88] The text of this tradition can be found in Shaykh Sadūq, ‘Ilal ash-Sharāi‘ (Qum, 1378/1958), I, sec. 182, hadīth 9, p. 251. (Pub.)
[89] That is, in the absence of the Imām or an individual deputy named by him (as was the case during the Lesser Occultation), the task devolves upon the fuqahā as a class. See argument on pp. 44-112.
[90] Here the allusion may be in particular to the so-called Family Protection Law of 1967, which Imām Khomeini denounced as contrary to Islam in an important ruling. See Imām Khomeini, Tauzih al-Masā’il, n.p., n.d., pp. 462-463, par. 2836, and p. 441.
Written by The Late Imam Khomeini (R.A.)
Translated by Prof. Hamid Algar
Source: Imam reza network

The Necessity for Islamic Government

A body of laws alone is not sufficient for a society to be reformed. In order for law to ensure the reform and happiness of man, there must be an executive power and an executor. For this reason, God Almighty, in addition to revealing a body of law (i.e., the ordinances of the sharī‘ah), has laid down a particular form of government together with executive and administrative institution.
The Most Noble Messenger (s) headed the executive and administrative institutions of Muslim society. In addition to conveying the revelation and expounding and interpreting the articles of faith and the ordinances and institutions of Islam, he undertook the implementation of law and the establishment of the ordinances of Islam, thereby, bringing into being the Islamic state. He did not content himself with the promulgation of law; rather, he implemented it at the same time, cutting off hands and administering lashings, and stonings. After the Most Noble Messenger (s), his successor had the same duty and function. When the Prophet (s) appointed a successor, it was not only for the purpose of expounding articles of faith and law; it was for the implementation of law and the execution of God’s ordinances. It was this function—the execution of law and the establishment of Islamic institutions—that made the appointment of a successor such an important matter that the Prophet (s) would have failed to fulfill his mission if he had neglected it. For after the Prophet (s), the Muslims still needed someone to execute laws and establish the institution of Islam in society, so that they might attain happiness in this world and the hereafter.
By their nature, in fact, laws and social institutions require the existence of an executor. It has always and everywhere been the case that legislation alone has little benefit: legislation by itself cannot assure the well-being of man. After the establishment of legislation, an executive power must come into being, a power that implements the laws and the verdicts given by the courts, thus allowing people to benefit from the laws and the just sentences the courts deliver. Islam has therefore established an executive power in the same way that it has brought laws into being. The person who holds this executive power is known as the valī-yi amr.[61]
The Sunnah[62] and path of the Prophet (s) constitute a proof of the necessity for establishing government. First, he himself established a government, as history testifies. He engaged in the implementation of laws, the establishment of the ordinances of Islam, and the administration of society. He sent out governors to different regions; both sat in judgment himself and also appointed judges; dispatched emissaries to foreign states, tribal chieftains, and kings; concluded treaties and pacts; and took command in battle. In short, he fulfilled all the functions of government. Second, he designated a ruler to succeed him, in accordance with divine command. If God Almighty, through the Prophet (s), designated a man who was to rule over Muslim society after him, this is in itself an indication that government remains a necessity after the departure of the Prophet from this world. Again, since the Most Noble Messenger (s) promulgated the divine command through his act of appointing a successor, he also, implicitly stated the necessity for establishing a government.
It is self-evident that the necessity for enactment of the law, which necessitated the formation of a government by the Prophet (s), was confined or restricted to his time, but continues after his departure from this world. According to one of the noble verses of the Qur’an, the ordinances of Islam are not limited with respect to time or place; they are permanent and must be enacted until the end of time.[63] They were not revealed merely for the time of the Prophet, only to be abandoned thereafter, with retribution and the penal code no longer be enacted, or the taxes prescribed by Islam no longer collected, and the defense of the lands and people of Islam suspended. The claim that the laws of Islam may remain in abeyance or are restricted to a particular time or place is contrary to the essential creedal bases of Islam. Since enactment of laws, then, is necessary after the departure of the Prophet from this world, and indeed, will remain so until the end of time, the formation of a government and the establishment of executive and administrative organs are also necessary. Without the formation of a government and the establishment of such organs to ensure that through enactment of the law, all activities of the individual take place in the framework of a just system, chaos and anarchy will prevail and social, intellectual and moral corruption will arise. The only way to prevent the emergence of anarchy and disorder and to protect society from corruption is to form a government and thus impart order to all the affairs of the country.
Both reason and divine law, then, demonstrate the necessity in our time for what was necessary during the lifetime of the Prophet (s) and the age of the Commander of the Faithful, ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a)—namely the formation of a government and the establishment of executive and administrative organs.
In order to clarify the matter further, let us pose the following question. From the time of the Lesser Occultation[64] down to the present (a period of more than twelve centuries that may continue for hundreds of millennia if it is not appropriate for the Occulted Imām to manifest himself), is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast aside and remain unexecuted, so that everyone acts as he pleases and anarchy prevails? Were the laws that the Prophet of Islam labored so hard for twenty-three years to set forth, promulgate, and execute valid only for a limited period of time? Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation? Anyone who believes so, or voices such a belief, is worse situated than the person who believes and proclaims that Islam has been superseded or abrogated by another supposed revelation.[65]
No one can say it is no longer necessary to defend the frontiers and the territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland; that taxes such as the jizyah, kharāj, khums, and zakāt[66] should no longer be collected; that the penal code of Islam, with its provisions for the payment of blood money and the exacting of requital, should be suspended. Any person who claims that the formation of an Islamic government is not necessary implicitly denies the necessity for the implementation of Islamic law, the universality and comprehensiveness of that law, and the eternal validity of the faith itself.
After the death of the Most Noble Messenger (s), none of the Muslims doubted the necessity for government. No one said: “We no longer need a government”. No one was heard to say anything of the kind. There was unanimous agreement concerning the necessity for government. There was disagreement only as to which person should assume responsibility for government and head the state. Government, therefore, was established after the Prophet (s), both in the time of the caliphs and in that of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a); an apparatus of government came into existence with administrative and executive organs.
The nature and character of Islamic law and the divine ordinances of the sharī‘ah furnish additional proof of the necessity for establishing government, for they indicate that the laws were laid down for the purpose of creating a state and administering the political, economic and cultural affairs of society.
Firstly, the laws of the sharī‘ah embrace a diverse body of laws and regulation, which amounts to a complete social system. In this system of laws, all the needs of man have been met: his dealings with his neighbors, fellow citizens, and clan, as well as children and relatives; the concerns of private and marital life; regulations concerning war and peace and intercourse with other nations; penal and commercial law; and regulations pertaining to trade, industry and agriculture. Islamic law contains provisions relating to the preliminaries of marriage and the form in which it should be contracted, and others relating to the development of the embryo in the womb, and what food the parents should eat at the time of conception. It further stipulates the duties that are incumbent upon them while the infant is being suckled, and specifies how the child should be reared, and how the husband and the wife should relate to each other and to their children. Islam provides laws and instructions for all of these matters, aiming, as it does, to produce integrated and virtuous human beings who are walking embodiments of the law, or to put it differently, the law’s voluntary and instinctive executors. It is obvious, then, how much care Islam devotes to government and the political and economic relations of society, with goal of creating conditions conducive to the production of morally upright and virtuous human beings.
The Glorious Qur’an and the Sunnah contain all the laws and ordinances man needs in order to attain happiness and the perfection of his state. The book al-Kāfi[67]has a chapter entitled, “All the Needs of Men Are Set Out in the Book and the Sunnah,”[68] the “Book” meaning the Qur’an, which is, in its own words, “an exposition of all things.”[69]According to certain traditions, the Imām[70] also swears that the Book and the Sunnah contain without a doubt all that men need.
Second, if we examine closely the nature and character of the provisions of the law, we realize that their execution and implementation depend upon the formation of a government, and that it is impossible to fulfill the duty of executing God’s commands without there being established properly comprehensive administrative and executive organs. Let us now mention certain types of provisions in order to illustrate this point; the others you can examine yourselves.
The taxes Islam levies and the form of budget it has established are not merely for the sake of providing subsistence to the poor or feeding the indigent among the descendants of the Prophet (s); they are also intended to make possible, the establishment of a great government and to assure its essential expenditures.
For example, khums is a huge source of income that accrues to the treasury and represents one item in the budget. According to our Shī‘i school of thought, khums is to be levied in an equitable manner on all agricultural and commercial profits and all natural resources whether above or below the ground—in short, on all forms of wealth and income. It applies equally to the greengrocer with his stall outside this mosque, and to the shipping or mining magnate. They must all pay one-fifth of their surplus income, after customary expenses are deducted, to the Islamic ruler, so that it enters the treasury. It is obvious that such a huge income serves the purpose of administering the Islamic state and meeting all its financial needs. If we were to calculate one-fifth of the surplus income of all the Muslim countries (or of the whole world, should it enter the fold of Islam), it would become fully apparent that the purpose for the imposition of such a tax is not merely the upkeep of the sayyids[71] or the religious scholars, but on the contrary, something far more significant—namely, meeting the financial needs of the great organs and institutions of government. If an Islamic government is achieved, it will have to be administered on the basis of the taxes that Islam has established—khums, zakāt (this, of course, would not represent an appreciable sum)[72] jizyah, and kharāj.
How could the sayyids ever need so vast a budget? The khums of the bazaar of Baghdad would be enough for the needs of the sayyids and the upkeep of the religious teaching institution, as well as all the poor of the Islamic world, quite apart from the khums of the bazaars of Tehran, Istanbul, Cairo, and other cities. The provision of such a huge budget must obviously be for the purpose of forming a government and administering the Islamic lands. It was established with the aim of providing for the needs of the people, for public services relating to health, education, defense, and economic development. Further, in accordance with theprocedures laid down by Islam for the collection, preservation, and expenditure of this income, all forms of usurpation and embezzlement of public wealth have been forbidden; so that the head of state and all those entrusted with responsibility for conducting public affairs (i.e., members of the government) have no privileges over the ordinary citizen in benefiting from the public income and wealth; all have an equal share.
Now, should we cast this huge treasury into the ocean, or bury it until the Imām returns,or just spend it on fifty sayyids a day until they have all eaten their fill? Let us suppose we give all this money to 500,000 sayyids; they would not know what to do with it. We all know that the sayyids and the poor have a claim on the public treasury only to the extent required for subsistence. The budget of the Islamic state is constructed in such a way that every source of income is allocated to specific types of expenditures. Zakāt, voluntary contributions and charitable donations, and khums are all levied and spent separately. There is a hadīth to the effect that at the end of the year, sayyids must return any surplus from what they have received to the Islamic ruler, just as the ruler must aid them if they are in need.
The jizyah, which is imposed on the ahl adh-dhimmah,[73] and the kharāj, which is levied on agricultural land, represent two additional sources of considerable income. The establishment of these taxes also proves that the existence of a ruler and a government is necessary. It is the duty of a ruler or governor to assess the poll tax to be levied on the ahl adh-dhimmah in accordance with their income and financial capacity, and to fix appropriate taxes on their arable lands and livestock. He must also collect the kharāj on those broad lands that are the “property of God” and in the possession of the Islamic state. This task requires the existence of orderly institutions, rules and regulations, and administrative procedures and policies; it cannot be fulfilled in the absence of order. It is the responsibility of those in charge of the Islamic state, first, to assess the taxes in due and appropriate measure and in accordance with the public good; then, to collect them; and finally, to spend them in a manner conducive to the welfare of the Muslims.
Thus, you see that the fiscal provisions of Islam also point to the necessity for establishing a government, for they cannot be fulfilled without the establishment of the appropriate Islamic institutions.
The ordinances pertaining to preservation of the Islamic system and defense of the territorial integrity and independence of the Islamic ummah[74] also demanded the formation of a government. An example is the command: “Prepare against them whatever force you can muster and horses tethered” (Qur’an, 8:60), which enjoins the preparation of as much armed defensive force as possible and orders the Muslims to be always on the alert and at the ready, even in time of peace.
If the Muslims had acted in accordance with this command, and after forming a government, made the necessary extensive preparations to be in a state of full readiness for war, a handful of Jews would never have dared to occupy our lands and to burn and destroy the Masjid al-Aqsā[75] without the people’sbeing capable of making an immediate response. All this has resulted from the failure of the Muslims to fulfill their duty of executing God’s law and setting up a righteous and respectable government. If the rulers of the Muslim countries truly represented the believers and enacted God’s ordinances, they would set aside their petty differences, abandon their subversive and divisive activities, and join together like the fingers of one hand. Then a handful of wretched Jews (the agents of America, Britain and other foreign powers) would never have been able to accomplish what they have, no matter how much support they enjoyed from America and Britain. All this has happened because of the incompetence of those who rule over the Muslims.
The verse: “Prepare against them whatever force you can muster” commands you to be as strong and well-prepared as possible, so that your enemies will be unable to oppress you and transgress against you. It is because we have been lacking in unity, strength, and preparedness that we suffer oppression and are at the mercy of foreign aggressors.
There are numerous provisions of the law that cannot be implemented without the establishment of a government apparatus; for example, blood money, which must be exacted and delivered to those deserving it, or the corporeal penalties imposed by the law, which must be carried out under the supervision of the Islamic ruler. All of these laws refer back to the institutions of government for it is the government power alone that is capable of fulfilling this function.
After the death of the Most Noble Messenger (s), the obstinate enemies of the faith, the Umayyads[76] (God’s curses be upon them), did not permit the Islamic state to attain stability with the rule of ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a). They did not allow a form of government to exist that was pleasing to God, Exalted and Almighty, and to His Most Noble Messenger (s). They transformed the entire basis of government, and their policies were, for the most part, contradictory to Islam. The form of government of the Umayyads and the Abbasids,[77] and the political and administrative policies they pursued, were anti-Islamic. The form of government was thoroughly perverted by being transformed into a monarchy, like those of the kings of Iran, the emperors of Rome, and the pharaohs of Egypt. For the most part, this non-Islamic form of government has persisted to the present day, as we can see.
Both law and reason require that we not permit governments to retain this non-Islamic or anti-Islamic character. The proofs are clear. First, the existence of a non-Islamic political order necessarily results in the non-implementation of the Islamic political order. Then, all non-Islamic systems of government are the systems of kufr[78] since the ruler in each case is an instance of tāghūt,[79] and it is our duty to remove from the life of Muslim society all traces of kufr and destroy them. It is also our duty to create a favorable social environment for the education of believing and virtuous individuals, an environment that is in total contradiction with that produced by the rule of tāghūt and illegitimate power. The social environment created by tāghūt and shirk[80] invariably brings about corruption such as you can observe now in Iran, the same corruption termed “corruption on earth.”[81] This corruption must be swept away, and its instigators should be punished for their deeds. It is the same corruption that the Pharaoh generated in Egypt with his policies, so that the Qur’an says of him, “Truly, he was among the corruptors” (28:4). A believing, pious, just individual cannot possibly exist in a socio-political environment of this nature, and still maintain his faith and righteous conduct. He is faced with two choices: either he commits acts that amount to kufr and contradict righteousness, or in order not to commit such acts and not to submit to the orders and commands of tāghūt, the just individual opposes him and struggles against him in order to destroy the environment of corruption. We have in reality, then, no choice but to destroy those systems of government that are corrupt in themselves and also entail the corruption of others, and to overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes.
This is a duty that all Muslims must fulfill, in every one of the Muslim countries, in order to achieve the triumphant political revolution of Islam.
We see, too, that together, the imperialists and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers have divided the Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic ummah from each other and artificially created separate nations. There once existed the great Ottoman State, and that, too, the imperialists divided. Russia, Britain, Austria, and other imperialist powers united, and through wars against the Ottomans, each came to occupy or absorb into its sphere of influence, part of the Ottoman realm. It is true that most of the Ottoman rulers were incompetent, that some of them were corrupt, and that they followed the monarchical system. Nonetheless, the existence of the Ottoman State represented a threat to the imperialists. It was always possible that righteous individuals might rise up among the people and, with their assistance, seize control of the state, thus putting an end to imperialism by mobilizing the unified resources of the nation. Therefore after numerous prior wars, the imperialists at the end of World War I divided the Ottoman State, creating in its territories about ten or fifteen petty states.[82] Then each of these was entrusted to one of their servants or a group of their servants, although certain countries were later able to escape the grasp of the agents of imperialism.
In order to assure the unity of the Islamic ummah, in order to liberate the Islamic homeland from occupation and penetration by the imperialists and their puppet governments, it is imperative that we establish a government. In order to attain the unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government of justice that will be in the service of the people. The formation of such a government will serve to preserve the disciplined unity of the Muslims; just as Fātimah az-Zahrā[83] (‘a) said in her address: “The Imamate exists for the sake of preserving order among the Muslims and replacing their disunity with unity”.
Through the political agents they have placed in power over the people, the imperialists have imposed on us an unjust economic order, and thereby divided our people into two groups: oppressors and oppressed. Hundreds of millions of Muslims are hungry and deprived of all forms of health care and education, while minorities comprised of the wealthy and powerful live a life of indulgence, licentiousness, and corruption. The hungry and deprived have constantly struggled to free themselves from the oppression of their plundering overlords, and their struggle continues to this day. But their way is blocked by the ruling minorities and the oppressive governmental structures they head. It is our duty to save the oppressed and deprived. It is our duty to be a helper to the oppressed, and an enemy to the oppressor. This is nothing other than the duty that the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) entrusted to his two great offspring[84] in his celebrated testament: “Be an enemy to the oppressor and a helper to the oppressed.”[85]
The scholars of Islam have a duty to struggle against all attempts by oppressors to establish a monopoly over the sources of wealth or to make illicit use of them. They must not allow the masses to remain hungry and deprived while plundering oppressors usurp the sources of wealth and live in opulence. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) says: “I have accepted the task of government because God, Exalted and Almighty, has exacted from the scholars of Islam a pledge not to sit silent and idle in the face of gluttony and plundering of the oppressors, on the one hand, and the hunger and deprivation of the oppressed, on the other.” Here is the full text of the passage we refer to:
“I swear by Him Who causes the seed to open and creates the souls of all living things that were it not for the presence of those who have come to swear allegiance to me, were it not for the obligation of rulership now imposed upon me by the availability of aid and support, and were it not for the pledge that God has taken from the scholars of Islam not to remain silent in the face of the gluttony and plundering of the oppressors, on the one hand, and the harrowing hunger and deprivation of the oppressed, on the other hand---were it not for all of this, then I would abandon the reins of government and in no way seek it. You would see that this world of yours, with all of its position and rank, is less in my eyes than the moisture that comes from the sneeze of a goat.”[86]
How can we stay silent and idle today when we see that a band of traitors and usurpers, the agents of foreign powers, have appropriated the wealth and the fruits of labor of hundreds of millions of Muslims—thanks to the support of their masters and through the power of the bayonet—granting the Muslim not the least right to prosperity? It is the duty of Islamic scholars and all Muslims to put an end to this system of oppression and, for the sake of the well-being of hundreds of millions of human beings, to overthrow these oppressive governments and form an Islamic government.
Reason, the laws of Islam, and the practice of the Prophet (s), and that of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), the purport of various Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions—all indicate the necessity of forming a government. As an example of the traditions of the Imāms, I now quote the following tradition of Imām Ridā[87] (‘a):
‘Abd al-Wāhid ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abdus an-Neyshābūri al-‘Attār said: “I was told by Abū ’l-Hasan ‘Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Qutayba an-Neyshābūri that he was told by Abū Muhammad al-Fadl ibn Shadhan an-Neyshābūri this tradition. If someone asks, ‘Why has God, the All-Wise, appointed the holders of authority and commanded us to obey them?’ then we answer, ‘For numerous reasons. One reason is this: Men are commanded to observe certain limits and not to transgress them in order to avoid the corruption that would result. This cannot be attained or established without there being appointed over them a trustee who will ensure that they remain within the limits of the licit and prevent them from casting themselves into the danger of transgression. Were it not for such a trustee, no one would abandon his own pleasure and benefit because of the corruption it might entail for another. Another reason is that we find no group or nation of men that ever existed without a ruler and leader, since it is required by both religion and worldly interest. It would not be compatible with divine wisdom to leave mankind to its own devices, for He, the All-Wise, knows that men need a ruler for their survival. It is through the leadership he provides that men make war against their enemies, divide among themselves the spoils of war, and preserve their communal solidarity, preventing the oppression of the oppressed by the oppressor.
“A further reason is this: were God not to appoint over men a solicitous, trustworthy, protecting, reliable leader, the community would decline, religion would depart, and the norms and ordinances that have been revealed would undergo change. Innovators would increase and deniers would erode religion, inducing doubt in the Muslims. For we see that men are needy and defective, judging by their differences of opinion and inclination and their diversity of state. Were a trustee, then, not appointed to preserve what has been revealed through the Prophet (s), corruption would ensue in the manner we have described. Revealed laws, norms, ordinances, and faith would be altogether changed, and therein would lie the corruption of all mankind.”[88]
We have omitted the first part of the hadīth, which pertains to prophethood, a topic not germane to our present discussion. What interests us at present is the second half, which I will now paraphrase for you.
If someone should ask you, “Why has God, the All-Wise, appointed holders of authority and commanded you to obey them?” you should answer him as follows: “He has done so for various causes and reasons. One is that men have been set upon a certain well- defined path, and commanded not to stray from it, nor to transgress against the established limits and norms, for if they were to stray, they would fall prey to corruption. Now men would not be able to keep to their ordained path and to enact God’s laws unless a trustworthy and protective individual (or power) were appointed over them with responsibility for this matter, to prevent them from stepping outside the sphere of the licit and transgressing against the rights of others. If no such restraining individual or power were appointed, nobody would voluntarily abandon any pleasure or interest of his own that might result in harm or corruption to others; everybody would engage in oppressing and harming others for the sake of his own pleasures and interests.
“Another reason and cause is this: we do not see a single group, nation, or religious community that has ever been able to exist without an individual entrusted with the maintenance of its laws and institutions—in short, a head or a leader; for such a person is essential for fulfilling the affairs of religion and the world. It is not permissible, therefore, according to divine wisdom that God should leave men, His creatures, without a leader and guide, for He knows well that they depend on the existence of such a person for their own survival and perpetuation. It is under his leadership that they fight against their enemies, divide the public income among themselves, perform Friday and other congregational prayers and foreshorten the arms of the transgressors who would encroach on the rights of the oppressed.
“Another proof and cause is this: were God not to appoint an Imām over men to maintain law and order, to serve the people faithfully as a vigilant trustee, religion would fall victim to obsolescence and decay. Its rites and institutions would vanish; the customs and ordinances of Islam would be transformed or even deformed. Heretical innovators would add things to religion and atheists and unbelievers would subtract things from it, presenting it to the Muslims in an inaccurate manner. For we see that men are prey to defects; they are not perfect, and must need to strive for perfection. Moreover, they disagree with each other, having varying inclinations and discordant states. If God, therefore, had not appointed over men one who would maintain order and law and protect the revelation brought by the Prophet (s), in the manner we have described, men would have fallen prey to corruption; the institutions, laws, customs, and ordinances of Islam would be transformed; and faith and its content would be completely changed, resulting in the corruption of all humanity.”
As you can deduce from the words of the Imām (‘a), there are numerous proofs and causes that necessitate formation of a government, and establishment of an authority. These proofs, causes, and arguments are not temporary in their validity or limited to a particular time, and the necessity for the formation of a government, therefore, is perpetual. For example, it will always happen that men overstep the limits laid down by Islam and transgress against the rights of others for the sake of their personal pleasure and benefit. It cannot be asserted that such was the case only in the time of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), and that afterwards, men became angels. The wisdom of the Creator has decreed that men should live in accordance with justice and act within the limits set by divine law. This wisdom is eternal and immutable, and constitutes one of the norms of God Almighty. Today and always, therefore, the existence of a holder of authority, a ruler who acts as trustee and maintains the institutions and laws of Islam, is a necessity—a ruler who prevents cruelty, oppression, and violation of the rights of others; who is a trustworthy and vigilant guardian of God’s creatures; who guides men to the teachings, doctrines, laws, and institutions of Islam; and who prevents the undesirable changes that atheists and the enemies of religion wish to introduce in the laws and institutions of Islam. Did not the caliphate of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) serve this purpose? The same factors of necessity that led him to become the Imām still exist; the only difference is that no single individual has been designated for the task.[89] The principle of the necessity of government has been made a general one, so that it will always remain in effect.
If the ordinances of Islam are to remain in effect, then, if encroachment by oppressive ruling classes on the rights of the weak is to be prevented, if ruling minorities are not to be permitted to plunder and corrupt the people for the sake of pleasure and material interest, if the Islamic order is to be preserved and all individuals are to pursue the just path of Islam without any deviation, if innovations and the approval of anti-Islamic laws by sham parliaments[90] are to be prevented, if the influence of foreign powers in the Islamic lands is to be destroyed—government is necessary. None of these aims can be achieved without government and the organs of the state. It is a righteous government, of course, that is needed; one presided over by a ruler who will be a trustworthy and righteous trustee. Those who presently govern us are of no use at all for they are tyrannical, corrupt, and highly incompetent.
In the past, we did not act in concert and unanimity in order to establish proper government and overthrow treacherous and corrupt rulers. Some people were apathetic and reluctant even to discuss the theory of Islamic government, and some went so far as to praise oppressive rulers. It is for this reason that we find ourselves in the present state. The influence and sovereignty of Islam in society have declined; the nation of Islam has fallen victim to division and weakness; the laws of Islam have remained in abeyance and been subjected to change and modification; and the imperialists have propagated foreign laws and alien culture among the Muslims through their agents for the sake of their evil purposes, causing people to be infatuated with the West. It was our lack of a leader, a guardian, and our lack of institutions of leadership that made all this possible. We need righteous and proper organs of government; that much is self-evident.
Notes:
[61] Valī-yi Amr: “the one who holds authority,” a term derived from Qur’an, 4:59: “O you who believe! Obey God, and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority
#363;li ’l-amr) from among you.” For commentary of this verse, see Mīr Ahmad ‘Ali, The Holy Qur’an (NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 1988), http://www.al-islam.org/quran (Pub.)
[62] Sunnah: the practice of the Prophet, accepted by Muslims as the norm and ideal for all human behavior.
[63] See, for example, Sūrah Ibrāhīm (14:52), Sūrah Yūnus (10:2), Sūrah al-Hājj (22:49), Sūrah al-Ahzāb (33:40), and Sūrah Yā-Sīn (36:70). (Pub.)
[64] Lesser Occultation: ghaybat-i sughrah, the period of about 70 years (260/872-329/939) when, according to Shī‘i belief, Muhammad al-Mahdi, the Twelfth Imām, absented himself from the physical plane but remained in communication with his followers through a succession of four appointed deputies, viz., ‘Uthmān ibn Sa‘īd, Muhammad ibn ‘Uthmān, Husayn ibn Rūh, and ‘Ali ibn Muhammad. At the death of the fourth deputies no successor was named, and the Greater Occultation (ghaybat-i kubrah) began, and continues to this day. See Muhammad Bāqir as-Sadr and Murtadā Mutahhari, Awaited Saviour (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications), http://www.islam.org/saviour/index.htm; Muhammad Bāqir as-Sadr, An Inquiry Concerning Al-Mahdi (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Jassim M. Husain, The Occultation of the Twelfth Imām: A Historical Background (London: Muhammadi Trust, 1982); Ibrāhīm Amīni, Al-Imām Al-Mahdī: The Just Leader of Humanity, trans. ‘Abdul ‘Azīz Sachedina (Qum: Ansariyan Publications), http://www.al-islam.org/mahdi/nontl/index.htm. (Pub.)
[65] The allusion is probably to the Bahā’is, who claim to have received a succession of post-Qur’anic revelations.
[66] Jizyah: a tax levied on non-Muslim citizens of the Muslim state in exchange for the protection they receive and in lieu of the taxes, such as zakāt, that only Muslims pay. Kharaj: a tax levied on certain categories of land. Khums: a tax consisting of one-fifth of agricultural and commercial profits (see p. 24 and Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, Khums, http://www.al-islam.org/beliefs/practices/khums.html). Zakāt: the tax levied on various categories of wealth and spent on the purposes specified in Qur’an, 9:60. (Pub.)
[67] Al-Kāfi: more fully, Al-Kāfi fī ’l Hadīth,one of the most important Shī‘i collections of hadīth, compiled by Shaykh Abū Ja‘far Muhammad ibn Ya‘qūb al-Kulayni (d. 329/941). This treatise consists of 34 books, 326 sections, and over 16,000 ahādīth. Two fascicules of this work have been translated into English by Sayyid Muhammad Hasan Rizvi and published by the Tehran-based World Organization for Islamic Services (WOFIS), http://www.wofis.com, e-mail: این آدرس ایمیل توسط spambots حفاظت می شود. برای دیدن شما نیاز به جاوا اسکریپت دارید. (Pub.)
[68] Usūl al-Kāfi, Book of “Virtues of Knowledge,” vol. 1, pp. 76-80. (Pub.)
[69] Qur’an, 16:89.
[70] The reference is probably to Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq, whose sayings on this subject are quoted by ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’i in al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān (Beirut, 1390/1979), XII, 327-328. First eight volumes of ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’i’s Al-Mīzān has been translated into English by Sayyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi and published by the WOFIS. (Pub.)
[71] Sayyids: the descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fātimah and son-in-law ‘Ali, the first of the Twelve Imāms.
[72] Zakāt would not represent an appreciable sum presumably because it is levied on surplus wealth, the accumulation of which is inhibited by the economic system of Islam.
[73] Ahl adh-Dhimmah: non-Muslim citizens of the Muslim state, whose rights and obligations are contractually determined.
[74] Ummah: the entire Islamic community, without territorial or ethnic distinction.
[75] Masjid al-Aqsā: the site in Jerusalem where the Prophet ascended to heaven in the eleventh year of his mission (Qur’an, 17:1); also the complex of mosques and buildings erected on the site. The chief of these was extensively damaged by arson in 1969, two years after the Zionist usurpation of Jerusalem.
[76] Umayyads: descendants of ‘Umayyah ibn ‘Abdu Shams ibn ‘Abdu Manāf from the Quraysh tribe, and members of the dynasty that ruled at Damascus from 41/632 until 132/750 and transformed the caliphate into a hereditary institution. Mu‘āwiyah, ibn Abū Sufyān frequently mentioned in these pages, was the first of the Umayyad line. This kingdom ended with the murder of Marwān II, the last Umayyad caliph. (Pub.)
[77] Abbasids: offspring of ‘Abbās ibn ‘Abdul Muttalib, uncle of the Holy Prophet (s), and the dynasty that replaced the Umayyads and established a new caliphal capital in Baghdad. This dynastic rule began in 132/750 with the caliphate of ‘Abdullāh as-Saffāh. With the rise of various local rulers, generally of military origin, the power of the Abbasids began to decline from the fourth/tenth century and it was brought to an end by the Mongol conquest in 656/1258. (Pub.)
[78] Kufr: the rejection of divine guidance; the antithesis of Islam.
[79] Tāghūt: one who surpasses all bounds in his despotism and tyranny and claims the prerogatives of divinity for himself, whether explicitly or implicitly. See also p. 78-79.
[80] Shirk: the assignment of partners to God, either by believing in a multiplicity of gods, or by assigning divine attributes and prerogatives to other-than-God.
[81] “Corruption on earth”: a broad term including not only moral corruption, but also subversion of the public good, embezzlement and usurpation of public wealth, conspiring with the enemies of the community against its security, and working in general for the overthrow of the Islamic order. See the commentary on Qur’an, 5:33 in Tabātabā’i’s, al-Mīzān, V, 330-332.
[82] It may be apposite to quote here the following passage from a secret report drawn up in January 1916 by Thomas E. Lawrence, the British organizer of the so-called Arab revolt led by Sharīf Husayn of Mecca: “Husayn’s activity seems beneficial to us, because it matches with our immediate aims, the breakup of the Islamic bloc and the defeat and disruption of the Ottoman Empire…. The Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. If properly handled they would remain in a state of political mosaic, a tissue of small jealous principalities incapable of political cohesion.” See Philip Knightley and Colin Simpson, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia (New York, 1971), p. 55.
[83] Fātimah az-Zahrā: Fātimah, the daughter of the Prophet and wife of Imām ‘Ali. For her biography, see Fātimah the Gracious (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[84] I.e., Hasan and Husayn.
[85] Nahj al-Balāghah, Letter 47. See English translation of Nahj al-Balāghah, Peak of Eloquence with commentary and its original Arabic text (Qum: Ansariyan Publications), http://www.al-islam.org/nahjul/index.htm. (Pub.)
[86] Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 3 (The famous Shaqshaqiyyah Sermon).See Nahj al-Balāghah, ed. Subhi as-Sālih. (Pub.)
[87] Imām Ridā: eighth of the Twelve Imāms, born in 148/765 and died in 203/817 in Tūs (Mashhad). He was poisoned by the Abbasid caliph Ma’mūn, who had appointed him as his successor at first, but then grew fearful of the wide following he commanded (see p. 137). His shrine in Mashhad is one of the principal centers of pilgrimage and religious learning in Iran. See Bāqir Sharīf al-Qarashi, The Life of Imām ‘Ali bin Mūsā al-Ridā, trans. Jāsim al-Rasheed (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Muhammad Jawād Fadlallāh, Imam al-Ridā: A Historical and Biographical Research, trans. Yāsīn T. al-Jibouri, http://www.al-islam.org/al-rida/index.html; Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Dīn, “Al-Imām ar-Ridā (‘a) and the Heir Apparency,” At-Tawhīd Journal, http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/heir.htm. (Pub.)
[88] The text of this tradition can be found in Shaykh Sadūq, ‘Ilal ash-Sharāi‘ (Qum, 1378/1958), I, sec. 182, hadīth 9, p. 251. (Pub.)
[89] That is, in the absence of the Imām or an individual deputy named by him (as was the case during the Lesser Occultation), the task devolves upon the fuqahā as a class. See argument on pp. 44-112.
[90] Here the allusion may be in particular to the so-called Family Protection Law of 1967, which Imām Khomeini denounced as contrary to Islam in an important ruling. See Imām Khomeini, Tauzih al-Masā’il, n.p., n.d., pp. 462-463, par. 2836, and p. 441.
Written by The Late Imam Khomeini (R.A.)
Translated by Prof. Hamid Algar
Source: Imam reza network

The Form of Islamic Government

Islamic government does not correspond to any of the existing forms of government. For example, it is not a tyranny, where the head of state can deal arbitrarily with the property and lives of the people, making use of them as he wills, putting to death anyone he wishes, and enriching anyone he wishes by granting landed estates and distributing the property and holdings of the people. The Most Noble Messenger (s), the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), and the other caliphs did not have such powers. Islamic government is neither tyrannical nor absolute, but constitutional. It is not constitutional in the current sense of the word, i.e., based on the approval of laws in accordance with the opinion of the majority. It is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administering the country, conditions that are set forth in the Noble Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Most Noble Messenger (s). It is the laws and ordinances of Islam comprising this set of conditions that must be observed and practiced. Islamic government may therefore be defined as the rule of divine law over men.
The fundamental difference between Islamic government, on the one hand, and constitutional monarchies and republics, on the other, is this: whereas the representatives of the people or the monarch in such regimes engage in legislation, in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty. The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative power. No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator. It is for this reason that in an Islamic government, a simple planning body takes the place of the legislative assembly that is one of the three branches of government. This body draws up programs for the different ministries in the light of the ordinances of Islam and thereby determines how public services are to be provided across the country.
The body of Islamic laws that exist in the Qur’an and Sunnah has been accepted by the Muslims and recognized by them as worthy of obedience. This consent and acceptance facilitates the task of government and makes it truly belong to the people. In contrast, in a republic or a constitutional monarchy, most of those claiming to be representatives of the majority of people approve anything they wish as law and then impose it on the entire population.
Islamic government is a government of law. In this form of government, sovereignty belongs to God alone and law is His decree and command. The law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government. Everyone, including the Most Noble Messenger (s) and his successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity—the law that has been revealed by God, Almighty and Exalted, and expounded by the tongue of the Qur’an and the Most Noble Messenger (s). If the Prophet (s) assumed the task of divine viceregency upon earth, it was in accordance with divine command. God, Almighty and Exalted, appointed him as His viceregent, “the viceregent of God upon earth”; he did not establish a government on his own initiative in order to be leader of the Muslims. Similarly, when it became apparent that disagreements would probably arise among the Muslims because their acquaintance with the faith was recent and limited, God Almighty charged the Prophet (s), by way of revelation, to clarify the question of succession immediately, there in the middle of the desert. Then the Most Noble Messenger (s), nominated the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) as his successor, in conformity and obedience to the law, not because he was his own son-in-law or had performed certain services, but because, he was acting in obedience to God’s law, as its executor.[91]
In Islam, then, government has the sense of adherence to law; it is law alone that rules over society. Even the limited powers given to the Most Noble Messenger (s) and those exercising rule after him have been conferred upon them by God. Whenever the Prophet (s) expounded a certain matter or promulgated a certain injunction, he did so in obedience to divine law, a law that everyone without exception must obey and adhere to. Divine law obtains both for the leader and the led; the sole law that is valid and imperative to apply is the law of God. Obedience to the Prophet (s) also takes place in accordance with divine decree, for God says: “And obey the Messenger”(Qur’an, 4:59). Obedience to those entrusted with authority is also on the basis of divine decree: “And obey the holders of authority from among you”(Qur’an, 4:59). Individual opinion, even if it be that of the Prophet (s) himself, cannot intervene in matters of divine law; here, all are subject to the will of God.
Islamic government is not a form of monarchy, especially not an imperial one. In that type of government, the rulers are empowered over the property and persons of those they rule and may dispose of them entirely as they wish. Islam has not the slightest connection with this form and method of government. For this reason, we find that in Islamic government, unlike monarchial and imperial regimes, there is not the slightest trace of vast palaces, opulent buildings, servants and retainers, private equerries, adjutants to the heir apparent, and all the other appurtenances of monarchy that consume as much as half of the national budget. You all know how the Prophet (s) lived, the Prophet who was the head of the Islamic state and its ruler. The same mode of life was preserved until the beginning of the Umayyad period. The first two [caliphs] adhered to the Prophet’s (s) example in the outer conduct of their personal lives, even though in other affairs they acted to the contrary, which led to the grave deviations that appeared in the time of ‘Uthmān, the same deviations that have inflicted on us these misfortunes of the present day.[92] In the time of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), the system of government was corrected and a proper form and method of rule were followed. Even though that excellent man ruled over a vast realm that included Iran, Egypt, Hijāz[93] and the Yemen among its provinces, he lived more frugally than the most impoverished of our clergy students. According to tradition, he once bought two tunics, and finding one of them better than the other, he gave the better one to his servant Qanbar. The other he kept for himself, and since its sleeves were too long for him, he tore off the extra portion.[94] In this torn garment, the ruler of a great, populous, and prosperous realm clothed himself.
If this mode of conduct had been preserved, and government had retained its Islamic form, there would have been no monarchy and no empire, no usurpation of the lives and property of the people, no oppression and plunder, no encroachment on the public treasury, no vice and abomination. Most forms of corruption originate with the ruling class, the tyrannical ruling family and the libertines that associate with them. It is these rulers who establish centers of vice and corruption, who build centers of vice and wine-drinking, and spend the income of the religious endowments constructing cinemas.[95]
If it were not for these profligate royal ceremonies,[96] this reckless spending, this constant embezzlement, there would never be any deficit in the national budget forcing us to bow in submission before America and Britain and request aid or a loan from them. Our country has become needy on account of this reckless spending, this endless embezzlement, for are we lacking in oil? Do we have no minerals, no natural resources? We have everything, but this parasitism, this embezzlement, this profligacy—all at the expense of the people and the public treasury—have reduced us to a wretched state. Otherwise he [the Shāh] would not need to go all the way to America and bow down before that ruffian’s desk, begging for help.
In addition, superfluous bureaucracies and the system of file-keeping and paper-shuffling that is enforced in them, all of which are totally alien to Islam, impose further expenditures on our national budget not less in quantity than the illicit expenditures of the first category. This administrative system has nothing to do with Islam. These superfluous formalities, which cause our people nothing but expense, trouble, and delay, have no place in Islam. For example, the method established by Islam for enforcing people’s rights, adjudicating disputes, and executing judgments is at once simple, practical, and swift. When the juridical methods of Islam were applied, the sharī‘ah judge in each town, assisted only by two bailiffs and with only a pen and inkpot at his disposal, would swiftly resolve disputes among people and send them about their business. But now the bureaucratic organization of the Ministry of Justice has attained unimaginable proportions, and is, in addition, quite incapable of producing results.
It is things like these that make our country needy and produce nothing but expense and delay.
The qualifications essential for the ruler drive directly from the nature and form of Islamic government. In addition to general qualifications like intelligence and administrative ability, there are two other essential qualifications: knowledge of the law and justice.[97]
After the death of the Prophet (s), difference arose concerning the identity of the person who was to succeed him, but all the Muslims were in agreement that his successor should be someone knowledgeable and accomplished; there was disagreement only about his identity.
Since Islamic government is a government of law, knowledge of the law is necessary for the ruler, as has been laid down in tradition. Indeed such knowledge is necessary not only for the ruler, but also for anyone holding a post or exercising some government function. The ruler, however, must surpass all others in knowledge. In laying claim to the Imamate, our Imāms also argued that the ruler must be more learned than everyone else.[98] The objections raised by the Shī‘i ‘ulamā are also to the same effect. A certain person asked the caliph a point of law and he was unable to answer; he was therefore unfit for the position of leader and successor to the Prophet (s). Or again, a certain act he performed was contrary to the laws of Islam; hence he was unworthy for his high post.[99]
Knowledge of the law and justice, then, constitute fundamental qualifications in the view of the Muslims. Other matters have no importance or relevance in this connection. Knowledge of the nature of the angels, for example, or of the attributes of the Creator, Exalted and Almighty, is of no relevance to the question of leadership. In the same vein, one who knows all the natural sciences, uncovers all the secrets of nature, or has a good knowledge of music, does not thereby qualify for leadership or acquire any priority in the matter of exercising government over those who know the laws of Islam and are just. The sole matters relevant to rule, those that were mentioned and discussed in the time of the Most Noble Messenger (s), and our Imāms (‘a), and were, in addition, unanimously accepted by the Muslims, are: (1) the knowledgeability of the ruler or caliph, i.e., his knowledge of the provisions and ordinances of Islam; and (2) his justice, i.e., his excellence in belief and morals.
Reason also dictates the necessity for these qualities, because Islamic government is a government of law, not the arbitrary rule of an individual over the people or the domination of a group of individuals over the whole people. If the ruler is unacquainted with the contents of the law, he is not fit to rule; for if he follows the legal pronouncements of others his power to govern will be impaired, but if, on the other hand, he does not follow such guidance, he will be unable to rule correctly and implement the laws of Islam. It is an established principle that “the faqīh has authority over the ruler.”[100] If the ruler adheres to Islam, he must necessarily submit to the faqīh, asking him about the laws and ordinances of Islam in order to implement them. This being the case, the true rulers are the fuqahā[101]themselves, and rulership ought officially to be theirs, to apply to them, not to those who are obliged to follow the guidance of the fuqahā on account of their own ignorance of the law.
Of course, it is not necessary for all officials, provincial governors, and administrators to know all the laws of Islam and be fuqahā; it is enough that they should know the laws pertaining to their functions and duties. Such was the case in the time of the Prophet (s), and the Commander of the Faithful (‘a). The highest authority must possess the two qualities mentioned—comprehensive knowledge and justice—but his assistants, officials and those sent to the provinces need know only the laws relevant to their own tasks; on other matters they must consult the ruler.
The ruler must also possess excellence in morals and belief; he must be just and untainted by major sins. Anyone who wishes to enact the penalties provided by Islam (i.e., to implement the penal code), to supervise the public treasury and the income and expenditures of the state, and to have God assign to him the power to administer the affairs of His creatures must not be a sinner. God says in the Qur’an: “my vow does not embrace the wrongdoer” (2:124);[102] therefore, He will not assign such functions to an oppressor or sinner.
If the ruler is not just in granting the Muslims their rights, he will not conduct himself equitably in levying taxes and spending them correctly and in implementing the penal code. It becomes possible then for his assistants, helpers, and confidants to impose their will on society, diverting the public treasury to personal and frivolous use.
Thus, the view of the Shī‘ah concerning government and the nature of the persons who should assume rule was clear from the time following the death of the Prophet (s) down to the beginning of the Occultation.[103] It is specified that the ruler should be foremost in knowledge of the laws and ordinances of Islam, and just in their implementation.
Now that we are in the time of the Occultation of the Imām (‘a), it is still necessary that the ordinances of Islam relating to government be preserved and maintained, and that anarchy be prevented. Therefore, the establishment of government is still a necessity.
Reason also dictates that we establish a government in order to be able to ward off aggression and to defend the honor of the Muslims in case of attack. The sharī‘ah, for its part, instructs us to be constantly ready to defend ourselves against those who wish to attack us. Government, with its judicial and executive organs, is also necessary to prevent individuals from encroaching on each other’s rights. None of these purposes can be fulfilled by themselves; it is necessary for a government to be established. Since the establishment of a government and the administration of society necessitate, in turn, a budget and taxation, the Sacred Legislator has specified the nature of the budget and the taxes that are to be levied, such as kharāj, khums, zakāt, and so forth.
Now that no particular individual has been appointed by God, Exalted and Almighty, to assume the function of government in the time of Occultation, what must be done? Are we to abandon Islam? Do we no longer need it? Was Islam valid for only two hundred years? Or is it that Islam has clarified our duties in other respects but not with respect to government?
Not to have an Islamic government means leaving our boundaries unguarded. Can we afford to sit nonchalantly on our hands while our enemies do whatever they want? Even if we do put our signatures to what they do as an endorsement, still are failing to make an effective response. Is that the way it should be? Or is it rather that government is necessary, and that the function of government that existed from the beginning of Islam down to the time of the Twelfth Imām (‘a) is still enjoined upon us by God after the Occultation even though He has appointed no particular individuals to the function?
The two qualities of knowledge of the law and justice are present in countless fuqahā of the present age. If they come together, they could establish a government of universal justice in the world.
If a worthy individual possessing these two qualities arises and establishes a government, he will posses the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger (‘a) in the administration of society, and it will be the duty of all people to obey him.
The idea that the governmental power of the Most Noble Messenger (s) were greater than those of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), or that those of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) were greater than those of the faqīh, is false and erroneous. Naturally, the virtues of the Most Noble Messenger (s) were greater than those of the rest of mankind, and after him, the Commander of the Faithful was the most virtuous person in the world. But superiority with respect to spiritual virtues does not confer increased governmental powers. God has conferred upon government in the present age the same powers and authority that were held by the Most Noble Messenger and the Imāms (‘a), with respect to equipping and mobilizing armies, appointing governors and officials, and levying taxes and expending them for the welfare of the Muslims. Now, however, it is no longer a question of a particular person; government devolves instead upon one who possesses the qualities of knowledge and justice.
When we say that after the Occultation, the just faqīh has the same authority that the Most Noble Messenger and the Imāms (‘a) had, do not imagine that the status of the faqīh is identical to that of the Imāms and the Prophet (‘a). For here we are not speaking of status, but rather of function. By “authority” we mean government, the administration of the country, and the implementation of the sacred laws of the sharī‘ah. These constitute a serious, difficult duty but do not earn anyone extraordinary status or raise him above the level of common humanity. In other words, authority here has the meaning of government, administration, and execution of law; contrary to what many people believe, it is not a privilege, but a grave responsibility. The governance of the faqīh is a rational and extrinsic[104] matter; it exists only as a type of appointment, like the appointment of a guardian for a minor. With respect to duty and position, there is indeed no difference between the guardian of a nation and the guardian of a minor. It is as if the Imām were to appoint someone to the guardianship of a minor, to the governorship of a province, or to some other post. In cases like these, it is not reasonable that there would be a difference between the Prophet and the Imāms (‘a), on the one hand, and the just faqīh, on the other.
For example, one of the concerns that the faqīh must attend to is the application of the penal provisions of Islam. Can there be any distinction in this respect between the Most Noble Messenger (s), the Imāms, and the faqīh? Will the faqīh inflict fewer lashes because his rank is lower? Now, the penalty for the fornicator is one hundred lashes. If the Prophet (s) applies the penalty, is he to inflict one hundred fifty lashes, the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) one hundred, and, the faqīh fifty? The ruler supervises the executive power and has the duty of implementing God’s laws; it makes no difference if he is the Most Noble Messenger (s), the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) or the representative or judge he appointed to Basrah or Kūfah, or a faqīh in the present age.
Another one of the concerns of the Most Noble Messenger (s) and the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was the levying of taxes—khums, zakāt, jizyah and kharāj on taxable lands.[105] Now when the Prophet (s) levied zakāt, how much did he levy? One-tenth in one place and one-twentieth elsewhere? And how did the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) proceed when he became the ruler? And what now, if one of us becomes the foremost faqīh of the age and is able to enforce his authority? In these matters, can there be any difference in the authority of the Most Noble Messenger (s), that of ‘Ali (‘a), and that of the faqīh? God Almighty appointed the Prophet (s) in authority over all the Muslims; as long as he was alive, his authority extended over even ‘Ali (‘a). Afterwards, the Imām (‘a) had authority over all the Muslims, even his own successor as Imām (‘a); his commands relating to government were valid for everyone, and he could appoint and dismiss judges and governors.
The authority that the Prophet and the Imām (‘a) had in establishing a government, executing laws, and administering affairs, exists also for the faqīh. But the fuqahā do not have absolute authority in the sense of having authority over all other fuqahā of their own time, being able to appoint or dismiss them. There is no hierarchy ranking one faqīh higher than another or endowing one with more authority than another.
Now that this much has been demonstrated, it is necessary that the fuqahā proceed, collectively or individually, to establish a government in order to implement the laws of Islam and protect its territory. If this task falls within the capabilities of a single person, he has personally incumbent upon him the duty to fulfill it; otherwise, it is a duty that devolves upon the fuqahā as a whole. Even if it is impossible to fulfill the task, the authority vested in the fuqahā is not voided, because it has been vested in them by God. If they can, they must collect taxes, such as zakāt, khums, and kharāj, spend them for the welfare of the Muslims, and also enact the penalties of the law. The fact that we are presently unable to establish a complete and comprehensive form of government does not mean that we should sit idle. Instead, we should perform, to whatever extent we can, the tasks that are needed by the Muslims and that pertain to the functions an Islamic government must assume.
To prove that government and authority belong to the Imām (‘a) is not to imply that the Imām (‘a) has no spiritual status. The Imām (‘a) does indeed possess certain spiritual dimensions that are unconnected with their function as a ruler. The spiritual status of the Imām (‘a) is a universal divine viceregency that is sometimes mentioned by the Imāms (‘a). It is a viceregency pertaining to the whole of creation, by virtue of which all the atoms in the universe humble themselves before the holder of authority. It is one of the essential beliefs of our Shī‘i school that no one can attain the spiritual status of the Imāms, not even the cherubim or the prophets.[106] In fact, according to the traditions that have been handed down to us, the Most Noble Messenger and the Imāms (‘a) existed before the creation of the world in the form of lights situated beneath the divine throne; they were superior to other men even in the sperm from which they grow and in their physical composition.[107] Their exalted station is limited only by the divine will, as indicated by the saying of Jibrā’īl (‘a) recorded in the traditions on the mi‘rāj: “Were I to draw closer by as much as the breadth of a finger, surely I would burn.”[108] The Prophet (s) himself said: “We have states with God that are beyond the reach of the cherubim and the prophets.”[109] It is a part of our belief that the Imāms too enjoy similar states, before the question of government even arises. For example, Fātimah (‘a) also possessed these states, even though she was not a ruler, a judge, or a governor.[110] These states are quite distinct from the function of government. So when we say that Fātimah (‘a) was neither a judge nor a ruler, this does not mean that she was like you and me, or that she has no spiritual superiority over us. Similarly, if someone says, in accordance with the Qur’an, that “The Prophet (s) has higher claims on the believers than their own selves” (33:6), he has attributed to him something more exalted than his right to govern the believers. We will not examine these matters further here, for they belong to the area of another science.
To assume the function of government does not in itself carry any particular merit or status; rather, it is a means for fulfilling the duty of implementing the law and establishing the Islamic order of justice. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) said to Ibn ‘Abbās[111] concerning the nature of government and command: “How much is this shoe worth?” Ibn ‘Abbās replied: “Nothing”. The Commander of Faithful (‘a) then said: “Command over you is worth still less in my eyes, except for this: by means of ruling and commanding you I may be able to establish the right”—i.e., the laws and institutions of Islam—“and destroy the wrong”[112]—i.e., all impermissible and oppressive laws and institutions.
Rule and command, then, are in themselves only a means, and if this means is not employed for the good and for attaining noble aims, it has no value in the eyes of the men of God. Thus the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) says in his sermon in Nahj al- Balāghah: “Were it not for the obligation imposed on me, forcing me to take up this task of government, I would abandon it.”[113] It is evident, then, that to assume the function of government is to acquire a means, and not a spiritual station, for if government were spiritual station, nobody would be able to either usurp it or abandon it. Government and the exercise of command acquire value only when they become the means for implementing the law of Islam and establishing the just Islamic order; then the person in charge of government may also earn some additional virtue and merit.
Some people, whose eyes have been dazzled by the things of this world, imagine that leadership and government represented in themselves dignity and high station for the Imāms, so that if others come to exercise power, the world will collapse. Now the Soviet ruler, the British Prime Minister, and the American President all exercise power, and they are all unbelievers. They are unbelievers, but they have political power and influence, which they use to execute anti-human laws and policies for the sake of their own interests.
It is the duty of the Imāms and the just fuqahā to use government institutions to execute divine law, to establish the just Islamic system, and serve mankind. Government in itself represents nothing but pain and trouble for them, but what are they to do? They have been given a duty, a mission to fulfill; the governance of the faqīh is nothing but the performance of a duty.
When explaining why he assumed the tasks of government and rule, the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) declared that he did so for the sake of certain exalted aims, namely the establishment of justice and the abolition of injustice. He said, in effect: “O God, You know that it is not our purpose to acquire position and power, but rather to deliver the oppressed from the hands of the unjust. What impelled me to accept the task of command and rule over the people was this: God, Almighty and Exalted, has exacted a pledge from the scholars of religion and assigned the duty of not remaining silent in the face of the gluttony and self-indulgence of the unjust and the oppressor on the one hand, and the wasting hunger of the oppressed, on the other.”[114] He also said: “O God! You know well that the struggle we have waged has not been for the sake of winning political power, nor for seeking worldly goods and overflowing wealth.” He went directly on to explain the goal for the sake of which he and his companions had been struggling and exerting themselves: “Rather it was our aim to restore and implement the luminous principles of Your religion and to reform the conduct of affairs in Your land, so that Your downtrodden servants might gain security and Your laws, which have remained unfulfilled and in abeyance, might be established and executed.”[115]
The ruler who, by means of the organs of government and the power of command that are at his disposal, desires to attain the exalted aims of Islam, the same aims set forth by the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), must possess the essential qualities to which we have already referred; that is, he must know the law and be just. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) mentions next the qualities essential in a ruler immediately after he has specified the aims of government: “O God! I was the first person that turned toward You by accepting Your religion as soon as I heard your Messenger (s) declare it. No one preceded me in prayer except the Messenger (s) himself. And you, O people! You know well that it is not fitting that one who is greedy and parsimonious should attain rule and authority over the honor, lives, and income of the Muslims, and the laws and ordinances enforced among them, and also leadership of them.
“Furthermore, he should not be ignorant and unaware of the law, lest in his ignorance he mislead the people. He must not be unjust and harsh, causing the people to cease all traffic and dealing with him because of his oppressiveness. Nor must he fear states, so that he seeks the friendship of some and treats others with enmity. He must refrain from accepting bribes when he sits in judgment, so that the rights of men are trampled underfoot and the claimant does not receive his due. He must not leave the practice of the Prophet (s) and law in abeyance, so that the community falls into misguidance and peril.”[116]
Notice how this discourse revolves around two points, knowledge and justice, and how the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) regards them as necessary qualities of the ruler. In the expression: “He should not be ignorant and unaware of the law, lest in his ignorance he mislead the people,” the emphasis is upon knowledge, while in the remaining sentences the emphasis is upon justice, in its true sense. The true sense of justice is that the ruler should conduct himself like the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) in his dealings with other states, in his relations and transactions with the people, in passing sentence and giving judgment, and in distributing the public income. To put it differently, the ruler should adhere to the program of rule that the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) assigned to Mālik Ashtar[117]—in reality, to all rulers and governors, for it is something like a circular addressed to all who exercise rule. If the fuqahā become rulers, they too should consider it as their set of instructions.
Here is a narration totally without ambiguity. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) relates that the Most Noble Messenger (s) said: “O God! Have mercy on those that succeed me.” He repeated this thrice and was then asked: “O Messenger of God, who are those that succeed you?” He replied: “They are those that come after me, transmit my traditions and practice, and teach them to the people after me.”
Shaykh Sadūq[118] (may God’s mercy be upon him) has related this narration with five chains of transmission (actually four, since two of them are similar in certain respects) in the following books: Jamī‘al-Akhbār, ‘Uyūn Akhbār ar-Ridhā, and Al-Majālis.[119]
Among the cases where this tradition has been designated as musnad,[120] in one instance we find the words “and teach them,” and in other instances we find, “and teach them to the people.” Whenever the tradition is designated as mursal,[121] we find only the beginning of the sentence, with the phrase “and teach them to the people after me” completely omitted.
We can make either of two assumptions with respect to this tradition. First, it is the only instance of the tradition, and the phrase beginning “and teach them” either was later added to the end, or was indeed a part of the tradition but was later omitted in certain versions. The second alternative is more probable. For if the phrase were added, we could not say that it was as the result of mistake or error, given that the tradition was handed down by several chain of transmission and the respective narrators lived at great distances from each other—one in Balkh, another in Nishābūr, and still another elsewhere. Nor is it possible that this phrase was deliberately added; it is highly unlikely that it would have occurred to each of several people living far apart from each other to add such a sentence to the tradition. Therefore, if it is a single narration, we can assert with certainly that either the phrase beginning, “and teach them” was omitted from one of the versions recorded by Shaykh Sadūq (or overlooked by the copyists who wrote down his work), or Shaykh Sadūq himself failed to mention it for some other reason.
The second assumption would be that there are two separate traditions; one without the phrase “and teach them…” and the other with it. If the phrase is part of the tradition, it certainly does not apply to those whose task is simply the narration of tradition and who are not competent to express an independent juridical opinion or judgment. There are certain scholars of tradition who do not understand hadīth at all; as implied in the saying: ”Many a scholar of law falls short of being a faqīh,” they are merely a vehicle for the recording, collecting and writing down of traditions and narrations and for placing them at the disposal of the people. It cannot be said of such scholars that they are the successors of the Prophet, teaching the sciences of Islam.[122] Their efforts on behalf of Islam and the Muslims are of course most valuable, and many scholars of tradition have indeed also been fuqahā, competent to express an independent opinion; e.g., Kulayni,[123] Shaykh Sadūq,[124] and his father (God’s mercy on all of them). These three were fuqahā, and they taught the ordinances and sciences of Islam to the people. When we say that Shaykh Sadūq differed from Shaykh Mufīd,[125] we do not mean that Shaykh Sadūq was unlearned in fiqh,[126] or that he was less learned than Shaykh Mufīd. Shaykh Sadūq was, after all, the person who elucidated all the principles and secondaries of religion in a single sitting. He differed from Shaykh Mufīd and others like him in that they were mujtahids who brought their own reasoning to bear on traditions and narrations, while Shaykh Sadūq was a faqīh who did not have recourse to his own reasoning, or did so only rarely.
The phrase we are discussing applies to those who expound the sciences of Islam, who expound the ordinances of Islam, and who educate the people in Islam, preparing them to instruct others in turn. In the same way, the Most Noble Messenger (s), and the Imāms (‘a) proclaimed and expounded the ordinances of Islam; they had teaching circles where they gave the benefit of their learning to several thousand people, whose duty it was, in turn, to teach others. That is the meaning implied in the phrase “and teach the people…”: disseminating the knowledge of Islam among the people and conveying to them the ordinances of Islam. If we believe that Islam is for all the people in the world, it becomes obvious to every rational mind that the Muslims, and particularly the scholars among them, have the duty of disseminating knowledge of Islam and its ordinances and acquainting the people of the world with them.
If we suppose that the phrase “and teach them to the people” does not belong to the end of the hadīth, then we must see what the Prophet (s) might have meant in his saying: “O God! Have mercy on those that succeed me: those that come after me and transmit my traditions and practice.” The tradition, even in this form, still would not apply to those who merely relate traditions without being fuqahā. For the divine practices and norms constituting the totality of the ordinances of Islam are known as the practice of the Prophet (s) by virtue of the fact that they were revealed to him. So anyone who wishes to disseminate the practices of the Most Noble Messenger (s) must know all the ordinances of God; he must be able to distinguish the authentic from the false, those of absolute from those of limited application, and the general from the specific. Further, he must be able to discern rational categories, distinguish between traditions originating in circumstances of taqiyyah[127] and those originating otherwise, and be fully conversant with all the necessary criteria that have been specified. Traditionists who have not attained the level of ijtihād[128] and who merely transmit hadith know nothing about all this; hence, they are incapable of discerning the true practice of the Messenger of God (s). Mere transmission could have no value in the eyes of the Messenger, and it was certainly not his desire that phrases like: “The Messenger of God said,” or “It is related on the authority of the Messenger of God” should gain currency among the people, if the sentences prefaced by these phrases were counterfeited and not his. What he desired instead was that his true practice should be disseminated among the people and the real ordinances of Islam spread among them. The tradition: “Whoever preserves for my people forty traditions will be resurrected by God as a faqīh”[129] and similar traditions praising the dissemination of hadith do not pertain to traditionists who have no concept of the nature of tradition. They pertain to those who are able to distinguish the true narration of the Most Noble Messenger (s) in accordance with the true ordinances of Islam. Such persons are none other than the mujtahids and the fuqahā; they are the ones able to assess all different aspects and implications of a ruling, and to deduce the true ordinances of Islam on the basis of the criteria they have inherited from the Imāms (‘a). They are the successors of the Most Noble Messenger (s), disseminating the divine ordinances and instructing men in the sciences of Islam. It is for them that the Prophet (s) prayed when he said, “O God! Have mercy on my successors.”
There is no doubt, therefore, that the tradition: “O God! Have mercy on my successors” does not relate to the transmitters of tradition who are mere scribes; a scribe cannot be a successor to the Prophet (s). The successors are the fuqahā of Islam. Dissemination of the ordinances of Islam, as well as the teaching and instruction of the people, is the duty of fuqahā who are just. For if they are not just, they will be like those who forged traditions harmful to Islam, like Samūrah ibn Jundab,[130] who forged traditions hostile to the Commander of the Faithful (‘a). And if they are not fuqahā, they cannot comprehend the nature of fiqh and the ordinances of Islam, and they may disseminate thousands of traditions in praise of kings that have been forged by the agents of the oppressors and pseudo-scholars attached to royal courts. It is easy to see what results they obtained on the basis of the two weak traditions that they set up against the Qur’an, with its insistent commands to rise up against kings and its injunctions to Moses to rebel against the Pharaoh.[131] Quite apart from the Glorious Qur’an, there are numerous traditions exhorting men to struggle against tyrants and those who pervert religion.[132] Lazy people among us have laid these aside and, relying on these two weak hadīths that may well have been forged by court preachers, tell us we must make peace with kings and give our allegiance to the court. If they were truly acquainted with tradition and knowledgeable about religion, they would act instead in accordance with the numerous traditions that denounce the oppressors. If it happens that they are acquainted with tradition, then we must conclude that, they do not have the quality of justice. For, not being just and failing to eschew sin, they overlook the Qur’an and all the narration that condemn the oppressor, and concentrate instead on those two weak hadith. It is the appetites of their stomachs that cause them to cling to them, not knowledge. Appetite and ambition make men subservient to royal courts; true tradition does not.
In any event, the dissemination of the sciences of Islam and the proclamation of its ordinances are the task of the just fuqahā—those who are able to distinguish the true ordinances from the false, and the traditions of the Imāms (‘a) arising in conditions of taqiyyah from those originating otherwise. For we know that our Imāms were sometimes subjected to conditions that prevented them from pronouncing a true ordinance; they were exposed to tyrannical and oppressive rulers who imposed taqiyyah and fear upon them. Naturally, their fear was for religion not themselves, and if they had not observed taqiyyah in certain circumstances, oppressive rulers would have entirely rooted out true religion.
There cannot be the least doubt that the tradition we have been discussing refers to the governance of the faqih, for to be a successor means to succeed to all the functions of prophethood. In this respect what is implied by the sentence: “O God! Have mercy on my successors” is no less than what is implied by the sentence: “ ‘Ali is my successor,” since the meaning of successorship is the same in both cases. The phrase “who come after me and transmit my traditions” serves to designate the successors, not to define succession, for succession was a well-known concept in the first age of Islam and did not require elucidation. Moreover, the person who asked the Prophet (s), whom he meant by his successors was not enquiring after the meaning of successorship; he was requesting the Prophet (s) to specify those whom he meant, as he indeed did in his reply. It is remarkable that nobody has taken the phrase: “ ‘Ali is my successor,” or “the Imāms are my successors,” as referring to the simple task of issuing juridical opinions; instead they derive the tasks of successorship and government from them, whereas they hesitated to draw the same conclusion from the words “my successors” in the tradition under consideration. This is solely because they have imagined that succession to the position of the Most Noble Messenger (s) has been limited or restricted to certain people, and that since each of the Imāms was a successor, the religious scholars cannot act as successors, rulers, and governors. The result is that Islam must be without any leader to care for it, the ordinances of Islam must be in abeyance, the frontiers of Islam must be at the mercy of the enemies of religion, and various kinds of perversion that have nothing to do with Islam are gaining currency.
Muhammad ibn Yahyā relates, on the authority of Ahmad ibn Muhammad, who heard it from Ibn Mahbūb, who was informed of it by ‘Ali ibn Abi Hamzah, that the Imām Abu ‘l-Hasan, son of Ja‘far,[133] (‘a) said: “whenever a believer dies, the angels weep, together with the ground where he engaged in the worship of God and the gates of heaven that he would enter by means of his good deeds. A crack will appear in the fortress of Islam, that naught can repair, for believers who are fuqahā are the fortresses of Islam, like the encircling walls that protect a city.”[134]
In the same chapter of Al-Kāfi, is another version of this tradition, which reads: “Whenever a believer who is a faqih…” instead of “Whenever a believer…” In contrast, at the beginning of the version we have cited, the expression “who is a faqih” is missing. Later in the second version, however, when the cause for the angels’ weeping is adduced, the expression “believers who are fuqahā” does occur. This makes it clear that the word faqih was omitted at the beginning of the tradition, particularly since the concepts “fortress of Islam” and “encircling walls” and the like are fully appropriate to the faqih.
The saying of the Imām (‘a) that “believers who are fuqaha are the fortresses of Islam” actually ascribes to the fuqahā the duty of being guardians of the beliefs, ordinances, and institutions of Islam. It is clear that these words of the Imām (‘a) are not an expression of ceremonial courtesy, like the words we sometimes exchange with each other (I call you “Support of the Sharī‘ah,” and you bestow the same title on me in return
. Nor do they have any similarity to the titles we use in addressing a letter to someone: “His Noble Excellency, the Proof of Islam.”
If a faqīh sits in the corner of his dwelling and does not intervene in any of the affairs of society, neither preserving the laws of Islam and disseminating its ordinances, nor in any way participating in the affairs of the Muslims or having any care for them, can he be called “the fortress of Islam” or the protector of Islam?
If the leader of a government tells an official or a commander, “Go and guard such-and–such an area,” will the duty of guarding that he has assumed permit him to go home and sleep, allowing the enemy to come and ravage that area? Or should he, on the contrary, strive to protect that area in whatever way he can?
Now if you say that we are preserving at least some of the ordinances of Islam, let me ask you this question. Are you implementing the penal law of Islam and the sanctions it provides? You will have to answer no.
So a crack has appeared in the protective wall surrounding Islam, despite your supposedly being its guardians.
Then I ask you: Are you guarding the frontiers of Islam and the territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland? To this, your answer may be: “No, our task is only to pray!”
This means that a piece of the wall has collapsed.
Now I ask you: Are you taking from the rich what they owe the poor and passing it on to them? For that is your Islamic duty, to take from the rich and give to the poor. Your answer may be, in effect: “No, this is none of our concern! God willing, others will come and perform this task.”
Then another part of the wall will have collapsed, and your situation will be like that of Shāh Sultān Husayn waiting for the fall of Isfahan.[135]
What kind of fortress is this? Each of the corners is occupied by some “pillar of Islam,” but all he can do is offer excuses when put to the test. Is that what we mean by “fortress”?
The meaning of the statement of the Imām (‘a) that the fuqahā are the fortresses of Islam is that they have a duty to protect Islam and that they must do whatever is necessary to fulfill that duty. It is one of the most important duties and, moreover, an absolute duty, not a conditional one. It is an issue to which the fuqahā of Islam must pay particular attention. The religious teaching institution must give due thought to the matter and equip itself with the means and strength necessary to protect Islam in the fullest possible sense, just as the Most Noble Messenger (s) and the Imāms (‘a) were the guardians of Islam, protecting its beliefs, ordinances and institutions in the most comprehensive manner.
We have abandoned almost all aspects of our duty, restricting ourselves to passing on, from one generation to the next; certain parts of Islamic law and discussing them among ourselves. Many of the ordinances of Islam have virtually become part of the occult sciences, and Islam itself has become a stranger;[136] only its name has survived.
All the penal provisions of Islam, which represent the best penal code ever devised for humanity, have been completely forgotten; nothing but their name has survived. As for the Qur’anic verses stipulating penalties and sanctions, “Nothing remains of them but their recitation.”[137] For example, we recite the verse: “Administer to the adulterer and the adulteress a hundred lashes each”(24:2), but we do not know what to do when confronted with a case of adultery. We merely recite the verse in order to improve the quality of our recitation and to give each sound its full value. The actual situation prevailing in our society, the present state of the Islamic community, the prevalence of lewdness and corruption, the protection and support extended by our governments to adultery—none of this concern us! It is enough that we understand what penalties have been provided for the adulterer and adulteress without attempting to secure their implementation or otherwise struggling against the existence of adultery in our society!
I ask you, is that the way the Most Noble Messenger (s) conduct himself? Did he content himself with reciting the Qur’an, then lay it aside and neglect to ensure the implementation of its penal provisions? Was it the practice of the successors of the Prophet (s) to entrust matters to the people and tell them, “I have no further concern with you”? Or, on the contrary, did they decree penalties for various classes of offender—whippings, stonings, perpetual imprisonment, banishment? Examine the sections of Islamic law relating to penal law and blood money: you will see that all of these matters are part of Islam and part of the reason for the coming of Islam. Islam came in order to establish order in society; leadership[138] and government are for the sake of ordering the affairs of society.
It is our duty to preserve Islam. This duty is one of the most important obligations incumbent upon us; it is more necessary even than prayer and fasting. It is for the sake of fulfilling this duty that blood must sometimes be shed. There is no blood more precious than that of Imām Husayn (‘a), yet it was shed for the sake of Islam, because of the precious nature of Islam. We must understand this matter well and convey it to others. You can be the true successors to the Prophet (s) as the guardians of Islam only if you teach Islam to the people; do not say, “We will wait until the coming of the Imām of the Age (‘a).” Would you consider postponing your prayer until the coming of the Imām? The preservation of Islam is even more important than prayer. Do not follow the logic of the governor of Khumayn[139] who used to say, “We must promote sin so that the Imām of the Age (‘a) will come. If sin does not prevail, he will not manifest himself!”[140] Do not sit here simply debating among yourselves. Study all the ordinances of Islam and propagate all aspects of the truth by writing and publishing pamphlets. It cannot fail to have an effect, as my own experience testifies.
‘Ali relates, on the authority of his father, from an-Nawfali, who had it from as-Sukūni, who was told it by Abu ‘Abdullāh (‘a), that the Most Noble Messenger (s) said, “The fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a), as long as they do not concern themselves with the illicit desires, pleasures, and wealth of the world.” The Prophet (s) was then asked: “O Messenger of God! How may we know if they do so concern themselves?” He replied: “By seeing whether they follow the ruling power. If they do that, fear for your religion and shun them.”[141] Examination of the whole of this hadith would involve us in a lengthy discussion. We will speak only about the phrase: “The fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a),” since it is what interests us here because of its relevance to the topic of the governance of faqīh.
First, we must see what duties, powers, and functions the prophets (‘a) had in order to discover what the duties of the fuqahā, the trustees and successors of the prophets (‘a), are in turn.
In accordance with both wisdom and the essential nature of religion, the purpose in sending the prophets (‘a) and the task of the prophets (‘a) cannot be simply the delivery of judgments concerning a particular problem or the expounding of the ordinances of religion. These judgments and ordinances were not revealed to the Prophet (s) in order for him and the Imāms (‘a) to convey them truthfully to the people as series of divinely appointed muftis,[142] and then to pass this trust on in turn to the fuqahā, so that they might likewise convey them to the people without any distortion. The meaning of the expression: “The fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a)” is not that the fuqahā are the trustees simply with respect to the giving of juridical opinions. For in fact the most important function of the prophets (‘a) is the establishment of a just social system through the implementation of laws and ordinances (which is naturally accompanied by the exposition and dissemination of the divine teachings and beliefs). This emerges clearly from the following Qur’anic verse: “Verily We have sent Our messengers with clear signs, and sent down with them the Book and the Balance, in order that men might live in equity” (57:25). The general purpose for the sending of prophets (‘a), then, is so that men’s lives may be ordered and arranged on the basis of just social relations and true humanity may be established among men. This is possible only by establishing government and implementing laws, whether this is accomplished by the prophet himself, as was the case with the Most Noble Messenger (s), or by the followers who come after him.
God Almighty says concerning the khums: “Know that of whatever booty you capture, a fifth belongs to God and His Messenger and to your kinsmen”(8:41). Concerning zakāt He says: “Levy a tax on their property”(9:103). There are also other divine commands concerning other forms of taxation. Now the Most Noble Messenger (s) had the duty not only of expounding these ordinances, but also of implementing them; just as he was to proclaim them to the people, he was also to put them into practice. He was to levy taxes, such as khums, zakāt and kharāj, and spend the resulting income for the benefit of the Muslims; establish justice among peoples and among the members of the community; implement the laws and protect the frontiers and independence of the country; and prevent anyone from misusing or embezzling the finances of the Islamic state.
Now God Almighty appointed the Most Noble Messenger (s) head of the community and made it a duty for men to obey him: “Obey God and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority from among you” (4:59). The purpose for this was not so that we would accept and conform to whatever judgment the Prophet (s) delivered. Conformity to the ordinances of religion is obedience to God; all activities that are conducted in accordance with divine ordinances, whether or not they are ritual functions, are a form of obedience to God. Following the Most Noble Messenger (s), then, is not conforming to divine ordinances; it is something else. Of course, obeying the Most Noble Messenger (s) is, in a certain sense, obeying God; we obey the Prophet (s) because God has commanded us to do so. But if, for example, the Prophet (s), in his capacity as leader and guide of Islamic society, orders everybody to join the army of Usāmah,[143] so that no one has the right to hold back, it is the command of the Prophet (s), not the command of God. God has entrusted to him the task of government and command, and accordingly, in conformity with the interests of the Muslims, he arranges for the equipping and mobilization of the army, and appoints or dismisses governors and judges.
This being the case, the principle: “The fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a)” means that all of the tasks entrusted to the prophets (‘a) must also be fulfilled by the just fuqahā as a matter of duty. Justice, it is true; is a more comprehensive concept than trustworthiness and it is possible that someone may be trustworthy with respect to financial affairs, but not just in a more general sense.[144] However, those designated in the principle: “The fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a)” are those who do not fail to observe any ordinances of the law, and who are pure and unsullied, as is implied by the conditional statement: “as long as they do not concern themselves with the illicit desires, pleasures, and wealth of this world”---that is, as long as they do not sink into the morass of worldly ambition. If a faqīh has as his aim the accumulation of worldly wealth, he is longer just and cannot be the trustee of the Most Noble Messenger (‘a) and the executor of the ordinances of Islam. It is only the just fuqahā who may correctly implement the ordinances of Islam and firmly establish its institutions, executing the penal provisions of Islamic law and preserving the boundaries and territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland. In short, implementation of all laws relating to government devolves upon the fuqahā: the collection of khums, zakāt, sadaqah, jizyah, and kharāj and the expenditure of the money thus collected in accordance with the public interest; the implementation of the penal provisions of the law and the enactment of retribution (which must take place under the direct supervision of the ruler, failing which the next-of-kin of the murdered person has no authority to act); the guarding of the frontiers; and the securing of public order.
Just as the Most Noble Messenger (s) was entrusted with the implementation of divine ordinances and the establishment of the institutions of Islam, and just as God Almighty set him up over the Muslims as their leader and ruler, making obedience to him obligatory, so, too, the just fuqahā must be leaders and rulers, implementing divine ordinances and establishing the institutions of Islam.
Since Islamic government is a government of law, those acquainted with the law, or more precisely, with religion—i.e., the fuqahā—must supervise its functioning. It is they who supervise all executive and administrative affairs of the country, together with all planning.
The fuqahā are the trustees who implement the divine ordinances in levying taxes, guarding the frontiers, and executing the penal provisions of the law. They must not allow the laws of Islam to remain in abeyance, or their operation to be effected by either defect or excess. If a faqīh wishes to punish an adulterer, he must give him one hundred lashes in the presence of the people, in the exact manner that has been specified. He does not have the right to inflict one additional lash, to curse the offender, to slap him, or to imprison him for a single day. Similarly, when it comes to the levying of taxes, he must act in accordance with the criteria and the laws of Islam; he does not have the right to tax even a shāhi[145] in excess of what the law provides. He must not let disorder enter the affairs of the public treasury or even so much as a shāhi be lost. If a faqīh acts in contradiction to the criteria of Islam (God forbid
, then he will automatically be dismissed from his post, since he will have forfeited his quality of trustee.
Law is actually the ruler; the security for all is guaranteed by law, and law is their refuge. Muslims and the people in general are free within the limits laid down by the law; when they are acting in accordance with the provisions of the law, no one has the right to tell them, “Sit here,” or “Go there.” An Islamic government does not resemble states where the people are deprived of all security and everyone sits at home trembling for fear of a sudden raid or attack by the agents of the state. It was that way under Mu‘āwiyah[146] and similar rulers: people had no security, and they were killed or banished, or imprisoned for lengthy periods, on the strength of an accusation or a mere suspicion, because the government was not Islamic. When an Islamic government is established, all will live with complete security under the protection of the law, and no ruler will have the right to take any step contrary to the provisions and laws of the immaculate sharī‘ah.
The meaning of “trustee,” then, is that the fuqahā execute as a trust all the affairs for which Islam has legislated—not that they simply offer legal judgments on given questions. Was that the function of the Imām (‘a)? Did he merely expound the law? Was it the function of the prophets (‘a) from whom the fuqahā have inherited it as a trust? To offer judgment on a question of law or to expound the laws in general is, of course, one of the dimensions of fiqh. But Islam regards law as a tool, not as an end in itself. Law is a tool and an instrument for the establishment of justice in society, a means for man’s intellectual and moral reform and his purification. Law exists to be implemented for the sake of establishing a just society that will morally and spiritually nourish refined human beings. The most significant duty of the prophets (‘a) was the implementation of divine ordinances, and this necessarily involved supervision and rule.
There is a tradition of Imām Ridā (‘a) in which he says approximately the following: “An upright, protecting, and trustworthy imām is necessary for the community in order to preserve it from decline,” and then reasserts that the fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a). Combining the two halves of the tradition, we reach the conclusion that the fuqahā must be the leaders of the people in order to prevent Islam from falling into decline and its ordinances from falling into abeyance.
Indeed it is precisely because the just fuqahā have not had executive power in the lands inhabited by Muslims and their governance has not been established that Islam has declined and its ordinances have fallen into abeyance. The words of Imām Ridā have fulfilled themselves; experience has demonstrated their truth.
Has Islam not declined? Have the laws of Islam not fallen into disused in the Islamic countries? The penal provisions of the law are not implemented; the ordinances of Islam are not enforced; the institutions of Islam have disappeared; chaos, anarchy, and confusion prevail—does not all this mean that Islam has declined? Is Islam simply something to be written down in books like al-Kāfi[147] and then laid aside? If the ordinances of Islam are not applied and the penal provisions of the law are not implemented in the external world—so that the thief, the plunderer, the oppressor, and the embezzler all go unpunished while we content ourselves with preserving the books of law, kissing them and laying them aside (even treating the Qur’an this way), and reciting Yā-Sin on Thursday nights[148]—can say that Islam has been preserved?
Since many of us did not really believe that Islamic society must be administered and ordered by an Islamic government matters have now reached such a state that in the Muslim countries, not only does the Islamic order not obtain, with corrupt and oppressive laws being implemented instead of the laws of Islam, but the provisions of Islam appear archaic even to the ‘ulamā. So when the subject is raised, they say that the tradition: “The fuqahā are trustees of the prophets” refers only to the issuing of juridical opinions. Ignoring the verses of the Qur’an, they distort in the same way all the numerous traditions that the scholars of Islam are to exercise rule during the Occultation. But can trusteeship be in this manner? Is the trustee not obliged to prevent the ordinances of Islam from falling into abeyance and criminals from going unpunished? To prevent the revenue and income of the country from being squandered, embezzled or misdirected?
It is obvious that all of these tasks require the existence of trustees, and that it is the duty of the fuqahā to assume the trust bequeathed to them, to fulfill it in a just and trustworthy manner.
The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) said to Shurayh[149]: “The seat [of judge] you are occupying is filled by someone who is a prophet (‘a), the legatee of a prophet, or else a sinful wretch.”[150] Now since Shurayh was neither a prophet nor the legatee of a prophet, it follows that he was a sinful wretch occupying the position of judge. Shurayh was a person who occupied the position of judge in Kūfah for about fifty or sixty years. Closely associated with the party of Mu‘āwiyah, Shurayh spoke and issued fatwās[151] in a sense favorable to him, and he ended up rising in revolt against the Islamic state. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was unable to dismiss Shurayh during his rule, because certain powerful figures protected him on the grounds that Abu Bakr and ‘Umar had appointed him and that their action was not to be controverted. Shurayh was thus imposed upon the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), who did, however, succeed in ensuring that he abided by the law in his judgment.
It is clear from the foregoing tradition that the position of judgment may be exercised only by a prophet (‘a) or by the legatee of a prophet. No one would dispute the fact that the function of judge belongs to the just fuqahā, in accordance with their appointment by the Imāms (‘a). This unanimity contrasts with the questions of the governance of the faqīh: some scholars, such as Narāqi,[152] or among more recent figures, Nā’ini,[153] regard all of the extrinsic functions and tasks of the Imāms (‘a) as devolving upon the faqih, while other scholars do not. But there can be no doubt that the function of judging belongs to the just fuqahā; this is virtually self-evident.
Considering the fact that the fuqahā do not have the rank of prophethood, and they are indubitably not “wretched sinners,” we conclude that, in the light of the tradition quoted above, they must be the legatees or successors of the Most Noble Messenger (s). Since, however, the expression “legatee of a prophet” is generally assumed to refer to his immediate successors, this tradition and others similar to it are only rarely cited as evidence for the successorship of the fuqahā. The concept “legatee of a prophet” is a broad one, however, and includes the fuqahā. The immediate legatee of the Most Noble Messenger (s) was of course the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), who was followed by the other Imāms (‘a), and the affairs of the people were entrusted to them. But no one should imagine that the function of governing or sitting in judgment was a form of privilege for the Imāms. Rule was entrusted to them only because they were best able to establish a just government and implement social justice among the people. The spiritual stations of the Imāms, which far transcend human comprehension, had no connection with their naming and appointing officials. If the Most Noble Messenger (s) had not appointed the Commander of the Faithful to be his successor, he would still have possessed the same sublime spiritual qualities. It is not that the exercise and function of government bestow spiritual rank and privilege on a man; on the contrary, spiritual rank and privilege qualify a man for the assumption of government and social responsibilities.
In any event, we deduce from the tradition quoted above that the fuqahā are the legatees, at one remove, of the Most Noble Messenger (s) and that all the tasks he entrusted to the Imāms (‘a) are also incumbent on the fuqahā; all the tasks that Messenger (s) performed, they too must perform, just as the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) did.
There is another tradition that may serve as proof or support for our thesis, one that is, indeed, preferable with respect to both its chain of transmission and its meaning. One chain of transmission for it, that passing through Kulayni, is weak, but the other, mentioned by Sadūq and passing through Sulaymān ibn Khālid[154] is authentic and reliable. This is the text of the tradition. Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq[155] (‘a) said: “Refrain from judging, because judging is reserved for an imām who is knowledgeable of the law and legal procedures and who behaves justly toward all the Muslims; it is reserved for a prophet (‘a) or the legatee of a prophet.”
Notice that the person who wishes to sit in judgment must, first of all, be an imām. What is meant here by imām is the common lexical meaning of the word, “leader” or “guide,” not its specific technical sense. In this context the Prophet (s) himself counts as an imām. If the technical meaning of imām[156] were intended, the specification of the attributes of justice and knowledge in the tradition would be superfluous. Second, the person who wishes to exercise the function of a judge must possess the necessary knowledge. If he is an imām, but unlearned in matters of law and juridical procedure, he does not have the right to be a judge. Third, he must be just. The position of judge, then, is reserved for those who posses these three qualifications—being a leader, and being knowledgeable and just. The tradition proceeds to clarify that these three qualifications can be found only in a prophet (‘a) or the trustee of a prophet.
I stated earlier that the function of judge belongs exclusively to the just faqīh; this is a fundamental aspect of fiqh, which is not a matter of dispute. Let us now see whether the three-fold qualifications for exercising the function of judge are present in the faqīh. Obviously we are concerned here only with the just faqīh, not with any faqīh. The faqīh is, by definition, learned in matters pertaining to the function of judge, since the term faqīh is applied to one who is learned not only in the laws and judicial procedure of Islam, but also in the doctrines, institutions, and ethics of the faith—the faqīh is, in short, a religious expert in the full sense of the word. If, in addition, the faqīh is just, he will be found to have two of the necessary qualifications. The third qualification is that he should be an imām, in the sense of leader. Now we have already stated that the just faqīh occupies a position of guidance and leadership with respect to judging, in accordance with his appointment by the Imām (‘a). Further, the Imām has specified that the three necessary qualifications are not to be found in anyone except a prophet (‘a) or the legatee of a prophet. Since the fuqahā are not prophets (‘a) they must be legatees or successors of the prophets (‘a). Therefore, we come to the conclusion that the faqīh is the legatee of the Most Noble Messenger (s), and in addition, during the Occultation of the Imām (‘a), he is the leader of the Muslims and the chief of the community. He alone may exercise the function of judge and no one else has the right to occupy the position of judgeship.
To whom should we recourse in social circumstances?
The third tradition relates to a signed decree of the Imām from which certain conclusions may be deduced, as I propose to do.
It is related in the bookIkmāl ad-DīnwaItmām an-Ni‘mah[157]that Ishāq ibn Ya‘qūb wrote a letter to the Imām of the Age[158] (may God hasten his renewed manifestation) asking him for guidance in certain problems that had arisen, and Muhammad ibn ‘Uthmān al-‘Umari,[159] the deputy of the Imām (‘a), conveyed the letter to him. A response was issued, written in the blessed hand of the Imam (‘a), saying: “In case of newly occurring social circumstances, you should turn for guidance to those who relate our traditions, for they are my proof to you, as I am God’s proof.”
What is meant here by the phrase “newly occurring social circumstances” (hawādith-i wāqi‘ah) is not legal cases and ordinances. The writer of the letter did not wish to ask what was to be done in the case of legal issues that were without precedent. For the answer to that question would have been self-evident according to the Shī‘i school, and unanimously accepted traditions specify that one should have recourse to the fuqahā in such cases. Indeed people had recourse to the fuqahā and made enquiries of them even during the lifetime of the Imāms (‘a). A person living in the time of the Lesser Occultation and in communication with the four deputies of the Imam (‘a), who wrote a letter to him and received an answer, must have known whom to refer to for the solution of legal cases. What is meant by hawādith-i wāqi‘ah is rather the newly arising situations and problems that affect the people and the Muslims. The question Ishāq ibn Ya‘qūb was implicitly posing was this: “Now that we no longer have access to you, what should we do with respect to social problems? What is our duty?” Or, he may have mentioned certain specific events and then asked: “To whom should we have recourse for guidance in these matters?” But it seems that his question was general in intent and that the Imām (‘a) responded in correspondingly general fashion, saying, “With respect to such occurrences and problems, you should refer to those who narrate our traditions, i.e., the fuqahā. They are my proofs to you, and I am God’s proof to you.”
What is the meaning of “God’s proof”?[160] What do you understand by this term? Can a single tradition count as a proof? If Zurārah[161] related a tradition, would that make him a proof? Is the Imām of the Age (‘a) comparable in authority to Zurārah, whom we follow in the sense that we act upon a tradition of the Most Noble Messenger (s) that Zurārah has narrated? When it is said that the holder of authority is the proof of God, does it mean that he is a “proof” purely with respect to details of the law, with the duty of giving legal opinions? The Most Noble Messenger (s) said: “I am now departing, and the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) will be my proof to you.” Do you deduce from this that after the Prophet (s) departed all tasks came to an end except delivering legal opinions, and that this was all that was left for the Commander of the Faithful (‘a)? Or on the contrary, does the term “proof of God” mean that just as the Most Noble Messenger (s) was the proof and authoritative guide of all the people, just as God had appointed him to guide people in matters, so too the fuqahā are responsible for all affairs and are the authoritative guides of the people?
A “proof of God” is one whom God has designated to conduct affairs; all his deeds, actions, and sayings constitute a proof for the Muslims. If some one commits an offense, reference will be to the “proof” for adducing evidence and formulating the charge. If the “proof” commands you to perform a certain act, to implement the penal provisions of the law in a certain way, or to spend the income derived from booty, zakāt, and sadaqah[162] in a certain manner, and you fail to obey him in any of these respects, then God Almighty will advance a “proof” against you on the Day of Judgment. If, despite the existence of the “proof,” you turn to oppressive authorities for the solution of your affairs, again God Almighty will refer to the “proof” as an argument against you on the Day of Judgment, saying: “I established a proof for you; why did you turn instead to the oppressors and the judicial system of the wrongdoers?” Similarly, God designates the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) as a “proof” against those who disobeyed him and followed false paths. Again, against those who assumed the caliphate, against Mu‘āwiyah and the Umayyad caliphs, against the Abbasid caliphs, and those who acted in accordance with their desires, a proof and argument is established: “Why did you illicitly assume rule over the Muslims? Why did you usurp the caliphate and government, despite your unworthiness?”
God calls to account all oppressive rulers and all governments that act contrary to the criteria of Islam, asking them: “Why did you commit oppression? Why did you squander the property of the Muslims? Why did you organize millenary celebrations?[163] Why did you spend the wealth of the people on the coronation[164] and the abominable festivities that accompanied it?” If one of them should reply: “Given the circumstances of the day, I was unable to act justly, or to relinquish my pretentious, luxurious palaces; I had myself crowned to draw attention to my country and the degree of progress we had achieved,” he will then be answered: “The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was also a ruler; he ruled over all the Muslims and the whole of the broad Islamic realm. Were you more zealous than he in promoting the glory of Islam, the Muslims and the lands of Islam? Was your realm more extensive than his? The country over which you ruled was but a part of his realm; Iraq, Egypt and the Hijāz all belonged to his realm, as well as Iran. Despite this, his seat of command was the mosque: the bench of the judge was situated in one corner of the mosque, while in another, the army would prepare to set out for battle. That army was composed of people who offered their prayers regularly, were firm believers in Islam; you know well how swiftly it advanced and what results it obtained!”
Today, the fuqahā of Islam are proof to the people. Just as the Most Noble Messenger (‘a) was the proof of God---the conduct of all affairs was entrusted to him so that whoever disobeyed him had a proof advanced against him---so, too, the fuqahā are the proof of the Imām (‘a) to the people. All the affairs of the Muslims have been entrusted to them. God will advance a proof and argument against anyone who disobeys them in anything concerning government, the conduct of Muslim affairs, or the gathering and expenditure of public funds.
There can be no doubt concerning the meaning of the tradition we have quoted, although it is possible to have certain reservations about its chain transmission. Nonetheless, even if one does regard the tradition as being in its own right, a proof of the thesis we have advanced, it serves to support the other proofs we have mentioned.
Another tradition that supports our thesis is the maqbūlah[165] of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah. Since this narration refers to a certain verse of the Qur’an, we must first discuss the verse in question as well as the verses that precede it in order to elucidate its meaning, before we go on to examine the tradition.
Verily God commands you to return trusts to their owners, and to act with justice when you rule among men. Verily, God counsels you thus, and God is all hearing, all seeing. O you who believe, obey God and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority from among you [i.e., those entrusted with leadership and government]. When you dispute with each other concerning a thing, refer it to God and His Messenger; if you believe in God and the Last Day, this will be best for you and the result, most beneficial. (4: 58-59)
In these verses, God commands us to return trusts to their owners. Some people believe that what is meant here by “trusts” is twofold: trust pertaining to men (i.e., their property), and those pertaining to the Creator (i.e., the ordinances of the sharī‘ah).[166] The sense of returning the divine trust would then be implementing the ordinances of Islam correctly and completely. Another group of exegetes believes instead that what is intended by “trust” is the imamate.[167] There is indeed a tradition that specifies: “We [the Imāms (‘a)] are those addressed in this verse,” for God Almighty commands the Most Noble Messenger (s) and the Imāms to entrust governance and leadership to their rightful possessors. Thus the Most Noble Messenger (s) entrusted governance to the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), who entrusted it to his successor, and each of his successors among the Imāms (‘a) handed it on in turn.
The verse goes on to say: “and to act with justice when you rule among men.” Those addressed here are the person who holdthe reins of affairs in their hands and conduct the business of government—not judges, for the judge exercises only a juridical function, not a governmental one. The judge is a ruler only in a limited sense; the decrees that he issues are exclusively judicial, not executive. Indeed, in forms of government that have emerged in recent centuries, the judges represent one of the three branches of power, the other two being the executive (consisting of the council of ministers) and the legislative or planning body (the assembly or parliament). More generally, the judiciary is one of the branches of government and it fulfills one of the tasks of government. We must therefore conclude that the phrase “when you rule among men” relates to all the affairs of government, and includes both judges and those belonging to the other branches of power.
Now it has been established that since all the concerns of religion constitute a divine trust; a trust that must be vested in its rightful possessors a part of the trust must inevitably be government. Thus, in accordance with this verse, the conduct of all governmental affairs must be based on the criteria of justice, or to put it differently, on the law of Islam and the ordinances of the sharī‘ah. The judge may not issue an incorrect verdict—i.e., one based on some illegitimate, non-Islamic code—nor may the judicial procedure he follows or the law on which he bases his verdict be non-Islamic and therefore invalid. For example, when those engaged in planning the affairs of the country draw up a fiscal program for the nation, they must not impose unjust taxes on peasants working on publicly owned lands, reducing them to wretchedness and destroying the land and agriculture as a whole through the burden of excessive taxation. If the executive branch of government wishes to implement the juridical ordinances of the law and its penal provisions, they must not go beyond the limits of the law by inflicting extra lashes upon the offender or abusing him.
After the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) had cut off the hands of two thieves, he showed such love and concern in treating them and attending to their needs that they became his enthusiastic supporters. On another occasion, he heard that the plundering army of Mu‘āwiyah had stolen an anklet from the foot of a dhimmi[168] woman. He became so distraught and his sensibilities were so offended that he said in a speech: “If a person were to die in circumstances such as mine, no one would reproach him.” But despite all this sensitivity, the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was a man who would draw his sword when it was necessary—to destroy the workers of corruption—with all the strength he could muster. This is the true meaning of justice.
The Most Noble Messenger (s) is the foremost example of the just ruler. When he gave orders for the conquest of a certain area, the burning of a certain place, or the destruction of a certain group whose existence was harmful for Islam, the Muslims, and mankind in general, his orders were just. If he had not given orders such as these, it would have meant neglecting the welfare of Islam, the Muslims, and human society.
Anyone who rules over the Muslims, or over human society in general, must always take into consideration, the public welfare and interest, and ignore personal feelings and interests. For this reason, Islam is prepared to subordinate individuals to the collective interest of society and has rooted out numerous groups that were a source of corruption and harm to human society.
Since the Jews of Bani Qurayza were a troublesome group, causing corruption in Muslim society and damaging Islam and the Islamic state, the Most Noble Messenger (‘a) eliminated them.[169]
Indeed, there are two essential qualities in a believer: he executes justice whenever necessary, with the utmost force and decisiveness and without exhibiting the least trace of feeling; and he displays the utmost love and solicitude whenever they are called for. In these two ways, the believer comes to serve as a refuge for society. Society, with both Muslim and non-Muslim members, will achieve security and tranquility as the result of government exercised by believers, and everybody will live in ease and without fear. The fact that men in our age live in fear of their rulers is because existing governments are not based on law; they are a form of banditry. But in the case of a government headed by someone like the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), that is, in the case of an Islamic government, only the traitors and oppressors—those who transgress and encroach on the rights of their fellows—suffer fear; for the public at large, fear and anxiety are nonexistent.
In the second of the two verses we have quoted, God Almighty says: “O you who believe, obey God and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority among you” (4:59).
According to a certain tradition, the beginning of the first verse (“return trusts to their owners”) is addressed to the Imāms (‘a), the next part of that verse, concerning rule with justice, is addressed to those who exercise command, and the second verse (“O you who believe…”) is addressed to the entire Muslim people. God commands them to obey Him by following his divine ordinances, and to obey His Most Noble Messenger (s) as well as the holders of authority (i.e., the Imāms) by adhering to their teachings and following their governmental decrees.
I have already said that obedience to the commands of God Almighty is different from obedience to the Most Noble Messenger (s). All the ordinances of divine law, whether or not they relate to worship, are the commands of God and to implement them is to obey God. The Most Noble Messenger (s) did not issue any commands concerning prayer, and if he urged men to pray, it was by way of confirming and implementing God’s command. When we pray, we too are obeying God; obeying the Messenger is different from obeying God.
The commands of the Most Noble Messenger (s) are those that he himself issued in the course of exercising his governmental function, as when, for example, he commanded the Muslims to follow the army of Usāmah,[170] to protect the frontiers of the Islamic state in certain way, to levy taxes on certain categories of people, and in general to interact with people in certain prescribed ways. All of these were commands of the Prophet (s). God has laid upon us the duty of obeying the Messenger (s). It is also our duty to follow and obey the holders of authority, who, according to our beliefs, are the Imāms (‘a). Of course, obedience to their governmental decrees is also a form of obedience to God. Since God Almighty has commanded us to follow the Messenger (s) and the holders of authority, our obeying them is actually an expression of obedience to God.
The verse we have cited continues: “When you dispute with each other concerning a thing, refer it to God and His Messenger.” Disputes that arise among people are of two kinds. First, there is the dispute arising between two groups or two individuals concerning a particular matter or claim. For example, someone may claim that there is a debt owed him, while the order party denies it; the truth of the matter must then be established, in accordance either with the sharī‘ah or with customary law.[171] In such cases one must turn to judges, who will examine the matter and deliver an appropriate verdict. The first kind of dispute then, is a civil one.
The second kind of dispute does not concern a disagreement of this type, but relates to oppression and crime. If a robber takes someone’s property by force, for example, or makes illicit use of people’s property, or if a burglar inters someone’s house and carries off his property, the competent authority to whom one should have recourse is not the judge but the public prosecutor. In such matters as this, which relates to penal not civil law (apart from some cases, which are simultaneously civil and penal), it is primarily the public prosecutor who is the guardian of the law and its ordinances and the protector of society. He begins his task by issuing an indictment, and then the judge examines the matter and delivers a verdict. The verdicts issued, whether civil or penal in nature, are put into effect by another branch of power, the executive.
The Qur’an says, then, in effect: “Whenever a dispute arises among you concerning any matter, your point of reference must be God and His ordinances and the Messenger (s), the executor of those ordinances. The Messenger (s) must receive the ordinances from God and implement them. If any dispute arises among you concerning a debt or loan, the Messenger (s) will intervene in his capacity as judge and deliver a verdict. If other disputes arise involving unlawful coercion or the usurpation of rights, again it is to the Prophet (s) that you should have recourse. Since he is the head of the Islamic state, he is obliged to enact justice. He must dispatch an official whose duty is to recover the usurped right and restore it to its owner. Further, in any matter where people had recourse to the Messenger, recourse must be to the Imāms, and obedience to the Imāms is, in effect, obedience to the Most Noble Messenger (s).”
In short, both of these verses with all their components embrace government in general, as well as judgehood; they are not restricted in any way to the function of judging, quiet aside from the consideration that certain verses of the Qur’an explicitly relate to government in the sense of the executive.
In the next verse, God says: “Have you not looked at those who claim to believe in what was revealed to you and what was revealed before you? They wish to seek justice from tāghūt [illegitimate powers], even though they have been commanded to disbelieve in therein” (4:60). Even if we do not interpret tāghūt as oppressive governments and all illicit forms of power that have revolted against divine government in order to establish monarchy or some other form of rule, we must still interpret it as including both judges and rulers. For customarily, one has recourse to the judicial authorities to initiate legal proceedings and obtain redress and the punishment of the offender, but then, the juridical verdict that they reach must be implemented by the executive power, which usually forms a separate branch of the government. Tyrannical governments—including the judiciary, the executives, and all other components of the state—comprise what is meant by tāghūt, for they have rebelled against divine command by instituting evil laws, implementing them, and then making them the basis of judicial practice. God has commanded us to disbelieve in them; that is, to revolt against them and their commands and ordinances. All who wish to disbelieve, in this sense, in the tāghūt —that is, to rise up in disobedience against illegitimate ruling powers —have a formidable duty that they must strive to fulfill as far as they are able.
Now let us examine the tradition known as the maqbūlah of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah to establish its meaning and intent. ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah says: “I asked Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) whether it was permissible for two of the Shī‘ah who had a disagreement concerning a dept or a legacy to seek the verdict of the ruler or judge. He replied: ‘Any one who has recourse to the ruler or judge, whether his case be just or unjust, has in reality had recourse to tāghūt [i.e. the illegitimate ruling power]. Whatever he obtains as result of their verdict, he will have obtained by forbidden means, even if he has a proven right to it, for he will have obtained it through the verdict and judgment of the tāghūt, that power which God Almighty has commanded him to disbelieve in.’” (“They wish to seek justice from illegitimate powers, even though they have been commanded to disbelieve therein” [4:60].)
‘Umar ibn Hanzalah then asked: “What should these two Shī‘ah do then, under such circumstances?” Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) answered: “They must seek out one of you who narrates our tradition, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well acquainted with our laws and ordinances, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as judge over you.”[172]
As both the beginning and the conclusion of this tradition make clear, and also the reference made by the Imām (‘a) to the Qur’anic verse, the scope of the question put to the Imām was general, and the instructions he gave in response were also of general validity. I said earlier that for the adjudication of both civil and penal cases, one must have recourse to judges, as well as to the executive authorities or general governmental authorities. One has recourse to judges in order to establish the truth, reconcile enmities, or determine punishments; and to the executive authorities, in order to obtain compliance with the verdict given by the judge and the enactment of his verdict, whether the case is civil or penal in nature. It is for reason that in the tradition under discussion the Imām (‘a) was asked whether we may have recourse to the existing rulers and powers, together with their judicial apparatus.
In his answer, the Imām (‘a) condemns all recourse to illegitimate governments, including both their executive and their judicial branches. He forbids the Muslims to have recourse in any of their affairs to kings and tyrannical rulers, as well as to the judges who act as their agents, even if they have some well-established right that they wish to have enforced. Even if a Muslim’s son has been killed or his house has been ransacked, he does not have the right of recourse to oppressive rulers in order to obtain justice. Similarly, if a debt is owed to him and he has irrefutable evidence to that effect, again he may not have recourse to judges who are the servants and appointees of oppressors. If a Muslim does have recourse to them in such cases and obtains his undeniable rights by means of those illegitimate powers and authorities, the result he obtains will be harām,[173] and he will have no right to make use of it. Certain fuqahā have even gone so far as to say that, in cases where property is restored, the same rule applies. For example, if your cloak is stolen from you, and you regain it through the intervention of an illegitimate authority, you have no right to wear it. This particular ruling is open to discussion, but there is no doubt in more general cases. For example, if someone has a debt owed to him, and, in order to obtain it, has recourse to a body or authority other than that specified by God, and he subsequently receives his due, he may not legitimately put it to use. The fundamental criteria of the sharī‘ah make this necessary.
So this is the political ruling of Islam. It is a ruling that makes Muslims refrain from having recourse to illegitimate powers and their appointed judges, so that non-Islamic and oppressive regimes may fall and the top-heavy judicial systems that produce nothing for the people but trouble may be abolished. This, in turn would open the way for having recourse to the Imāms (‘a) and those to whom they have assigned the right to govern and judge. The main purpose was to prevent kings and the judges appointed by them from attaining any form of authority, and people not to follow them. It has been declared to the Islamic nation that they are not authorities whom to be referred for God Himself had commanded men to disbelieve in kings and unjust rulers (i.e., to rebel against them),[174] and to have recourse to them would conflict with this duty. If you disbelieve in them and regard them as oppressors who are unfit to rule you must not have recourse to them.
What then is the duty of the Islamic community in this respect? What are they to do when new problems occur and dispute arises among them? To what authority should they have recourse? In the tradition previously quoted, the Imām (‘a) said: “They must seek out one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden”—that is, whenever disputes arise among them, they should seek to have them resolved by those who narrate our hadith, are acquainted with what God has made permissible or forbidden, and comprehend our ordinances in accordance with the criteria of reason and the sharī‘ah. The Imām (‘a) did not leave any room for ambiguity lest someone say: “So, scholars of traditions are also to act as authorities and judges.” The Imām (‘a) mentioned all the necessary qualifications and specified that the person to whom we have recourse must be able to give an opinion concerning what is permissible and forbidden in accordance with the well-known rules, must be knowledgeable with the ordinances of Islam, and must be aware of the criteria needed to identify the traditions originating in taqiyyah or similar circumstances (which are not to be taken as valid). It is obvious that such knowledge of the ordinances of Islam and expertise in the science of tradition is different from mere ability to narrate tradition.
In the same tradition the Imām (‘a) goes on to say: “I appoint him as ruler over you”—that is, “I appoint as ruler over you one who possesses such qualifications; I appoint anyone who possesses them to conduct the governmental and judicial affairs of the Muslims, and the Muslims do not have the right to have recourse to anyone other than him.” Therefore, if a robber steals your property, you should bring your complaint to the authorities appointed by the Imām (‘a). If you have a dispute with someone concerning debt or a loan and you need the truth of the matter to be established, again you should refer the matter to the judge appointed by the Imām (‘a), and not to anyone else. This is the universal duty of all Muslims, not simply of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah, who, when confronted by a particular problem, obtained the ruling.
This decree issued by the Imām (‘a), then, is general and universal in scope. For just as the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), while he exercised rule, appointed governors and judges whom all Muslims were bound to obey, so, too, Imām as-Sādiq (‘a), holding absolute authority and empowerment to rule over all the ‘ulamā, the fuqahā, and the people at large, was able to appoint rulers and judges not only for his own lifetime, but also for subsequent ages. This indeed he did, naming the fuqahāas “rulers,” so that no one might presume that their function was restricted to judicial affairs and divorced from the other concerns of government.
We may also deduce from the beginning and end of this tradition, as well as from the Qur’anic verse to which it refers, that the Imām (‘a) was not concerned simply with the appointing of judges and did not leave other duties of the Muslims unclarified, for otherwise, one of the two questions posed to him—that concerned with seeking justice from illicit executive authorities—would have remained unanswered.
This tradition is perfectly clear; there are no doubts surrounding its chain of transmission or its meaning. No one can doubt that the Imām (‘a) designated the fuqahā to exercise the functions of both government and judgeship. It is the duty of all Muslims to obey this decree of the Imām (‘a).
In order to clarify the matter still further, I will adduce additional traditions, beginning with that of Abū Khadījah.
Abū Khadījah, one of the trusted companions of Imām as-Sādiq (‘a), relates: “I was commanded by the Imām (‘a) to convey the following message to our friends [i.e., the Shī‘ah]: ‘When enmity and dispute arise among you, or you disagree concerning the receipt or payment of a sum of money, be sure not to refer the matter to one of these malefactors for judgment. Designate as judge and arbiter someone among you who is acquainted with our injunctions concerning what is permitted and what is prohibited, for I appoint such a man as judge over you. Let none of you take your complaint against another of you to the tyrannical ruling power.’ ”[175]
The meaning of the phrase “dispute concerning a thing” relates to civil disputes, so that the first part of the Imām’s decree means that we are not to have recourse to the malefactors. Concerning part of the tradition which says “I appoint such a man as judge over you” it becomes clear that ‘malefactors’ means those judges whom the rulers of the day and illegitimate governments have allowed to occupy the position of judge. The Imām (‘a) goes on to say “Let none of you take your complaint against another of you to the tyrannical ruling power.” That is to say, “Whatever personal disputes arise among you, do not have recourse to tyrannical authorities and illegitimate powers; do not seek their aid in matters relating to the executive.” The expression “tyrannical ruler” refers, in general, to all illegitimate powers and authorities (that is, all non-Islamic rulers) and embraces all three branches of government—judicial, legislative and executive. Considering that earlier in the tradition, recourse to tyrannical judges is prohibited, however, it appears that this second prohibition relates to the executive branch. The final sentence is not a repetition of the preceding statement. First, the Imām prohibits having recourse to impious judges in the various matters that are their concern (interrogation, the establishment of proof, and so on), designates those who may act as judge, and clarifies the duties of his followers. Then he declares that they must refrain from having recourse to illegitimate rulers. This makes it plain that the question of judges is separate from that of having recourse to illegitimate authority; they are two different subjects. Both are mentioned in the tradition of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah; there, the seeking of justice from both illegitimate authorities and judges is forbidden. In the tradition of Abū Khadijah the Imām (‘a) has appointed only judges, but in that reported by ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah the Imām (‘a) has designated both those who are to act as ruler and executive and those who are to act as judge.
In accordance with the tradition narrated Abu Khadījah, then, the Imām (‘a) designated the fuqahā as judges in his own lifetime, and according to that narrated by ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah, he assigned them both governmental and judicial authority. We must now examine whether the fuqahā automatically forfeited those functions when the Imām (‘a) left this world? Were all the judges and rulers appointed by the Imāms (‘a) somehow dismissed from their functions when the Imāms (‘a) left?
The governance of the Imāms (‘a) differs, of course, from that of all others; according to the Shi‘ah school, all the commands and instructions of the Imāms (‘a) must be obeyed, both during their lifetime and after their death. But, aside from this consideration, let us see what becomes of the functions and duties they have assigned in this world to the fuqahā.
In all existing forms of government whether monarchical, republican, or following some other model, if the head of state dies or circumstances change so that there is a change in administration, military ranks and appointments are not affected. For example, a general will not automatically be deprived of his rank, an ambassador will not be dismissed from his post, and a minister of finance or a provincial or local governor will not be removed. The new administration or successor administration may, of course, dismiss or transfer them from their posts, but their functions are not automatically withdrawn from them.
Obviously, certain powers do automatically terminate with death of the person who conferred them. Such is the case with ijāza-yi hasbiyyah, the authority given to someone by a faqīh to fulfill certain tasks on his behalf in a given town; when the faqīh dies, this authority expires. But, in another case, if a faqīh appoints a guardian for a minor or a trustee for an endowment, the appointments he makes are not annulled by his death but continue in force.
The judicial and governmental functions assigned by the Imāms to the fuqahā of Islam are retained permanently. The Imām (‘a) was certainly aware of all aspects of the matter, and there can be no possibility of carelessness on his part. He must have known that in all governments of the world the position and authority of individual officeholders is not affected by the death or departure of the head of state. If he had intended that the right to govern and judge should be withdrawn after his death from the fuqahā whom he had designated, he would have specified that to be the case, saying: “The fuqahā are to exercise these functions as long as I live.”
According to this tradition, then, the ‘ulamā of Islam have been appointed by the Imām (‘a) to the positions of ruler and judge, and these positions belong to them in perpetuity. The possibility that the next Imām would have annulled this decree and dismissed the fuqahā from these twin functions is extremely small. For the Imām forbade the Muslims to have recourse to kings and their appointed judges for obtaining their rights, and designated recourse to them as equivalent to recourse to the tāghūt; then, referring to the verse that ordains disbelief in tāghūt,[176] he appointed legitimate judges and rulers for the people. If his successor as Imām were not to have assigned the same functions to the fuqahā or to the new ones, what should the Muslims have done, and how would they have resolved their differences and disputes? Should they have had recourse to sinners and oppressors, which would have been equivalent to recourse to the tāghūt and thus a violation of divine command? Or should they have had recourse to no one at all, depriving themselves of all authority and refuge, which would have allowed anarchy to take over, with people freely usurping each other’s property, transgressing against each other’s rights, and being completely unrestrained in all they did?
We are certain that if Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) assigned these functions to the fuqahā, neither his son Mūsā (‘a) nor any of the succeeding Imāms (‘a) abrogated them. Indeed, it is not possible for them to have abrogate these functions and said: “Henceforth, do not have recourse to the just fuqahā for the settlement of your affairs; instead, turn to kings, or do nothing at all and allow your rights to be trampled underfoot.”
Naturally, if an Imām appoints a judge to a certain city, his successor may dismiss that judge and appoint another in his place, but the positions and functions that have been established cannot themselves be abolished. That is self-evident.
The tradition that I shall now quote supports the thesis I have been advancing. If the only proof I had were one of the traditions I have been citing, I would be unable to substantiate my claim. Its essence, however, has been proved by the traditions already cited; what follows now is by way of supplementary evidence. Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) relates that the Prophet (s) said: “For whomever travels a path in search of knowledge, God opens up a path to paradise, and the angels lower their wings before him as a sign of their being well pleased [or God’s being well pleased]. All that is in the heavens and on earth, even the fish in the ocean, seeks forgiveness for him. The superiority of the learned man over the mere worshipper is like that of the full moon over the stars. Truly the scholars are the heirs of prophets (‘a); the prophets bequeathed not a single dinār or dirham; instead they bequeathed knowledge, and whoever acquires it has indeed acquired a generous portion of their legacy.”[177]
The links in the chain of transmission of this tradition are all trustworthy; in fact, Ibrāhīm ibn Hāshim, father of ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhīm, is not moderately trustworthy but outstandingly so. The same tradition has been narrated with a slightly different text by another chain of transmission, one that is sound as far as Abū ’l-Bukhtūri although Abū’l-Bukhtūri himself is of questionable reliability. Here is the second version of the tradition: “Muhammad ibn Yahyā relates, on the authority of Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Īsā, who was told it by Muhammad ibn Khālid, to whom it was narrated by Abū ’l- Bukhtūri, that Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq (‘a) said: ‘The scholars are the heirs of the prophets, for although the prophets bequeathed not a single dinār or dirham, they bequeathed their sayings and traditions. Whoever, then, acquires a portion of their traditions has indeed acquired a generous portion of their legacy. Therefore, see from whom you may acquire this knowledge, for among us, the Family of the Prophet, there are in each generation just and honest people who will repel those who distort and exaggerate, those who initiate false practices, and those who offer foolish interpretations [that is, they will purify and protect religion from the influence of such biased and ignorant people and others like them].’ ”[178]
Our purpose in citing this tradition (which has also been referred to by the late Narāqi) is that it clarifies the meaning of the expression: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets.” There are several matters that must be explained at this point.
First, who are “the scholars”? Is it intended to mean the scholars of the Muslim community or the Imāms (‘a)? Some people are of the opinion probably the Imāms are intended. But it would appear that, on the contrary, the scholars of the community—the ‘ulamā—are intended. The tradition itself indicates this, for the virtues and qualities of the Imāms (‘a) that have mentioned elsewhere are quite different from what this tradition contains. The statement that the prophets (‘a) have bequeathed traditions and whoever learns those traditions acquires a generous portion of their legacy cannot serve as a definition of the Imāms. It must therefore refer to the scholars of the community. In addition, in the version narrated by Abū ’l-Bukhtūri, after the phrase: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets,” we read: “Therefore, see from whom you may acquire this knowledge.” It seems that what is intended here is that, indeed, the scholars are the heirs of the prophets, but one must be careful in the choice of a person from whom to acquire the knowledge the prophets have bequeathed. It will contradict the obvious meaning of the tradition, therefore, to maintain that the Imāms are intended by the expression “heirs of the prophets” and that it is from them that people must acquire knowledge. Anyone acquainted with the traditions that relate to the status of the Imāms (‘a) and the rank accorded them by the Most Noble Messenger (s) will immediately realize that it is not the Imāms but the scholars of the community who are intended in this tradition. Similar qualities and epithets have been used for the scholars in numerous other traditions; e.g., “The scholars of my community are like the prophets preceding me,” and “The scholars of my community are like the prophets of the Children of Israel.”
To conclude, then, it is obvious that the ‘ulamā—the scholars—are intended here.
There is a second objection that might be raised here, which calls for clarification. It might be said that the expression: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets” cannot be used as a proof of our thesis—the governance of the faqīh—since the prophets (anbiyā) have only one dimension of prophethood, which is that they derive knowledge from an exalted source by means of revelation, inspiration, or some other method, and this does not imply or require rule over the people or the believers. If God Almighty has not bestowed leadership and rule on the prophets, they can in no wise possess it; they are only prophets in the narrow sense of the word. If they have been ordained to communicate the knowledge they have received, then it will be their duty at most to communicate it to the people. For in our traditions, a distinction is made between the prophet (nabī) and the messenger (rasūl): the latter has the mission of communicating the knowledge he has received, while the former merely receives it. In addition, the state of prophethood (nubuwwat) is different from that of governance (wilāyat), and it is this titular designation of “prophet” (nabī) that has been used in this tradition. The scholars have been made the successors of the prophets with respect to this titular designation, and since this designation does not imply or necessitate governance (wilāyat), we cannot deduce from the tradition that the scholars are to possess governance. If the Imām had said that the scholars hold the rank of Moses or Jesus, we would naturally infer that the scholars possess all of the aspects and qualities of Moses or Jesus, including governance, but since he did not say this and did not assign to the scholars the rank of any particular person among the prophets, we cannot draw that particular conclusion from the tradition in question.
In answer to this objection, it must first be stated that the criterion for the understanding of traditions and their wording must be common usage and current understanding, not precise technical analysis, and we, too, follow this criterion. Once a faqīh tries to introduce subtle technical points into the understanding of traditions, many matters become obscured. So, if we examine the expression: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets” in the light of common usage, will it occur to us that only the titular designation of “prophet” is intended in the tradition, and that the scholars are heirs only to what is implied in that designation? Or on the contrary, does this expression provide a general principle that can be applied to individual prophets? To put it differently, if we were to ask someone who is aware only of the common usage of word, “Is such-and-such a faqīh a successor of Moses and Jesus?” He would answer—in the light of the tradition under discussion—“Yes, because Moses and Jesus are prophets.” Again, if we were to ask, “Is the faqīh an heir to the Most Noble Messenger (s)?” he would answer, “Yes, because the Most Noble Messenger is one of the prophets.”
We cannot, therefore, take the word “prophets” as a titular designation, particularly since it is in the plural. If the singular “prophet” were used in the tradition, then it might be possible that only the titular designation was intended, but since the plural is used, it means “every one of the prophets,” not “every one of the prophets with respect to that by virtue of which they are prophets.” This latter sense would indeed indicate that the titular designation exclusively was intended, as distinct from all other designations, so that the expression would come to mean, “The faqīh enjoys the stature of the prophet (nabī), but not that of the messenger (rasūl) nor that of the ruler (wali).” Analyses and interpretations like these, however, go against both common usage and reason.
For a third objection, let us suppose that the scholars are given the stature of the prophets with respect to their titular designation, with respect to that by virtue of which they are prophets. We must then regard the scholars as possessing all the attributes that God Almighty has designated the prophets as possessing, in accordance with this same equation of the scholars with the prophets. If, for example, some one says that so-and-so enjoys the same rank as the just and says next that we must honor the just, we infer from the two statements taken together that we must honor the person in question. This being the case, we can infer from the Qur’anic verse: “The prophet has higher claims on the believers than their own selves” (33:6) that the ‘ulamā possess the function of governance just as the prophet does. For what is implicit in having “higher claims” is precisely governance and command. In commenting upon the verse in question, the work Majma‘ al-Bahrayn[179] cites a tradition of Imām al-Bāqir (‘a): “This verse was revealed concerning governance and command”. The prophet, then, is empowered to rule and govern over the believers, and the same rule and governance that has been established for the Most Noble Messenger (s) is also established for the scholars for both in the verse quoted and in the tradition under discussion the titular designation “prophet” has been used.
We can, moreover, refer to a number of verses that designate the prophet as possessing various qualities and attributes, as, for example: “Obey God and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority from among you” (Qur’an, 4:59). Although a distinction is made in certain traditions between “prophet” and “messenger” with respect to the mode of revelation, rationally and in common usage the two words denote the same meaning. According to common usage, the “prophet” is one who receives tidings from God, and the “messenger” is one who conveys to mankind what he has received from God.
A fourth objection might also be raised. The ordinances that the Most Noble Messenger (s) left are a form of legacy, even though they are not designated technically as such, and those who take up those ordinances are his heirs. But what proof is there that the function of governance that the Prophet (s) exercised could be bequeathed and inherited? It might be that what could be bequeathed and inherited consisted only of his ordinances and his traditions, for the tradition states that the prophets bequeathed knowledge, or, in the version narrated by Abu ’l-Bukhturi, that they bequeathed “a legacy of their sayings and traditions.” It is apparent, then, that they bequeathed their traditions, but governance cannot be bequeathed or inherited.
This objection is also unjustified. For governance and command are extrinsic and rational matters; concerning these matters, we must have recourse to rational persons. We might ask them whether they regard the transfer of governance and rule from one person to another by way of bequest as possible. For example, if a rational person is asked, “Who is heir to the rule in such-and-such a country?” will he answer that the position of ruler cannot be inherited, or say instead that such-and-such a person is the heir to the crown and the throne? “Heir the throne” is a well-known current expression. There can be no doubt that rationally speaking governance can be transferred from one person to another just like property that is inherited. If one considers first the verse: “The prophet has higher claims on the believers than their own selves,” and then the tradition: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets,” he will realize that both refer to the same thing: extrinsic matters that are rationally capable of being transferred from one person to another.
If the phrase: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets” referred to the Imāms (‘a)—as does the tradition to the effect that the Imāms are the heirs of the Prophet (s) in all things—we would not hesitate to say that the Imāms are indeed the heirs of Prophet in all things, and no one could say that the legacy intended here refers only to knowledge and legal questions. So if we had before us only the sentence: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets” and could disregard the beginning and end of the tradition, it would appear that all functions of the Most Noble Messenger (‘a) that were capable of being transmitted—including rule over people—and that devolved on the Imāms after him, pertain also to the fuqahā, with the exception of those functions that must be excluded for other reasons and which we too exclude wherever there is reason to do so.
The major problem still remaining is that the sentence: “The scholars are heirs of the prophets” occurs in a context suggesting that the traditions of the prophets constitute their legacy. The authentic tradition narrated by Qaddāh reads: “The prophets bequeathed not a single dinār or dirham; instead they bequeathed knowledge.” That related by Abū ’l–Bukhtūri reads: “Although the prophets did not bequeath a single dinār or dirham; they bequeathed their sayings and traditions.” These statements provide a context suggesting that the legacy of the prophets is their traditions, and that nothing else has survived of them that might be inherited, particularly since the particle “innamā” occurs in the text of the tradition, indicating exclusivity.
But even this objection is faulty. For if the meaning were indeed that the Most Noble Messenger (s) had left nothing of himself that might be inherited except his traditions, this would contradict the very bases of our Shi’ah school. The Prophet (s) did indeed leave things that could be inherited, and there is no doubt that among them was his exercise of rule over the community, which was transmitted by him to the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), and then to each of the other Imāms (‘a) in succession. The particle “innamā” does not always indicate exclusivity, and indeed there are doubts that it ever does; in addition, “innamā” does not occur in the text narrated by Qaddāh, but only in that related by Abu ’l- Bukhturi whose chain of transmission is weak, as I have already said.
Now let us examine in turn each of the sentences in the text narrated by Qaddāh in order to see whether the context does, in fact, indicate that the legacy of the prophets consists exclusively of their traditions.
“For whoever travels a path in search of knowledge, God opens up a path to paradise.” This is a sentence in praise of scholars, but not in praise of any scholar, so that we imagine the sentence to be uniformly praising all types of scholar. Look up the traditions in al-Kāfi concerning the attributes and duties of scholars, and you will see that in order to become a scholar and an heir of the prophets, it is not enough to study a few lines. The scholar also has duties he must perform, and therein lies the real difficulty of his calling.
“The angels lower their wings before him as a sign of their being well pleased with him.” The meaning of “lower their wings” is obvious to those who concern themselves with these matters. It is an act signifying humility and respect.
“All that is in the heavens and on earth, even the fish in the ocean, seeks forgiveness for him.” This sentence does not require detailed explanation because it is not relevant to our present theme.
“The superiority of the learned man over the mere worshipper is like that of the full moon over the stars.” The meaning of this sentence is clear.
“Truly the scholars are the heirs of the prophets.” The entire tradition, from its beginning down to and including this sentence, is in praise of the scholars and in exposition of their virtues and qualities, one of these qualities being that they are the heirs of the prophets. Being the heirs of the prophets becomes a virtue for the scholars when they exercise governance and rule over people, like the prophets, and obedience to them is a duty.
The meaning of the next expression in the tradition, “The prophets bequeathed not a single dinār or dirham,” is not that they bequeathed nothing but learning and traditions. Rather it is an indication that although the prophets exercised authority and ruler over people, they were men of God, not materialistic creatures trying to accumulate worldly wealth. It also implies that the form of government exercised by the prophets was different from monarchies and other current forms of government, which have served as means for the enrichment and gratification of the rulers.
The way of life of the Most Noble Messenger (s) was extremely simple. He did not use his authority and position to enrich his material life in the hope of leaving a legacy. What he did leave behind was knowledge, the most noble of all things, and in particular, knowledge derived from God Almighty. Indeed, the singling out of knowledge for mention in this tradition may have been precisely because of its nobility.
It cannot be said that since the qualities of the scholars are mentioned in this verse together with their being heirs to knowledge and not heirs to property, therefore, the scholars are heirs only to knowledge and traditions.
In certain cases, the phrase: “What we leave behind is charity” has been added to the tradition, but it does not truly belong there. Found only in Sunni versions of the traditions, it has been added for political reasons.[180]
The most we can say with respect to the context these sentences provide for the statement: “The scholars are heirs to the prophets” is that the statement cannot be taken in an absolute sense, which would mean that everything that pertains to the prophets also pertains to the scholars. Nor can the statement, because of its context, be taken in the restricted sense that the scholars are heirs only to the knowledge of the prophets. If that were sense, the tradition would contradict the other traditions we quoted earlier in connection with our theme and tend to neglect them. This restricted sense cannot be derived from this.
For the sake of argument, if it were true that this tradition means that the Most Noble Messenger (s), left no legacy but knowledge, and that rulership and governance can be neither bequeathed nor inherited, and if, too, we did not infer from the Prophet’s saying: “‘Ali is my heir” that the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was indeed his successor, then we would be obliged to have recourse to nass[181] with respect to the successorship of the Commander of the Faithful and the remaining Imāms (‘a). We would then follow the same method with respect to the exercise of governance by the faqīh, for according to the tradition cited above, the fuqahā have been appointed to the function of successorship and rule. Thus, we have reconciled this tradition with those that indicate appointment.
In his ‘Awā’id,[182] Narāqi quotes the following tradition from the Fiqh-i Razāvi:[183] “The rank of the faqīh in the present age is like that of the prophets of the Children of Israel.” Naturally, we cannot claim that the Fiqh-i Razāvi was actually composed by Imām Ridā (‘a), but it is permissible to quote it as a further support for our thesis.
It must be understood that what is meant by “the prophets of the Children of Israel” is indeed the prophets, not fuqahā who lived in the time of Moses and may have been called prophets for some reason or other. The fuqahā who lived in the time of Moses were all subject to his authority, and exercised their functions in obedience to him. It may be that when he dispatched them somewhere to convey a message, he would also appoint them as “holder of authority”—naturally, we are not precisely informed about these matters—but it is obvious that Moses himself was one of the prophets of the Children of Israel, and that all of the functions that existed for the Most Noble Messenger (s) also existed for Moses, with a difference, of course, in rank, station, and degree. We deduce from the general scope of the word “rank” in this tradition, therefore, that the same function of rulership and governance that Moses exercised exists also for fuqahā.
The Jāmi’ al-Akhbār[184] contains the following tradition of the Most Noble Messenger (s): “On the Day of Judgment I will take pride in the scholars of my community, for the scholars of my community are like the prophets preceding me.” This tradition also serves to support my thesis.
In the Mustadrak,[185] a tradition is quoted from the Ghurār[186] to the following effect: “The scholars are rulers over the people.” One version reads “hukamā” (“wise men”) instead of “hukkām” (“rulers”), but this appears to be incorrect. According to the Ghurār, the form “hukkām” is correct. The meaning of this tradition is self-evident, and if its chain of transmission is valid, it may also serve to support my thesis.
There are still additional traditions that may be quoted. One of them is quoted in Tuhāf al-‘Uqūl[187] under the heading: “The Conduct of Affairs and the Enforcement of Ordinances by the Scholars.” This tradition consists of two parts. The first is a tradition transmitted by the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) from the Commander of the Faithful, ‘Ali (‘a), and concerns the enjoining of the good and the prohibition of the evil. The second part is the speech of the Doyen of the Martyrs concerning the governance of the faqīh and the duties that are incumbent upon the fuqahā, such as the struggle against oppressors and tyrannical governments in order to establish an Islamic government and implement the ordinances of Islam. In the course of this celebrated speech, which he delivered at Mīnah,[188] he set forth the reasons for his own jihād against the tyrannical Umayyad state. Two important themes may be deduced from this tradition. The first is the principle of the governance of the faqīh, and the second is that the fuqahā, by means of jihād and enjoying the good and forbidding the evil, must expose and overthrow tyrannical rulers and rouse the people so that the universal movement of all alert Muslims can establish Islamic government in place of tyrannical regimes.
This is the tradition.[189] The Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) said: “O people, take heed of the counsel God gave His friends when he rebuked the rabbis by saying, ‘Why do their scholars and rabbis not forbid their sinful talk and consumption of what is forbidden [that is, such talk and consumption on the part of the Jews]? Truly what they have done is evil’ (Qur’an, 5:63). Again God says: “Cursed by the tongue of David and Jesus, son of Mary, are those among the Children of Israel who have failed to believe on account of their rebellion and transgression. They did not prevent each other from committing vile and corrupt acts; truly what they did was abominable!” (Qur’an, 5:78). God blamed and reproached them because they saw with their own eyes the oppressors committing vile and corrupt acts but did not stop them, out of love for the income they received from them as well as fear of persecution and injury. However, God orders us to fear Him, not men, and He says: “And the believing men and women are friends and protectors of each other; they enjoin the good and forbid the evil” (Qur’an, 9:71).
“We see that this verse, in the course of enumerating the attributes of the believers, the attributes that indicate mutual affection, solitude, and desire to guide each other, God begins with enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, considering this the prime duty. For He knows that if this duty is performed and is established within society, performance of all other duties will follow, from the easiest to the most difficult. The reason for this is that enjoining the good and forbidding the evil means summoning people to Islam, which is a struggle to establish correct belief in the face of external opposition, while at the same time vindicating the rights of the oppressed; opposing and struggling against oppressors within the community; and endeavoring to ensure that public wealth and the income derived from war are distributed in accordance with the just laws of Islam, and that taxes [zakāt and all other forms of fiscal income, whether compulsory or voluntary] are collected, levied, and expended in due and proper form.
“O scholars, you who are celebrated and enjoy good repute on account of your learning! You have achieved fame in society because of your devotion, the good counsel you impart, and the guidance you dispense. It is on account of God that men venerate and stand in awe of you, so that even the powerful fear you and feel compelled to rise respectfully before you, and men who are not subject to you and over whom you hold no authority willingly regard themselves as your subordinates and grant you favors they deny themselves. When the people do not receive their due from the public treasury, you intervene and act with the awesomeness and imperiousness of monarchs and the stature of the great. Have you not earned all these forms of respect and prestige because of men’s hopes that you will implement God’s laws, even though in most instances you have failed to do so?
“You have failed to enforce most of the rights you were entrusted to preserve. For instance, you have neglected the rights of the oppressed and the lowly, squandered the rights of the weak and the powerless, but pursed assiduously what you regard as your personal rights. You have not spent your money or risked your lives for the sake of the One Who gave you life, nor have you fought against any group or tribe for the sake of God. You desire, and regard it as your due, that He should grant you paradise, the company of the Prophet, and security from hellfire in the hereafter. You who have such expectations of God, I fear that the full weight of His wrath will descend upon you, for although it is by his might and glory that you have achieved high rank, you show no respect to those who truly know God and wish to disseminate their knowledge while you yourselves enjoy respect among God’s bondsmen on His account.
“I am also afraid for you for another reason: you see the covenants enacted with God[190] being violated and trampled underfoot; yet you show no anxiety. When it comes to the covenants enacted with your fathers, you become greatly disturbed and anxious if they are only violated in part, but the pledges you have given to the Most Noble Messenger[191] are a matter of complete indifference to you. The blind, the dumb, and the poverty-stricken cultivators of the land everywhere lack protectors and no mercy is shown them. You do not behave in accordance with your function and rank, nor do you support or pay any regard to those who do so behave and who strive to promote the standing of the religious scholars. You purchase your safety from the oppressive ruling powers with flattery, cajolery and compromise.
“All these activities have been forbidden you by God, and He has, moreover, commanded you to forbid each other to engage in them, but you pay no attention. The disaster that has befallen you is greater than what has befallen others, for the true rank and degree of ‘ulamā has been taken away from you. The administration of the country, the issuing of judicial decrees, and the approving of legislative programs should actually be entrusted to religious scholars who are guardians of the rights of God and knowledgeable about God’s ordinances concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden. But your position has been usurped from you, for no other reason than that you have abandoned the pivot of truth—the law of Islam and God’s decree—and have disagreed about the nature of the Sunnah, despite the existence of clear proofs.
“If you were true men, strong in the face of torture and suffering and prepared to endure hardship for God’s sake, then all proposed regulations would be brought to you for your approval and for you to issue; authority would lie in your hands. But you allowed the oppressors to take away your function, and permitted that the government, which is supposed to be regulated by the provisions of the sharī‘ah, to fall into their hands so that they administer it on the shaky basis of their own conjectures and suppositions and make arbitrariness and the satisfaction of lust their consistent practice. What enabled them to gain control of government was your fleeing in panic from being killed, your attachment to the transitory life of this world. With that mentality and the conduct it inspires, you have delivered the powerless masses into the clutches of the oppressors. While some cringe like slaves under the blows of the oppressors, and others search in misery and desperation for bread and water, the rulers are entirely absorbed in the pleasures of kingship, earning shame and disgrace for themselves with their licentiousness, following evil counselors, and showing impudence toward God. One of their appointed spokesmen mounts the minbar[192] in each city. The soil of the homeland is defenseless before them, and they grab freely whatever they want of it. The people are their slaves, and are powerless to defend themselves. One ruler is a dictator by nature, malevolent and rancorous; another represses his wretched subjects ruthlessly, plundering by imposing on them all kinds of burdens; and still another refuses in his absolutism to recognize either God or the Day of Judgment! Is it not strange—how can one not think it strange—that society is in the clutches of a cunning oppressor whose tax collectors are oppressors and whose governors feel no compassion or mercy toward the believers under their rule?
“It is God Who will judge concerning what is at dispute among us and deliver a decisive verdict concerning all that occurs among us.
“O God! You know that everything we did [that is, the struggle in which they had recently engaged against the Umayyads] was not prompted by rivalry for political power, nor by a search for wealth and abundance; rather it was done in order to demonstrate to men the shining principles and values of Your religion, to reform the affairs of Your land, to protect and secure the indisputable rights of Your oppressed servants, and to act in accordance with the duties You have established and the norms, laws, and ordinances You have decreed.
“So, O scholars of religion! You are to help us reach this goal, win back our rights from those powers who have considered it acceptable to wrong you and who have attempted to put out the light kindled by your Prophet. God the One suffices us—upon Him do we rely, to Him do we turn, in His hands lies our fate, and to Him shall we return.”
When the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) said at the beginning of this sermon: “O people, take heed of the counsel God gave His friends when He rebuked the rabbis,” his address was not restricted to a particular group of people—those present in the assembly, the inhabitants of a certain city, town, or country, or even all people alive in the world at the time. Rather it embraces all who hear the summons at whatever time, for it begins with the expression “O people” (yā ayyuha ’n-nās), which occurs in the Qur’an with the same universal meaning.[193] When God rebukes the rabbis—the Jewish scholars—and condemns their behavior, He is at the same time addressing His friends (awliyā) and advising them. The word “awliyā” means here those who have set their faces toward God and hold responsible positions in society, not the Twelve Imāms.[194]
God says in the verse we are examining: “Why do their scholars and rabbis not forbid their sinful talk and consumption of what is forbidden? Truly what they have done is evil.” Thus He reproaches the rabbit and Jewish religious scholars for failing to prevent the oppressors’ sinful talk—a term that includes lying, slander, distorting the truth, and so forth—and consumption of what is forbidden. It is obvious that, this reproach and upbraiding is not confined to the scholars of the Jews, nor for that matter to those of the Christians; it applies also to the religious scholars in Islamic society, or indeed, any other society. If the religious scholars of Islamic society are silent, therefore, in the face of the policies of the oppressors, they too are reproached and condemned by God; and here there is no distinction between scholars of the past, present, and future—they are equal in this regard. The Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) made reference to this verse of Qur’an so that the religious scholars of Islamic society would take heed, awaken, and no longer neglect their duty of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil or stay silent in the face of the oppressive and deviant ruling classes.
There are two points to which he draws attention by citing this verse. First, the religious scholars’ neglect of their duties is more harmful than the failure of others to perform their normal duties. If a bazaar merchant, for example, does something wrong, it is only he who suffers the harm that results. But if the religious scholars fail in fulfilling their duties, by keeping silent, let us say, in the face of tyranny, Islam itself suffers as a result. But if, on the contrary, they act in accordance with their duty and speak out when they should, eschewing silence, then Islam itself will benefit.
Secondly, although all things contrary to the sharī‘ah must be forbidden, emphasis has been placed on sinful talk and consumption of what is forbidden, implying that these two evils are more dangerous than all the others and must therefore be more diligently combated. Sometimes the statements and propaganda put forth by oppressive regimes are more harmful to Islam and the Muslims than their actions and policy, endangering the whole repute of Islam and the Muslims. God reproaches the religious scholars, therefore, for failing to prevent the oppressors from uttering dishonest words and spreading sinful propaganda. He says in effect: “Why did they not denounce the man who falsely claimed to be God’s vicegerent on earth and the instrument of His will, who claimed to be enforcing God’s laws in the right way and to have a correct understanding and practice of Islamic justice, even though he was incapable of comprehending what justice is? Claims like these are a form of sinful talk that is extremely harmful to society. Why did the religious scholars not prevent them from being made? The tyrants who uttered this nonsense talk and committed treason and brought evil innovations[195] into Islam; why did the religious scholars not stand in their way and make them desist from these sins?
If someone interprets God’s ordinances in a way displeasing to Him, thus introducing an evil innovation in Islam, or executes laws that are anti-Islamic, claiming to be acting in accordance with the requirements of Islamic justice, it is the duty of the religious scholars to proclaim their opposition. If they fail to do so, they will be cursed by God, as is apparent both from the verse under discussion and from this tradition: “When evil innovations appear, it is the duty of the scholars to bring forth his knowledge [by condemning them]; otherwise, God’s curse will be upon him.”
In such cases, the expression of opposition and the expounding of God’s teachings and ordinances that stand in contradiction to innovation, oppression, and sin, are also useful in themselves, for they make the masses aware of the corruption of society and the wrongdoing of the treacherous, sinful, and irreligious rulers. The people will then rise up in revolt and refuse to collaborate any longer with the tyrants or to obey corrupt and treacherous ruling powers. The expression of opposition by religious scholars is a form of “forbidding the evil” on the part of the religious leadership, which creates in its wake a wave of broad opposition and “forbidding the evil” on the part of all religiously inclined and honorable people. If the oppressive and deviant rulers do not bow to the wishes of such an oppositional movement by returning to the straight path of Islam and obedience to God’s laws, but attempt to silence it by force of arms, they will, in effect, have engaged in armed aggression against the Muslims and acquired the status of a rebellious group (fī’a bāghiya). It will then be the duty of the Muslims to engage in an armed jihād against that ruling group in order to make the policies of the ruling society and the norms of government conform to the principles and ordinances of Islam.
It is true that at present, you do not have the power to prevent the innovative practices of the rulers or to halt the corruption in which they are engaged. But at least do not stay silent. If they strike you on head, cry out in protest! Do not submit to oppression; such submission is worse than oppression itself. In order to counteract their press and propaganda apparatus, we must create our own apparatus to refuse whatever lies they issue and to proclaim that Islamic justice is not what they claim it is, but on the contrary, has a complete and coherent program for ordering the affairs of the family and all Muslim society. All these matters must be made clear so that people can come to know the truth and coming generations will not take the silence of the religious leaders as proof that the deeds and policies of the oppressors conform to the sharī‘ah, and that the perspicacious religion of Islam allows them to “consume what is forbidden,” or in other words, to plunder the wealth of the people.
Since the range of thought of some people is confined to the mosque we are now sitting in and is incapable of extending any further, when they hear the expression “consumption of what is forbidden,” they can only think of some corner grocer whose is (God forbid) selling his customers short. They never think of the whole range of more important forms of “consuming what is forbidden,” of plunder. Huge amounts of capital are being swallowed up; our public funds are being embezzled; our oil is being plundered; and our country is turned into a market for expensive, unnecessary goods by the representatives of foreign companies, which makes it possible for foreign capitalists and their local agents to pocket the people’s money. A number of foreign states carry off our oil after drawing it out of the ground, and the negligible sum they pay to the regime they have installed returns to their pockets by other routes. As for the small amount that goes into the treasury, God only knows what it is spent on. All of this is a form of “consumption of what is forbidden” that takes place on an enormous scale, in fact on an international scale. It is not merely an evil, but a hideous and most dangerous evil. Examine carefully the conditions of society and the actions of the government and its component organs, and then you will understand what hideous “consumption of what is forbidden” is taking place now. If an earthquake occurs in some corners of the country, it too becomes a means for the ruling profiteers to increase their illegal income: they fill their pockets with money that is supposed to go to the victims of the earthquake. Whenever our oppressive, anti-national rulers enter into agreements with foreign states or companies, they pocket huge amounts of our people’s money and lavish additional huge sums on their foreign masters. It is a veritable flood of forbidden consumption that sweeps past us, right before our eyes. All this is misappropriation of wealth goes on and on: in our foreign trade and in the contracts made for the exploitation of our mineral wealth, the utilization of our forests and other natural resources, construction work, road building, and the purchase of arms from the imperialists, both Western and communist.
We must end all this plundering and usurpation of wealth. The people as a whole have a responsibility in this respect, but the responsibility of the religious scholars is graver and more critical. We must take the lead over other Muslims in embarking on this sacred jihād, this heavy undertaking; because of our rank and position, we must be in the forefront. If we do not have the power today to prevent these misdeeds from happening and to punish these embezzlers and traitors, these powerful thieves that rule over us, then we must work to gain that power. At the same time, to fulfill our minimum obligation, we must not fail to expound the truth and expose the thievery and mendacity of our rulers. When we come to power, we will not only put the country’s political life, economy, and administration in order, we will also whip and chastise the thieves and the liars.
They set fire to the Masjid al-Aqsā.[196] We cry out: “Leave the Masjid al-Aqsā half-burned to the ground; do not erase all traces of the crime!” But the Shāh’s regime opens an account, sets up a fund, and starts collecting money from the people supposedly to rebuilt the Masjid al-Aqsā, but really to fill the pockets of our rulers while also covering up the crime committed by Israel.
These are the disasters that are afflicting the nation of Islam, and that have brought us to our present state. Is it not duty of the scholars of Islam to speak out about all this? “Why do their rabbis not forbid their consumption of what is forbidden”? why do our Muslims scholars not protect? Why do they say nothing about all this plundering?
To return to the sermon of the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a), he continues with a reference to the verse: “Cursed are those among Children of Israel who have failed to believe” (5:78). This is not relevant to our present discussion. Then he says: “God reproached and blamed them [the rabbis] because they saw with their own eyes the oppressors committing vile and corrupt acts but did not stop them.” According to the Doyen of the Martyrs, their silence was due to two factors: greed and baseness. Either they were covetous persons who profited materially from the oppressors, accepting payment to keep quiet, or they were faint-hearted cowards who were afraid of them.
Consult the traditions referring to enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. There the conduct of those who constantly invent excuses in order to escape from doing their duty is condemned and their silence is considered shameful. “God says: ‘Do not fear men, but fear Me’ (2:150). This verse means roughly: ‘Why do you fear men? Our friends (awliyā) have given up their lives for the sake of Islam; you should be prepared to do the same.’
“Elsewhere in the Qur’an God also says: “The believers, men and women, are friends and protectors to each other; they enjoin the good and forbid the evil;…they establish the prayer, pay the zakāt, and obey God and His Messenger’ (9:71). In this verse, God mentions the duty of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil first because He knows that if this duty is correctly performed, all other duties, whether easy or difficult, will fall into place. For enjoining the good and forbidding the evil means summoning men to Islam while at the same time remedying oppression, opposing the oppressor, making just distribution of the spoils of war, and levying and spending taxes in just and due form.”
If the duty of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil is properly performed, all other duties will automatically fall into place. If the good is enjoined and the evil forbidden, the oppressors and their agents will be unable to usurp the people’s property and dispose of it according to their own whims; they will be unable to squander the taxes taken from the people. For he who enjoins the good and forbids the evil actively calls men to Islam by remedying injustice and opposing the oppressor.
Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil has been made a duty primarily for the sake of accomplishing these high aims. We have restricted it, however, to a narrow category of affairs where harm is suffered chiefly by the individual who is guilty of a sin by deed or by omission. We have the idea firmly in our heads that the instances of evil we are called upon to combat (munkarāt) are only the things we encounter or hear about in everyday life. For example, if someone plays music while we are riding on the bus,[197] or the owner of a coffee house does something wrong, or someone eats in the middle of the bazaar during Ramadān,[198] we regard all these things as instances of evil we must denounce. Meanwhile, we remain totally oblivious to far greater evils. Those who are destroying the welfare of Islam and trampling on the rights of the weak---it is they whom we must force to desist from evil.
If a collective protest were made against the oppressors who commit an improper act or crime, if several thousand telegrams were sent to them from all the Islamic countries telling them to desist, to relinquish their errors, they certainly would desist. If every time a step were taken or a speech given against the interests of Islam and the welfare of the people, those responsible were condemned throughout the country, in every single village and hamlet, they would be obliged to retreat. Could they possibly do otherwise? Never! I know them; I know what kind of people they are. They are very cowardly and would retreat very quickly. But if they see that we are more gutless than they are, they will give themselves airs and do whatever they want.
When the ‘ulamā of Qum met and banded together on one occasion, and the provinces supported them by sending delegations and delivering speeches to show their solidarity, the regime retreated and canceled the measures we were objecting to.[199] Afterwards, they were able to cool our enthusiasm and weaken us; they divided us up and invented a separate “religious duty” for each of us. As a result of the differing opinions that appeared among us, they grew bold again, and now they do whatever they want with the Muslims and this Islamic country of ours.
The Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) speaks of “summoning men to Islam while at the same time remedying oppression and opposing the oppressors”; it is for the sake of these great aims that enjoining the good and forbidding the evil has been made a duty. If some poor grocer does something wrong, he has not harmed Islam, but only himself. In performing our duty of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, we must pay closest attention to those who harm Islam and those who, under various pretexts, plunder the people’s means of livelihood.
On occasion we read in the paper—sometimes it is stated humorously, sometimes seriously—that many of the items collected for the victims of floods or earthquakes are picked up by our rulers for their own use. One of the ‘ulamā of Malāyer told me that the people had wanted to send a truckload of shrouds for the victims of some disaster, but the police refused to let them through, and even tried to confiscate the load! “Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil” is more imperative in such cases.
Now let me ask you, were the subjects mentioned by the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) in his sermon addressed only to his companions who were gathered around him listening to his words? Does not the phrase “O people, take heed” address us too? Are we not included in “people”? Should we not profit from this address of the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a)?
As I stated at the beginning of this discussion, the subjects contained in the sermon of the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) were not intended for a single group or class. His address was more in the nature of a circular directed to all commanders, ministers, rulers, fuqahā—and in short, to the whole world, particularly those who are alive and fully conscious. The circulars he issued belong together with the Qur’an in the sense that they demand our obedience until the Day of Resurrection. The verse referred to in the address speaks only of the Jewish scholars and rabbis, but its purport is universal. The Jewish scholars and rabbis were condemned by God because fear or covetousness made them keep silent in the face of the misdeeds of the oppressors, whereas if they had spoken or cried out in protest, they could have prevented oppression from occurring. If the ‘ulamā of Islam likewise fail to rise up against the oppressors and remain silent instead, they too will be condemned.
After addressing the people in general, the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) then turns to a particular group, the ‘ulamā of Islam, and tells them: “You enjoy prestige and standing in society; the nation of Islam respects and venerates you. You are held in awe and have high standing in society because you are expected to rise up against the oppressors in defense of the truth and to compel the oppressor to enforce the rights of the oppressed. Men have placed their hopes in you for the establishment of justice and the prevention of transgression by the oppressors.
“Thus you have reached a certain station and rank. But you have failed to perform the duties of your station. If some harm were to befall the father of one of you, or if—God forbid—someone were to insult him, you would be greatly distressed and would cry out in protest. But now that God’s covenants are being violated before your very eyes and Islam is being dishonored, you keep silent and are not distressed even in your hearts for if you were distressed, you would be bound to raise your voices in protest. The blind, the dumb, and the poverty-stricken cultivators of the land are being destroyed and nobody shows any concern; no one is concerned for the wretched, barefooted people.”
Do you imagine all that bombastic propaganda being broadcast on the radio is true? Go and see for yourselves at first hand what state our people are living in. Not even one, out of two hundred villages has a clinic. No one is concerned about the poor and the hungry, and they do not allow the measures Islam has devised for the sake of the poor to be implemented. Islam has solved the problem of poverty and inscribed it at the very top of its program: “Sadaqāt is for the poor.”[200] Islam is aware that first, the conditions of the poor must be remedied; the conditions of the deprived must be remedied. But they do not allow the plans of Islam to be implemented.
Our wretched people subsist in conditions of poverty and hunger, while the taxes that the ruling class extorts from them are squandered. They buy Phantom jets so that pilots from Israel and its agents can come and train in them in our country.[201] So extensive is the influence of Israel in our country—Israel, which is in a state of war with the Muslims, so that those who support it are likewise in a state of war with the Muslims—and so great is the support the regime gives it, that Israeli soldiers come to our country for training! Our country has become a base for them! The markets of our country are also in their hands. If matters go on this way, and the Muslims continue to be apathetic, the Muslims will lose all say in the commercial life of the country.
To return to the address of the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a): “You have not made proper use of your station. Not only you do nothing yourselves; you fail to support the person who does want to do his duty. The only source of concern and satisfaction for you is that you have the support and respect of the oppressor, that he addresses you as ‘Noble Shaykh’! What the nation suffers at the hands of the government is of no concern to you. The disaster that has befallen you is greater than what has befallen others for the true rank and degree of ‘ulamā has been taken away from you. The administration of affairs and the implementation of law ought to be undertaken by those who are knowledgeable concerning God and are trustees of God’s ordinances concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden. But that rank has been taken away from you.”
The Imām (‘a) could have said at this point: “What is my right has been taken away from me, but you have not come to my aid,” or, “The rights of Imāms have been taken away, but you have kept silent.” Instead, he spoke of those “knowledgeable concerning God” (al-‘ulamā bi-’llāh), meaning the religious scholars (rabbāniyūn) or leaders. Here he is not referring to the philosophers or mystics, for the person knowledgeable concerning God is the one who is learned in God’s ordinances. It is such a person who is designated as a religious scholar (rūhāni or rabbāni), naturally on condition that spirituality (rūhāniyyat) and orientation to God Almighty be fully apparent in him.
The Imām went on: “But your position has been usurped from you, for no other reason but that you have abandoned the pivot of truth and have disagreed about the nature of the Sunnah, despite the existence of clear proofs. But if you were to show strength in the face of hardship and suffering for God’s sake, then the conduct of affairs, as willed by God, would be restored to you; command and authority would be yours.”
If you were to act correctly and perform your duty, you would see that the conduct of affairs would be bound over to you. If the form of government willed by Islam were to come into being, none of the governments now existing in the world would be able to resist it; they would all capitulate. But unfortunately, we have failed to establish such a government. Even in the earliest age of Islam, its opponents hindered its establishment and prevented governments from being entrusted to the person chosen by God and His Messenger precisely in order to prevent what has happened.
“You allowed the oppressors to take away your functions.” When you failed to perform your duties and abandoned the task of government, it became possible for the oppressors to take over the position that was legitimately yours. “You allowed the affairs of God to fall into their hands, so they came to conduct them on the basis of their suppositions and arbitrary desires. What enabled them to win this control was your panic-stricken flight from being killed, and your attachment to the life of this world. You have delivered the powerless into their clutches, so that some of the people are now subjugated like slaves and others are deprived of even their livelihood.” All of this applies to the age we live in; in fact, it applies more fully to the present than to the time of the Imām (‘a). “The rulers are entirely absorbed in the pleasures of kingship, earning shame and disgrace for themselves with their licentiousness, following evil counselors, and showing impudence toward God. One of their appointed spokesmen mounts the minbar in each city to tell lies.” In those days preachers would praise the oppressors from the minbar. Today, radio stations fill the air with propaganda on their behalf and maliciously misrepresent the ordinances of Islam.
“The earth is defenseless against them.” Now, too, the oppressors can freely exploit the earth, without any obstruction; there is no one to stand in their way. “They grab freely whatever they want [of the earth]. The people are their slaves and are powerless to defend themselves. One ruler is an obstinate tyrant, while another represses his wretched subjects ruthlessly, and still another refuses in his absolutism to recognize God as the beginning and end of all things. Is it not strange—how could one not think it strange—that the world is in the clutches of cunning tyrants, oppressive tax collectors, and governors who have no compassion for the believers under their rule?
“It is God Who will judge concerning what is at dispute among us, and deliver a decisive verdict concerning all that occurs among us.
“O God! You know that everything we did was not prompted by rivalry for political power, nor by desire for the chattels of this world. Rather, it was done in order to demonstrate the signs of Your religion, to reform the affairs of your land, to protect the oppressed among Your servants, and to act in accordance with the duties, norms, and ordinances You have established.
“So, O scholars of religion! Help us reach our goal and obtain our rights. The oppressors will wax strong in their efforts against you and will attempt to put out the light kindled by your Beloved [the Prophet]. But God suffices us; upon Him do we rely, to Him we do turn, and to Him is our journeying.”
As we said, the entire address from beginning to end is addressed to the ‘ulamā. There is no indication that the person intended by the expression “those knowledgeable about God” are the Imāms (‘a). They are the scholars of Islam, the rabbāniyyūn. The designation rabbāni refers to one who believes in God, fulfills God’s ordinances, and is knowledgeable concerning those ordinances, as a trustee of God’s decrees concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden.
When the Imām (‘a) said that the conduct of affairs belongs to the ‘ulamā,he did not mean to restrict this function to a period of ten or twenty years, or simply to the city and people of Medina. It is apparent from the whole speech that his meaning was more universal, that he had in mind a vast community that would undertake the establishment of justice.
If the ‘ulamā who are the trustees of God’s decrees concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden, and who possess the two characteristics of knowledge and justice as set forth above—if they were to implement God’s ordinances, to execute the penal provisions of the law, and generally to conduct and administer the affairs of the Muslims, the people would no longer be hungry and wretched and the laws of Islam would no longer be in abeyance.
The tradition containing this noble speech, then, is part of the evidence supporting our thesis, the governance of the faqīh. Were its chain of transmission not weak, we could cite it as a direct proof. Even as it stands, we might say that the content of the tradition, being veracious, bears witness that it was uttered by one of the ma‘sūmīn.[202]
We have now completed our discussion of the governance of the faqīh; we have nothing further to say on the subject. There is no need to go into details such as the manner in which zakāt is to be collected or spent, or how the penal provisions of the law are to be implemented. We have set forth the main principles of the subject and shown that the same governance that was exercised by the Most Noble Messenger (s), and by the Imāms (‘a), is also the prerogative of the fuqahā. There can be no doubt about this. If there is any evidence, however, that in certain specific cases the faqīh does not possess the same right of governance, we naturally exclude such cases from the operation of the general rule.
As I stated previously, the subject of the governance of faqīh is not something new that I have invented; since the very beginning, it has been mentioned continually.
The ruling given by the late Mīrzā Hasan Shirāzi[203] prohibiting the use of tobacco was in effect a governmental ruling; hence all other fuqahā were obliged to follow it, and indeed the great ‘ulamā of Iran did follow it, with only a few exceptions. It was not a judicial ruling on a matter being disputed by a few individuals, based purely on his own determination. It was instead a governmental ruling based on the interests of Islam and the Muslims and his determination of a secondary consideration (‘unvān-i-sanavi).[204] As long as this secondary consideration obtained, the ruling retained its validity, and when the consideration no longer applied, the decree also ceased to apply.
Again, when Mīrzā Muhammad Taqi Shirāzi[205] gave orders for jihād—or “defense,” they called it—all the ‘ulamā obeyed, because his order was a governmental ruling.
It is related that the late Kāshif al-Ghitā[206] also used to expound much of what I have said. Among other modern scholars, the late Narāqi also was of the opinion that the fuqahā are entitled to exercise all the worldly functions of the Most Noble Messenger (s). The late Nā’ini also believed that the doctrine of the governance of the faqīh may be deduced from the maqbūla of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah.[207]
In any case, this subject is by no means new. I have simply examined it at greater length with reference to the different branches of government, to give the subject greater clarity for my listeners. In accordance with the commands of God Almighty, as expressed in His Book and by the tongue of His Most Noble Messenger (s), I have also set forth certain matters of importance to the present age.
We have stressed the main principles of the subject. Now it is up to the present and future generation to discuss it further and reflect upon it, and to find a way to translate it into reality, eschewing all forms of apathy, weakness and despair. God Almighty willing, by means of mutual consultation and the exchange of views, they will develop a method for establishing an Islamic government with all its various branches and departments. They will entrust the affairs of government to persons who are honest, intelligent, believing, and competent and remove traitors from the control of the government, the homeland, and the treasury of the Muslims. Let them be assured that God Almighty is with them.
Notes:
[91] It is referring to the Prophet’s appointment of Imām ‘Ali as his successor at a gathering near the pool of Khumm during his return to Medina from Mecca, after having performed the last pilgrimage in his life. See Muhammad Bāqir as-Sadr, Ghadīr (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project, The Event of Ghadīr Khumm in the Qur’ān, Hadīth, History, http://www.al-islam.org/ghadir. An article entitled, Did the Prophet (s) Appointed a Successor translated in various languages of the world is available at: http://www.al-islam.org/nutshell. (Pub.)
[92] The attribution of errors to Abū Bakr and ‘Umar and deviations to ‘Uthmān is a part of Shī‘i belief and is entirely to be expected in this context. See Ibn Abil Hadīd, Sharh-i Nahj al-Balāghah, vol. 2, commentary on Sermon 30, pp. 126-161 and pp. 324-333; vol. 3, commentary on Sermon 43, 3-69; vol. 9, commentary on Sermon 135, pp. 3-30; and Al-Ghadīr, vol. 8, pp. 97-323. Worthy of note, however, is the statement here that Abū Bakr and ‘Umar adhered to the example of the Prophet in their personal lives. See also the statement on p. 37. (Pub.)
[93] Hijāz: the region in Western Arabia that includes Mecca and Medina.
[94] Bihār al-Anwār, vol. 40, p. 324.
[95] After the Revolution, extensive evidence came to light of misappropriation of the religious endowment. Land was being given to cabaret singers and members of the royal family by the state-controlled administration of the endowments. See the articles on this subject in the Tehran daily Kayhān, Isfand 27, 1357/March 18, 1979. Concerning attempts by the regime to build a cinema in Qum, see S.H.R., Barrasī va Tahlīlī az Nihzat-i Imām Khumaynī (Najaf? 1356 Sh./1977), pp. 103-104.
[96] A reference to the coronation ceremonies of 1967.
[97] Concerning the precise meaning of “justice,” see n. 21 above.
[98] Imām ‘Ali (‘a) said: “O men! The most qualified among men for the caliphate is he who is most capable and knowledgeable of Allah’s commands.” Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 172. See Al-Ihtijāj, vol. 1, p. 229; Bihār al-Anwār, vol. 25, “Kitāb al-Imāmah,” “Bāb Jamī‘ fī Sifāt al-Imām,” p. 116. (Pub.)
[99] The reference here is to certain shortcomings Shī‘ah traditionally perceived in the exercise of rule by Abū Bakr. See ‘Allāmah Hilli, Kashf al-Murād fī Sharh Tajrīd al-I’tiqād, ‘Destination’ (Maqsad) 5, ‘Issue’ (Mas’alah) 6. (Pub.)
[100] Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq (‘a) said: “The king is sovereign over the people while the scholar is the authority over the king.” Bihār al-Anwār, vol. 1, “Kitāb al-‘Ilm,” sec. 1, hadīth 92, p. 183. (Pub.)
[101] Fuqahā: the plural of faqīh (see n. 1 above).
[102] The words of God’s since they are Qur’anic, but in the context in which they appear, the speaker is Abraham. After asking God that prophethood be vested in his progeny, Abraham excludes any of his descendants who might be wrongdoers from exercising the prophetic function. For an elaborate commentary on this verse (Q 2:124), see Mīr Ahmad ‘Ali, Text, Translation and Commentary of the Holy Qur’an (Elmhurst, NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, Inc., 1988), pp. 146-154, http://www.al-islam.org/quran. (Pub.)
[103] Occultation: see n. 27 above.
[104] The “governance” (vilāyat) of the faqīh is extrinsic (i‘tibārī) to his person; he exercises it only by virtue of the acquired attribute of just faqīh.
[105] Taxable lands: those acquired by the Muslims under the Prophet (s) or the Islamic ruler. These lands belong to all Muslims and therefore non-sellable. The Islamic government leases them and their accrued income is called kharāj. (Pub.)
[106] The “governance” (vilāyat) of the Imāms is intrinsic to their persons, unlike that of the fuqahā; moreover, its scope is not limited to men but embraces the whole of creation. They therefore exercise “cosmic governance” (vilāyat-i takvīnī), in part through the performance of miracles. This form of vilāyat is common to the Imāms and to the foremost of the prophets, who exercised a governmental function while also propagating a divine message. The statement here that “no one can attain the spiritual status of the Imāms, not even the cherubim or the prophets” thus carries the strict sense that the Imāms are superior to those prophets whose mission lacked the dimension of governmental leadership. Concerning the different types of vilāyat, see Murtazā Mutahhari, Valīhā va Vilāyat-hā (Qum, 1355 Sh./1975), which was translated into English by Mustajab Ansāri under the title Master and Mastership (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publication, 1980) and by Yahyā Cooper as Wilāyat: The Station of the Master (Tehran: World Organization for Islamic Services, 1982); http://www.al-islam.org/mastership. (Pub.)
[107] Concerning these attributes of the Imāms, see Henri Corbin, Histoire de la philosophie islamique (Paris, 1964), pp. 74 ff; Sayyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi, Imamate: Vicegerency of the Prophet, anno. Sayyid Muhammad Akhtar Rizvi (Tehran: WOFIS, 1986);Sayyid Mujtabā Mūsāwi Lāri, Imamate and Leadership, trans. Hamid Algar (Qum: Foundation for Cultural Propagation in the World);Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, Shī‘ism Imamate and Wilāyat (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 2000). (Pub.)
[108] The archangel Jibrā’īl (Gabriel) accompanied the Most Noble Messenger on his mi‘rāj (ascension to the divine presence), but being of lowlier station than the Messenger, he was unable to endure the splendor of the divine presence. See Bihār al-Anwār, vol. 18, “bāb ithbāt al-mi‘rāj wa ma‘nāhu wa kayfiyyatah,” p. 382. (Pub.)
[109] A well-known tradition relating to the mi‘rāj.
[110] Fātimah, the daughter of the Prophet, shared in the exalted states of the Prophet and the Twelve Imāms in that she possessed the same quality of ‘ismat (divinely bestowed freedom from error and sin) that they did. As daughter of the Prophet and wife of the first Imām, she served, moreover, as a link between the Prophet and his successors. See Ibrāhīm Amīni and Sayyid Kāzim Qazvīni, Fatima the Gracious, trans. Abū Muhammad Ordoni (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[111] Ibn ‘Abbās: more fully, ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abbās ibn ‘Abdul Muttalib (3 B.H.-68 A.H.) was a cousin of the Prophet and ‘Ali, who learned the science of Qur’anic exegesis from the latter and known as “chief of the exegetes” and “scholar of the community”. He had been one of Imām ‘Ali’s commanders in the Battles of Jamal, Siffīn and Nahrawan. (Pub.)
[112] Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 33, p. 76. (Pub.)
[113] Nahj al-Balāghah, p. 50.
[114] Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 3 (Shaqshaqiyyah Sermon). (Pub.)
[115] Nahj al-Balāghah, pp. 188-189.
[116] Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 131 on p. 31 of the present volume. (Pub.)
[117] Mālik Ashtar: more fully, Mālik ibn Hārith from Nakha’a and famous as al-Ashtar, was among the prominent commanders of Imām ‘Ali’s army and the governor appointed to Egypt by Imām ‘Ali. He accompanied the Imām in the Battles of Jamal and Siffīn. On his way to Egypt, he was killed through the conspiracy of Mu‘āwiyah. For the text of the Imām’s famous instructions to him before setting forth to Egypt, see Nahj al-Balāghah, Letter 53, pp. 426-445. A complete translation is contained in William C. Chittick, A Shī‘ite Anthology (Albany, N.Y., 1980), pp. 68-82. (Pub.)
[118] Shaykh Sadūq: also known as Ibn Babūyah, one of the most important of the early Shī‘i scholars. He died in 381/991. For his short biography and works, see the introduction of Shaykh as-Sadūq, I’tiqādātu ’l-Imāmiyyah: A Shī‘ite Creed, 3rd Ed., trans. Asaf A. A. Fyzee (Tehran: World Organization for Islamic Services, 1999), pp. 6-23. (Pub.)
[119] Jamī‘ al-Akhbār: a collection of Shī‘I traditions. ‘Uyūn Akhbār ar-Ridhā: a collection of traditions relating to Imām Ridā, compiled by Shaykh Sadūq for Sāhib ibn ‘Abbād, celebrated minister of the Buwayhid dynasty and patron of learning. Al-Majālis: also known as al-Amali, the record of a series of discourses given by Shaykh Sadūq concerning all aspects of Shī‘i Islam.
[120] Musnad: a hadīth that goes back to the Prophet by an unbroken chain of transmission.
[121] Mursal: a hadīth whose chain of transmission goes only as far back as a “follower” (member of the second generation of Islam) who does not mention the name of the companion of the Prophet from whom he heard it.
[122] That is, there is a functional distinction between the scholar of hadīth and the faqīh, although it is possible for a single individual to embody the two functions.
[123] Kulayni: see n. 30 above.
[124] Shaykh Sadūq: see n. 73 above.
[125] Shaykh Mufīd: the common designation of Abū ‘Abdullāh Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Nu‘mān al-Hārithi (d. 413/1022) who was a great Shī‘ah jurist, traditionist and scholar of scholasticism. Notable among his disciples were Sayyid Murtadā ‘Allama al-Hudā, Sayyid Rāzi, Shaykh Tūsi, and Najashi. Aroung 200 works are attributed to him, from which we can cite Kitāb al-Irshad, Ikhtisās, Awā’il al-Maqālāt, ‘Amali, and Maqna‘ah.See Shaykh Mufīd, Kitāb al-Irshād: The Book of Guidance into the Lives of the Twelve Imāms, trans. I.K.A. Howard (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications), introduction, pp. xxi-xxvii; Martin J. McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd (Beirut: Dar al-Mashreq, 1978), introduction, pp. 8-45.(Pub.)
[126] Fiqh: jurisprudence; the discipline devoted to the study of the principles and ordinances of Islamic law.
[127] Taqiyyah: see n. 16 above.
[128] Ijtihād: see n. 4 above.
[129] A well-known tradition that has led to the compilation of anthologies of forty hadīth intended for memorization by those who wish to attain the promised reward.
[130] Samūrah ibn Jundab: more fully, Abū Sa‘īd Samūrah ibn Jundab al-Qazāri, a companion of the Prophet who accompanied him in numerous battles. He later settled in Basrah, where he temporarily acted as governor on a number of occasions during the rule of Mu‘āwiyah, first Umayyad caliph.
[131] One of the two weak traditions referred to here is probably: “The sultan is the shadow of God upon earth; whoever respects him, respects God, and whoever affronts him, affronts God.” For a critique of this alleged tradition, see Nāsir ad-Dīn al-Albāni, Silsilat al-Āhādīth ad-Da‘īfa wa’l-Maudū‘a (Damascus, 1384/ 1964), I, i, 98. The other weak tradition may be that says: ‘Whoever wishes long life for a king will be resurrected together with him’. See Islam and Revolution, p. 220.
[132] For example, there is a tradition that says: “A word of truth spoken in the presence of an unjust ruler is a meritorious form of jihād,” and two others close with the phrase “there is no obeying the one who disobeys God.” For these and similar traditions, see ‘Abdullāh Fahd an-Nafīsi, ‘Indamā yahkum al-Islām (London, n.d.), pp. 142-146.
[133] Imām Abū ’l-Hasan Mūsā, son of Ja‘far: seventh of the Twelve Imāms, and generally known as Imām Mūsā al-Kāzim. He was born in Medina in 128/744 and died in prison in Baghdad in 183/799.
[134] See Shaykh Abū Ja‘far al-Kulayni, al-Kāfi, Eng. trans. Sayyid Muhammad Hasan Rizvi (Tehran: WOFIS, 1398/1978), I, ii, 94-95.
[135] Shāh Sultān Husayn was the last monarch of the Safavid dynasty, which ruled over Iran from the beginning of the sixteenth century until the second decade of the eighteenth. Among the least competent of the Safavid rulers, he devoted his energies to debauchery and failed to organize the defense of his capital city, Isfahan, against Afghan invaders, to whom it fell in 1722 after a six-month siege. See L. Lockhart, The Fall of the Safavid Dynasty (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 144-170.
[136] See n. 2 above.
[137] Part of a long hadīth concerning a dream in which the Messenger foresaw the misdeeds of the Umayyads.
[138] The expression translated here as “leadership” is imāmat-i i‘tibāri; see n. 62 above.
[139] Khumayn: the native town of Imām Khomeini.
[140] Since the Imām of the Age—i.e., the Twelfth Imām—will emerge from his occultation at the time when injustice fills the earth, it has sometimes been thought that all positive action to remedy injustice must be postponed until his coming.
[141] See Kulayni, al-Kāfi, I, ii, 188-119.
[142] Mufti: a scholar who pronounces an authoritative opinion (fatwā) on a point of law.
[143] Usāmah: that is, Usāmah ibn Zayd, a beloved companion of the Prophet who was placed in charge of a military expedition when he was only eighteen. He died in 59/679.
[144] See n. 21 above.
[145] Shāhi: now obsolete, formerly the smallest unit of Iranian currency, worth one-twentieth of a rial.
[146] Mu‘āwiyah: first of the Umayyad caliphs and an adversary of Imām ‘Ali. He ruled from 41/661 to 60/680.
[147] See n. 30 above.
[148] Yā-Sīn is the thirty-sixth chapter of the Qur’an. Its recitation is recommended as particularly meritorious on certain occasions, among them Thursday night, because it leads into Friday, the best of all days.
[149] Shurayh: more fully, Abū Umayyah Shurayh ibn al-Hārith al-Kindi, judge of Kūfah appointed by ‘Umar. He retained this position under ‘Uthmān, ‘Ali, and the Umayyads and died a centenarian in 87/706. It is said that he sided with Ibn Ziyād and instigated the people against Imam Husayn in the ‘Āshūrā uprising. (Pub.)
[150] From Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah, a Shī‘i collection of traditions by Muhammad Hasan al-Hurr al-‘Āmili (d. 1104/1693).
[151] Fatwā: the plural of fatwā (an authoritative opinion on a point of law).
[152] Narāqi: that is, Hājj Mullāh Ahmad Narāqi, a scholar of importance in the early nineteenth century, d. 1244/1829. He not only was a prolific author, but also clashed repeatedly with the monarch of his day, Fath ‘Ali Shāh. See Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906 (Berkeley, 1969), pp. 57, 89.
[153] Nā’ini: that is, Mīrzā Muhammad Husayn Nā’ini, an important scholar of the early twentieth century, 1277/1860-1354/1936. Concerning his book on Shī‘i political theory, Tanbīh al-Ummah wa Tanzīh al-Millah, see ‘Abdul-Hādi Hā’iri, Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran (Leiden, Netherlands, 1977), pp. 165-220.
[154] Sulaymān ibn Khālid: more fully, Sulaymān ibn Khālid ibn Dehqān ibn Nāfilah, was a reciter, jurist, traditionist, and a trustee and confidant of Imāms al-Bāqir and as-Sāqid (‘a). (Pub.)
[155] Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq: sixth of the Twelve Imāms, 83/702-140/757. Also referred to as Imām Sādiq, he was particularly important for his role in developing the religious sciences. See Shaykh Mohammed al-Husayn al-Muzaffar, Imām Al-Sādiq, trans. Jāsim al-Rasheed (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1998). (Pub.)
[156] The technical sense of the word imām is that which it requires when applied to the Twelve Imāms, who were not only successors to the Prophet but also endowed with lofty spiritual virtues.
[157] Ikmāl ad-Dīn wa Itmām an-Ni‘mah: a work by Shaykh Sadūq on the occultation of the Imām.
[158] Imām of the Age: the Twelfth Imām. See n. 95 above.
[159] Muhammad ibn ‘Uthmān al-‘Umari: the second deputy of the Imām during the Lesser Occultation. See n. 27 above.
[160] The designation hujjat (“proof”) given to the Imāms has a two-fold sense. First, through the qualities they manifest, they are proofs of the existence of God and of the veracity of the religion He has revealed. Second, they constitute proofs to be advanced on the Day of Judgment against those who claim they were uninformed of God’s law. See ‘Abdul ‘Azīz ‘Abdulhussein Sachedina, Islamic Messianism (Albany, N.Y., 1980), pp. 66-67.
[161] Zurārah: more fully, ‘Abd Rabbih ibn A‘yan Shaybāni al-Kufi al-Zurārah, an authority on the traditions of the fourth, fifth, and sixth Imāms, d. 150/767. Scholars of ‘ilm ar-rijāl (science of hadīth transmitters’ biographies) have affirmed his reliability. He was known to have authored the books Al-Istitā‘ah and Al-Jabr. (Pub.)
[162] Sadaqah: voluntary payments collected by the Muslim state to be spent for purposes of charity.
[163] The Shāh organized his vulgar and criminally extravagant celebration of two-and-a-half millennia of monarchical rule in October 1971, some two years after these lectures were given in Najaf. Preparations for the event, however, were begun in the late 1960’s. See also Islam and Revolution, pp. 200-208.
[164] In 1967 the Shāh had himself and his wife crowned.
[165] Maqbūlah: a hadīth to which one may make acceptable reference.
[166] See, for example, Ismā‘īl Haqqi al-Burūsawi, Ruh al-Bayān (Istanbul, 1390/1970), II, 227-228.
[167] See, for example, Tabātabā’i, al-Mīzān, IV, 385.
[168] Dhimmi: one of the ahl adh-dhimmi, concerning whom see n. 35 above.
[169] The Bani Qurayza was a Jewish tribe inhabiting Medina. During the Battle of the Ditch (Ghazwat al-Khandaq) in the fifth year of Islam, they collaborated with a Meccan force that came to attack the city. The menfolk of the tribe were put to death for their treachery. See chapter 38, “The Last Stage of Mischief,” of Āyatullāh Ja‘far Subhāni’s The Message (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications), http://al-islam.org/message/index.htm. (Pub.)
[170] Usāmah: see n. 98 above.
[171] The reference to customary law (‘urf) is not intended to sanction, but merely to clarify, existing judicial practice.
[172] This tradition is contained in al-‘Āmili, Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah, XVII, 98.
[173] Harām: categorically forbidden by religious law.
[174] See Qur’an, 2:256.
[175] See al-‘Āmili, Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah, XVIII, 100.
[176] Here, “disbelief” implies disobedience. See p. 92.
[177] This tradition is quoted in Kulayni, al-Kāfi, I, ii, 85-86.
[178] Kulayni, al-Kāfi, I, 78-79.
[179] There are a number of works by this title. The reference here may be to the Qur’an commentary written in the eleventh/seventh century by Ziyā ad-Dīn Yūsuf Qazvīni. See Āqā Buzurg Tehrāni, Adh-Dhāri‘ah ilā Tasānif ash-Shī‘ah (Tehran, 1390/1970), XX, 23.
[180] After the death of the Prophet (s), his daughter Fātimah asked for the arable lands near Fadak (a small town near Medina) to be assigned to her as a legacy from her father, since in his lifetime the Prophet had used the produce of the land for the upkeep of his wives. Abū Bakr refused, citing the alleged words of the Prophet: “We prophets bequeath no legacies; what we leave behind is charity (sadaqah).” See al-Balādhūri, al-Futūh, ed. de Goeje (Leiden, Netherlands, 1886), pp. 29-33. For Shī‘i tradition, Fadak became a symbol of unjust denial. “The Shī‘ah traditionists and exegetes and some Sunni scholars write: “When the verse: Give the kinsmen his due, and the needy, and the wayfarer…(Sūrah Isrā, 17:26) was revealed the Prophet called her daughter Fātimah and made over Fadak to her” [Majma‘ al-Bayān, vol. III, p. 411; Sharh-i Ibn Abi ’l-Hadīd, vol. XVI, p. 248]. And the narrator of this incident is Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudri who was one of the distinguished companions of the Prophet.” Subhāni, The Message, chap. 44, “The Story of Fadak,” http://www.al-islam.org/message/45.htm.
[181] Nass: a clear and authoritative text, unequivocal in its meaning.
[182] Narāqi (n. 107 above) wrote a comprehensive book on the principles of fiqh entitled ‘Awā’id al-Ayyām min Qawā‘id al-Fuqahā al-A‘lam.
[183] Fiqh-i Razāvi: a work purporting to contain the legal pronouncements of Imām Ridā, of disputed authenticity. See Tehrāni, adh-Dhāri‘ah, XVI, 292-293.
[184] See n. 74 above.
[185] Mustadrak: that is, Mustadrak al-Wasā’il, a supplement to Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah (see n. 105) composed by Mīrzā Husayn Nūri (d. 1320/1902).
[186] Possibly Ghurār al-Farā’id was Durār al-Qalā’id, a work on the principles of fiqh by Muhsīn ibn Hasan al-A’raji (d.1227/1812). See Tehrāni, Adh-Dhāri‘ah, XVI, 41-42.
[187] Tuhāf al-‘Uqūl: a collection of sermons and aphorisms of the Imāms compiled by Shaykh Muhammad al-Halabi, a contemporary of Shaykh Sadūq and teacher of Shaykh Mufīd.
[188] Mīnah: a small town near Mecca.
[189] Imām Khomeini quotes the Arabic text of the tradition before giving his own translation in Persian. We have rendered into English only the Persian translation, which is slightly fuller in parts than the Arabic original.
[190] That is, the social contracts that establish the institutions of society and determine social relations in Islam. (Kh.)
[191] That is, Islamic relationships based upon the oath of loyalty sworn to the Prophet and similar pledge to obey and follow his successors, ‘Ali and his descendants, given to the Prophet at the pool of Khum. (Kh).
[192] Minbar: the pulpit in the mosque.
[193] See, for example, 2:168, 4:170, 7:150, 10:57, and many other verses.
[194] The word awliyā—like the cognate wilāyat—has numerous different meanings. It is used here in the general sense that can be deduced from Qur’an, 10:62-63: “Verily the friends (awliyā) of God—those who believe and guard against evil—shall suffer no fear nor shall they grieve.”
[195] Evil innovation: bid‘at, a belief or practice not compatible with either the Qur’an or the Sunnah.
[196] Masjid al-Aqsā: see n. 37 above.
[197] Among the different schools of Islamic law, the Shī‘I school manifests the greatest disapproval of music. Music in a public place is doubly reprehensible since it is an imposition on the unwilling listener.
[198] There are certain circumstances that may dispense one from fasting during Ramadān, notably illness, but out of respect for the sanctity of the month and the fasting of others, one must refrain from eating in public.
[199] A reference to the agitation against the new laws on the election of local councils promulgated by the Shāh’s regime on October 6, 1962. These laws no longer specified that candidates were to be Muslim, and they were seen as a prelude to increased participation in public life by the Bahā’is and eventual abolition of the Constitution of 1906. After a prolonged campaign against the laws, in which Imām Khomeini took a prominent part, they were annulled by the government on November 28, 1962. See S.H.R., Barrasī va Tahlīlī, pp. 142-187.
[200] Qur’an, 9:60.
[201] One indication of the close ties existing with Israel was the regular contacts that took place between Iranian generals and high-ranking members of the Zionist armed forces. For example, General Palizban met in Occupied Palestine with Moshe Dayan and Arik Sharon, most probably in 1974. Photographs of the meeting, showing all participants with cordial smiles, were discovered after the Revolution and published in the newspaper Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī on Shahrīvar 26, 1359/September 17, 1980.
[202] Ma‘sūmīn: those possessing the quality of ‘ismat (see n. 67 above); i.e., the Prophet, Fātimah, and the Twelve Imāms. See A Brief History of the Fourteen Infallibles (Tehran: WOFIS); Sayyid Murtadā al-‘Askari, The Twelve Successors of the Holy Prophet (s), http://www.al-islam.org/twelve. (Pub.)
[203] Mīrzā Hasan Shirāzi: a mujtahid, d. 1312/1894. After the production and marketing of tobacco in Iran had been made the monopoly of a British company, he declared in December 1891 that “the use of tobacco is tantamount to war against the Imām of the Age.” In obedience to his declaration, all of Iran boycotted tobacco, forcing the cancellation of the concession in early 1892. See Algar, Religion and State, pp. 205-215.
[204] “Secondary consideration”: ‘unvān-i sanavi, a contingent circumstance of legal significance. Tobacco as a substance was religiously unobjectionable; it was the circumstance of the British monopoly that furnished the legal grounds for its prohibition.
[205] Mīrzā Muhammad Taqi Shirāzi: a pupil of Mīrzā Hasan and an important Shī‘ah scholar, d. 1338/1921. He was a leading force in the resistance by the Shī‘ah ‘ulamā opposed to the imposition of British rule on Iraq at the end of World War I. See Muhammad Hirz ad-Dīn, Ma‘ārif ar-Rijāl (Najaf, 1384/1964), II, 215-218.
[206] Kāshif al-Ghitā: more fully, Muhammad Husayn Kāshif al-Ghitā, a leading Shī‘ah scholar of Iraq, 1295/1876-1373-1954. He was active politically as well as academically throughout his life. See the biographical introduction to his Asl ash-Shī‘ah wa Usūluhā, 7th ed. (Beirut, 1377/1957), pp. 7-21. The book is translated into English as The Origin of Shī‘ite Islam and Its Principles (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[207] See p. 79.
Written by The Late Imam Khomeini (R.A.)
Translated by Prof. Hamid Algar
Source: Imam reza network

Program for the Establishment of an Islamic Government

It is our duty to work toward the establishment of an Islamic government. The first activity we must undertake in this respect is the propagation of our case; that is how we must begin.
It has always been that way, all over the world: a group of people came together, deliberated, made decisions, and then began to propagate their aims. Gradually, the number of like-minded people would increase, until finally they became powerful enough to influence a great state or even to confront and overthrow it, as was the case with the downfall of Muhammad ‘Ali Mīrzā and the supplanting of his absolute monarchy with constitutional government.[208] Such movements began with no troops or armed power at their disposal; they always had to resort to propagating the aims of their movement first. The thievery and tyranny practiced by the regime would be condemned and the people awakened and made to understand that the thievery inflicted on them was wrong. Gradually, the scope of this activity would be expanded until it came to embrace all groups of society, and the people, awakened and active, would attain their goal.
You have neither a country nor an army now, but propagating activity is possible for you, because the enemy has been unable to deprive you of all the required means.
You teach the people matters relating to worship, of course, but more important are the political, economic, and legal aspects of Islam. These are, or should be, the focus of our concern. It is our duty to begin exerting ourselves now in order to establish a truly Islamic government. We must propagate our cause to the people, instruct them in it, and convince them of its validity. We must generate a wave of intellectual awakening, to emerge as a current throughout society, and gradually, to take shape as organized Islamic movement made up of the awakened, committed, and religious masses who will rise up and establish an Islamic government.
Propagation and instruction, then, are our two fundamental and most important activities. It is the duty of the fuqahā to promulgate religion and instruct the people in the creed, ordinances, and institutions of Islam, in order to pave the way in society for the implementation of Islamic law and the establishment of Islamic institutions. In one of the traditions we have cited, you will have noticed that the successors of the Most Noble Messenger (s) are described as “teaching the people”—that is, instructing them in religion.
This duty is particularly important under the present circumstances, for the imperialists, the oppressive and treacherous rulers, the Jews, Christians, and materialists are all attempting to distort the truths of Islam and lead the Muslims astray. Our responsibilities of propagation and instruction are greater than ever before. We see today that the Jews (may God curse them) have meddled with the text of the Qur’an and have made certain changes in the Qur’ans they have printed in the occupied territories.[209] It is our duty to prevent this treacherous interference with the text of Qur’an. We must protest and make the people aware that the Jews and their foreign backers are opposed to the very foundations of Islam and wish to establish Jewish domination throughout the world. Since they are a cunning and resourceful group of people, I fear that—God forbid!—they may one day achieve their goal, and that the apathy shown by some of us may allow a Jew to rule over us one day. May God never let us see such a day!
At the same time, a number of orientalists serving as propaganda agents for the imperialist institution are also active in endeavors to distort and misrepresent the truths of Islam. The agents of imperialism are busy in every corner of the Islamic world drawing our youth from us with their evil propaganda. They are not converting them into Jews and Christians; they are corrupting them, making them irreligious and indifferent, which is sufficient for their purposes. In our own city of Tehran now there are centers of evil propaganda run by the churches, the Zionists, and the Bahā’is in order to lead our people astray and make them abandon the ordinances and teachings of Islam. Do we not have a duty to destroy these centers that are damaging Islam? Is it enough for us simply to possess Najaf? (Actually, we do not even have Najaf
[210] Should we be content to sit lamenting in Qum, or should we come to life and be active?
You, the younger generation in the religious institution, must come fully to life and keep the command of God alive. Develop and refine your thinking, and lay aside your concern with the minutiae and subtleties of the religious sciences, because that kind of concentration on petty detail has kept many of us from performing our more important duties. Come to the aid of Islam; save Islam! They are destroying Islam! Invoking the laws of Islam and the name of the Most Noble Messenger (s), they are destroying Islam! Agents—both foreigners sent by the imperialists and natives employed by them—have spread out into every village and region of Iran and are leading our children and young people astray, who might otherwise be of service to Islam one day. Help save our young people from this danger!
It is your duty to disseminate among the people the religious knowledge you have acquired and to acquaint them with the subjects you have learned. The scholar or the faqīh is accorded praise and glorified in the traditions because he is the one who makes the ordinances, doctrines, and institutions of Islam known to the people and instructs them in the Sunnah of the Most Noble Messenger (s). You must now devote your energies to the tasks of propagation and instruction in order to present Islam more fully to the people.
It is our duty to dispel the doubts about Islam that have been created; until we have erased these doubts from people’s minds, we will not be able to accomplish anything. We must impress upon ourselves and upon the generation—and even the generation after that—the necessity for dispelling these doubts about Islam that have arisen in the minds of many people, even the educated among us, as the result of centuries of false propaganda. You must acquaint the people with the worldview, social institution, and form of government proposed by Islam, so that they may come to know what Islam is and what its laws are.
It is the duty of the teaching institution today in Qum, Mashhad, and elsewhere to propagate Islam, to expound this faith and school of thought. In addition to Islam, you must make yourselves known to the people of the world and also authentic models of Islamic leadership and government. You must address yourselves to the university people in particular, the educated class. The students have had their eyes opened. I assure you that if you present Islam and Islamic government to the universities accurately, the students will welcome it and accept it. The students are opposed to tyranny; they are opposed to the puppet regimes imperialism imposes; they are opposed to thievery and the plundering of public wealth; they are opposed to this consumption of what is forbidden and this deceitful propaganda. But no student could be opposed to Islam, whose form of government and teachings are beneficial to society. The students are looking to Najaf, appealing for help. Should we sit idle, waiting for them to enjoin the good upon us and call us to our duties?[211] Our young people studying in Europe are enjoining the good upon us; say to us: “We have organized Islamic associations; now help us!”[212]
It is our duty to bring all these matters to the attention of the people. We must explain what the form of government is in Islam and how rule was conducted in the earliest days of Islamic history. We must tell them how the center of command and the seat of the judiciary under it were both located in part of the mosque, at a time when the Islamic state embraced the farthest reaches of Iran, Egypt, the Hijaz, and the Yemen. Unfortunately, when government passed into the hands of the next generations, it was converted into a monarchy, or even worse than a monarchy.
The people must be instructed in these matters and helped to mature, intellectually and politically. We must tell them what kind of government we want, what kinds of people would assume responsibility for affairs in the government we propose, and what policies and programs they would follow. The ruler in Islamic society is a person who treats his brother ‘Aqil[213] in such a way that he would never request extra support from the public treasury (lest there be economic discrimination among the Muslims), and who requires to account for the guaranteed loan she has obtained from the public treasury, telling her, “If you do not pay back this loan, you will be the be the first woman of the Bani Hāshim[214] to have her hand cut off.” That is the kind of ruler and leader we want, a leader who will put the law into practice instead of his personal desires and inclinations; who will treat all members of the community as equals before the law; who will refuse to countenance privilege or discrimination in any form; who will place his own family on an equal footing with the rest of the people; who will cut off the hand of his own son if he commits a theft; who will execute his own brother and sister if they sell heroin (not execute people for possession of ten grams of heroin when his own relative operate gangs that bring into the country heroin by the hundred-weight).[215]
Many of the ordinances of Islam that refer to worship also pertain to social and political functions. The forms of worship practiced in Islam are usually linked to politics and the gestation of society. For example, congregational prayer, the gathering on the occasion of hajj, and Friday prayer, for all their spirituality, exert a political as well as moral and doctrinal influence. Islam has provided for such gatherings so that religious use might be made of them; so that feelings of brotherhood and cooperation may be strengthened, intellectual maturity fostered, solutions found for political and social problems, with jihād and collective effort as the natural outcome.
In non-Islamic countries, or Islamic countries ruled by non-Islamic governments, whenever they want the people to assemble like this, millions must be spent out of the national treasury or budget, and even then the result is unsatisfactory; such meetings lack spontaneity and spirit and are of no real consequence. In Islam, however, anyone who wishes to perform the hājj departs of his own will and goes on the hājj. Also people go eagerly to take part in congregational prayer. We must take advantage of these assemblies to propagate and teach religion and to develop the ideological and political movement of Islam.
Some people are completely unaware of this; they are only concerned about the correct pronunciation of “wa lā ’dh-dhāllin.”[216] When they go on the hājj, instead of exchanging ideas with their Muslim brothers, propagating the beliefs and ordinances of Islam, and seeking solutions to the universal problems and afflictions of the Muslims (for example, rallying to liberate Palestine, which is part of the Islamic homeland)—instead of doing all this, they exacerbate the differences that exist among Muslims. The first Muslims, on the other hand, used to accomplish important business on the occasion of hājj or at their Friday gatherings. The Friday sermon was more than a sūrah from the Qur’an and a prayer followed by a few brief words. Entire armies used to be mobilized by Friday sermon and proceed directly from the mosque to the battlefield—and a man who sets out from the mosque to go into battle will fear only God, not poverty, hardship, or his army will be victorious and triumphant. When you look at the Friday sermons given in that age and the sermons of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), you see that their purpose was to set people in motion, to arouse them to fight and sacrifice themselves for Islam, to resolve the sufferings of the people of this world.
If the Muslims before us had gathered every Friday and reminded themselves of their common problems, and solved them or resolved to solve them, we would not be in the position we find ourselves in today. Today we must start organizing these assemblies in earnest and make use of them for the sake of propagation and instruction. The ideological and political movement of Islam will thus develop and advance toward its climax.
Make Islam known to the people, then, and in so doing, create something akin to ‘Āshūrā.[217] Just as we have steadfastly preserved the awareness of ‘Āshūrā (peace be upon its founder) and not let it be lost, so that people still gather during Muharram and beat their breasts, we should now take measures to create a wave of protest against the state of the government; let the people gather, and the preachers and rawzakhwāns[218]firmly fix the issue of government in their minds.
If you present Islam accurately and acquaint people with its worldview, doctrines, principles, ordinances, and social system, they will welcome it ardently (God knows, many people want it). I have witnessed that myself. A single word was enough once to cause a wave of enthusiasm among the people, because then, like now, they were all dissatisfied and unhappy with the state of affairs. They are living now in the shadow of the bayonet, and repression will let them say nothing. They want someone to stand up fearlessly and speak out. So, courageous sons of Islam, stand up! Address the people bravely; tell the truth about our situation to the masses in simple language; arouse them to enthusiastic activity, and turn the people in the street and the bazaar, our simple-hearted workers and peasants, and our alert students into dedicated mujāhids.[219] The entire population will become mujāhids. All segments of society are ready to struggle for the sake of freedom, independence, and the happiness of the nation, and their struggle needs religion. Give the people Islam, then, for Islam is the school of jihād, the religion of struggle; let them amend their characters and beliefs in accordance with Islam and transform themselves into a powerful force, so that they may overthrow the tyrannical regime imperialism has imposed on us and set up an Islamic government.
Only those fuqahā who make people acquainted with the beliefs and institutions of Islam, and who defend and protect them, are truly “citadels of Islam.”[220] They must deliver rousing, impassioned speeches and lead the people in order to fulfill this function. Only then, if they live to be, say, 120, will the people feel that Islam has suffered a misfortune with their passing away and that a gap has appeared in the Muslim community, or as the tradition puts it, “A crack will appear in the fortress of Islam.” Will some irremediable deficiency occur in Islamic society now if one of us dies after spending his life at home reading books? What loss could our death mean? But when Islam lost Imām Husayn (‘a), then indeed the loss was irreparable. A loss occurs with the death of people who have preserved the doctrines, laws, and social institutions of Islam, like Khwājah Nāsir ad-Dīn Tūsi[221] or ‘Allāmah Hilli.[222] But what have you or I done for Islam that our passing should remind men of that tradition? If a thousand of us were to die, nothing would happen. The only explanation for this is that either we are not true fuqahā or we are not true believers.
No reasonable person expects our activities of propagation and instruction to lead quickly to the formation of an Islamic government. In order to succeed in establishing an Islamic government, we must have several kinds of continuous activities. Ours is a goal that will take time to achieve. Sensible people in this world lay one stone in position on the ground in the hope that someone two hundred years later will come to finish a building mounted upon it so that the goal will finally be reached. Once the caliph said to an old man who was planting a walnut tree: “Old man! Why plant this walnut tree, which will not bear fruit until fifty years from now, by which time you will be dead?” The man replied: “Others planted so that we might eat. We are planting so that others may eat.”
We must preserve in our efforts even though they may not yield their result until the next generation, for our service is devoted to Islam and the cause of human happiness. If it were for a personal cause, we might say: “Why trouble ourselves! Our efforts cannot benefit us, but only those who come later.” If the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a), who risked and indeed sacrificed all his material interests, had thought that way, acting only for himself and his personal benefits, he would have compromised with Yazīd[223] at the very beginning and settled the whole affair—the Umayyad rulers were only too anxious for him to swear allegiance to them and accept them as rulers. What could have been better for them than to have the grandson of the Prophet (s), the Imām of the Age, call them “Commander of the Faithful” and recognize their rule? But his concern was the future of Islam and the Muslims. So that Islam might be propagated among men in the future, and its political and social order established in society, he opposed the Umayyads, fought against them, and ultimately sacrificed himself.
Examine carefully one of the traditions I have cited above. You will see that Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) was subjected to pressure by oppressive rulers and therefore chose taqiyyah. He had no executive power, and most of the time he was confined under surveillance. Nevertheless, he kept informing the Muslims of their duties and appointing judges for them. What was the reason for this, and what benefit was there in appointing and dismissing judges?
Great men, with broad horizons of thought, never despair or pay attention to the circumstances in which they find themselves—imprisonment or captivity, for example, which may continue indefinitely; instead, they continue making plans for the advancement of their cause. Either they will carry out their plans themselves, or if they are not granted the opportunity, others will follow their plans, even if it is two or three hundred years later. The foundations of many great movements in history were laid in this way. Sukarno, the former president of Indonesia, conceived and drew up his plans in prison and later put them into practice.
Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) not only laid down plans; he also made appointments to certain posts. If his appointments had been intended for that time, naturally they would have been pointless, but in reality, he was thinking of the future. He was not like us, thinking only of ourselves and concerned with our personal predicaments; he was concerned with the ummah, with humanity as a whole, and he wished to reform mankind by implementing the laws of justice. Thus, more than a thousand years ago, he had to lay down a pattern of government and make his appointments, so that on the day when the nations awoke and the Muslims came to their senses, there would be no confusion and the form of Islamic government and its leadership would be known.
Generally speaking, Islam, and the Shī‘i school of thought, and indeed, all religions and schools of thought have advanced and progressed in this fashion. They all started with nothing but a plan, which came to fruition later because of the fortitude and dedication of the respective leaders and prophets.
Moses was a mere shepherd, and for years he followed that calling. When he was summoned to do battle with the pharaoh, he had no supporter or helper. But as a result of his innate ability and his steadfastness, he overthrew the rule of the pharaoh with a staff. Now imagine that staff in the hands of you or me would we have been able to achieve the same result? It takes the determination, seriousness, and resourcefulness of a Moses to make that staff capable of overthrowing a pharaoh; not everyone can perform such a feat.
When the Most Noble Messenger (s) was given his prophetic mission and began to propagate his massage, an eight-year old child (the Commander of the Faithful, upon whom be peace) and a forty-year old woman (his wife Khadījah) were the only people who believed in him; he had no one else. Everyone knows of the vexations that plagued the Prophet, the obstacles that were placed in his way, the oppositions that he faced. Yet he never despaired or said, “I am all alone.” He persisted and, with his spiritual power and firm resolve, was able to advance his cause from nothing to the point it has reached today, where seven hundred million people are gathered under his banner.
The Shī‘i school of thought also began from zero. On the day that the Most Noble Messenger (s) laid its foundations, he was greeted with mockery. He invited people to his house and told them, “The man who possesses such-and-such qualities is to be my minister,” meaning the Commander of the Faithful (‘a). At the time, the Commander of the Faithful had not yet reached adulthood, although he always possessed a great spirit, the greatest in the world. But no one rose to pay him respect, and some one even turned to Abū Tālib[224] and said to him in jest, “You are to march under the banner of your son now!”
Also on the day of the Prophet’s announcement to the people that the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was to succeed him and govern, some expressed apparent admiration and satisfaction, but the opposition to him began on that very day and continued down to the end. If the Most Noble Messenger (s), had appointed him only as an authority to be consulted on legal problems, there would have been no opposition to him. Since he assigned him the rank of successor, however, and said that he was to rule over Muslims and be entrusted with the destiny of the Islamic nation, various sorts of discontent and opposition arose. If you, too, were to sit at home today, and not intervene in the affairs of the country, no one would disturb you. They trouble you only when you try to intervene in the destiny of the nation. It was because they intervened in the affairs of government and the country that the Commander of the Faithful and his followers were harassed and persecuted. But they did not abandon their activity and their struggle, with the result that today, thanks to their labors, there are about two hundred million Shī‘ah in the world.
To present Islam properly to the people, the religious teaching institutions must be reformed. The syllabi and methods of propagation and instruction must be improved; apathy, laziness, despair, and lack of self-confidence must be replaced by diligence, endeavor, hope and self-confidence; the effects left on the minds of some people by foreigners’ insinuating propaganda must be erased; the attitudes of the pseudo-saintly persons, who, despite their position within the teaching institution, make it difficult for people to gain a true appreciation of Islam and the necessity for social reforms, must be changed; and the court-affiliated ākhūnds,[225] who have sold their religion for worldly gain, must be divested of their garb and expelled from the religious institution.
The agents of imperialism, together with the educational and political apparatuses of the anti-national puppet governments they have installed, have been spreading poison for centuries and corrupting the minds and morals of the people. Those who have entered the religious institutions have naturally brought with them traces of this corruption, for the religious institution make up part of society and the people. We must therefore strive to reform, intellectually and morally, the members of the religious institution and to remove the traces left on their minds and spirits by the insinuating propaganda of the foreigners and the policies of corrupt and treacherous governments.
One can easily observe the effects of which I speak. For example, sometimes I see people who sit in the centers of religious institution saying to each other, “These matters are beyond us; what business are they of ours? All we are supposed to do is to offer our prayers and to give our opinions on questions of religious law.” Ideas like these are the result of several centuries of malicious propaganda on the part of the imperialists penetrating deeply into the very heart of Najaf, Qum, Mashhad, and other religious centers, causing apathy, depression, and laziness to appear; and preventing people from maturing, so that they constantly make excuses for themselves and say, “These matters are beyond us!”
These ideas are wrong. What are the qualifications of those who now rule the Muslims countries? What gives them the ability to rule that we allegedly lack? Who among them has any more ability than the average person? Many of them have never studies anything! Where did the ruler of the Hijāz ever go to study? As for Rizā Khān, he was totally illiterate, an illiterate soldier, no more! It has been the same throughout history: many arbitrary and tyrannical rulers have been totally lacking in any capacity to govern the society or administer the nation and devoid of learning and accomplishment. What did Hārūn ar-Rashīd[226] ever study, or any other man who ruled over realms as vast as his? Study—the acquisition of knowledge and expertise in various science—is necessary for making plans for a country and for exercising executive and administrative functions; we too will make use of people with those qualifications. But as for the supervision and supreme administration of the country, the dispensing of justice, and the establishment of equitable relations among the people—these are precisely the subjects that the faqīih has studied. Whatever is needed to preserve national independence and liberty is, again, precisely what the faqīh has to offer. For it is the faqīh, who refuses to submit to others or fall under the influence of foreigners, and who defends the rights of the nation and the freedom, independence, and territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland, even at the cost of his life. It is the faqīh, who does not deviate either to the left or to the right.
Rid yourselves of your depression and apathy. Improve your methods and program of propagation, try diligently to present Islam accurately, and resolve to establish an Islamic government. Assume the lead and join hands with the militant and freedom-loving people. An Islamic government will definitely be established; have confidence in yourselves. You have the power, courage, and sense of strategy it takes to struggle for national liberty and independence, you have succeeded in waking the people and inspiring them to struggle, casing imperialism and tyranny to tremble. Day by day, you are accumulating more experience and your ability to deal with the affairs of society is increasing. Once you have succeeded in overthrowing the tyrannical regimes, you will certainly be capable of administering the state and guiding the masses.
The entire system of government and administration, together with the necessary laws, lies ready for you. If the administration of the country calls for taxes, Islam has made the necessary provision; and if laws are needed, Islam has established them all. There is no need for you, after establishing a government, to sit down and draw up laws, or, like rulers who worship foreigners and are infatuated with the West, run after others to borrow their laws. Everything is ready and waiting. All that remains is to draw up ministerial programs, and that can be accomplished with the help and cooperation of consultants and advisers who are experts in different fields, gathered together in a consultative assembly.
Fortunately, the Muslim peoples are ready to follow you and your allies. What we are lacking are the necessary resolve and armed power, and these, too, we shall acquire, God willing. We need the staff of Moses and the resolve of Moses; we need people who are able to wield the staff of Moses and the sword of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a).
But the gutless people who now sit in the religious centers are certainly not capable of establishing and maintaining a government; for they are so gutless that they cannot wield even a pen or undertake any activity at all. The foreigners and their agents have filled our ears with their propaganda so often that we have begun to believe we are incapable of anything: “Go mind your own business! Attend to your schools, your classes, your studies. What business of yours are these matters? They are beyond your capacity!” I cannot disabuse some people of these notions and make them understand that they must become leaders of humanity; that they are at least the equals of others and are capable of administrating the country. What qualifications do others have that they lack? All one can say is that some of the others went abroad to enjoy themselves, and maybe studied a little while they were there. (We do not say they should not study. We are not opposed to study or learning. Let them go to the moon, found an atomic industry; we will not stand in their way. However, we have duties as well.)
Give them Islam; proclaim to the world the program of Islamic government; maybe the kings and presidents of the Muslim countries will understand the truth of what we say and accept it. We would not want to take any thing away from them; we will leave anyone in his place who faithfully follows Islam.
Today, we have 700 million Muslims in the world, 170 million or more of whom are Shī‘ah. They are all ready to follow us, but we are so lacking in resolve that we are unable to lead them. We must establish a government that will enjoy the trust of the people, one in which the people have confidence and to which they will be able to entrust their destiny. We need trustworthy rulers who will guard the trust the people have placed with them, so that protected by them and the law, the peoples will be able to live their lives and go about their tasks in tranquility. These are the things to which you should be devoting your thought. Do not despair; do not imagine that this task is impossible. God knows that your capacity and courage are not less than those of others—unless, of course, the meaning of courage is oppressing and slaughtering the people; that kind of courage we certainly do not have.
Once that man came to see me while I was in prison[227] along with Āqā-yi Qummi[228] (may God preserve him), who is under arrest again now. He said: “Politics is all dirt, lying, and viciousness; why don’t you leave it to us?”
What he said was true in a sense; if that is what politics really consists of, it belongs exclusively to them. But the politics of Islam, of the Muslims, of the guiding Imāms who lead God’s servants by means of politics, is quite different from the politics he was speaking of.
Afterwards, he told the newspapers: “An agreement has been reached to the effect that the religious leaders will not interfere in politics.” As soon as I was released, I denied his statement from the minbar. I said: “He is lying; if Khomeini or anyone else gives such a pledge, he will be expelled from the religious institution!”[229]
At the outset, they plant in your minds the suggestion that politics means lying and the like so that you lose all interest in national affairs and they can proceed with their business undisturbed, doing whatever they like and indulging all their vices. Meanwhile, you are to sit here offering prayers for their welfare: “May God perpetuate their rule!” They, of course, do not have the intelligence to elaborate such a plan themselves (thank God
; it is their masters and the experts who advise them that devised this plan. The British imperialists penetrated the countries of the East more than three hundred years ago. Being knowledgeable about all aspects of these countries, they drew up elaborate plans for assuming control of them. Then came the new imperialists, the Americans and others. They allied themselves with the British and took part in the execution of their plans.
Once when I was in Hamadān, a former student of the religious sciences, who had forsaken the religious garb but preserved his Islamic ethics, came to see me and he showed me a map on which certain places had been marked in red. He told me that those red symbols indicated all the mineral resources existing in Iran that had been located by foreign experts.
Foreign experts have studied our country, and have discovered all our mineral reserves—gold, copper, petroleum, and so on. They have also made an assessment of our people’s intelligence and came to the conclusion that the only barriers blocking their way are Islam and the religious leadership.
They have known the power of Islam themselves for it once ruled part of Europe, and they know that true Islam is opposed to their activities. They have also realized they cannot make the true religious scholars submit to their influence, nor can they affect their thinking. From the very outset, therefore, they have sought to remove this obstacle from their path by disparaging Islam and besmirching the religious leaders. They have resorted to malicious propaganda so that today, we imagine that Islam simply consists of a handful of legal topics. They have also tried to destroy the reputation of fuqahā and the ‘ulamā, who stand at the head of Islam society, by slanderous accusations and other means. For example, that shameless agent of imperialism wrote in his book[230]: “Six hundred of the ‘ulamā of Najaf and Iran were on the payroll of the British. Shaykh Murtadā[231] took the money for only two years before he realized where it was coming from. The proof may be found in documents preserved in the India Office archives.” Imperialism tells him to insult the ‘ulamā so that it may reap the benefits. Imperialism dearly wants to present all the ‘ulamā as being on its payroll so that they will lose the respect of the people and the people will turn away from them. At the same time, they have tried with their propaganda and insinuations to present Islam as a petty, limited affair, and to restrict the functions of the fuqahā and ‘ulamā to insignificant matters. They have constantly tried to persuade us that the only duty of the fuqahā is to give their opinion on legal problems.
Some people, lacking in correct understanding, have believed them and gone astray. They have failed to realize that all this is part of a plan designed to destroy our independence and establish control over all aspects of life in the Islamic countries. Unwittingly, they have assisted the propaganda organs of imperialism in carrying out its politics and reaching its goals. The propaganda institutions of imperialism have sought to persuade us that religion must be separate from politics, that the religious leaders must not interfere in social matters, and that the fuqahā do not have the duty of overseeing the destiny of the Islamic nation. Unfortunately, some people have believed them and fallen under their influence, with the result that we see. This result is what the imperialists have always desired, desire now, and will desire in the future.
Look at the religious teaching centers and you will see the effects of this imperialist propaganda. You will see negligent, lazy, idle, and apathetic people who do nothing but discuss points of law and offer their prayers, and are incapable of anything else. You will also encounter ideas and habits that are born of the same imperialist propaganda—for example, the idea that to speak is incompatible with the dignity of the ākhūnd; the ākhūnd and the mujtahīd should not be able to speak, or if they are, they should not say anything except, “Lā ilāha illa ’Llāh,” or may be one word more! But that is wrong, and contrary to the Sunnah of God’s Messenger (s). God has praised speech and expression, as well as writing and the use of pen. For example, He says in Sūrat ar-Rahmān: “He taught him [man] expression” (55: 4), counting the instruction in speech that He gave man as a great blessing and a source of nobility. Speech and expression are necessary for promulgating the ordinances of God and the teachings and doctrines of Islam; it is by means of them that we can instruct the people in their religion and fulfill the duty indicated in the phrase: “They instruct the people.”[232] The Most Noble Messenger and the Commander of Faithful both delivered speeches and sermons; they were men of eloquence.
These foolish ideas that exist in the minds of some people help the imperialists and the oppressive governments in their attempts to keep the Muslim countries in their present state and to block the progress of the Islamic movement. Such ideas are characteristic of those who are known as saintly but in reality are pseudo-saints, not true ones. We must change the way they think and make clear our attitudes toward them, for they are blocking our movement and the reforms we want to carry out, and are keeping our hands tied.
The late Burūjirdī,[233] the late Hujjat,[234] the late Sadr,[235] and the late Khwansari[236] (may God be pleased with all of them) had gathered in our house one day to discuss some political matter. I said to them: “Before anything else, you must decide what to do with these pseudo-saints. As long as they are there, our situation is like that of a person who is attacked by an enemy while someone else keeps his hands bound behind him. These persons who are known as saints but are pseudo-saints, not real ones, are totally unaware of the state of society, and if you want to do something—take over the government, assume control of the Majlis, stop the spread of corruption—they will destroy your standing in society. Before everything else, you must decide what to do with them.”
The state of Muslim society today is such that these false saints prevent Islam from exerting its proper influence; acting in the name of Islam, they are inflicting damage upon Islam. The roots of this group that exists in our society are to be found in the centers of the religious institution. In the centers at Najaf, Qum, Mashhad, and elsewhere, there are individuals who have this pseudo-saintly mentality, and from their base within the religious institution, they infect the rest of society with their evil ideas and attitudes. They will oppose anyone who tells the people: “Come now, awaken! Let us not live under the banners of others! Let us not be subject to the imposition of Britain and America! Let us not allow Israel to paralyze the Muslims!”
First, we must advise these pseudo-saints and try to awaken them. We must say to them: “Can you not see the danger? Do you not see that the Israelis are attacking, killing, and destroying and the British and Americans are helping them? You sit there watching, but you must wake up; you must try to find a remedy for the ills of the people. Mere discussion is not enough. Simply pronouncing opinions on points of law is of no use by itself. Do not keep silent at a time when Islam is being destroyed, Islam is being wiped out, like Christians who sat discussing the Holy Ghost and the Trinity until they were destroyed.[237] Wake up! Pay some attention to reality and the questions of the day. Do not let yourselves be so negligent. Are you waiting for the angels to come and carry you on their wings? Is it the function of the angles to pamper the idle? The angels spread their wings beneath the feet of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) because he was of benefit to Islam: he made Islam great, secured the expansion of Islam in the world and promoted its interests. Under his leadership, a free, vital, virtuous society came into being and won fame; everyone had to bow before him its might, even the enemy. But why should anyone bow before you, whose only activity is offering opinions on points of law?
If our pseudo-saints do not wake up, and begin to assume their responsibilities after repeated admonition and advice, it will be obvious that the cause of their failure is not ignorance, but something else. Then, of course, we will adopt a different attitude toward them.
The centers of the religious institution are places for teaching, instruction, propagation, and leadership. They belong to the just fuqahā, learned scholars, teachers, and students. They belong to those who are the trustees and successors of the prophets. They represent a trust, and it is obvious that a divine trust cannot be placed in the hands of anyone. Whoever wishes to assume such a weighty responsibility, to administer the affairs of the Muslims and to act as the deputy of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), to settle matters concerning the honor, property, and lives of the people, as well as the booty taken in war and the penal provisions of the law—such a person must be totally disinterested in the world and devoid of worldly ambition. Anyone whose efforts are oriented to this world—even in matters that are inherently legitimate—cannot be the trustee of God, and is not worthy of our trust. Any faqīh who joins the state apparatus of the oppressors and becomes a hanger-on of the court is not a trustee and cannot exercise God’s trust. God knows what misfortunes Islam has suffered—from its inception down to the present at the hands of these evil ‘ulamā! Abū Hurayrah was one of the fuqahā, but God knows what judgments he falsified for Mu‘āwiyah and others like him, and what damage he inflicted upon Islam. When an ordinary person enters the service of an oppressive government, he is to be accounted a sinner, but no greater harm will come of it. But, when a faqīh like Abū Hurayrah[238] or a judge like Shurayh joins such a government, he improves its standing while besmirching the reputation of Islam. When a faqīh enters the service of an oppressive government, it is as if the whole ulamā entered it along with him; it is no longer a question of a single individual. It is for this reason that the Imāms (‘a) strictly forbade their followers to join the government service, and told them that the situation they found themselves in had come about because some of them had done so.
The obligations that are incumbent on the fuqahā do not apply to others; on account of their position and function, fuqahā must avoid and relinquish even things that are otherwise licit. In cases where others are permitted to resort to taqiyyah, fuqahā may not. The purpose of taqiyyah is the preservation of Islam and the Shī‘i school; if people had not resorted to it, our school of thought would have been destroyed. Taqiyyah relates to the branches (furū’) of religion; for example—performing ablution in different ways. But when the chief principles of Islam and its welfare are endangered, there can be no question of silence or taqiyyah. If they try to force a faqīh to mount the minbar and speak in a way contrary to God’s command, can he obey them, telling himself “Taqiyyah is my religion and the religion of my forefathers”?[239] The question of taqiyyah does not even arise here. If a faqīh anticipates that by his entering the service of an oppressive government, oppression will be furthered and the reputation of Islam soiled, he must not enter its service even if he is killed as a result. There is no acceptable excuse he can offer, unless his entry into the service of the state has some rational basis, as was the case with ‘Ali ibn Yaqtīn,[240] whose motives in joining state service are well-known, and with Khwāja Nāsir Tūsi[241] (may God be pleased with him), whose actions resulted in benefits also well- known.
The true fuqahā of Islam are, of course, free of all guilt in this respect. From the beginning of Islam down to the present, their example is clear, and shines before us like a light; they are untouched by guilt. The ākhūnds who joined the service of governments in past ages did not belong to our school. Not only did our fuqahā oppose the rulers; they also suffered imprisonment and torture because of their disobedience.[242] Let no one imagine that the ‘ulamā of Islam have ever entered the service of the state or do so now. Upon occasion, of course, they have entered it in order to bring the state under their control or transform it; were such a thing possible now, it would be our duty to do so. But that is not what I am speaking of. Our problem is the people who wear turbans on their heads, have read a few books somewhere or other (or nor read them, as the case may be), and joined the service of the government in order to fill their stomachs or increase the scope of their authority. What are we to do with them?
Those persons are not Muslim fuqahā; they are people whom SAVAK has issued a turban and told to pray. If SAVAK cannot force the congregational imāms to be present on the occasion of government-sponsored festivities and other ceremonies, it will have its own people on hand ready to say: “Greater be his glory!” (Yes, they have recently begun to say, “Greater be his glory” when they mention the name of the Shāh.) These persons are not fuqahā; the people have recognized them for what they are. A certain tradition warns us to guard our religion against these people, lest they destroy it. They must be exposed and disgraced so that they may come to lose whatever standing they enjoy among the people. If their standing in society is not destroyed, they will destroy the standing of the Imām of the Age and the standing of Islam itself.
Our youths must strip them of their turbans. The turbans of these ākhūnds, who cause corruption in Muslim society while claiming to be fuqahā and ‘ulamā, must be removed. I do not know if our young people in Iran have died; where are they? Why do they not strip these people of their turbans? I am not saying they should be killed; they do not deserve to be killed. But take off their turbans! Our people in Iran, particularly the zealous youths, have a duty not to permit these ākhūnds, these reciters of “Greater be his glory!” to appear in society and move among the people wearing turbans. They do not need to be beaten much; just take off their turbans, and do not permit them to appear in public wearing turbans. The turban is a noble garment; not everyone is fit to wear it.
As I have said, the true ‘ulamā of Islam are free of all guilt in this respect; they have never joined the service of the government. Those who are affiliated with the government are parasites trying to grow fat on religion and on the ‘ulamā, but they have nothing to do with the ‘ulamā, and people recognize them for what they are.
We too have difficult tasks facing us. We must improve ourselves spiritually and improve our way of life. We must become more ascetic than before and completely shun the goods of this world. All of you must equip yourselves to protect the divine trust that has been vested in your. Become worthy trustees, and hold the world in less esteem. You cannot be like the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), who said that the world was no more to him than the snot of a goat; but turn away from the desire for worldly gain, purify your souls, turn toward God Almighty, cultivate piety. If your purpose in studying is—God forbid—to secure your future livelihood, you will never become fuqahā or trustees of Islam. Prepare yourselves to be useful to Islam; act as the army for the Imām of the Age in order to be able to serve him in spreading the rule of justice. The mere existence of righteous people has a beneficial effect on society—as I myself have observed, one becomes purified by walking with them and keeping company with them. Act so that your deeds, conduct, character, and aversion to worldly ambition will have an uplifting effect on people. They will imitate your example, and you will become models for them and soldiers of God. Only thus can you make Islam and Islamic government known to the people.
I am not telling you to abandon your studies. Indeed you must study, become fuqahā, devote yourselves to fiqh, and not permit fiqh to decline in the centers of the religious institution. Unless you are fuqahā, you will not be able to serve Islam. But while you study, be concerned, too, with representing Islam accurately to the people. Islam is now a stranger; no one knows Islam properly. You must convey Islam and its ordinances to the people so that they understand what Islam is, what Islamic government is, what prophethood and imamate mean, and in the broadest terms, why Islam was revealed and what its goals are. Thus Islam will gradually become known, and, God willing, an Islamic government will one day be established.
Let us overthrow tyrannical governments by: (1) severing all relations with governmental institutions; (2) refusing to cooperate with them; (3) refraining from any action that might be construed as aiding them; and (4) creating new judicial, financial, economic, cultural, and political institutions.
It is the duty of all of us to overthrow tāghūt; i.e., the illegitimate political powers that now rule the entire Islamic world. The governmental apparatus of tyrannical and anti-popular regimes must be replaced by institutions serving the public good and administered according to Islamic law. In this way, an Islamic government will gradually come into existence. In the Qur’an, God Almighty has forbidden men to obey the tāghūt—illegitimate regimes—and encouraged them to rise up against kings, just as He commanded Moses to rebel. There are a number of traditions encouraging people to fight against oppressors and those who wish to pervert religion. The Imāms (‘a), joined by their followers, the Shi‘ah, have always fought against tyrannical governments and illegitimate regimes, as one can easily see by examining their biographies and way of life. Most of the time they were subject to the pressures of tyrannical and oppressive rulers, and were compelled to observe taqiyyah out of extreme fear---not fear for themselves, of course, but fear for their religion, as is evident from an examination of the relevant traditions. Tyrannical rulers, for their part, stood in terror of the Imāms. They were aware that if they gave the Imāms the slightest opportunity, they would rebel and deprive them of their life, which was synonymous with pleasure-seeking and licentiousness. This is the reason we see Hārūn arresting Imām Mūsā ibn Ja‘far[243] (‘a) and imprisoning him for several years, and after him, Ma’mūn[244] transporting Imām Ridā (‘a) to Marv[245] and confining him there for many years before finally poisoning him. Hārūn and Ma’mūn acted as they did not because the Imāms were sayyids—i.e., descendants of the Prophet—and the rulers were opposed to the prophet; indeed, both Hārūn and Ma’mūn were Shī‘ah.[246] They were motivated entirely by considerations of state: they knew that the descendants of ‘Ali laid claim to the caliphate and that their earnest desire was to establish an Islamic government, considering this to be their duty. One day, it was suggested to Imām Mūsā ibn Ja‘far that he delineate the boundaries of Fadak[247] so that it might be returned to him. According to a certain tradition, he drew a map of the entire Islamic realm and said, “Everything within these boundaries is our legitimate right. We should rule over it, and you are usurpers.” The tyrannical rulers thus saw that if Imām Musa ibn Ja‘far were free, he would make life impossible for them and might lay the groundwork for a rebellion and the overthrow of their rule. So they did not give him the slightest opportunity. Have no doubt that if he had had the chance, he would indeed have rebelled and overthrow the ruling usurpers.
Ma’mūn similarly kept Imām Ridā under surveillance, cunningly and hypocritically addressing him as “Cousin” and “Descendant of God’s Messenger” out of fear that one day he might rise and destroy the foundation of his rule. Since he was indeed a descendant and a legatee of the Prophet (s), he could not be allowed to go free in Medina. The tyrannical rulers desired rule and were ready to sacrifice everything for its sake; they had no personal enmity with anyone. If—God forbid—the Imām (‘a) had frequented their court, he would have been shown the utmost veneration and respect; they would even have kissed his hand. According to tradition, when Imām Ridā came into the presence of Hārūn, the ruler ordered that the Imām be carried on horseback all the way to his throne and showed him all possible veneration. But when it was time to distribute the shares that were to be given from the treasury and it was the turn of the Bani Hāshim to receive their share, Hārūn awarded them only a very small amount. His son Ma’mūn who was present was surprised as the contrast between the veneration he had just witnessed and the allotment he now saw being made. Hārūn told him: “You do not understand. The Bani Hāshim must remain in this state. They must always be poor, imprisoned, banished, afflicted, even poisoned or killed; otherwise, they will rise up against us in revolt and ruin our lives.”
The Imāms (‘a) not only fought against tyrannical rulers, oppressive governments, and corrupt courts themselves, they also summoned the Muslims to wage jihād against those enemies. There are more than fifty traditions in Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah,[248] the Mustadrak, [249]and other books calling on the Muslims to shun tyrannical rulers and governments and to fill with earth the months of those who praise them, and threatening anyone who does so much as lend their panegyrists a pen or fill their inkwells. In short, the Imāms have given orders that all relations with such rulers be severed and that no one collaborate with them in any way. In contrast to these traditions are others that praise the learned scholars and the just faqīh, and emphasize their superiority over other men. Taken together, these two classes of traditions form a program for the establishment of an Islamic government. First, the people are induced to turn away from the tyrannical government of the oppressors and destroy their house of oppression; then the houses of fuqahā are to open their doors to the people: fuqahā who are just and ascetic and who fight in God’s way to implement the laws of Islam and establish its social systems.
The Muslims will be able to live in security and tranquility and preserve their faith and morals only when they enjoy the protection of a government based on justice and law, a government whose form, administrative system, and laws have been laid down by Islam. It is our duty now to implement and put into practice the plan of a government established by Islam. I hope that by presenting the system of government and the political and social principles of Islam to broad segments of humanity, we will create a strong new current of thought and a powerful and popular movement that will result in the establishment of an Islamic government.
O God, foreshorten the arms of the oppressors that are stretched out against the lands of the Muslims and root out all traitors to Islam and the Islamic countries. Awaken the heads of the Muslims states from their deep sleep so that they may exert themselves on behalf of their people’s interests and renounce divisiveness and the quest for personal gain. Grant that the younger generation studying in the religious colleges and the universities may struggle to reach the sacred aims of Islam and strive together, with ranks united, first, to deliver the Islamic countries from the clutches of imperialism and its vile agents, and then to defend them. Grant that the fuqahā and the scholars may strive to guide and enlighten the minds of the people, to convey the sacred aims of Islam to all Muslims, particularly the younger generation, and to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic government. From You is success, and there is neither recourse nor strength except in God, the Exalted, the Sublime.
Notes:
[208] On June 23, 1908, Muhammad ‘Ali Shāh carried out with Russian aid a military coup against the first Iranian Majlis. He was overthrown and constitutional rule restored on July 16, 1909, as a result of popular resistance, largely directed by the most important religious scholars of the day in Najaf. See Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, chs. 7-10.
[209] Soon after the Six-Day War, it was reported that copies of the Qur’an were circulating in the territories seized by the Zionists, as well as in African countries, from which all verses critical of the Jews had been excised.
[210] Najaf is the main center of learning in the Shī‘i world. The lament here that “we do not even have Najaf” refers to the restrictions and pressure placed on the Shī‘ah scholars of Najaf by the Ba‘athist regime of Baghdad. The Ba‘athist persecution of Najaf reached a highpoint in May 1969—ten months before these lectures were given—when a number of ‘ulamā were arrested and tortured and religious endowments were confiscated. See anon., Hayāt-e-Kareem, in Eng. (Karachi, 1973), pp. 73-84. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the crime of the regime in Baghdad was epitomized by torturing and cold-bloodedly murdering Āyatullāh al-‘Uzma Sayyid Muhammad al-Bāqir as-Sadr and his sister Bint al-Hudā in April 1980. (Pub.)
[211] Insofar as the “enjoining of the good” is the particular duty of the religious scholars, it would be shaming for them to need a reminder from students.
[212] Throughout his exile in Najaf, Imām Khomeini gave special attention to the Islamic associations of Iranian students in Europe and the United States, sending them guidance and encouragement. For an example of his messages to the Iranian Muslim students in North America, see Islam and Revolution, pp. 209-211.
[213] ‘Āqil ibn Abi Tālib: brother of Imām ‘Ali. After Imām ‘Ali assumed the caliphate, ‘Aqil is related to have asked him to withdraw 40,000 dirhams from the public treasury to enable him to settle a debt. When his request was denied, ‘Aqil abandoned his brother and joined the camp of Mu‘āwiyah in Damascus.
[214] Bani Hāshim: the Meccan clan to which the Prophet and his descendants belonged. See Subhāni, chap. 4, “Ancestors of the Prophet,” http://www.al-islam.org/message/5.htm. (Pub.)
[215] An allusion to the activities of Ashraf, the Shāh’s twin sister, who was reported in 1960 to have been detained by the Swiss police after large quantities of heroin were found in her possession. See Bahman Nīrūmand, Persien, Modell eines Entwicklungslandes (Hamburg, 1967), pp. 133-134.
[216] Wa lā ’adh-Dhāllīn: “not those who go astray,” a phrase occurring in the seventh verse of the opening chapter of the Qur’an that is recited in every prayer. The letter dh
#65213;) in ’dh-dhāllīn represents an Arabic sound that does not exist in Persian and it is generally pronounced by Persian speakers as a z. Nonetheless, there are those—in Iran and elsewhere—who devote excessive energy to the task of giving the letter its Arabic value when reciting the verse in prayer.
[217] ‘Āshūrā: the tenth day of Muharram; the day on which Imām Husayn was martyred in Karbala. See n. 11 above.
[218] Rauzakwāns: those who specialize in reciting narrations, often versified, of the martyrdom of the Imāms. The first part of the designation, rauza, is taken from the title of one such narrative, Rauzat ash-Shuhadā, by Husayn Vā‘iz Khāshifi (d. 910/1504).
[219] Mujāhid: those who engage in jihād, who struggle for the attainment of God’s purposes on earth.
[220] “Citadels of Islam”: see the tradition cited on p. 58.
[221] Khwāja Nāsir ad-Dīn Tūsi: one of the most outstanding of all Shī‘ah scholars, 597/1201-672/1274. He wrote voluminously not only on the religious sciences, but also on philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy. He joined the entourage of the Mongol conqueror Hulagu when he was passing through Iran on his way to Baghdad, a circumstance that has led many to accuse him of complicity in the conquest. Concerning his associations with the Mongols, see A.H. Hā’iri, “Nāsir ad-Dīn Tūsi: His Alleged Role in the Fall of Baghdad,” Actes du Ve Congress international d’Arabisants et d’Islamisants (Brussels, 1971), pp. 255-266.
[222] ‘Allāmah Hilli: more fully, ‘Allāmah ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli, another important Shī‘ah scholar who lived in the period of Mongol domination of Iran, 648/1250-716/1325. Concerning his scholarly and political activities, see Michel Mazzaoui, The Rise of the Safawids (Wiesbaden, 1972), pp. 27-34.
[223] Yazid: second Umayyad caliph and adversary of Imām Husayn. He ruled from 60/680-64/683.
[224] Abū Tālib: father of Imām ‘Ali. According to Shī‘i belief, he embraced Islam; but according to Sunni belief, he did not. For a discussion of his faith in Islam, see Subhāni, op. cit., chap. 21, “Death of Abū Tālib,” http://al-islam.org/message/22.htm; Islam of Abū Tālib (Part I-IV), http://al-islam.org/encyclopedia/chapter5a/4.html. (Pub.)
[225] Ākhūnd: see n. 5 above.
[226] Hārūn ar-Rashīd: Abbasid caliph who reigned from 180/186-193/809 and was the contemporary of the seventh and eighth Imāms, Mūsā al-Kāzim and Ridā.
[227] “That man” was Hasan Pakravan, head of SAVAK between 1961 and 1965, executed after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution. This visit occurred on July 2, 1963 when Imām Khomeini was being detained at the ‘Ashratābād garrison in Tehran. See S.H.R., Barrasī va Tahlīlī, p. 575.
[228] Āqā-yi Qummi: that is, Āyatullāh Hasan Tabātabā’i Qummi, religious leader of Mashhad who actively cooperated with Imām Khomeini in the movement of Khurdād 15.
[229] For the text of this speech, given at the Masjid-i A‘zam in Qum on March 6, 1964, see anon., Biyūgrāfi-yi Pīshvā, n.p., n.d., II, 109-138; Sahīfeh-ye Imām (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, 1379 Sh.), vol. 1, p. 269. (Pub.)
[230] The reference may be to a passage in Mahmūd Mahmūd, Tārīkh-i Ravābit-i Siyāsī-yi Īrān va Inglīs (Tehran, 1332 Sh./1953), VI, 1743. Sultān Ghāzī ad-Dīn Haydar of Oudh established an endowment of a hundred lakhs of rupees for the support of the needy in Najaf and Karbala. After his principality was absorbed into British India, the administration of the endowment passed into British hands. Concerning the Oudh bequest and its recipients, see Algar, Religion and State, pp. 237-238.
[231] Shaykh Murtadā: that is, Shaykh Murtadā Ansāri, first mujtahid to become the sole source of guidance (marja’-i taqlīd) of the Shī‘i world, 1216/1801-1281/1865. He was the author of al-Makāsib, a major work on Shī‘i jurisprudence. See Algar, Religion and State, pp. 162-164.
[232] See p.52.
[233] Burūjirdi: that is, Āyatullāh Husayn Burūjirdi, concerning whom, see p. xii. See also ‘Abbās al-‘Abīri, Āyatullāh Al-Broojerdi, trans. Muhammad Hasan Najafi (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[234] Hujjat: that is, Āyatullāh Muhammad Hujjat, a teacher for many years and an associate of Āyatullāh Hā’iri, 1310/1862-1372/1953. He was responsible for the building of Hujjatiyyah Madrasah. See Muhammad Sharīf Rāzi, Ganjinā-yi Dānishmandān (Tehran, 1352 Sh./1973), I, pp. 305-335.
[235] Sadr: that is, Āyatullāh Sadr ad-Dīn, 1299/1882-1373/1953, another of the chief associates of Hā’iri in Qum. See Rāzi, Ganjinā-yi Dānishmandān, I, pp. 326-335.
[236] Khwansāri: that is, Āyatullāh Muhammad Taqi Khwansāri, a religious scholar who combined militancy with learning, 1305/1888-1371/1952. He fought against the British occupiers of Iraq under the leadership of Mīrzā Muhammad Taqi Shirāzi (see n. 157) before joining the circle of Hā’iri in Qum. See Rāzi, Ganjinā-yi Dānishmandān, I, pp. 322-326; Hasan Iedrem, Āyatullāh Khonsāri: Through Sources of Witnesses, trans. ‘Abbās Abū Sa‘eedi (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[237] Possibly a reference to the Christological disputes of Byzantium.
[238] Abū Hurayrah: a companion of the Prophet (d. 59/679) who embraced Islam in 7 A.H. Even though his companionship with the Prophet hardly exceeded three years, he is reported to have narrated 5,374 of the Prophet’s traditions, more than any other companion. Even during the Era of the Caliphate, prominent companions used to complain against him. He was named governor of Bahrain by ‘Umar (but deposed later and was fined with 10 thousand dirhams due to misappropriation of public funds); judge of Medina by ‘Uthmān (for whom he concocted traditions, extolling his virtues); and governor of Medina by Mu‘āwiyah. It has been reported that during the Battle of Siffīn he kept aloof from taking side. Many a times he spent a day in the camp of Imām ‘Ali while in the midst of Mu‘āwiyah’s army in another day. He used to pray behind ‘Ali while giving preference to partake meals with Mu‘āwiyah. He said: “Mu’āwiyah’s food is more gorgeous whereas praying behind ‘Ali is more virtuous.” A number of traditions transmitted by him have been rejected by both Sunni and Shī‘ah scholars. See ‘Allāmah Sayyid ‘Abdul Husayn Sharafuddīn, Abū Hurayrah; Muhammad Abūzahrā, Abū Hurayrah: Shaykh al-Madīrah; Abī Abī ’l Hadīd, Sharh Nahj al-Balāghah, vol. 4, pp. 63-69; Ibn Abī ’l Hadīd, Dāyirat al-Ma‘ārif Islāmiyyah, vol. 1, pp. 418-419. (Pub.)
[239] A celebrated saying of Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq.
[240] ‘Ali ibn Yaqtīn: an early Shī‘ah traditionist, 124/742-182/798. His father was a staunch supporter of the Abbasids during the Umayyad period. He associated with Mansūr, the second Abbasid caliph, and is said to have assisted him in planning Baghdad. (Pub.)
[241]See n. 173 above.
[242] Although a pattern of alliance between Sunni fuqahā and rulers can be discerned in Islamic history, it is worth noting that there have been numerous important exceptions, e.g., Abū Hanīfah (80/669-152/769), founder of the most widespread Sunni law school, who was imprisoned by the ‘Abbasid caliph Mansūr.
[243] See n. 88 above.
[244] Ma’mūn: Abbasid caliph from 198/813 to 218/833, and persecutor of Imām Ridā (see n. 48 above).
[245] Marv: a city in Transoxiana.
[246] Ma’mūn and his father Hārūn were Shī‘ah in the sense that they implicitly recognized the authority of Imām Ridā in their dealings with him.
[247] Fadak: see n. 134 above.
[248] Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah: see n. 105.
[249] Mustadrak: see n. 159 above.
Written by The Late Imam Khomeini (R.A.)
Translated by Prof. Hamid Algar
Source: Imam reza network