Immigration and Jihad
In the Name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful
Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds, the Creator of all beings, and may peace be with the servant of God, His Messenger, friend, the chosen one, the trustee of His secret and the transmitter of His Message, our master and prophet, Mohammad and his pure and infallible progeny.
I seek refuge in God from the reviled Satan,
“He who forsakes his home in the cause of God, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious: Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God: And God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” (4/100).
Immigration and jihad are two cornerstones on which Islam relies on in the social field. As is evident, the Holy Qur’an has, out of reverence for their sanctity, held them in high regard, wherever they are mentioned. Similarly, it has conferred great veneration and grandeur on the rank of immigrants and mujahideen (the fighters back).
Immigration (hijra), means leaving one’s home, people, and homeland, for a new place of abode, with a view to saving one’s faith from being compromised. In many Qur’anic verses, you will notice that both words are mentioned beside each other:
“Those who believe, and adopt exile, and fight for the Faith, in the cause of Allah as well as those who give (them) asylum and aid, - these are (all) in very truth the Believers: for them is the forgiveness of sins and a provision most generous.” (8/74).
In the early days of Islam, Muslims used to be divided into two groups: al-Muhajiroon (The migrants) and al-Ansar (The supporters or helpers). Al-Ansar were the inhabitants of Medina, previously know as Yetherb, who gave Al-Muhajiroon haven and aid. The latter were the ones who fled their homes and travelled to Medina in order to preserve their faith.
In common with jihad, immigration is an Islamic sharia rule that is not constant. That is, it becomes a performable religious obligation on Muslims when certain circumstances emerge and certain conditions are met.
To avoid misunderstanding and contradictions in understanding the rules of both jihad and immigration, we set out here to discuss the subject in some detail.
For both jihad and immigration different interpretations have been put forward, i.e. different from the one we have just mentioned. Immigration has been taken to mean, “the abandonment of misdeeds and sinning”; thus, “the immigrant is the person who emigrated from the camp of disobedience”.
How precise is this interpretation? Would the person, whose soul has been tainted with sins, he then repented a true repentance, become a deserter of misdeeds? If we accept this interpretation, all people of the world who repented would fit this description for they forsook the vile deeds they were committing, such as Faheel bin Ayyadh, Bishr al-Hafi and others.
Ibn Ayyadh, used to be a thief. He turned his back to this type of wrongdoing and turned to God in a true penitence. Having mended his ways, he became a great man, turning into a famous teacher and educationalist for many people. In the spell when he had taken to stealing, Ibn Ayyadh was in the process of breaking into a house with the intent to steal. While he was scaling the fence of the house, he noticed that the owner of the house was in the middle of a devotional prayer, reciting the Holy Qur’an in a submissive voice. He heard the man recite,
“Has not the time arrived for the believers that their hearts in all humility should engage in the remembrance of Allah..” (57/16).
While listening to this Qur’anic verse being recited, he somehow felt that as though he were being addressed with those words. The words shocked him to the core, so much so that he retorted, “O Lord! Yea. O Lord! Yea. It is high time. And it’s up.” He then came down the fence, after he had been dissuaded from carrying out his raid. This was the last time he carried out an offending, be it a criminal activity, consuming alcohol or gambling, and all other sins. He made a clean break with his unsavoury past. And in order to wipe the slate clean and forget about his past, he made amends with the victims of his crimes and reached a settlement with them, i.e. compensating them for what he stole from them and asking their forgiveness. He further made amends with his Creator. Therefore, Ibn Ayyadh fits the definition of immigration, in that he abandoned the vile deeds he was hooked on.
In Baghdad, and during the lifetime of Imam Mousa al-Kadhim (a.s.), there was a well know man called Bishr al-Hafi. One-day, al-Kadhim was passing by the house of Bishr. It happened that one of his maids opened the door to leave a bag of rubbish in front of the house. The Imam asked her if the owner of the house was a slave or a freeman. She answered, without hiding her bewilderment at his question, that he was a freeman. The Imam said, “You are right. Had he been a slave he would have feared his Lord”.
The Imam then left the scene. When the maid went back into the house, Bishr, who was in a drinking session, asked her as to what kept her so late. She told him the story. It seems that the words of the Imam descended on him like a thunderbolt waking him up from his deep slumber and forgetfulness. After the maid had told him of the direction the Imam continued his walk in, he quickly set off trying to catch up with the Imam, so much so that he forget to wear his slippers. While he was in hot pursuit, he was saying to himself that the man who uttered those words must have been Imam Mousa bin Ja’far al-Kadhim (a.s.).
Indeed, he went to the house of the Imam and apologised to him. And while still weeping, declared in his presence that he wanted to repent and become a slave, not to any one, but to God. He went on saying that he did not want any more the type of freedom he was used to, i.e. that which imprisoned in him his humanity and set forth the animal base instigations; that he did not want any more to chase lofty positions and repute; that he did not want to wade in the mire of sins and become their hostage; that he did not want to suffocate inside him the good innate nature and sound mind. He concluded that he wanted to be a true slave to God and a freeman when dealing with others.
Thus, Bishr announced his repentance at the hands of Imam al-Kadhim. From that point in time onward, he was never to relapse in his previous bad ways, i.e. he discarded his sins (hajara thunubah) and began a clean sheet, destroying all objects and symbols of wrongdoings, and turning to submission to and worship of God. Accordingly, Bishr met the criterion of immigration for he turned his back to all misdeeds and immoralities.
This definition of immigration (hijra) is similar to that of jihad for the mujahid (lit. maker of a great effort) which is “the one who is at odds with the inclinations of his tempting self”, especially its bad suggestions. It is a known fact that the internal struggle is ever present between the soul and its preferences on the one hand and reason on the other; in other words, a constant warring between heart and mind.
Imam Ali (a.s.) has been quoted as saying, “The bravest of people is he who overcomes his leanings”. The real courage is demonstrated in this incident, which took place during the time of the Messenger of God, Mohammad (s.a.w.). He was passing by a place where he saw a group of youth competing with one another over who could lift the heaviest rock.
Aiming to make use of the occasion to preach to the youngsters, he approached them and offered to act as a referee between them in their contest. They accepted his offer. He said to them, “No one of you should be in need to lift any rock so that they can be judged the strongest. Instead, I have a proposition for you, in that whoever among you can muster the strength and plug the courage to overpower his soul and prevent it from committing sins should be declared the strongest.” It therefore follows that the mujahid is the one who could win over his self and the brave is the one who could overcome his desires.
There is another example and lesson, which demonstrates true bravery, and which we could draw from the story of Purya Wali, a famous wrestling champion. He sets a parable for what a true champion should be. He was the epitome of gentlemanly conduct and magnanimity. The story goes like this: One day, our champion arrived in a town where he was scheduled to meet in a contest with the top wrestler of that town. While he was on a tour in that town, he came across an old woman who was giving out pieces of sweets to passers by. She gave him a piece of chocolate and asked him for a prayer.
He asked her whether there was anything in particular she wanted him to pray for. She said to him that her son was the wrestling champion of their town and that he was going to meet later in the week, another wrestler who came from another town. She added that she felt apprehensive about her son’s chances of winning, in that he might lose, and that his defeat would not only be considered a setback for her son, but it would mean that their source of income would dry up. In short, his defeat would spell disaster for the family. Our champion told her to have peace of mind, in that he would pray for her son to win the match.
After that conversation with the old woman, he was in a reflective mood, calling to mind that “he who overcomes his inclinations is the bravest of people”. At the appointed time of contest between him and his opponent and as the contest progressed, he came to know that his opponent was much weaker than him and that if he wanted to, he could have defeated him in no time. However, having reached a decision that he would let his opponent defeat him, he overindulged in evasive movements to give the impression that the contest was proceeding normally, and in the opportune time, he gave way and let his opponent defeat him. The storyteller went on to say that at the moment of defeat, our champion felt that his heart became wide open for God, as though he were in His dominion. And because that man did battle with his soul and scored a victory over its inclinations, he had become among the friends of God. You might ask, why? The answer is because “the true mujahid is the one who does battle with his soul”, the “bravest of people is he who overcomes his desires”, and lastly, because he demonstrated the kind of courage and magnanimity that made him excel over all champions.
More significant of the previous story is that of Imam Ali (a.s.) and Amr bin Abdwad, a battle-hardened fighter, who earned the nickname of “the Knight of Yelyel. This story goes like this: At the battle of Khandaq (the Trench) the army of Muslims was on one side of the trench and that of the polytheists (mushrikeen) was on the other side. A group of infidels, among them Amr bin Wid, managed to cross over to the side of the Muslim army. Ibn Wid, mounting his horse, started yelling and challenging the Muslim fighters to fight him in a duel. The Prophet (s.a.w.) turned to his companions, enquiring whether anyone of them was willing to fight the challenger.
All were quiet, apart from Ali, who stood up and said, “I am his match.” The Prophet said, “He is Amr. Sit down.” Ibn Wid grew more vociferous, taunting the Muslims and making fun of their assertion that whoever was killed among Muslims would go to heaven. For the second time, Ali stood up and volunteered to face him in combat. He was asked by the Prophet to sit down. Amr bin Wid shouted for the third time, throwing down the gauntlet. Ali picked up the gauntlet and asked the Prophet to give him permission to fight Ibn Wid.
The result of the swordfight was in favour of Ali. The high point of the combat came when Ali overcame Ibn Wid, by seriously wounding him, and wanted to deal him the last blow. Ibn Wid spat in the face of Ali who was sitting on his chest, prior to beheading him. Ali let go of him and moved away to have a stroll before returning to finish him off. While Ali was in the process of doing just that, Ibn Wid asked him as to why he moved away and came back. Ali replied that he was hurt and offended when Ib Wid spat at him, preferring to move away as not to let his dealing him the last blow be considered as though it were for taking personal revenge. That is, killing him would not count in the cause of God. So, the short time Ali took between the incident of spitting and moving away from the fallen foe and coming back to finish him off was for suppressing his anger, so that his killing him would be deemed in the cause of God, and not for Ali’s personal vendetta.
In summation, the second definition of hijra (immigration) is forsaking sins and misdeeds and the second interpretation for jihad is battling with one’s own self, with a view to deterring it from driving one to committing that which is vile or improper. However, is this interpretation correct? The answer to this question is yes, in that in itself it is correct and, yet, it has been misunderstood. Our statement, “The immigrant is he who departs wrongdoings, and the mujahid (the battler) is he who is at odds with his tempting self”, can be found in the traditions (hadith) of the Infallibles (a.s.). The Prophet (s.a.w.) describes battling one’s soul (jihadun nafs) as “the major jihad”.
And yet, the mix-up and misinterpretation has come about as a result of some people’s resorting to annulling the first meaning by suggesting that the import of hijra is departing one’s misdeeds by mending their ways, and that the meaning of jihad is battling with oneself to dissuade it from committing what is unlawful, implying that there is no need for man to leave his home and kin when it becomes necessary. That is, there is no point in fleeing to other countries when needs be. We should, instead, stay put; it would suffice that we abandon the crooked ways that leads to the commissioning of sins and would therefore be eligible for the definition of muhajir (immigrant).
As regards jihad, some would like to argue that since jihad is doing battle with oneself, there remains no necessity for entering in war with the enemies of Islam; it would, they further allege, suffice that we stay at home and busy ourselves with wrestling with our internal struggle. This, in their view, is the jihad in the cause of God (aljihadu fi sabilillah). In their judgement, this type of jihad is far superior to the other one because it is “the major jihad” (aljihadul akbar) as opposed to the other one, which is “the minor jihad” (aljihadul asghar).
As is evident, interpreting hijra, as abandoning committing what is vile, has been taken as an alleged reason for dismissing as irrelevant hijra (immigration) according to the first meaning. Similarly, interpreting jihad as doing battle with oneself as an excuse for rejecting as redundant the jihad according to the first meaning. This is where deviation from the right reading of both the concepts has occurred. It goes without saying that there are two types of hijra (immigration) in Islam; the same goes for jihad. Choosing [for convenience] any type at the expense of the other, i.e. in both the cases – jihad and immigration would entail departure from Islam and its injunctions.
Our great leaders of religion – the Prophet (s.a.w.), Imam Ali and the rest of the Imams (a.s.) were all among the immigrants (muhajir) in the Way of God in the sense of both types of hijra (immigration). And the same goes for jihad. However, tackling the subject from a semantic standpoint, we would come across gradations that cannot be reached without going through both the categories of jihad as well as immigration. That is, it is implausible that someone attains the rank of mujahid (fighter) before experiencing combat in the battlefield. Likewise, one cannot be deemed “immigrant” without going through the process of real immigration, in the manifest meaning of term.
This is God’s law with His creation; He has made man’s attaining maturity and advancement contingent on his passing educational/training courses. For example, in the view of Islam, marriage is a sacred institution for a number of reasons, unlike contemporary Christianity that considers celibacy, [perhaps a reference to the institution of bachelorhood of the Catholic priesthood] as a sacred deed. So, why does Islam regard marriage a sanctified practice? The secret of attaching great importance to this tradition lies in its immense influence in cultivating man’s spirit.
For man’s soul to attain a sublime position of wisdom and perfection, marriage would contribute immeasurably to reaching that rank. Conversely, if men preferred to stay bachelor and women spinster till death, they would remain lacking in spiritual prosperity. The reason for this is the absence of the educational dimension of marriage. Such men and women will not be able to overcome this inadequacy even if they spent their entire lives in worship, meditation, and battling with their tempting selves. Islam has, therefore, considered the institution of wedlock among its traditions, being one of positive influences on man’s education and his pursuit of perfection. Thus, any effect of any factor that contributes in shaping man’s character is limited to the area where it can be effective. Equally, any alternative factor would not have the same effect, if it were to be hoped to give the same results. And by the same token, any of these factors that are collectively taking part in the process of man’s cultivation cannot be used interchangeably.
Immigration and jihad are among the factors that have a say in man’s development towards perfection. It therefore follows that no other factor can replace them. Using the same rationale, jihad, in the sense of man’s struggle with oneself, has its place, so does immigrating, i.e. turning one’s back to committing sins. And yet, practical immigration is one of the educational factors that cannot be superseded by the type of immigration in the sense of abandoning committing sins. Similarly, jihad, in the sense of fighting back the enemies of God, can never be replaced by the second type of jihad, i.e. doing battle with one’s tempting self and vice versa. In the eye of Islam, both are in the same rank of importance in Islamic education.
Here one may say that the living circumstances vary from one individual Muslim to another and that a certain Muslim individual may not be required to embark on either immigration or jihad against the enemies of God. What would become of such an individual, given the important positive influence of upholding these two tenets? The Noble Messenger (s.a.w.) provides the answer for this question, saying that the religious duty on such a Muslim in such circumstances should be that he always has a true and sincere intention to embark on such a duty should circumstances change, in that there may arise the need for embarking on immigration or engaging in jihad as the case may be. Thus, provided there is such intention and determination, such an individual should be able to meet the requirements of attaining the rank of immigrant (muhajir) and fighter (mujahid). This meaning can be gleaned from this prophetic tradition, “Whomever did not take part in battle [against the infidels] or did not contemplate such an eventuality, would die a hypocrite.”
The Holy Qur’an has this to offer in this regard:
“Not equal are those believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of God with their goods and their persons. God hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than to those who sit (at home). Unto all (in Faith) hath God promised good: But those who strive and fight hath He distinguished above those who sit (at home) by a special reward, - Ranks specially bestowed by Him, and Forgiveness and Mercy. For God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” (4/95-96).
It is clear from this Qur’anic text that in its discussion, it does not talk about those who preferred not join the fight [out of choice, and not for a good reason]. The reference to those “who sit at home” is confined to those believers who did not join others in the strife and fight because there is a sufficient number of mujahidin (fighters). So, when it comes to allotting ranks, the fighters are given loftier positions or ranks over those who stayed behind for a reason. However, in the same vein, the Qur’anic verse confirms that this classification does not cover ”Those who sit (at home) by a special reward”, i.e. those who stayed behind by virtue of their physical disabilities – such as blindness, paralysis, and illness. The Qur’an reiterates that those too may attain the rank of the fighters. They may as well overtake the fighters, should they have harboured sincere intentions and true determination to join in the fight. That is, if their valid reasons for not joining were lifted, they would have joined the war effort in person and wealth. This principle is sound, when its conditions are fulfilled.
On the return of Imam Ali (a.s.) from the battle of Siffeen [fought against Mu’awiyah], a man, among the rank and file of his army, asked him, “O Commandar of the Faithful! I have a brother whom I would have loved that he be among us, so that he could achieve the favour of your companionship.” The Imam replied, “What was the intention of your brother, his resolution, the inclination of his heart? Had he a valid reason that prevented him from joining us?” The Imam then provided the answers for all these questions, saying, “Had he no valid reason and did not join us, his not being with us is better for us. Had he a good reason for not being with us and yet his heart was with us and his resolution was to join us once the reasons that had prevented him from joining us were lifted, he would be judged as though he were with us.” The man answered in the affirmative.
The Imam (a.s.) said, “Not only your brother alone was with us. Verily, other men who are still in the wombs of their mothers; rather, those unborn men [who are still, in the form of sperm in the semen] of their fathers, are with us.” This is an unshakeable truth till the Day of Judgement, that any person who is intent on wishing that he were at the time of Ali and that he would have, with firm will, joined him in his army in Siffeen, he must rest assured that he would be deemed among his supporters, even though he did not witness the battle.
Awaiting relief from suffering
What does waiting for the happy ending mean? And what does the statement, “The best of works is looking forward to the happy ending” mean? Some people mistakenly believe that waiting for relief from suffering (faraj), which is the best of deeds, means that we should look forward to the reappearance of the Awaited Imam, al-Mahdi (May God hasten his reappearance) who would do so with a group of his disciples, totalling 313 men, with scores of followers. And once they appeared on the scene, they would wage war against the enemies of Islam, cleanse the earth of their uncleanness and vile deeds, establish the rule of justice and security in the land, and make available freedom and prosperity for all. And once this is done, they would invite us to enjoy their toil!! It seems that some people would like us to believe that this is what is meant by “Waiting for the happy ending (faraj)”, describing it as the best of good deeds.
However, the true waiting for faraj is that we should expect the reappearance of Imam al-Mahdi and be drafted in his army and fight under his command even if we get martyred in the process. The genuine waiting is in man’s whole aspiration to be party to the jihad in the cause of God. That is, not the kind of waiting that entails dependency on the Imam to solve our problems by performing all the intractable tasks, and once these are out of the way and the time for reaping the fruit of the toil comes we would then emerge to enjoy the harvest. This is not the right approach. This is the reasoning of the followers of Prophet Moses (a.s.). As for the followers of Prophet Mohammad (s.a.w.), they said to him: O Messenger of God! We are not going to address you in the same manner the Israelites did with Moses when they got to the approaches of Jerusalem, Palestine and found out that there was an army waiting for them:
“..O Moses! We shall never enter it as long as they are in it. Gof thou, and thy Lord, and fight ye two, while we sit here.” (5/24).
To that, Moses (a.s.) retorted: What is your responsibility then? You should be liable to drive out the transgressors who occupied your land and sent you into exile. In contrast, the followers of Mohammad (s.a.w.), such as al-Miqdad, did not replicate the position of Moses’ followers. They said: We believed in you and bore witness that what you call for is the truth, and swore allegiance to you to be obedient. Therefore, set forth to wherever you have decided and we will be with you. We swear by Him Who sent you with the truth, should you decide to push your way in this sea we would have done so with you, without a single one of us turning back. We are not averse to the orders to engage in combat an enemy tomorrow.
As such, genuine “waiting for the happy ending” is that we should be full of hope and determination to succeed in joining the army of the Awaited Imam (May God hasten his reappearance), so that we be in a position to contribute to reforming the world.
“We wish we were with you, so that we could have achieved a great victory”. We always repeat this statement, addressing Imam Hussain (a.s.). Yet, do we really pay attention to its actual meaning? It simply means, “O Aba Abdillah! We wish we were with you so that we could have attained the rank of martyrdom fighting on your side and under your standard, and thus we would have achieved a great victory.” Are these just words or do they underline a sincere intension and a true desire? Although there are people who utter the words and truly mean what they are talking about, yet the majority of us recite these words in the book of visitations, paying lip service to them.
Imam Hussain (a.s.) uttered these words, in commendation of the sincerity of his companions, “I am not aware of any companions who are better than my companions both in kindness and loyalty.”
An outstanding Shia scholar used to cast doubt over the authenticity of the statement, in that it might have not emanated from Imam Hussain. His rationale for dismissing it as unauthentic goes thus, “Having pondered the question, I have reached this conclusion: The companions of Imam Hussain did not do an exceptional deed. It was the enemy who demonstrated debased attitude and practice.
Knowing that Imam Hussain is the grandson of the Prophet, the son of Imam Ali and Fatima, the Imam of his Age, etc., it goes without saying that any ordinary Muslim would have come to his rescue, seeing him in that situation. So, the band of people who fought beside him did not do anything out of the ordinary. On the contrary, those who did not come to his aid were very bad people”. He went on to say, “It seems that Allah wanted to deliver me from this inattention, ignorance, and misguidance.
In my dream, I saw myself witnessing the battle of at-Taf, i.e. Kerbala. In response to his appeal for support, I declared to Imam Hussain my readiness to side with him against his enemy. The Imam asked me to wait for his instructions. In the meantime, the time for prayer became due. The Imam said: We want to say our prayer. You are required to keep a vigil in that corner, so that you can forestall any attack by the enemy that could be coming from there. I said: Go ahead O son of the Messenger of God! He started saying the prayer. I stood in front of him. After a short while I saw an arrow coming in my direction. I, unconsciously, ducked it. The arrow crashed into the Imam. I said: I seek forgiveness from God and repent to Him, what a preposterous act I have just committed.
This incident happened on three more occasions, where I, time and again, took evasive action to avoid the arrow hitting me and instead let it hit the Imam every time. On turning my head towards the Imam, I noticed that he was looking at me with a smile on his face and said: (I have never seen any companions better than my companions both in kindness and loyalty)”.
The Imam then added, and the narrative is still that of the Shia scholar was relating, “Sitting at home repeating the words: (We wish we were with you, so that we would achieve a great victory) is worthless if you do not put it into practice. Are you like this? My companions were people whose actions spoke louder than words. They were not mincing their words.”
[Going back to that part of the story of the martyrdom of Imam Hussain (a.s.)], on the tenth of Muharram (Aashoura’), the Imam said the last Dhuhr (noon) prayer before he was martyred. Most of his comrades in arms were martyred earlier that day, in the exchanges of volleys of arrows between the combatants. Thus, he was left with the immediate members of his family and a small band of his companions. The fighting force of the Imam totalled some seventy-two warriors.
And yet, despite their small number, they were enjoying high morale and showing exemplary gallantry. Being the commander of this small army, Imam Hussain did not show any sign of weakness or despondency. He planned for the showdown with the enemy by positioning three main groups of his soldiers into a central segment (the heart), right and left flanks, as any other regular army did in those circumstances. Zuhair bin al-Qayn was appointed commander of the right flank, Habib bin Mudhahir was charged with the responsibility of defending the left flank. His brother al-Abbas (a.s.) was made the standard-bearer.
The companions of Imam Hussain (a.s.) were eager to start the fight. However, the Imam was insistent on not launching the first strike, leaving it to the enemy to do so. That starting shot came at the hands of Omar bin Sa’ad.
Ibn Sa’ad was keen on holding both the spiritual and the materialistic at the same time. He was aspiring to securing Ibn Ziyad’s offer of appointing him the governor of Ray, but without staining his hands with the blood of al-Hussain. Because of this soul-searching and struggle to subdue his inclinations, he embarked on a string of letters to Imam Hussain with a view to avoiding the bloodshed. When the news reached Ibn Ziyad, he wrote to him a stern letter, ordering him to quickly kill the Imam. He threatened him that he would sack him and appoint someone else in his place, should he choose to ignore his instructions. Ibn Sa’ad could not rid himself of his bondage to the materialistic world. So, since he was given a choice between this world and the next, he opted for the former, selling his faith in return.
Thus, he acquiesced to the order of Ibn Ziyad. In so doing, he demonstrated dishonourable qualities and treachery and committed one of the most heinous crimes in the history of mankind. Ibn Ziyad’s justifications for committing some of those atrocities was that he was seeking to be seen taking a position of neutrality, i.e. by not siding with Imam Hussain (a.s.).
In order to show his loyalty to Ibn Ziyad, especially in the light of the latter’s receiving many reports accusing him of showing reluctance in fighting the Imam, he embarked on a killing spree, massacring the Progeny of the Prophet (a.s.). When the two adversarial armies pitched their fighters opposite one another, Ibn Ziyad took a bow and arrow from one of his bowmen, or archers, placed an arrow in the bow and shot in the direction of al-Hussain’s camp, remarking, “Bear witness for me with the Prince [Ibn Ziyad] that I was the first one to shoot]”.
Another of the Imam’s companions was Aabis bin Shibeeb ash-Shakiri, who was filled with high spirit and valour. He took the centre stage of the battlefield and issued a challenge to the army of Ibn Ziyad, if there was any one among them who was prepared to fight him in one-to-one combat. No one dared to respond to his challenge. Having repeated his call several times, but to know avail, and realizing that the coat of arms and headgear he was wearing were proving cumbersome, he parted with them. Thus, he mounted attacks on the enemy soldiers who were fleeing before him. They were not able to kill him, only by stoning him and shooting him with torrents of arrows. Thus, he was martyred.
On the day of the Battle of Kerbala, all the companions of Imam Hussain (a.s.), men and women, depicted the most vivid portraits of gallantry and sacrifice. They left their indelible marks in the chapters of history of mankind, only to be revered and emulated. Had their equivalent been found in the history of the West, they would have held them in a very high regard.
Abdullah bin Omeir al-Kalbi was another of the companions of Imam Hussain. In his company were his wife and mother. He was a gallant warrior. When he wanted to join the battle, his wife, a newly wed woman, tried to prevent him and pleaded with him, “With whom you are going to leave me? Who is going to take care of me? Please do not leave me behind for bereavement.” On hearing her, his mother intervened, “O my son!
Do not listen to her. Go and fight in defence of the son of the Messenger of God, so that he would tomorrow, on the Day of Judgement, be your intercessor. I will not be pleased with you until you got killed fighting with al-Hussain.” He assaulted the enemy and got killed in the process. His mother plucked the courage, arming herself with a pole, and embarked on attacking the enemy. Al-Hussain prevented her from doing so, saying, “May all members of your family be rewarded with that which is best. Go back and join the rest of the women. May God have mercy on you. Being a woman, you are not required to do jihad.”
As the battle progressed, more massacres took place. The enemy beheaded Abdullah bin al-Hussain, [who was just an infant], hurling the severed head towards his mother. She held it and wiped the dirt off it, hugging and kissing it, and saying, “O my son! I am pleased with you, I am pleased.” She then tossed the baby’s head towards the camp of the enemy, saying, “What we give away in the Way of God, we do not reclaim.”
Among the other supporters of al-Hussain was a boy, aged either ten or twelve years, whose father was killed earlier on in the fighting. Armed with his sword, he approached the Imam and asked for permission to enter the fight. The Imam did not grant him permission out of sympathy for his mother who had just been bereaved of her husband, saying, “The father of this boy was killed in the first campaign, and maybe his mother does not like him to be killed.” The boy replied that his mother had agreed to his taking part in the fighting and that she would be pleased with him, if he got killed in defence of al-Hussain.
That boy was of an outstanding character, demonstrating his moral fibre in the battle. His way of joining the battle was different from the manner the rest of the fighters, who were coming forward for their debut in the battle. They introduce themselves and their lineage by way of reciting war poetry in a roaring style (rajz). That boy did not follow in the footsteps of the fighters who preceded him and introduced themselves in that pattern. Instead, he recited a couplet, singing the praise of his connection with al-Hussain (a.s.) and being one of his soldiers per se,
“My lord is Hussain, the pleasure that descended on the heart of the bearer of good tidings, the warner [Prophet Mohammad]. Ali and Fatima are his parents. Do you know of anyone thus pure-bred?”
[Approaching the end of the lecture, it is customary to end it on this note, i.e. a supplication],
“O Lord! Grant us the success to be submissive to You, keep our distance from committing what is vile, be truthful in our intensions, and make us recognise that Your Mercy knows no bounds. Be gracious to us by bestowing on us guidance and straightforwardness. Guide our speech towards that which is right and wise. Fill our hearts up with knowledge and mindfulness.
O Lord! Illuminate our hearts with the light of faith. Make us among the true immigrants (muhajirs) and fighters (mujahids) in the way of striving to make the word of Thy religion rule supreme.
O Lord! Grant the Muslims victory over their enemies in all the fronts.”
Introduction to lecture two
In the Name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful
Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds, the Creator of all beings, and may peace be with the servant of God, His Messenger, friend, the chosen one, the trustee of His secret and the transmitter of His Message, our lord and prophet, Mohammad and his pure and infallible progeny.
“He who forsakes his home in the cause of God, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious: Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God: And God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” (4/100).
In the last lecture we discussed immigration and jihad, which have been mentioned repeatedly in the Holy Qur’an almost together. In this lecture we aim to continue the discussion about the significance of both these tenets, not least for their influence in cultivating man’s character in his progress towards perfection and particularly in the moral domain. However, we may, as the discussion develops, discuss the social dimension of these principles.
As you may recall, we have already examined the misinterpretation of the concept of immigration and jihad and explained their true meaning and parameters. Should we aim for the spirit, [not the letter], of both the concepts in all fields, be they materialistic or moral, we should conclude that by immigration (hijra), we mean forsaking the things that became part of man or he became attached to them. The immigrant (muhajir) is the person who is capable of turning his back to any practice he has become hooked on, should the sharia law make it incumbent on him to do so.
By jihad, we mean struggle, strife, and exertion, be it external, i.e. against the enemies of God, or internal, i.e. against one’s own tempting self. Without immigration and jihad man’s lot would be nothing other than degradation and misery. For man to be free in the full sense of the word, he has to free himself from all the shackles of humiliation that surround him. He should not let himself be enslaved by anything he might feel very close to his heart. Otherwise, he who submits to the circumstances that may govern his living and show weakness in getting rid of them cannot be deemed free at all. Rather, he is a prisoner of that state of affairs.
Embarking on discussing the semantics of immigration, especially its core constituent, i.e. travel, we would soon find ourselves confronted by this question: Which is better for man: travel or staying put? Of course, one should not infer from this question that man should always be on the move, i.e. without permanent abode or home. Perhaps, we should paraphrase the question thus: Is it better for man to reside in his hometown/country without ever travelling abroad, or is taking to travel beneficial to him, being a kind of immigration? From an Islamic standpoint travel, in itself, is praiseworthy.
Although Islam discouraged wandering aimlessly in the land(14), yet this does not mean that man should spend all his life in his village or town without venturing outside them, to other towns and countries. This status quo is liable to weaken one’s spirit, making it subservient to the conditions being lived.
In contrast, the person who takes to travelling, travel is bound to broaden his horizons and sharpen his wit, especially when the aim is aspiring for personal advancement, acquiring new virtues and that which is capable of contributing to perfectly shaping one’s personality. Travel has five benefits:
1. Releasing the pressure: Travel provides the tourist with an opportunity to unwind by relieving tension, grief and sorrow. As long as man stays put in the climate he has got used to, it would make him live and remember all the bad things and regrettable incidents. This is bound to put him under immense pressure. So, by venting out such pressure, the person would be able to recharge their batteries.
2. Looking for work: The smart among people is he who can win his bread by relocating. New opportunities will certainly arise where immigrants could better their lot in their host countries.
3. Pursuit of knowledge: This is yet another valuable benefit that comes with travel. Setting out in search of knowledge and scholarship beyond your hometown or country should provide you with new experiences. [When it comes to religious learning], each and every scholar [alim, plural ulema] is unique in his own right. No doubt, the ulema in your town are great, and yet each flower has its own distinctive scent, in that the alim of a particular town could not be as knowledgeable as the one in your town. Nevertheless, he could have his own area of expertise. Should you decide to meet with him, you would find out that he has a brand of knowledge the alim of your town does not possess.
4. Attainment of moral excellence: You cannot acquire all morals depending entirely on abstract sciences and by staying in the same environment. By the same token, shorn of any foundation of knowledge, travel alone is not going to prove a panacea for claiming the high moral ground. Getting a blend of both would lead to good results. A traveller is bound to see and experience new situations he was not used to in his own hometown or homeland. The spiritual maturity gained through travel cannot be had by any other means, including reading.
There may be people who could claim that they can gain new knowledge and expertise without travelling abroad. In their judgement, reading books about the intended countries, for example, should provide them with the required information. Without a shadow of a doubt, reading is beneficial. And yet, it cannot make the same impact travel and witnessing things first hand can. In the Holy Qur’an reference is made to “touring the land”, such as “Travel through the earth” (3/137) and “Say: travel through the earth” (6/11). Historians are unanimous in their interpretation of these holy verses, in that they suggest the familiarization with and drawing lessons from historical events. However, the Holy Qur’an does not confine achieving this objective to reading history annals. Rather, it calls on us to do that which is more tangible, i.e. to experience first hand the historical relics on the ground and draw the lessons thereof. In these two lines of poetry, which are attributed to Imam Ali (a.s.), he says:
Emigrate from your native country in pursuit of loftier positions, for there are five benefits to be had from travel:
Alleviating anxiety, working for a living, acquiring knowledge, attaining moral excellence and the companionship of distinguished people.
So, travel far and wide and do not be like a caged bird. Travel and let your goal be gaining knowledge about the people and the countries you are heading for. For sure, you are going to experience new sets of morals and social norms, which you may sometimes find superior than your own and which you can make use of, or at least be in a position to compare between the two and, maybe, be in a position to select the more superior.
5. The companionship of distinguished people: In travel, you may come across more illustrious people and forging relationships with such distinguished people may benefit you, not least in shaping your character through the positive influences such associations would leave. Friendship here does not necessarily mean that of imparting knowledge by someone and receiving it by the other, i.e. teaching/learning relationship. Rather, it means good companionship and what would come out of it, i.e. gaining practical experience.
When the Imam (a.s.) establishes the aim of travel by “seeking higher status”, this should not mean that, in travel, one should restrict one’s attention to finding the best food, hotels and the like. The aim should be attaining moral excellence, learning, knowledge, human consummate conduct and intellectual maturity. So, let these be the fruits of travel and migration.
History tells us that the scholars who made journeys or emigrated to other countries, especially after they had gone through the early stages of their maturity, gained new experiences in their progress towards perfection. Examples of such luminaries abound. Ash-Sheikh al-Baha’ie, for instance, occupies a special place among the ulema. He was an encyclopaedic scholar who excelled in various disciplines. Among outstanding poets, the name of Sa’adi features high. He stood out in the different departments of poetry – love, mysticism, and heroism to name but a few. The secret of his brilliance in all those poetry genres is attributed to his vast mine of education and knowledge.
Sa’adi lived some ninety years. He spent thirty years of his life in schooling, education and acquiring knowledge. The second thirty years, he spent in travel, and the third thirty years witnessed the stages of his intellectual and literary maturity, prowess, and achievements.
In his divan, or collection of poems, Bustan, he has this to say about his globe trotting and the benefits he had reaped from it, “I travelled all over the world and enjoyed the company of each person I met a number of days. I benefited something from every corner I happened to be in and garnered from every field a spike of grain.”
In his short stories, Gulstan and Bustan, he said, “I was in a mosque in Baalbek, [ancient Heliopolis, village in East Lebanon], when such and such happened.” In another place, he said, “I was in Kashmir when so and so took place.” So, you may ponder the distance that separates the two places. In a third place, he said, “I was in India when thus and thus occurred.” In a fourth place, he said, “I came across a man whose behaviour was such and such. We were in each other’s company on the way to Hijaz [modern day Saudi Arabia].”
Most of this imagery found its way to Sa’adi’s poetry. No doubt, the poet’s spirit would roam in new heights with these experiences. Indeed, this is true in Sa’adi’s case, in that his travels contributed to his poetic and literary genius. This characteristic, you find in Mawlawi’s poetic works. This was made possible by his wide travels that netted him diverse knowledge and experiences about other nations. Some of these were reflected in his poems, which boast some of those nations culture, expressions and impressions. Thanks to his travels, he learned several languages.
In contrast with this, you do not find this quality in Hafiz’s poetry. In spite of the fact that we hold him in high regard, as he was a mystic and notwithstanding his excellence in divine love poetry, so much so that, compared to him in this poetic genre, Sa’adi could not match him; his skill shined in that type of poetry. Maybe, this was because Hafiz stayed put in his hometown and never left it because he was attached to it. He even admits that attachment to his hometown, Shiraz, “Although Isfahan is the spring of life, yet Shiraz is far superior.”
In his poetry, he often sings the praise of Shiraz and the beauty of its places. Although, he lived almost the entire of his life in Shiraz, it is reported that he ventured out of it once by travelling to Yezd. Yet, he was melancholic and felt homesick only to hurry back to Shiraz. He recorded his feelings in one of his poems where he expresses a wish to return to his hometown where he equates his seat there with the seat of Solomon, and expresses a wish to free himself from the prison of Alexander. Hafiz borrowed this metaphor from history. Fables have it that when he invaded Iran, Alexander, the Macedonian [Great] made Yezd a dumping ground for his prisoners, whereas, of old, Shiraz used to be described as the Seat of Power of Solomon.
This may exert some light on both the feelings of the poet vis-à-vis Yezd and Shiraz. Some of his poems bear witness to the fact that the poet’s dislike for Yezd had nothing to do with its inhabitants; rather, it was to do with his affection for his hometown, Shiraz. The evidence is found in his poetry where he spoke highly of Yezd’s people and their hospitality. However, when Hafiz was offered a trip to India to stay somewhere close to the seaside, he declined it outright.
No doubt a scholar as famous as ash-Sheikh al-Baha’ie, who travelled the world over, stands head and shoulders above others who did not venture out of Najaf, [in Iraq, the well known seat of Shia Muslim learning and scholarship] all of their lives. Sheikh al-Baha’ie got in touch with the followers of different faiths and schools of thought and came to know a lot about their beliefs, cultures, and customs. There are others of our ulema (scholars), like al-Baha’ie, who came in contact with people of other faiths, persuasions, men of letters, professors, and other disciplines.
History books tell us that those who took to travel and in the process came into contact with other people of different backgrounds benefited a lot from this cross germination of experiences and ideas, so much so that it enriched their knowledge, sharpened their wit, and broadened their intellectual horizon. In contrast, there had been great ulema, who were as erudite, genius, and loyal as the aforesaid group of ulema, if not more superior, and yet they did not avail themselves of journeying outside the boundaries of their usual domicile. It goes without saying that members of the latter group were less experienced than the former.
This should lead us to conclude that there is another meaning for immigration (hijra) that is different from the patent one. This meaning has come out in the hadith (traditions) of the Infallibles (a.s.). It can be found in these words, “The immigrant is he who has turned his back (hajara) to committing that which is vile”. And yet, one should not get the wrong end of the stick. That is, this interpretation does not, by any way, make the manifest meaning of hijra redundant. On the contrary, the second meaning corroborates the fact that, in Islam, there are two types of hijra (immigration), one is patent and the other latent. In other words, the Islamic immigration is not restricted to leaving behind your family and homeland for a new destination as is dictated by the interest of Islam or for the aim of freeing oneself from becoming enslaved by one’s own circumstances; should it be the latter, this could encroach on one’s sole servitude to God Almighty, and thus one must break free from the clutches of circumstance.
Thus, the second type of immigration is getting rid of the yoke of [bad] customs and traditions on which one is brought up from a tender age, so much so that they become part of their very being. Insomuch as one should not become prisoner to one’s own spiritual climate, they should not be held hostage to the surrounding spiritual climate. Consequently, freeing oneself from this form of captivity is the type of immigration that should be gleaned from the second meaning, i.e. that which has been talked about in the hadith.
Man may become used to certain norms of personal habits or conduct as a result of the influence of social custom. He may become so attached to what he acquired from society that the acquired habits become part and parcel of his personality. Let us, for example, take smoking as a habit of a personal choice. Although the dangers of smoking to one’s health are well known, yet when some people become ill as a result and are advised by their doctor to kick the habit, they find it difficult to do so, because they got addicted on it and that giving it up would exasperate the situation. Off course, this is some sort of idle talk. Nevertheless, “The immigrant is he who has turned his back (hajara) to committing that which is vile”. That is, a real person is he who could give up that which they got used to doing, including smoking.
The late Ayatollah Hujjat, May God elevate his station, could be described as a chain smoker. When he fell ill and was taken to hospital in Tehran, the doctors advised him to quit smoking because he was diagnosed with chest infection and continuing smoking would complicate matters for him. He jokingly remarked, “I need my chest for smoking. If I stop smoking what need will there be for a chest!?” He enquired, “Is it true that smoking is bad for my health?” The doctors answered him in the affirmative. He then said that he would never smoke again. Thus, in a word, he turned his back to a habit of almost a lifetime.
It has been reported that al-Ma’moun [the Abbasid Caliph] was suffering from the habit of devouring dust. Conventional remedies were doomed to failure. In a gathering, people were talking about al-Ma’moun’s habit and how he could not give it up. Among those present was a dervish who shouted that he had the remedy for al-Ma’moun’s habit. The people turned their eyes in his direction and asked him as to what could this magic potion be. He answered, “A firm will of the sort kings are capable of.” When the story of the dervish reached al-Ma’moun, he said that the man was right and took a decision to give the habit up completely and forthwith.
Therefore, it is incumbent on man not to become a hostage to any [bad] habit. It is regrettable to say that this is more widespread among women. They cling vehemently, i.e. more so than men, to social customs relating to ceremonies of marriage and memorial services. Whenever they are told off, in that it is not right, they, without any hesitation, answer that they cannot trample social norms and practices. And when they are asked about the benefit that could be reaped from those norms and practices, they say that they just cannot abandon those social customs.
This simply means blind following and submission to those customs and entails a lack of willpower and sheer enslavement. Man ought not acquiesce to these impositions. Sensible people should subject their behaviour and the positions they take to the judgement of their intellect and common sense. It is noteworthy, at this juncture, to point out that it is not right, of some people, to dismiss outright as irrelevant all social customs and therefore the necessity to rebel against them. This is a kind of extremist view. We do not reject all social customs; rather, some of them, i.e. those which go against the sensibility of the human mind and common sense.
Islam, therefore, looks upon immigration (hijra) as a fundamental pillar in the life of people, the objective of which is the revival and the shaping of man’s character. The other aim is to combat one of the most salient factors which could thrust man into slavery, humiliation, and submission to the environment he lives in, or materialistic or abstract things he becomes used to doing. It is not expected of man to become a slave to the environment in which he was born and brought up.It is incumbent on him, instead, to preserve his integrity, freedom and independence. In so doing, he would ensure that he would never become a slave to immoral practices and be shackled to bad social norms. That is, “The immigrant is he who has turned his back (hajara) to committing that which is vile”. And immigration means breaking clean with all the unsavoury things that surrounds man, worldly or non-figurative. Thus, immigration is an important educational tool in moulding man’s personality.
Jihad
Jihad means struggle (or battling with someone). However, the other definition of jihad is that of doing battle with one’s tempting self. In as much as man should not fall under the sway of his own environment, he should not surrender to the impediments and difficulties, found in such an environment as a matter of course, which may encounter him in his life. Man has been created with an built-in mechanism to deal with these barriers and overcome them to reach maturity and perfection.
The Holy Qur’an says:
”He who forsakes his home in the cause of God, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious..” (4/100).
However, in the same verse, the above-quoted statement is immediately followed by this one:
”Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God: And God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” (4/100).
The Holy Qur’an’s approach to this subject is unique, in that it talks, in verse 98 of the same Chapter, i.e. just three verses ahead of the aforesaid verse, about those who were deemed weak (mustadh’afeen):
“When angels take the souls of those who die in sin against their souls. They say: In what (plight) were ye? They reply: Weak and oppressed were we in the earth. They say: Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from evil)?” (4/97).
This discusses, in a dialogue mode, the pretexts of those who went astray of the path of right and guidance by condoning the status quo, i.e. of staying in the climate of injustice and vice.When the angels of death come to take their souls away, they find out that their records have turned black with the vile deeds and when they ask such people as why their balance sheets are full of debits, they reply, “Weak and oppressed were we in the earth.” That is, they were living in conditions conducive to misconduct and since they were deemed weak, they could not do anything to alleviate their situations. The angles’ reply comes in no time, “Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from evil)?”
This sort of excuse given by those people may, for a good reason, be accepted from trees whose environment became polluted, so much so that their leaves withered away and eventually died, having no choice of moving away since they were deep rooted. However, this cannot be accepted from man. Even animals do not entertain such excuses. There are great numbers of migrating animals, such as birds, that got used to moving away from their natural habitat when the weather changes. There are some species of fish which migrate twice a year pursuant to the change of climate, i.e. from summer to winter and vice versa, covering thousands of kilometres in the process. Locust is yet another example of migrating animals. So, animals refuse to get bogged down in their habitat, taking to migration instead.
Thus, it is repugnant of man to give as pretext the unbecoming surroundings to justify his staying in the mire and falling prey to the temptations and immoral practices that engulf him, blaming the sins he has committed on the environment he has become part of, rather than himself. This goes against the divine logic, ”He who forsakes his home in the cause of God, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious..” (4/100). That is, you can get to the land where you would be able to fight back (or wage jihad) against the enemies of God in the same way they fight you to deny you your beliefs and principles. You should fight back against the enemy’s beliefs and principles; in other words, you engage them in struggle (or jihad).
The other definition or interpretation for the concept of jihad is governed by the same principle of struggle. The difference being that you are battling with your tempting self, i.e. the enemy within. Some people have become compulsive liars and when you take issue with them as to why they do it, they say: Is there any one who does not lie? No doubt, man can, sometimes, be driven to lying. Among other examples are those who you turn to and ask them to lower their gaze, i.e. not to look at that which God has ordained haraam (unlawful). They reply in astonishment, “Can any person not do that?”
You counsel another person among the faithful to set their hearts and minds towards God in prayer, and not to be distracted by mundane issues. They reply that it is impossible. And yet, should this appeal have been far-fetched, God would have not ordained it. The problem is that some people have become used to paying lip service to some devotional acts, especially prayer, not even trying to concentrate on the job in hand, and do away with inattention, while they are in audience with their Creator. If they had tried they would have said their prayer in complete submission, humility and attention.
Provided that you remain watchful for your own self and battle with it against its temptations, you should be in control of your intellectual capacity and conscience. Imagination is a transient state of mind and thus is not capable of overcoming your intellect, if you did not want that and make it possible. Should you be in control, you would be able to restrain your mental power and prevent it from becoming victim to lack of concentration. Why should man become a slave to others while God has created him free from any bondage to any one? God has endowed man with power, freedom and independence. Consequently, if he so desires, he would be able to set himself free from everything; rather, it is in his power to control everything. Yet, this requires genuine willpower and jihad (struggle), not least with the enemy within, i.e. one’s own self, which is inclined to beautify committing what is evil. It requires going against one’s love for comfort, good living and the enslavement to lust.
He who is not prepared to engage in such a struggle is not worthy of acceptance and respect. God has bestowed on man the gift of reason. Thus, it is incumbent on him to choose one of two paths – either battling with his tempting self, which is often inclined to lure you to do what is vile, and put it under the control of your intellect, and this is the road of perfection and advancement. The second alternative is giving up that struggle in return for leaving the tempting soul rule supreme where the result would inevitably be that you become subservient to its own whims. This is the road that leads to the lowest point of the low. If you do not keep it preoccupied, it will engage you and keep you on your toes and at its service.
What was the philosophy of Imam Ali’s (zuhd) asceticism (or indifference to worldly things)? It revolves around activating the power of freedom man enjoys and controlling his ego. Imam Ali (a.s) hated to be defeated in combat by external foes, such as Amr bin Wid and Marhab. Similarly, he hated to give in to the enemy within, i.e. his own ego and inclinations. That is, he did not want his desires to achieve a victory over him. It is related that one day the Imam (a.s.) was going through a marketplace when he passed a butcher’s shop. The butcher said to him that he had fresh meat that day and pressed him to buy some of it. The Imam answered that he did not have money on him then. The butcher said that he would sell him the meat on credit. The Imam said, “Rather, I would say to my stomach to be patient. And if I cannot do that to my stomach, I would rather ask you to be patient until I got the money. Nevertheless, I shall say to my stomach to be patient.” Speaking of his philosophy of asceticism (zuhd), he had this to say, “If I wanted, I would have found the way to enjoying the best produce of honey, wheat, and linen.”
Thus, Ali (a.s.) could, if he wanted, acquire the best of this world’s enjoyments, for he knew the way to them, and yet he did not want to. Why? This is his answer to this question, “How preposterous! I am not going to let my inclination win over my resoluteness.” He then turned his attention to the life of this world and addressed it, thus, “O Life of this World! Leave me alone. I have given you free rein. I have managed to extricate myself from your clutches and slip away from your snares.”
[This is an epilogue to the lecture, i.e. going back to telling part of the story of the Kerbala tragedy – the martyrdom of Imam Hussain (a.s.)]:
The eleventh of Muharrram, 61 AH. [Circa 680 CE.] was one of the worst days that the Progeny of the Prophet (a.s.) had witnessed. Examining the tragedy of Kerbala from its both ends, i.e. the shining side that is full of vivid images of bravery, patience and sacrifice in the cause of God and the dark side that teems with the ugliest imagery of treachery, vileness, and crime, the implications of the dialogue between God and the angels when He was informing them of Adam’s creation, would become manifestly clear,
“Behold, thy Lord said to the angels; I will create a vicegerent on earth. They said: Wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood? Whilst we do celebrate Thy praises and glorify Thy holy (name)? He said: I know what ye know not.” (2/30).
All that which the angels saw of the nature of man and his ability to do mischief, his capacity for going astray and arrogance, was demonstrated at the battle of Kerbala. And yet, alongside that evil, the epitomes of virtue and sublimity were also established. The angels did not see these luminous aspects of man, when God Almighty addressed them, thus, “I know what ye know not.”
Indeed, Kerbala was a strange battleground for trials. The criminals committed the most heinous crimes. Among those was the act of violence perpetrated against children and young people, beheading them and tearing their corpses to pieces before the eyes of their mothers. Those who were massacred in this way on that day in Kerbala were eight, three youth and five children.
Al-Qassim, son of Imam al-Hassan (a.s.) was another of the Kerbala martyrs, whose killing, in that gruesome way, was witnessed by his mother.
Awn bin Abdulla bin Ja’far was another martyr who was killed in the same way. His mother, Zeinab, [daughter of Imam Ali (a.s.)], witnessed his killing. Zeinab had demonstrated a noble character and sublime upbringing, in that historians are almost unanimous in confirming that she did not mention any thing about her son, be it before or after his martyrdom, as she must have been aware of what was going to happen to her brother, Imam Hussain (a.s.). So, she treated the sacrifice of her son as a small contribution towards defending her brother and the principles he stood for. This self-denial was evident when she came out of her tent in the wake of the martyrdom of her nephew, Ali al-Akbar, lamenting his death.
Another of the martyrs of Kerbala was a boy, aged ten. Historiographers have it that the boy came out of his tent disorientated after the martyrdom of Imam Hussain. He was distraught because the events, which were unfolding before his eyes, overwhelmed him. He was spotted by one of the enemy camp who descended upon him, beheaded him and snatched two earrings he was wearing. This happened in the presence of his mother, who went out to look for him.
Another young boy met his death that day in a shocking manner. It was Abdullah bin Imam al-Hassan (a.s.), who was around ten years old. It is said that when his father died he was either still in his mother’s womb or a suckling sibling. He was brought up by his uncle, Imam Hussain (a.s.). That is why there was a strong bond between uncle and nephew.
Although Imam Hussain ordered members of his family not to venture out of their tents, yet he could not bear staying put after his uncle fell to the ground having been fatally wounded in the battle. He broke free from her aunt’s hands, Zeinab, who was trying to restrain him, and ran towards his uncle, shouting, “By God! I am not going to part with my uncle.” Having reached the place where his uncle fell, he threw himself on his uncle’s chest. Imam Hussain (a.s.) showed utmost forbearance and hugged the boy.
In the meantime, a soldier of the enemy’s camp was about to drive his sword into the body of Imam Hussain when the boy yelled at him, saying, “O son of the evil one! Are you killing my uncle?” He then raised his arm to prevent the sword blow from reaching the body of his uncle. The full force of the blow fell on his arm, severing it. The boy shouted, “O Uncle! Help!” [While still lying, suffering from his wounds], the Imam embraced his nephew tighter, saying to him, “O my newphew! Show patience for what has befallen you. God will soon unite you with your pure fathers and forefathers – The Messenger of God, Ali, Hamza, Ja’far and al-Hassan.”
[It is customary to conclude lectures, such as this one, given to big gatherings, with the following prayer (supplication)]:
O God! Fill our hearts up with the light of faith. Fill them up with Your love and the love of your friends. O God! Increase our faith and make our hearts fast set on Your religion. O God! Grant the sick among the faithful a speedy recovery and shower our dead with Your forgiveness and mercy. O God! Accept our works and the works of those who seek, with effort and/or money, to hold commemorative assemblies for the martyrdom of Imam Hussain (a.s.) and glorify Your worship and propagate His injunctions. O God! Out of Your Grace, give us of the sustenance of this world and the next. There is neither power nor refuge except with God Almighty. And may peace be with Mohammad and his Pure Progeny.
Lecture three
In the Name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful
Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds, the Creator of all beings, and may peace be with the servant of God, His Messenger, friend, the chosen one, the trustee of His secret and the transmitter of His Message, our lord and prophet, Mohammad and his pure and infallible progeny.
I seek refuge in God from the reviled Satan,
“He who forsakes his home in the cause of God, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious: Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God: And God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” (4/100).
Among the subjects that the Holy Qur’an paid attention to, as did Islamic jurisprudence, is the question of immigration (hijra). In the opinion of the majority of us, hijra revolves around a special historical incident that took place in the early days of Islam. That event was the migration of the Great Messenger (s.a.w.) and his companions from Mecca to Medina. That event marked the Hijri calendar [For those who want to have some idea of the date according to the Western dating system, a rough guide is to add some 620 years to the Islamic date.].
No doubt this event is very significant because it represents a milestone in the history and development of Islam. However, is the importance of hijra limited to this event? Do all the references made in the Holy Qur’an to hijra and deeming the muhajirs (migrants) in rank on a par with the mujahideen (fighters), such as “Those who believe, and emigrate, and fight for the Faith, in the cause of Allah..” (8/74), belong to that particular historical event and that there is left no other signification to be inferred after that event? Is this really the situation with hijra, or is it not, in common with belief and jihad, governed by any particular time or place? No doubt, there is no way the meaning of hijra (immigration), like jihad and belief, can be confined to what happened in the early days of Islam. Whatever meaning was attached to hijra in those days, and in the same measure was true of jihad, makes both general and constant rulings. That is, they are not the exclusive preserve of a particular time or place.
Imam Ali (a.s.) has discussed this topic in Nahjul Balagha (The Path of Eloquence). [A collection of his sermons, letters, and axioms] and said, “Hijra is commensurate with its first meaning.” (al-hijra qa’ima ala haddihal awwal), meaning that hijra is not restricted to a particular time or place. And as the Prophet (s.a.w.) found it necessary to emigrate from Mecca to Medina, his followers must do the same, should circumstances make it necessary for them to emigrate. Our reading of Imam Ali’s statement is that we cannot argue that there are no practical expressions for hijra post the Prophet era.
Now, let us dwell on the definition and significance of hijra. As we have already mentioned, immigration means moving away from home, family and friends in order to preserve one’s faith. What is self-evident is that since this is the definition of the concept, you cannot restrict it to a particular time or space. This is the Islamic standpoint of hijra. Taking the cue from the definition, it becomes obligatory on the person to flee his place of abode where they may endanger their religious life if they stayed. So, if you are presented with one of two alternatives, in that you either lose your faith, or find somewhere else to practice it freely, Islam obligates his followers to embark on hijra to protect their religion.
In the Holy Qur’an, there is a verse that discusses “force majeure”, [or power that cannot be acted or fought against]. Many among our people, who have grown accustomed to doing what is vile, seem to cite this principle as an excuse for their going astray and being overwhelmed by social custom. That is, even though some social norms go against the grain of religion. So, when you take issue with someone and ask them why they do not seem embarrassed by joining in parties where, for example, alcohol is being served and consumed, an act that is unlawful (haraam), their answer comes ready, “Society’s customs push us to do so. There is nothing we can do. Society is afflicted with corruption and deviant practices.”
Indeed, the pretext of “force majeure” has become a scapegoat for many sinners. Islam rejects these reasons, on the whole and in detail. Islam outlines for us clearly defined positions vis-à-vis corrupt societies, making it a religious duty of the Muslim to do his level best to reverse the decadence and degeneration of society and rehabilitate its members to live a moral life in accordance with the path and ideals that have been mapped out by Islam. Nevertheless, should it prove that we are facing an uphill struggle, in that there is no hope in making the profligate society in which we live mend its ways, that we reached a conclusion that our present and future generation might be adversely affected, Islam offers us a way out – immigration to some other place where we can safeguard our religion.
It is noteworthy that immigration could prove sufficient if one moves out from one’s usual place of abode to some other neighbourhood. That is, you do need to contemplate moving out from your own hometown or homeland, for that matter. This is particularly true of metropolises like Tehran, for example, where you can find neighbourhoods where children can be brought up in an Islamic climate. This is in contrast to other areas within the same city where you can hardly come across any hint of Islamic life. Families who moved houses to such districts would be confronted with unsavoury scenes, let alone the absence of Islamic institutions, such as mosques and seminaries.
It is quite possible that such unbecoming environments might not negatively influence the adult population among us, especially those who have been brought up in Islamic climates and who have become immune to such influences. Nevertheless, what would the consequences for young children be? Those children will open their eyes on climates plagued with deviation and corruption. So, there is a risk that such children will not emerge true young Muslims. Here, there is a question that begs for an answer. What is the religious duty vis-à-vis this issue?
The answer is that in the beginning every effort should be made towards turning those societies into Muslim ones. For example, if there was no mosque in that neighbourhood, a real effort should be made to build one. However, the mosque alone is not an end in itself. It should be a hub for religious activity, i.e. in the form of acts of worship, giving lectures, and holding preaching sessions.
Whoever discharged their duty in this regard, they will be deemed among the propagators of Islam. However, if we cannot succeed in our mission, what should our religious duty be? At this juncture, Islam orders us to run away from that society that has become accustomed to immoral practices, for we might get caught up in the state of things as they are, if not become part of it. The Qur’anic logic rejects seeing us remorseful, by hiding under the umbrella of “force majeure”, for losing our religion. This has been made manifestly clear by this Qur’anic verse:
“When angels take the souls of those who die in sin against their souls. They say: In what (plight) were ye? They reply: Weak and oppressed were we in the earth. They say: Was it not Allah’s earth spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from evil)?” (4/97).
The holy verse talks about that group of people, whose records the angel found appalling, not least by doing themselves injustice, asking them: What has happened to you? Why did the records of your deeds become so disgraceful? Since they have nothing of substance to come up with, they resort to the same old excuses: “we were deemed weak in the land”.
They go on to say, “We were living in corrupt societies, where it was not possible for us to know about pristine Islam and what it stands for; we lacked knowledge; there were no teachers of Islam we could turn to, ” The angelic answer comes crisp and clear, ”Was it not Allah’s earth spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from evil)?” You have yourself only to blame, not least for condoning those corrupt climates. Not all the corners of the world were as bad as the environments you allowed yourselves to be hostage to. There were places that were conducive to that which is good and commendable. So, why did not you emigrate to them?
Just to reiterate that Islam attaches great importance to immigration, in the sense of abandoning family and homeland, with a view to preserving one’s religion and practicing it in freedom. According to this meaning, immigration is a constant law, in that it is not limited to a particular time or place and that it is not confined to the immigrants of the early Islamic era.
However, it seems that some people have gone to extremes in interpreting the meaning and the concept of hijra (immigration) as is mentioned in the above-quoted verse. They argue that the verse has it, “Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger”. That is, while the verse mentions the point where the hijra takes place, it does not mention the destination where the immigrant intends to go, mentioning instead “God and His Messenger”.
They further maintain that the latter is an abstract destination and not material, i.e. it is in the mind and the conscience. Thus, they conclude that the significance of the word entails that this type of hijra is a notional one in which man exerts himself towards attaining that which is sublime and which brings him closer to God; in other words, it is a journey towards God that does not require actual physical travel away from family and homeland. That is, man could make this journey from the cosiness of his home through striving with his tempting self to reaching perfection, not least by keeping up prayer, fast, supplication, and other forms of worship that are capable of bringing him closer to his Creator.
Yet, when the exponents of this brand of interpretation are asked as to the objective of such a journey, they say God and his proximity, for whose purpose man does battle with his own self and tries to cultivate his spiritual life in order to be nearer to God. They, therefore, maintain that there is no need to cover the distances, leaving behind family and home, as, to their mind, the home mentioned in the verse is not the real home; rather, a figurative one, i.e. the abode of the soul and the boundaries of the ego. To sum up, their interpretation of the verse can be put thus: Whoever breaks free from the bondage of his own inclinations and emigrates to God, his reward would come from Him. This, of course, is a misconception and an erroneous reading of the verse.
In this verse, the Holy Qur’an talkes about the two types of hijra (immigration). Here, there is an example of the inimitable style of the Qur’an; the home (house) which the Qur’an mentions in the verse is the physical structure we all know. And yet, it wants to say to us: O you who emigrate from your home! Be it from one neighbourhood to another, from one hometown to another, or from one homeland to another, let it be known to you that your objective (final destination) should be God alone. Otherwise, your immigration will not be of any value, even if you travel from one end of the globe to the other, and sacrifice everything in the process, i.e. your home, family and worldly possessions, and were contented with poverty instead. This is the Qur’anic logic that is corroborated by the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) in this hadith, “Who intended his immigration for God and His Messenger, then it would be deemed so. And yet, whoever embarked on immigration, seeking a financial benefit or a [heart of a] woman he wanted to win, his immigration would be judged by the intended end. ” (al-Bukhari Authentic Compendia of Hadith, p.22, vol. 1).
It looks as though the Prophet (s.a.w.) wanted to say, “I welcome the immigrant who had a covenant with God that what he did was for His sake. Physical migration of a group of people to the target destination, i.e. Medina, shorn of good and pure intentions that their migration was in His Cause alone, is worthless.”
This is true of the concept of jihad, for it is not sufficient for man to brandish his sword and fight the enemies of God. This should go hand in hand with the intent and purpose of seeking the pleasure of God and in His Cause. It is possible that you find, in the ranks of Muslims, a combatant who shows unparalleled zeal in the battle, and yet if you divulge his secret you would find that his real purpose behind showing that fervour was driven by self-aggrandizement; he sought to gain personal fame, in that he aspired for his picture to be circulated and history sings his praise. Another example is that of him who takes part in the war effort in the hope that they do not get killed, only to enjoy the materialistic privileges, and thus they would score victory on both the tracks, i.e. that of this life and the hereafter.
All these appearances do not count as jihad in the cause of God. Of course, man could win in this world by virtue of jihad, provided that his ultimate end is not securing a place in it.
In one of the battles, some companions of the Prophet (s.a.w.) commended the effort of one of the combatants, called Qazman, i.e. how good, brave and sincere he was. The Prophet did not pay attention to such commendations. He used to say, “He is among the inmates of hellfire.” When the news of his death in the battle came to the Prophet, he remarked, “God does whatever He wills.” Another version of the story of how he was killed reached the prophet. It was reported that he committed suicide. The Prophet said, “I am the Messenger of God!” This is how the story was told: He fought very valiantly, so much so that he killed some seven people among the infidels. Having sustained serious injuries, he managed to stagger as far as the neighbourhood of Bani Dhafar. The Muslims spoke good of his “heroism” and that he would be rewarded. He retorted: I fought only in pursuit of personal fame and in defence of the honour and pride of my kinsmen. Had it not been for that, I would have never joined in the battle. Having, experienced severe pain due to his serious wounds, he reached out for his arrow kit, pulled an arrow and killed himself with it. (Ibn Hisham’s Prophetic Biography, vol. 2, p. 88).
After the people heard about the fate of Qazman, they realized why the Prophet was not impressed by all the reports about his heroism in the battle. This should reinforce the true meaning of jihad, i.e. it has to be purely in the cause of God. By the same token, immigration (hijra) has to be so. In other words, immigration, in the sense of physically removing oneself from their roots and moving away, should go hand in hand with the intention of moving towards God to achieve His pleasure and be closer to Him. Islam encourages both types of hijra, and the Holy Qur’an mentions them both, “Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger..”
This verse talks about immigration on two levels, one in body and the other in spirit. The immigrant travels in body from one place to the other, while his spirit departs from the phase of egotism to the phase of sincere loyalty to God Almighty. A refugee of this type is the one whom God has promised with reward, “His reward becomes due and sure with God.” How profound this description is! God means that the reward of this refugee is far greater than that which the intellect can comprehend; it is far greater than words can explain.
In one of the commentaries on this particular verse, it has been said that a good example of the immigrant meant by the verse is a theology student who leaves behind family and friends and travels to a new place in pursuit of Islamic knowledge and scholarship. The aim of this theology trainee is to attain new levels of learning, so that he becomes better equipped to impart religious knowledge, revive the faith and spread the Word of God, doing away with personal gain, fame, and looking down on others. The said student is deemed an immigrant in the cause of God, so long as his objective behind travel was God, and for the sake of meeting the needs of Islam and Muslims.
That said, this is not confined to theology students; rather, it covers the students in other fields, such as medicine and engineering, provided the aim is discharging one’s religious duty, i.e. by way of wajibun kifa’ie (A collective obligation imposed on the Muslim community, and yet if any of its members discharged it, other Muslims become absolved from the responsibility). For example, a person moves out of his homeland to some other foreign country to train to become a physician out of his feeling the need of society for Muslim doctors and also out of a sense of duty (wajibun kifa’ie). This student is deemed an immigrant in the cause of God, provided that earning His pleasure was his intention, and not worldly gains of this sort or the other, “Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God.” So, should they meet their death while in the host town/country, their reward would come from God, and their rank would be close to that of mujahideen (fighters).
As we have already mentioned, the Holy Qur’an speaks about the two types of immigration in the same breath. Now, let us pose this question: When would the person qualify for both the descriptions, i.e. an immigrant and a mujahid at the same time? The answer to this question is that the description is true of the person who takes to immigration in the way of God and whose aim is to come to the rescue of the faith and the spiritual life of society. Thus, such a person would meet the criteria set in this Qur’anic verse, “Should he die as a refugee from home for God and His Messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with God.”
By the same token such a person would be covered by all the Qur’anic verses that talk about jihad, such as:
“Allah hath purchased of the believers their persons and their goods; for theirs (in return) is the Garden (of Paradise): They fight in His Cause, and slay and get slain: A promise binding on Him in Truth, through the Torah, the Gospel, and the Qur’an: And who is more faithful to his covenant than Allah.” (9/111).
Imam Hussain (a.s.) is the best of examples of a muhajir (immigrant)/mujahid (fighter), in that he moved away from his hometown and waged genuine jihad in the cause of God, i.e. in defence of Islam not to undergo deviation and the faith of the Islamic umma (community), lest it should be lost. Moses, son of Imran (a.s.), was another immigrant in the cause of God for he left his country, Egypt, and headed for Medyen. The same goes for Abraham, “He said: I will go to my Lord! He will surely guide me!” (37/99). He left his homeland of his own accord. However, what puts Imam Hussain (a.s.) in a different league is that in his immigration, he was both an immigrant and a mujahid (fighter).
The immigrants of the early days of Islam were immigrants per se. That is, before the Divine order of jihad was issued, they were only immigrants. However, after the Divine instruction, the description of “mujahid – fighter” was applied to those of them who took part in jihad.
In a dream, the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) said to his grandson, al-Hussain (a.s.) that God has promised him with a rank that was not going to be achieved only with martyrdom by way of getting slain in His cause”.
En route from Mecca [in present day Saudi Arabia] to Kerbala [in Iraq], Imam Hussain [and members of his family and some companions] spent twenty-three days travelling. Before his departure from Mecca, he gave a sermon to the people mentioning in it his immigration and jihad and said, “The similitude of the inevitability of man’s death is that of a necklace worn by a young woman. I therefore yearn to have reunion with my predecessors in the same way Jacob was yearning to be united with [his son] Joseph.”
What the lord of the free wanted to say is that he did not fear death and getting martyred in the cause of God and His religion, and that faith is a source of pride for man in as much as the necklace that adorns a woman’s neck, and that he could not wait to join his predecessors. The Imam went on to tell them about how he was going to be martyred, “It is better to meet my death, as I have a feeling that I will be torn to pieces by the desert beasts between Nawawees and Kerbala.”
The Imam (a.s.) moved to another topic to talk about how he, and members of his household had been immersed in God’s love and said, “Seeking our, i.e. the Progeny of the Prophet’s, pleasure is seeking the Pleasure of God. We forbear His affliction, only to reward us with the recompense of the forbearing. What He loved we love, what He allotted to us, we accepted. Should He have chosen for us safety, we would love it. Yet, should He have afflicted us with hardships and illness, we would accept. Should He have chosen for us to keep silent, we would oblige. Should He have wanted for us to talk, we would oblige. Should He have chosen for us stillness, we would oblige, and yet, should He have decreed that we should move around, we would oblige.”
After that, he declared that he was intent on emigrating in the way of God, calling on the people to join him, if they had resolved that they were doing it for God, provided that they were prepared for jihad and sacrificing their blood for His cause, “Those of you who have reached a conclusion that they are going to sacrifice themselves for our cause, making their mind up that they will reunite with God, let them join us, as I am determined to set forth tomorrow morning, God willing!”
In the beginning huge crowds accompanied the convoy of Imam Hussain (a.s.), among whom some who were still reluctant to accept the statement of the Imam about what would be in store for him and his companions, and that there was still hope that they would scrape through. On the way through his journey, other groups of people joined him. As he had made it clear to everyone that whoever chose to accompany him in his fateful journey should be ready for the ultimate sacrifice and the hope to meet with one’s Lord, he did not want in his company any of the fainthearted, who were not ready for martyrdom.
Accordingly, he used to remind everybody who was with him, on different occasions and stages of the journey, as to the gigantic task ahead. This was with the aim of winnowing the wheat from the chaff, giving the chance for those who were not up to the responsibility to melt away. In so doing, the Imam had wanted to ensure that those who would remain with him to the end were those whose hearts God had tried with true faith, so much so that they submit to His Will, come what may. When it reached the crunch, none stuck it out with him other than a band of loyal companions among the true believers, to whose bravery and integrity he had these words of praise, “I do not know of any companions who are more superior to mine.” This testimony of the Imam means that he was trying to say to his companions: If I were given an option to choose between you and the companions of the Prophet in the battle of Badr, I would have chosen you over them. Were I given a choice between you and the companions of Ali in the battle of Siffeen, I would have preferred you to them. You are the lords, and the crowns over the heads, of all martyrs.
On the eve of the tenth of Muharram [62 AH, 680 CE] Imam Hussain (a.s.) gave permission to his companions to leave him under the cover of darkness, saying to them, “I think our appointment with those (the enemy) is tomorrow. So, I give you leave to go away, having no liability on you. Darkness is spreading and engulfing you; so, why do you not make use of it and slip away. And let each one of you take a man of my household with them. May God compensate you with the best of rewards. Scatter among the masses and in the towns. Indeed, the enemy is after me; thus, if they were successful in getting me, they would forget about you. Bring to mind the killing of Muslim [bin Aqeel, his cousin, and emissary to Kufa], which would be sufficient. Please leave.”
This was the last test the Imam put the loyalty and truthfulness of his companions through. He absolved them from the covenant of allegiance they made with him; he set them free from their religious obligation, in that it was incumbent on them to be on his side in the war. However, they all refused to accede to his request, insisting that they preferred to die defending him. The first to declare that position was his brother al-Abbas, who said, “May God let us not ever witness that!” These were reassuring words for Imam Hussain for they demonstrated the fact that they shared his aim, vision, belief and determination. At that juncture, Imam Hussain (a.s.), once again made clear to them as to what he was expecting to happen come tomorrow, “Tomorrow, I will be killed, so will you. No one will be spared, even al-Qassim and Abdullah, the infant.”
On the tenth of Muharram, Imam Hussain (a.s.) awarded his comrades in arms medals and honour whose memory would not go away. In the dying moments of the battle of Kerbala and the last throws of his life, after almost all male members of his family alongside his companions were martyred, the Imam stood, amid the multitudes of the enemy, turning his eyes around, only to see that there was neither a supporter nor a helper, apart from the grisly sight of dead bodies strewn all over the battlefield. At that point in time, he was reported as saying something like this:
I do not see on this ground a living person except those mutilated bodies, in reference to the dead bodies of his companions. Thus, the Imam considered those dead bodies the truly living beings that were worthy of his cry for help, thus, “O heroes of Safa! And knights of war! Rise from your sleep, O sons of the honourable ones! Fend off the thugs from encroaching upon the noble ladies among the Progeny of the Prophet.” That cry for help was made after the enemy attacked and ransacked the tents where members of Imam Hussain’s family, mostly women, were sheltering. And yet, the Imam responded to his own call for help and apologised for them on their behalf, “How could they answer, when they were turned into headless corpses.”
Murtaza Mutahhari
Imam reza network
The Rulers are the People's Trustees Not Their Lords
In the last chapter, we said that a dangerous and misleading view became current in the thought of some modern European thinkers interlinking in an unnatural fashion the belief in God on the one hand and negation of peoples rights on the other. This correlation played a significant role in inducing a group to incline towards materialism. Duty and responsibility to God was assumed to necessarily negate the duty and responsibility to the people. Divine obligations completely displaced human obligations. The belief and faith in God (Who, according to the Islamic teachings, created the universe on the principles of truth and justice) was considered to conflict with and contradict the belief in innate and natural human rights, instead of being regarded as their basis. Naturally, belief in the right of people\'s sovereignty was equated with atheism.
From Islamic point of view the case is actually the reverse. In the Nahj al-balaghah, which is the subject of our discussion, the main topics are tawhid and \'irfan; throughout the talk is about God, whose Name occurs repeatedly everywhere in its pages. Nevertheless, it not only does not neglect to discuss the rights of the people and their privileges vis-a-vis the ruler, in fact regarding the ruler as the trustee and protector of their rights, but also lays great emphasis on this point. According to the logic of this noble book, the imam and the ruler is the protector and trustee of the rights of the people and responsible to them. If one is asked as to which of them exists for the other, it is the ruler\' who exists for the people and not vice versa. Sa\'di has a similar idea in his mind when he says:
It\'s not the sheep who are to serve the shepherd, But it is the shepherd who is for their service.
The word ra\'iyyah (lit. herd), despite that it gradually acquired an abominable meaning in the Persian language, has an original meaning which is essentially good and humanitarian. The word ra\'i for the ruler and ra\'iyyah for the masses first appears in the speech of the Prophet (\'s) and is literally used thereafter by \'Ali (\'a).
This word is derived from the root ra\'a, which carries the sense of \'protection\' and \'safeguarding\'. The word ra\'iyyah is applied to the people for the reason that the ruler is responsible for protecting their lives, property, rights, and liberties.
A tradition related from the Holy Prophet (\'s) throws full light on the meaning of this word:
Truly, everyone of you is a raii responsible for his rai\'yyah. The ruler is the ra\'i of his people and responsible for them; the woman is the ra\'i of her husband\'s house and responsible for it; the slave is the ra\'i of his master\'s property and responsible for it; indeed all of you are ra\'i and responsible [for those under your charge]. [1]
In the preceding pages we cited some examples from the Nahj al-balaghah which illustrated \'Ali\'s outlook regarding the rights of the people. Here we shall give sample quotes from other sources, beginning with the following verse of the Holy Quran:
God commands you to deliver trusts back to their owners; and that when you judge between the people, judge with justice ... (4:58)
Al-Tabarsi, in his exegesis Majma\' al-bayan, commenting upon this verse, remarks:
There are several opinions regarding the meaning of this verse; firstly, that it is about trusts in general, including the Divine and the non Divine, the material and the non-material trusts; secondly, that it is addressed to the rulers, and that God, by making the returning of the trusts an obligation, is commanding them to observe the rights of the people.
Then he further adds:
This is corroborated by the verse immediately following it:
O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you ... (4:59)
According to this verse the people are bound to obey the commands of God, His Messenger and those in authority (wulat al-\'amr). While the preceding verse mentions the rights of the people, this one reiterates the complementary rights of those in authority. It has been related from the Imams (\'a) that \'one of these two verses is ours (i.e. it establishes our rights in relation to you), and the other is yours (i.e. it outlines your rights in relation to us)\' ... Al-Imam al-Baqir (\'a) said that the performanee of salat, zakat, sawm, and Hajj are some of the trusts (mentioned in 4:58). One of the trusts (amanat) is that the wulat al-\'amr have been commanded to justly distribute the ghana\'im, sadaqat, and whatever is a part of the rights of the people, among them.
In the exegesis al-Mizan, in the part of the commentary upon this verse which deals with tradition, the author relates a tradition from al-Durr al-manthur from \'Ali (\'a) that he said:
It is incumbent on the imam to rule according to the decrees revealed by God, and to discharge the trusts that he has been charged with. When he does that, it is incumbent upon the people to pay attention to the Divine command (about obeying the wali al-\'amr), to obey him and respond to his call.
As noticed earlier, the Holy Quran considers the ruler and the head of the State as a trustee and a guardian; it regards just government as a fulfillment of a trust entrusted to the ruler. The approach of the Imams(\'a), in particular that of Amir al-Mu\'minin \'Ali (\'a), corresponds with the view which can be inferred from the Holy Quran.
Now that we know the Quran\'s view of this matter, we may go on to examine the statements of the Nahj al-balaghah on this issue. More than anything else, we must study \'Ali\'s letters to his governors, especially those which were meant to be official circulars. It is in these letters that we would find glimpses of the teachings of Islam regarding the functions of the ruler and his duties towards the people as well as their rights. Ali (\'a), in his letter to the governor of Adharba\'ijan, reminds him of his duties towards the people in these words:
Beware lest you consider this assignment as a bait [for acquiring personal gain]; rather, it is a trust lying on your neck. You have been charged with caretaking [of the people] by your superior. It is not for you to betray your duties with respect to the people (ra\'iyyah). (Kutub 5)
In another letter written as a circular to tax collectors, after a few words of advice and admonition, \'Ali (\'a) says:
Fulfill the demands of justice in your relationship with the people and be patient in matters regarding their needs; because you are treasurers of the people (ra\'iyyah), representatives of the community (Ummah), and envoys of your imams. Kutub 51
In the famous epistle to Malik al-\'Ashtar, which contains elaborate instructions about various aspects of government, he writes:
Awaken your heart to kindness and mercy for the people (ra\'iyyah) and love and tenderness for them. Never, never act with them like a predatory beast which seeks to be satiated by devouring them, for the people fall into two categories: they are either your brethren in faith or your kindred in creation ... Do not ever say, \'I have been given authority\' or \'My command should be obeyed.\' Because it corrupts the heart, consumes one\'s faith, and invites calamities.
In another letter sent as a circular to army commanders, he says:
It is an obligation that an official should not behave differently with the people (ra\'iyyah) on account of a distinction he receives or material advantage that he may achieve. Instead these favours from Allah should bring him nearer to God\'s creatures and increase his compassion towards his brethren. Kutub 50
\'Ali (\'a) shows an amazing sensitivity to justice and compassion towards the people and a great respect for them and their rights, which, as reflected in his letters, is an exemplary and unique attitude towards this issue.
There is another letter in the Nahj al-balaghah consisting of instructions to the collectors of zakat, and is entitled: \'To the officials assigned to the job of collecting zakat\'. The title indicates that it was not addressed to any particular official but sent either as a general instruction in writing or delivered as a routine oral instruction. Al-Sayyid al-Radi has included it in the section of kutub, or letters, with the clarification that he is placing this letter here to show to what extent \'Ali was meticulous in matters pertaining to justice and rights of the people, being attentive not only to main points but also to minute details. Here are \'Ali\'s instructions:
Set out with the fear of God, Who is One and has no partner. Do not intimidate any Muslim. Do not tresspass upon his land so as to displease him. Do not take from him more than Allah\'s share in his property. When you approach a tribe, at first come down at their watering place, stay there instead of entering their houses. Approach them with calm dignity and salute them when you stand amongst them, grudge not a proper greeting to them. Then say to them "O servants of God, the Wali and Khalifah of God has sent me to you to collect from you Allah\'s share in your property. Is there anything of His share in your property? If there is, return it to His Wali. " If someone says \'No\', then do not repeat the demand. If someone answers in the affirmative, then go with him without frightening, threatening, or compelling him. Take whatever gold and silver he gives you. If he has cattle or camels, do not approach them save with his permission, because the major part belongs to him. When you arrive (into the cattle enclosure), do not enter upon them in a bossy and rude manner ... Kutub 25, also see 26, 27 and 46
The passages quoted above are sufficient to throw light on \'Ali\'s attitude as a ruler toward the people under his rule.
Notes:
[1] Bukhari, Kitab al Nikah, vol. VIII
Murtaza Mutahhari
Imam reza network
Why Wilayat al-Faqih?
In the previous chapter, we encountered the absolute priority of God as a fundamental component of Imami political doctrine. After all, it is He who has accorded the Holy Prophet and the Imams (peace be upon them) the authority to lead and govern the Islamic society (ummah), and ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ is an extension of this authority. However, while the Wilayat of the Imams has traditionally been verified according to Islamic theology (kalam), the guardianship of the jurists (Wilayat al-Faqih) is almost exclusively discussed within the sphere of jurisprudence (fiqh). Hence the universal authority of the faqih (Wilayat al- amma) must be substantiated according to ijtihad (juridical reasoning).
This method shall be referred to as an “internal justification” as it is intended to convince those who already accept the basic principals of the Shi’a creed. On the other hand, Wilayat al-Faqih, as a political model of guardianship, must be able to justify itself amongst other political ideologies; especially the democratic theories that essentially criticize any guardianship form of state. This approach is what we shall refer to as the “external justification” for the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih, and we shall return to it later.
The internal justification relies primarily on religious traditions narrated from the Holy Prophet and Imams, although some jurists also refer to rational arguments as well. Consequently, from the basis of Islamic jurisprudence, the authority of the faqih may be established according to sunnah (traditions) and reason (daleel al-aql).
Traditional Evidences for Wilayat al-Faqih
Imami jurists usually refer to a set of reports from the Prophet Muhammad and the Imams to establish Wilayat al- amma for the fuqaha. We shall examine a few of them here.
A Signet Letter (Tuqih)[63]from the Absent Imam
One of the most reliable traditions adduced by scholars[64] for the purpose of this discussion is a report from the twelfth and absent Imam (May God hasten his reappearance). Shaykh al-Sadiq transmits in his book ‘Ikmal al-Deen wa itmam an-Ni\'ma’ that Ishaq ibn Yaqub wrote a letter to the absent Imam asking him about some concerns that he had. The Imam\'s deputy (Muhammad ibn Uthman al-Umari) conveyed the letter to him. The Imam replied:
As for events that may occur (al-hawadith al-waqi\'a) [when you may need guidance] refer to the transmitters (ruwat) of our teachings who are my Hujjah (proof) to you and I am the proof of God (Hujjatullah) to you all[65].
Shaykh al-Tusi also transmits the narration in the book ‘al- Qayba’[66] and other collections of Imami ahadith report the tradition from the books mentioned above.
Advocates of Wilayat al-Faqih often refer to the second part of the tradition, namely, “they are my proof to you, and I am the proof of God to you all” to establish the authority of the fuqaha. However, some scholars (such as Imam Khomeini) maintain that the first part of the hadith may also be used to establish the authority of the faqih. The first section of this narration encourages people to ask those who relate the traditions of the Imams (peace be upon them) about any new occurrences that they encounter. It is highly unlikely that Ishaq ibn Yaqub asked the Imam about what was to be done regarding religious questions; even ordinary Shi’a would know that in these cases of fiqh (jurisprudence) one should refer to the fuqaha (jurists). In fact, according to some narrations, people would recourse to the students of an Imam during his lifetime. Therefore, Ishaq must have been referring to something other than this by his question about ‘al-hawadith al-waqi’a’, Imam Khomeini says:
What is meant by hawadith al-waqi\'a is rather the newly arising problems that affect the people and Muslims. The question Ishaq ibn Yaqub was implicitly posing was this: now that we no longer have access to you, what should we do with respect to social problems? What is our duty?[67]
It is necessary to establish what the Imam meant by ‘ruwat’ (narrators), when he commands his followers to refer to the narrators of traditions with respect to these new circumstances. After all, it is self evident that people who merely transmit traditions and narrate what they have seen and heard, without a comprehensive understanding of the science of ahadith or jurisprudence, are not qualified to undertake this duty. Therefore the Imam must have been referring to the fuqaha (jurists) who are experts in the interpretation and explanation of Islamic sources.
We mentioned earlier that most Imami jurists usually refer to the second part of this tradition to establish the guardianship of the jurists. The statement makes clear that fuqaha (ruwat) act as the proof (Hujjah) of the Imam in all matters in which the Imam acts as the proof of Allah. Imam Khomeini describes a ‘proof of God’ (or Hujjah) as someone who God has designated to conduct affairs; all his deeds, actions and sayings constitute a proof for the Muslims. If the proof commands you to perform a certain act and you fail to obey him, or if despite the existence of the proof, you turn to oppressive authorities for the solution of your affairs, then God almighty will advance a proof against you on the Day of Judgment[68].
In summary, being a hujjat implies the authority of one over his followers, and hence the injunctions of the holder of such a status must be complied with. Since the Imam as God\'s hujjat (the ‘proof’ that Allah will not accept any excuses for disobeying) has designated the fuqaha as his Hujjah, the commands and directives of the fuqaha are as those of the Imam.
With regards to its chain of transmission (sanad), the only issue that arises is the existence of Ishaq ibn Yaqub. There is no particular attestation of him found in the Imami books of biography (Ela al-Rejal). Hence the question may be raised, how can we be certain that the letter was really issued by the Imam and that Ibn Yaqub received the letter? There is a difference between reporting an ordinary transmission and the claim that one has received a special letter from the Imam in the era of the minor occultation, during which, access to him is only possible through his appointed deputy. The key point, however, is that many great Imami scholars such as Shaykh Sadiq, Shaykh Tusi and specially Shaykh Kolayni, who were alive during the era of the minor occultation (and were experts in ahadith) mention the tradition as ‘tuqih’ which is sufficient evidence for a valid chain of transmission[69].
Maqbula of Umar ibn Hanzala
According to the science of ahadith, the ‘maqbula’ is a narration that has been accepted by fuqaha as a valid tradition without examining the authenticity or weakness of its chain of transmission. In other words, even though some of those who appear as its transmitters may be weak and unreliable, some evidences that support the soundness of the text compel the fuqaha to ignore such weakness.
Umar ibn Hanzala, who was a disciple of Imam as-Sadiq (pbuh) said[70]:
I asked Imam Sadiq whether it was permissible for two of the Shi’a who had a disagreement concerning a debt or an inheritance to seek the verdict of the ruler or judge. He replied: \'anyone who has recourse to taghut [i.e. The illegitimate ruling power], whatever he obtains as a result of their verdict, he will have obtained by forbidden means, even if he has a proven right to it. For he will have obtained it through the verdict and judgment of the taghut, the power that almighty God has commanded him to disbelieve in.
“They wish to seek justice from illegitimate powers, even though they have been commanded to disbelieve therein”. [Al-Qur’an, Chapter 4, Verse 60]
Umar ibn Hanzala then asked what was the correct action for two the Shi’a to take under such circumstances. Imam Sadiq replied:
They must seek out one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well acquainted with our laws and ordinances, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as hakim [judge][71].
No Imami jurist disputes that this tradition firmly establishes the authority of a faqih with regards to the administration of justice (Wilayat al-qada). However, many leading scholars such as Mirza al-Nayini, Sayyid Mohammad Reza Gulpaayigani, Shaykh al-Ansari[72]and Imam Khomeini believe that the text does not confine the authority of a faqih to Wilayat al-qada. They assert that the Imam designated the faqih as trustees of universal authority (Wilayat al-amma) when he said: “I appoint him [faqih] as hakim [judge]”.
However, a judge\'s role is not limited to merely resolving disagreements amongst the people; their conflicts and disagreements compel them to not only recourse to judges, but also to possessors of political power. The tradition of Imam Sadiq (pbuh) unconditionally prohibits any referral to illegitimate authorities (taghut) and there is no reason to assume that the Imam solely commanded his followers not to refer to judges appointed by an illegitimate government, while allowing them to recourse to the same government for the regulation of their affairs. By appointing the faqih as hakim, the Imam made it incumbent upon all Shi’a to refuse any kind of recourse to illegitimate authority. Hence in all aspects of disagreement it is necessary for them to refer to a faqih, whether it is in a governmental or judicial capacity.
There are no problems surrounding this hadith’s chain of transmission. All of the transmitters (Muhammad ibn Yahya, Muhammad ibn al-Hussain, Muhammad ibn Isa, Safvan ibn Yahya and Dawood ibn al-Husayn) are reliable. And although there is no specific confirmation that Umar ibn Hanzala himself existed, fuqaha generally accept this and other transmissions from him.
The Tradition of Abu Khadija
Fuqaha such as Imam Khomeini and Shaykh Muhammad Hassan[73] appeal to a famous transmission that was narrated by Abu Khadija (who was one of Imam Sadiq\'s companions), to argue in favor of Wilayat al-amma. The tradition is mentioned by Shaykh Tusi, Shaykh Sadiq, and Shaykh Kolayni. According to them, Abu Khadija said:
I was commanded by the Imam [Ja\'far as-Sadiq (pbuh)] to convey the following message to our friends [Shi’a]: \'when enmity and dispute arise among you, or you disagree concerning the receipt or payment of a sum of money, be sure not to refer the matter to one of these malefactors for judgment. Designate as judge and arbiter someone amongst you who is acquainted with our junctions concerning what is permitted and what is prohibited, for I appoint such a man as judge over you. Let none of you take your complaint against another of you to the tyrannical ruling power[74].
The explanation of the argument here is similar to the previous narration. Even though the Imam says: “I appoint such a man as judge”, a statement that explicitly concerns Wilayat al-qada, it is essential to recognize that the final section of this transmission is not merely a repetition. Rather it is a prohibition of recourse to tyrannical authorities in matters relating to the executive. In the first instance, the Imam has commanded his followers to turn away from illegitimate judges, while in the second he has prohibited them from referring to other illegitimate powers with regard to non-judicial issues. This indicates that the appointment of a faqih is necessary in all matters of judgment and of government.
Many experts in the field of biography (Elm al-Rejal) testify that Abu Khadija is a trustworthy narrator. In addition, the hadith is well known amongst the fuqaha and classified as mashureh (famous), consequently there is no problem regarding its chain of transmission.
One might suppose that the designations issued by Imam Sadiq in the previous two traditions are temporal and limited to his lifetime. This possibility is based on the assumption that his successors may have dismissed the fuqaha from authority, just as the successors of a ruler may dismiss his previous commands. However, this supposition obviously overlooks the status of Imams within Imami Shi’ism; their commands and instructions are not equitable to those of an average ruler and their orders must be obeyed both during their lifetime and after their death. Furthermore, Imam as- Sadiq referred to a verse of the Qur’an (4:60), which ordains disbelief in taghut (oppressive authority) and prohibits any recourse to illegitimate government as a ground for his designation of the fuqaha as ‘hakim’. This is a strong indication that his edict is not restricted to a specific time, and that it is forever obligatory for people to turn away from tyrannical authorities.
These three traditions are considered reliable and act as solid foundations for the establishment of Wilayat al-amma. Nevertheless there are some disagreements amongst Imami jurists pertaining to the transmission and interpretation of the texts. Most critics maintain that the above-mentioned traditions confirm little more than the administration of justice (Wilayat al-qada) by the fuqaha.
Aside from the three aforementioned traditions, advocates of Wilayat al-amma also appeal to a set of transmissions that, although too weak to prove the universal guardianship of the faqih by themselves, certainly reinforce and verify the doctrine.
The First Tradition: The Sound Transmission of Qadah
Ali bin Ibrahim, from his father, from Hamad bin Eisa from Qadah (Abd al-Allah bin Maimun) from Imam Sadiq (pbuh), who narrated the Prophet (pbuh) as saying:
The superiority of the learned man over the mere worshipper is like that of the full moon over the stars. Truly the ulema (scholars) are the heirs of the Prophet (pbuh); the prophets bequeathed not gold (dinar) and silver (dirham) instead they bequeathed knowledge, and whoever acquires it has indeed acquired a generous portion of their legacy[75].
According to this tradition, the just and pious religious scholars (ulema) are the heirs of the Prophet; consequently, they must fulfil all the attributes and responsibilities that Allah designated for him (aside from receiving the divine revelation). Hence they are entrusted with maintaining his authority (Wilayat) and the integrity of Islam. And, as has become clear from previous discussions, the Prophet has been appointed as the guardian and leader of the ummah. As the Qur’an says:
The Prophet has higher claims over the believers than their own selves. [Chapter 33, Verse 6]
So his right to rule and govern over the believers is also entrusted to the scholars.
Critics believe that the tradition discusses the knowledge rather than the status of the prophets. So the scholars are the heirs of the Prophet in the field of knowledge. The hadiths’ chain of transmission is sound and the fuqaha usually accept it.
The Second Tradition: Saduqs’ Morsala[76]
Shaykh Saduq in several of his many books mentions the following hadith:
Imam Ali narrated the Prophet (pbuh) saying: “O God! Have mercy on those that succeed me” [Kholaphayi]. He repeated this twice and was then asked: “O Messenger of Allah, who are these that succeed you?” He replied: “They are those that come after me, transmit my traditions and practice and teach them to the people after me[77].”
The interpretation of this tradition is similar to the previous one. Those who are successors of the Prophet (pbuh) should have his status (in all areas apart from those such as receiving divine revelation), as Imam Khomeini says:
To be a successor means to succeed to all the functions of Prophethood. In this respect, what is implied by the sentence, ‘O God! Have mercy on my successors’ is not less than what is implied by the sentence: ‘Ali is my successor’, since the meaning of successorship is the same in both cases[78].
The Third Tradition: The Fuqaha are the Trustees of the Prophets
Shaykh Kolayni mentions the following hadith from the Prophet (pbuh): The fuqaha are the trustees of the Prophets, as long as they do not concern themselves with the world (dunya). The Prophet was asked: ‘what is the sign with their concern to this world?’ He replied: ‘By seeing whether they follow Kings (sultans). If they do that, then fear for your religion’[79].
The argument is that the fuqaha are trustees of the Prophet not merely with respect to deducing Islamic laws, but with all the duties and functions of the Prophet (pbuh) and this encompasses the establishment of a religious government and a just social system.
The Fourth Tradition: The Ulema are the Rulers
Amody transmits a tradition from the Commander of the faithful, Ali (pbuh): The ulema [scholars] are the rulers [hakim] over people[80].
The meaning of this tradition explicitly supports Wilayat al- amma, but the chain of transmission is weak.
The Fifth Tradition: Imam Hussain’s Sermon
During a sermon about enjoining good and forbidding evil, Imam Hussein (pbuh) addressed the scholars and said:
…The disaster that has befallen you is greater than what has befallen others, for the true rank and degree ulema has been taken away from you. The administration of the country and the issuing of orders should actually be entrusted to religious scholars (ulema) who are guardians of the rights of God and knowledgeable about Gods ordinances concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden. But your position has been usurped from you, for no other reason than you have abandoned the pivot of truth and have disagreed about the nature of the sunnah, despite the existence of clear proofs. If you were strong in the face of torturing and suffering and prepared to endure hardship for God’s sake, then all proposed regulations would be brought to you for your approval and for you to issue[81].
If it were not for the weakness of its chain of transmission, the tradition would have been the most explicit verification Wilayat al-amma.
The Sixth Hadith: The Fuqaha are the Fortress of Islam
Shaykh Kolayni mentions the tradition from Imam Kazim (pbuh):
Believers who are fuqaha are the fortresses of Islam, like the encircling walls that protect a city[82].
The statement, which is that the fuqaha are the fortresses of Islam, means that fuqaha have a duty to protect Islam. They must do whatever is necessary to fulfil that duty hence they need to follow the Prophet as a good example for every believer. The Qur’an says:
Certainly there is for you in them a good example, for him who fears Allah and the last day. [Chapter 60, Verse 6]
The Prophet (pbuh) as the fortress of Islam did not restrict himself for training and teaching to protect Islam, rather he undertook socio-political duties and functions as well, hence all the tasks entrusted to the Prophet Muhammad must also be fulfilled by the well qualified fuqaha, as a matter of duty to become the true fortresses of Islam.
Wilayat al-amma as Hisbah
By referring to textual evidences (the Qur’an and ahadith), advocates of universal authority (Wilayat al-amma) intend to illustrate that well qualified fuqaha not only have priority over others to govern the believers, but are also explicitly designated as guardians (Wali) of the Muslim community. However, some Imami jurists maintain that even when you overlook the traditional proofs of Wilayat al-Faqih, one can establish the same authority for the faqih by considering ‘hisbah’. Although this method of reasoning cannot confirm the designation of the faqih as Wali, it does emphasize the priority of the fuqaha to undertake these social duties and makes clear that their authority is legitimate.
‘Hisbah’ as a word literally means reward or spiritual wage, and it is usually applied to deeds that are done to please God and seek heavenly reward (thawab). In Islamic jurisprudence, this term refers to something that God is not willing to ignore or overlook. For instance, there are people who are minors or suffer from insanity, who are unable to discharge their own affairs and need someone to take care of them. If they have no father or grandfather, someone else should undertake their responsibilities and since these who prepare themselves to be in charge of their affairs do that for the sake of God, it is called ‘hisbah’.
There is an important difference between ‘hisbah’ and what is referred to as sufficient necessity (wajib al-kefai). Sufficient necessity is an obligation that everyone one can fulfil, but if undertaken by a sufficient number of individuals, other people are relieved of their duty, whereas ‘hisbah’ should be undertaken by the faqih. If a qualified jurist is not available, then only the just believers (mumineen adil) have the right to be in charge of such affairs.
Having clarified the meaning of ‘hisbah’, we will now examine an argument that presupposes the extension of its denotation. People who adopt this line of reasoning argue that ‘hisbah’ is not restricted to its traditional examples such as in the case of minors and the insane. Rather, the philosophy and reasoning behind such a role demand its extension to social and political affairs. This argument has two major premises:
(a) Muslims are obliged to observe the instructions and prohibitions of Islam in all areas of their personal and social lives, and some of these realistically require the authority and apparatus of a state in order to be practically implemented. Furthermore, it is impermissible for the believers to allow illegitimate and unjust rulers to govern their society, while they have the potential to manage their own affairs independently. From a juridical perspective, this premise is universally accepted.
(b) A just faqih must undertake the duty of social and political guardianship for two reasons: either that the traditional evidences supporting Wilayat al-amma are sound, or the just faqih has priority over others to undertake this duty. The reason behind this is that no one has the right to establish his authority over another unless they are qualified to undertake the duty of ‘hisbah’ (guardianship). And the protection of Islam and Islamic society is an instance of ‘hisbah’, which means God is not willing to ignore or overlook it, consequently well-qualified fuqaha have priority over ordinary people to bear this responsibility. In other words, necessarily someone has to undertake the function. We have two options; either to delegate the authority to those who have no professional knowledge about Islam or approve the authority of a just faqih. We have natural misgivings about the former when the later is feasible. Therefore, the fuqaha have a duty and a right to fulfil it[83].
Despite the traditional arguments illustrating that the fuqaha have been designated as Wali, this argument merely establishes the priority of a faqih to be in charge of governmental affairs similar to other cases of hisbah.
The Rational Argument
Recourse to rational argument has a long history amongst Shi’a scholars. Some believe that the rational theory was first adopted by the Zaydi Shi’a, al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim (785 - Medina 860), who argued that divinely appointed political authority is necessary due to the imperfections of human nature[84].
Mullah Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1829), the author of ‘Avaed al-Ayyam’, was the first Imami jurist who appealed to logical reasoning to support the concept of universal authority (Wilayat al-amma).
This approach adopts a similar structure to those rational arguments upon which Shi’a scholars base the necessity of Prophethood and Imamate; that it was necessary for God to appoint some people as Prophets and Imams in order to provide divine guidance to mankind. Therefore it is only reasonable to assume that in the absence of such infallible guidance, God would entrust the responsibilities of religious and political leadership to those people best qualified to undertake it as deputies of the absent, infallible Imam.
Two strands of argument are presented as a justification of Wilayat al-Faqih. The first of which is an argument consisting entirely of rational premises without reference to the Qur’an or traditions, while the second is an argument established by a combination of reasoning and textual evidences. However, purely rational arguments are generally unable to definitively establish the prophecy or leadership of a particular person. Rational arguments must typically consist of universal, certain and necessary premises, and consequently, pure reasoning can prove the necessity of Prophethood and Imamate, although these rational arguments often encompass an explanation of qualifications that the ideal leader should have (e.g. sinless or just). Although there are many different lines of reasoning, it will suffice here to mention a few of them. In his volume concerning theology, Avecina (Ibn Sina) presents a discussion based on the necessity of a well-organised social order in order to establish the necessity of prophets[85].
Although this argument has naturally been appealed to by Muslim scholars and philosophers in order to establish and define Prophethood, the addition of some premises gives it the potential to confirm the necessity of its continuation in the vicegerency of the fuqaha. The structure of modified version of the proof is as follows:
(a) Man is a social being and therefore necessarily needs social order to overcome many of his conflicts and affairs.
(b) Human social life and order should be designed so that it provides individual social happiness.
(c) A set of adequate and perfect laws and the existence of one who is capable of executing these laws and leading society are two necessary conditions for the establishment of an ideal society.
(d) It is not in the power of human beings to establish an ideal, just, and truly well-ordered society without the aid of God and His divine laws.
(e) To avoid any deficiency, interference or possession of God’s message (revelation), the Prophets who delivers His message must be infallible.
(f) The explanation of the contents of the perfect religion and the execution of its laws prerequisite the appointment of infallible Imams.
(g) When there is no access to infallible Imams for attaining the above-mentioned aim (3), the leaders who are just and are expert in religious knowledge (Just faqih)[86].
The first four premises prove the necessity of prophecy and that it is necessary for God to send prophets. The sixth one extends the reasoning to the question of Imamate and the necessity of an infallible Imam. And the final premise establishes the necessity of a qualified religious leader in the era of the absent Imam.
Another rational argument has been presented by Ayatollah Borujerdi who applied some historical and religious premises in his reasoning.
(1) The leader and ruler of a society must be entrusted with the protection of social order and meet the essential needs of the people.
(2) Islam has paid attention to those essential needs and has legislated suitable laws. The ruler (Wali) of Islamic society is responsible for the execution of these laws.
(3) Within the early period of Islam, the Prophet (pbuh) and the Imams (pbut) were the legitimate political leaders and the organisation of political and social affairs was their duty.
(4) The need to regulate social relationships according to divine laws and values is not confined to a specific period of time. Rather it is a crucial need for every age and generation. Certainly when infallible Imams were present amongst people, they appointed reliable people as their representatives to undertake Shi’a social affairs and prevent their followers from recourse to tyrannical governments (taghut) for their affairs. The assumption that Imams encouraged people to avoid referring to taghut without presenting an alternative solution to their problems is illogical.
Considering the previous premise, it is also logical that just fuqaha should be appointed as their representatives and deputies in the era of greater absence because there are only three possibilities:
(1) A non-faqih (one who is not a just faqih) is designated as the Imam’s deputy. This supposition is obviously unwise and impractical, as a person lacking the essential knowledge or qualifications would be unable to provide guidance.
(2) In the era of occultation, Imami have a duty to avoid any recourse to illegitimate government for their social affairs, however the Imams did not introduce any alternative point of reference. This theory is equally impractical.
(3) The Imam has designated the just faqih as his deputy to undertake these affairs and that is what we are seeking[87].
Before concluding the internal justifications of Wilayat al-faqih, it is necessary for the sake of our discussion to examine what qualifications a deputy of the Imam must have. Although we have previously mentioned that only a well-qualified jurist may be considered the Imam’s deputy (neyab), we have not yet discussed what qualifications he requires according to Islamic sources, i.e. Qur’an and Sunnah.
The Characteristics of Wali al-Faqih and the Problem of ‘A‘lamiya’
When compared to other political doctrines, Imami political thought has some significant advantages. For example, when it insists that the ruler of the society must possess specific characteristics. In modern democratic systems, factors such as popularity, being telegenic and having the support of a powerful party and large corporations are the most important factors, while individual virtues and qualifications are often neglected. Shi’a political thought, on the other hand, makes the personal characteristics of a political leader an essential factor. Some of these are as follows.
Ijtihad (Proficiency in Islamic Jurisprudence)
Since the implementation of Islamic laws and values in the various aspects of social life are one of the most important aims of an Islamic state, the ruler must naturally have expertise and knowledge in Islamic thought in order to be able to make socio-political decisions and issue orders according to the Islamic point of view. Many traditional proofs of Wilayat al-amma insist that the Wali (hakim) must be a faqih: In maqbula of Umar ibn Hanzala, Imam Sadiq (pbuh) says:
They must seek out one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well acquainted with our laws and ordinance, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as hakim[88].
In the tradition of Abu Khadija too, Imam says:
Designate as judge and arbiter someone among you who is acquainted with our injunctions concerning what is permitted and prohibited[89].
In a signed letter the Absent Imam (may Allah hasten his reappearance) writes:
As for events that may occur, refer to the transmitters of our teachings[90].
As we have already discussed, these titles and attributes correspond with a just and competent faqih’s (mujtahid) abilities, and not those who merely transmit traditions.
Justice
Justice is a quality required of all forms of authority and leadership in Imami political doctrine; judges and prayer leaders must all be considered fair and capable, and their roles are considerably less than those who rule an entire state. In addition, the Qur’an teaches Muslims to have no inclination and cooperation with unjust people and tyrannical authorities:
And do not incline to those who are unjust, lest the fire shall touch you, and you have no guardians beside Allah, then shall you not be helped. [Chapter 11, Verse 113]
In some verses of the Qur’an Allah Almighty invites the believers to show their disobedience to unjust people, those who commit great sins:
And do not obey the bidding of the extravagant, (those) who make mischief in the land and do not act right. [Chapter 26, Verses 151-152]
Do not follow him whose heart we have made unmindful to our remembrance and he follows his low desires and his case is one in which due bounds are exceeded. [Chapter 18, Verse 28]
Although justice has not been stipulated in the traditional proofs of Wilayat al-Faqih examined in the course of this subject, the Qur’an and a number of transmissions criticize unjust rulers and those who are obedient to tyrannical governors. They also maintain that a community founded on Islamic laws and teachings, cannot be run by someone who does not believe in or behave in accordance to justice. To cite an example, Imam Muhammad al-Baqir (A) said to Muhammad b. Muslim:
O Muhammad, surely the unjust rulers and those who follow them are separated from God’s religion. Certainly they went astray, and led many astray[91].
Prudence, Trustworthiness, Administrative Facilities, and Courage
Such qualities are obvious requirements of any appropriate political leader, thus there is no need to mention evidences regarding them.
Knowledge
Many evidences stipulate that a trustee of Islamic political authority must be amongst the most knowledgeable (‘alem), competent and qualified of Islamic scholars. This criterion is somewhat contentious however, as many of the traditions mentioned in it’s support have weak chains of transmission.
According to the book of Solaim b. Qais, Ali (p) says:
Does anyone deserve to be the ruler (caliph) over the ummah except one who is most knowledgeable of God’s book (Qur’an) and the Prophet (pbuh)’s traditions (sunnah). Allah says in the Qur’an (10:35), “Is he then, who guides to the truth, more worthy to be followed, or he who himself does not go aright unless he is guided?[92]
It is transmitted from the Prophet (pbuh) that he said:
One who leads his people, while there are among them more knowledgeable than he, their sovereignty (the people’s) would begin to decline forever[93].
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, a just faqih has various functions. Some of them like the administration of justice (qada) and ‘hisbah’ are categorized as ‘Wilayat’, whilst others such as ‘ifta’ do not require a designation from the Imam. In the context of the present subject, it is essential to determine which of these functions is dependant on ‘alamiyat’ (being the most knowledgeable).
Reference to Imami jurists’ decrees shows that those who consider ‘alamiyat as a condition have merely concentrated on ‘ifta’. Ayatollah Sayyid Kazim Yazdi, the author of ‘al- ‘urwat ul-wuthqa’ writes:
With regard to a mujtahid’s functions, none of them are restricted by al-‘alamiya but taqleed (ifta). The matter of his Wilayat however, is not conditioned by al-‘alamiya[94].
Many great Imami jurists who have commented upon this important book (al-urwat ul-wuthqa), such as Ayatollahs Haery, Mirza al-Nayini, Aqa Ziya al-Araki, Sayyid Abul- Hassan al-Esfahani, Burujerdi, Khomeini, Khui, Milani, and Gulpaayigani, do not add any marginal notes to this decree of Yazdi, which means they agree with him that the functions of the faqih that exercises his authority (Wilayat) are not conditioned by being the most knowledgeable.
Shaykh al-Ansari also maintains that ‘alamiya is not necessary in the designation of a faqih as Wali (hakim)’. Every just faqih has the right to undertake affairs which require justified authority (Wilayat). He believes that only when fuqaha have different decrees (fatwa) the decree of the one who is most knowledgeable (‘alam) has priority over others[95].
Shaykh Muhammad Hassan, the author of ‘Jawahir al- Kalam’, also believes that the traditional proofs, which state that the fuqaha are designated as ‘Wali’ and the deputies of the Imam, emphasize on the professional knowledge about Islam (fiqahat) and not upon the ‘most knowledgeable’ as the condition of a faqih’s Wilayat[96].
Essentially with regards to some functions of the faqih such as ‘qada’, it seems incredible if one supposes that it is conditioned on ‘alamiya because this implies on a very large scale that the Shi’a community has only one faqih who has legitimate authority to judge.
Finally, we have indicated that ‘Ijtihad’ has various aspects and therefore it is quite reasonable to assume ‘X’ is the most knowledgeable (a’lem) in chapters of Islamic jurisprudence concerning worship (such as praying and fasting), while ‘Y’ is a’lem in the chapters of transactions (moamelat) and ‘Z’ is the most knowledgeable in the context of the administration of justice and punishment (hudud). Consequently, we have to take into account the relationship between a function that a faqih wants to undertake and the kind of knowledge that is a prerequisite to that function. There is no sufficient reason to convince us that one who is the most knowledgeable in chapters of worship would be able to perform the function of ‘qada’ better than a faqih who is most knowledgeable in administration of justice.
On the other hand, ijtihad and fiqahat are but one characteristic that a leader of the Islamic society should have. There is no reason to concentrate on the priority of ‘a’lem’ and thereby ignore other qualifications that Walis (fuqaha) must possess, which might provide them with the necessary abilities and characteristics of a ruler. Certainly, in a situation wherein a few faqih are completely equal in all qualifications of leadership except ijtihad, one might claim that the authority of a’lem has priority over others, especially when he is the most knowledgeable in social- political aspects of Islamic law. But it should be noted that even this is merely a ‘rational preference’, because as the author of Jawaher al-Kalam indicated, the traditional proofs of Wilayat al-Faqih are silent about alamiya as a condition of Wilayat.
The External Justification
Many political theories are known as ‘guardianship’ in spite of the profound differences they have with one another. By guardianship, we mean a political system in which the state is governed by qualified rulers (guardians).
The ruler or rulers are not subject to election and do not come to office through free election. They deserve to govern the people due to their specific qualifications and abilities. Therefore, the delegation of authority in a guardianship model of state is not due to a democratic process, but rather to the qualities of a guardian. Advocates of guardianship commonly believe that the entrustment of political power to a highly qualified minority, who has exceptional expertise, guarantees the interests and good of the people. Although the followers of guardianship disagree about the qualifications the guardians must have, or about the interpretation of happiness and people’s good. This is why the guardianship supported by Plato is rationally different from the Marxist Leninist interpretation of it. Plato’s guardians are a minority of well- qualified philosophers, whereas the latter’s are an organized group of revolutionaries.
There are many arguments to justify guardianship over democracy. Although on the other hand, guardianship in turn faces many criticisms, especially from advocates of democracy. So if we admit that ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ is a political doctrine belonging to the guardianship model of state, it must be able to overcome its critics and eventually establish itself as a reasonable, rational and legitimate political doctrine. That is what is meant by ‘external justification’, which, contrary to ‘internal justification’, does not rely on religiously accepted reasoning.
First of all, we must assess why and how ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ poses as a guardianship regime. According to this theory of state, a just, capable and pious jurist, who possesses a number of qualities, has legitimate authority to govern the society in the era of occultation (ghaibat). This obviously indicates that other kinds of experts and average people have no equal access to the highest political office and only specific experts (jurists) have the right and the opportunity to attain the highest level of political leadership. Moreover, they are not elected by people, but are instead designated by Imams as ‘Wali’ and possessors of the authority.
On the other hand, the unique example of this political system, whose detailed blueprints are embedded in the constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran, does not adopt a pure system of guardianship. After all, it’s constitution respects a limited democratic processes in that the majority of governmental institutions, even the political leadership is chosen through elections. According to article 107, a group of elected experts (a few jurists are elected by people every seven years) shall elect a well-qualified faqih as the political leader. Both the authority of Shari’ah (Wilayat al-Faqih) and the sovereignty of the people in this political regime make it a mixture of democracy and guardianship. Hence it should be categorized as a ‘meritocracy’, because it does not go hand in hand with all the standards of guardianship.
What distinguishes this model of ‘meritocracy’ from guardianship is the role of the people in participating in the distribution of political power and in shaping political decisions through their representatives. However, people and their representatives are not religiously free to delegate the political authority to a non-faqih or those who have no tendency to rule, legislate and execute within the framework of divine laws and Islamic values and teachings. Consequently, in this meritocracy, a just Imami jurist as ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and a group of fuqaha as the ‘guardian council’, supervise and control the decisions and functions of representatives and bureaucrats, who are themselves subject to the democratic process. The central discussion here concerns the relationship between ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and what traditionally are stated as the foundation and justification of the guardianship. We must now evaluate whether these foundations are adequate to cite as justifications of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and how could this doctrine overcome the critiques of guardianship.
Some advocates of guardianship hold that ordinary people lack the necessary qualifications for ruling. They seem to lack much understanding of their own basic needs, interests and good. Many of them are unable or unwilling to do whatever may be necessary to attain deep knowledge about their own needs and good as well as the appropriate means to achieve these needs and goods. In conclusion, people have no political competence to govern themselves. Their deficiency is partly in knowledge, partly in virtue i.e. strong tendencies to seek good ends; hence they are not qualified to govern. This approach undermines the fundamental ground of democracy and supports the idea that guardians who have sufficient political competence should govern people.
Obviously, the doctrine of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ does not rely on the political incompetence of people to justify the priority of the faqih’s authority. Neither in traditional proofs of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ nor in the rational ones, do Imami scholars stress on people’s deficiencies. Some rational proofs of ‘Wilayat al-faqih’ depend on the belief that it is not in the power of human beings to establish an ideal, ordered society with no aid of God’s revelation. Clearly, this premise expresses the deficiency of human beings as such, and not simply the imperfection of ordinary people, confirming the competence of a small minority as guardians. Indeed, this deficiency justifies man’s need of religion, and its important role in organizing social relationships.
The second foundation mentioned as a reason for guardianship consists of a specific conception of governing. For them, ruling people is an art. Therefore, rulers must be experts of a certain type, meaning experts in the art of governing. They as guardians would be specialists whose specialization would make them superior in the art of leadership, not only in comparison with ordinary people but also with other kinds of experts such as economists, physicists, engineers and so on.
Although most people are potentially capable of acquiring the qualifications needed for leadership, they lack the time to acquire them. A society needs many different types of experts. The need for acquiring different skills and then implementing them, makes it impossible for each and every person to spend the time they would need to gain the moral and instrumental competence for ruling. To suppose that a large number of people each have the capacity to acquire and use numerous specialized skills is not realistic. Consequently, in a well ordered society some persons should be rigorously trained and selected to function well as rulers (guardians). Because leadership is so crucial nothing could be of greater importance than the education of our rulers[97].
Apart from the fact that many scholars have misgivings about the actual existence of the art of governing, this argument exclusively supports the Platonic version of guardianship. There is no single art or science that can provide us with the moral and technical knowledge and abilities required for being an ideal leader. Many versions of guardianship, including ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’, do not look at guardians as specialists in the art of governing. Instead, they believe that the duty of governing should delegate to a few qualified persons, because of some certain qualifications and abilities that they have. Guardians have a advantage over others in matters of leadership, such as their in depth knowledge of ideological, great commitment to the ambitions of specific party, being vanguard and leader in revolution or possession the knowledge that is necessary for shaping particular social formation.
The unique reason that justifies (apart from traditional religious reasons) the ruling of the fuqaha as guardians, pertains to their knowledge about Shari’a which must be accompanied with personal virtues and moral competence. It is true that moral competence is not confined to a small minority and that many people have the capacity to gain moral competence and become just and pious. However, what distinguishes the just fuqaha and render them the unique group who has legitimate authority to rule over the believers is their expertise in Islamic jurisprudence. The justification of the guardianship of fuqaha is owed to the fundamental role of Islamic law in the lives of Muslims. Islam obliges Muslims to adopt Islamic laws and values in both their individual as well as public lives. Consequently, one who has the ability (as a jurisprudent) that is necessary for undertaking this task must be in charge of ruling the people. Therefore, the question of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ is not a question of having a specific art. It has roots in a religious belief that sees a crucial role for Shari’ah in Islamic society.
The distinction between the general good and personal interests could provide the advocates of guardianship the third reason for justification. The case of guardianship sometimes rest on assumption that the composition of the general good (general interest) and how the knowledge of what composes the general good may be acquired. If the general good were only composed of individual interests and if we were to believe that everyone could pursue his personal interests without guardians, then the guardianship model of state would be unnecessary and undesirable.
But if the general good and interest of society consists of something more than an aggregation of personal interests, then to achieve it will require more than this. To bring about the general good would then require an understanding of the ways in which the general good differs from a combination individual interests. If it is also true that most people are mainly concerned with their own individual interests instead of that of the general public, then the task of deciding on the general good should be entrusted to those especially trained to understand what the general good consists of. Obviously, that depends on what is meant by the general good[98].
Although the followers of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ do not fully accept this argument, however, a modified version of it would sufficiently justify this model of guardianship. Islam as a perfect religion aims for real human happiness, hence, its laws and teachings are necessarily established for the ultimate self-realization of the human being and for gaining true salvation. From this point of view both the good of the individual as well as the general public are harmonized with the contents of Islam. Concepts such as public interest should not be defined without considering of the crucial role played by Islam in both the public and private spheres. When one acknowledges this fact, which is especially true in a society where most people believe that Islam is the ultimate way to salvation, the following argument could be supposed as external justification for the doctrine of ‘Willayat al-Faqih’:
(1) General interest and public good are not merely a composition of individual interests and they must be determined through a higher source.
(2) Within an Islamic society the real public good and interest cannot be known while neglecting Islamic laws and values. It does not mean that other kinds of expertise play no role in the process of determining public good, rather, the key point is that all political and economic decisions, various legislations as well as government orders must take Islamic teachings (especially jurisprudence) seriously and harmonize themselves with the demands of Islam.
(3) eople are mostly concerned with their own individual interests so the task of deciding the public interest, at least in cases that are specifically dealt with by Islam should not be entrusted to the ups and downs of public opinion.
(4) Technocrats and those who are experts in the various sciences are often more concerned than average people with the good and interest of the public. However, as mentioned in the second premise, in an Islamic society technocrats as policymakers can not have a full understand of the public good, unless they are experts in Islamic thought.
Policymaking, legislation, organizing the system of rights and duties and other significant functions of government must be done under the supervision and authority of a well qualified faqih (or fuqaha) who is just, brave, honest, intelligent, knowledgeable about social and political issues, and an expert in Islamic ideology.
This external justification seems quite convincing within a specific context, that is, for those who pursue Islamic culture and support the establishment of an Islamic society. For those who do not believe in Islam, the premises of this justification (particularly the second and fourth) need further evidence.
Criticism of Guardianship
Advocates of democracy usually criticize guardianship and its justifications. We have to consider briefly a few of these criticisms to assess how the connection between the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and these critiques might be? In my view the three following criticisms are more significant than the others:
(i) Adversaries of guardianship insist that the keystone of this theory that tries to justify the deserts of guardians to rule based on their knowledge is disputable. The possession of this religious knowledge is not sufficient enough to prove that political power should be entrusted to a fagih to protect and promote public welfare and prosperity. How can we know that the guardian is not seeking his own interests rather than that of the general public? Is there any system of control over them to prevent hem from abusing his authority? In the guardianship model of state, since the people do not delegate authority to the guardian, they cannot legally or constitutionally withdraw political power from the guardian. The guardians are free of popular controls.
(ii) Unlike democracy that provides people with the opportunity to engage in governing themselves and to improve their moral-political experiences, the guardianship system of rule prevents an entire population from developing their social, political and moral capacities. This is essentially because only a few people (guardians) are engaging in governing. Therefore, only a few people have the opportunity to learn how to act as morally responsible human beings. Only guardians can exercise the freedom of participating in the process of making laws, while in democratic states the whole population enjoys that freedom. Even though in many democratic states, the cooperate and political elite are far more powerful than ordinary citizens, however, they cannot be compared to guardians. These elites are not despots and people can still play a role in the distribution of political power and in making political decisions.
(iii) Guardianship is based upon the idea that there is a set of truths, objective propositions and valid knowledge that can determine public good or true social interests. The second pillar of guardianship rests on the point that only those who have this knowledge[99] (what does public good consist of and by what means can we achieve it?) are exclusively competent to hold political authority. Some critics of guardianship criticize the first pillar of the argument. They emphasize that there is no such thing as rational, unquestionable, or objective knowledge. There are no determined truths as ‘science of ruling’ that can justify the authority of a few people as guardians. In addition, they believe advocates of guardianship face the problem of validation because they can not establish why their understanding of public good and social interests is objectively true. Robert Dahl writes:
In judging the validity of statements about the general good we can and should employ reason and experience. Nonetheless, no assertion that ‘the public good definitely consists of such and such’ can be shown to be ‘objectively true’ in the same sense that many statements in mathematics, logic, or the natural sciences are understood to be objectively true[100].
To clarify the relationship between these critiques and the Imami political doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih we have to keep in mind that these criticisms are targeting ‘pure guardianship’, a political theory that leaves no room for people in political affairs while entrusting complete political authority to non-elected minority (guardians). In the next chapter it will be explained that Wilayat al-Faqih is compatible with a specific version of democracy called ‘religious democracy’. In any case the mixture between the authority of a just faqih who represents both the authority of Islamic jurisprudence as well as the authority of the people, renders some of these criticisms essentially irrelevant to the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih. For example the second critique mentioned above is absolutely inapplicable to the guardianship of the faqih. Moreover, according to what has been discussed in the previous chapter about the meaning of absolute authority of a just faqih, the first criticism is also irrelevant, because the guardianship of a faqih is not beyond the control of a group of elected experts who supervise and control his usage of power and authority. In addition, it is the religious responsibility of all Muslims to be not neutral about the behavior of their governors and leaders.
In the previous pages it is clear that the guardianship of the faqih is not base on the assumption that leadership is a specific art or knowledge that consists of a set of truths and skills. Therefore, the final criticism cannot undermine this version of guardianship either. Almost all Shi’a scholars believe in rationalism, hence, the problem of validation is very important in their eyes. This is true not only with regards to fundamental Islamic beliefs, but also in other aspects of Islamic thought including political thought. They attempt to justify their system of beliefs through rational arguments, as well as through traditional evidences. As a result, Shi’a political thought is based upon a set of true, valid and objective doctrines about human nature, the philosophy of life, and morality. It consists of a set of philosophical-theological statements that produce an Islamic world ‘s view. Indeed, this theory of state like other political theories is rested upon a comprehensive philosophy and the justification of this political thought is due to the justification of its moral-philosophical foundations as well. However, we do not believe in ‘hard rationalism’, which demands that all religious statements and beliefs must be verified by decisive rational proofs, exactly as with mathematics. Obviously, religious statements and beliefs should be categorized according to their own appropriate methods of justification. Islam consists of objective truths and valid statements; however, one can not prove its validation by recourse to a unique methodology (rational proofs). Unlike the fundamental doctrines of Islam (usul al- Din) that can largely be validated and justified through rational arguments, the validation of Islamic law is, to a large extent, based upon trust in the commands of God, which in turn can be established by appealing to rational proof.
The key point is that the validity of this model of guardianship (Wilayat al-Faqih) does not acquire its approbation from the assumption that there is an objective art or science for ruling people or a specific knowledge used for understanding public good and finding the means for achieving them. Its verification is due to the validation of Islam’s moral, philosophical and theological foundations including the importance of Shari’ah for our ultimate happiness.
The external justification of Wilayat al-Faqih consists of two independent sides, the positive and the negative. Positive justification aims to justify the validation of this theory directly and through the emphasis on the necessity of the Islamic legal system and the implementation of its laws for the establishment of an ideal social and personal existence. However, the negative side refers to any efforts undertaken to prove the priority of this doctrine over its alternatives. Since the doctrine of democracy in general and the theory of liberal democracy in particular is the most important alternative theory facing guardianship, the external justification of our political theory would be insufficient if we fail to assess the relationship between the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih and democracy. The next chapter will attempt to make complete the external justification of this political doctrine by evaluating the nature of democracy and its possible connections to this version of guardianship.
There is another significant reason why we should discuss democracy. Some Muslim thinkers maintain that Islam fundamentally disagrees with democracy. Hence, in their eyes our interpretation of imami political thought that mixes the guardianship of the faqih with elements of democracy is totally wrong and is against the foundations of Islam.
Notes:
[63] Tuqih as a word means seal and signature and in Islamic historical books and in the history of Hadith the term applies to the letters issued by Imams especially letters and decrees of the absent Imam declared through his four particular deputies.
[64] For example, Shaikh Muhammad Hassan in Jawaher al-Kalam, Volume 15, p. 422, Shaikh Morteza Ansari in al-Aada wa al-Shahadat, p. 46, Shaikh Morteza Haeri in Salat al-Jum’a, p. 154, Kashif al-Qeta in al- Ferdus al-A’la, p. 54.
[65] Shaikh al-Saduq, Ikmal al-Din, Ali Akbar al-Qafari (ed), Qom, 1405AH, Volume 2, Chapter 45, p. 483.
[66] Muhammad ibn Hassan al-Tusi, Kitab al-Qayba, Qom, 1411AH, p. 290.
[67] Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 85.
[68] Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 86.
[69] Seyed Kazim Haeri, Wilayat al-Amr fi asr al-Qayba, Qom, Majma al- Fikr al-Islami, 1415AH, pp. 123-124.
[70] Shaikh al-Kolayni reports the tradition in Al-Kafi, Kitab al-Fazl al-Elm, Chapter of Ekhtelaf al-Hadith, Volume 1, p. 67 also Al-Tusi, Tahzib al- Ahkam , Kitab al-Qada, Volume 6, p. 218, Hadith 514.
[71] Translated in Islam and Revolution, p. 93.
[72] In Kitab al-Qada wa al-Shahadat, p. 48.
[73] In Jawaher al-Kalam, Volume 21, p. 395 and Volume 40, p. 17.
[74] Al-Kolayni, Al-Foru’ men al-Kafi, Kitab al-Qada, Volume 7, p. 412; Al-Tusi, Al-Tahzib, Kitab al-Qada, Volume 6, p. 303; Shaikh al-Saduq, Man la Yahzoruhu al-Faqih, Volume 3, p. 2.
[75] Shaikh al-Kolayni, Al-Kafi, The Book of Virtue of Knowledge, Volume 1, p. 34.
[76] In the study of hadith the terminology for a transmission in which the name of the first transmitter or a number of them has not been mentioned is called ‘morsal’.
[77] Uyun al-Akhbar al-Reda, volume 2, chapter, 31, p. 37 also Ma‘ani al- Akhbar, p. 374 also Man la Yahzurohu al-Faqih, Volume 4, p. 420.
[78] Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 72.
[79] Kolayni, al-Kafi, Volume 1, p. 46.
[80] Amodi, Qorar al-Hekam, Volume 1, p. 137, 506.
[81] Harrani Iibn Shobeh, Tohaf al-Huqul, Qom, 1404 A.H. Volume 1, p.238.
[82] Al-Kolayni, Al-Kafi, Volume 1, p. 38.
[83] Seyed Kazim Haeri, Wilayat al-Amr fi Asr al-Qayba, p. 96.
[84] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p. 40.
[85] Ibn Sina, Al-Shefa, The book of Al-Elahiyat, The 10th Article, Chapter 2, p. 487.
[86] Abdullah Javadi Amoli, Wilayat ul-Faqih, Qom: Esra Publication, 1378 AH, pp. 151-152.
[87] Hussain Borujerdi, Al-Badr al-Zaher fi Salat ul-Jom‘a wal-Mosafer, Qom, 1367AH, pp. 72-78.
[88] Muhammad Hassan Hor al-A’meli, Wasael al-Shi°a, Qom: Ahl ul-Bait Institution, 1412AH, Volume 27, p. 137.
[89] Al-Kafi, Volume 7, p.412.
[90] Sheikh al-Saduq, Ikmal al-Din, Volume 2, p.483.
[91] Al-Kafi, Volume 1, p. 184.
[92] Solaim ibn Qais Al-Helali, Kitab al-Solaim, Tehran: Dar al-Kotob al- Islamiya, p. 118.
[93] Barqi, Al-Mahasin, Volume 1, p. 93.
[94] Al-Urvat ul-Wosqa, The Chapter of Ijtihad wal-Taqlid, Question 68.
[95] Shaikh al-Ansari, Taqlid, Published by International Congress of Shaikh al-Ansari publications, p. 67.
[96]Jawahir al-Kalam, Volume 40, pp. 44-45.
[97] Democracy and its Critics, pp. 62-63.
[98] Democracy and its Critics, pp. 70-71.
[99] There is no agreement among advocates of guardianship about the nature of this knowledge therefore they disagree about the qualifications of this small minority of rulers (guardians). For instance, in the eyes of Plato this knowledge consists of a set of propositions about what is best for the community. This knowledge is based on rational certainty that ordinary people have no access to. Unlike true philosophers, ordinary people just have opinions (uncertainties) instead of knowledge (rational certainty). From an entirely different perspective, Marxist-Leninists maintain that this knowledge consists of the laws of historical development based on ‘historical materialism’ as a rigorous methodological approach rooted in the belief that the structure of society and human relations in all their forms are the product of material conditions and circumstances rather than of ideas, thought or consciousness. Consequently, for them the guardians are a few revolutionaries who know the laws and material conditions that rule over these historical developments.
[100] Democracy and its Critics, p. 71.
Ahmed Vaezy
Imam reza network
The Rational Argument for Wilayat al-Faqih
Recourse to rational argument has a long history amongst Shi’a scholars. Some believe that the rational theory was first adopted by the Zaydi Shi’a, al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim (785 - Medina 860), who argued that divinely appointed political authority is necessary due to the imperfections of human nature[84].
Mullah Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1829), the author of ‘Avaed al-Ayyam’, was the first Imami jurist who appealed to logical reasoning to support the concept of universal authority (Wilayat al-amma).
This approach adopts a similar structure to those rational arguments upon which Shi’a scholars base the necessity of Prophethood and Imamate; that it was necessary for God to appoint some people as Prophets and Imams in order to provide divine guidance to mankind. Therefore it is only reasonable to assume that in the absence of such infallible guidance, God would entrust the responsibilities of religious and political leadership to those people best qualified to undertake it as deputies of the absent, infallible Imam.
Two strands of argument are presented as a justification of Wilayat al-Faqih. The first of which is an argument consisting entirely of rational premises without reference to the Qur’an or traditions, while the second is an argument established by a combination of reasoning and textual evidences. However, purely rational arguments are generally unable to definitively establish the prophecy or leadership of a particular person. Rational arguments must typically consist of universal, certain and necessary premises, and consequently, pure reasoning can prove the necessity of Prophethood and Imamate, although these rational arguments often encompass an explanation of qualifications that the ideal leader should have (e.g. sinless or just). Although there are many different lines of reasoning, it will suffice here to mention a few of them. In his volume concerning theology, Avecina (Ibn Sina) presents a discussion based on the necessity of a well-organised social order in order to establish the necessity of prophets[85].
Although this argument has naturally been appealed to by Muslim scholars and philosophers in order to establish and define Prophethood, the addition of some premises gives it the potential to confirm the necessity of its continuation in the vicegerency of the fuqaha. The structure of modified version of the proof is as follows:
(a) Man is a social being and therefore necessarily needs social order to overcome many of his conflicts and affairs.
(b) Human social life and order should be designed so that it provides individual social happiness.
(c) A set of adequate and perfect laws and the existence of one who is capable of executing these laws and leading society are two necessary conditions for the establishment of an ideal society.
(d) It is not in the power of human beings to establish an ideal, just, and truly well-ordered society without the aid of God and His divine laws.
(e) To avoid any deficiency, interference or possession of God’s message (revelation), the Prophets who delivers His message must be infallible.
(f) The explanation of the contents of the perfect religion and the execution of its laws prerequisite the appointment of infallible Imams.
(g) When there is no access to infallible Imams for attaining the above-mentioned aim (3), the leaders who are just and are expert in religious knowledge (Just faqih)[86].
The first four premises prove the necessity of prophecy and that it is necessary for God to send prophets. The sixth one extends the reasoning to the question of Imamate and the necessity of an infallible Imam. And the final premise establishes the necessity of a qualified religious leader in the era of the absent Imam.
Another rational argument has been presented by Ayatollah Borujerdi who applied some historical and religious premises in his reasoning.
(1) The leader and ruler of a society must be entrusted with the protection of social order and meet the essential needs of the people.
(2) Islam has paid attention to those essential needs and has legislated suitable laws. The ruler (Wali) of Islamic society is responsible for the execution of these laws.
(3) Within the early period of Islam, the Prophet (pbuh) and the Imams (pbut) were the legitimate political leaders and the organisation of political and social affairs was their duty.
(4) The need to regulate social relationships according to divine laws and values is not confined to a specific period of time. Rather it is a crucial need for every age and generation. Certainly when infallible Imams were present amongst people, they appointed reliable people as their representatives to undertake Shi’a social affairs and prevent their followers from recourse to tyrannical governments (taghut) for their affairs. The assumption that Imams encouraged people to avoid referring to taghut without presenting an alternative solution to their problems is illogical.
Considering the previous premise, it is also logical that just fuqaha should be appointed as their representatives and deputies in the era of greater absence because there are only three possibilities:
(1) A non-faqih (one who is not a just faqih) is designated as the Imam’s deputy. This supposition is obviously unwise and impractical, as a person lacking the essential knowledge or qualifications would be unable to provide guidance.
(2) In the era of occultation, Imami have a duty to avoid any recourse to illegitimate government for their social affairs, however the Imams did not introduce any alternative point of reference. This theory is equally impractical.
(3) The Imam has designated the just faqih as his deputy to undertake these affairs and that is what we are seeking[87].
Before concluding the internal justifications of Wilayat al-faqih, it is necessary for the sake of our discussion to examine what qualifications a deputy of the Imam must have. Although we have previously mentioned that only a well-qualified jurist may be considered the Imam’s deputy (neyab), we have not yet discussed what qualifications he requires according to Islamic sources, i.e. Qur’an and Sunnah.
The Characteristics of Wali al-Faqih and the Problem of ‘A‘lamiya’
When compared to other political doctrines, Imami political thought has some significant advantages. For example, when it insists that the ruler of the society must possess specific characteristics. In modern democratic systems, factors such as popularity, being telegenic and having the support of a powerful party and large corporations are the most important factors, while individual virtues and qualifications are often neglected. Shi’a political thought, on the other hand, makes the personal characteristics of a political leader an essential factor. Some of these are as follows.
Ijtihad (Proficiency in Islamic Jurisprudence)
Since the implementation of Islamic laws and values in the various aspects of social life are one of the most important aims of an Islamic state, the ruler must naturally have expertise and knowledge in Islamic thought in order to be able to make socio-political decisions and issue orders according to the Islamic point of view. Many traditional proofs of Wilayat al-amma insist that the Wali (hakim) must be a faqih: In maqbula of Umar ibn Hanzala, Imam Sadiq (pbuh) says:
They must seek out one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well acquainted with our laws and ordinance, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as hakim[88].
In the tradition of Abu Khadija too, Imam says:
Designate as judge and arbiter someone among you who is acquainted with our injunctions concerning what is permitted and prohibited[89].
In a signed letter the Absent Imam (may Allah hasten his reappearance) writes:
As for events that may occur, refer to the transmitters of our teachings[90].
As we have already discussed, these titles and attributes correspond with a just and competent faqih’s (mujtahid) abilities, and not those who merely transmit traditions.
Justice
Justice is a quality required of all forms of authority and leadership in Imami political doctrine; judges and prayer leaders must all be considered fair and capable, and their roles are considerably less than those who rule an entire state. In addition, the Qur’an teaches Muslims to have no inclination and cooperation with unjust people and tyrannical authorities:
And do not incline to those who are unjust, lest the fire shall touch you, and you have no guardians beside Allah, then shall you not be helped. [Chapter 11, Verse 113]
In some verses of the Qur’an Allah Almighty invites the believers to show their disobedience to unjust people, those who commit great sins:
And do not obey the bidding of the extravagant, (those) who make mischief in the land and do not act right. [Chapter 26, Verses 151-152]
Do not follow him whose heart we have made unmindful to our remembrance and he follows his low desires and his case is one in which due bounds are exceeded. [Chapter 18, Verse 28]
Although justice has not been stipulated in the traditional proofs of Wilayat al-Faqih examined in the course of this subject, the Qur’an and a number of transmissions criticize unjust rulers and those who are obedient to tyrannical governors. They also maintain that a community founded on Islamic laws and teachings, cannot be run by someone who does not believe in or behave in accordance to justice. To cite an example, Imam Muhammad al-Baqir (A) said to Muhammad b. Muslim:
O Muhammad, surely the unjust rulers and those who follow them are separated from God’s religion. Certainly they went astray, and led many astray[91].
Prudence, Trustworthiness, Administrative Facilities, and Courage
Such qualities are obvious requirements of any appropriate political leader, thus there is no need to mention evidences regarding them.
Knowledge
Many evidences stipulate that a trustee of Islamic political authority must be amongst the most knowledgeable (‘alem), competent and qualified of Islamic scholars. This criterion is somewhat contentious however, as many of the traditions mentioned in it’s support have weak chains of transmission.
According to the book of Solaim b. Qais, Ali (p) says:
Does anyone deserve to be the ruler (caliph) over the ummah except one who is most knowledgeable of God’s book (Qur’an) and the Prophet (pbuh)’s traditions (sunnah). Allah says in the Qur’an (10:35), “Is he then, who guides to the truth, more worthy to be followed, or he who himself does not go aright unless he is guided?[92]
It is transmitted from the Prophet (pbuh) that he said:
One who leads his people, while there are among them more knowledgeable than he, their sovereignty (the people’s) would begin to decline forever[93].
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, a just faqih has various functions. Some of them like the administration of justice (qada) and ‘hisbah’ are categorized as ‘Wilayat’, whilst others such as ‘ifta’ do not require a designation from the Imam. In the context of the present subject, it is essential to determine which of these functions is dependant on ‘alamiyat’ (being the most knowledgeable).
Reference to Imami jurists’ decrees shows that those who consider ‘alamiyat as a condition have merely concentrated on ‘ifta’. Ayatollah Sayyid Kazim Yazdi, the author of ‘al- ‘urwat ul-wuthqa’ writes:
With regard to a mujtahid’s functions, none of them are restricted by al-‘alamiya but taqleed (ifta). The matter of his Wilayat however, is not conditioned by al-‘alamiya[94].
Many great Imami jurists who have commented upon this important book (al-urwat ul-wuthqa), such as Ayatollahs Haery, Mirza al-Nayini, Aqa Ziya al-Araki, Sayyid Abul- Hassan al-Esfahani, Burujerdi, Khomeini, Khui, Milani, and Gulpaayigani, do not add any marginal notes to this decree of Yazdi, which means they agree with him that the functions of the faqih that exercises his authority (Wilayat) are not conditioned by being the most knowledgeable.
Shaykh al-Ansari also maintains that ‘alamiya is not necessary in the designation of a faqih as Wali (hakim)’. Every just faqih has the right to undertake affairs which require justified authority (Wilayat). He believes that only when fuqaha have different decrees (fatwa) the decree of the one who is most knowledgeable (‘alam) has priority over others[95].
Shaykh Muhammad Hassan, the author of ‘Jawahir al- Kalam’, also believes that the traditional proofs, which state that the fuqaha are designated as ‘Wali’ and the deputies of the Imam, emphasize on the professional knowledge about Islam (fiqahat) and not upon the ‘most knowledgeable’ as the condition of a faqih’s Wilayat[96].
Essentially with regards to some functions of the faqih such as ‘qada’, it seems incredible if one supposes that it is conditioned on ‘alamiya because this implies on a very large scale that the Shi’a community has only one faqih who has legitimate authority to judge.
Finally, we have indicated that ‘Ijtihad’ has various aspects and therefore it is quite reasonable to assume ‘X’ is the most knowledgeable (a’lem) in chapters of Islamic jurisprudence concerning worship (such as praying and fasting), while ‘Y’ is a’lem in the chapters of transactions (moamelat) and ‘Z’ is the most knowledgeable in the context of the administration of justice and punishment (hudud). Consequently, we have to take into account the relationship between a function that a faqih wants to undertake and the kind of knowledge that is a prerequisite to that function. There is no sufficient reason to convince us that one who is the most knowledgeable in chapters of worship would be able to perform the function of ‘qada’ better than a faqih who is most knowledgeable in administration of justice.
On the other hand, ijtihad and fiqahat are but one characteristic that a leader of the Islamic society should have. There is no reason to concentrate on the priority of ‘a’lem’ and thereby ignore other qualifications that Walis (fuqaha) must possess, which might provide them with the necessary abilities and characteristics of a ruler. Certainly, in a situation wherein a few faqih are completely equal in all qualifications of leadership except ijtihad, one might claim that the authority of a’lem has priority over others, especially when he is the most knowledgeable in social- political aspects of Islamic law. But it should be noted that even this is merely a ‘rational preference’, because as the author of Jawaher al-Kalam indicated, the traditional proofs of Wilayat al-Faqih are silent about alamiya as a condition of Wilayat.
The External Justification
Many political theories are known as ‘guardianship’ in spite of the profound differences they have with one another. By guardianship, we mean a political system in which the state is governed by qualified rulers (guardians).
The ruler or rulers are not subject to election and do not come to office through free election. They deserve to govern the people due to their specific qualifications and abilities. Therefore, the delegation of authority in a guardianship model of state is not due to a democratic process, but rather to the qualities of a guardian. Advocates of guardianship commonly believe that the entrustment of political power to a highly qualified minority, who has exceptional expertise, guarantees the interests and good of the people. Although the followers of guardianship disagree about the qualifications the guardians must have, or about the interpretation of happiness and people’s good. This is why the guardianship supported by Plato is rationally different from the Marxist Leninist interpretation of it. Plato’s guardians are a minority of well- qualified philosophers, whereas the latter’s are an organized group of revolutionaries.
There are many arguments to justify guardianship over democracy. Although on the other hand, guardianship in turn faces many criticisms, especially from advocates of democracy. So if we admit that ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ is a political doctrine belonging to the guardianship model of state, it must be able to overcome its critics and eventually establish itself as a reasonable, rational and legitimate political doctrine. That is what is meant by ‘external justification’, which, contrary to ‘internal justification’, does not rely on religiously accepted reasoning.
First of all, we must assess why and how ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ poses as a guardianship regime. According to this theory of state, a just, capable and pious jurist, who possesses a number of qualities, has legitimate authority to govern the society in the era of occultation (ghaibat). This obviously indicates that other kinds of experts and average people have no equal access to the highest political office and only specific experts (jurists) have the right and the opportunity to attain the highest level of political leadership. Moreover, they are not elected by people, but are instead designated by Imams as ‘Wali’ and possessors of the authority.
On the other hand, the unique example of this political system, whose detailed blueprints are embedded in the constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran, does not adopt a pure system of guardianship. After all, it’s constitution respects a limited democratic processes in that the majority of governmental institutions, even the political leadership is chosen through elections. According to article 107, a group of elected experts (a few jurists are elected by people every seven years) shall elect a well-qualified faqih as the political leader. Both the authority of Shari’ah (Wilayat al-Faqih) and the sovereignty of the people in this political regime make it a mixture of democracy and guardianship. Hence it should be categorized as a ‘meritocracy’, because it does not go hand in hand with all the standards of guardianship.
What distinguishes this model of ‘meritocracy’ from guardianship is the role of the people in participating in the distribution of political power and in shaping political decisions through their representatives. However, people and their representatives are not religiously free to delegate the political authority to a non-faqih or those who have no tendency to rule, legislate and execute within the framework of divine laws and Islamic values and teachings. Consequently, in this meritocracy, a just Imami jurist as ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and a group of fuqaha as the ‘guardian council’, supervise and control the decisions and functions of representatives and bureaucrats, who are themselves subject to the democratic process. The central discussion here concerns the relationship between ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and what traditionally are stated as the foundation and justification of the guardianship. We must now evaluate whether these foundations are adequate to cite as justifications of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ and how could this doctrine overcome the critiques of guardianship.
Some advocates of guardianship hold that ordinary people lack the necessary qualifications for ruling. They seem to lack much understanding of their own basic needs, interests and good. Many of them are unable or unwilling to do whatever may be necessary to attain deep knowledge about their own needs and good as well as the appropriate means to achieve these needs and goods. In conclusion, people have no political competence to govern themselves. Their deficiency is partly in knowledge, partly in virtue i.e. strong tendencies to seek good ends; hence they are not qualified to govern. This approach undermines the fundamental ground of democracy and supports the idea that guardians who have sufficient political competence should govern people.
Obviously, the doctrine of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ does not rely on the political incompetence of people to justify the priority of the faqih’s authority. Neither in traditional proofs of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ nor in the rational ones, do Imami scholars stress on people’s deficiencies. Some rational proofs of ‘Wilayat al-faqih’ depend on the belief that it is not in the power of human beings to establish an ideal, ordered society with no aid of God’s revelation. Clearly, this premise expresses the deficiency of human beings as such, and not simply the imperfection of ordinary people, confirming the competence of a small minority as guardians. Indeed, this deficiency justifies man’s need of religion, and its important role in organizing social relationships.
The second foundation mentioned as a reason for guardianship consists of a specific conception of governing. For them, ruling people is an art. Therefore, rulers must be experts of a certain type, meaning experts in the art of governing. They as guardians would be specialists whose specialization would make them superior in the art of leadership, not only in comparison with ordinary people but also with other kinds of experts such as economists, physicists, engineers and so on.
Although most people are potentially capable of acquiring the qualifications needed for leadership, they lack the time to acquire them. A society needs many different types of experts. The need for acquiring different skills and then implementing them, makes it impossible for each and every person to spend the time they would need to gain the moral and instrumental competence for ruling. To suppose that a large number of people each have the capacity to acquire and use numerous specialized skills is not realistic. Consequently, in a well ordered society some persons should be rigorously trained and selected to function well as rulers (guardians). Because leadership is so crucial nothing could be of greater importance than the education of our rulers[97].
Apart from the fact that many scholars have misgivings about the actual existence of the art of governing, this argument exclusively supports the Platonic version of guardianship. There is no single art or science that can provide us with the moral and technical knowledge and abilities required for being an ideal leader. Many versions of guardianship, including ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’, do not look at guardians as specialists in the art of governing. Instead, they believe that the duty of governing should delegate to a few qualified persons, because of some certain qualifications and abilities that they have. Guardians have a advantage over others in matters of leadership, such as their in depth knowledge of ideological, great commitment to the ambitions of specific party, being vanguard and leader in revolution or possession the knowledge that is necessary for shaping particular social formation.
The unique reason that justifies (apart from traditional religious reasons) the ruling of the fuqaha as guardians, pertains to their knowledge about Shari’a which must be accompanied with personal virtues and moral competence. It is true that moral competence is not confined to a small minority and that many people have the capacity to gain moral competence and become just and pious. However, what distinguishes the just fuqaha and render them the unique group who has legitimate authority to rule over the believers is their expertise in Islamic jurisprudence. The justification of the guardianship of fuqaha is owed to the fundamental role of Islamic law in the lives of Muslims. Islam obliges Muslims to adopt Islamic laws and values in both their individual as well as public lives. Consequently, one who has the ability (as a jurisprudent) that is necessary for undertaking this task must be in charge of ruling the people. Therefore, the question of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ is not a question of having a specific art. It has roots in a religious belief that sees a crucial role for Shari’ah in Islamic society.
The distinction between the general good and personal interests could provide the advocates of guardianship the third reason for justification. The case of guardianship sometimes rest on assumption that the composition of the general good (general interest) and how the knowledge of what composes the general good may be acquired. If the general good were only composed of individual interests and if we were to believe that everyone could pursue his personal interests without guardians, then the guardianship model of state would be unnecessary and undesirable.
But if the general good and interest of society consists of something more than an aggregation of personal interests, then to achieve it will require more than this. To bring about the general good would then require an understanding of the ways in which the general good differs from a combination individual interests. If it is also true that most people are mainly concerned with their own individual interests instead of that of the general public, then the task of deciding on the general good should be entrusted to those especially trained to understand what the general good consists of. Obviously, that depends on what is meant by the general good[98].
Although the followers of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ do not fully accept this argument, however, a modified version of it would sufficiently justify this model of guardianship. Islam as a perfect religion aims for real human happiness, hence, its laws and teachings are necessarily established for the ultimate self-realization of the human being and for gaining true salvation. From this point of view both the good of the individual as well as the general public are harmonized with the contents of Islam. Concepts such as public interest should not be defined without considering of the crucial role played by Islam in both the public and private spheres. When one acknowledges this fact, which is especially true in a society where most people believe that Islam is the ultimate way to salvation, the following argument could be supposed as external justification for the doctrine of ‘Willayat al-Faqih’:
(1) General interest and public good are not merely a composition of individual interests and they must be determined through a higher source.
(2) Within an Islamic society the real public good and interest cannot be known while neglecting Islamic laws and values. It does not mean that other kinds of expertise play no role in the process of determining public good, rather, the key point is that all political and economic decisions, various legislations as well as government orders must take Islamic teachings (especially jurisprudence) seriously and harmonize themselves with the demands of Islam.
(3) eople are mostly concerned with their own individual interests so the task of deciding the public interest, at least in cases that are specifically dealt with by Islam should not be entrusted to the ups and downs of public opinion.
(4) Technocrats and those who are experts in the various sciences are often more concerned than average people with the good and interest of the public. However, as mentioned in the second premise, in an Islamic society technocrats as policymakers can not have a full understand of the public good, unless they are experts in Islamic thought.
Policymaking, legislation, organizing the system of rights and duties and other significant functions of government must be done under the supervision and authority of a well qualified faqih (or fuqaha) who is just, brave, honest, intelligent, knowledgeable about social and political issues, and an expert in Islamic ideology.
This external justification seems quite convincing within a specific context, that is, for those who pursue Islamic culture and support the establishment of an Islamic society. For those who do not believe in Islam, the premises of this justification (particularly the second and fourth) need further evidence.
Criticism of Guardianship
Advocates of democracy usually criticize guardianship and its justifications. We have to consider briefly a few of these criticisms to assess how the connection between the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and these critiques might be? In my view the three following criticisms are more significant than the others:
(i) Adversaries of guardianship insist that the keystone of this theory that tries to justify the deserts of guardians to rule based on their knowledge is disputable. The possession of this religious knowledge is not sufficient enough to prove that political power should be entrusted to a fagih to protect and promote public welfare and prosperity. How can we know that the guardian is not seeking his own interests rather than that of the general public? Is there any system of control over them to prevent hem from abusing his authority? In the guardianship model of state, since the people do not delegate authority to the guardian, they cannot legally or constitutionally withdraw political power from the guardian. The guardians are free of popular controls.
(ii) Unlike democracy that provides people with the opportunity to engage in governing themselves and to improve their moral-political experiences, the guardianship system of rule prevents an entire population from developing their social, political and moral capacities. This is essentially because only a few people (guardians) are engaging in governing. Therefore, only a few people have the opportunity to learn how to act as morally responsible human beings. Only guardians can exercise the freedom of participating in the process of making laws, while in democratic states the whole population enjoys that freedom. Even though in many democratic states, the cooperate and political elite are far more powerful than ordinary citizens, however, they cannot be compared to guardians. These elites are not despots and people can still play a role in the distribution of political power and in making political decisions.
(iii) Guardianship is based upon the idea that there is a set of truths, objective propositions and valid knowledge that can determine public good or true social interests. The second pillar of guardianship rests on the point that only those who have this knowledge[99] (what does public good consist of and by what means can we achieve it?) are exclusively competent to hold political authority. Some critics of guardianship criticize the first pillar of the argument. They emphasize that there is no such thing as rational, unquestionable, or objective knowledge. There are no determined truths as ‘science of ruling’ that can justify the authority of a few people as guardians. In addition, they believe advocates of guardianship face the problem of validation because they can not establish why their understanding of public good and social interests is objectively true. Robert Dahl writes:
In judging the validity of statements about the general good we can and should employ reason and experience. Nonetheless, no assertion that ‘the public good definitely consists of such and such’ can be shown to be ‘objectively true’ in the same sense that many statements in mathematics, logic, or the natural sciences are understood to be objectively true[100].
To clarify the relationship between these critiques and the Imami political doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih we have to keep in mind that these criticisms are targeting ‘pure guardianship’, a political theory that leaves no room for people in political affairs while entrusting complete political authority to non-elected minority (guardians). In the next chapter it will be explained that Wilayat al-Faqih is compatible with a specific version of democracy called ‘religious democracy’. In any case the mixture between the authority of a just faqih who represents both the authority of Islamic jurisprudence as well as the authority of the people, renders some of these criticisms essentially irrelevant to the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih. For example the second critique mentioned above is absolutely inapplicable to the guardianship of the faqih. Moreover, according to what has been discussed in the previous chapter about the meaning of absolute authority of a just faqih, the first criticism is also irrelevant, because the guardianship of a faqih is not beyond the control of a group of elected experts who supervise and control his usage of power and authority. In addition, it is the religious responsibility of all Muslims to be not neutral about the behavior of their governors and leaders.
In the previous pages it is clear that the guardianship of the faqih is not base on the assumption that leadership is a specific art or knowledge that consists of a set of truths and skills. Therefore, the final criticism cannot undermine this version of guardianship either. Almost all Shi’a scholars believe in rationalism, hence, the problem of validation is very important in their eyes. This is true not only with regards to fundamental Islamic beliefs, but also in other aspects of Islamic thought including political thought. They attempt to justify their system of beliefs through rational arguments, as well as through traditional evidences. As a result, Shi’a political thought is based upon a set of true, valid and objective doctrines about human nature, the philosophy of life, and morality. It consists of a set of philosophical-theological statements that produce an Islamic world ‘s view. Indeed, this theory of state like other political theories is rested upon a comprehensive philosophy and the justification of this political thought is due to the justification of its moral-philosophical foundations as well. However, we do not believe in ‘hard rationalism’, which demands that all religious statements and beliefs must be verified by decisive rational proofs, exactly as with mathematics. Obviously, religious statements and beliefs should be categorized according to their own appropriate methods of justification. Islam consists of objective truths and valid statements; however, one can not prove its validation by recourse to a unique methodology (rational proofs). Unlike the fundamental doctrines of Islam (usul al- Din) that can largely be validated and justified through rational arguments, the validation of Islamic law is, to a large extent, based upon trust in the commands of God, which in turn can be established by appealing to rational proof.
The key point is that the validity of this model of guardianship (Wilayat al-Faqih) does not acquire its approbation from the assumption that there is an objective art or science for ruling people or a specific knowledge used for understanding public good and finding the means for achieving them. Its verification is due to the validation of Islam’s moral, philosophical and theological foundations including the importance of Shari’ah for our ultimate happiness.
The external justification of Wilayat al-Faqih consists of two independent sides, the positive and the negative. Positive justification aims to justify the validation of this theory directly and through the emphasis on the necessity of the Islamic legal system and the implementation of its laws for the establishment of an ideal social and personal existence. However, the negative side refers to any efforts undertaken to prove the priority of this doctrine over its alternatives. Since the doctrine of democracy in general and the theory of liberal democracy in particular is the most important alternative theory facing guardianship, the external justification of our political theory would be insufficient if we fail to assess the relationship between the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih and democracy. The next chapter will attempt to make complete the external justification of this political doctrine by evaluating the nature of democracy and its possible connections to this version of guardianship.
There is another significant reason why we should discuss democracy. Some Muslim thinkers maintain that Islam fundamentally disagrees with democracy. Hence, in their eyes our interpretation of imami political thought that mixes the guardianship of the faqih with elements of democracy is totally wrong and is against the foundations of Islam.
Notes:
[84] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p. 40.
[85] Ibn Sina, Al-Shefa, The book of Al-Elahiyat, The 10th Article, Chapter 2, p. 487.
[86] Abdullah Javadi Amoli, Wilayat ul-Faqih, Qom: Esra Publication, 1378 AH, pp. 151-152.
[87] Hussain Borujerdi, Al-Badr al-Zaher fi Salat ul-Jom‘a wal-Mosafer, Qom, 1367AH, pp. 72-78.
[88] Muhammad Hassan Hor al-A’meli, Wasael al-Shi°a, Qom: Ahl ul-Bait Institution, 1412AH, Volume 27, p. 137.
[89] Al-Kafi, Volume 7, p.412.
[90] Sheikh al-Saduq, Ikmal al-Din, Volume 2, p.483.
[91] Al-Kafi, Volume 1, p. 184.
[92] Solaim ibn Qais Al-Helali, Kitab al-Solaim, Tehran: Dar al-Kotob al- Islamiya, p. 118.
[93] Barqi, Al-Mahasin, Volume 1, p. 93.
[94] Al-Urvat ul-Wosqa, The Chapter of Ijtihad wal-Taqlid, Question 68.
[95] Shaikh al-Ansari, Taqlid, Published by International Congress of Shaikh al-Ansari publications, p. 67.
[96]Jawahir al-Kalam, Volume 40, pp. 44-45.
[97] Democracy and its Critics, pp. 62-63.
[98] Democracy and its Critics, pp. 70-71.
[99] There is no agreement among advocates of guardianship about the nature of this knowledge therefore they disagree about the qualifications of this small minority of rulers (guardians). For instance, in the eyes of Plato this knowledge consists of a set of propositions about what is best for the community. This knowledge is based on rational certainty that ordinary people have no access to. Unlike true philosophers, ordinary people just have opinions (uncertainties) instead of knowledge (rational certainty). From an entirely different perspective, Marxist-Leninists maintain that this knowledge consists of the laws of historical development based on ‘historical materialism’ as a rigorous methodological approach rooted in the belief that the structure of society and human relations in all their forms are the product of material conditions and circumstances rather than of ideas, thought or consciousness. Consequently, for them the guardians are a few revolutionaries who know the laws and material conditions that rule over these historical developments.
[100] Democracy and its Critics, p. 71.
Ahmed Vaezy
Imam reza network
Islam and Democracy
Contemporary Islamic political thought has become deeply influenced by attempts at reconciling Islam and democracy. Muslim thinkers who deal with political debates cannot ignore the significance of the democratic system, as it is the prevailing theme of modern western political thought. Thus it is necessary for any alternative political system, whether it is religious or secular, to explore its position with regards to democratic government. In the past, prominent Islamic thinkers such as Imam Khomeini, Mirza Muhammad Hussain Nayini and al-Kawakibi maintained that a democratic Islamic form of government is a compatible and practical thesis, believing that a constitution could protect and guarantee both the essential Islamic as well as democratic aspects of government.
In contrast to this more optimistic approach, many fundamentalist thinkers argue that Islam and democracy are irreconcilably opposed, and that there exists a clear contradiction between Islamic and democratic principles. This opinion has emerged as a result of their perception of the source from which democracy came, the creed from which it emanated, the basis upon which it has been established as well as the ideas and systems of thought with which it is currently associated. However, opposition to religious democracy is not confined to fundamentalists; advocates of a secular state also believe that the concept of a democratic Islamic government is a paradoxical thesis, and they often refer to a selection of Islamic rulings and beliefs that they construe as antagonistic to the foundations and underlying values of the democratic system.
Other Muslim intellectuals maintain that any apparent incompatibility or conflict between the ideas of religion and democracy are caused by the misinterpretation of Islam. They maintain that there is no conflict between democracy and an understanding of religion, which is changing, rational and in harmony with accepted extra-religious criteria and values. They believe that by reinterpreting Islam and constantly reviewing and renewing its beliefs, the vision of a religious democracy would be completely feasible and indeed desirable.
Consequently the question of whether or not religious democracy is feasible has given rise to four major schools of thought amongst thinkers and Muslim political movements:
1. The implementation of Islamic laws (Shari’ah) and the establishment of an Islamic society based upon Islamic values is possible within a constitutionally Islamic and democratic political system. The participation of citizens in making political decisions can serve the socio- political aims of Islam and democracy merely acts as a system and method for the distribution of political power and a means by which citizens express their opinions.
2. There is an obvious conflict between the traditional juridical (fiqhi) based conception of Islam and democracy. The establishment of a religious democratic government is in need of a rethinking, reinterpretation and review of Islamic thought in order for it to become harmonious with contemporary global and philosophical foundations, values and implications of democracy. Therefore, the practicality of religious democracy rests upon the reformation of traditional religious knowledge.
3. Democracy is a system of disbelief (kufr) and is totally and completely irreconcilable with Islamic beliefs and principles. Commitment to Islam leaves no room for democracy.
4. The fourth approach arrives at the same conclusion as the third, that the idea of a democratic Islamic government is paradoxical. However, unlike advocates of the third approach, this group emphasizes the desirability and justification of democracy, and insists that religion cannot possibly satisfy the values and foundations that democracy requires.
These approaches shall be addressed in detail later in this Chapter, but first it is necessary to examine democracy, its various interpretations, its relationship to liberalism and some philosophical presuppositions that support this political doctrine. Many apprehensions surrounding the theory of religious democracy are caused by conceptional ambiguities concerning the description of democracy and its possible models. We must define what it is that democracy means, whether or not there is a unique and commonly agreed interpretation of democracy and what exactly distinguishes a democratic government from a non- democratic one. Without answering such questions it will be impossible to come to an objective and accurate conclusion regarding the issue of religious democracy.
What is Democracy?
The term democracy is derived from the Greek words ‘demos’ (people) and ‘kratia’ (rule), so democracy literally means ‘rule by the people’. In other words it is a political doctrine in which it is believed the people possess the capacity needed in order to govern and regulate society. This idea originally emerged towards the beginning of the fifth century B.C. in ancient Greece, primarily amongst the Athenians. The city-state of Athens referred to itself as a democracy (from 500 B.C to 330 B.C) because all citizens (excluding women, slaves and non-residents) could participate in political decisions. Abraham Lincoln’s famous definition of ‘Government for the people and by the people’[101]refers to this model of participatory democracy.
Throughout the long history of political thought, many different forms of democratic government have emerged and declined, they often came into being almost completely independently of one another, as Dahl writes:
It would be a mistake to assume that democracy was invented once and for all, as, for example, the steam engine was invented...democracy seems to have been invented more than once, and in more than one place. After all, if the conditions were favorable for the invention of democracy at one time and place, might not similar favorable conditions have existed elsewhere? I assume democracy can be independently invented and reinvented whenever the appropriate conditions exist[102].
Although the root meaning of the Greek term ‘demokratia’ is clear and straightforward (rule by the people), it is necessary to properly define what constitutes ‘demos’ (the people). Historically the criteria of who ought to be included in ‘demos’ to rule and participate in political decisions, as a citizen has been an ambiguous and contentious issue. In the most ancient models of democracy, ‘the people’ did not include all adults; women and slaves were not given the right to participate in the political system. And even today there are noticeable disagreements amongst modern interpretations of democracy about who should be included among the ‘demos’. For example, even though the principle of equality was firmly established in the American declaration of independence in 1776, the right for free men to vote on an equal basis was not granted until 1850. Black males were prevented from voting until the fifteenth constitutional amendment some twenty years later. And females, both free and enslaved, were not given the right to vote until the nineteenth constitutional amendment in 1920[103].
Democracy in the above mentioned forms, is an imaginary and inapplicable idea in large scale societies.
In general, both advocates and critics agree that ‘rule by the people’ - in the truest meaning of the people – never existed and is never likely to exist. It is impossible for any democratic regime to be fully democratic, as it will always fall short of the criteria that emanates from its self-evident meaning.
The virtues and advantages that are mentioned to justify democratic government undoubtedly require ‘participatory democracy’, which delegates decisions to citizens, so, in a single meeting or during an election, people are able to express their opinions. That is why the Greeks passionately supported ‘assembly democracy’. Obviously this system is inherently limited by practical considerations, in a small political unit such as a city, assembly democracy provides citizens with desirable opportunities for engaging in the process of governing themselves. This original conception of democracy, which was embodied in Greek city-states, is possibly the most appropriate to the true meaning of the term (excluding the fact that only a minority could vote). However modern democracies within nation- states exist on a much greater scale than before. Consequently, modern theories of democracy, despite their alleged efficiency when dealing with the problems of large- scale societies, effectively decrease the political participation of the people. In modern democratic theories ‘the people’ (demos) are replaced by ‘representatives’, so that a small proportion of the population are made responsible for looking after the affairs of the people, thus ‘rule by the people’ becomes ‘rule by representatives elected by a majority of the people’.
A significant cause for the confusion concerning the meaning of ‘democracy’ at present is due to the fact that it has developed over several thousand years and ultimately stems from a variety of sources. Our understanding of the term ‘democracy’ is not necessarily the same as an Athenian\'s understanding of the term. Greek, Roman, Medieval and Renaissance notions have intermingled with those of later centuries to produce a mosaic of theories and practices that are often deeply inconsistent[104].
If any attempt to apply the original meaning of democracy to the nation-state is impossibly absurd, and moreover if there is no commonly agreed definition of the democratic system amongst its advocates, it should be reasonable to concentrate on what at present are known as democratic states in order to recognize its major elements and what distinguishes them from a non-democratic state.
Even though, in theory, political philosophers and theorists have presented various models of democracy such as ‘elitism’, ‘participatory’, ‘pluralistic’ and ‘corporate’, in practice representative democracy is the prevailing norm among contemporary democratic systems. The major characteristics of modern democracy, according to Dahl are as follow:
Elected officials: control over government decisions concerning policy is constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens. Thus, modern, large-scale democratic governments are representative.
Free, fair and frequent elections: elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
Freedom of expression: citizens have a right to express themselves on political matters without danger of severe punishment; this includes criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socio-economic order and the prevailing ideology.
Access to alternative sources of information: citizens have a right to seek out alternative and independent sources of information from other citizens, experts, newspapers, magazines, books, etc.
Associational autonomy: citizens have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups in order to achieve their various rights.
Inclusive citizenship: No adult permanently residing in the country and subject to its laws can be denied the rights that are necessary for the five political institutions listed above[105].
These help explain the political reality of democracy as a political system in which people participate, and as a method and process for making collective political decisions. The key point is that democracy requires \'majority rule\', meaning that majority support should not only be necessary, but also sufficient for enacting laws. Some contemporary writers even go so far as to argue that majority rule is a definition, not a requirement of democracy[106]. Also numerous advocates of democracy do not confine the role of the people to the mere distribution of political power, or participation in the process of collective political decisions (via their representatives), rather, they have a right to control governors. Mayo writes:
In short, a political system is democratic to the extent that the decision makers are under effective popular control[107].
In summary, democracy is a political system, which acknowledges the right of the people to participate in political decisions, either directly or indirectly through elected representatives, to distribute and regulate the political power under the rule of a majority. Political prerequisites such as free, fair and frequent elections, freedom of expression, inclusive citizenship and so on, are necessary in order to insure the soundness of the process.
Democracy and Liberalism
Most contemporary democracies are liberal democracies: a combination of the democratic political system, and the liberal political ideology, that places emphasis upon specific rights and values such as private possession, negative freedom, individualism and toleration. Therefore, liberal democracies embody two distinct features; the first of these is the liberal conception of a limited government; this is that the individual should enjoy a degree of protection from arbitrary action of government officials. This limitation of government - which is often referred to as the theory of limited democracy – is rooted in the belief that fundamental rights and values supported by liberalism possess a moral standing and philosophical grounds, that are altogether independent of democracy and the democratic process. These rights and values serve as a limitation or restriction on what can be enacted by means of the political system. Citizens are entitled to exercise certain rights and should not be threatened by the powers of state and governmental processes. Liberals believe in protecting these rights from infringement, even though they may be by democratic means.
This is why liberal attitudes towards democracy have historically been distinctly ambivalent. In the nineteenth century, liberals often perceived democracy as something threatening or dangerous. The central concern for liberals has always been that democracy could evolve to become the enemy of individual liberty and pluralism. The rule of the majority is the \'democratic solution\' to conflicts that people have regarding their interests and opinions. This means that the will of the greatest number of people should prevail over that of the minority. In other words, democracy comes down to the rule of 51 percent, a prospect that Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) famously described as ‘the tyranny of the majority’. Individual liberty and minority rights can thus potentially be crushed in the name of the people[108].
Liberals have expressed particular reservation concerning democracy, and have crafted a network of checks and balances in order to reconcile the advantages of democracy and fundamental liberal rights and values. This combination creates a model of democracy that, as Heywood says, has three central features:
First, liberal democracy is an indirect and representative form of democracy. Political office is gained through success in regular elections, conducted on the basis of formal political equality – ‘one person, one vote; one vote, one value’. Second, it is based upon competition and electoral choice. This is ensured by political pluralism, a tolerance of a wide range of contending beliefs, conflicting social philosophies and rival political movements and parties. Third, liberal democracy is characterized by a clear distinction between the state and civil society. This is maintained both by internal and external checks on government power and the existence of autonomous groups and interests, and by the market or capitalist organization of economic life[109].
As far as our discussion – the relationship between Islam and democracy – is concerned, it is fundamental to distinguish between democracy just as a method to form a political system or as a process for making collective decisions opposed and liberal democracy as one of the possible models of democracy consisting of an ideological framework of beliefs and values. Many opponents of religious democracy have failed to distinguish between democracy as a method and liberal democracy, which in principal represents a particular political philosophy and doctrines with its own beliefs regarding human nature, human rights, ends and moral values.
Benefits of Democracy
There are many advantages that make democracy more desirable than any other feasible alternative political system. Even though to attain all of the potential benefits is beyond the capacity of current democracies, these ideal consequences cannot be overlooked. When properly implemented and regulated, the democratic political system should in theory produce a series of beneficial objectives.
Avoiding tyranny: Democracy reduces the likelihood of a tyrannical or autocratic government obtaining power. However, this does not mean that democracy can totally guarantee the prevention of oppressive or dictatorial rule, or that it is entirely capable of preventing injustice in society. For example, the Nazi party in Germany (1933-1945) obtained power through the manipulation of the democratic and free-electoral systems. Advocates of democracy argue, though, that in the long-term a democratic process is less likely to do harm to the interests of the citizens than a non- democratic one.
Protecting essential rights: Democracy guarantees its citizens a number of fundamental rights that undemocratic systems do not grant. These political rights are all necessary elements of democratic political institutions.
Human development: It is claimed that democracy fosters human development more fully than any practical alternative. This claim is controversial and very difficult to substantiate. The only way to test this assertion is by measuring human development in democratic and non- democratic societies.
Political equality: Only a democratic government can guarantee a high degree of political equality amongst citizens.
Protecting essential personal interests: Democracy assists people in protecting their own fundamental interests. It allows people to shape their life in accordance with their own goals, preferences, values and beliefs[110].
Perhaps the most common justification given for democracy is that it is essential for the protection of the general interests of the persons who are subject to a democratic state.
However, it is worth mentioning that this attempt to justify democracy has been attacked by some democratic theorists. For example, John Plamenatz argues that we cannot compare governments and, as a reasonable empirical judgment, conclude that “the policies of one have in general done more than those of the other to enable their subjects to maximize the satisfaction of their wants”. This is particularly true if the governments are not of the same type and the values and beliefs of the people concerned differ greatly. Moreover people do not and should not prefer democracy to its alternatives because they believe it is better at maximizing the satisfaction of their desires. They should instead favor it because it provides people with certain rights and opportunities or reject it because it does not[111].
Foundations of Democracy
It is widely believed that political theories have philosophical or metaphysical foundations that justify every political ethos or system amongst its alternatives. Referring to these foundations for the justification of political thought is considered important because they represent the basis from which the system has emanated. It is insufficient merely to examine publicly admitted elements and values that have emanated from this basis, as these have ultimately grown around a political doctrine and logically cannot prove the validity of that political theory. The prevalent approach maintains that the question of justification is also a question of truth. A valid and justified political system must be consistent with human nature, human common goods and ends and other related moral-philosophical truths.
This methodof political theorizing (also known as foundationalism) is omnipresent in the history of political thought, especially so during the age of enlightenment, when thinkers such as John Locke and Emmanuel Kant presented rational foundations as basic elements of contemporary western political culture. Political foundationalism presupposes that there is a correct answer to every fundamental political question, and through the appropriate method of thinking, political truths are made available.
Recently, some advocates of liberal democracy, in contrast to traditional supporters of democratic governments, have inclined to justify their political system without reference to a particular interpretation of human nature or any comprehensive moral, religious or philosophical doctrine as a basis. John Rawls (1921-2002) and Richard Rorty, the contemporary American philosopher, are to prominent figures of this modern anti-foundationalism movement in political thought. They present a ‘political’ democratic liberalism instead of a ‘philosophical’ one. Their justification for this model of political thought is not rooted in any specific philosophical or moral doctrine. John Rawls writes:
Political liberalism, then, aims for a political conception of justice as a freestanding view. It offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine beyond what is implied by the political conception itself[112].
This attitude, its influence and its relevance to our main debate (Islam and democracy), will be assessed later in the Chapter. It is now necessary to briefly refer to some philosophical foundations mentioned by some thinkers to justify democracy as the most desirable political system.
Intrinsic Equality
The belief that all humanity is made intrinsically equal by man’s own inherent nature and instincts is a concept supported by the great religions of Islam, Christianity and Judaism. For some, however, the idea of inherent equality provides a justification for democracy because it indicates that all human beings are of equal intrinsic worth and no person is naturally superior to another. Locke says:
Though I have said above...that all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue may give men a just precedence: excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level...and yet all this consists with equality, which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion over one another, which was the equality I there spoke of, as proper to the business in hand, being that equal right that every man hath, to his nature freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man[113].
The politically implicit meaning of the last sentence of this quotation is that the good or interests of each person must be given equal consideration, hence, people have a right to express their will and no one has the right to make a decision on behalf of them except with their permission. For advocates of democracy who refer to the intrinsic equality, every guardianship model of government, which entrusts the authority to a few people (guardians) instead of people themselves, must therefore be incompatible with the idea of the intrinsic equality of people. Locke ascribed the intrinsic quality to ‘men’ instead of ‘the people’ because in his own era the theory that men alone qualify as ‘active citizens’ was common (As indicated earlier, it was not until the twentieth century that women gained the right to vote).
It is also worth mentioning that Kant too firmly supported political freedom and according to his view, the legislative authority should be placed in the hands of a representative assembly, whose members are elected by a majority of voters in each district. However, Kant\'s franchise is restrictive. He assumes that it should extend only to adult males who own property and that these persons alone qualify as ‘active citizens’. Others are merely ‘passive citizens’ and while they must be assured the same civil rights and legal equality as everyone else, they should not be allowed to vote[114].
If we were to overlook this restriction and ascribe the intrinsic equality to all human beings (men and women), it could not justify democracy as the best desirable political system, as essentially there is no necessary connection between admitting intrinsic equality and the necessity of a democratic state. Robert Dahl states that intrinsic equality is quite compatible with guardianship as well. He writes:
As I have already said, nothing in the assumption of intrinsic equality implies that Able, Baker and Carr are the best judges of their own good or interests, suppose it were true that a few people like Eccles not only understood much better than the others what constitutes their individual and common good, and how best to bring it about, but could be fully trusted to do so. Then it would be perfectly consistent with the idea of intrinsic equality to conclude that these persons of superior knowledge and virtue, like Eccles, should rule over all the others. Even more: if the good of each person is entitled to equal consideration, and if a superior group of guardians could best ensure equal consideration, then it follows that guardianship would definitely be desirable and democracy just as definitely would be undesirable[115].
Priority of the Will of the Majority over Rightness
A rare conception of democracy supposes that the democratic system and the rule of the majority can guarantee correct decisions and right answers to political needs. People who individually are the best judge for their private, personal affairs also are the best judge in public affairs (policy decisions).
The political judgments of the majority reflect what is best and right for the community. According to this theory, there is no need for a few experts (guardians) with specific moral and scientific-philosophical knowledge to perform correct policy decisions, because the performance of the experts is no better than the people\'s choices. The choice of the majority would be based upon certainty and would achieve a correct result.
However, the practical and realistic approach to democracy, supported by its advocates, does not accept that the rule of the majority is a guarantee for right decisions. It admits that people have a right to decide, however it also accepts that voters and their representatives may not always make the correct decisions. The validity of the democratic political system is not owed to the knowledge that the will of the people (majority) reflects the correct outcomes and true social good. The political legitimacy of democracy, instead, rests upon the will and consent of the people, not upon their reason or rightness. This means that although there is no rational- philosophical certainty that democratic political decisions are right, it is simply sufficient that these decisions are outcomes of the will of the people and their exercising of their practical rights and freedoms. Michael Walzer writes:
Democracy rests, as I have already suggested, on an argument concerning freedom and political obligation. Hence it is not only the case that the people have a procedural right to make the laws. On the democratic view, it is right that they make the laws – even if they make them wrongly[116].
Since the legitimacy of the democratic system rests on people’s rights instead of their valid knowledge, there is no reason to suppose firstly that the power of the people must be limited by the rightness of what they decide, and secondly that a few experts ought to be empowered to review what the people do and step in when they move beyond those limits and make incorrect decisions. The presupposition of such a view is that there is a small group of people, in every society, that can recognize the truth better than society as a whole can, hence they must have a right to intervene. Democracy in principle absolutely disagrees with this procedure, for the people’s rule does not rest upon their knowledge of truth. If we admit that finding objective knowledge, true answers, and right decisions is possible and philosophers are those who can be presumed to attain the truth, then the tension between philosophy and democracy is inevitable because the democratic system fails to reconcile between the rule of majority and the authority of truth (philosophy). Walzer says:
Nor can the philosophical instrument be a majority amongst the people, for majorities in any genuine democracy are temporary, shifting and unstable. Truth is one, but the people have many opinions, truth is eternal, but the people continually change their minds. Here in its simplest form is the tension between philosophy and democracy. The people\'s claim to rule does not rest upon their knowledge of truth...the claim is most persuasively put, it seems to me, not in terms of what the people know, but in terms of what they are. They are the subjects of the law, and if the law is to bind them as free men and women, they must also be its makers[117].
Many advocates of the democratic system as the best desirable political system strive to justify the detachment between democracy and the issue of truth by stating misgivings about the possibility of attaining objective knowledge about public good and moral truths. For instance, Robert Dahl emphasizes that not only is the justification for democracy independent of any specific answer to the epistemological ontological questions about the nature of moral judgments, but also democracies should have misgivings about such claims. For him, we are entitled, indeed obliged, to look with the greatest suspicion on any claim that another possesses objective knowledge of the good of the self that is definitely superior to the knowledge possessed by the self[118].
General Freedom
Democracy, not only as an ideal, but in actual practice prerequires certain rights and liberties. A truly democratic government could only be established within a political culture that profoundly supports these rights and freedoms. That is why advocates of democracy always stress its relationship to freedom and view democracy as the best political system that maximizes and protects general freedoms such as freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of religion. Accordingly some liberties are preconditions for the emergence of a democratic state, whereas others (such as the freedom of self determination) are seen as results of such a state. Thus one can conclude that democracy is desirable because freedom in general and freedom of self-determination in particular is desirable.
In other words, to govern oneself, to obey laws that one has chosen for oneself, and to be able to determine ones destiny is a desirable state of affairs. On the other hand, however, human beings cannot exist in isolation from society, and it is essential for them to live in association with others and to live in association with others naturally requires that they must sometimes obey collective decisions that are binding upon all members of the association. Democracy maximizes the potential for self-determination amongst society because its members still govern themselves. Dahl claims that this justification for democracy has been endorsed by all those, from Locke onwards, who have believed that governments ought to be based upon the consent of the governed[119]
In a similar manner, democracy is also justified by the assumption that this political system maximizes ‘moral autonomy’. A morally autonomous person is one who defines his own moral principals. Dahl states a deeper reason for valuing self-determination; that the freedom to govern oneself is in fact an expression of the value of moral autonomy, but he neglects to discuss the arguments for why moral autonomy should be respected[120].
Dahl believes that the cornerstone of democratic beliefs is the presumption of personal autonomy, namely the assumption that no person is, in general, more likely than yourself to be a better judge of your own good and interests, or to act in order to bring them about. Consequently you should have the right to judge whether a policy is, or is not, in your best interest. On this assumption, then, no one else is more qualified than you to judge whether the results are in your interest[121]
It is quite clear that this justification, if any, merely supports the assembly model of democracy, which is appropriate for a small-scale society in which people have an opportunity to share directly in the process of making political decisions, whereas most present day democracies are representative. In the representative model of democracy, the choice of people about their goods and interests is confined to electing representatives. Dahl in his later book (On Democracy) refers to this dark side of representative democracy:
The dark side is this: under a representative government, citizens often delegate enormous discretionary authority over decisions of extraordinary importance. They delegate authority not only to their elected representatives, but, by an even more indirect and circuitous route, they delegate authority to administrators, bureaucrats, civil servants, judges and at a still further remove to international organizations...popular participation and control are not always robust, and the political and bureaucratic elites possess great discretion[122].
Even though the roots of democracy mentioned by advocates who believe in foundationalism are not restricted to what has been discussed above, these four principals are viewed as more significant than the others. In comparison with the second approach i.e. the political or pragmatic defense of the democratic state, which does not rest on any specific foundation or doctrine to justify this political system, foundationalism is significant because with a comparative discussion one can make judgment and recognize how compatible Islam and the foundations of democracy might be. Before further debate about these foundations, it would be appropriate to explore the modern approach to liberal democracy (anti-foundationalism). As indicated previously, John Rawls, one of the most influential political philosophers of the twenty century, in his latest works insists that we should present a political conception of liberal democracy – liberal justice – instead of the comprehensive conception that rests upon specific moral and philosophical doctrines. For him this new political liberalism is ‘free standing’ with no reference to any particular comprehensive doctrine or specific moral-philosophical foundation. He writes:
While we want a political conception to have a justification by reference to one or more comprehensive doctrines, it is neither presented as, nor derived from, such a doctrine applied to the basic structure of society…but as a distinguishing feature of a political conception is that it is presented as free standing and expounded apart from, or without reference to any such wider background[123].
By emphasis on a freestanding view of liberal democracy – a well ordered, just, democratic society, which does not rest on particular doctrines – he hopes that this conception can attain an overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The political conception of liberal democracy with its freestanding view supplies appropriate circumstances to be endorsed by citizens who belong to various comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines. He says:
The problem, then, is how to frame a conception of justice for a constitutional regime such that those who support, or who might be brought to support that kind of regime might also endorse the political conception provided it did not conflict to sharply with their comprehensive views. This leads to the idea of a political conception of justice as a freestanding view starting from the fundamental ideas of a democratic society and presupposing no particular wider doctrine, so that it can be supported by a reasonable and enduring, overlapping consensus[124].
Rawls’ starting point is the ideas and values that are latent in the public political culture of contemporary western liberal democracies. His political conception of a well-ordered democratic society based on the principles of justice, is formed upon western culture without any attempt to justify these ideas and values. Rawls writes:
In order to state what I have called political liberalism, I have started with a number of familiar and basic ideas implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society. These have been worked up into a family of conceptions in terms of which political liberalism can be formulated on understood[125].
Richard Rorty, a famous American philosopher, maintains that Rawls does not attempt to justify democratic institutions through philosophical foundations. Rorty writes:
Rawls is not attempting a transcendental deduction of American liberalism or supplying philosophical foundations for democratic institutions, but simply trying to systematize the principals and intuitions typical of American liberals[126].
For Rorty, the sources latent in the public political culture of liberal democracies seem to be all that is available, and so must be all that is required to justify the liberal democracy political system. Rorty says:
It is not evident that [liberal democratic institutions] are to be measured by anything more specific than the moral intuitions of the particular historical community that has created those institutions. The idea that moral and political controversies should always be ‘brought back to first principals’ is reasonable if it means merely that we should seek common ground in the hope of attaining agreement. But it is misleading if it is taken as the claim that some particular interlocutor has already discerned that order[127].
For many thinkers it is obvious, that this method of justifying a political system, which consists of merely invoking the basic elements of a public political culture, because these cultural elements and values grow and thrive around that political system, cannot logically support this argument. This anti-foundationalist approach to the contemporary democratic system comes to the conclusion that advocates of liberal democracies are free to ignore critics whose criticisms question the moral intuitions of western liberal democracies. Rorty, in principle, disagrees with any attempt to provide rational foundations for systems of values and concepts[128].
Obviously this form of justifying a democratic state does not provide an opportunity for comparative critical discussion between Islam and democracy. This anti-foundationalist approach as a first step and starting point wants us to completely admit all basic values of western liberal democratic culture while allowing no room for criticism or philosophical discussion concerning these values and foundations. As Rorty states “Rawls puts the democratic politics first and philosophy second.”[129]
Limited Democracy versus Pure Democracy
Pure democracy or unlimited democracy is a political system in which all political questions are settled directly, without any restrictions, by the majority vote of citizens. Early liberals were concerned about pure democracy for its potential harms, for instance Kant maintained that pure democracy that relies upon the majority vote in an assembly, without any constitutional restrictions, subjects the individual to the whims of the masses, as it contains no constitutional safeguards against the tyranny of the majority and, therefore, it cannot protect personal rights. Justice demands that a people be given the right to make its own laws, but the right must be constrained by constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. In Kant’s view, political freedom embodied in voting and democratic processes, alone does not ensure civil freedom. The majority may fail to respect the rights of the minority[130].
Conversely the idea of a limited democracy is based on the doctrine that there are many fundamental rights – including political rights – that possess a moral standing and a philosophical ontological basis that is independent of democracy and the democratic process. Since the validity and foundational justification of these rights does not depend on majority rule or the democratic process, they can serve as limits on what can be done by means of the democratic process. Citizens are entitled to exercise these rights, against the democratic process if need be, to preserve fundamental political rights and liberties and in order to protect themselves from infringement even by means of the democratic process itself[131].
The above-mentioned justification for limited democracy should not be restricted to fundamental rights; rather, it also embraces moral and religious values. According to this justification, whatever possesses a moral or philosophical standing – a reliable and valid foundation – independent of democracy and the democratic process, should be protected from possible democratic harms. Consequently the limits of democracy could be constitutional, moral or even religious. Theoretically, the limits of this type of democracy depend on what is crucial and most fundamental for citizens who choose democracy as their desirable political system.
For example, in the United States, since 1803 the Supreme Court, consisting of nine judges, has been assigned to declare whether legislation is ‘constitutional’ or not. Indeed they have the authority to review what the people and the people’s representatives enact via the democratic process. Of course, the constitutional role of the Supreme Court judges extends no further than the enforcement of a written constitution that is itself based on democratic consent and is subject to amendments through the democratic process. The tension between judicial review and democracy occurs within the framework of the constitution. Even when the judges act in ways that go beyond upholding the textual integrity of the constitution, they generally claim no special understanding of truth and rightness but refer instead to historical precedents, long-established legal principals or common values. Nevertheless, the place they hold and the power they wield make it possible for them to impose philosophical constraints on democratic choice[132].
Having referred to these primary points concerning democracy, it is now time to address the central purpose of this Chapter; that is the possibility of a religious (Islamic) democracy.
What is the Conception of a ‘Religious Democracy’?
It goes without saying that ‘pure democracy’, which delegates all dimensions of public affairs including legislation to majority rule without limitation, is absolutely incompatible with Islam. Essentially every school of thought, ideology and religion that follows a set of beliefs, values or rules independent of the will and desire of people cannot approve unlimited democracy. These values and rules must be protected and this cannot be insured by the will of the majority, as majorities in any form of democracy are shifting and unstable. Even political ideologies such as Liberalism and Socialism are in need of a constitution to control a purely democratic process and to protect their fundamental values and beliefs from possible harm from majority rule. On the other hand, democracy and the democratic process do not provide us with a comprehensive ideology, way of life or any substantial values. Democracy is but a method among other alternative methods for overcoming difficulties in decision making in an association or society.
The philosophical foundations mentioned to justify the democratic system, fail to uphold it as a reliable means to attain truth and righteous decisions. Majority rule is too weak to be presented as an alternative to comprehensive religious, moral and philosophical doctrines. In fact what gave democracy superiority over other alternative systems is far removed from any philosophical or ideological basis; instead the democratic system is made desirable in comparison to other political systems because of its practicality.
Democracy as a method does not contain fixed, unalterable or absolute moral and philosophical ideas and values. However, in order for a political regime to be democratic, it must meet some criteria. A democratic political system should provide the opportunity for the people to participate, at least in some significant political decisions, to express their ideas, orientations and needs, to distribute political power through free elections and be able to regulate and bring to account the governors. These political rights and duties of the people in a democratic regime could be dealt with within a fixed framework consisting of specific rights and values. In current limited democracies these frameworks are embodied in constitutions, and constitutions in turn are influenced by values and beliefs that people of each country respect and support. Muslim advocates of democracy cannot accept ‘pure democracy’ as Abu al-Ala Mawdudi says:
Islam is not democracy: for democracy is the name given to that particular form of government in which sovereignty ultimately rests with the people, in which legislation depends both in its form and content on the force and direction of public opinion and laws are modified and altered, to correspond to changes in that opinion[133].
Therefore the key issue concerning religious democracy is whether Islam has the capacity to draw an appropriate framework for a democratic government that meets the above-mentioned criteria. As I have indicated in the earlier pages of this Chapter, many Islamic thinkers believe that Islam has delegated significant political as well as social roles and duties to Muslims. In Islam, no conflict exists between the supreme authority of religion – the definite and unquestionable status of divine laws and Islamic values – and the political status of people in an ideal Islamic state. As there are limitations for the will and desire of the people, they have authority within the framework of Islamic rules and values. Hence, a majority of the people or their representatives have no power to legislate or make judgments that contradict Islam. At the same time the governors in an Islamic state must respect the rights, will, and authority of the people. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran during a meeting with the representative of Pope VI said:
I do not want to impose (my will) on my people, and Islam does not permit us to establish a dictatorship. We follow our nation’s votes and act according to their views. We have no right, God has not conferred such a right to us, and the Prophet (pbuh) never permitted us to impose our ideas upon Muslims[134].
Smoothing the Path to Religious Democracy
The advocates of Islamic democracy usually refer to the shura (consultation) as the most important Islamic teaching that supports and justifies the authority of people in an Islamic government. Rashid al-Ghannouchi (Tunisia, born 1941) writes:
The Islamic government is one in which:
1- Supreme legislative authority is for the Shari’ah, which is the revealed law of Islam, which transcends all laws. Within this context, it is responsibility of scholars to deduce detailed laws and regulations to be used as guidelines by judges. The head of the Islamic state is the leader of the executive body entrusted with the responsibility of implementing such laws and regulations.
2- Political power belongs to the community (ummah), which should adopt a form of ‘shura’ which is a system of mandatory consultation[135].
Thinkers like Sadek Sulaiman (Oman, born 1933) maintain that shura in Islam includes basic elements of democracy. He says:
As a concept and as a principle, shura in Islam does not differ from democracy. Both shura and democracy arise from the central consideration that collective deliberation is more likely to lead to a fair and sound result for the social good than individual preference[136].
The Holy Qur’an explicitly proposes and encourages that public affairs and the governance of the ummah should be based upon shura:
And those who respond to their Lord and keep up prayer, and their rule is to take counsel amongst themselves. (Chapter 42, Verse 38)
And ask pardon for them, and take counsel with them in the affair. (Chapter 3, Verse 159)
The second verse orders the Prophet (pbuh), who receives revelation and enjoys infallible knowledge, to take counsel with believers in management of public affairs. This command shows the fundamental significance of the participation of Muslims in social and political affairs. It is somewhat an exaggeration to suppose that the shura is the functional equivalent of western parliamentary democracy because there are some controversies amongst scholars about the political status of shura. For instance, those who believe in the theory of Caliphate, emphasize that members of the council only have a duty to express their opinion with no right to make political decisions. Accordingly if the Caliph refers to the assembly to take their opinion regarding rulings, which he wants to adopt, their opinion is not binding on him, even if it is a consensus of majority opinion.
What makes shura one of the basic elements of Islamic democracy, it seems, is the fact that shura refers to one of the significant essentials of democracy. Democracy in its long history has had evolutions and alterations, but matters such as public participation, the rule of law and the responsibility and accountability of governors can be recognized as essential to democracy. In conclusion, the assumption that the Islamic political system could be a democratic one, merely implies that Islamic teachings endorse and agree with the essentials of democracy. From this point of view, there is no doubt that the verses of the Holy Qur’an concerning shura along with some transmissions from the prophet and Imams emphasize on the necessity of public participation in political and social affairs. But the question concerning the political role of consultation (shura) in the process of making decisions still remains. Is consultation merely a religious duty of the ruler of the Islamic state, or is he bound by the decisions of those consulted?
The last verse of Surah Aale-Imran verifies the view that shura is not binding upon the ruler, for the Almighty God delegates the final decision, after consultation, to the Prophet (pbuh):
And take counsel with them in the affair, so when you have decided then place your trust in Allah. (Chapter 3, Verse 159)
However, the practice of the Holy Prophet, according to some traditions, testifies that he had implemented and respected the opinion of the believers even when it was against his own views. It is recorded that the Prophet not only consulted with his experienced or close companions, but sometimes he held open meetings in which all Muslims were invited. The consultation that took place about the battle of Badr and Uhud was one such example. In the case of Uhud he gave precedent to the opinion of the majority of Muslims over his own concerning the location of the battlefield and decided to fight outside the city of Madina. He also consulted the people concerning the treatment of prisoners of war following the battles of Badr and al- Khandaq[137].
Clearly, however, the Prophet did not consult the Muslims concerning religious affairs or divine matters. His consultations were restricted to war, peace and ordinary public affairs that were not determined by revelation and were not amongst the situations in which divine order determined must be done. For example, with regard to the treaty of al-Hudaybiyah the Prophet (pbuh) did not submit to the opinion of the majority of his companions who were in disagreement with the covenant, it was not in fact a consultation but a series of complaints made to the messenger regarding the terms of the peace. He rejected their suggestions to break his promises and continued to respect the agreement, which he had made because it was a command of Allah (swt). He told them: “Verily I am the servant of Allah and his messenger. I shall never disobey his order.”
In short, even though the shura in its historical function within the Islamic world does not totally overlap with the modern concept of democracy and the political status of parliament in contemporary representative democracies, it would be appropriate for shaping a limited democratic model for an Islamic state. The Qur’anic emphasis on the status of shura as an essential aspect of the Islamic political system – according to those who interpret the word for amr in both of the two verses relating to shura, as referring to governmental affairs – makes way for defining a determined systematic role for the people’s representatives (members of the shura) within the body of the Islamic state. The above- mentioned verses are silent about how the form and mechanism of shura in an Islamic political system might be, consequently the constitutional approach inclines to determine and stabilize the political status of shura (people’s authority) under the supreme authority of Islam does not confront any religious problem.
The second element, however, often mentioned by advocates of religious democracy as an appropriate approach to an Islamic democratic state is Bay’ah. In the first Chapter, the meaning of ‘Bay’ah’ has already been discussed. Here, the aim is to examine its legal nature, for it is supposed that its political function is the same as the function of an election in democratic systems. It should be noted that Bay’ah in the sense of adherence to a religion (as occurred between the Prophet and his supporters from Madina before Hijrah) or recognition of a pre-established authority by other means (such as the testamentary designation, such as the Bay’ah of people to the second caliph Umar) is irrelevant to our debate. Bay’ah as a means and method of designating a person as a ruler (caliph) among other legitimate methods is held to be the same as democratic election in its legal nature. This political view exclusively belongs to Sunni jurists, because Shi’a political thought, except that of the Zaydis, maintains that the Imamah is acquired by election within the Alid family. The Bay’ah has never been able to play this role, for the Shi’a recognize only one method of designating the Imam. He is appointed through the testament (nass) of one in the legitimate line of descent[138].
This sense of Bay’ah is a supposed contractual agreement between those who elect and he who has been designated as the ruler. As far as democracy is concerned, for at least two reasons, Bay’ah is not simply and solely a democratic election. Firstly, Bay’ah implies binding obedience to the ruler, and since it is a contractual agreement, like commercial agreements such as bao (to sell), the obedience of the elected ruler as a religious duty, would be obligatory. Secondly, this obligatory obedience is life long, whereas the democratic process of appointing a person as ruler is merely temporal with no religious implications.
One of the most important characteristics of a democratic government is its accountability to its people. A democratic state must be accountable and its citizens must have the right to criticize its policies and functions. Advocates of religious democracy maintain that al-amr bi\'l-maruf wal nahy\'an al- munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil) is one of the most significant Islamic duties placed upon Muslims and it should render the Islamic state accountable. Many Qur’anic verses emphasize on this fundamental injunction, which if Muslims take seriously would produce a healthy and healthy society that is far removed from tyranny, injustice and dictatorship. Almighty God says in the Holy Qur’an:
And from amongst you there should be a party who invite to good and enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong, and these it is that shall be successful. (Chapter 3, Verse 104)
And (as for) the believing men and believing women, they are guardians of each other, they enjoin good and forbid evil. (Chapter 9, Verse 71)
It is an Islamic duty, incumbent upon all Muslims, to concern themselves with the health and well being of society, to oppose injustice and immorality, and to scrutinize the actions of those who undertake governmental affairs. There exists a mutual responsibility between the rulers and those whom they rule to implement and uphold the Islamic Shari’ah and this provides a clear framework and basis upon which citizens may question the actions and policies of their governors with regards to their socio-religious duties. As the most-noble Messenger (pbuh) in a famous tradition says:
Every one of you is a shepherd (of the community), and all are responsible for their dependants and herd[139].
In order to fulfil this obligation (to monitor governmental functions) there is a requirement for certain conditions to be met, such as the freedom of speech and to criticize as well as access to accurate and objective information. Otherwise, the active participation of people in public-religious duties such as providing constructive feedback and criticisms toward the governors and standing for justice and truth would be impossible. It is obvious that Islam does not concur with individual freedom to the extent prevalent in western culture. However, the preconditions of an Islamic and democratic government that respects the rights of the people and their contribution in socio-political affairs, are outlined by the Qur’an and Sunnah (valid traditions). For example the Qur\'an encourages believers to listen to different opinions and to select the best of them:
Therefore give good news to my servant. Those who listen to the word, then follow the best of it; those are whom Allah has guided, and those it is who are men of understanding. (Chapter 39, Verses 17-18)
There are many narrations in historical and religious texts documenting dialogue and debate that occurred between Shi’a Imams and non-Muslim intellectuals in which disbelievers (even atheists) were able to express their ideological views so long as they were voiced as academic opinions and kept within the circles of scholarly debate, rather than attempting to propagate them. In a true Islamic state, it is the right granted to the people that they be kept aware of affairs in society and government.
Imam Ali (pbuh) once explained the mutual rights and duties that exist between an Imam (leader) and the people:
It is your right that I must not hide any secret, except that of war, from you. And that I should not take over matters (without your consultation or awareness) other than those concerning divine laws (hukm)[140].
Aside from the obvious distinction between religious democracy and western liberal democracy, the former holds the same essential advantages as any democratic government. These include the participation of citizens, the distribution of political power by election, political accountability of governors, constitutionalism and political transparency as well as mutual responsibility between the rulers and the ruled. Religious democracy however, is far more desirable for Muslims than any feasible alternative because of the supreme role of the Shari’ah in providing a basis for, and shaping the growth of, the contents of this political system. It is also desired because of the qualities and moral-religious commitments that the governor must have as the leader of Muslim society.
For instance, constitutionalism and accountability in secular, western democracies as Nathan Brown says, has expressed itself most frequently in human authored constitutional texts and rights, whereas religious constitutionalism is defined under the authority of the Shari’ah. Therefore, the religious government is not only accountable with regard to people\'s rights and needs, but also with regard to the Shari’ah and divine laws. He writes:
Many Muslims have come to believe that the crisis of political accountability can be solved by insisting that Muslim governments rule within the bounds fixed by the Islamic Shari’ah. In essence, this demand renders the Islamic Shari’ah as a kind of constitution. Governments may not cross the boundaries firmly established by the Islamic Shari’ah; rulers are held accountable to God\'s law[141].
In summary, although governments throughout history have often ignored the political teachings of Islam, the main purpose here is to show that these significant teachings smooth the path towards the establishment of a religious democracy.
Religious Democracy is Paradoxical
Critics of religious democracy maintain that there is an inherent antagonism between the fundamental aspects of the Islamic creed and the basis of democracy. According to this view, those who subscribe to the idea of religious democracy ignore the true nature of religion and overlook the epistemological foundations of democracy.
The democratic system is based upon pluralism that places emphasis upon freedom instead of regulation, diversity as opposed to homogeneity, and multiplicity rather than unity. According to pluralistic doctrine, no single person, group or school of thought can possess or claim to possess the absolute truth or that it\'s understanding and opinions are correct and that all others are false.
Truths are distributed amongst humanity, hence, every opinion is but a composition of truth and falsehood, and consequently no opinion has superiority over another, and cannot claim such. People are free to follow and support any opinion they decide upon, whether it be religious or secular, theistic or atheistic, moral or immoral. The unlimited freedom of choice is one of the most important foundations of democracy, a foundation that Islam is opposed to. Hamid Paydar writes:
One of the epistemological foundations of democracy is the obscurity of truth and its distribution amongst all human beings, however, if an ideology or religion should call itself the sample of truth, maintaining that other religions and opinions are manifestations of infidelity, polytheism and misleading, it would not be compatible with democratic government. Islam, according to some verses of the Qur’an introduces itself as a unique right and true religion. Verses such as “This then is Allah, your true lord; and what is there after the truth but error” (10:32) “And whoever desires a religion other than Islam, it should not be accepted from him” (3:85) and the opening verses of Surah Taubah (repentance) are in contradiction to man\'s freedom of choice[142].
This view emphasizes on the inflexibility of Islamic laws and the absolute authority of the Shari’ah as evidence of incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Obviously the interpretation of democracy stated above does not represent what exists in an ordinary democratic state. It is a particular version of democracy mixed with extreme liberalism, which asserts the absolute neutrality of a liberal democratic state. For this new approach a desirable political system should ignore any conception of good and should not based upon any particular philosophical-religious doctrine of life. As Galston says:
According to this view, the liberal state is desirable not because it promotes a specific way of life but precisely because it alone does not do so. The liberal state is ‘neutra’ amongst different ways of life. It presides benignly over them, intervening only to adjudicate conflict, to prevent any particular way of life tyrannizing over others, and to ensure that all adhere to the principals that constitute society\'s basic structure[143].
It is not our objective to discuss whether the neutrality of a political system is possible. However, the fact is that no form of political life can be justified without appealing to certain ideas and values concerning society and the individual. Some advocates of liberalism maintain that liberal theorists covertly employ theories concerning goodness. However, their adamant denial of any reference to a basis or foundation reduces the strength of their argument and leaves their theories vulnerable to criticism[144].
Regardless of whether a neutral government is feasible or not, there is no doubt that Islam is in complete disagreement with many underlying values of liberal democracy, including secularism, pluralism and radical individualism. Consequently the above-mentioned theory merely explains the general incompatibility of Islam with liberalism and specifically the new conception of a \'liberal state\'. This, nevertheless, does not in any way undermine other versions of limited democracy, including religious democracy.
Usurpation of God\'s Sovereignty
Some Muslim thinkers who emphasize on Islamic governance argue that democracy is contradictory to Islamic principals because it involves the legislation of laws, and there are may verses of Qur’an that demonstrate that legislation is reserved for Allah (swt).
Indeed judgment (hukm) is only for Allah. (Chapter 6, Verse 57)
And in whatever thing you disagree, the judgment thereof is with Allah. (Chapter 42, Verse 10)
And if you were in dispute in anything amongst yourselves, refer to Allah and His Messenger. (Chapter 4, Verse 59)
In conclusion, Islam holds that sovereignty is with God (Divine law = Shari’ah) and not with the ummah (people), thus the ummah does not possess the right to legislate on any matter. For example, even if all the Muslims were to gather together and agree to permit usury, usury would remain prohibited because it is a decree from Allah and Muslims have no choice in the matter. On the other hand, in democracy sovereignty is with the people, thus they are able to legislate according to their own free will and desires, either directly or indirectly via the representatives they have elected[145].
The Egyptian revivalist scholar, Sayyid Qutb holds that the essential doctrine of liberal democracy, namely the sovereignty of man, is a usurpation of God\'s sovereignty and a rebellion against His authority, for it subordinates the individual to the will of other individuals instead of God\'s governance on the earth[146].
Clearly this approach to religious government, in principal, should not ignore the administrative and executive role of the people in an Islamic state, because for them the problem of legislation is fundamental. This approach insists that the believers cannot frame any law for themselves, nor do they have the right to alter or modify God\'s laws. This assumption has emanated from the idea that it is incumbent upon Muslims to follow Shari’ah and to restrict all actions and principals to this basis. It is not allowed for them to undertake or leave anything except after understanding the rule of Allah regarding it. Furthermore, those who deny any legislative role for the people maintain that the Islamic Shari’ah contains rules for all past events, current problems, all possible incidents and that it encompasses the actions of man completely and comprehensively. Allah says:
And we have sent down to you the book as an exposition of everything, a guidance, a mercy and glad tidings to those who have submitted themselves to Allah. (Chapter 16, Verse 89)
Accordingly, Muslims are allowed to make use of the sciences and thoughts of human beings unless they contradict Islam. However, with regard to laws and legislation it is prohibited for Muslims to devise and obey un-Islamic rules because it is impossible to find a human action that does not have an evidence or a sign that indicates its rule in the Quran. This is due to the general meaning of His saying ‘exposition of everything’[147].
Since the above view is both influential and popular amongst Islamic revivalist movements, it would be both convenient and useful to examine its various aspects. In order to do this, one must first clarify the meaning of “God’s sovereignty”, then the assumption that all legislative authority rests with God and that believers and qualified jurists (fuqaha) cannot frame any laws for Muslim society should be examined. It should also be emphasized that there is a lack of knowledge concerning the Islamic model of democracy, which insists on the sovereignty of God as well as people’s authority in limited aspects of political affairs. The followers of this doctrine focus solely on a comparison between their conception of an Islamic state and a purely democratic (or liberal democratic) model.
By definition, sovereignty is the claim of ultimate political authority, subject to no higher power with regards to the legislation and enforcement of political decisions. In the international system, sovereignty is the claim by the state to independent self-government and the mutual recognition of claims to sovereignty is the basis of international society[148].
Through regarding sovereignty as the basis and foundation of the political power that a government relies upon in order to be able to exercise its power and organize its domestic and international relationships, the idea that sovereignty as a political term has no connection to God has come to being. Therefore those who attribute the quality to God confuse between the religious status of God amongst believers and the political power of a state referred to by the term ‘sovereignty’. Hence many thinkers such as Fazlur-Rahman essentially deny any attempt to translate the supremacy of Allah into political sovereignty.
The term ‘sovereignty’ as a political term is of a relatively recent coining and denotes definite and defined factors in a society to which rightfully belongs coercive force in order to obtain obedience to its will. It is absolutely obvious that God is not sovereign in this sense and that only people can be and are sovereign, since only to them belongs ultimatecoercive force i.e. Only their \'word is law\' in the politically ultimate sense[149].
As a matter of fact, every formed state has sovereignty regardless of how its political hegemony and power are established and shaped. So, all political models of government - democratic, dictatorship, guardianship and even a military government established by a coup d’etat - so long as it remains in power and can exercise ultimate political authority, possesses sovereignty. In the Islamic ideology, however, there is no unique origin for the establishment of political sovereignty and thus the fundamentally crucial question in this regard is one of ‘legitimacy’. Which form of political sovereignty is the legitimate one? Amongst political philosophers there are several answers to this significant question. The idea that ‘only people can be and are sovereign’, as Fazl ur-Rahman stated, represents the democratic approach to this question. Certainly, for philosophers who believe in ‘guardianship’ such as Plato, the rule of majority and the consent of the people does not legitimize the political sovereignty of a government.
Therefore, sovereignty as such could be created through a number of means and in different forms, but every political doctrine presents its own specific interpretation of legitimate sovereignty and emphasizes on one factor as an essential element of a legitimate state. In the view of those who support the doctrine of an Islamic state, the legitimacy of a government is strongly tied to the extent of that government\'s commitment to the Shari’ah as well as Islamic teachings and values. Muslim thinkers construe the phenomena as God\'s sovereignty because God\'s will is embodied in his legislations and His will and orders have priority over the will and orders expressed by the rulers of an Islamic government, who are obligated to rule in accordance with divine laws (Shari’ah).
With regards to this interpretation of God\'s sovereignty with its particular insistence on his supremacy in legislation, the key issue that arises is whether sovereignty prevents the believers from any form of legislation. This important question distinguishes between religious democracy and the above-mentioned doctrine that does not recognize any right for the believers to frame any law for themselves. Religious democracy, as emphasized before, is based firmly upon the belief in the ultimate authority of almighty God, including his legislative sovereignty. But it is essential to recognize that the unquestionable legislative superiority over dimensions of Muslim\'s life is one issue, and their frequent need for appropriate, fresh and temporal laws to handle new and unusual situations is another. Muslims society, like all other societies, is in need of new laws and regulations in order to adapt its legal system with the frequent alterations in social relationships, namely, new developments in human lifestyle, technological development and cultural– economical changes. Social change in its broad meaning regularly produces many fresh judicial questions, which often cannot be resolved without new legislation.
The conception that Islam is perfect, comprehensive and all- embracing with regards to the needs of human beings, particularly the judicial-legislative necessities that arise, andthat the Islamic legal system consequently includes all rules required for a desirable Islamic way of life, with no need to draft new legislation and laws, can be interpreted in two ways. The first notion incorporates a misinterpretation of the idea that Islam is indeed a perfect religion. This theory asserts that in every case in which mankind is in need of laws, there are appropriate rules that already exist in the Shari’ah that can be automatically applied. Islam contains every law that people require in order to handle their private and public affairs. In conclusion, there remains no legal vacuum to justify the existence of another legislative sovereignty to derive new laws. According to this view, Qur’anic verses such as “And we have sent down to you the book as an exposition of every thing” (16:89) should be interpreted as supporting this view, because the word ‘everything’ embraces all rules we need in the various dimensions of our life, at all times and in every model of social formation. Regarding the Islamic legal system, all judicial demands would be satisfied either by in advance prepared rules or through Ijtihad (fuqaha derive new laws by referring to Islamic sources), which in turn is not legislation. Through ijtihad the faqih recourse to the sources of Shari’ah to declare the position of Islam with regards to new questions and situations, this in its nature is completely separate from legislation. Islamic jurists have no right to legislate, they merely are able to understand and announce to believers what Almighty God has declared.
Small-scale societies have a relatively simple social structure that can be easily regulated by a basic set of rules. However, contemporary society is considerably larger and possesses a vast social structure permeated by many complex interrelationships. In such an environment, every circumstance and aspect of public life requires a flexible legal network, consisting of both fixed and changeable rules, in order to be able to stay in harmony with the demands of a growing and modern society. The existence of ahistorical, non-temporal and fixed laws is a significant characteristic that is common in many comprehensive legal systems, especially in the Islamic legal code, nevertheless, the importance of temporal, changeable rules that every government must legislate according to new economic, social and political situations cannot be ignored. These policies are required to protect the interests of society and to overcome different social difficulties concerning education, taxation, security, exports, immigration and so on. Therefore the adoption of policy is one of the most important functions of a government.
The Shari’ah is perfect, not because we do not need any kind of legislation or because all the rules needed have been previously prepared, rather it is because Islam is the most perfect of all legal systems. It consists of comprehensive and all-inclusive divine laws and Islamic jurisprudence also has specific elements, which render it a dynamic and flexible system that is capable of operating hand-in-hand with changes in society and reality. One of the most significant aspects of this structure is the right of a well-qualified jurist (Wali al-Faqih mujtahid a-adil) to issue rulings and commands. If the Shari’ah has already providing a verdict regarding a specific issue, it is an obligation upon the Islamic state to adopt the ruling of the Shari’ah.
If a situation arises in which the Shari’ah is ambiguous or there exists a difference of opinion concerning the divine law, the opinion and edict of the Wali Amr (who carries the responsibility of rulership in the absence of the infallible Imam) has precedence over all others. In the case where there exists no obligation or prohibition in the Shari’ah, it is permissible for the just faqih to issue a governmental order necessitated by the interest of Islam and Muslims. Since the just faqih has legitimate authority (wilayah) and legislative sovereignty other governors, including those elected by the people such as members of parliament and the president, should be appointed by the just faqih otherwise they would have no legitimate authority to make governmental rules and decisions. For instance Ayatollah Khomeini says:
In the absence of the guardianship of a faqih or divine ruler, the taghut (illegitimate authority) will prevail. If the president is not appointed by a just faqih, he would be illegitimate[150].
In letters appointing the members of the Islamic Revolutionary Council in Iran as well as the first premier, referring to the above points, he writes:
As a person who enjoys the wilayah of the sacred religion, I appoint him...any opposition to this government is tantamount to opposition of Shari’ah[151].
Therefore, being elected by the majority or obtaining public consensus does not automatically grant legislative sovereignty or legitimate religious authority to rule and govern Islamic society. And in cases that governors have been appointed by the just faqih – even elected officials – their authority for making decisions and orders cannot contradict the Shari’ah. Finally, in instances where there is noclear indication from the Shari’ah because the case is totally new, and without previous record, it is the responsibility of the fuqhaha (jurists) to deduce the appropriate rule from Islamic sources.
The legitimate status of the majority is what truly distinguishes religious democracy from all other conceptions of the democratic state, for religious democracy limits the authority of the people in accordance with the legislative sovereignty of God. Whereas in non-religious democratic states, the sovereignty of elected individuals is not restricted by Shari’ah, and the doctrine explicitly assumes democracy as a secular system detached from the authority and sovereignty of God. It thus fails to make a fair assessment of the religious model of democracy and the relationship between Islam and democracy.
The Problem of Legal Equality
Legal equality is often highlighted as one of the crucial foundations of democratic government. Consequently, every political theory that wishes to categorize itself as democratic must respect the legal equality of its citizens. Some critics of religious democracy maintain that Islam is not compatible with democracy on the grounds of some inequalities endorsed within the Islamic legal system.
Islam may be credited with having disseminated the spirit of equality and brotherhood amongst its followers, nevertheless the inferior status of three groups, namely non-Muslim citizens, slaves, and women, and their inequality before the law ascompared with free male Muslim citizens do not help in smoothing the path to a democratic system[152].
Even though the modern conception of democracy emphasizes on all embracing legal equality, democracy in its nature – as the history of political thought – testifies that it is compatible with legal inequalities. As discussed before, in ancient models of democracy only free male landowners had the right to participate in the process of making decisions for city-states. In modern democracies, the right for all free men to vote on an equal basis was not granted until 1850. Males of African origin were denied the right to vote until 1870, and females, both those who were free and the slaves, were not granted the right until the 19th constitutional amendment in 1920.
Moreover, even the modern conception of democracy does not rest upon a complete, unexceptional, and all-inclusive legal equality. Instead it relies upon the principal that all adult members of society are considered equal in political rights, and are able to participate in voting and the distribution of political power. Therefore the existence of non-political legal inequalities, in principal, is not incompatible with democracy. Suppose that according to a legal system, women have not been granted the right to become a judge or religious leader, or that they inherit less than males, obviously these non-political inequalities do not undermine the idea of establishing a democratic system.
No one can make a credible attack against the Islamic ideology because of its supposed endorsement of slavery, slavery was an age-old, and universally accepted institution, which was only officially abolished in the western world less than two centuries ago when emerged around the world.
However, when Islam was revealed, slavery was considered a completely natural aspect of human culture as well as an inseparable element of society. Islam moderated this institution and encouraged believers to emancipate their slaves. In fact, the concept of freeing slaves is an important element in the Islamic system of punishment. The acceptance of slavery by Islam should not, therefore, be considered an obstacle for democracy. In summary, there is no doubt that there are some differences in Shari’ah between Muslims and non-Muslims (for example in retribution), between men and women (for example in inheritance), but these legal inequalities have no connection to political equality and citizenship. For example, in the constitution of Iran as a model of Islamic democratic government, many articles emphasize the equal rights of citizens, men and women, Muslim and non-Muslim:
All people of Iran, whatever their ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; color, race, language and the like, do not bestow any privilege. (Article 19)
All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social and cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic criteria. (Article 20)
Reconciling Islam and Liberal Democracy
Muslim advocates of religious democracy strongly support the conception of a democratic political system possessing a religious framework drawn by Shari’ah. In other words, a judicial (fiqhi) based model of democracy that respects the authority of the people regarding God\'s sovereignty and Islamic law. They emphasize upon the accountability of the government, the participation of the people in political affairs and the implementation of the Shari’ah. According to their conception of religious democracy, the political power belongs to the people, but their authority is limited by the Shari’ah. Hence, it is not in the people\'s power to make political decisions that contradict Islamic rules and values. The basic structure of a fiqhi based society, namely the system of rights and duties, should be defined according to instructions and limitations set forth by Islamic teachings in general and Shari’ah in particular.
Some Muslim intellectuals attempt to present a model of Islamic democratic government, which in principle welcomes with open arms many underlying values of contemporary liberal democracies. As a notable sample of this modernist approach there is the conception of Abdul- Kareem Soroush (an Iranian intellectual born in 1945) regarding religious democracy. Here we will briefly explore a political approach that strives to reconcile Islam and the western conception of human rights, justice and rationality, by reducing the status of Shari’ah to juridical conflicts with no connection to the management of society or the regulation of social relationships. The basic elements of this doctrine are as follows:
* In contrast to the prevailing conception of a religious society and Islamic government, that is essentially fiqh based and defines a religious society as one wherein the implementation of Shari’ah is the ultimate aim and major function of the religious state, the above mentioned doctrine does not give Islamic jurisprudence such a crucial role. According to a fiqh-based interpretation of religious society and Islamic governance, the rights and responsibilities of people have been defined and determined by Islamic laws, in other words the issue of human rights is defined within a religious context, particularly jurisprudential arguments. However, the above doctrine insists that defining human rights, and thus human duties, belongs to the extra-religious area and should be determined outside the domain of religion and Shari’ah.
* “The first issue concerning human rights is that it is not a solely legal (fiqhi) inter religious argument. Discussion of human rights belongs to the domain of philosophical theology and philosophy in general. Furthermore, it is an extra-religious area of discourse. Like other debates on matters that are prior to religious understanding and acceptance such as the existence of God, and the election of the Prophets, human rights lies outside of the domain of religious”[153]
* Religious law (Shari’ah) is not synonymous with the entirely of religion; nor is the debate over the democratic religious government a purely jurisprudential argument, so we shouldn\'t define the religious society according to the extent of its adoption of Shari’ah. The prophets founded a society based on faith and spirituality, not on legality. The heart of a religious society is freely chosen faith, not coercion and conformity. Religious society is based upon free, invisible faith, and dynamic and varied religious understanding[154].
* The jurisprudential governing and attempt to resolve social and public difficulties by Islamic laws must be replaced by rationality and scientific magnanimity. Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) was a solution for simple, underdeveloped societies that had simple, uncomplicated relationships. Fiqh could handle and successfully organize such societies, but the problems of complicated modern societies would be resolved solely by rationality and science instead of jurisprudence[155].
* Democratic religious regimes need not wash their hands of religiosity nor turn their backs on God\'s approval. In order to remain religious, they, of course, need to establish religion as the guide and arbiter of their problems and conflicts. But, in order to remain democratic, they need dynamically to absorb an adjudicative understanding of religion in accordance with the dictates of collective reason. Furthermore, every democratic religious government must be mindful of both the inside and the outside of the religion in order to remain faithful to both of its foundations[156].
* Debates concerning justice, human rights and the methods of government cannot be resolved through intra-religious debate: these are extra-religious arguments that deeply influence the understanding and practice of religion. Religious understanding must constantly renew and correct itself according to philosophical-theological debate concerning human rights, the meaning and nature of justice, the effective method of government and so on. The legal and jurisprudential schools of thought should harmonize their achievements with these novel insights[157].
Having accepted these premises, one comes to the conclusion that many substantial changes of modern humankind in its ideas, attitudes, worldviews and lifestyle must be admitted and respected by religion. These profound and widespread alterations include the desirable political system, human rights, the structure of fundamental rights and duties and the limited role of religion in human life. According to this doctrine, these significant changes should be noticed as new realities and truths, hence, religious knowledge must try to acknowledge and adopt itself to these facts. Therefore Muslims should not strive to deduce their political system from Islamic sources or form their social relationships according to the Shari’ah, instead they have to shape the fundamental basics of their society (i.e. The system of rights and duties) to become consistent modern mankind\'s world views, ideas and perspectives. The keystone of this political approach consists of the concept that the traditional Islamic thought – religious knowledge – is temporally limited and must therefore undergo a drastic metamorphosis in order that it be brought into line according to the views of “modern mankind”.
This political doctrine suffers from three major categories of weakness. The first of these is that the fundamental aspects of this theory, presupposed by a specific doctrine about the nature of religious knowledge, rests on a subjective approach to the interpretation of texts. This subjective approach, called by Soroush “theoretic evolution and devolution ofShari’ah”, insists that religious knowledge and the science of religion are relative to presuppositions, and in addition, that they are also temporal.
He states that since these presuppositions are varied and restricted by time, religious knowledge and the interpretation of religion is entirely human and this worldly. All of this implies that religion is constantly surrounded by a host of contemporaneous data and deliberations, thus the interpretation remains constant so long as these external elements are also constant. However, once they change, the change will be reflected in the understanding of religion as well. Consequently, religious texts (such as the Holy Qur’an and Islamic traditions or ahadith) do not carry their meaning on their own shoulders, instead it is necessary to situate them within a context. The interpretation of the text is in flux, and presuppositions are actively at work here. Therefore, the interpretation of religious texts is subject to expansion and contradiction according to the assumptions preceding them. These assumptions are part of the world’s view of an age, which need not and usually does not enter the mind through any formal education or conscious adoption, but rather are utilized inadvertently and fluently[158].
This approach to religious knowledge and the interpretation of texts has been strongly influenced by subjectivist schools of interpretation particularly the German philosopher Georg Gadamer (died 2001) and the philosophical hermeneutics of his famous book “Truth and Method” (First German edition 1960)[159].According to these, the horizon of the reader (his presuppositions, attitudes and expectations) share in the process of interpretation, thereby making the reader more than a passive observer who merely receives the message of the text, rather he is an active participant who creates the meaning of a text, or at least the horizon of the reader shares in the process of constructing a meaning around the text. Hence, according to this theory, admitting modern and popularly viewed and shared ideas as extra-religious presuppositions is acceptable, even if this should interfere in the interpretation of religion. Examples of such ideas include the western conception of human rights, political system and the social formation of rights and duties. Below are a few brief criticisms of this conception of the nature of religious knowledge and understanding religious texts.
à When referring to a religious text, the fundamental aim of interpretation for believers and religious scholars is to understand the \'intention\' of the author (for instance the intention of God in divine revelation and what the Prophet had in mind with regard to interpretation of his hadith). To achieve this understanding, they seek objective and valid interpretations of the texts. Obviously every form of interference originates from the reader\'s prejudices, presuppositions and expectations, which imposing a specific meaning upon the text, this is obviously harmful for any attempt to interpret religious texts.
à It is quite possible to subjectively interpret a religious text with no regard to the intentions of its author or its context. This form of interpretation is known as tafsir bi rai (interpretation by personal attitude and prejudice), and is criticized in many traditions originating from the Prophet and the Imams (peace be upon them). Developing a meaning according to the varied presuppositions and prejudices that exist in human society, is not a question of feasibility, rather it is a question of legitimacy.
à The assumption that religious texts do not carry their own meaning ignores the profound semantical relationship between words and meanings that is established in every natural language. This doctrine supposes that sentences of a text are empty vessels that a reader may place his own meaning within, as Soroush says:
Statements are hungry of meanings instead of being pregnant of them[160].(meaning a statement requires a meaning to be given to it, rather than providing a meaning from it).
Clearly anyone who wants to use or understand a language must respect its structure and limitations. Why aren\'t we free to apply and understand an English text as we wish? The point is that the pre-established connection between words (and their meanings) in this language prevent us from doing so and these limit the shape and framework of our linguistic activity. Therefore, statements in a text are not devoid of meaning, rather they contain their own meaning and play a crucial role in the process of understanding and transmitting the intention of their author, although this is not to say that other elements (such as the context of the text) are not important.
à This method of understanding in general, and understanding religious texts in particular, lends itself towards \'relativism\'. It emphasizes tha religious knowledge and the interpretation of text is a theory-laden, as Soroush writes:
Religious knowledge will be in continuous flux, and since it is only through those presuppositions that one can hear the voice of revelation. Hence the religion itself is silent[161].
This absolute relativism doesn\'t allow any room for the question of validity in interpretation of the text and religious knowledge. According to this approach, the validity of religious knowledge is connected to the validity of extra-religious knowledge, which consists of the presuppositions of each age, which in turn are varied and changeable. Whereas appealing to religious beliefs and knowledge based on reliability and validity of religious knowledge is undermined by this theory.
à As a matter of fact readers face a text through their horizons that means they cannot ignore their knowledge, mental abilities, backgrounds and personal experiences concerning the context and content of the text. In other words, it is quite impossible that someone can overlook his own horizon and keep his mind empty when confronting a text, because our knowledge, experiences and so on are inseparable parts of our identity. This reality would not excuse free and nonstandard interference of the reader ‘s horizon in the process of the interpretation of the text. Indeed, the horizon of every reader consists of several categories and some of them play a crucial role in understanding the text. For instance, those who know Arabic and have suitable background in Islamic philosophy understand philosophical texts that have been written by Muslim philosophers in Arabic language much better than others. On the other hand, there are some elements whose influence we have to control during the interpretation of text, such as our prejudices and expectations that tend to impose particular and prejudged meanings over the text. That is why even some great advocates of philosophical hermeneutics notice the danger of some pre-understandings that hold back the correct process of interpretation. Heidegger and Gadamer emphasize that we have to distinguish between ‘correct and incorrect’, ‘legitimate and illegitimate’ conceptions and prejudices that come into understanding[162]. Consequently we are not free to allow our prejudgments, attitudes and fore conceptions to be presented in the event of understanding. Substantial changes in ideas, lifestyle and attitudes among modern humankind should not decide the message of a religion. Certainly these radical alterations sometimes create challenges and conflicts between a religion and modernism that require solutions, but reinterpretation of religion in favour of these new ideas and attitudes is not an appropriate solution, especially when we know that there is no justification for many of these modern concepts and approaches. Values such as consumerism, individualism, the liberal concept of freedom, secularism, free market (capitalism) and technology that make the major paradigms of contemporary civilization and modern humankind ‘s lifestyle, have established themselves because of the personal preferences of the majority. However, most of these paradigms suffer from the problem of justification. Therefore, there is no reason for believers to blindly apply all modern values and conception to their religious texts and to reproduce their religious knowledge in accordance to them.
Another criticism of the above mentioned political doctrine concerns the ambiguous role of religion in this version of “religious” democratic government. The scope of political- social affairs concerns the practical aspect of Islam, which is largely embodied in Islamic law. Yet, this doctrine essentially denies the fiqhi based model of governing and, therefore, it remains ambivalent about the role (if any) of the Shari’ah with regards to the organization of social relationships and the process of making significant social- political decisions.
On the other hand, if we endorse the claim that religious understanding should constantly be renewed and corrected in light of extra-religious presuppositions and that Islamic jurisprudential thought must harmonize its achievements with these novel insights obtained by human sciences, then what reason would justify and obligate us to harmonize our political-social decisions with such dependent, relative and changeable religious knowledge? Why shouldn\'t we just directly trust these novel extra-religious sights and presuppositions and relinquish religion?
Soroush emphasizes that religious democracies in order to remain religious, need to establish religion as the guide and arbiter of their problems and conflicts[163].
However, by overlooking the role of the Shari’ah in resolving the problems of contemporary modern societies, he does not explicitly state the mechanism upon which Islam might be the guide and arbiter of conflicts in the modern world.
Also significant is the fact that this doctrine fails to demonstrate why the problem of human rights and the system of rights and duties are extra-religious and why we shouldn\'t respect the explanation of religious sciences from intra-religious contents. It seems that the only reason that could possibly justify this approach rests on an extremely subjective conception of the nature of religious knowledge and the interpretation of texts, which has been criticized previously. In spite of this, there is no justification for ignorance concerning Islamic teachings, conceptions and laws with regards to human rights and duties. In cases where extra-religious notions and values contrast some Islamic teachings first of all we have to assess their capacity for truth-valid objective reasons that support and justify them. Clearly many fundamental notions in the modern conception of human rights are deeply influenced by concepts and values of liberalism, which in turn suffer from absence of valid justification. For instance the liberal conception of freedom plays a very significant role in shaping modern conceptions of human rights, while advocates of Liberalism still have not presented a valid convincing rational argument for this conception of liberty.
Consider John Stuart Mill who tried to base and defend this freedom entirely on the principle of utility[164], which as many critics have pointed out is ill-equipped to bear the burden. If personal liberty is as valuable as Mill insists, liberals should at least attempt to find a more permanent foundation for it than the disputable proposition - the principle of utility. Classical liberals like Mill are not the only liberals whose defense of individual freedom have run into trouble. Recent defenders of the liberal conception of personal freedom such as Friedrich Hayek and Isaiah Berlin do not present a convincing rational justificatory basis for it. Hayek stakes his defense of personal liberty on skepticism about moral rationality, while Berlin resorts to a kindred species of moral relativism. For Hayek ‘reason’ is powerless to determine ‘ends’ and, therefore, cannot tell us what we ought to do. Human intellect cannot by itself settle questions concerning value, especially questions about moral values.
Consequently people personally must be absolutely free to choose[165],Berlin, on the other hand, emphasizes on ‘relativity of values’ and the subjective nature of values to conclude that there is no objective higher good than the arbitrary or relative good each individual sets for herself[166]. The weaknesses of these arguments seem plain. How is it possible to claim that there are no objective values and that all values are purely subjective, and yet simultaneously state that we should always hold personal liberty in such high regard as to make it one of the central pillars of human rights and political life. If they are right that there are no objective ends or values, then there can be no rational or objective grounds for valuating individual ends or liberty. In short, liberals must avoid the temptation to base their argument on relativistic or skeptical premises because it undercuts rather than supports their own arguments.
There are other points about the above mentioned political doctrine regarding the role of Islamic law (fiqh) in an Islamic government, which were discussed in the first chapter and do not need to be repeated again.
Notes:
[101] Daniel Webster in 1830 (thirty three years before Lincoln’s definition) said: people’s government, made for the people, made by the people and answerable to the people. Cf: Patterns of Democracy, p. 1.
[102] Robert Dahl, On Democracy, Yale University Press, 2000, p.9.
[103] Sulaiman Sadek Jawad, Democracy and Shura, Published in Liberal Islam, p. 97.
[104] Democracy and its Critics, p.2.
[105] On Democracy, pp. 85-86.
[106] Democracy and its Critics, p.135.
[107] H. .B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 60.
[108] Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies, Macmillan Press, 2nd Edition, 1998, p. 43.
[109] Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies, Macmillan Press, 2nd Edition, 1998, p. 46.
[110] On Democracy, pp. 45-57.
[111] John Plamenatz, Democracy and Illusion, Longman, 1973, pp. 164-168.
[112] John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1996, p.10.
[113] John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett (ed), Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 322
[114] Allen Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice, Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 34-35.
[115] Democracy and its Critics, p. 88.
[116] Michael Walzer, “Philosophy and Democracy”, in Political Theory, Volume 9, No 3, August 1981, p. 386.
[117] Michael Walzer, “Philosophy and Democracy”, in Political Theory, Volume 9, No 3, August 1981, p. 383.
[118] Democracy and its Critics, pp. 66, 101, 103.
[119] Democracy and its Critics, p.89.
[120] Democracy and its Critics, p.91.
[121] Democracy and its Critics, p.99.
[122] On Democracy, p. 113.
[123] Political Liberalism, p. 12.
[124] Political Liberalism, p. 40.
[125] Political Liberalism, p. 43.
[126] Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy”, in Reading Rorty, Alan R. Malachowski (ed), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. 289.
[127] Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy”, in Reading Rorty, Alan R. Malachowski (ed), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. 290.
[128] Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and communitarians, Blackwell, 2nd Edition, 1996, pp. 259-261.
[129] Reading Rorty, p. 291.
[130] Kant’s Theory of Justice, p. 34.
[131] Democracy and its Critics, p. 169.
[132] Walzer, “Philosophy and Democracy”, in Political Theory, Volume 9, No. 3, August 1981,pp. 387-388.
[133] Abu al-A’la Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam, Karachi: Maktaba-e Islami, p. 30.
[134] Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifa Nur, Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, Volume 10, p. 181.
[135] Rachid Ghannouchi, “Participation in Non-Islamic Government”, in Liberal Islam, p. 91.
[136] Liberal Islam, p. 98.
[137] Ibn Kathir, Umda, Volume 3, p. 63; Ibn Hisham, Sireh Ibn Hisham, Volume 2, pp. 272-273.
[138] Encyclopedia of Islam, Volume 1, p. 1113a.
[139]Sahih Muslim, Hadith 1829.
[140] Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh-e- Nahjul Balaqeh, Volume 16, p. 17.
[141] N athan Brown, “Islamic Constitutionalism in Theory and Practice”, in Democracy the Rule of Law and Islam, Eugene Cotran (ed), Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 491.
[142] H amid Paydar, “The Paradox of Islam and Democracy”, in Modara wa Modiriyat, Abdul Karim Surush (ed), Tehran: Serat Publication, 1997, pp. 525-526.
[143] William .A Galston, Liberal Purposes, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 80.
[144] William .A Galston, Liberal Purposes, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 79.
[145] Abdul Qadeem Zalloom, Democracy is a System of Kufr, London: Al- Khilafah Publication, p. 35-37.
[146] “Sayyid Qutb, Ideologue of Islamic Revival”, in Voices of Resurgent Islam, John Esposito (ed), Oxford University Press, 1983.
[147] Democracy is a System of Kufr, pp. 22-25.
[148] Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, p. 464.
[149] Fazlur-Rahman, “The Islamic Concept of State” in Islam in Transition, Ponohue and John Esposito (eds), Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 269.
[150]Sahifa Nur, Volume 9, p. 253.
[151] Sahifa Nur, Volume 5, p. 31.
[152] Forough Jahanbakhsh, Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran, Brill, 2001, p. 49.
[153] Abdul Karim Soroush, Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri (trs), Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 128.
[154] Abdul Karim Soroush, Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri (trs), Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 134-141.
[155] Abdul Karim Soroush, Qesseye Arbab-e Marefat, Tehran: Serat Publication, 1995, pp. 54-55
[156]Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, pp. 128-129.
[157]Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, p. 148.
[158] Abdul Karim Soroush, “The Evolution and Devolution of Religious Knowledge,” in Liberal Islam, pp. 245-246.
[159] I have written a few books and articles concerning the exploration and criticism of this hermeneutical approach for instance refer to:
“The Hermeneutical Reflection of Heidegger,” in Transcendental Philosophy, Volume 3, No. 3, September 2002.
An Introduction to Hermeneutics (Persian), Tehran, 2001, Chapters3&4.
The Alteration of Understanding Religion (Persian), Tehran, 1996
[160] Qabs wa Bast-e theory e Shari’a, Tehran, Serat Publication, 1995, 3rd Edition, p. 287.
[161] Liberal Islam, p. 245.
[162] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, John Maquarrie and Edward Robinson (trs), Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, p.195; Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, London: Sheet& Ward, 1999, p. 298.
[163]Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, p. 128.
[164] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Edited by Gertrude Himmglfarb, Penguin Books, 1984, p. 69-70
[165] Friedrich Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty, University of Chicago, 1973, pp. 32-34.
[166] Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. li, lvi, 172.
Ahmed Vaezy
Source: Imam reza network
What is a "Religious Government”?
The influence of religion upon politics is not a phenomenon that is confined solely to the Islamic world. However, it is impossible for any political theorist to ignore the role of Islam in the public lives of Muslims. Its considerable impact upon the politics of Muslim nations can be attributed to the strong inclination of the population towards it, and thus the powerful voice that it is given by them. Leaman writes:
One of the comments which writers on Islamic Political Philosophy often make is that it is irremediably conservative. Even the so-called modernizers have in mind some sort of theocracy, a state in which religion plays a leading role[1].
It is obvious that any legal system requires a government to adopt it and the apparatus of a state to implement and enforce it. Therefore, Islamic Law (Shari’ah) is also in need of a state for its sanction and application. However, the key concern then becomes whether or not all theories shaped in the history of Islamic political thought are actually seeking the establishment of an “Islamic state”. The two aforementioned factors; that Islam is a vital and necessary aspect of a Muslim’s culture, and that the Shari’ah requires political power and authority in order to be implemented, might bring one to the conclusion that all political systems in the Islamic world were historically religious governments.
Although there are obvious difficulties associated with finding a precise and agreed definition of a “religious government”, it is essential to distinguish between various levels of state commitment to a specific religion. The minimal degree of dedication would be that a government did not prevent its people from undertaking their religious rituals and practices. On the other hand, a maximized relationship between religion and politics requires the total commitment and adherence of a state to the contents of a specific religion. Obviously, many varying degrees of religious authority could be supposed between these two extremes.
Official definitions of a “religious state” focus on a series of prescribed characteristics and functions embodied by this model of political system. These may be related to individual characteristics, such as a governor necessarily belonging to a specific religion or social class, similar to the governments of European states throughout the Middle Ages. One might also define a religious government according to its partial or prejudicial favour towards a particular religion. Consequently, a religious state uses its military, political and economic power to promote and strengthen the position and followers of that specific faith.
This draws our attention to a few, specific aspects of a religious government. However, it fails to adequately introduce what most contemporary Islamic political movements and doctrines have in mind when they apply the term “Islamic State”, which is perhaps most effectively described as the maximum realization of a religious state.
An Islamic government’s primary aim is to establish a truly Islamic society. Islam does not consider society to be merely a collection of individuals. Rather, it deems that society also consists of their social relationships and the social order in which these individuals exist. These are perhaps the most definitive factors of a society, as different societies are categorized as being just or unjust, developed or undeveloped and complex or plain, according to their social formations and their systems of rights and duties. Financial sources, social advantages and the structure of the prevailing political system, are all part of the complex web of social relationships that contribute to the makeup of society. Therefore, an Islamic society, by definition, is an ideal society in which social order is established and regulated according to underlying Islamic values, teachings and rulings.
An Islamic government is one that accepts and admits the absolute authority of Islam. It seeks to establish an Islamic social order according to the contents of Islam, implementing the Shari’ah, while attempting to direct its political decisions and public functions according to the aims and values of Islam.
This understanding of an Islamic state obviously faces criticism, especially from those who adopt more secular political ideologies. The following pages will assess some of the contentious aspects surrounding this theory of Islamic governance.
Rejection of Islamic Government
Opponents of Islamic governance can be divided into two major categories: The first of these are the supporters of secularism, who contend that religion must be completely separate from worldly affairs. In their eyes, the concept of a religious state is backward and outdated. They maintain that this model of political system must be confined to a time when human beings lacked the knowledge or experience to organize their social order and were in need of religion to arrange their legal, economic and cultural relationships. However, secularism is not a doctrine that merely addresses the relationship between religion and politics. Essentially, it is a radical approach to the role of religion and revelation in shaping human knowledge. Secular rationality maintains that the human intellect is capable of forming its own knowledge independent of revelation. According to this, reason in itself is self-sufficient and autonomous. Hence, mankind is capable of constructing natural and human sciences as well as philosophy, law and ethics without the aid of God or religion.
Secular thinking, therefore, leaves very little scope for religion. According to secularist thought, every instance in which the human intellect is capable of gaining knowledge exists as part of the exclusive realm of the human being, without any need for faith or revelation. Such reasoning constrains the role of religion to regulating the individual relationship between man and his creator, while isolating it from the social and political order. This is because social relationships form part of “human” affairs and not “divine” affairs; they are “extra-religious” as opposed to “intra- religious”. Law, economy and political decisions as well as the formations of our social structures and systems of rights and duties are all considered as merely dealing with the relationship between man and man, not man and God. Therefore, religion in these cases must delegate everything to human reasoning and science.
This concise overview of secular thinking illustrates that the reduction of secularism to a political doctrine, which purely insists on the separation of faith from politics, is incorrect. The isolation of religion from politics is but one of the many accomplishments of secular rationality. Advocates of this view insist on the disengagement of religion, not only from politics, but also from ethics, art, law, philosophy and the sciences. Consequently, they advocate not only a secular state, but secular laws, a secular culture, a secular science and so on.
Whereas the first approach delegates a limited scope for religion, the second group of opponents have no argument with those who believe it cannot be restricted to merely having a limited, fixed or previously determined capacity. In principle, they agree that no one has the right to confine the contents and the implementation of Islam to private life, or more precisely, to the individual relationship between man and God. The central concern of the second group, however, is that although Islam embodies certain values and ideas, it is not composed of both spirituality and politics. Thus it has not specified any particular form of government and Muslims are free to support any regime they desire.
So the fundamental distinction that arises between these two groups is that, while secularists argue that religion and politics must remain separate, the second faction contend that Islam does not in any way oblige it’s followers to establish it in the political realm. They attempt to demonstrate that Islam has no connection to politics by concentrating on the Holy Qur’an and early Islamic history, arguing that it is a purely spiritual doctrine, as opposed to a spiritual and political one. Secularists, on the other hand, focus on the demands of modernity, the inability of religion to conduct and organize the contemporary world, and its failure to overcome the complications presented by modernism. Therefore, it is crucial to clarify whether or not Islam compelled its followers to establish an Islamic government, and whether or not Islam is indeed capable of regulating modern society.
No credible Muslim thinker advocates the segregation of religion from worldly affairs, as the secular tradition would insist, reducing it to little more than a personal relationship between man and God. In fact, very few Islamic intellectuals appeal to secular rationality other than to insist on the separation of religion from socio-political relationships (i.e. restricting the scope of religion and extending the role of reasoning in public life). Although these thinkers do not explicitly call themselves secular, their attitudes towards the issue of Islam and politics obviously have common characteristics with those of secularists.
Having introduced the two main critical attitudes towards Islamic government, the following pages will examine the central arguments presented by adherents to these two schools of thought, beginning with the reasons provided that reject any original connection between Islam and politics.
The First Argument
In his famous book “Islam and the Foundations of Government” (Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm) Shaykh Ali Abd al-Raziq[2] (1888-1966) sought to justify the separation of religion and political authority on the basis of religious evidences. He argued that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) did not intend to establish a political state in Madina and that Islam did not support the rise of any particular social system.
This assertion totally contradicted the traditional belief, which held that the Hijrah (migration to Madina in 622) marked the beginning of the Prophet’s political activity and the realization of Islamic governance. Abd al-Raziq argued that the Prophet was the bearer of a religious message; he did not have a government, nor did he seek to establish a kingdom in the political sense or anything synonymous with it. Rather, his authority was sacred, derived from God so that he could deliver the divine revelation. According to Abd al- Raziq, this did not entail political leadership; it was the mandate of a Prophet and not of a Sultan.
To justify his view, Abd al-Raziq refers to several verses of the Qur’an. He believes that according to these, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was only a messenger, commissioned to deliver God’s revelation to the people and nothing else.
We have sent you only to give good news and to warn. [Chapter 17, Verse 105]
The duty of the messenger is to convey the message clearly. [Chapter 27, Verse 54]
Yet we have sent you only to give good tidings and to warn. [Chapter 25, Verse 56]
Tell him: I am only a warner. [Chapter 27,Verse 92]
Abd al-Raziq argues that if the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) had other roles, such as that of a political leader, then the Qur’an would clearly have announced them[3].
In order to justify his position, he argues that every state requires a political structure that contains specific institutions and administrations, but that Muhammad’s leadership was devoid of these necessary elements of government. In fact, according to this point of view, political authority only appeared in the Islamic community following the demise of the Messenger of God. Consequently, striving for the establishment of a government is not considered part of Islamic teachings[4].
However, contrary to Abd al-Raziq’s opinion, there is a mass of historical evidence that clearly demonstrates the Prophet’s role as both a political and religious leader. In fact, many western thinkers, such as Anthony Black, agree that the Prophet’s objective was not merely to establish a new identity by replacing old tribal customs. According to these thinkers, he addressed political power as well as spiritual and cultural authority. Black writes:
His purpose was to construct out of tribal confederacies a new people driven by his own sense of moral mission. Judaism had preached an all- embracing (ethnic) law, While Christianity had preached spiritual (universal) brotherhood. But, neither seriously addressed the problem of military power and political authority; both had accepted life under alien, pagan rule. Muhammad preached spiritual brotherhood, plus an all-embracing law, and universal political control to be achieved[5].
The activities of the Prophet Muhammad following the Hijrah brought about revolutionary changes to the Arabian Peninsula. These cannot simply be interpreted as the ordinary behavior of a religious leader. Included here are concise examples of his political deeds, which could not have been issued without political authority.
He assembled a number of hostile tribes and forged them into a new community (ummah). This is essentially a political endeavor, which is embodied in what Montgomery Watt refers to as the “Constitution of Medina”, a document that outlines the nature of the state that the Prophet was intending to establish. The charter incorporates articles concerning the rights and duties of the various tribes and social groupings that formed this new society, including their obligations regarding one another, criminal events and the rights of non-Muslim members of this community[6].
He delegated both religious and political responsibilities to his companions. Some, such as Amr ibn Hazm, were sent to lead the prayers and teach the people about the Qur’an. Whilst others, such as Abu Musa al-Ashari and Saed ibn Aas, were dispatched as representatives to collect taxes (zakat), arbitrate disputes and punish criminals as well as to educate people about Islam. Sometimes, the Prophet would assign companions to exclusively governmental capacities, such as when he sent Abu Sufyan to gather taxes in Najran, while Amr ibn Hazm remained his religious representative in that region[7].
The Prophet (pbuh) was a general, a diplomat and a judge. He led the army, entered into treaties and agreements with various tribes, and passed judgment in criminal cases. Issues such war, diplomatic relations and legal arbitration are all obviously included in political authority and have no connection to a specifically spiritual mandate.
Furthermore, it is unreasonable to compare the structures of a modern state and the Prophet’s authority in Madina in order to determine whether he established a political state. Dr. Senhoury, for example, argues that the political order established in Madina adequately met the demands of a simple tribal community, thus there was no need to establish a complex social order when the Prophet’s political system was appropriate to the requirements of his age and society[8].
Some thinkers, such as Abid al-Jaberi, contend that because the word “dawlat” (state) was not adopted as a political term until the beginning of the Abbasid-era, the political concept of an Islamic state did not exist either. According to Al- Jaberi, the Prophet (pbuh) established an “ummah” as opposed to a state. However, although it may be true that the term dawlat was not prevalent in Arab vocabulary at the time of the Prophet, it is not the name that constitutes a state. Rather, it is the nature of the authority that establishes an Islamic government, thus it is irrelevant whether the term “state” was adopted or not.
Although Abd al-Raziq refers to several verses of the Qur’an in order to justify his opinion, which is that the Prophet (pbuh) had no role beside that of a messenger, the verses that he submits as evidence do not confine the character of the Prophet to a single attribute. A clear distinction must be made between a relative restriction and an absolute or definite restriction. The latter confines the character of a subject to one feature, whilst the former refers to a restriction in a limited scope of attributes. For example, someone supposes that x is both a writer and a poet. You correct his opinion by telling him that ‘x is only a writer’. However, this does not mean that x has no other qualities apart from being a writer, because your statement restricts his character in relation to only two attributes.
All the verses to which Abd al-Raziq refers fall into the first category, which is that of relative restriction. They are merely emphasizing that the Prophet has no responsibility towards those who disbelieve in his call. Certainly, the Prophet as a human being has many other qualities and duties. Therefore, emphasis upon one issue within a specific context does not nullify the possibility of other tasks or characteristics. Take, for example, following verses:
O Prophet, urge the believers to war. [Chapter 8, Verse 65]
And judge (rule) between them by what Allah has revealed, and do not follow their low desires. [Chapter 5, Verse 49]
Your Wali is none but Allah and his Messenger. [Chapter 5, Verse 55]
And We did not send a messenger except that he should be obeyed…. [Chapter 4, Verse 64]
Second Argument
Aside from those who subscribe to a view similar to that of Abd al-Raziq, other opponents of the Islamic state accept that the Prophet did, in fact, establish a political order following his migration to Madina. However, they also maintain that this does not constitute an intrinsic connection between Islam and politics. The emergence of the Prophet’s authority in Madina is considered as little more than a historical event; a specific situation in which the social and political circumstances necessitated this endeavor, rather than a religious duty that was included in divine revelation.
Dr. Haery seems to adopt a similar opinion in the following passage, in which he emphasizes that the Prophet’s government was formed upon the consensus of the people and then later endorsed by God. He writes:
Some previous Prophets, especially the Prophet of Islam, besides the exalted position of Prophethood had undertaken governing people and committing political affairs. We have to know that since people compelled them with no anticipate inclination, these political authorities and special circumstances forced them to accept, the Political authority cannot be taken into account as part of God’s revelation[9].
To support this point of view regarding the Prophet’s authority, Haery refers to the following verse of the Qur’an:
Certainly Allah was well pleased with the believers when they swore allegiance to you under the tree. [Chapter 48, Verse 18]
He, and others who adopt a comparable opinion, insist that although God endorsed the pledge of allegiance (bay’a) given to the Prophet, His approval is not enough to make the establishment of political authority an Islamic objective[10].
However, the relationship between Islam and politics and the historical events precluding the creation of an Islamic social order are two entirely separate and distinct topics. Studying the latter requires a precise analysis of the historical, social and cultural context in that era. Whereas the former necessitates a comprehensive evaluation of the Islamic ideology to determine whether or not it encompasses a political dimension and if it has the potential to be practically applied. Thus, the correlation of historical stages and circumstances to the process of forming a government is entirely separable from our present debate, which concerns the Islamic political system. Hence, many contemporary Muslim scholars, such as Muhammad Ammareh, who is an advocate of the Islamic state, come to the following conclusion:
Even though the generous Qur’an did not explicitly [make it] incumbent upon Muslims to form a religious government [it obliged them] with some duties [that] would be impossible to fulfil without the establishment of an Islamic State[11].
Both Dr. Haery and Muhammad Ammareh maintain that the pledge of allegiance (Bay’a) given by the tribal representatives of Madina to the Prophet, during the year prior to his emigration from Mecca, was the keystone of his government. However, this theory, which introduces the allegiance (Bay’a) of the people as the root of the Prophet’s political authority, confronts two difficulties. The first is that the contract of Bay’a was a prevailing custom amongst the Arabs, which occurred for a variety of reasons; the pledge of Bay’a to a political leader or tribal chief was only one of these. Accordingly, it is essential that we assess the content of these pledges used to support the arguments of Dr Haery and Muhammad Ammareh.
The pledge mentioned in Chapter 18 of the Qur’an, known as “Bay’a rezwan”, occurred at Hudaybiyah, near Mecca, in the sixth year after Hijrah. The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and a number of his followers were en-route to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca, when Meccan polytheists who wished to prevent them from entering the city confronted them. Under these dangerous circumstances, a number of believers pledged allegiance to the Prophet so as to reassure him that they would remain by his side and protect him from the enemies of Islam. This pledge was merely a reaffirmation of their loyalty in a difficult situation, rather than the acknowledgement of the Prophet’s political authority. Furthermore, it took place five years after the establishment of the Islamic state in Madina, thus it seems strange to consider this event the original root of his government.
What is often referred to as the second pledge of allegiance known as “Bay’a al-Aqabeh” also has no connection to the nomination of a ruler. Comparing it to the negotiations that took place at Saqifa, prior to the appointment of Abu Bakr, explicitly demonstrates that the pledge of al-Aqabeh was not a recognition of the Prophet’s political authority. The negotiations at Saqifa were concerned with leadership following the death of Muhammad (pbuh). Hence, the Bay’a at Saqifa merely served as an election, whereas the pledge of al-Aqabeh was regarding the protection and safety of the Prophet; the representatives of Madina promised to resist the polytheists and protect the Prophet as they would their own families.
The second difficulty confronted by the supporters of this argument, arises from several verses of the Holy Qur’an which delegate and approve the guardianship (Wilayat) of the Prophet over the believers, with no reference to any anticipated acceptance from the people; therefore indicating that his authority is indeed divine. These verses shall be discussed in greater detail later, but for now we shall mention a few:
The Prophet has a greater claim on the faithful that they have on themselves. [Chapter 33, Verse 6]
Only Allah is your guardian (Wali) and His Apostle. [Chapter 5, Verse 55]
The Third Argument
Another prevailing argument, employed by secularists to undermine the theory of a religious government focuses on the ambitions of those who support an Islamic state (i.e. the establishment of an ideal social order according to Islam and the application of the Shari’ah to all facets of society). Secularists, who adopt this line of reasoning, contend that a religious social order is an incompatible thesis because it is confronted by an inherent difficulty known as “the problem of accommodation”. To justify this argument, they rely on two premises:
Social, economic and cultural relationships undergo constant change and development: There is a significant difference between our contemporary lifestyles and the lifestyles of previous generations in areas such as transportation, commerce, education and so on. Thus social formation is essentially variable and no one can expect a society to remain stable for a prolonged period of time.
Religion is fixed, unchanging and stable: Every religion is confined to a specific period of history; as it was founded upon the demands, circumstances and problems of a particular age. Religion is an event that happened in a determined time and place, which cannot be repeated. Consequently, the message of every religion is inflexible and has no capacity for adaptation to new situations.
Thus, a secularist would argue that because religion is a fixed and unchanging set of ideas, it is entirely incapable of accommodating changes to social relationships, which are in turn fundamentally unfixed and variable. It is entirely reasonable to admit that religion is able to form a social order, which is influenced by its conventions and ethics, but only at a time when social circumstances would permit such an influence. For example, in the time when Islam emerged, it was able to adequately meet the demands of the historical period. Thus, Islam succeeded in establishing a civilization during that era. However, it seems paradoxical to suppose that Islam is capable of effectively shaping social order under any circumstances and at any time. The core of this reasoning is that social associations and relationships are fluid and open to regular changes; no one is able to prevent these social alterations and thereby narrow them to a fixed religious form and structure. In summary, secularists assert that although Shari’ah has within it the competence and capability to deal with social formations similar to those existing at the time when Islam appeared, there are serious obstacles for the application of Shari’ah to contemporary social configurations.
Such an assessment is based on the presupposition that the conception of a religious state leaves no room for adaptation or the endorsement of social changes. Therefore, the response to this argument will discuss three significant points;
(a) An evaluation of this interpretation of social changes.
(b) Aspects of the Islamic legal system, which have been overlooked by secularists who subscribe to this opinion, that render it both dynamic and flexible.
(c) A clarification of what is meant by the accommodation of Shari’ah and the precise definition of the establishment of “Islamic social order”.
Categorizing Social Alterations
No one can dispute the fluidity and variable nature of social relationships. Changes occur both radically over a short period of time, and gradually over a more prolonged period. They have numerous dimensions and affect various aspects of human life. As far as the present discussion is concerned, which is the role of religion in a well ordered society; the legal and moral dimensions are the most important ones that should be considered.
From a legal perspective, every social order and its assorted characteristics confront many questions. An efficient legal system must be able to overcome these problems and introduce a competent framework, which is able to respond to new developments that are the result of social alterations. In order to practically implement a religion that encompasses social interactions, it becomes crucial to institute a dynamic legal structure that is able to organize their juridical aspects. Because the aim of a religious state is to harmonize social order according to a religious legal system, it is therefore essential to understand the nature of the legal aspect of social alterations.
Establishing a truly Islamic society and regulating social relationships according to the Islamic ideology cannot, however, be confined to merely the legal aspects of this transformation. The moral and cultural outcomes of such a revolution are fundamental as well. An Islamic government must maximize the role of moral virtues, Islamic values and true humanity in social relationships. Advocates of the Islamic state believe that religious aims and values, stemming from moral virtues and true humanity, can lead human society towards a higher level of existence. However, the argument that denies the possibility of harmonizing social order according to Islamic laws and values usually attempts to reduce the discussion to a purely legal one, attempting to illustrate that the Islamic legal system is incapable of accommodating social changes.
Those who subscribe to this argument presuppose that social alterations result in entirely new legal problems that have no previous precedent. Hence, they argue that a religious legal system, because of its unchanging nature, cannot deal with the problems that it will be frequently confronted by.
Social changes ultimately give rise to two areas of legal discourse. The first stems from an entirely new social phenomenon, of which there is no previous record. Every legal system must define its position with regard to these. For instance, the invention of computers and the development of information technology require fresh legislation. Another example is transplantation, a new technique in medicine that requires jurists to clarify the legal aspect of this new medical ability, such as the laws regarding the exchange of natural organs between human beings. The significant factor with this first group, is that they require more than merely the application of old and current laws to new situations, rather, they require a set of absolutely new laws and up-to-date legislation.
Secondly, there are those social transformations that, despite the fact they are new, have emerged from pre-existing relationships and associations, consequently these social phenomena are new in form and not in content. Accordingly, they do not require totally new legislation or a fresh set of laws; jurists could and would categorize them according to previous legal precedents. For instance, previously there existed only a few types of companies, whereas at present there are many forms of commercial relationships. However, these are not new legal phenomena. They are distinguished from previous kinds of companies essentially in form, because they are merely new structural designs.
In short, with regard to analyzing social alterations, we must adopt the following conclusion. From a juridical perspective, social changes cannot be restricted to a single definition. Generally speaking, two streams of social transformation can be identified in this regard. On the one hand, there are the cases of completely new legal phenomena that are without previous record, while on the other there are those that possess obvious connections or similarities to previous and familiar elements within the existing legal framework, though they may have each adopted a partially, or entirely new form.
Flexibility of the Islamic Legal System
The precise criticism introduced by this argument against the concept of an “Islamic state”, when we are confined to the juridical aspect, is that the Islamic legal system is incapable of coping with social transformations. Hence, because it is inflexible and unable to meet the juridical requirements of new circumstances, it cannot possibly satisfy the legal demands of human society.
In order to efficiently cope with the various societal relationships it will inevitably encounter, every legal system prerequires the existence of flexible elements in its methodology and basic foundations. Although the Islamic legal system does not contain these factors, it is essential that we realize that it has aspects that provide it with the capacity to meet and fulfil all the juridical requirements presented by the two aforementioned categories of social change.
The Islamic legal system is fully equipped to deal with the first category of social changes. Even though the historical advent of Islam occurred during a specific time and in a specific place, it is quite reasonable to extrapolate a universal, ahistorical and timeless legal framework for different aspects of social relationships. Many legal aspects of social alterations can, in fact, remain stable in spite of their formal changes. This enables Islamic law (Shari’ah) to form a general juridical framework for the various categories of social associations. In reference to different sections of Islamic law, there exist a selection of unchanging, absolute and general rules that, at any time and place, all Muslims are obliged to respect; they are required to harmonize their public and private relationships with these rules. For example, in commercial affairs there are some general rules as follows:
It is incumbent upon believers to fulfil their contracts and obligations:
O you who believe! Fulfil the obligations. [Chapter 5, Verse 1]
Some types of contracts and commercial agreements are prohibited because they include unlawful profit such as usury:
Allah has allowed trading and forbidden usury. [Chapter 2, Verse 275]
Lawful commercial and financial contracts and covenants must fulfil some general conditions such as mutual consent without coercion and must not be subject to false methods of attaining wealth, for example, gambling:
O you who believe! Do not devour your property among yourselves falsely, except that it be trading by your mutual consent. [Chapter 4, Verse 29]
These examples of obligations, prohibitions and conditions concerning one aspect of social life, even though they do not embrace all the Islamic edicts in this field, help us to confront developing models of contracts. New forms of contracts, whether they are altered versions of familiar and prevailing models or entirely original ideas without previous record, can be categorized as either lawful or unlawful according to these three principals and so on. For instance, “insurance” is an example of an entirely new contract, while purchasing books via an online bookstore is merely a new method of trading which, although formally different, is a continuation of a particular category of business. When all these new forms of contracts adopt and fulfil the framework that has been drawn by Shari’ah, they are considered lawful.
The other important aspect concerning the flexibility of Islamic law emerges when we take into consideration the role of covenant and promise in this context. Some verses of the Qur’an order Muslims to fulfil their promises when they enter into a covenant or agreement:
And fulfil the promise, surely every promise shall be questioned about. [Chapter 17, Verse 34]
This Islamic principle enables an Islamic state to enter into international conventions, in order to make use of their advantages, even though some of these conventions are concerned with completely new forms of social relationships, such as maritime laws or laws governing airlines and international trade, of which there is no previous record in the Shari’ah.
The doctrine of “Ijtihad”, which is the deduction of laws through reference to Islamic sources, enables a qualified Jurist (faqih) to deduce responses to both old and new questions. Every qualified faqih is free to issue new decrees with regards to subjects that have no previous record amongst other Imami jurists; thereby providing the Islamic legal system with a high degree of flexibility, which enables it to confront new situations and circumstances. This potential is reinforced in view of jurists who subscribe to a doctrine that advocates the absolute guardianship of the well-qualified faqih (Wilayat-a-mutlaqih). This doctrine insists that the trustworthy jurist, who is responsible for Muslim society, has the right to legislate according to specific conditions. This subject will be discussed further in the next chapter.
Rational Management versus Juristic Management
Misconceptions surrounding the implementation of Shari’ah and the role of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in governing a state and it’s society, have given rise to two opposing groups, who erroneously come to the conclusion that the Islamic method of governance is completely incompatible with “rational management”, which prevails in most modern states. This group is divided into two categories; the first of which insists that Muslims in the modern world must submit to the organization of their economic, political, social and cultural affairs through rational and technical management. In this model of regulation, the human intellect, technology and the sciences have authority, while religion remains separate from worldly affairs. Therefore all public decisions and the organizing of the fundamental structures of society are fulfilled according to the rational form of authority.
The second group, however, advocates the total authority of religion and attempts to organize social affairs by presenting absolute “juristic management”. This model of management, according to them, ignores the role of humanistic sources of knowledge and instead insists that the solution to all problems must emanate solely from Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). In other words, this school of thought endeavours to replace rationality and reference to scientific means, with religion and purely juristic solutions.
It was indicated previously that this misleading interpretation for the role of Islamic jurisprudence with regards to social management and the making of political or economic decisions, arises from a misunderstanding of the term “religious state” and “religious social order”. This misconception of a religious society and state grants a foothold to the critics who wish to portray the Islamic state as backward and ignorant of the demands of the contemporary world and who depict Islam as a system that denies human knowledge, rationality and progress.
Adopting the Islamic ideology and applying its laws and aims in order to harmonize different aspects of life is one thing, and ignorance of human knowledge and rationality is another. Drawing such a sharp and distinctive line between juridical and rational management is purely fictitious, as it overlooks any possible cooperation between these two methods, while incorrectly assuming that a religious state’s model of government does not overlap with that of a non- religious state’s in any way, shape or form (When in fact all states are burdened with similar responsibilities). Consequently, this third model would enjoy the advantages of both methods of management and combine rationality with respect to the ultimate authority of religion. The unusual, and irrationally narrow distinction between the two models of management, fails to provide any definite reason to suppose that the integration of religious authority and rationality is either impossible or incompatible. According to the history of Islamic thought, the Shi’a and Mutazali schools have always believed in rationalism. They endorse the role of the human intellect as a significant source of religious knowledge alongside Islamic evidence (Qur’an and hadith).
Rationality is included with Islamic sources and reasoning is taken into account as a part of religious knowledge.
It is necessary to emphasize that organizing social relationships, in its full scope, involves many facets. These include legislation, politics and policymaking as well as industrial-economic planning, social services and education. It is incorrect to suppose that, under an Islamic government, these functions and tasks would be undertaken exclusively by jurists and that all types of social, economic and cultural difficulties would be resolvable by jurisprudence.
In fact, the fundamental distinction between an Islamic state and a secular one should be based on the acceptance or denial of the authority of Islam in social affairs, rather than the denial of rationality and scientific knowledge. An Islamic authority would address the needs of a society according to the criteria laid down by Islam; the extent to which jurisprudence and Shari’ah influence this depends on the depth to which Islam has defined the subject matter. For instance, the role of Shari’ah is greater in legislation than in policy making or international politics. The various elements of an Islamic government must harmonize and adapt their functions, policies and decisions to the contents of Islam, though they are able to employ their reasoning and scientific knowledge wherever it is required.
In conclusion, the allegation that Islam is somehow unable to cope with social progress or changes to various aspects of human existence is false. Islam cannot be confined to a specific time or set of circumstances, as it has within it the capacity to guide humanity towards happiness at all times. However, Islam’s ability to adapt to the demands of various social formations and situations should not be taken to mean that Islam has a passive attitude towards alternative lifestyles. It is illogical to assume that every kind of cultural, social or economic relationship can be universally endorsed by Islam, for it has timeless rules, values and objectives that disagree with certain types of associations and lifestyles. This approach is not the product of essential links to a specific model of social formation or a particular social order. Rather, it is an active and dynamic attitude that emerges from a set of unchanging rules and principals that are not restricted to a specific age or generation.
Objectives of an Islamic State
Ideological aims and functions are an essential part of any political system, as they serve to distinguish and separate it from alternative doctrines. Objectives such as creating a welfare state and extending education or promoting prosperity and defending a nation’s borders are not specific to any one model of political system. In fact, almost all political theories commonly emphasize upon these targets. Therefore, it is necessary that we define the unique objectives of a religious government and discuss how they set it apart from other political systems.
Implementation of the Shari’ah
The application of Islamic laws and rulings is a fundamental aspect of the religious state. A government that neglects the Shari’ah cannot be considered a legitimate Islamic authority; as such a notion is paradoxical and ultimately self- contradicting. The Holy Qur’an obliges the believers to implement, protect and respect Islamic laws in all spheres of their public and private lives. For example, take the following verses:
And we have revealed to you the Book with the Truth, verifying what is before it of the book and a guardian over it, therefore, judge between them by what Allah revealed. [Chapter 5, Verse 48]
And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed, they are the unbelievers. [Chapter 5, Verse 44]
Allah raised prophets as bearers of good news and warners, and He revealed with them the book with truth, that it might judge between people in that in which they differed. [Chapter 2, Verses 2 & 3]
These are the limits of Allah, so do no exceed them, and whoever exceeds the limits of Allah, these it is that are the unjust. [Chapter 2, Verse 229]
And if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to Allah and His messenger. [Chapter 4, Verse 59]
For the government and citizens of the Islamic state to fulfil this duty, it becomes essential for the state’s laws to be consistent with the Shari’ah and it’s ruling system to be founded upon the principals of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). As pointed out, many modern Muslim intellectuals have criticized this jurisprudential conception, insisting that Shari’ah must be separated from governance, public affairs and the shaping of the system of human rights and duties that regulate society. They maintain that these should be governed according to human sciences, rationality and an extra-religious conception of human rights, rather than through Islamic jurisprudence. This ultimately secular approach belittles the importance of the Shari’ah and its practical necessity in an Islamic state. This approach shall be further assessed in the final chapter when considering the arguments of those who seek to reconcile Islam with liberal democracy.
To Enjoin the Good and Forbid the Evil
Islam has made it incumbent upon believing men and women to establish a healthy society, which is purified of corruption and wrongdoing and conducts itself correctly and avoids injustice. This duty is embodied in the principal of “al-amr’ bi’l maruf’ wal-nahi an al-munkar” (Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil) that is mentioned in the following verses of the Qur’an:
And from among you there should be a party who invite to good and enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong and these it is that shall be successful. [Chapter 3, Verse 104]
And (as for) the believing men and the believing women, they are guardians of each other; they enjoin good and forbid evil. [Chapter 9, Verse 71]
Calling people to what is right and preventing injustice is the joint responsibility of the state and its citizens. An Islamic government cannot remain neutral concerning the moral- religious conditions of society. Also, as well as being accountable for affairs such as security, welfare and social order, the government is also charged with maintaining human virtues, common good, morality and religious commitment.
Unlike most contemporary political theories, especially those formed upon the traditions of liberalism, Islam does not support the concept of a ‘limited state’. According to this liberal approach, the authority of a government is limited by the scope and framework defined by liberalism and it’s interpretation of human rights and social justice, which are connected to the underlying values of liberal doctrine. Consequently, the government is rendered unable to adopt a partial position with regards to morality, religion or ethics. Whether someone is moral or immoral, religious or irreligious, these are regarded as individual matters that the individual is able to choose as he pleases. Only if the individual break the law or violates the rights of others is the liberal government allowed to interfere in their affairs.
However, it must be pointed out that the duty of a religious government, regarding the moral-religious position of society, does not allow Muslim rulers or citizens to impose Islamic beliefs and values upon others. Religious tolerance is a significant characteristic of the Islamic ideology; a fact to which history testifies. For example, the Jews and Christians of the Spanish Peninsula enjoyed the same rights, security and prosperity afforded to all citizens of the Islamic state, as did many other ethnic and religious minorities throughout the domain of Islam at that time.
The nature of a religious government’s responsibility regarding the moral condition of society is concerned primarily with decision-making, legislation and government policy. An Islamic state is obliged to maximize the opportunities to promote spirituality, moral values and individual virtues, while providing the people with a stable environment in which to attain a comfortable, safe and fruitful existence. Essentially, its role is to maintain a healthy social atmosphere. People are free to adopt their own beliefs and opinions, but in public they must respect and abide by Islamic laws. For instance, it is not the duty of an Islamic government to monitor the private lives of it’s people to discover whether or not they drink alcohol, but no one is allowed to publicly consume the substance, as this would damage the social environment, and it is the responsibility of an Islamic authority to protect society from corruption and immorality.
From the Islamic view the problem of happiness and wickedness eventually rests on the choice made by the individual. Almighty God says:
Surely we have shown him the way; he may be thankful or unthankful. [Chapter 76, Verse 3]
That is because those who disbelieve follow falsehood, and those who believe follow the truth from their Lord. [Chapter 47, Verse 3]
Therefore an individual is allowed to adopt his or her personal wishes and ideas in private, but these cannot be allowed to infringe upon the moral health and stability of society. Nothing must prevent the government and believers from striving to create desirable social circumstances, or promoting Islamic values in order to remove the obstacles in the path of a truly correct and fulfilling lifestyle.
Modern political doctrines tend to emphasize human rights, rather than human goods. For them, it would be more desirable and practical if we concentrated on defining the mutual duties of the rulers and the ruled according to the rights of human beings. This is because other concepts such as happiness, virtue and social good are often ambiguous, subjective and controversial. For example, there is a strong tradition in political thought that amongst the members of any polity there is a common good and the function of the government is to determine and actualize this. However, adversaries argue that there are a number of significant difficulties regarding the idea of a “common good”. Modernist political thinkers usually ask “what is a common good? and how are we to know what it is?” Robert Dahl says:
Every attempt I have seen to prescribe the common good is either too limited to be generally accepted or too general to be very relevant and helpful[12].
The Islamic doctrine approaches this problem of “common good” by extending it beyond the boundaries of a community. Not only do the members of a community have a common good but also all human beings have a common good. Islam believes that human beings share common inclinations and needs, which they are able to fulfil correctly through their own actions with the aid of a desirable, just and true Islamic government.
To Protect True Freedom of Human Beings
Liberty is arguably one of the most important underlying values upon which contemporary western political thought is founded. Although there are contending analyses regarding the nature of freedom amongst western thinkers, liberals traditionally recognize individual freedom as the most fundamental human value and they define and evaluate all other values according to their relationship with it[13].
Because most people, especially in the west, adopt a liberal conception of liberty, they often have reservations about whether a truly religious government can promote the freedom of its subjects. At a glance, it may seem strange to suppose that Islam, with its binding nature and limitations, could act as an effective safeguard of human freedom. But before proceeding with this discussion, it is appropriate to explore and assess the liberal theory of freedom.
Also known as the negative view of liberty, the liberal conception of freedom has come to be understood as the absence of coercion. This definition of freedom emanates from the works of thinkers such as Hobbes and Bentham, who envisaged it merely as the absence of external, physical or legal impediments. However, this theory fails to acknowledge less immediate or obvious obstacles to freedom, such as lack of awareness, false consciousness, repression or other inner factors of this kind. In fact, it insists that to speak of such inner factors as relevant to the issue of freedom, is to abuse words. The only clear meaning that can be given to this perception of freedom is the absence of external obstacles[14].
Alternatively, the positive view of liberty asserts that freedom involves the realization of some specific capacities, abilities and powers. And it implies that if these are not realized, then the individual is not truly free, even if he or she is not subject to external coercion. Whereas negative freedom is best described as ‘freedom from’ (compulsion), positive freedom can be termed as ‘freedom to’, meaning that an individual must be free to realize his capabilities. Therefore, it is necessary for positive freedom to adopt a theory concerning human nature and a set of ideas about human needs and abilities[15].
Taylor maintains that the positive perception of freedom concerns the exercising of control of ones life:
Doctrines of positive freedom are concerned with a view of freedom which involves essentially the exercising of control over one’s lives; one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of ones life. The concept of freedom here is an exercise-concept[16].
According to the Islamic conception of human nature, we are subject to various desires and capacities. Those who follow merely their natural instincts will remain in the prison of their low desires, unable to realize their potential. But those who exercise control over themselves and strive for self-purification, rather than merely obeying their impulses, are truly free. The Qur’an says:
Have you considered the one who takes his low desires as his Master; Allah has made him err having knowledge and has set a seal upon his ear, his heart and placed a covering upon his eyes. Who can then guide him after Allah? Will you not then be mindful? [Chapter 45, Verse 23]
Then know that they only follow their low desires, and who is more erring than he who follows his low desires without any guidance from Allah? Surely Allah does not guide the unjust people. [Chapter 28, Verse 50]
From this perspective, namely the positive interpretation of freedom, Islam should be recognized as a perfect form of guidance from Allah and a divine means to achieve true human freedom. The Qur’an says:
Those who follow the Apostle Prophet, the ummi, whom they find written down with them in the Taurat [Torah] and the Injeel [Gospel], (who) enjoins them good and forbids them evil, and makes things lawful to them the good things and makes unlawful to them impure things, and removes from their burden and the shackles which were upon them, so (as for) those who believe in him and honour him and help him, and follows the light which has been sent down with him, there is it that are the successful. [Chapter 7, Verse 157]
This verse among many others like it, state that the revelation received by the Prophet was sent as guidance to all mankind. That Islam is able to free human beings from the shackles placed upon them by their low desires, to raise them from a state of ignorance (concerning God and the hereafter) and to elevate them to a position of enlightenment and progress. By submitting oneself to the divine revelation and teachings of the Prophet, the individual is making an obvious commitment to worship and obey God, to control oneself and to accept certain limitations. In other words, Islam is a religion; a way of life that encompasses both spiritual and worldly aspects, thus obliging its followers to follow a specific lifestyle. This disagrees with the liberal ‘negative’ conception of human liberty, because it establishes boundaries and limitations upon freewill. But according to the Islamic point of view, these limitations help them to attain true freedom embodied in spiritual life and nearness to Allah.
In conclusion, one of the key objectives of an Islamic state is to prepare a desirable social condition, so that people are able to realize their full capacities, and thus free themselves from burdens. This self-realization means that people can promote their individual virtues and prepare themselves for the ultimate salvation.
Establishing a just society and respecting human equality Justice (Adl) and Equality (Qest) are two of the most important aspects of the Islamic ideology. There are many verses of the Qur\'an that oblige the believers to treat people equally and to deal with them justly.
Certainly we sent our apostles with clear arguments, and sent down with them the book and the balance that men may conduct themselves with equity. [Chapter 57, Verse 25]
Surely Allah commands you to make over trusts to their owners and that when you judge rule between people you judge with justice. [Chapter 4, Verse 58]
O you who believe, be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness of Allah\'s sake, though it may be against your own-selves or your parents or near relatives, if he be rich or poor, Allah is nearer to them in compassion; therefore, do not follow low desires, lest you deviate; and if your swerve or turn aside, then surely Allah is aware of what you do. [Chapter 4, Verse 135]
These concepts of justice and equality encompass many different aspects of individual and public affairs. With specific regard to politics, they require the government to ensure that all people are granted an equal entitlement to citizenship, protection, the rights granted by Islam, and the benefits that accompany it, regardless of their ethnicity, beliefs or talents.
However, the establishment of a society upon justice and equality does not require ‘legal equality’. Meaning that it does not need to adopt a legal system that endorses universal and indiscriminate rights and duties for all members of that society. In fact, in its most precise definition, legal equality is clearly impractical. All contemporary legal systems adopt legal inequalities within their structures of rights and duties. In politics for example, no democratic state allows children to vote, while in economics the salary of a qualified expert is greater than that of a labourer. Equally so, the Islamic legal system, which was revealed as divine law, includes legal inequalities. These arise in cases such as that of inheritance, where the share of a woman is less than that of a man. Therefore, social justice and fair governance cannot be defined as merely overlooking all categories of inequality. Instead, Islamic social justice is realized by the correct and complete implementation of the Islamic laws (Shari’ah) and values without exception.
Thus an Islamic state is distinguished by the objectives stated above, which have been laid down by the Qur’an and Islamic traditions. Other objectives include the eradication of tyranny, the promotion of tolerance and peaceful co- existence with non-Muslims in Islamic territory, the dissemination of knowledge amongst the people and the creation of a welfare society in order to decrease the economic divide between the rich and the poor. Finally, it is also essential that the Islamic government should be led by a just and well-qualified leader, so that it may realize it’s fundamental aims. This is emphasized in the following tradition of Imam Rida (peace be upon him):
Some of the reasons behind appointments of lawful amirs (holders of authority) by God and making their obedience obligatory are as follows: Firstly, people would feel duty bound to follow certain rulers that would rescue them from corruption. It is not possible to follow such rulers unless power is entrusted on a trustee ruler. Secondly, prosperity of nations depends on the existence of rulers who try to solve their temporal and spiritual problems. God, the Wise, never leaves His creatures without a guide. The third reason is that, in the absence of a right leader and guide, the religious commandments and orders would be ruined[17].
Spheres of Islamic Political Thought
At present, there is a significantly broad scope for political debates. Many scholars and intellectuals examine various spheres of political thought such as political philosophy, political ideology, political science and political systems. Thinkers who explore the relationship between Islam and politics are usually interested by what sort of political knowledge Islam provides, whether or not Islam supports political philosophy or advocates a specific political ideology and whether or not Islamic sources support a particular form of political system.
Historically, Islamic political thought has been concerned with leadership; the means of appointing a political authority and the qualities that a ruler must possess. One might suppose that Islam has restricted the discussion to a particular area of debate, and that it therefore overlooks many serious political concerns. However, it is necessary for us to distinguish between the political heritage of Muslim thinkers and what is provided by the contents of Islam. The political heritage of Muslims is embodied in the works of a selection of prominent Shi’a and Sunni jurists, philosophers and theologians, whose disciplines can be placed into four major categories: “political theology”, “political philosophy”, “political jurisprudence” and “political ethics”. It is essential that we briefly review these aspects of Islamic political thought in order to clarify the perspective and nature of the discussions in the following chapters.
i) Political Theology
The nature of Islamic political debates has been deeply influenced by a long history of theological (kalam) disagreement between Shi’a and Sunni scholars. Shi’a political thought, the original and oldest Islamic political theory, is essentially theological because its primary concern is leadership; the characteristics of the rightful leader and the correct method of identifying and appointing him. The Shi’a school of thought does not restrict these issues to a solely political or juridical (fiqh) discussion, rather they are considered a fundamental component of the Islamic ideology. Imamate is the focal point of this aspect of political thought and many books have been written by an assortment of thinkers from different sects on this topic.
ii) Political Philosophy
Political philosophy refers to a set of political consequences that are inferred from fundamental metaphysical-moral issues. The political writings of Al-Farabi are a typical example of Islamic achievements in this field. By definition, political philosophy should remain independent of any particular religious system or set of beliefs, as it is based upon metaphysical and rational foundations. However, Islamic political philosophers have formed deeply rational grounds for many Islamic doctrines before applying these as religious-philosophical premises in their political philosophy.
To deny the validity of Islamic political philosophy is to ignore the philosophical and ideological aspects of political issues. Many philosophical problems in politics have a close relationship with religion. And there are many Islamic teachings that offer, either directly or indirectly, suitable answers to some essential questions in political philosophy.
iii) Political Ethics
Political ethics (or the morals of politics) refers to a series of writings from Muslim scholars, who have attempted to advise and guide rulers to a successful and just method of government. These prescriptions were usually accompanied by stories of previous kings and rulers. They were collections of Islamic teachings, Greek philosophy and some elements of Persian literature. Examples of these include “Siyasat Nameh” (Book of Government) of Nidham al-Mulk (1020-1092), and “Nasihat al-Mulk” (Advice to King) of Ghazzali (1058-1111).
iv) Political Jurisprudence
Muslim jurists (fuqaha) adopted the method of political jurisprudence (or “fiqh ul-siyasi”) to explicate and define the Islamic political system and juridical aspects of political affairs. They discussed the duties of rulers over their subjects, the means for appointing and the grounds for dismissing of political leaders, the personal qualities that an Imam or Deputy (caliph) should possess, and the relationship between different elements of the government to one another. Political jurisprudence overlaps political theology in several areas, such as the discussion concerning leadership. However, political jurisprudence is distinguished by its methodology and the large scope of its subject matter.
“Al-ahkam as-sultaniyya”, written by the jurist Al-Mawardi between 1045 and 1058, is a good example of this facet of Islamic political heritage.
The assumption that Islam has a political ideology implies that it is impossible for one of these disciplines of political thought to illuminate its dimensions in isolation from the others. Ideology, as a political term, refers to a collection of ideas and instructions that are capable of directing political action. Every political ideology includes ultimate aims and offers a particular form of political regime that emphasizes upon specific norms, values and rights in order to draw a framework for all political affairs. In summary, a political ideology is a set of ideas that is considered as a decisive solution for the political aspects of human life. It attempts to adjust and arrange political relationships according to determined ideas and directives. Every political ideology ultimately relies upon political philosophy, because it must express its position according to fundamental political- philosophical issues, namely questions concerning human nature, the concept of justice, freedom and it’s limitation and the relationship between liberty and equality and so on.
From this brief exploration of political ideology, it becomes clear how extensive the dimensions of a comprehensive political theory might be. Thus, any explanation of Islamic political ideology must develop all four aspects of Islamic political heritage; especially regarding political philosophy and jurisprudence.
However, it is not the intention of this book to explicate the entire Islamic political system, including the wide disputes and disagreements amongst the various Islamic sects and movements. The focus of the following pages will be on Imami political theory, which is known as the doctrine of Imamate in the age of the present, infallible Imam, and as “Wilayat al-Faqih” in the age of the absent Imam. Although, in order to keep this book concise, the political ideology shall not be discussed in great depth, the most important aspects of it will be clarified. The content and debate of the next chapters will be a composition of theological, philosophical and mostly Islamic juridical (fiqh) discussions.
Notes:
[1] Oliver Leaman, A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, Polity Press, 1999, p. 134.
[2] Born in Egypt, a disciple of Shaykh Abduh, Abd al-Raziq studied at Oxford University and was a senior member of al-Azhar University, an authorative centre of Sunni learning. His short, but controversial book caused many debates in religious and political circles. Al-Azhar immediately condemned Abd al-Raziq’s work; he was thrown out of the university and dismissed from his position as a religious judge.
[3] Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, Cairo 1925, p. 73.
[4] Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, Cairo 1925, pp. 62-64.
[5] Anthony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 2001, p. 10.
[6] Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought, p. 5.
[7] Tabary, Tareekh al-Rasul wa al-Malik (History of Messengers and Kings), volume 3, p. 318.
[8] Ahmed Abd al-Razig al-Senhoury, Fiqh ul-Khilafah wa Tataworeha (The Jurisprudence of Caliphate and Development), Cairo, 2nd Edition, 1993, p. 82.
[9] Mehdi Haery Yazdi, Hekmat wa Hokumat, London: Shadi Publication, 1995, p. 143.
[10] Mehdi Haery Yazdi, Hekmat wa Hokumat, London: Shadi Publication, 1995, p. 152
[11] Muhammad Amareh, Al-Elmaniya wa Nehzatona, Cairo: Dar al- Shorugh, 1986, p. 35.
[12] Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, Yale University Press, 1989, p.283.
[13] For instance Immanuel Kant in ‘Theory and practice’ defines justice as ‘the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else’. For him justice is more than a condition in which external freedom is guaranteed to all, it is a condition of maximum liberty for all. Allen Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice, Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 9-11.
[14]Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” in Contemporary Political Philosophy, Robert E. Goodin (ed), Blackwell, 1997, p. 418.
[15] Rymond Plant, Modern Political Thought, Blackwell, 1991, p. 222-3.
[16] Charles Taylor, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Blackwell, 1997, p. 419.
[17] Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Babwayh (al-shaykh al-Saduq), Ellal al- Shariah, Qom: Maktiba Davari, p. 253.
Ahmed Vaezy
Source: Imam reza network
Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist
Foreword
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
All praise be to God; there is neither might nor strength but from God, the Exalted, the Sublime. May peace and blessings be upon the Messenger of God, Muhammad, the Seal of the Prophets, and his purified progeny.
The present book, Governance of the Jurist, including relevant footnotes and explanations, is the compendium of thirteen speeches of His Eminence Imām Khomeini delivered during his stay in Najaf from January 21 to February 8, 1970. Now, this book is presented to the knowledgeable researchers and those ardent of the works of Imām Khomeini. These speeches had been reproduced and disseminated then in various forms as lessons and instruction materials. Later, in autumn of 1970 the texts of the speeches were edited and prepared for printing. Following the approval of Imām Khomeini, it was printed in Beirut (Lebanon) by Imām Khomeini’s friends, then secretly sent to Iran, while copies of which were simultaneously sent to the revolutionary Muslims in Europe, United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In 1977, before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the book was published in Iran entitled, A Letter from Imām Mūsāwi Kāshif al-Ghitā and Jihād-i Akbar as its supplement. Like the other works of Imām Khomeini, the book Governance of the Jurist had been considered on top of the list of prohibited books for publication during the Shāh’s regime. So many people were imprisoned and tortured on the charge of publishing, possessing, or reading the book. However, despite all pressures exerted by the SAVAK (the Shāh’s notorious secret police) and restraints imposed by the Shāh’s regime, the notion to support the establishment of an Islamic government whose legislative principles are expounded here by Imām Khomeini, gained a widespread adherence among the revolutionary Muslim forces at the religious seminaries, universities and other notable centers; and with the 15th of Khurdād uprising and Imām Khomeini’s movement, the idea of establishing an Islamic government based on governance of the jurist was crystallized as a fundamental idea. The Islamic jurists (fuqahā) have generally been involved in the issue of governance of the jurist in different subject matters in fiqh, some briefly and some in details. However, no comprehensive and orderly discourse is found in the fiqh books of predecessors; the reason being the unfavorable political and social conditions prevailing over Islamic countries in the past and the dominance of tyrannical ruling cliques that had made it impossible to touch upon such discussions. But regardless of the difference among fuqahā on the extent of authorities and the case applicability of governance of the jurist during the period of Occultation,[1] there is unanimity among them in general as to the affirmation of a certain kind of guardianship authority for the fully competent faqīh. Opinions of fuqahā on the kind of guardianship and the extent of authorities of the Islamic jurists during the period of Occultation have been recently compiled and published in some books.
According to available sources, the late Āyatullāh Mullā Ahmad Narāqi[2] (one of the Qājār dynasty contemporary scholars) has dealt with this subject matter in his book ‘Awā’id al-Ayyām more detailed than the others. He first tried to seek evidence from numerous narrations proving that the faqīh is entrusted with guardianship rights during the Occultation period in the following areas:
In all instances, where the Prophet and the infallible Imāms (‘a) had been authorized and assigned as guardians except in cases, where this had been excluded due to religiously legal requirement.
In all instances related to religious and living duties of people that must be carried out.
By relying on Qur’anic verses, Prophetic traditions, and jurisprudential arguments, he continues the discourse by giving ten examples of applicable cases within the sphere of governance of the jurist such as iftā; administering punishment; protecting the properties of the orphans, insane, and the absent individuals; and taking possession of properties of the infallible Imāms.
Although it can be understood from the late Narāqi’s discussions that he has included governance within the same sphere, he has not openly stressed on it.
After the late Narāqi, Imām Khomeini was the only faqīh to deal tacitly with the governance of the jurist for the first time and proved the point. As indicated earlier, Imām Khomeini had once discussed the question of governance of the jurist in Najaf in thirteen instructional sessions of which the present book is the transcription and edited form of the same course instructions. He further discussed governance of the jurist in the second volume of his five-volume book entitled, Kitāb al-Bay‘ in the same profound style.
In the present book, Governance of the Jurist, Imām Khomeini has laid great emphasis on guardianship (wilāyat) as a principle, serving as the base and foundation for all duties. He especially examines guardianship from governmental and political points of view. Here, in addition to expounding the political and social factors causing the neglect of the most important Islamic issue, he has methodologically examined the question, and based on the same sturdy approach exercised in fiqh, proceeded with introductory practicable programs for realization of governance of the jurist in the government.
He begins by disclosing the plots and conspiracies made by the enemies to annihilate Islam. Then he continues logically to discuss insinuated misgivings, such as “Islam is not a competent religion to govern the society at the age of industrial civilization” or “legal provisions of Islam are inadequate to resolve the social problems, and to provide us with appropriate answers”.
In this regard Imām Khomeini points out that the misgivings suggested by the enemies to pave the way for the faulty notion of separation of religion from politics, have unfortunately been so much effective; even in the seminaries, one dares not to speak freely about the Islamic government. He further indicated the domestic shortcomings and infatuations for the new civilization, all of which are the souvenir of the devilish propaganda of imperialism. He warned the seminaries, the young clergy students, and the Muslim thinkers to endeavor enormously to carry out their political and social duties and be careful not to be deceived. Islam is not opposed to technological and industrial progress; but social problems require ethical and religious solution, and Islam is that all-embracing religion that can solve all problems, provided the thinkers and scholars of the Islamic world would face the challenge.
By expounding the indisputable historical fact that the Most Noble Messenger (s) had appointed a successor, Imām Khomeini posed the question of “whether the successor had been designed just to expound the religious precepts.” Of course not! Expounding religious precepts does not require to be done by the Prophet’s successor. Therefore the appointment had been for rulership, and for enforcement of laws and regulations. It is most important now to believe in the necessity to establish an Islamic government; thus, we can determine the position and role of the successor.
In this book Imām Khomeini has given some instances proving the necessity for establishing an Islamic government, as follows:
Action taken by the Holy Prophet (s) to establish a government;
The fact that divine precepts are to be enforced perpetually; they are enacted not only for the time of the Holy Prophet (s); they are meant for all time.
The nature and characteristic of Islamic laws and regulations like fiscal, national defense, and legal and penal precepts are such that they are not executable without a government.
After giving quite well-reasoned explanation on the necessity of Islamic government, Imām Khomeini refers to the historical background of deviation from this principle during the Umayyad period and its continuation during the Abbasids who had adopted un-Islamic rule, imitating the Iranian monarchical, Roman imperial and the Egyptian pharaonic systems. And the same way continued afterwards. He stresses on the logical demand for alteration of such systems, and that it is therefore necessary to stir up a political revolution. Accordingly, it is necessary to revolt against tyrannical governments to pave the way for the establishment of Islamic government and the enforcement of Islamic precepts, unification of Islamic ummah that have now fallen into the trap of disunity caused by various domestic elements as well as foreigners, and finally, to save the oppressed and the deprived people as a religious duty of all Muslims, especially the scholars. Imām Khomeini further continues emphasizing on the necessity of establishing an Islamic government, by relating the subject to a narration quoted by Fadl ibn Shādān on the philosophy of ordaining governments as provided for in the narration and traditions.
An important part of the book deals with the difference between an Islamic government and other types of governments, pointing out that the Islamic government is a special kind of constitutional government that is anchored on the Islamic laws. Imām Khomeini believes, therefore, that Islamic legislative power or law-making assemblies are bound to devise all governmental plans and programs within the framework of Islamic precepts; not according to regular procedures followed by other states.
Imām Khomeini further deals with the prerequisite qualities of the ruler, as derived directly from the nature of Islamic government. In addition to the regular requirement such as intelligence and prudence, there are two principal prerequisites for the ruler: his knowledge about the law and his justness.
Governance of the faqīh during the Occultation is the next to be dealt with. Following the previous discussion, Imām Khomeini says, “Now we live at the Occultation period. On the one hand, Islamic precepts are to be enforced, (and no one is designated by God Almighty to fulfill this task), and on the other hand, what should we do then?” He examines this subject matter and comes to the conclusion that “God Almighty has given the quality which is required for rulership to a great number of religious scholars from the very outset of Islam to the advent of the Imām of the Age (‘a). This quality is the knowledge about law and justice. A great number of our contemporary scholars (fuqahā) possess this quality and they should join hands. They will be able to establish a just government in the world.” He then points out that governance of the jurist is an extrinsic and rational issue, and the fully competent faqīh is entrusted with all the authorities; that the Prophet and the infallible Imāms (‘a) were entitled too, for governance; and that this guardianship cannot be realized except through entitlement and that it implies in itself no dignity and status, but only a means of carrying out one’s duty and enforcing religious precepts.
The exalted aims of government, and characteristics required for the ruler are then referred to. Relying on traditions, Imām Khomeini deduces that governance of the jurist implies entitlement to government as well as argumentation that constitutes the greater part of the book. The concluding part of the book deals with the necessity for a long-range planning to achieve this divine objective. Here, Imām Khomeini points out the importance of propagation and instructions, while saying, “Meetings must be directed to serve these two important tasks. Struggles must be stirred as ‘Āshūrā to create waves of crowds insisting on the establishment of Islamic government, and prepared for a long-term struggle while not bearing in mind an immediate achievement”.
The necessity for proper attention to instructions and propagations, moral and cultural reformation of seminaries, annihilation of the moral and cultural effects of imperialism, correction of the pseudo-saints, purging the seminaries of the court ‘ulamā, and finally, taking effective measures to overthrow the oppressive and tyrannical governments, are among the concluding discussions of the book.
Esteemed readers’ attentions are drawn to the fact that after his divine uprising, which, thanks to the divine grace, consciousness and unity of the Muslim people, gained victory over monarchical system in Iran on Bahman 22, 1358 Sh./February 11,1979, Imām Khomeini undertook the leadership of the Islamic Revolution and the guardianship function of the nation. It should, therefore, be taken into consideration that comprehending precisely Imām Khomeini’s viewpoints on governance of the jurist, which is explained in this book, can only be realized when full consideration is given to his personal manners and conducts in the course of his rule and his ideas about the extent of authorities and the station of guardianship as expressed through his speeches, messages and letters.[3]
“O God, foreshorten the arms of the oppressors that are stretched out against the lands of the Muslims and root out all traitors to Islam and the Islamic countries. Awaken the heads of the Muslims states from their deep sleep so that they may exert themselves on behalf of their people’s interests and renounce divisiveness and the quest for personal gain. Grant that the younger generation studying in the religious colleges and the universities may struggle to reach the sacred aims of Islam and strive together, with ranks united, first, to deliver the Islamic countries from the clutches of imperialism and its vile agents, and then to defend them. Grant that the fuqahā and the scholars may strive to guide and enlighten the minds of the people, to convey the sacred aims of Islam to all Muslims, particularly the younger generation, and to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic government. From You is success, and there is neither recourse nor strength except in God, the Exalted, the Sublime.”[4]
The Institute for Compilation and Publication
of Imām Khomeini’s Works
Notes:
[1] See n. 27 of the present volume.
[2] See n. 107 of the present volume.
[3] A collection of the viewpoints and stances on this argumentation is being compiled by this Institute.
[4] The written supplication at the end of the present volume.
Imām Khomeini - a Short Biography
Imām Rūhullāh al-Musawi al-Khomeini was born on September 24, 1902 into a family of strong religious traditions in Khumayn, a small town some hundred kilometers to the southwest of Tehran.[6] Both his grandfather and father were religious scholars. The former, Sayyid Ahmad, was known as al-Hindi because of a period he had spent in India, where a distant branch of the family is said still to exist. The latter, Āyatullāh Mustafā, was murdered by bandits only five months after the birth of Rūhullāh, so that his mother and an aunt were responsible for his early upbringing. At the age of sixteen, he lost both mother and aunt in the course of a single year, and the task of supervising his education then fell to an elder brother, Sayyid Murtadā (better known, in later years, as Āyatullāh Pasandīdeh). Āyatullāh Pasandīdeh recalls that, even in his youth, Imām Khomeini showed great piety, seriousness, and determination. It was the general consensus in Khumayn that a significant if turbulent career awaited him.[7]
At the age of nineteen, the young Khomeini was sent to study religious sciences in the nearby town of Arāk under the guidance of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karīm Hā‘iri[8] who had been a pupil of great scholars at the Shī‘i teaching centers in Iraq, most notably Mīrzā Hasan Shirāzi.[9] His studies under Hā’iri made Khomeini an heir to the traditions established by the great figures of the nineteenth century— traditions that included political activism as well as learning.
The following year, Hā’iri accepted an invitation from the people and scholars of Qum to settle there. Qum had always been a center of learning as well as pilgrimage, but Hā’iri’s arrival there, followed by his reorganization of the religious teaching institution, was the first in a series of development that elevated Qum to the status of spiritual capital of Islamic Iran. The final and decisive development would be the movement of nationwide opposition to the Pahlavi monarchy that Imām Khomeini was to initiate in Qum in 1962.
Indications of Imām Khomeini’s future role were already present in those early years. He attained prominence among the numerous students of Hā’iri, excelling in a wide variety of subjects, but especially ethics and the variety of spiritual philosophy known in Iran as ‘irfān. At the early age of twenty-seven, he wrote a treatise in Arabic on these subjects, Misbāh al-Hidāyah, which was well received by his teachers.[10] Many of Imām Khomeini’s important associates who came to be well known during the Revolution years—e.g. Āyatullāh Muntaziri[11]—recall that they were first attracted to him by his proficiency in ethics and philosophy and that the classes he taught on them twice a week in Qum were frequently attended by hundreds of people.[12]
Given the current fame of Imām Khomeini as a revolutionary leader who has achieved a rare degree of success in the purely political sphere, it may appear surprising that he first gained fame as a writer and teacher concerned with devotional and even mystical matters. For Imām Khomeini, however, spirituality and mysticism have never implied social withdrawal or political quietism, but rather the building up of a fund of energy that finds its natural expression on the sociopolitical plane. The life of Imām Khomeini is a clear indication that the Revolution wrought by Islam necessarily begins in the moral and spiritual realm.[13] The classes he taught at Qum in the 1930s bore witness to this; topics of an ethical and spiritual nature were constantly interwoven with evocations of the problems of the day and exhortations to his listeners to devote themselves to solving them as part of their religious duty.
The early years of Imām Khomeini’s activity in Qum coincided with the establishment of the Pahlavi state by Rizā Khān. Rizā Khān transformed the Iranian monarchy into a dictatorship of the modern, totalitarian kind and made its chief internal aim the elimination of Islam as a political, social, and cultural religion. Efforts directed towards this aim were directly witnessed by Imām Khomeini in Qum, and reports reached him regularly from other cities such as Mashhad, Isfahan and Tabriz. What he saw and heard in those years left a deep impression on him; the repressive measures directed against the religious institution in later years by the second and last of the Pahlavi shāhs, Muhammad Rizā, were for him a natural and direct continuation of what he had experienced in the period of Rizā Shāh; the father and the son were of a piece.
Imām Khomeini’s first public statement of a political nature came in a book published in 1941, Kashf al-Asrār.[14] The book is essentially a detailed, systematic critique of an anti-religious tract, but it also contains numerous passages that are overtly political and critics of the Pahlavi rule.
In 1937, Hā’iri died, and the religious institution was temporarily headed by a triumvirate of his closest senior associates: Āyatullāhs Sadr, Hujjat, and Khwansāri. Soon, however, a single leader succeeded to the role of Hā’iri, Āyatullāh Burūjirdi. Imām Khomeini was active in promoting the candidacy of Burūjirdi, whom he expected to utilize the potentialities of the position of supreme religious authority in order to combat the Pahlavi rule. He remained close to Burūjirdi until his death in 1962, but other influences prevailed on Burūjirdi; history regards him as a religious leader of great piety and administrative ability, but almost totally inactive in political matters.[15]
After the death of Burūjirdi, no single successor to his position emerged. Khomeini was reluctant to allow his own name to be canvassed, but he ultimately yielded to the urgings of close associates that a collection of his rulings on matters of religious practice be published, thus implicitly declaring his availability as leader and authority. It was not, however, primarily through technical procedures such as this that the prominence of Imām Khomeini spread first within Qum, and then throughout the country. Of greater importance was his willingness to confront the Shāh’s regime at a time when few dared to do so. For example, he was alone among the major religious scholars of Qum in extending support publicly to the students at the religious institution who were campaigning against the opening of liquor stores in the city.
Soon his attention was drawn to matters of greater significance. The first step came in October 1962, when the Shāh promulgated a law abolishing the requirement that candidates for election to local assemblies be Muslim and male. Imām Khomeini, joined by religious leaders elsewhere in the country, protested vigorously against the measure; it was ultimately repealed.[16] The measure itself was not intrinsically important, because elections to local assemblies were invariably corrupt and their functions were purely formal. But the campaign against it provided a point of departure for more comprehensive agitation against the regime as well as an opportunity to build a coalition of religious scholars that might be mobilized for more fundamental aims in the future.
The next step was taken in 1963, when the Shāh began to promulgate a series of measures for reshaping the political, social and economic life of Iran that were collectively designated the “White Revolution”. The appearance of popular approval was obtained by a fraudulent referendum held on January 26, 1963. However, the measures in question were correctly perceived by a large segment of Iranian society as being imposed on the country by the United States and designed to bring about augmentation of the Shāh’s power and wealth, as well as intensification of the United States dominance, which had been instituted with the CIA coup d’état against Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddiq in August 1953. Imām Khomeini moved immediately to denounce the fraudulent “revolution” and to expose the motives that underlay it, preaching a series of sermons from Fayziyyah Madrasah[17] in Qum that had a nationwide impact.
The Shāh’s regime responded by sending paratroopers to attack Fayziyyah Madrasah on March 22, 1963. A number of students were killed and the madrasah was ransacked. Far from intimidating Imām Khomeini, this event marked the beginning of a new period of determined struggle that was directed not only against the errors and excesses of the regime, but against its very existence. The attack on the madrasah had an almost symbolic value, exemplifying as it did both the hostility of the regime to Islam and Islamic institutions and the ruthless, barbaric manner in which it expressed that hostility.
Throughout the spring of 1963, Imām Khomeini continued to denounce the Shāh’s regime. He concentrated his attacks on its tyrannical nature, its subordination to the United States, and its expanding collaboration with Israel. The confrontation reached a new peak in June with the onset of Muharram, the month in the Muslim calendar when the martyrdom of Imām Husayn (‘a), the grandson of the Prophet (s), is commemorated and aspirations to emulate his example, by struggling against contemporary manifestation of tyranny, are awakened. On the tenth day of the month, Imām Khomeini delivered a historic speech in Qum, repeating his denunciations of the Shāh’s regime and warning the Shāh not to behave in such a way that the people would rejoice when he should ultimately be forced to leave the country.[18] Two days later, he was arrested at his residence and taken to confinement in Tehran.
The arrest of Imām Khomeini brought popular disgust with the Shāh’s regime to a climax, and a major uprising shook the throne. In Qum, Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad, Isfahan, Kashan, and other cities, unarmed demonstrators confronted the Shāh’s US-trained and -equipped army, which, upon the command to shoot to kill, slaughtered not less than 15,000 people in the space of a few days. The date on which this uprising began, Khurdād 15 according to the solar calendar used in Iran, marked a turning point in the modern history of Iran. It established Imām Khomeini as national leader and spokesperson for popular aspirations, provided the struggle against the Shāh and his foreign patrons with a coherent ideological basis in Islam, and introduced a period of mass political activity under the guidance of the religious leadership instead of the secular parties that had been discredited, with the overthrow of Musaddiq. In all of these ways, uprising of Khurdād 15 foreshadowed the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979.
The uprising was suppressed, but the general public and the religious scholars refused to tolerate the imprisonment of Imām Khomeini. Agitation persisted throughout the country, and numerous religious leaders converged on Tehran to press for Imām Khomeini’s release. It finally came on April 6,1964, accompanied by a statement in the government-controlled press that Imām Khomeini had agreed to refrain from political activity as a condition for his release. This was immediately refuted by the Imām,[19] who resumed his denunciation of the regime with undiminished vigor.
If further proof were needed of the Shāh’s tutelage to the US, it came in October 1964, when legal immunity was granted to American personnel for all offenses committed in Iranian territory. After learning that the Iranian rubber–stamp Majlis (Parliament) had agreed to this measure, Imām Khomeini spent a sleepless night, and the next day, October 27, he furiously denounced this open violation of Iranian sovereignty and independence.[20] It had by now become apparent to the Shāh and his foreign overlords that Imām Khomeini could not be intimidated into silence, and it was decided to exile him, in the vain hope of destroying his influence. Accordingly, on November 4,1964 Imām Khomeini was arrested again and sent into exile in Turkey, accompanied by agents of the Shāh’s secret police.
After a brief stay in Ankara, Imām Khomeini was obliged to take up residence in Bursa, a city in the west of Turkey. Continual pressure was brought on the Shāh’s regime to permit Imām Khomeini to leave Turkey for a more favorable place of exile, Najaf, one of the Shī‘i shrine cities of Iraq. In October 1965, consent was given, and Imām Khomeini proceeded to Najaf, which was to be his home for thirteen years.
In agreeing to this move, the Shāh’s regime had been motivated not only by the desire to free itself from popular pressure, but also by the assumption that Imām Khomeini would be overshadowed in Najaf by the religious authorities resident there. This assumption proved false. Imām Khomeini established himself as a major religious presence in Najaf. More importantly, he maintained his influence and popularity in Iran. He issued periodic proclamations concerning developments in Iran that were smuggled into the country and clandestinely circulated at great risk. In addition, his messages addressed to the Muslim world at large were distributed several times in Mecca during pilgrimage season of the year. In Najaf itself, he received visits during the long years of his exile from a number of important Iranian and other Muslim personalities.
The name and person of Imām Khomeini and the cause that he embodied were never forgotten in Iran. His example inspired a number of religious scholars and groups, which continued to build on the foundations laid in 1963 and 1964, and unnoticed by most foreign observers, an Islamic movement of unparalleled breadth and profundity came into being.
It was then entirely natural that Imām Khomeini should swiftly emerge as the leader of the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979. Notwithstanding his physical absence from the country, he was present in the hearts of his countrymen and infinitely more in tune with their aspirations than politicians who had suffered neither exile nor imprisonment.
On November 23, 1977, the elder son of Imām Khomeini, Hajj Mustafā, died suddenly in Najaf, assassinated by the Shāh’s US-instituted security police, SAVAK. Imām Khomeini bore this blow stoically, but the tragedy inflamed the public in Iran. Massive social corruption and economic dislocation as well as continuing political repression had already aroused universal discontent in Iran, and when the regime aimed its next blow against Imām Khomeini, discontent overflowed into rebellion, and rebellion, in turn, matured into revolution.
On January 8,1978, one week after President Carter had been in Tehran lauding the Shāh as a wise statesman beloved of his people,[21] the government-controlled press printed an article supplied by the Ministry of Court attacking Imām Khomeini as an agent of foreign powers. The public reaction was immediate outrage. The following day in Qum, demonstrations broke out that were suppressed with heavy loss of life. This was the first of a series of demonstrations that progressively unfurled across the country, until in the end barely a single region remained untouched by revolutionary fervor. Throughout the spring and summer of 1978, Imām Khomeini issued a series of proclamations and directives, congratulating the people on their steadfastness and encouraging them to persist until the attainment of the final objective—overthrow of the monarchy and institution of an Islamic republic.
The centrality of the Imām in the revolutionary movement was obvious from the beginning. His name was constantly repeated in the slogans that were devised and chanted in the demonstrations; his portrait served as a revolutionary banner; and his return from exile to supervise the installation of an Islamic government was insistently demanded. Acting under another of its erroneous assumptions, the Shāh’s regime requested the Ba’athist government in Iraq, in September 1978, to expel Imām Khomeini from its territory, in the hope of depriving him of his base of operations and robbing the Revolution of its leadership. Imām Khomeini had never enjoyed cordial relations with the various governments that had ruled Iraq since his arrival there in 1965, and he now informed the Ba’athists that he would be happy to leave Iraq for a country that was not subject to the Shāh’s dictates. Syria and Algeria were considered as possible destinations, but in the end, as Imām Khomeini testifies himself, no Muslim country offered him refuge with the assurance of his being able to continue his activity freely.[22] So, he went to France, taking up residence at the hamlet of Neauphle-le-Chāteau near Paris in early October 1978.
The move to France proved beneficial. Paradoxically, communication with Iran was easier from France than it had been from Iraq. The declarations and directives that were now being issued with increasing frequency were telephoned directly to Tehran, for further dissemination to a number of centers in the provinces. A never-ending stream of Iranians, from Europe and the United States as well as Iran itself, came to visit and pay homage to the Imām, and to consult with him. The world’s media also descended on the modest residence of the Imām at Neauphle-le-Chāteau, and his words began to reach a global audience.
The month of Muharram that coincided with December 1978 witnessed vast and repeated demonstrations in Tehran and other Iranian cities, demanding the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic republic under the leadership of Imām Khomeini. Despite all the savagery the Shāh had employed, including the slaughter of thousands of unarmed demonstrators, the torture and abuse of detainees, and massacres of the wounded on their hospital beds, and despite the unstinting support he had received from the United States and other foreign powers, the corrupt and murderous rule of the Shāh was approaching its end. His masters decided it was politic for him to leave, and when preparation had been made for the installation of a surrogate administration under Shāhpūr Bakhtiār, the Shāh left Iran for the last time on January 16, 1979. The outburst of joy that followed his departure was a fulfillment of the prophecy Imām Khomeini had made sixteen years earlier.
Once the Shāh left Iran, Imām Khomeini prepared to return to his homeland. When he did, on February 1, he was met with a tumultuous welcome. With his renewed presence in Iran, the fate of the Bakhtiār’s government was sealed. After a final outburst of savagery on February 10 and 11, the old regime collapsed in disgrace, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was born.
In the two eventful years that have elapsed since the triumph of the Revolution, Imām Khomeini has continued to play an indispensable role in consolidating its gains and guiding the destiny of the nation. In a formal sense, his role has been defined by Articles, 107 to 112 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,[23] which incorporate the key political principle of the “governance of the faqīh (vilāyat-i faqīh).[24] In a more general sense, however, he has continued to provide the Revolution with its very substance, acting as its highest instance of authority and legitimacy. Countless addresses to different groups of citizens that come to visit him, as well as public speeches to wider audiences on particular significant occasions, have confirmed Imām Khomeini as the teacher and guide of the Islamic Revolution.[25]
Throughout this long and remarkable career, Imām Khomeini has manifested a unique set of characteristics: spirituality and erudition, asceticism and self-discipline, sobriety and determination, political genius and leadership, compassion for the poor and deprived, and a relentless hatred of oppression and imperialism. Summarizing his assessment of Imām Khomeini, the late Āyatullāh Mutahhari[26] compared him with ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a), that high exemplar of Islamic courage, wisdom, and spirituality. All who had the privilege to come into the presence of the Imām will concur in his judgment.
Notes:
[5] The translator’s introduction in the English translation as part of an anthology titled Islam and Revolution, originally published by Al-Mizan Press, Berkeley, USA in 1981. Notes with “(Pub.)” at the end are that of, or modified by, the publisher. (Pub.)
[6]Some information about the early life of Imām Khomeini is to be found in the opening sections of two books that concern themselves chiefly with the events of 1962-1964: S.H.R. Barrasī va Tahlīlī az Nihzat-i Imām Khomeini (Najaf? n.d); and anon., Biyugrāfi-yi Pishvā, n.p, n.d. This Institute has recently published the first volume of The Life of Imām Khomeini, which elaborately deals on his early life up to matrimony. (Pub.)
[7] Interview of the translator with Āyatullāh Pasandīdeh, Qum, December 19, 1979.
[8] For detailed accounts of the life and achievements of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karīm Hā’iri, see Muhammad Sharif Rāzi, Āthār al-Hujjah (Qum 1332 A.H.S./1953), I, pp. 22-90; Ganjinā-yi Dānishmandān (Tehran, 1352 Sh./1973), I, pp. 283-304. His relations with Rizā Khān are discussed briefly in ‘Abd al-Karīm Hā’iri, Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran (Leiden, 1977), pp. 135-139.
[9] Concerning Mīrzā Hasan Shirāzi, see p. 124 and 162, note 155.
[10] For lists of Imām Khomeini’s writings, published and unpublished, see S.H.R., Barrasī va Tahlīlī az Nihzat-i Imām Khomeini, pp. 55-61, and anon., Biyugrāfī-yi Pīshvā, I, 52-53. Copies as well as lists of Imām Khomeini’s literary works can be obtained from the publisher, The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imām Khomeini’s Works, http://www.imam-khomeini.org, email: این آدرس ایمیل توسط spambots حفاظت می شود. برای دیدن شما نیاز به جاوا اسکریپت دارید. (Pub.)
[11] Āyatullāh Muntaziri, born to a family of peasant stock in Najafābād in 1301 A.H./1884, had for many years been closely associated with Imām Khomeini, who had described him as “the product of my life.” Not only a master of both law and philosophy, but also a militant leader, Āyatullāh Muntaziri played an important role in sustaining the struggle against the Shāh during Imām Khomeini’s years in exile.
[12] Rāzi, Āthār al-Hujjah, II, 45.
[13] See Imām Khomeini’s own remarks on the connection between spirituality and sociopolitical activity in lectures on Sūrah al-Fātiha published in the anthology of Imām Khomeini’s writings and declarations titled Islam and Revolution, Al-Mizan Press, Berkeley, USA, 1981, pp. 399-400. See Imām Khomeini, Ādāb as-Salāt: The Disciplines of the Prayer (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imām Khomeini’s Works, 1996), pp. 357-418, available online at: http://www.al-islam.org/adab. (Pub.)
[14] For an extract from this book, see ibid., pp.169-173.
[15] For a brief account of the achievements of Āyatullāh Burūjirdi, see Murtadā Mutahhari, “Mazāyā va Khadamāt-i Marhūm Āyatullāh Burūjirdi,” Bahsi dar bāreh-ye Marja‘iyyat va Rūhāniyyat (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 233-249.
[16] See p. 118 and p. 161, n. 151.
[17] Fayziyyah Madrasah, founded in Safavid times, has acquired particular fame among the teaching institutions in Qum because of the role it has played in the Islamic movement. Closed down in 1975 by the Shāh’s regime, it was ceremonially reopened after the triumph of the Revolution.
[18] For the text of this speech, see Islam and Revolution, pp. 177-180.
[19] See p. 127.
[20] For the text of this speech, see Islam and Revolution, pp. 181-188.
[21] Carter told the Shāh in Tehran on January 1, 1978: “Iran is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect, admiration and love which your people give to you.” New York Times, January 2, 1978.
[22] See Islam and Revolution, p. 238.
[23] See Hamid Algar, trans., The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Berkeley, 1980), pp. 66-69.
[24] This principle forms the central topic of the first session of this book. See especially pp. 62-125.
[25] It is important to understand that despite this centrality of Imām Khomeini to the Revolution, the Islamic Republic is not an authoritarian regime over which he presides. The notion of a “Khomeini regime,” as promoted by the Western media, is entirely fictitious. Repeated consultations of the popular will after February 1979 have resulted in the emergence of a new set of political institutions that function with demonstrable freedom.
[26] Āyatullāh Murtadā Mutahhari was a scholar of unusually wide learning, a writer and lecturer of great effectiveness, and a cherished pupil of Imām Khomeini. He was a leading member of the Revolutionary Council until his assassination on May 1, 1979 by the terrorist Furqān group.
Islamic Government (The Book)
Probably the best known of Imām Khomeini’s works, the book Islamic Government originated in a series of lectures given at Najaf between January 21 and February 8, 1970. The lectures were recorded and transcribed by a student, and then published in book form.
“Islamic Government” is an exact translation of the original Persian title, Hukūmat-i Islāmi. However, the reader should bear in mind that the book does not purport either a complete scheme of Islamic political philosophy or a detailed plan for the establishment and functioning of an Islamic state. Its purpose is narrower and more specific and geared to the audience to whom the lectures were delivered: students of the religious sciences, who might be expected later to assume positions of influence in Muslim society.
Three major points emerge from the lectures. The first is the necessity for the establishment and maintenance of Islamic political power for Islamic goals, precepts, and criteria. The second is the duty of the religious scholars (the fuqahā) to bring about an Islamic state, and to assume legislative, executive, and judicial positions within it—in short, the doctrine of “the governance of the faqīh” (vilāyat-i faqīh). The various texts that support this second point are subjected to lengthy review and examination. Finally, Imām Khomeini sets out a program of action for the establishment of an Islamic state, including various measures for self-reform by the religious establishment. All three themes are expounded against a backdrop of particular concern with Iran; hence the occurrence of numerous references to Iran in the course of the general and theoretical discussion.
Accurate translations of Hukūmat-i Islāmi exist in French, Arabic, Turkish, and Urdu. In the fall of 1978, the Joint Publications and Research Service, the translation branch of the US Central Intelligence Service, commissioned an English translation, not of the original Persian text, but of the translation in Arabic. The resulting version, crude and unreliable, was subsequently published in a vulgar and sensational format by Manor Books, a commercial publisher in New York. What follows is an integral and faithful translation of the third edition of the Persian text, published at Najaf in 1391 A.H./1971.
Introduction
In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
All Praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds
And may His blessings be upon the best of His creation,
Muhammad and His Descendants.
The subject of the governance of the jurist (vilāyat-i faqīh[27]) provides us with the opportunity to discuss certain related matters and questions. The governance of the faqīh is a subject that in itself elicits immediate assent and has little need of demonstration, for anyone who has some general awareness of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam will unhesitatingly give his assent to the principle of the governance of the faqīh as soon as he encounters it; he will recognize it as necessary and self-evident. If little attention is paid to this principle today, so that it has come to require demonstration, it is because of the social circumstances prevailing among the Muslims in general, and the teaching institution in particular. These circumstances, in turn, have certain historical roots to which I will now briefly refer.
From the very beginning, the historical movement of Islam has had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who first established anti-Islamic propaganda and engaged in various stratagems, and as you can see, this activity continues down to the present. Later they were joined by other groups, who were in certain respects, more satanic than they. These new groups began their imperialist penetration of the Muslim countries about three hundred years ago,[28] and they regarded it as necessary to work for the extirpation of Islam in order to attain their ultimate goals. It was not their aim to alienate the people from Islam in order to promote Christianity among them, for the imperialists really have no religious belief, Christian or Islamic. Rather, throughout this long historical period, and going back to the Crusades,[29] they felt that the major obstacle in the path of their materialistic ambitions and the chief threat to their political power was nothing but Islam and its ordinances, and the belief of the people in Islam. They therefore plotted and campaigned against Islam by various means.
The preachers they planted in the religious teaching institution, the agents they employed in the universities, government educational institutions, and publishing houses, and the orientalists who work in the service of the imperialistic states—all these people have pooled their energies in an effort to distort the principles of Islam. As a result, many persons, particularly the educated, have formed misguided and incorrect notions of Islam.
Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are committed to truth and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism. But the servants of imperialism have presented Islam in a totally different light. They have created in men’s minds a false notion of Islam. The defective version of Islam, which they have presented in the religious teaching institution, is intended to deprive Islam of its vital, revolutionary aspect and to prevent Muslims from arousing themselves in order to gain their freedom, fulfill the ordinances of Islam, and create a government that will assure their happiness and allow them to live, lives worthy of human beings.
For example, the servants of imperialism declared that Islam is not a comprehensive religion providing for every aspect of human life and has no laws or ordinances pertaining to society. It has no particular form of government. Islam concerns itself only with rules of ritual purity after menstruation and parturition. It may have a few ethical principles, but it certainly has nothing to say about human life in general and the ordering of society.
This kind of evil propaganda has unfortunately had an effect. Quite apart from the masses, the educated class—university students and also many students at the religious teaching institutions—have failed to understand Islam correctly and have erroneous notions. Just as people may, in general, be unacquainted with a stranger, so too they are unacquainted with Islam. Islam lives among the people of this world as if it were a stranger.[30] If somebody were to present Islam as it truly is, he would find it difficult to make people believe him. In fact, the agents of imperialism in the religious teaching institutions would raise a hue and cry against him.
In order to demonstrate to some extent, the difference between Islam and what is presented as Islam, I would like to draw your attention to the difference between the Holy Qur’an and the books of hadīth,[31] on the one hand, and the practical treatises of jurisprudence, on the other. The Holy Qur’an and the books of hadīth, which represent the sources for the commands and ordinances of Islam, are completely different from the treatises written by the mujtahīds[32] of the present age both in breadth of scope and in the effects they are capable of exerting on the life of society. The ratio of Qur’anic verses concerned with the affairs of society to those concerned with ritual worship is greater than a hundred to one. Of the approximately fifty sections[33] of the corpus of hadīth containing all the ordinances of Islam, not more than three or four sections relate to matters of ritual worship and the duties of man toward his Creator and Sustainer. A few more are concerned with questions of ethics, and all the rest are concerned with social, economic, legal, and political questions—in short, the gestation of society.
You who represent the younger generation and who, God willing, will be of service to Islam in the future must strive diligently all your lives to pursue the aims I will now set forth and to impart the laws and ordinances of Islam. In whatever way you deem most beneficial, in writing or in speech, instruct the people about the problems Islam has had to contend with since its inception and about the enemies and afflictions that now threaten it. Do not allow the true nature of Islam to remain hidden, or people will imagine that Islam is like Christianity (nominal, not true Christianity), a collection of injunctions pertaining to man’s relation to God, and the mosques will be equated with the church.
At a time when the West was a realm of darkness and obscurity—with its inhabitants living in a state of barbarism, and America still peopled by half-savaged redskins—and the two vast empires of Iran and Byzantium were under the rule of tyranny, class privilege, and discrimination, and the powerful dominated all without any trace of law or popular government, God, Exalted and Almighty, by means of the Most Noble Messenger (s), sent laws that astound people with their magnitude. He instituted laws and practices for all human affairs and laid injunctions for man extending from even before the embryo is formed until after he is placed in the tomb. In just the same way that there are laws setting forth the duties of worship for man, so too there are laws, practices, and norms for the affairs of society and government. Islamic law is a progressive, evolving, and comprehensive system. All the voluminous books that have been compiled from the earliest times on different areas of law, such as judicial procedure, social transactions, penal law,[34] retribution,[35] international relations, regulations pertaining to peace and war, private and public law—taken together, these contain a mere sample of the laws and injunctions of Islam. There is not a single topic in human life for which Islam has not provided instructions and established a norm.
In order to make the Muslims, especially the intellectuals, and the younger generation, deviate from the path of Islam, foreign agents have constantly insinuated that Islam has nothing to offer, that Islam consists of a few ordinances concerning menstruation and parturition, and that this is the proper field of study for the ākhūnds.[36]
There is something of truth here, for it is fitting that those ākhūnds who have no intention of expounding the theories, injunctions and worldview of Islam and who spend most of their time on precisely such matters, forgetting all the other topics of Islamic law, be attacked and accused in this manner. They too are at fault; foreigners are not the only ones to be blamed. For several centuries, as might be expected, the foreigners laid certain plans to realize their political and economic ambitions, and the neglect that has overtaken the religious teaching institution has made it possible for them to succeed. There have been individuals among us, the ‘ulamā,[37] who have unwittingly contributed to the fulfillment of those aims, with the result that you now see.
It is sometimes insinuated that the injunctions of Islam are defective, and said that the laws of judicial procedure, for example, are not all that they should be. In keeping with this insinuation and propaganda, agents of Britain were instructed by their masters to take advantage of the idea of constitutionalism in order to deceive the people and conceal the true nature of their political crimes (the pertinent proofs and documents are now available). At the beginning of the constitutional movement, when people wanted to write laws and draw up a constitution, a copy of the Belgian legal code was borrowed from the Belgian embassy and a handful of individuals (whose names I do not wish to mention here) used it as the basis for the constitution they then wrote, supplementing its deficiencies with borrowings from the French and British legal codes.[38] True, they added some of the ordinances of Islam in order to deceive the people, but the basis of the laws that were now thrust upon the people was alien and borrowed.
What connections do all the various articles of the Constitution as well as the body of Supplementary Law[39] concerning the monarchy, the succession, and so forth, have with Islam? They are all opposed to Islam; they violate the system of government and the laws of Islam.
Islam proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession wrong and invalid. When Islam first appeared in Iran, the Byzantine Empire, Egypt, and the Yemen, the entire institution of monarchy was abolished. In the blessed letters that the Most Noble Messenger (s) wrote to the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius and the Shāhanshāh of Iran,[40] he called upon them to abandon the monarchical and imperial form of government, to cease compelling the servants of God to worship them with absolute obedience, and to permit men to worship God, Who has no partner and is the True Monarch. Monarchy and hereditary succession represent the same sinister, evil system of government that prompted the Doyen of the Martyrs[41] (‘a) to rise up in revolt and seek martyrdom in an effort to prevent its establishment. He revolted in repudiation of the hereditary succession of Yazīd,[42] to refuse it his recognition.
Islam, then, does not recognize monarchy and hereditary succession; they have no place in Islam. If that is what is meant by the so-called deficiency of Islam, then Islam is indeed deficient. Islam has laid down no laws for the practice of usury, for banking on the basis of usury, for the consumption of alcohol, or for the cultivation of sexual vice, having radically prohibited all of these. The ruling cliques, therefore, who are the puppets of imperialism and wish to promote these vices in the Islamic world, will naturally regard Islam as defective. They must import the appropriate laws from Britain, France, Belgium, and most recently, America. The fact that Islam makes no provision for the orderly pursuit of these illicit activities, far from being a deficiency, is a sign of perfection and a source of pride.
The conspiracy worked out by the imperialist government of Britain at the beginning of the constitutional movement had two purposes. The first, which was already known at that time, was to eliminate the influence of Tsarist Russia in Iran, and the second was to take the laws of Islam out of force and operation by introducing Western laws.[43]
The imposition of foreign laws on our Islamic society has been the source of numerous problems and difficulties. Knowledgeable people working in our judicial system have many complaints concerning the existing laws and their mode of operation. If a person becomes caught up in the judicial system of Iran or that of analogous countries, he may have to spend a whole lifetime trying to prove his case. In my youth I once encountered a learned lawyer who said, “I can spend my whole life following a litigation back and forth through the judicial machinery, and then bequeath it to my son for him to do the same thing!” That is the situation that now prevails, except, of course, when one of the parties has influence, in which case the matter is examined and settled swiftly, albeit unjustly.
Our present judicial laws have brought our people nothing but trouble, causing them to neglect their daily task and providing the occasion for all kinds of misuse. Very few people are able to obtain their legitimate rights. In the adjudication of cases, it is necessary not only that everyone should obtain his rights, but also that correct procedure be followed. People’s time must be considered, as well as the way of life and profession of both parties, so that matters are resolved as swiftly and simply as possible.
A case that a sharī‘ah[44] judge in earlier times settled in one or two days cannot be settled now in twenty years. The needy, young, and old alike, must spend the entire day at the Ministry of Justice, from morning to evening, wasting their time in corridors or standing in front of some official’s desk, and in the end they will still not know what has transpired. Anyone who is more cunning, and more willing and able to give bribes, has his case settled expeditiously, but at the cost of justice. Otherwise, they must wait in frustration and perplexity until their entire lives are gone.
The agents of imperialism sometimes write in their books and their newspapers that the legal provisions of Islam are too harsh. One person was even so impudent as to write that the laws of Islam are harsh because they have originated with the Arabs, so that the “harshness” of the Arabs is reflected in the harshness of Islamic law!
I am amazed at the way these people think. They kill people for possessing ten grams of heroin and say, “That is the law” (I have been informed that ten people were put to death some time ago, and another person more recently, for possession of ten grams of heroin).[45] Inhuman laws like this are concocted in the name of a campaign against corruption, and they are not to be regarded as harsh. (I am not saying it is permissible to sell heroin, but this is not the appropriate punishment. The sale of heroin must indeed be prohibited but the punishment must be in proportion to the crime.)[46] When Islam, however, stipulates that the drinker of alcohol should receive eighty lashes, they consider it “too harsh.” They can execute someone for possessing ten grams of heroin and the question of harshness does not even arise!
Many forms of corruption that have appeared in society derive from alcohol. The collisions that take place on our roads, and the murders and suicides are very often caused by the consumption of alcohol. Indeed, even the use of heroin is said to derive from addiction to alcohol. But still, some say, it is quiet unobjectionable for someone to drink alcohol (after all, they do it in the West); so let alcohol be bought and sold freely.
But when Islam wishes to prevent the consumption of alcohol—one of the major evils—stipulating that the drinker should receive eighty lashes, or sexual vice, decreeing that the fornicator be given one hundred lashes (and the married man or woman be stoned[47]), then they start wailing and lamenting: “What a harsh law that is, reflecting the harshness of the Arabs!” They are not aware that these penal provisions of Islam are intended to keep great nations from being destroyed by corruption. Sexual vice has now reached such proportions that it is destroying entire generations, corrupting our youth, and causing them to neglect all forms of work. They are all rushing to enjoy the various forms of vice that have become so freely available and so enthusiastically promoted. Why should it be regarded as harsh if Islam stipulates that an offender must be publicly flogged[48] in order to protect the younger generation from corruption?
At the same time, we see the masters of this ruling class of ours enacting slaughters in Vietnam over fifteen years,[49] devoting enormous budgets to this business of bloodshed, and no one has the right to object! But if Islam commands its followers to engage in warfare or defense in order to make men submit to laws that are beneficial for them, and kill a few corrupt people or instigators of corruption, then they ask: “What’s the purpose for that war?”
All of the foregoing represent plans drawn up several centuries ago that are now being implemented and bearing fruit.
First, they opened a school in a certain place[50] and we overlooked the matter and said nothing. Our colleagues also were negligent in the matter and failed to prevent it from being established so that now, as you can observe, these schools have multiplied, and their missionaries have gone out into the provinces and villages, turning our children into Christians or unbelievers.
Their plan is to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands, and our human resources. They want us to remain afflicted and wretched, and our poor to be trapped in their misery. Instead of surrendering to the injunctions of Islam, which provide a solution for the problem of poverty, they and their agents wish to go on living in huge places and enjoy lives of abominable luxury.
These plans of theirs are so broad in scope that they have even touched the institutions of religious learning. If someone wishes to speak about an Islamic government and the establishment of Islamic government, he must observe the principle of taqiyyah[51] and count upon the opposition of those who have sold themselves to imperialism. When this book was first printed, the agents of the embassy undertook certain desperate measures to prevent its dissemination,[52] which succeeded only in disgracing themselves more than before.
Matters have now come to the point where some people consider the apparel of a soldier incompatible with true manliness and justice, even though the leaders of our religion were all soldiers, commanders, and warriors. They put on military dress and went into battle in the wars that are described for us in our history; they killed and they were killed. The Commander of the Faithful[53] (‘a) himself would place a helmet on his blessed head, don his coat of chain mail, and gird on a sword. Imām Hasan[54] and the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a), acted likewise. The later Imāms did not have the opportunity to go into battle, even though Imām Bāqir[55] (‘a) was also a warrior by nature. But now the wearing of military apparel is thought to detract from a man’s quality of justice,[56] and it is said that one should not wear military dress. If we want to form an Islamic government, then we must do it in our cloaks and turbans; otherwise, we commit an offense against decency and justice!
This is all the result of the wave of propaganda that has now reached the religious institution and imposed on us the duty of proving that Islam also possesses rules of government.
That is our situation then—created for us by the foreigners through their propaganda and their agents. They have removed from operation all the judicial processes and political laws of Islam and replaced them with European importations, thus diminishing the scope of Islam and ousting it from Islamic society. For the sake of exploitation they have installed their agents in power.
So far, we have sketched the subversive and corrupting plan of imperialism. We must now take into consideration as well certain internal factors notably the dazzling effect that the material progress of the imperialist countries has had on some members of our society. As the imperialist countries attained a high degree of wealth and affluence—the result both of scientific and technical progress and of their plunder of the nations of Asia and Africa—these individuals lost all their self-confidence and imagined that the only way to achieve technical progress was to abandon their own laws and beliefs. When the moon landings took place, for instance, they concluded that Muslims should jettison their laws! But what is the connection between going to the moon and the laws of Islam? Do they not see that countries having opposing laws and social systems compete with each other in technical and scientific progress and the conquest of space? Let them go all the way to Mars or beyond the Milky Way; they will still be deprived of true happiness, moral virtues and spiritual advancement and be unable to solve their own social problems. For the solution of social problems and the relief of human misery require foundations in faith and moral; merely acquiring material power and wealth, conquering nature and space, have no effect in this regard. They must be supplemented by, and balanced with, the faith, the conviction, and the morality of Islam in order truly to serve humanity instead of endangering it. This conviction, this morality, and these laws that are needed, we already possess. So, as soon as someone goes somewhere or invents something, we should not hurry to abandon our religion and its laws, which regulate the life of man and provide for his well being in this world and hereafter.
The same applies to the propaganda of the imperialists. Unfortunately some members of our society have been influenced by their hostile propaganda, although they should not have been. The imperialists have propagated among us the view that Islam does not have a specific form of government or governmental institutions. They say further that even if Islam does have certain laws, it has no method for enforcing them, so that its function is purely legislative. This kind of propaganda forms part of the overall plan of the imperialists to prevent the Muslims from becoming involved in political activity and establishing an Islamic government. It is in total contradiction with our fundamental beliefs.
We believe in government and believe that the Prophet (s) was bound to appoint a successor, as he indeed did.[57] Was a successor designated purely for the sake of expounding law? The expounding of law did not require a successor to the Prophet. He himself, after all, had expounded the laws; it would have been enough for the laws to be written down in a book and put into people’s hands to guide them in their actions. It was logically necessary for a successor to be appointed for the sake of exercising government. Law requires a person to execute it. The same holds true in all countries of the world, for the establishment of a law is of little benefit in itself and cannot secure the happiness of man. After a law is established, it is necessary also to create an executive power. If a system of law or government lacks an executive power, it is clearly deficient. Thus Islam, just as it established laws, also brought into being an executive power.
There was still a further question: who was to hold the executive power? If the Prophet (s) had not appointed a successor to assume the executive power, he would have failed to complete his mission, as the Qur’an testifies.[58] The necessity for the implementation of divine law, the need for an executive power, and the importance of that power in fulfilling the goals of the prophetic mission and establishing a just order that would result in the happiness of mankind—all of this made the appointment of a successor synonymous with the completion of the prophetic mission. In the time of the Prophet (s), laws were not merely expounded and promulgated; they were also implemented. The Messenger of God (s) was an executor of the law. For example, he implemented the penal provisions of Islam: he cut off the hand of the thief and administered lashings and stonings. The successor to the Prophet (s) must do the same; his task is not legislation, but the implementation of the divine laws that the Prophet (s) has promulgated. It is for this reason that the formation of a government and the establishment of executive organs are necessary. Belief in the necessity for these is part of the general belief in the Imamate, as are, too, exertion and struggle for the sake of establishing them.
Pay close attention. Whereas hostility toward you has led them to misrepresent Islam, it is necessary for you to present Islam and the doctrine of the Imamate correctly. You must tell people: “We believe in the Imamate; we believe that the Prophet (s), appointed a successor to assume responsibility for the affairs of the Muslims, and that he did so in conformity with the divine will. Therefore, we must also believe in the necessity for the establishment of government, and we must strive to establish organs for the execution of law and the administration of affairs.” Write and publish books concerning the laws of Islam and their beneficial effects on society. Improve your style and method of preaching and related activity. Know that it is your duty to establish an Islamic government. Have confidence in yourselves and know that you are capable of fulfilling this task. The imperialists began laying their plans three or four centuries ago; they started out with nothing, but see where they are now! We too will begin with nothing, and we will pay no attention to the uproar created by a few “xenomaniacs”[59] and devoted servants of imperialism.
Present Islam to the people in its true form, so that our youth do not picture the ākhūnds as sitting in some corner in Najaf or Qum, studying the questions of menstruation and parturition instead of concerning themselves with politics, and draw the conclusion that religion must be separate from politics. This slogan of the separation of religion from politics and the demand that Islamic scholars should not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them. Were religion and politics separate in the time of the Prophet (s)? Did there exist, on one side, a group of clerics, and opposite it, a group of politicians and leaders? Were religion and politics separate in the time of the caliphs—even if they were not legitimate—or in the time of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a)? Did two separate authorities exist? These slogans and claims have been advanced by the imperialists and their political agents in order to prevent religion from ordering the affairs of this world and shaping Muslim society, and at the same time to create a rift between the scholars of Islam, on the one hand, and the masses and those struggling for freedom and independence, on the other. They will thus been able to gain dominance over our people and plunder our resources, for such has always been their ultimate goal.
If we Muslims do nothing but engage in the canonical prayer, petition God, and invoke His name, the imperialists and the oppressive governments allied with them will leave us alone. If we were to say “Let us concentrate on calling the azān[60]and saying our prayers. Let them come and rob us of everything we own—God will take care of them! There is no power or recourse except in Him, and God willing, we will be rewarded in the hereafter!”—if this were our logic, they would not disturb us.
Once during the occupation of Iraq, a certain British officer asked, “ Is the azān I hear being called now on the minaret harmful to British policy?” When he was told that it was harmless, he said: “Then let him call for prayers as much as he wants!”
If you pay no attention to the policies of the imperialists, and consider Islam to be simply the few topics you are always studying and never go beyond them, then the imperialists will leave you alone. Pray as much as you like; it is your oil they are after—why should they worry about your prayers? They are after our minerals, and want to turn our country into a market for their goods. That is the reason the puppet governments they have installed prevent us from industrializing, and instead, establish only assembly plants and industry that is dependent on the outside world.
They do not want us to be true human beings, for they are afraid of true human beings. Even if only one true human being appears, they fear him, because others will follow him and he will have an impact that can destroy the whole foundation of tyranny, imperialism, and government by puppets. So, whenever some true human being has appeared they have either killed or imprisoned and exiled him, and tried to defame him by saying: “This is a political ākhūnd!” Now the Prophet (s) was also a political person. This evil propaganda is undertaken by the political agents of imperialism only to make you shun politics, to prevent you from intervening in the affairs of society and struggling against treacherous governments and their anti-national and anti-Islamic politics. They want to work their will as they please, with no one to bar their way.
Notes:
[27] Faqīh: one learned in the principles and ordinances of Islamic law, or more generally, in all aspects of the faith. For a full discussion of the term, see p. 69-70.
[28] Since mid-16th century, i.e., more than three centuries ago when the Portuguese and thereafter the Dutch, English, French, Italian, and the Spaniards colonized Muslim countries. At the beginning, newly discovered African countries and then, after finding the sea routes, Asian countries (whose link with the Europeans had been curtailed since the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453) fell under the sway of colonialism. (Pub.)
[29] Crusades is the name of a series of war campaigns waged by the European Christians against the Muslims (11th-13th centuries) for the control of the Holy Land, particularly Jerusalem. Waged in eight stages, these campaigns commenced with the religious edict of Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont (1096/489) and ended with the death of the French King, Saint Louis IX (1214-70) in 1270/669. Owing to the red-colored piece of cloth in the form of cross embedded on their right shoulders, the Christians became known as the Army of the Cross, or Crusaders. (Pub.)
[30] This is an allusion to the celebrated saying of the Prophet: “Islam will again become a stranger among men, as it was in the beginning, but blessed is the state of the stranger.”
[31] Hadīth: a tradition setting forth a saying or deed of the Prophet, or in Shī‘i usage, of one of the Twelve Imāms.
[32] Mujtahīd: an authority on divine law who practices ijtihād, that is, “the search for a correct opinion…in the deducing of the specific provisions of the law from its principles and ordinances” (Muhammad Sanglaji, Qazā dar Islam [Tehran, 1338 Sh./1959], p.14).
[33] The term kitāb (“book”) in the parlance of the Islamic jurists and traditionists means “section” in which Prophetic narrations (ahādīth) pertaining to a single topic are collected or particular laws of a topic, are discussed, such as Kitāb at-Tawhīd, Kitāb al-Īmān wa ’l-Fikr, Kitāb as-Salāh, and others. For instance, in the hadīth literature, Dūreh-ye Kāfi consists of 35 books, and in jurisprudence, Sharā’i ‘ul-Islām comprises 50 books. (Pub.)
[34] Hadd (literally means limit, boundary or limit) in the Islamic law is generally applied for penal law for punishments prescribed for particular crimes. The extent of these punishments is determined by law. (Pub.)
[35] Qisās (literally means retribution or retaliation) in the Islamic jurisprudence is to be executed against a criminal, according to the legal decree, who committed such crime as murder, amputation of a body limb, or laceration and beating in case the victim or his guardians are seeking retribution in lieu of receiving fine or blood money. (Pub.)
[36] Ākhūnd: a word of uncertain etymology that originally denoted a scholar of unusual attainment, but was later applied to lesser-ranking scholars, and then acquired a pejorative connotation, particularly in secularist usage.
[37] ‘Ulamā: the scholars of Islam.
[38] The draft of the first constitution was written by a commission from among the members of the Parliament and was approved with 51 articles. Kasravi, in this connection, writes: “It seems that Mashīr ad-Dawlah and Mu’tamīn al-Mulk and sons of Sadr A‘zam wrote it, or to be more appropriate, we say they translated [it].” Thereafter, a committee was formed so that a text called “Supplement” be appended in the constitution. By the way, this text was prepared in 107 articles. According to the narration of Mustafā Rahīmi, “With the use of the Belgian constitution and to some extent, the French constitution, and taking into account the laws of the Balkan states (in view of the newness of the supplementary laws under consideration), the committee embarked on the compilation of the Supplementary Constitutional Laws and on the omission of flaws of the former laws.” Concerning this influence of Belgian constitutional law on the six-man committee that drafted the Supplementary Constitutional Laws of 1907, see A.K.S. Lambton, “Dustur, iv: Iran,” Encyclopedia of Islam new ed., II, 653-654; Kasravi Tabrizi, Tārīkh-i Mashrūteh-yi Īrān (Constitutional History of Iran), pp. 170, 224; Mustafā Rahīmi, Qānūn-i Asāsi-yi Īrān va Usūl-i Demokrāsi (The Constitution of Iran and Democratic Principles) (Tehran, 1347 Sh./1968), p. 94; Qānūn-i Asāsi va Mutammin Ān (The Constituion and Its Supplement) (Tehran: National Consultative Assembly Press). (Pub.)
[39] Articles 35 through 57 of the Supplementary Constitutional Laws approved on October 7, 1906 relate to “the rights of the throne.” See E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge, 1911), pp. 337-379.
[40] In the seventh year of the Islamic era, Prophet Muhammad wrote not only to Heraclius and the ruler of Iran (probably Parvīz), but also to the rulers of Egypt and Abyssinia, inviting them all to embrace Islam and abandon unjust rule. Following is the text of the Most Noble Messenger’s letter to Khosroe Parviz:
“In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. From Muhammad, the Messenger of Allah, to the great Kisra of Iran. Peace be upon him, who seeks truth and expresses belief in Allah and in His Prophet and testifies that there is no god but Allah and that He has no partner, and who believes that Muhammad is His servant and Prophet. Under the Command of Allah, I inviteyou to Him. He has sent me for the guidance of all people so that I may warn them all of His wrath and may present the unbelievers with an ultimatum. Embrace Islam so that you may remain safe. And if you refuse to accept Islam, you will be responsible for the sins of the Magi.”
Text of his letter to Heraclius is as follows:
“In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. “(This is a letter) from Muhammad ibn ‘Abdullāh to the great Hercules of Rome. Peace be upon the followers of guidance. I invite you to the religion of Islam. Embrace Islam so that you may be safe. Allah will give you two rewards (reward for your own faith as well as reward for the faith of those who are your subordinates). In case, however, you turn away your face from Islam you will be responsible for the sins of the Arisiyans as well. “O people of the Scriptures! We invite you to a common basis i.e., we should not worship anyone except Allah. We should not treat anyone to be His partner. Some of us too should not accept others as their gods. And (O Muhammad! as and when) they become recalcitrant against the true religion say: “Be witness to the fact that we are Muslims [Q 3:64].” ”
See Makātib ar-Rasūl, vol. 1, pp. 90 and 105; Ja‘far Subhāni, The Message (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications, 1984), chap. 42, pp. 540-566, http://www.al-islam.org/message/43.htm; Muhammad Hamidullah, Le Prophète de l’Islam (Paris, 1959), I, 196-197, 212, 230, 241. (Pub.)
[41] The Doyen of the Martyrs: Imām Husayn, grandson of the Prophet. Concerning his biography, see Mīr Ahmad ‘Ali, Husain the Saviour of Islam (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1987); ‘Abdullāh Yūsuf ‘Ali, Imām Husain and His Martyrdom, http://www.al-islam.org/short/martyrdom/index.htm. (Pub.)
[42] In 60/680, Imām Husayn refused to swear allegiance to Yazīd, son of Mu‘āwiyah and second caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, since Yazīd did not possess legitimate authority and had succeeded to the caliphate by hereditary succession. The ensuing death of the Imām in battle at Karbala has always been commemorated by Shī‘ah Muslims as the supreme example of martyrdom in the face of tyranny. It served as an important point of both ideological and emotive reference throughout the Islamic Revolution in Iran. See Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Dīn, The Revolution of Al-Husayn, http://www.al-islam.org/revolution; Ibrāhīm Āyāti, A Probe into the History of Āshūrā (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications, 1984);Zākir, Tears and Tributes (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Yāsīn T. al-Jibouri, Kerbala and Beyond (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Sayyid Wāhid Akhtar, “Karbala: An Enduring Paradigm of Islamic Revivalism,” Al-Tawhīd Journal, http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/paradigm-akhtar.htm. (Pub.)
[43] No detailed study has yet been made of the British role in the early part of the constitutional movement. Some of the relevant documents, however, are to be found in General Report on Persia for the Year 1906 (file F.O. 416/30, Public Records Office, London).
[44] Sharī‘ah: the all-embracing law of Islam derived from the Qur’an, the normative practice and authoritative pronouncements of the Prophet, and a number of secondary sources.
[45] A law promulgated in July 1969 provided the death penalty for anyone in possession of more than two kilograms of opium or ten grams of heroin, morphine, or cocaine. The first ten executions were carried out in December 1969 and by 1974, 236 people had been executed on charges under this law. See Ulrich Gehrke, Iran: Natur, Bevolkerung, Geschichte, Kultur, Staat, Wirschaft (Tubingen and Basel, 1976), p. 281. It is also probable that the law was also used to provide a cover for the execution of political prisoners who had no involvement with narcotics. Concerning the royal family’s own involvement in the drug trade, see p. 117, n. 167.
[46] Imām Khomeini’s complain is referring to another point; that is, the absence of justice. (Pub.)
[47] Under the penal laws of Islam, proof of the married status is one of the indispensable requisites for stoning an adulterer. Married man or woman is one who is mature (bāligh), mentally sound, and has a permanent spouse. (Pub.)
[48] In Islamic law, the presence of a number of believers at the time of penal execution has been considered part of etiquettes of punishing the offender. Shī‘ah jurists have been emphasizing on the observance of this tradition at the time of penal execution for adultery, slandering, and pandering. Their religious edict regarding the first case is based on Sūrah an-Nūr (24:2): “And a number of believers must witness the punishment of adulterer men and women.” Another reason for it is that the attendants would take lesson from the requital, and anyone who is inclined to do so or is guilty of the same, would desist or cease from its performance. (Pub.)
[49] After many years of resistance against the French and Japanese colonizers, in 1960 Vietnam had once again engaged in a protracted war with the United States. This war that ended in 1973 with the defeat and withdrawal of the American forces, brought untold destructions and casualties on the Vietnamese people. As the official figures fall short of exactly describing the degree of casualties and damages wrought by this ruthless aggression, the realities of the bitter contemporary history can be gleaned to some extent: Up to early 1965 when the scope of the war extended to South Vietnam, the number of South Vietnamese who perished or were injured is as follows: 170,000 died, 800,00 wounded, and 400,000 imprisoned. During that time the number of persons who had been sent on concentration camps, which are called “agricultural units” exceeds 5 millions. According to the Voice of America (January 6, 1963), throughout 1962 US Air Force had attacked 50 thousand times villages beyond the realm of “state villages,” and based on the assertions of General Herkins(?), on the same year about 30 thousand villages perished. US Air Force operations in South Vietnam reached 30 thousand times a month. According to a news report of the New York Times, in a combined US and Saigon government air operations nearly 1,400 out of 2,600 villages in the South were totally ruined by napalm bombs and chemical weapons. A Red Cross report indicates that as the effect of using poisonous elements in the vast and populous areas, thousands of residents in the South have been afflicted with divergent diseases particularly skin-related ones and for a long time they have experienced sufferings and discomforts arising from the sickness. Moreover, many herds of cows and buffalos as well as other four-footed domesticated animals had died while leaves, flowers, and fruits of tree and rice fields were completely devastated. (Pub.)
[50] We have not been able to determine whether this is an allusion to a particular school established by foreigners. Before the Islamic Revolution, there were a number of foreign-run schools in Iran—secular and missionary—that in effect alienated their students from Islamic culture and society.
[51] Taqiyyah: prudential dissimulation of one’s true beliefs under conditions of acute danger, a practice based on Qur’an, 3:28. For a fuller discussion of taqiyyah, see ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’i, Shi‘ite Islam (Albany, N.Y., 1975), pp. 223-225, http://www.al-islam.org/anthology/index.htm; Al-Taqiyya/Dissimulation,http://al-islam.org/encyclopedia/chapter6b/1.html; and also p. 133 of the present work. (Pub.)
[52] This is a reference to an earlier and briefer series of talks given by Imām Khomeini on the subject of Islamic government. The Iranian embassy in Baghdad had sought to prevent the published text of those talks from being distributed.
[53] The Commander of the Faithful: ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, and first of the Twelve Imāms from the Prophet’s Progeny. He exercised rule from 35/656 until his martyrdom in 40/661. See Yousuf N. Lalljee, ‘Ali the Magnificent (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1987); Muhammad Jawād Chirri, The Brother of the Prophet Mohammad (Imām ‘Ali), (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); George Jordaq, The Voice of Human Justice, trans. M. Fazal Haq (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1990) (Pub.)
[54] Imām Hasan: son of Imām ‘Ali and second of the Imāms. He was poisoned in 50/670 after spending most of his life in seclusion in Medina. See Shaykh Rādi Āl-Yāsīn, Sulh al-Hasan: The Peace Treaty of Al-Hasan, trans. Jāsim al-Rasheed (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1998), http://www.al-islam.org/sulh/. (Pub.)
[55] Imām Bāqir: the fifth Imām. He was born in 57/675 and spent most of his life in Medina, until his martydom there in 114/732. See Bāqir Sharīf al-Qarashi, The Life of Imām Mohammed al-Bāqir, trans. Jāsim al-Rasheed (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1999). (Pub.)
[56] The “quality of justice” that is demanded of a religious scholar includes not only the practice of equity in all social dealings, but also complete abstention from major sins, the consistent performance of all devotional duties, and the avoidance of conduct incompatible with decorum. Justice is among the requisites for becoming a judge, rector (mufti), and congregational prayer leader (imām). At the margin of the book, Sharh-i Lum‘ah, vol. 1, chap. 11, p. 98, wearing of indecent clothes in the congregational prayers has been considered contrary to the spirit of magnanimity (muruwwah) and justice. (Pub.)
[57] The Most Noble Messanger (s) indicated in many instances the successorship of Imām ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) such as in Hadīth Yawm ad-Dār (Day of the Prophet’s invitation to his kinsmen); Hadīth Manzilah (The Prophet’s designation of ‘Ali as his deputy in Medina during the Tabuk expedition); Āyat al-Wilāyah (‘Ali’s offering of a ring to a beggar and the subsequent revelation of a pertinent verse); Event of Ghadīr Khumm; and Hadīth ath-Thaqalayn. See Tafsir Kabīr, vol. 12, pp. 28, 53 under Sūrah al-Mā’idah, verses 55, 67; Sīrah ibn Hisham, vol. 4, p. 520; Tārīkh Tabari, vol. 2, pp. 319, 322; Al-Ghadīr, vols. 1-3; Caliphate of Imām ‘Ali, http://www.al-islam.org/encyclopedia/chapter3/1.html. (Pub.)
[58] “O Messenger! Proclaim what has been revealed to you by your Lord, for if you do not, you will not have fulfilled the mission He has entrusted to you” (4:67). On the commentary of this verse, see Mīr Ahmad ‘Ali, Text, Translation and Commentary of the Holy Qur’an (Ehlmurst, NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, Inc., 1988), http://www.al-islam.org/quran. (Pub.)
[59] Xenomaniacs: those infatuated with foreign and especially Western models of culture. This is a translation of a Persian term, gharbzādeh-ha, popularized by Jalāl Āl-i Ahmad (d. 1969) in his book Gharbzādegi (“Xenomania”). See its English translation, R. Campbell (trans.) and Hamid Algar (ed. and anno.), Occidentosis: A Plague from the West (Berkeley: Al-Mizan Press, 1984). He was a writer of great influence and Imām Khomeini was acquainted with his work. See the commemorative supplement on Jalāl Āl-i Ahmad in the Tehran daily newspaper Jumhūri-yi Islāmi, Shahrīvar 20, 1359/October 12, 1980, p. 10. (Pub.)
[60] Azān: the call to prayer.
The Necessity for Islamic Government
A body of laws alone is not sufficient for a society to be reformed. In order for law to ensure the reform and happiness of man, there must be an executive power and an executor. For this reason, God Almighty, in addition to revealing a body of law (i.e., the ordinances of the sharī‘ah), has laid down a particular form of government together with executive and administrative institution.
The Most Noble Messenger (s) headed the executive and administrative institutions of Muslim society. In addition to conveying the revelation and expounding and interpreting the articles of faith and the ordinances and institutions of Islam, he undertook the implementation of law and the establishment of the ordinances of Islam, thereby, bringing into being the Islamic state. He did not content himself with the promulgation of law; rather, he implemented it at the same time, cutting off hands and administering lashings, and stonings. After the Most Noble Messenger (s), his successor had the same duty and function. When the Prophet (s) appointed a successor, it was not only for the purpose of expounding articles of faith and law; it was for the implementation of law and the execution of God’s ordinances. It was this function—the execution of law and the establishment of Islamic institutions—that made the appointment of a successor such an important matter that the Prophet (s) would have failed to fulfill his mission if he had neglected it. For after the Prophet (s), the Muslims still needed someone to execute laws and establish the institution of Islam in society, so that they might attain happiness in this world and the hereafter.
By their nature, in fact, laws and social institutions require the existence of an executor. It has always and everywhere been the case that legislation alone has little benefit: legislation by itself cannot assure the well-being of man. After the establishment of legislation, an executive power must come into being, a power that implements the laws and the verdicts given by the courts, thus allowing people to benefit from the laws and the just sentences the courts deliver. Islam has therefore established an executive power in the same way that it has brought laws into being. The person who holds this executive power is known as the valī-yi amr.[61]
The Sunnah[62] and path of the Prophet (s) constitute a proof of the necessity for establishing government. First, he himself established a government, as history testifies. He engaged in the implementation of laws, the establishment of the ordinances of Islam, and the administration of society. He sent out governors to different regions; both sat in judgment himself and also appointed judges; dispatched emissaries to foreign states, tribal chieftains, and kings; concluded treaties and pacts; and took command in battle. In short, he fulfilled all the functions of government. Second, he designated a ruler to succeed him, in accordance with divine command. If God Almighty, through the Prophet (s), designated a man who was to rule over Muslim society after him, this is in itself an indication that government remains a necessity after the departure of the Prophet from this world. Again, since the Most Noble Messenger (s) promulgated the divine command through his act of appointing a successor, he also, implicitly stated the necessity for establishing a government.
It is self-evident that the necessity for enactment of the law, which necessitated the formation of a government by the Prophet (s), was confined or restricted to his time, but continues after his departure from this world. According to one of the noble verses of the Qur’an, the ordinances of Islam are not limited with respect to time or place; they are permanent and must be enacted until the end of time.[63] They were not revealed merely for the time of the Prophet, only to be abandoned thereafter, with retribution and the penal code no longer be enacted, or the taxes prescribed by Islam no longer collected, and the defense of the lands and people of Islam suspended. The claim that the laws of Islam may remain in abeyance or are restricted to a particular time or place is contrary to the essential creedal bases of Islam. Since enactment of laws, then, is necessary after the departure of the Prophet from this world, and indeed, will remain so until the end of time, the formation of a government and the establishment of executive and administrative organs are also necessary. Without the formation of a government and the establishment of such organs to ensure that through enactment of the law, all activities of the individual take place in the framework of a just system, chaos and anarchy will prevail and social, intellectual and moral corruption will arise. The only way to prevent the emergence of anarchy and disorder and to protect society from corruption is to form a government and thus impart order to all the affairs of the country.
Both reason and divine law, then, demonstrate the necessity in our time for what was necessary during the lifetime of the Prophet (s) and the age of the Commander of the Faithful, ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a)—namely the formation of a government and the establishment of executive and administrative organs.
In order to clarify the matter further, let us pose the following question. From the time of the Lesser Occultation[64] down to the present (a period of more than twelve centuries that may continue for hundreds of millennia if it is not appropriate for the Occulted Imām to manifest himself), is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast aside and remain unexecuted, so that everyone acts as he pleases and anarchy prevails? Were the laws that the Prophet of Islam labored so hard for twenty-three years to set forth, promulgate, and execute valid only for a limited period of time? Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation? Anyone who believes so, or voices such a belief, is worse situated than the person who believes and proclaims that Islam has been superseded or abrogated by another supposed revelation.[65]
No one can say it is no longer necessary to defend the frontiers and the territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland; that taxes such as the jizyah, kharāj, khums, and zakāt[66] should no longer be collected; that the penal code of Islam, with its provisions for the payment of blood money and the exacting of requital, should be suspended. Any person who claims that the formation of an Islamic government is not necessary implicitly denies the necessity for the implementation of Islamic law, the universality and comprehensiveness of that law, and the eternal validity of the faith itself.
After the death of the Most Noble Messenger (s), none of the Muslims doubted the necessity for government. No one said: “We no longer need a government”. No one was heard to say anything of the kind. There was unanimous agreement concerning the necessity for government. There was disagreement only as to which person should assume responsibility for government and head the state. Government, therefore, was established after the Prophet (s), both in the time of the caliphs and in that of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a); an apparatus of government came into existence with administrative and executive organs.
The nature and character of Islamic law and the divine ordinances of the sharī‘ah furnish additional proof of the necessity for establishing government, for they indicate that the laws were laid down for the purpose of creating a state and administering the political, economic and cultural affairs of society.
Firstly, the laws of the sharī‘ah embrace a diverse body of laws and regulation, which amounts to a complete social system. In this system of laws, all the needs of man have been met: his dealings with his neighbors, fellow citizens, and clan, as well as children and relatives; the concerns of private and marital life; regulations concerning war and peace and intercourse with other nations; penal and commercial law; and regulations pertaining to trade, industry and agriculture. Islamic law contains provisions relating to the preliminaries of marriage and the form in which it should be contracted, and others relating to the development of the embryo in the womb, and what food the parents should eat at the time of conception. It further stipulates the duties that are incumbent upon them while the infant is being suckled, and specifies how the child should be reared, and how the husband and the wife should relate to each other and to their children. Islam provides laws and instructions for all of these matters, aiming, as it does, to produce integrated and virtuous human beings who are walking embodiments of the law, or to put it differently, the law’s voluntary and instinctive executors. It is obvious, then, how much care Islam devotes to government and the political and economic relations of society, with goal of creating conditions conducive to the production of morally upright and virtuous human beings.
The Glorious Qur’an and the Sunnah contain all the laws and ordinances man needs in order to attain happiness and the perfection of his state. The book al-Kāfi[67]has a chapter entitled, “All the Needs of Men Are Set Out in the Book and the Sunnah,”[68] the “Book” meaning the Qur’an, which is, in its own words, “an exposition of all things.”[69]According to certain traditions, the Imām[70] also swears that the Book and the Sunnah contain without a doubt all that men need.
Second, if we examine closely the nature and character of the provisions of the law, we realize that their execution and implementation depend upon the formation of a government, and that it is impossible to fulfill the duty of executing God’s commands without there being established properly comprehensive administrative and executive organs. Let us now mention certain types of provisions in order to illustrate this point; the others you can examine yourselves.
The taxes Islam levies and the form of budget it has established are not merely for the sake of providing subsistence to the poor or feeding the indigent among the descendants of the Prophet (s); they are also intended to make possible, the establishment of a great government and to assure its essential expenditures.
For example, khums is a huge source of income that accrues to the treasury and represents one item in the budget. According to our Shī‘i school of thought, khums is to be levied in an equitable manner on all agricultural and commercial profits and all natural resources whether above or below the ground—in short, on all forms of wealth and income. It applies equally to the greengrocer with his stall outside this mosque, and to the shipping or mining magnate. They must all pay one-fifth of their surplus income, after customary expenses are deducted, to the Islamic ruler, so that it enters the treasury. It is obvious that such a huge income serves the purpose of administering the Islamic state and meeting all its financial needs. If we were to calculate one-fifth of the surplus income of all the Muslim countries (or of the whole world, should it enter the fold of Islam), it would become fully apparent that the purpose for the imposition of such a tax is not merely the upkeep of the sayyids[71] or the religious scholars, but on the contrary, something far more significant—namely, meeting the financial needs of the great organs and institutions of government. If an Islamic government is achieved, it will have to be administered on the basis of the taxes that Islam has established—khums, zakāt (this, of course, would not represent an appreciable sum)[72] jizyah, and kharāj.
How could the sayyids ever need so vast a budget? The khums of the bazaar of Baghdad would be enough for the needs of the sayyids and the upkeep of the religious teaching institution, as well as all the poor of the Islamic world, quite apart from the khums of the bazaars of Tehran, Istanbul, Cairo, and other cities. The provision of such a huge budget must obviously be for the purpose of forming a government and administering the Islamic lands. It was established with the aim of providing for the needs of the people, for public services relating to health, education, defense, and economic development. Further, in accordance with theprocedures laid down by Islam for the collection, preservation, and expenditure of this income, all forms of usurpation and embezzlement of public wealth have been forbidden; so that the head of state and all those entrusted with responsibility for conducting public affairs (i.e., members of the government) have no privileges over the ordinary citizen in benefiting from the public income and wealth; all have an equal share.
Now, should we cast this huge treasury into the ocean, or bury it until the Imām returns,or just spend it on fifty sayyids a day until they have all eaten their fill? Let us suppose we give all this money to 500,000 sayyids; they would not know what to do with it. We all know that the sayyids and the poor have a claim on the public treasury only to the extent required for subsistence. The budget of the Islamic state is constructed in such a way that every source of income is allocated to specific types of expenditures. Zakāt, voluntary contributions and charitable donations, and khums are all levied and spent separately. There is a hadīth to the effect that at the end of the year, sayyids must return any surplus from what they have received to the Islamic ruler, just as the ruler must aid them if they are in need.
The jizyah, which is imposed on the ahl adh-dhimmah,[73] and the kharāj, which is levied on agricultural land, represent two additional sources of considerable income. The establishment of these taxes also proves that the existence of a ruler and a government is necessary. It is the duty of a ruler or governor to assess the poll tax to be levied on the ahl adh-dhimmah in accordance with their income and financial capacity, and to fix appropriate taxes on their arable lands and livestock. He must also collect the kharāj on those broad lands that are the “property of God” and in the possession of the Islamic state. This task requires the existence of orderly institutions, rules and regulations, and administrative procedures and policies; it cannot be fulfilled in the absence of order. It is the responsibility of those in charge of the Islamic state, first, to assess the taxes in due and appropriate measure and in accordance with the public good; then, to collect them; and finally, to spend them in a manner conducive to the welfare of the Muslims.
Thus, you see that the fiscal provisions of Islam also point to the necessity for establishing a government, for they cannot be fulfilled without the establishment of the appropriate Islamic institutions.
The ordinances pertaining to preservation of the Islamic system and defense of the territorial integrity and independence of the Islamic ummah[74] also demanded the formation of a government. An example is the command: “Prepare against them whatever force you can muster and horses tethered” (Qur’an, 8:60), which enjoins the preparation of as much armed defensive force as possible and orders the Muslims to be always on the alert and at the ready, even in time of peace.
If the Muslims had acted in accordance with this command, and after forming a government, made the necessary extensive preparations to be in a state of full readiness for war, a handful of Jews would never have dared to occupy our lands and to burn and destroy the Masjid al-Aqsā[75] without the people’sbeing capable of making an immediate response. All this has resulted from the failure of the Muslims to fulfill their duty of executing God’s law and setting up a righteous and respectable government. If the rulers of the Muslim countries truly represented the believers and enacted God’s ordinances, they would set aside their petty differences, abandon their subversive and divisive activities, and join together like the fingers of one hand. Then a handful of wretched Jews (the agents of America, Britain and other foreign powers) would never have been able to accomplish what they have, no matter how much support they enjoyed from America and Britain. All this has happened because of the incompetence of those who rule over the Muslims.
The verse: “Prepare against them whatever force you can muster” commands you to be as strong and well-prepared as possible, so that your enemies will be unable to oppress you and transgress against you. It is because we have been lacking in unity, strength, and preparedness that we suffer oppression and are at the mercy of foreign aggressors.
There are numerous provisions of the law that cannot be implemented without the establishment of a government apparatus; for example, blood money, which must be exacted and delivered to those deserving it, or the corporeal penalties imposed by the law, which must be carried out under the supervision of the Islamic ruler. All of these laws refer back to the institutions of government for it is the government power alone that is capable of fulfilling this function.
After the death of the Most Noble Messenger (s), the obstinate enemies of the faith, the Umayyads[76] (God’s curses be upon them), did not permit the Islamic state to attain stability with the rule of ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a). They did not allow a form of government to exist that was pleasing to God, Exalted and Almighty, and to His Most Noble Messenger (s). They transformed the entire basis of government, and their policies were, for the most part, contradictory to Islam. The form of government of the Umayyads and the Abbasids,[77] and the political and administrative policies they pursued, were anti-Islamic. The form of government was thoroughly perverted by being transformed into a monarchy, like those of the kings of Iran, the emperors of Rome, and the pharaohs of Egypt. For the most part, this non-Islamic form of government has persisted to the present day, as we can see.
Both law and reason require that we not permit governments to retain this non-Islamic or anti-Islamic character. The proofs are clear. First, the existence of a non-Islamic political order necessarily results in the non-implementation of the Islamic political order. Then, all non-Islamic systems of government are the systems of kufr[78] since the ruler in each case is an instance of tāghūt,[79] and it is our duty to remove from the life of Muslim society all traces of kufr and destroy them. It is also our duty to create a favorable social environment for the education of believing and virtuous individuals, an environment that is in total contradiction with that produced by the rule of tāghūt and illegitimate power. The social environment created by tāghūt and shirk[80] invariably brings about corruption such as you can observe now in Iran, the same corruption termed “corruption on earth.”[81] This corruption must be swept away, and its instigators should be punished for their deeds. It is the same corruption that the Pharaoh generated in Egypt with his policies, so that the Qur’an says of him, “Truly, he was among the corruptors” (28:4). A believing, pious, just individual cannot possibly exist in a socio-political environment of this nature, and still maintain his faith and righteous conduct. He is faced with two choices: either he commits acts that amount to kufr and contradict righteousness, or in order not to commit such acts and not to submit to the orders and commands of tāghūt, the just individual opposes him and struggles against him in order to destroy the environment of corruption. We have in reality, then, no choice but to destroy those systems of government that are corrupt in themselves and also entail the corruption of others, and to overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes.
This is a duty that all Muslims must fulfill, in every one of the Muslim countries, in order to achieve the triumphant political revolution of Islam.
We see, too, that together, the imperialists and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers have divided the Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic ummah from each other and artificially created separate nations. There once existed the great Ottoman State, and that, too, the imperialists divided. Russia, Britain, Austria, and other imperialist powers united, and through wars against the Ottomans, each came to occupy or absorb into its sphere of influence, part of the Ottoman realm. It is true that most of the Ottoman rulers were incompetent, that some of them were corrupt, and that they followed the monarchical system. Nonetheless, the existence of the Ottoman State represented a threat to the imperialists. It was always possible that righteous individuals might rise up among the people and, with their assistance, seize control of the state, thus putting an end to imperialism by mobilizing the unified resources of the nation. Therefore after numerous prior wars, the imperialists at the end of World War I divided the Ottoman State, creating in its territories about ten or fifteen petty states.[82] Then each of these was entrusted to one of their servants or a group of their servants, although certain countries were later able to escape the grasp of the agents of imperialism.
In order to assure the unity of the Islamic ummah, in order to liberate the Islamic homeland from occupation and penetration by the imperialists and their puppet governments, it is imperative that we establish a government. In order to attain the unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government of justice that will be in the service of the people. The formation of such a government will serve to preserve the disciplined unity of the Muslims; just as Fātimah az-Zahrā[83] (‘a) said in her address: “The Imamate exists for the sake of preserving order among the Muslims and replacing their disunity with unity”.
Through the political agents they have placed in power over the people, the imperialists have imposed on us an unjust economic order, and thereby divided our people into two groups: oppressors and oppressed. Hundreds of millions of Muslims are hungry and deprived of all forms of health care and education, while minorities comprised of the wealthy and powerful live a life of indulgence, licentiousness, and corruption. The hungry and deprived have constantly struggled to free themselves from the oppression of their plundering overlords, and their struggle continues to this day. But their way is blocked by the ruling minorities and the oppressive governmental structures they head. It is our duty to save the oppressed and deprived. It is our duty to be a helper to the oppressed, and an enemy to the oppressor. This is nothing other than the duty that the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) entrusted to his two great offspring[84] in his celebrated testament: “Be an enemy to the oppressor and a helper to the oppressed.”[85]
The scholars of Islam have a duty to struggle against all attempts by oppressors to establish a monopoly over the sources of wealth or to make illicit use of them. They must not allow the masses to remain hungry and deprived while plundering oppressors usurp the sources of wealth and live in opulence. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) says: “I have accepted the task of government because God, Exalted and Almighty, has exacted from the scholars of Islam a pledge not to sit silent and idle in the face of gluttony and plundering of the oppressors, on the one hand, and the hunger and deprivation of the oppressed, on the other.” Here is the full text of the passage we refer to:
“I swear by Him Who causes the seed to open and creates the souls of all living things that were it not for the presence of those who have come to swear allegiance to me, were it not for the obligation of rulership now imposed upon me by the availability of aid and support, and were it not for the pledge that God has taken from the scholars of Islam not to remain silent in the face of the gluttony and plundering of the oppressors, on the one hand, and the harrowing hunger and deprivation of the oppressed, on the other hand---were it not for all of this, then I would abandon the reins of government and in no way seek it. You would see that this world of yours, with all of its position and rank, is less in my eyes than the moisture that comes from the sneeze of a goat.”[86]
How can we stay silent and idle today when we see that a band of traitors and usurpers, the agents of foreign powers, have appropriated the wealth and the fruits of labor of hundreds of millions of Muslims—thanks to the support of their masters and through the power of the bayonet—granting the Muslim not the least right to prosperity? It is the duty of Islamic scholars and all Muslims to put an end to this system of oppression and, for the sake of the well-being of hundreds of millions of human beings, to overthrow these oppressive governments and form an Islamic government.
Reason, the laws of Islam, and the practice of the Prophet (s), and that of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), the purport of various Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions—all indicate the necessity of forming a government. As an example of the traditions of the Imāms, I now quote the following tradition of Imām Ridā[87] (‘a):
‘Abd al-Wāhid ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abdus an-Neyshābūri al-‘Attār said: “I was told by Abū ’l-Hasan ‘Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Qutayba an-Neyshābūri that he was told by Abū Muhammad al-Fadl ibn Shadhan an-Neyshābūri this tradition. If someone asks, ‘Why has God, the All-Wise, appointed the holders of authority and commanded us to obey them?’ then we answer, ‘For numerous reasons. One reason is this: Men are commanded to observe certain limits and not to transgress them in order to avoid the corruption that would result. This cannot be attained or established without there being appointed over them a trustee who will ensure that they remain within the limits of the licit and prevent them from casting themselves into the danger of transgression. Were it not for such a trustee, no one would abandon his own pleasure and benefit because of the corruption it might entail for another. Another reason is that we find no group or nation of men that ever existed without a ruler and leader, since it is required by both religion and worldly interest. It would not be compatible with divine wisdom to leave mankind to its own devices, for He, the All-Wise, knows that men need a ruler for their survival. It is through the leadership he provides that men make war against their enemies, divide among themselves the spoils of war, and preserve their communal solidarity, preventing the oppression of the oppressed by the oppressor.
“A further reason is this: were God not to appoint over men a solicitous, trustworthy, protecting, reliable leader, the community would decline, religion would depart, and the norms and ordinances that have been revealed would undergo change. Innovators would increase and deniers would erode religion, inducing doubt in the Muslims. For we see that men are needy and defective, judging by their differences of opinion and inclination and their diversity of state. Were a trustee, then, not appointed to preserve what has been revealed through the Prophet (s), corruption would ensue in the manner we have described. Revealed laws, norms, ordinances, and faith would be altogether changed, and therein would lie the corruption of all mankind.”[88]
We have omitted the first part of the hadīth, which pertains to prophethood, a topic not germane to our present discussion. What interests us at present is the second half, which I will now paraphrase for you.
If someone should ask you, “Why has God, the All-Wise, appointed holders of authority and commanded you to obey them?” you should answer him as follows: “He has done so for various causes and reasons. One is that men have been set upon a certain well- defined path, and commanded not to stray from it, nor to transgress against the established limits and norms, for if they were to stray, they would fall prey to corruption. Now men would not be able to keep to their ordained path and to enact God’s laws unless a trustworthy and protective individual (or power) were appointed over them with responsibility for this matter, to prevent them from stepping outside the sphere of the licit and transgressing against the rights of others. If no such restraining individual or power were appointed, nobody would voluntarily abandon any pleasure or interest of his own that might result in harm or corruption to others; everybody would engage in oppressing and harming others for the sake of his own pleasures and interests.
“Another reason and cause is this: we do not see a single group, nation, or religious community that has ever been able to exist without an individual entrusted with the maintenance of its laws and institutions—in short, a head or a leader; for such a person is essential for fulfilling the affairs of religion and the world. It is not permissible, therefore, according to divine wisdom that God should leave men, His creatures, without a leader and guide, for He knows well that they depend on the existence of such a person for their own survival and perpetuation. It is under his leadership that they fight against their enemies, divide the public income among themselves, perform Friday and other congregational prayers and foreshorten the arms of the transgressors who would encroach on the rights of the oppressed.
“Another proof and cause is this: were God not to appoint an Imām over men to maintain law and order, to serve the people faithfully as a vigilant trustee, religion would fall victim to obsolescence and decay. Its rites and institutions would vanish; the customs and ordinances of Islam would be transformed or even deformed. Heretical innovators would add things to religion and atheists and unbelievers would subtract things from it, presenting it to the Muslims in an inaccurate manner. For we see that men are prey to defects; they are not perfect, and must need to strive for perfection. Moreover, they disagree with each other, having varying inclinations and discordant states. If God, therefore, had not appointed over men one who would maintain order and law and protect the revelation brought by the Prophet (s), in the manner we have described, men would have fallen prey to corruption; the institutions, laws, customs, and ordinances of Islam would be transformed; and faith and its content would be completely changed, resulting in the corruption of all humanity.”
As you can deduce from the words of the Imām (‘a), there are numerous proofs and causes that necessitate formation of a government, and establishment of an authority. These proofs, causes, and arguments are not temporary in their validity or limited to a particular time, and the necessity for the formation of a government, therefore, is perpetual. For example, it will always happen that men overstep the limits laid down by Islam and transgress against the rights of others for the sake of their personal pleasure and benefit. It cannot be asserted that such was the case only in the time of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), and that afterwards, men became angels. The wisdom of the Creator has decreed that men should live in accordance with justice and act within the limits set by divine law. This wisdom is eternal and immutable, and constitutes one of the norms of God Almighty. Today and always, therefore, the existence of a holder of authority, a ruler who acts as trustee and maintains the institutions and laws of Islam, is a necessity—a ruler who prevents cruelty, oppression, and violation of the rights of others; who is a trustworthy and vigilant guardian of God’s creatures; who guides men to the teachings, doctrines, laws, and institutions of Islam; and who prevents the undesirable changes that atheists and the enemies of religion wish to introduce in the laws and institutions of Islam. Did not the caliphate of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) serve this purpose? The same factors of necessity that led him to become the Imām still exist; the only difference is that no single individual has been designated for the task.[89] The principle of the necessity of government has been made a general one, so that it will always remain in effect.
If the ordinances of Islam are to remain in effect, then, if encroachment by oppressive ruling classes on the rights of the weak is to be prevented, if ruling minorities are not to be permitted to plunder and corrupt the people for the sake of pleasure and material interest, if the Islamic order is to be preserved and all individuals are to pursue the just path of Islam without any deviation, if innovations and the approval of anti-Islamic laws by sham parliaments[90] are to be prevented, if the influence of foreign powers in the Islamic lands is to be destroyed—government is necessary. None of these aims can be achieved without government and the organs of the state. It is a righteous government, of course, that is needed; one presided over by a ruler who will be a trustworthy and righteous trustee. Those who presently govern us are of no use at all for they are tyrannical, corrupt, and highly incompetent.
In the past, we did not act in concert and unanimity in order to establish proper government and overthrow treacherous and corrupt rulers. Some people were apathetic and reluctant even to discuss the theory of Islamic government, and some went so far as to praise oppressive rulers. It is for this reason that we find ourselves in the present state. The influence and sovereignty of Islam in society have declined; the nation of Islam has fallen victim to division and weakness; the laws of Islam have remained in abeyance and been subjected to change and modification; and the imperialists have propagated foreign laws and alien culture among the Muslims through their agents for the sake of their evil purposes, causing people to be infatuated with the West. It was our lack of a leader, a guardian, and our lack of institutions of leadership that made all this possible. We need righteous and proper organs of government; that much is self-evident.
Notes:
[61] Valī-yi Amr: “the one who holds authority,” a term derived from Qur’an, 4:59: “O you who believe! Obey God, and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority
#363;li ’l-amr) from among you.” For commentary of this verse, see Mīr Ahmad ‘Ali, The Holy Qur’an (NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 1988), http://www.al-islam.org/quran (Pub.)
[62] Sunnah: the practice of the Prophet, accepted by Muslims as the norm and ideal for all human behavior.
[63] See, for example, Sūrah Ibrāhīm (14:52), Sūrah Yūnus (10:2), Sūrah al-Hājj (22:49), Sūrah al-Ahzāb (33:40), and Sūrah Yā-Sīn (36:70). (Pub.)
[64] Lesser Occultation: ghaybat-i sughrah, the period of about 70 years (260/872-329/939) when, according to Shī‘i belief, Muhammad al-Mahdi, the Twelfth Imām, absented himself from the physical plane but remained in communication with his followers through a succession of four appointed deputies, viz., ‘Uthmān ibn Sa‘īd, Muhammad ibn ‘Uthmān, Husayn ibn Rūh, and ‘Ali ibn Muhammad. At the death of the fourth deputies no successor was named, and the Greater Occultation (ghaybat-i kubrah) began, and continues to this day. See Muhammad Bāqir as-Sadr and Murtadā Mutahhari, Awaited Saviour (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications), http://www.islam.org/saviour/index.htm; Muhammad Bāqir as-Sadr, An Inquiry Concerning Al-Mahdi (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Jassim M. Husain, The Occultation of the Twelfth Imām: A Historical Background (London: Muhammadi Trust, 1982); Ibrāhīm Amīni, Al-Imām Al-Mahdī: The Just Leader of Humanity, trans. ‘Abdul ‘Azīz Sachedina (Qum: Ansariyan Publications), http://www.al-islam.org/mahdi/nontl/index.htm. (Pub.)
[65] The allusion is probably to the Bahā’is, who claim to have received a succession of post-Qur’anic revelations.
[66] Jizyah: a tax levied on non-Muslim citizens of the Muslim state in exchange for the protection they receive and in lieu of the taxes, such as zakāt, that only Muslims pay. Kharaj: a tax levied on certain categories of land. Khums: a tax consisting of one-fifth of agricultural and commercial profits (see p. 24 and Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, Khums, http://www.al-islam.org/beliefs/practices/khums.html). Zakāt: the tax levied on various categories of wealth and spent on the purposes specified in Qur’an, 9:60. (Pub.)
[67] Al-Kāfi: more fully, Al-Kāfi fī ’l Hadīth,one of the most important Shī‘i collections of hadīth, compiled by Shaykh Abū Ja‘far Muhammad ibn Ya‘qūb al-Kulayni (d. 329/941). This treatise consists of 34 books, 326 sections, and over 16,000 ahādīth. Two fascicules of this work have been translated into English by Sayyid Muhammad Hasan Rizvi and published by the Tehran-based World Organization for Islamic Services (WOFIS), http://www.wofis.com, e-mail: این آدرس ایمیل توسط spambots حفاظت می شود. برای دیدن شما نیاز به جاوا اسکریپت دارید. (Pub.)
[68] Usūl al-Kāfi, Book of “Virtues of Knowledge,” vol. 1, pp. 76-80. (Pub.)
[69] Qur’an, 16:89.
[70] The reference is probably to Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq, whose sayings on this subject are quoted by ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’i in al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān (Beirut, 1390/1979), XII, 327-328. First eight volumes of ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’i’s Al-Mīzān has been translated into English by Sayyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi and published by the WOFIS. (Pub.)
[71] Sayyids: the descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fātimah and son-in-law ‘Ali, the first of the Twelve Imāms.
[72] Zakāt would not represent an appreciable sum presumably because it is levied on surplus wealth, the accumulation of which is inhibited by the economic system of Islam.
[73] Ahl adh-Dhimmah: non-Muslim citizens of the Muslim state, whose rights and obligations are contractually determined.
[74] Ummah: the entire Islamic community, without territorial or ethnic distinction.
[75] Masjid al-Aqsā: the site in Jerusalem where the Prophet ascended to heaven in the eleventh year of his mission (Qur’an, 17:1); also the complex of mosques and buildings erected on the site. The chief of these was extensively damaged by arson in 1969, two years after the Zionist usurpation of Jerusalem.
[76] Umayyads: descendants of ‘Umayyah ibn ‘Abdu Shams ibn ‘Abdu Manāf from the Quraysh tribe, and members of the dynasty that ruled at Damascus from 41/632 until 132/750 and transformed the caliphate into a hereditary institution. Mu‘āwiyah, ibn Abū Sufyān frequently mentioned in these pages, was the first of the Umayyad line. This kingdom ended with the murder of Marwān II, the last Umayyad caliph. (Pub.)
[77] Abbasids: offspring of ‘Abbās ibn ‘Abdul Muttalib, uncle of the Holy Prophet (s), and the dynasty that replaced the Umayyads and established a new caliphal capital in Baghdad. This dynastic rule began in 132/750 with the caliphate of ‘Abdullāh as-Saffāh. With the rise of various local rulers, generally of military origin, the power of the Abbasids began to decline from the fourth/tenth century and it was brought to an end by the Mongol conquest in 656/1258. (Pub.)
[78] Kufr: the rejection of divine guidance; the antithesis of Islam.
[79] Tāghūt: one who surpasses all bounds in his despotism and tyranny and claims the prerogatives of divinity for himself, whether explicitly or implicitly. See also p. 78-79.
[80] Shirk: the assignment of partners to God, either by believing in a multiplicity of gods, or by assigning divine attributes and prerogatives to other-than-God.
[81] “Corruption on earth”: a broad term including not only moral corruption, but also subversion of the public good, embezzlement and usurpation of public wealth, conspiring with the enemies of the community against its security, and working in general for the overthrow of the Islamic order. See the commentary on Qur’an, 5:33 in Tabātabā’i’s, al-Mīzān, V, 330-332.
[82] It may be apposite to quote here the following passage from a secret report drawn up in January 1916 by Thomas E. Lawrence, the British organizer of the so-called Arab revolt led by Sharīf Husayn of Mecca: “Husayn’s activity seems beneficial to us, because it matches with our immediate aims, the breakup of the Islamic bloc and the defeat and disruption of the Ottoman Empire…. The Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. If properly handled they would remain in a state of political mosaic, a tissue of small jealous principalities incapable of political cohesion.” See Philip Knightley and Colin Simpson, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia (New York, 1971), p. 55.
[83] Fātimah az-Zahrā: Fātimah, the daughter of the Prophet and wife of Imām ‘Ali. For her biography, see Fātimah the Gracious (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[84] I.e., Hasan and Husayn.
[85] Nahj al-Balāghah, Letter 47. See English translation of Nahj al-Balāghah, Peak of Eloquence with commentary and its original Arabic text (Qum: Ansariyan Publications), http://www.al-islam.org/nahjul/index.htm. (Pub.)
[86] Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 3 (The famous Shaqshaqiyyah Sermon).See Nahj al-Balāghah, ed. Subhi as-Sālih. (Pub.)
[87] Imām Ridā: eighth of the Twelve Imāms, born in 148/765 and died in 203/817 in Tūs (Mashhad). He was poisoned by the Abbasid caliph Ma’mūn, who had appointed him as his successor at first, but then grew fearful of the wide following he commanded (see p. 137). His shrine in Mashhad is one of the principal centers of pilgrimage and religious learning in Iran. See Bāqir Sharīf al-Qarashi, The Life of Imām ‘Ali bin Mūsā al-Ridā, trans. Jāsim al-Rasheed (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Muhammad Jawād Fadlallāh, Imam al-Ridā: A Historical and Biographical Research, trans. Yāsīn T. al-Jibouri, http://www.al-islam.org/al-rida/index.html; Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Dīn, “Al-Imām ar-Ridā (‘a) and the Heir Apparency,” At-Tawhīd Journal, http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/heir.htm. (Pub.)
[88] The text of this tradition can be found in Shaykh Sadūq, ‘Ilal ash-Sharāi‘ (Qum, 1378/1958), I, sec. 182, hadīth 9, p. 251. (Pub.)
[89] That is, in the absence of the Imām or an individual deputy named by him (as was the case during the Lesser Occultation), the task devolves upon the fuqahā as a class. See argument on pp. 44-112.
[90] Here the allusion may be in particular to the so-called Family Protection Law of 1967, which Imām Khomeini denounced as contrary to Islam in an important ruling. See Imām Khomeini, Tauzih al-Masā’il, n.p., n.d., pp. 462-463, par. 2836, and p. 441.
Written by The Late Imam Khomeini (R.A.)
Translated by Prof. Hamid Algar
Source: Imam reza network
The Necessity for Islamic Government
A body of laws alone is not sufficient for a society to be reformed. In order for law to ensure the reform and happiness of man, there must be an executive power and an executor. For this reason, God Almighty, in addition to revealing a body of law (i.e., the ordinances of the sharī‘ah), has laid down a particular form of government together with executive and administrative institution.
The Most Noble Messenger (s) headed the executive and administrative institutions of Muslim society. In addition to conveying the revelation and expounding and interpreting the articles of faith and the ordinances and institutions of Islam, he undertook the implementation of law and the establishment of the ordinances of Islam, thereby, bringing into being the Islamic state. He did not content himself with the promulgation of law; rather, he implemented it at the same time, cutting off hands and administering lashings, and stonings. After the Most Noble Messenger (s), his successor had the same duty and function. When the Prophet (s) appointed a successor, it was not only for the purpose of expounding articles of faith and law; it was for the implementation of law and the execution of God’s ordinances. It was this function—the execution of law and the establishment of Islamic institutions—that made the appointment of a successor such an important matter that the Prophet (s) would have failed to fulfill his mission if he had neglected it. For after the Prophet (s), the Muslims still needed someone to execute laws and establish the institution of Islam in society, so that they might attain happiness in this world and the hereafter.
By their nature, in fact, laws and social institutions require the existence of an executor. It has always and everywhere been the case that legislation alone has little benefit: legislation by itself cannot assure the well-being of man. After the establishment of legislation, an executive power must come into being, a power that implements the laws and the verdicts given by the courts, thus allowing people to benefit from the laws and the just sentences the courts deliver. Islam has therefore established an executive power in the same way that it has brought laws into being. The person who holds this executive power is known as the valī-yi amr.[61]
The Sunnah[62] and path of the Prophet (s) constitute a proof of the necessity for establishing government. First, he himself established a government, as history testifies. He engaged in the implementation of laws, the establishment of the ordinances of Islam, and the administration of society. He sent out governors to different regions; both sat in judgment himself and also appointed judges; dispatched emissaries to foreign states, tribal chieftains, and kings; concluded treaties and pacts; and took command in battle. In short, he fulfilled all the functions of government. Second, he designated a ruler to succeed him, in accordance with divine command. If God Almighty, through the Prophet (s), designated a man who was to rule over Muslim society after him, this is in itself an indication that government remains a necessity after the departure of the Prophet from this world. Again, since the Most Noble Messenger (s) promulgated the divine command through his act of appointing a successor, he also, implicitly stated the necessity for establishing a government.
It is self-evident that the necessity for enactment of the law, which necessitated the formation of a government by the Prophet (s), was confined or restricted to his time, but continues after his departure from this world. According to one of the noble verses of the Qur’an, the ordinances of Islam are not limited with respect to time or place; they are permanent and must be enacted until the end of time.[63] They were not revealed merely for the time of the Prophet, only to be abandoned thereafter, with retribution and the penal code no longer be enacted, or the taxes prescribed by Islam no longer collected, and the defense of the lands and people of Islam suspended. The claim that the laws of Islam may remain in abeyance or are restricted to a particular time or place is contrary to the essential creedal bases of Islam. Since enactment of laws, then, is necessary after the departure of the Prophet from this world, and indeed, will remain so until the end of time, the formation of a government and the establishment of executive and administrative organs are also necessary. Without the formation of a government and the establishment of such organs to ensure that through enactment of the law, all activities of the individual take place in the framework of a just system, chaos and anarchy will prevail and social, intellectual and moral corruption will arise. The only way to prevent the emergence of anarchy and disorder and to protect society from corruption is to form a government and thus impart order to all the affairs of the country.
Both reason and divine law, then, demonstrate the necessity in our time for what was necessary during the lifetime of the Prophet (s) and the age of the Commander of the Faithful, ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a)—namely the formation of a government and the establishment of executive and administrative organs.
In order to clarify the matter further, let us pose the following question. From the time of the Lesser Occultation[64] down to the present (a period of more than twelve centuries that may continue for hundreds of millennia if it is not appropriate for the Occulted Imām to manifest himself), is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast aside and remain unexecuted, so that everyone acts as he pleases and anarchy prevails? Were the laws that the Prophet of Islam labored so hard for twenty-three years to set forth, promulgate, and execute valid only for a limited period of time? Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation? Anyone who believes so, or voices such a belief, is worse situated than the person who believes and proclaims that Islam has been superseded or abrogated by another supposed revelation.[65]
No one can say it is no longer necessary to defend the frontiers and the territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland; that taxes such as the jizyah, kharāj, khums, and zakāt[66] should no longer be collected; that the penal code of Islam, with its provisions for the payment of blood money and the exacting of requital, should be suspended. Any person who claims that the formation of an Islamic government is not necessary implicitly denies the necessity for the implementation of Islamic law, the universality and comprehensiveness of that law, and the eternal validity of the faith itself.
After the death of the Most Noble Messenger (s), none of the Muslims doubted the necessity for government. No one said: “We no longer need a government”. No one was heard to say anything of the kind. There was unanimous agreement concerning the necessity for government. There was disagreement only as to which person should assume responsibility for government and head the state. Government, therefore, was established after the Prophet (s), both in the time of the caliphs and in that of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a); an apparatus of government came into existence with administrative and executive organs.
The nature and character of Islamic law and the divine ordinances of the sharī‘ah furnish additional proof of the necessity for establishing government, for they indicate that the laws were laid down for the purpose of creating a state and administering the political, economic and cultural affairs of society.
Firstly, the laws of the sharī‘ah embrace a diverse body of laws and regulation, which amounts to a complete social system. In this system of laws, all the needs of man have been met: his dealings with his neighbors, fellow citizens, and clan, as well as children and relatives; the concerns of private and marital life; regulations concerning war and peace and intercourse with other nations; penal and commercial law; and regulations pertaining to trade, industry and agriculture. Islamic law contains provisions relating to the preliminaries of marriage and the form in which it should be contracted, and others relating to the development of the embryo in the womb, and what food the parents should eat at the time of conception. It further stipulates the duties that are incumbent upon them while the infant is being suckled, and specifies how the child should be reared, and how the husband and the wife should relate to each other and to their children. Islam provides laws and instructions for all of these matters, aiming, as it does, to produce integrated and virtuous human beings who are walking embodiments of the law, or to put it differently, the law’s voluntary and instinctive executors. It is obvious, then, how much care Islam devotes to government and the political and economic relations of society, with goal of creating conditions conducive to the production of morally upright and virtuous human beings.
The Glorious Qur’an and the Sunnah contain all the laws and ordinances man needs in order to attain happiness and the perfection of his state. The book al-Kāfi[67]has a chapter entitled, “All the Needs of Men Are Set Out in the Book and the Sunnah,”[68] the “Book” meaning the Qur’an, which is, in its own words, “an exposition of all things.”[69]According to certain traditions, the Imām[70] also swears that the Book and the Sunnah contain without a doubt all that men need.
Second, if we examine closely the nature and character of the provisions of the law, we realize that their execution and implementation depend upon the formation of a government, and that it is impossible to fulfill the duty of executing God’s commands without there being established properly comprehensive administrative and executive organs. Let us now mention certain types of provisions in order to illustrate this point; the others you can examine yourselves.
The taxes Islam levies and the form of budget it has established are not merely for the sake of providing subsistence to the poor or feeding the indigent among the descendants of the Prophet (s); they are also intended to make possible, the establishment of a great government and to assure its essential expenditures.
For example, khums is a huge source of income that accrues to the treasury and represents one item in the budget. According to our Shī‘i school of thought, khums is to be levied in an equitable manner on all agricultural and commercial profits and all natural resources whether above or below the ground—in short, on all forms of wealth and income. It applies equally to the greengrocer with his stall outside this mosque, and to the shipping or mining magnate. They must all pay one-fifth of their surplus income, after customary expenses are deducted, to the Islamic ruler, so that it enters the treasury. It is obvious that such a huge income serves the purpose of administering the Islamic state and meeting all its financial needs. If we were to calculate one-fifth of the surplus income of all the Muslim countries (or of the whole world, should it enter the fold of Islam), it would become fully apparent that the purpose for the imposition of such a tax is not merely the upkeep of the sayyids[71] or the religious scholars, but on the contrary, something far more significant—namely, meeting the financial needs of the great organs and institutions of government. If an Islamic government is achieved, it will have to be administered on the basis of the taxes that Islam has established—khums, zakāt (this, of course, would not represent an appreciable sum)[72] jizyah, and kharāj.
How could the sayyids ever need so vast a budget? The khums of the bazaar of Baghdad would be enough for the needs of the sayyids and the upkeep of the religious teaching institution, as well as all the poor of the Islamic world, quite apart from the khums of the bazaars of Tehran, Istanbul, Cairo, and other cities. The provision of such a huge budget must obviously be for the purpose of forming a government and administering the Islamic lands. It was established with the aim of providing for the needs of the people, for public services relating to health, education, defense, and economic development. Further, in accordance with theprocedures laid down by Islam for the collection, preservation, and expenditure of this income, all forms of usurpation and embezzlement of public wealth have been forbidden; so that the head of state and all those entrusted with responsibility for conducting public affairs (i.e., members of the government) have no privileges over the ordinary citizen in benefiting from the public income and wealth; all have an equal share.
Now, should we cast this huge treasury into the ocean, or bury it until the Imām returns,or just spend it on fifty sayyids a day until they have all eaten their fill? Let us suppose we give all this money to 500,000 sayyids; they would not know what to do with it. We all know that the sayyids and the poor have a claim on the public treasury only to the extent required for subsistence. The budget of the Islamic state is constructed in such a way that every source of income is allocated to specific types of expenditures. Zakāt, voluntary contributions and charitable donations, and khums are all levied and spent separately. There is a hadīth to the effect that at the end of the year, sayyids must return any surplus from what they have received to the Islamic ruler, just as the ruler must aid them if they are in need.
The jizyah, which is imposed on the ahl adh-dhimmah,[73] and the kharāj, which is levied on agricultural land, represent two additional sources of considerable income. The establishment of these taxes also proves that the existence of a ruler and a government is necessary. It is the duty of a ruler or governor to assess the poll tax to be levied on the ahl adh-dhimmah in accordance with their income and financial capacity, and to fix appropriate taxes on their arable lands and livestock. He must also collect the kharāj on those broad lands that are the “property of God” and in the possession of the Islamic state. This task requires the existence of orderly institutions, rules and regulations, and administrative procedures and policies; it cannot be fulfilled in the absence of order. It is the responsibility of those in charge of the Islamic state, first, to assess the taxes in due and appropriate measure and in accordance with the public good; then, to collect them; and finally, to spend them in a manner conducive to the welfare of the Muslims.
Thus, you see that the fiscal provisions of Islam also point to the necessity for establishing a government, for they cannot be fulfilled without the establishment of the appropriate Islamic institutions.
The ordinances pertaining to preservation of the Islamic system and defense of the territorial integrity and independence of the Islamic ummah[74] also demanded the formation of a government. An example is the command: “Prepare against them whatever force you can muster and horses tethered” (Qur’an, 8:60), which enjoins the preparation of as much armed defensive force as possible and orders the Muslims to be always on the alert and at the ready, even in time of peace.
If the Muslims had acted in accordance with this command, and after forming a government, made the necessary extensive preparations to be in a state of full readiness for war, a handful of Jews would never have dared to occupy our lands and to burn and destroy the Masjid al-Aqsā[75] without the people’sbeing capable of making an immediate response. All this has resulted from the failure of the Muslims to fulfill their duty of executing God’s law and setting up a righteous and respectable government. If the rulers of the Muslim countries truly represented the believers and enacted God’s ordinances, they would set aside their petty differences, abandon their subversive and divisive activities, and join together like the fingers of one hand. Then a handful of wretched Jews (the agents of America, Britain and other foreign powers) would never have been able to accomplish what they have, no matter how much support they enjoyed from America and Britain. All this has happened because of the incompetence of those who rule over the Muslims.
The verse: “Prepare against them whatever force you can muster” commands you to be as strong and well-prepared as possible, so that your enemies will be unable to oppress you and transgress against you. It is because we have been lacking in unity, strength, and preparedness that we suffer oppression and are at the mercy of foreign aggressors.
There are numerous provisions of the law that cannot be implemented without the establishment of a government apparatus; for example, blood money, which must be exacted and delivered to those deserving it, or the corporeal penalties imposed by the law, which must be carried out under the supervision of the Islamic ruler. All of these laws refer back to the institutions of government for it is the government power alone that is capable of fulfilling this function.
After the death of the Most Noble Messenger (s), the obstinate enemies of the faith, the Umayyads[76] (God’s curses be upon them), did not permit the Islamic state to attain stability with the rule of ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a). They did not allow a form of government to exist that was pleasing to God, Exalted and Almighty, and to His Most Noble Messenger (s). They transformed the entire basis of government, and their policies were, for the most part, contradictory to Islam. The form of government of the Umayyads and the Abbasids,[77] and the political and administrative policies they pursued, were anti-Islamic. The form of government was thoroughly perverted by being transformed into a monarchy, like those of the kings of Iran, the emperors of Rome, and the pharaohs of Egypt. For the most part, this non-Islamic form of government has persisted to the present day, as we can see.
Both law and reason require that we not permit governments to retain this non-Islamic or anti-Islamic character. The proofs are clear. First, the existence of a non-Islamic political order necessarily results in the non-implementation of the Islamic political order. Then, all non-Islamic systems of government are the systems of kufr[78] since the ruler in each case is an instance of tāghūt,[79] and it is our duty to remove from the life of Muslim society all traces of kufr and destroy them. It is also our duty to create a favorable social environment for the education of believing and virtuous individuals, an environment that is in total contradiction with that produced by the rule of tāghūt and illegitimate power. The social environment created by tāghūt and shirk[80] invariably brings about corruption such as you can observe now in Iran, the same corruption termed “corruption on earth.”[81] This corruption must be swept away, and its instigators should be punished for their deeds. It is the same corruption that the Pharaoh generated in Egypt with his policies, so that the Qur’an says of him, “Truly, he was among the corruptors” (28:4). A believing, pious, just individual cannot possibly exist in a socio-political environment of this nature, and still maintain his faith and righteous conduct. He is faced with two choices: either he commits acts that amount to kufr and contradict righteousness, or in order not to commit such acts and not to submit to the orders and commands of tāghūt, the just individual opposes him and struggles against him in order to destroy the environment of corruption. We have in reality, then, no choice but to destroy those systems of government that are corrupt in themselves and also entail the corruption of others, and to overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes.
This is a duty that all Muslims must fulfill, in every one of the Muslim countries, in order to achieve the triumphant political revolution of Islam.
We see, too, that together, the imperialists and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers have divided the Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic ummah from each other and artificially created separate nations. There once existed the great Ottoman State, and that, too, the imperialists divided. Russia, Britain, Austria, and other imperialist powers united, and through wars against the Ottomans, each came to occupy or absorb into its sphere of influence, part of the Ottoman realm. It is true that most of the Ottoman rulers were incompetent, that some of them were corrupt, and that they followed the monarchical system. Nonetheless, the existence of the Ottoman State represented a threat to the imperialists. It was always possible that righteous individuals might rise up among the people and, with their assistance, seize control of the state, thus putting an end to imperialism by mobilizing the unified resources of the nation. Therefore after numerous prior wars, the imperialists at the end of World War I divided the Ottoman State, creating in its territories about ten or fifteen petty states.[82] Then each of these was entrusted to one of their servants or a group of their servants, although certain countries were later able to escape the grasp of the agents of imperialism.
In order to assure the unity of the Islamic ummah, in order to liberate the Islamic homeland from occupation and penetration by the imperialists and their puppet governments, it is imperative that we establish a government. In order to attain the unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government of justice that will be in the service of the people. The formation of such a government will serve to preserve the disciplined unity of the Muslims; just as Fātimah az-Zahrā[83] (‘a) said in her address: “The Imamate exists for the sake of preserving order among the Muslims and replacing their disunity with unity”.
Through the political agents they have placed in power over the people, the imperialists have imposed on us an unjust economic order, and thereby divided our people into two groups: oppressors and oppressed. Hundreds of millions of Muslims are hungry and deprived of all forms of health care and education, while minorities comprised of the wealthy and powerful live a life of indulgence, licentiousness, and corruption. The hungry and deprived have constantly struggled to free themselves from the oppression of their plundering overlords, and their struggle continues to this day. But their way is blocked by the ruling minorities and the oppressive governmental structures they head. It is our duty to save the oppressed and deprived. It is our duty to be a helper to the oppressed, and an enemy to the oppressor. This is nothing other than the duty that the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) entrusted to his two great offspring[84] in his celebrated testament: “Be an enemy to the oppressor and a helper to the oppressed.”[85]
The scholars of Islam have a duty to struggle against all attempts by oppressors to establish a monopoly over the sources of wealth or to make illicit use of them. They must not allow the masses to remain hungry and deprived while plundering oppressors usurp the sources of wealth and live in opulence. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) says: “I have accepted the task of government because God, Exalted and Almighty, has exacted from the scholars of Islam a pledge not to sit silent and idle in the face of gluttony and plundering of the oppressors, on the one hand, and the hunger and deprivation of the oppressed, on the other.” Here is the full text of the passage we refer to:
“I swear by Him Who causes the seed to open and creates the souls of all living things that were it not for the presence of those who have come to swear allegiance to me, were it not for the obligation of rulership now imposed upon me by the availability of aid and support, and were it not for the pledge that God has taken from the scholars of Islam not to remain silent in the face of the gluttony and plundering of the oppressors, on the one hand, and the harrowing hunger and deprivation of the oppressed, on the other hand---were it not for all of this, then I would abandon the reins of government and in no way seek it. You would see that this world of yours, with all of its position and rank, is less in my eyes than the moisture that comes from the sneeze of a goat.”[86]
How can we stay silent and idle today when we see that a band of traitors and usurpers, the agents of foreign powers, have appropriated the wealth and the fruits of labor of hundreds of millions of Muslims—thanks to the support of their masters and through the power of the bayonet—granting the Muslim not the least right to prosperity? It is the duty of Islamic scholars and all Muslims to put an end to this system of oppression and, for the sake of the well-being of hundreds of millions of human beings, to overthrow these oppressive governments and form an Islamic government.
Reason, the laws of Islam, and the practice of the Prophet (s), and that of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), the purport of various Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions—all indicate the necessity of forming a government. As an example of the traditions of the Imāms, I now quote the following tradition of Imām Ridā[87] (‘a):
‘Abd al-Wāhid ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abdus an-Neyshābūri al-‘Attār said: “I was told by Abū ’l-Hasan ‘Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Qutayba an-Neyshābūri that he was told by Abū Muhammad al-Fadl ibn Shadhan an-Neyshābūri this tradition. If someone asks, ‘Why has God, the All-Wise, appointed the holders of authority and commanded us to obey them?’ then we answer, ‘For numerous reasons. One reason is this: Men are commanded to observe certain limits and not to transgress them in order to avoid the corruption that would result. This cannot be attained or established without there being appointed over them a trustee who will ensure that they remain within the limits of the licit and prevent them from casting themselves into the danger of transgression. Were it not for such a trustee, no one would abandon his own pleasure and benefit because of the corruption it might entail for another. Another reason is that we find no group or nation of men that ever existed without a ruler and leader, since it is required by both religion and worldly interest. It would not be compatible with divine wisdom to leave mankind to its own devices, for He, the All-Wise, knows that men need a ruler for their survival. It is through the leadership he provides that men make war against their enemies, divide among themselves the spoils of war, and preserve their communal solidarity, preventing the oppression of the oppressed by the oppressor.
“A further reason is this: were God not to appoint over men a solicitous, trustworthy, protecting, reliable leader, the community would decline, religion would depart, and the norms and ordinances that have been revealed would undergo change. Innovators would increase and deniers would erode religion, inducing doubt in the Muslims. For we see that men are needy and defective, judging by their differences of opinion and inclination and their diversity of state. Were a trustee, then, not appointed to preserve what has been revealed through the Prophet (s), corruption would ensue in the manner we have described. Revealed laws, norms, ordinances, and faith would be altogether changed, and therein would lie the corruption of all mankind.”[88]
We have omitted the first part of the hadīth, which pertains to prophethood, a topic not germane to our present discussion. What interests us at present is the second half, which I will now paraphrase for you.
If someone should ask you, “Why has God, the All-Wise, appointed holders of authority and commanded you to obey them?” you should answer him as follows: “He has done so for various causes and reasons. One is that men have been set upon a certain well- defined path, and commanded not to stray from it, nor to transgress against the established limits and norms, for if they were to stray, they would fall prey to corruption. Now men would not be able to keep to their ordained path and to enact God’s laws unless a trustworthy and protective individual (or power) were appointed over them with responsibility for this matter, to prevent them from stepping outside the sphere of the licit and transgressing against the rights of others. If no such restraining individual or power were appointed, nobody would voluntarily abandon any pleasure or interest of his own that might result in harm or corruption to others; everybody would engage in oppressing and harming others for the sake of his own pleasures and interests.
“Another reason and cause is this: we do not see a single group, nation, or religious community that has ever been able to exist without an individual entrusted with the maintenance of its laws and institutions—in short, a head or a leader; for such a person is essential for fulfilling the affairs of religion and the world. It is not permissible, therefore, according to divine wisdom that God should leave men, His creatures, without a leader and guide, for He knows well that they depend on the existence of such a person for their own survival and perpetuation. It is under his leadership that they fight against their enemies, divide the public income among themselves, perform Friday and other congregational prayers and foreshorten the arms of the transgressors who would encroach on the rights of the oppressed.
“Another proof and cause is this: were God not to appoint an Imām over men to maintain law and order, to serve the people faithfully as a vigilant trustee, religion would fall victim to obsolescence and decay. Its rites and institutions would vanish; the customs and ordinances of Islam would be transformed or even deformed. Heretical innovators would add things to religion and atheists and unbelievers would subtract things from it, presenting it to the Muslims in an inaccurate manner. For we see that men are prey to defects; they are not perfect, and must need to strive for perfection. Moreover, they disagree with each other, having varying inclinations and discordant states. If God, therefore, had not appointed over men one who would maintain order and law and protect the revelation brought by the Prophet (s), in the manner we have described, men would have fallen prey to corruption; the institutions, laws, customs, and ordinances of Islam would be transformed; and faith and its content would be completely changed, resulting in the corruption of all humanity.”
As you can deduce from the words of the Imām (‘a), there are numerous proofs and causes that necessitate formation of a government, and establishment of an authority. These proofs, causes, and arguments are not temporary in their validity or limited to a particular time, and the necessity for the formation of a government, therefore, is perpetual. For example, it will always happen that men overstep the limits laid down by Islam and transgress against the rights of others for the sake of their personal pleasure and benefit. It cannot be asserted that such was the case only in the time of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), and that afterwards, men became angels. The wisdom of the Creator has decreed that men should live in accordance with justice and act within the limits set by divine law. This wisdom is eternal and immutable, and constitutes one of the norms of God Almighty. Today and always, therefore, the existence of a holder of authority, a ruler who acts as trustee and maintains the institutions and laws of Islam, is a necessity—a ruler who prevents cruelty, oppression, and violation of the rights of others; who is a trustworthy and vigilant guardian of God’s creatures; who guides men to the teachings, doctrines, laws, and institutions of Islam; and who prevents the undesirable changes that atheists and the enemies of religion wish to introduce in the laws and institutions of Islam. Did not the caliphate of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) serve this purpose? The same factors of necessity that led him to become the Imām still exist; the only difference is that no single individual has been designated for the task.[89] The principle of the necessity of government has been made a general one, so that it will always remain in effect.
If the ordinances of Islam are to remain in effect, then, if encroachment by oppressive ruling classes on the rights of the weak is to be prevented, if ruling minorities are not to be permitted to plunder and corrupt the people for the sake of pleasure and material interest, if the Islamic order is to be preserved and all individuals are to pursue the just path of Islam without any deviation, if innovations and the approval of anti-Islamic laws by sham parliaments[90] are to be prevented, if the influence of foreign powers in the Islamic lands is to be destroyed—government is necessary. None of these aims can be achieved without government and the organs of the state. It is a righteous government, of course, that is needed; one presided over by a ruler who will be a trustworthy and righteous trustee. Those who presently govern us are of no use at all for they are tyrannical, corrupt, and highly incompetent.
In the past, we did not act in concert and unanimity in order to establish proper government and overthrow treacherous and corrupt rulers. Some people were apathetic and reluctant even to discuss the theory of Islamic government, and some went so far as to praise oppressive rulers. It is for this reason that we find ourselves in the present state. The influence and sovereignty of Islam in society have declined; the nation of Islam has fallen victim to division and weakness; the laws of Islam have remained in abeyance and been subjected to change and modification; and the imperialists have propagated foreign laws and alien culture among the Muslims through their agents for the sake of their evil purposes, causing people to be infatuated with the West. It was our lack of a leader, a guardian, and our lack of institutions of leadership that made all this possible. We need righteous and proper organs of government; that much is self-evident.
Notes:
[61] Valī-yi Amr: “the one who holds authority,” a term derived from Qur’an, 4:59: “O you who believe! Obey God, and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority
#363;li ’l-amr) from among you.” For commentary of this verse, see Mīr Ahmad ‘Ali, The Holy Qur’an (NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 1988), http://www.al-islam.org/quran (Pub.)
[62] Sunnah: the practice of the Prophet, accepted by Muslims as the norm and ideal for all human behavior.
[63] See, for example, Sūrah Ibrāhīm (14:52), Sūrah Yūnus (10:2), Sūrah al-Hājj (22:49), Sūrah al-Ahzāb (33:40), and Sūrah Yā-Sīn (36:70). (Pub.)
[64] Lesser Occultation: ghaybat-i sughrah, the period of about 70 years (260/872-329/939) when, according to Shī‘i belief, Muhammad al-Mahdi, the Twelfth Imām, absented himself from the physical plane but remained in communication with his followers through a succession of four appointed deputies, viz., ‘Uthmān ibn Sa‘īd, Muhammad ibn ‘Uthmān, Husayn ibn Rūh, and ‘Ali ibn Muhammad. At the death of the fourth deputies no successor was named, and the Greater Occultation (ghaybat-i kubrah) began, and continues to this day. See Muhammad Bāqir as-Sadr and Murtadā Mutahhari, Awaited Saviour (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications), http://www.islam.org/saviour/index.htm; Muhammad Bāqir as-Sadr, An Inquiry Concerning Al-Mahdi (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Jassim M. Husain, The Occultation of the Twelfth Imām: A Historical Background (London: Muhammadi Trust, 1982); Ibrāhīm Amīni, Al-Imām Al-Mahdī: The Just Leader of Humanity, trans. ‘Abdul ‘Azīz Sachedina (Qum: Ansariyan Publications), http://www.al-islam.org/mahdi/nontl/index.htm. (Pub.)
[65] The allusion is probably to the Bahā’is, who claim to have received a succession of post-Qur’anic revelations.
[66] Jizyah: a tax levied on non-Muslim citizens of the Muslim state in exchange for the protection they receive and in lieu of the taxes, such as zakāt, that only Muslims pay. Kharaj: a tax levied on certain categories of land. Khums: a tax consisting of one-fifth of agricultural and commercial profits (see p. 24 and Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, Khums, http://www.al-islam.org/beliefs/practices/khums.html). Zakāt: the tax levied on various categories of wealth and spent on the purposes specified in Qur’an, 9:60. (Pub.)
[67] Al-Kāfi: more fully, Al-Kāfi fī ’l Hadīth,one of the most important Shī‘i collections of hadīth, compiled by Shaykh Abū Ja‘far Muhammad ibn Ya‘qūb al-Kulayni (d. 329/941). This treatise consists of 34 books, 326 sections, and over 16,000 ahādīth. Two fascicules of this work have been translated into English by Sayyid Muhammad Hasan Rizvi and published by the Tehran-based World Organization for Islamic Services (WOFIS), http://www.wofis.com, e-mail: این آدرس ایمیل توسط spambots حفاظت می شود. برای دیدن شما نیاز به جاوا اسکریپت دارید. (Pub.)
[68] Usūl al-Kāfi, Book of “Virtues of Knowledge,” vol. 1, pp. 76-80. (Pub.)
[69] Qur’an, 16:89.
[70] The reference is probably to Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq, whose sayings on this subject are quoted by ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’i in al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān (Beirut, 1390/1979), XII, 327-328. First eight volumes of ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’i’s Al-Mīzān has been translated into English by Sayyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi and published by the WOFIS. (Pub.)
[71] Sayyids: the descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fātimah and son-in-law ‘Ali, the first of the Twelve Imāms.
[72] Zakāt would not represent an appreciable sum presumably because it is levied on surplus wealth, the accumulation of which is inhibited by the economic system of Islam.
[73] Ahl adh-Dhimmah: non-Muslim citizens of the Muslim state, whose rights and obligations are contractually determined.
[74] Ummah: the entire Islamic community, without territorial or ethnic distinction.
[75] Masjid al-Aqsā: the site in Jerusalem where the Prophet ascended to heaven in the eleventh year of his mission (Qur’an, 17:1); also the complex of mosques and buildings erected on the site. The chief of these was extensively damaged by arson in 1969, two years after the Zionist usurpation of Jerusalem.
[76] Umayyads: descendants of ‘Umayyah ibn ‘Abdu Shams ibn ‘Abdu Manāf from the Quraysh tribe, and members of the dynasty that ruled at Damascus from 41/632 until 132/750 and transformed the caliphate into a hereditary institution. Mu‘āwiyah, ibn Abū Sufyān frequently mentioned in these pages, was the first of the Umayyad line. This kingdom ended with the murder of Marwān II, the last Umayyad caliph. (Pub.)
[77] Abbasids: offspring of ‘Abbās ibn ‘Abdul Muttalib, uncle of the Holy Prophet (s), and the dynasty that replaced the Umayyads and established a new caliphal capital in Baghdad. This dynastic rule began in 132/750 with the caliphate of ‘Abdullāh as-Saffāh. With the rise of various local rulers, generally of military origin, the power of the Abbasids began to decline from the fourth/tenth century and it was brought to an end by the Mongol conquest in 656/1258. (Pub.)
[78] Kufr: the rejection of divine guidance; the antithesis of Islam.
[79] Tāghūt: one who surpasses all bounds in his despotism and tyranny and claims the prerogatives of divinity for himself, whether explicitly or implicitly. See also p. 78-79.
[80] Shirk: the assignment of partners to God, either by believing in a multiplicity of gods, or by assigning divine attributes and prerogatives to other-than-God.
[81] “Corruption on earth”: a broad term including not only moral corruption, but also subversion of the public good, embezzlement and usurpation of public wealth, conspiring with the enemies of the community against its security, and working in general for the overthrow of the Islamic order. See the commentary on Qur’an, 5:33 in Tabātabā’i’s, al-Mīzān, V, 330-332.
[82] It may be apposite to quote here the following passage from a secret report drawn up in January 1916 by Thomas E. Lawrence, the British organizer of the so-called Arab revolt led by Sharīf Husayn of Mecca: “Husayn’s activity seems beneficial to us, because it matches with our immediate aims, the breakup of the Islamic bloc and the defeat and disruption of the Ottoman Empire…. The Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. If properly handled they would remain in a state of political mosaic, a tissue of small jealous principalities incapable of political cohesion.” See Philip Knightley and Colin Simpson, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia (New York, 1971), p. 55.
[83] Fātimah az-Zahrā: Fātimah, the daughter of the Prophet and wife of Imām ‘Ali. For her biography, see Fātimah the Gracious (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[84] I.e., Hasan and Husayn.
[85] Nahj al-Balāghah, Letter 47. See English translation of Nahj al-Balāghah, Peak of Eloquence with commentary and its original Arabic text (Qum: Ansariyan Publications), http://www.al-islam.org/nahjul/index.htm. (Pub.)
[86] Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 3 (The famous Shaqshaqiyyah Sermon).See Nahj al-Balāghah, ed. Subhi as-Sālih. (Pub.)
[87] Imām Ridā: eighth of the Twelve Imāms, born in 148/765 and died in 203/817 in Tūs (Mashhad). He was poisoned by the Abbasid caliph Ma’mūn, who had appointed him as his successor at first, but then grew fearful of the wide following he commanded (see p. 137). His shrine in Mashhad is one of the principal centers of pilgrimage and religious learning in Iran. See Bāqir Sharīf al-Qarashi, The Life of Imām ‘Ali bin Mūsā al-Ridā, trans. Jāsim al-Rasheed (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Muhammad Jawād Fadlallāh, Imam al-Ridā: A Historical and Biographical Research, trans. Yāsīn T. al-Jibouri, http://www.al-islam.org/al-rida/index.html; Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Dīn, “Al-Imām ar-Ridā (‘a) and the Heir Apparency,” At-Tawhīd Journal, http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/heir.htm. (Pub.)
[88] The text of this tradition can be found in Shaykh Sadūq, ‘Ilal ash-Sharāi‘ (Qum, 1378/1958), I, sec. 182, hadīth 9, p. 251. (Pub.)
[89] That is, in the absence of the Imām or an individual deputy named by him (as was the case during the Lesser Occultation), the task devolves upon the fuqahā as a class. See argument on pp. 44-112.
[90] Here the allusion may be in particular to the so-called Family Protection Law of 1967, which Imām Khomeini denounced as contrary to Islam in an important ruling. See Imām Khomeini, Tauzih al-Masā’il, n.p., n.d., pp. 462-463, par. 2836, and p. 441.
Written by The Late Imam Khomeini (R.A.)
Translated by Prof. Hamid Algar
Source: Imam reza network
The Form of Islamic Government
Islamic government does not correspond to any of the existing forms of government. For example, it is not a tyranny, where the head of state can deal arbitrarily with the property and lives of the people, making use of them as he wills, putting to death anyone he wishes, and enriching anyone he wishes by granting landed estates and distributing the property and holdings of the people. The Most Noble Messenger (s), the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), and the other caliphs did not have such powers. Islamic government is neither tyrannical nor absolute, but constitutional. It is not constitutional in the current sense of the word, i.e., based on the approval of laws in accordance with the opinion of the majority. It is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administering the country, conditions that are set forth in the Noble Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Most Noble Messenger (s). It is the laws and ordinances of Islam comprising this set of conditions that must be observed and practiced. Islamic government may therefore be defined as the rule of divine law over men.
The fundamental difference between Islamic government, on the one hand, and constitutional monarchies and republics, on the other, is this: whereas the representatives of the people or the monarch in such regimes engage in legislation, in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty. The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative power. No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator. It is for this reason that in an Islamic government, a simple planning body takes the place of the legislative assembly that is one of the three branches of government. This body draws up programs for the different ministries in the light of the ordinances of Islam and thereby determines how public services are to be provided across the country.
The body of Islamic laws that exist in the Qur’an and Sunnah has been accepted by the Muslims and recognized by them as worthy of obedience. This consent and acceptance facilitates the task of government and makes it truly belong to the people. In contrast, in a republic or a constitutional monarchy, most of those claiming to be representatives of the majority of people approve anything they wish as law and then impose it on the entire population.
Islamic government is a government of law. In this form of government, sovereignty belongs to God alone and law is His decree and command. The law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government. Everyone, including the Most Noble Messenger (s) and his successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity—the law that has been revealed by God, Almighty and Exalted, and expounded by the tongue of the Qur’an and the Most Noble Messenger (s). If the Prophet (s) assumed the task of divine viceregency upon earth, it was in accordance with divine command. God, Almighty and Exalted, appointed him as His viceregent, “the viceregent of God upon earth”; he did not establish a government on his own initiative in order to be leader of the Muslims. Similarly, when it became apparent that disagreements would probably arise among the Muslims because their acquaintance with the faith was recent and limited, God Almighty charged the Prophet (s), by way of revelation, to clarify the question of succession immediately, there in the middle of the desert. Then the Most Noble Messenger (s), nominated the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) as his successor, in conformity and obedience to the law, not because he was his own son-in-law or had performed certain services, but because, he was acting in obedience to God’s law, as its executor.[91]
In Islam, then, government has the sense of adherence to law; it is law alone that rules over society. Even the limited powers given to the Most Noble Messenger (s) and those exercising rule after him have been conferred upon them by God. Whenever the Prophet (s) expounded a certain matter or promulgated a certain injunction, he did so in obedience to divine law, a law that everyone without exception must obey and adhere to. Divine law obtains both for the leader and the led; the sole law that is valid and imperative to apply is the law of God. Obedience to the Prophet (s) also takes place in accordance with divine decree, for God says: “And obey the Messenger”(Qur’an, 4:59). Obedience to those entrusted with authority is also on the basis of divine decree: “And obey the holders of authority from among you”(Qur’an, 4:59). Individual opinion, even if it be that of the Prophet (s) himself, cannot intervene in matters of divine law; here, all are subject to the will of God.
Islamic government is not a form of monarchy, especially not an imperial one. In that type of government, the rulers are empowered over the property and persons of those they rule and may dispose of them entirely as they wish. Islam has not the slightest connection with this form and method of government. For this reason, we find that in Islamic government, unlike monarchial and imperial regimes, there is not the slightest trace of vast palaces, opulent buildings, servants and retainers, private equerries, adjutants to the heir apparent, and all the other appurtenances of monarchy that consume as much as half of the national budget. You all know how the Prophet (s) lived, the Prophet who was the head of the Islamic state and its ruler. The same mode of life was preserved until the beginning of the Umayyad period. The first two [caliphs] adhered to the Prophet’s (s) example in the outer conduct of their personal lives, even though in other affairs they acted to the contrary, which led to the grave deviations that appeared in the time of ‘Uthmān, the same deviations that have inflicted on us these misfortunes of the present day.[92] In the time of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), the system of government was corrected and a proper form and method of rule were followed. Even though that excellent man ruled over a vast realm that included Iran, Egypt, Hijāz[93] and the Yemen among its provinces, he lived more frugally than the most impoverished of our clergy students. According to tradition, he once bought two tunics, and finding one of them better than the other, he gave the better one to his servant Qanbar. The other he kept for himself, and since its sleeves were too long for him, he tore off the extra portion.[94] In this torn garment, the ruler of a great, populous, and prosperous realm clothed himself.
If this mode of conduct had been preserved, and government had retained its Islamic form, there would have been no monarchy and no empire, no usurpation of the lives and property of the people, no oppression and plunder, no encroachment on the public treasury, no vice and abomination. Most forms of corruption originate with the ruling class, the tyrannical ruling family and the libertines that associate with them. It is these rulers who establish centers of vice and corruption, who build centers of vice and wine-drinking, and spend the income of the religious endowments constructing cinemas.[95]
If it were not for these profligate royal ceremonies,[96] this reckless spending, this constant embezzlement, there would never be any deficit in the national budget forcing us to bow in submission before America and Britain and request aid or a loan from them. Our country has become needy on account of this reckless spending, this endless embezzlement, for are we lacking in oil? Do we have no minerals, no natural resources? We have everything, but this parasitism, this embezzlement, this profligacy—all at the expense of the people and the public treasury—have reduced us to a wretched state. Otherwise he [the Shāh] would not need to go all the way to America and bow down before that ruffian’s desk, begging for help.
In addition, superfluous bureaucracies and the system of file-keeping and paper-shuffling that is enforced in them, all of which are totally alien to Islam, impose further expenditures on our national budget not less in quantity than the illicit expenditures of the first category. This administrative system has nothing to do with Islam. These superfluous formalities, which cause our people nothing but expense, trouble, and delay, have no place in Islam. For example, the method established by Islam for enforcing people’s rights, adjudicating disputes, and executing judgments is at once simple, practical, and swift. When the juridical methods of Islam were applied, the sharī‘ah judge in each town, assisted only by two bailiffs and with only a pen and inkpot at his disposal, would swiftly resolve disputes among people and send them about their business. But now the bureaucratic organization of the Ministry of Justice has attained unimaginable proportions, and is, in addition, quite incapable of producing results.
It is things like these that make our country needy and produce nothing but expense and delay.
The qualifications essential for the ruler drive directly from the nature and form of Islamic government. In addition to general qualifications like intelligence and administrative ability, there are two other essential qualifications: knowledge of the law and justice.[97]
After the death of the Prophet (s), difference arose concerning the identity of the person who was to succeed him, but all the Muslims were in agreement that his successor should be someone knowledgeable and accomplished; there was disagreement only about his identity.
Since Islamic government is a government of law, knowledge of the law is necessary for the ruler, as has been laid down in tradition. Indeed such knowledge is necessary not only for the ruler, but also for anyone holding a post or exercising some government function. The ruler, however, must surpass all others in knowledge. In laying claim to the Imamate, our Imāms also argued that the ruler must be more learned than everyone else.[98] The objections raised by the Shī‘i ‘ulamā are also to the same effect. A certain person asked the caliph a point of law and he was unable to answer; he was therefore unfit for the position of leader and successor to the Prophet (s). Or again, a certain act he performed was contrary to the laws of Islam; hence he was unworthy for his high post.[99]
Knowledge of the law and justice, then, constitute fundamental qualifications in the view of the Muslims. Other matters have no importance or relevance in this connection. Knowledge of the nature of the angels, for example, or of the attributes of the Creator, Exalted and Almighty, is of no relevance to the question of leadership. In the same vein, one who knows all the natural sciences, uncovers all the secrets of nature, or has a good knowledge of music, does not thereby qualify for leadership or acquire any priority in the matter of exercising government over those who know the laws of Islam and are just. The sole matters relevant to rule, those that were mentioned and discussed in the time of the Most Noble Messenger (s), and our Imāms (‘a), and were, in addition, unanimously accepted by the Muslims, are: (1) the knowledgeability of the ruler or caliph, i.e., his knowledge of the provisions and ordinances of Islam; and (2) his justice, i.e., his excellence in belief and morals.
Reason also dictates the necessity for these qualities, because Islamic government is a government of law, not the arbitrary rule of an individual over the people or the domination of a group of individuals over the whole people. If the ruler is unacquainted with the contents of the law, he is not fit to rule; for if he follows the legal pronouncements of others his power to govern will be impaired, but if, on the other hand, he does not follow such guidance, he will be unable to rule correctly and implement the laws of Islam. It is an established principle that “the faqīh has authority over the ruler.”[100] If the ruler adheres to Islam, he must necessarily submit to the faqīh, asking him about the laws and ordinances of Islam in order to implement them. This being the case, the true rulers are the fuqahā[101]themselves, and rulership ought officially to be theirs, to apply to them, not to those who are obliged to follow the guidance of the fuqahā on account of their own ignorance of the law.
Of course, it is not necessary for all officials, provincial governors, and administrators to know all the laws of Islam and be fuqahā; it is enough that they should know the laws pertaining to their functions and duties. Such was the case in the time of the Prophet (s), and the Commander of the Faithful (‘a). The highest authority must possess the two qualities mentioned—comprehensive knowledge and justice—but his assistants, officials and those sent to the provinces need know only the laws relevant to their own tasks; on other matters they must consult the ruler.
The ruler must also possess excellence in morals and belief; he must be just and untainted by major sins. Anyone who wishes to enact the penalties provided by Islam (i.e., to implement the penal code), to supervise the public treasury and the income and expenditures of the state, and to have God assign to him the power to administer the affairs of His creatures must not be a sinner. God says in the Qur’an: “my vow does not embrace the wrongdoer” (2:124);[102] therefore, He will not assign such functions to an oppressor or sinner.
If the ruler is not just in granting the Muslims their rights, he will not conduct himself equitably in levying taxes and spending them correctly and in implementing the penal code. It becomes possible then for his assistants, helpers, and confidants to impose their will on society, diverting the public treasury to personal and frivolous use.
Thus, the view of the Shī‘ah concerning government and the nature of the persons who should assume rule was clear from the time following the death of the Prophet (s) down to the beginning of the Occultation.[103] It is specified that the ruler should be foremost in knowledge of the laws and ordinances of Islam, and just in their implementation.
Now that we are in the time of the Occultation of the Imām (‘a), it is still necessary that the ordinances of Islam relating to government be preserved and maintained, and that anarchy be prevented. Therefore, the establishment of government is still a necessity.
Reason also dictates that we establish a government in order to be able to ward off aggression and to defend the honor of the Muslims in case of attack. The sharī‘ah, for its part, instructs us to be constantly ready to defend ourselves against those who wish to attack us. Government, with its judicial and executive organs, is also necessary to prevent individuals from encroaching on each other’s rights. None of these purposes can be fulfilled by themselves; it is necessary for a government to be established. Since the establishment of a government and the administration of society necessitate, in turn, a budget and taxation, the Sacred Legislator has specified the nature of the budget and the taxes that are to be levied, such as kharāj, khums, zakāt, and so forth.
Now that no particular individual has been appointed by God, Exalted and Almighty, to assume the function of government in the time of Occultation, what must be done? Are we to abandon Islam? Do we no longer need it? Was Islam valid for only two hundred years? Or is it that Islam has clarified our duties in other respects but not with respect to government?
Not to have an Islamic government means leaving our boundaries unguarded. Can we afford to sit nonchalantly on our hands while our enemies do whatever they want? Even if we do put our signatures to what they do as an endorsement, still are failing to make an effective response. Is that the way it should be? Or is it rather that government is necessary, and that the function of government that existed from the beginning of Islam down to the time of the Twelfth Imām (‘a) is still enjoined upon us by God after the Occultation even though He has appointed no particular individuals to the function?
The two qualities of knowledge of the law and justice are present in countless fuqahā of the present age. If they come together, they could establish a government of universal justice in the world.
If a worthy individual possessing these two qualities arises and establishes a government, he will posses the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger (‘a) in the administration of society, and it will be the duty of all people to obey him.
The idea that the governmental power of the Most Noble Messenger (s) were greater than those of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), or that those of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) were greater than those of the faqīh, is false and erroneous. Naturally, the virtues of the Most Noble Messenger (s) were greater than those of the rest of mankind, and after him, the Commander of the Faithful was the most virtuous person in the world. But superiority with respect to spiritual virtues does not confer increased governmental powers. God has conferred upon government in the present age the same powers and authority that were held by the Most Noble Messenger and the Imāms (‘a), with respect to equipping and mobilizing armies, appointing governors and officials, and levying taxes and expending them for the welfare of the Muslims. Now, however, it is no longer a question of a particular person; government devolves instead upon one who possesses the qualities of knowledge and justice.
When we say that after the Occultation, the just faqīh has the same authority that the Most Noble Messenger and the Imāms (‘a) had, do not imagine that the status of the faqīh is identical to that of the Imāms and the Prophet (‘a). For here we are not speaking of status, but rather of function. By “authority” we mean government, the administration of the country, and the implementation of the sacred laws of the sharī‘ah. These constitute a serious, difficult duty but do not earn anyone extraordinary status or raise him above the level of common humanity. In other words, authority here has the meaning of government, administration, and execution of law; contrary to what many people believe, it is not a privilege, but a grave responsibility. The governance of the faqīh is a rational and extrinsic[104] matter; it exists only as a type of appointment, like the appointment of a guardian for a minor. With respect to duty and position, there is indeed no difference between the guardian of a nation and the guardian of a minor. It is as if the Imām were to appoint someone to the guardianship of a minor, to the governorship of a province, or to some other post. In cases like these, it is not reasonable that there would be a difference between the Prophet and the Imāms (‘a), on the one hand, and the just faqīh, on the other.
For example, one of the concerns that the faqīh must attend to is the application of the penal provisions of Islam. Can there be any distinction in this respect between the Most Noble Messenger (s), the Imāms, and the faqīh? Will the faqīh inflict fewer lashes because his rank is lower? Now, the penalty for the fornicator is one hundred lashes. If the Prophet (s) applies the penalty, is he to inflict one hundred fifty lashes, the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) one hundred, and, the faqīh fifty? The ruler supervises the executive power and has the duty of implementing God’s laws; it makes no difference if he is the Most Noble Messenger (s), the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) or the representative or judge he appointed to Basrah or Kūfah, or a faqīh in the present age.
Another one of the concerns of the Most Noble Messenger (s) and the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was the levying of taxes—khums, zakāt, jizyah and kharāj on taxable lands.[105] Now when the Prophet (s) levied zakāt, how much did he levy? One-tenth in one place and one-twentieth elsewhere? And how did the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) proceed when he became the ruler? And what now, if one of us becomes the foremost faqīh of the age and is able to enforce his authority? In these matters, can there be any difference in the authority of the Most Noble Messenger (s), that of ‘Ali (‘a), and that of the faqīh? God Almighty appointed the Prophet (s) in authority over all the Muslims; as long as he was alive, his authority extended over even ‘Ali (‘a). Afterwards, the Imām (‘a) had authority over all the Muslims, even his own successor as Imām (‘a); his commands relating to government were valid for everyone, and he could appoint and dismiss judges and governors.
The authority that the Prophet and the Imām (‘a) had in establishing a government, executing laws, and administering affairs, exists also for the faqīh. But the fuqahā do not have absolute authority in the sense of having authority over all other fuqahā of their own time, being able to appoint or dismiss them. There is no hierarchy ranking one faqīh higher than another or endowing one with more authority than another.
Now that this much has been demonstrated, it is necessary that the fuqahā proceed, collectively or individually, to establish a government in order to implement the laws of Islam and protect its territory. If this task falls within the capabilities of a single person, he has personally incumbent upon him the duty to fulfill it; otherwise, it is a duty that devolves upon the fuqahā as a whole. Even if it is impossible to fulfill the task, the authority vested in the fuqahā is not voided, because it has been vested in them by God. If they can, they must collect taxes, such as zakāt, khums, and kharāj, spend them for the welfare of the Muslims, and also enact the penalties of the law. The fact that we are presently unable to establish a complete and comprehensive form of government does not mean that we should sit idle. Instead, we should perform, to whatever extent we can, the tasks that are needed by the Muslims and that pertain to the functions an Islamic government must assume.
To prove that government and authority belong to the Imām (‘a) is not to imply that the Imām (‘a) has no spiritual status. The Imām (‘a) does indeed possess certain spiritual dimensions that are unconnected with their function as a ruler. The spiritual status of the Imām (‘a) is a universal divine viceregency that is sometimes mentioned by the Imāms (‘a). It is a viceregency pertaining to the whole of creation, by virtue of which all the atoms in the universe humble themselves before the holder of authority. It is one of the essential beliefs of our Shī‘i school that no one can attain the spiritual status of the Imāms, not even the cherubim or the prophets.[106] In fact, according to the traditions that have been handed down to us, the Most Noble Messenger and the Imāms (‘a) existed before the creation of the world in the form of lights situated beneath the divine throne; they were superior to other men even in the sperm from which they grow and in their physical composition.[107] Their exalted station is limited only by the divine will, as indicated by the saying of Jibrā’īl (‘a) recorded in the traditions on the mi‘rāj: “Were I to draw closer by as much as the breadth of a finger, surely I would burn.”[108] The Prophet (s) himself said: “We have states with God that are beyond the reach of the cherubim and the prophets.”[109] It is a part of our belief that the Imāms too enjoy similar states, before the question of government even arises. For example, Fātimah (‘a) also possessed these states, even though she was not a ruler, a judge, or a governor.[110] These states are quite distinct from the function of government. So when we say that Fātimah (‘a) was neither a judge nor a ruler, this does not mean that she was like you and me, or that she has no spiritual superiority over us. Similarly, if someone says, in accordance with the Qur’an, that “The Prophet (s) has higher claims on the believers than their own selves” (33:6), he has attributed to him something more exalted than his right to govern the believers. We will not examine these matters further here, for they belong to the area of another science.
To assume the function of government does not in itself carry any particular merit or status; rather, it is a means for fulfilling the duty of implementing the law and establishing the Islamic order of justice. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) said to Ibn ‘Abbās[111] concerning the nature of government and command: “How much is this shoe worth?” Ibn ‘Abbās replied: “Nothing”. The Commander of Faithful (‘a) then said: “Command over you is worth still less in my eyes, except for this: by means of ruling and commanding you I may be able to establish the right”—i.e., the laws and institutions of Islam—“and destroy the wrong”[112]—i.e., all impermissible and oppressive laws and institutions.
Rule and command, then, are in themselves only a means, and if this means is not employed for the good and for attaining noble aims, it has no value in the eyes of the men of God. Thus the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) says in his sermon in Nahj al- Balāghah: “Were it not for the obligation imposed on me, forcing me to take up this task of government, I would abandon it.”[113] It is evident, then, that to assume the function of government is to acquire a means, and not a spiritual station, for if government were spiritual station, nobody would be able to either usurp it or abandon it. Government and the exercise of command acquire value only when they become the means for implementing the law of Islam and establishing the just Islamic order; then the person in charge of government may also earn some additional virtue and merit.
Some people, whose eyes have been dazzled by the things of this world, imagine that leadership and government represented in themselves dignity and high station for the Imāms, so that if others come to exercise power, the world will collapse. Now the Soviet ruler, the British Prime Minister, and the American President all exercise power, and they are all unbelievers. They are unbelievers, but they have political power and influence, which they use to execute anti-human laws and policies for the sake of their own interests.
It is the duty of the Imāms and the just fuqahā to use government institutions to execute divine law, to establish the just Islamic system, and serve mankind. Government in itself represents nothing but pain and trouble for them, but what are they to do? They have been given a duty, a mission to fulfill; the governance of the faqīh is nothing but the performance of a duty.
When explaining why he assumed the tasks of government and rule, the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) declared that he did so for the sake of certain exalted aims, namely the establishment of justice and the abolition of injustice. He said, in effect: “O God, You know that it is not our purpose to acquire position and power, but rather to deliver the oppressed from the hands of the unjust. What impelled me to accept the task of command and rule over the people was this: God, Almighty and Exalted, has exacted a pledge from the scholars of religion and assigned the duty of not remaining silent in the face of the gluttony and self-indulgence of the unjust and the oppressor on the one hand, and the wasting hunger of the oppressed, on the other.”[114] He also said: “O God! You know well that the struggle we have waged has not been for the sake of winning political power, nor for seeking worldly goods and overflowing wealth.” He went directly on to explain the goal for the sake of which he and his companions had been struggling and exerting themselves: “Rather it was our aim to restore and implement the luminous principles of Your religion and to reform the conduct of affairs in Your land, so that Your downtrodden servants might gain security and Your laws, which have remained unfulfilled and in abeyance, might be established and executed.”[115]
The ruler who, by means of the organs of government and the power of command that are at his disposal, desires to attain the exalted aims of Islam, the same aims set forth by the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), must possess the essential qualities to which we have already referred; that is, he must know the law and be just. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) mentions next the qualities essential in a ruler immediately after he has specified the aims of government: “O God! I was the first person that turned toward You by accepting Your religion as soon as I heard your Messenger (s) declare it. No one preceded me in prayer except the Messenger (s) himself. And you, O people! You know well that it is not fitting that one who is greedy and parsimonious should attain rule and authority over the honor, lives, and income of the Muslims, and the laws and ordinances enforced among them, and also leadership of them.
“Furthermore, he should not be ignorant and unaware of the law, lest in his ignorance he mislead the people. He must not be unjust and harsh, causing the people to cease all traffic and dealing with him because of his oppressiveness. Nor must he fear states, so that he seeks the friendship of some and treats others with enmity. He must refrain from accepting bribes when he sits in judgment, so that the rights of men are trampled underfoot and the claimant does not receive his due. He must not leave the practice of the Prophet (s) and law in abeyance, so that the community falls into misguidance and peril.”[116]
Notice how this discourse revolves around two points, knowledge and justice, and how the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) regards them as necessary qualities of the ruler. In the expression: “He should not be ignorant and unaware of the law, lest in his ignorance he mislead the people,” the emphasis is upon knowledge, while in the remaining sentences the emphasis is upon justice, in its true sense. The true sense of justice is that the ruler should conduct himself like the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) in his dealings with other states, in his relations and transactions with the people, in passing sentence and giving judgment, and in distributing the public income. To put it differently, the ruler should adhere to the program of rule that the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) assigned to Mālik Ashtar[117]—in reality, to all rulers and governors, for it is something like a circular addressed to all who exercise rule. If the fuqahā become rulers, they too should consider it as their set of instructions.
Here is a narration totally without ambiguity. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) relates that the Most Noble Messenger (s) said: “O God! Have mercy on those that succeed me.” He repeated this thrice and was then asked: “O Messenger of God, who are those that succeed you?” He replied: “They are those that come after me, transmit my traditions and practice, and teach them to the people after me.”
Shaykh Sadūq[118] (may God’s mercy be upon him) has related this narration with five chains of transmission (actually four, since two of them are similar in certain respects) in the following books: Jamī‘al-Akhbār, ‘Uyūn Akhbār ar-Ridhā, and Al-Majālis.[119]
Among the cases where this tradition has been designated as musnad,[120] in one instance we find the words “and teach them,” and in other instances we find, “and teach them to the people.” Whenever the tradition is designated as mursal,[121] we find only the beginning of the sentence, with the phrase “and teach them to the people after me” completely omitted.
We can make either of two assumptions with respect to this tradition. First, it is the only instance of the tradition, and the phrase beginning “and teach them” either was later added to the end, or was indeed a part of the tradition but was later omitted in certain versions. The second alternative is more probable. For if the phrase were added, we could not say that it was as the result of mistake or error, given that the tradition was handed down by several chain of transmission and the respective narrators lived at great distances from each other—one in Balkh, another in Nishābūr, and still another elsewhere. Nor is it possible that this phrase was deliberately added; it is highly unlikely that it would have occurred to each of several people living far apart from each other to add such a sentence to the tradition. Therefore, if it is a single narration, we can assert with certainly that either the phrase beginning, “and teach them” was omitted from one of the versions recorded by Shaykh Sadūq (or overlooked by the copyists who wrote down his work), or Shaykh Sadūq himself failed to mention it for some other reason.
The second assumption would be that there are two separate traditions; one without the phrase “and teach them…” and the other with it. If the phrase is part of the tradition, it certainly does not apply to those whose task is simply the narration of tradition and who are not competent to express an independent juridical opinion or judgment. There are certain scholars of tradition who do not understand hadīth at all; as implied in the saying: ”Many a scholar of law falls short of being a faqīh,” they are merely a vehicle for the recording, collecting and writing down of traditions and narrations and for placing them at the disposal of the people. It cannot be said of such scholars that they are the successors of the Prophet, teaching the sciences of Islam.[122] Their efforts on behalf of Islam and the Muslims are of course most valuable, and many scholars of tradition have indeed also been fuqahā, competent to express an independent opinion; e.g., Kulayni,[123] Shaykh Sadūq,[124] and his father (God’s mercy on all of them). These three were fuqahā, and they taught the ordinances and sciences of Islam to the people. When we say that Shaykh Sadūq differed from Shaykh Mufīd,[125] we do not mean that Shaykh Sadūq was unlearned in fiqh,[126] or that he was less learned than Shaykh Mufīd. Shaykh Sadūq was, after all, the person who elucidated all the principles and secondaries of religion in a single sitting. He differed from Shaykh Mufīd and others like him in that they were mujtahids who brought their own reasoning to bear on traditions and narrations, while Shaykh Sadūq was a faqīh who did not have recourse to his own reasoning, or did so only rarely.
The phrase we are discussing applies to those who expound the sciences of Islam, who expound the ordinances of Islam, and who educate the people in Islam, preparing them to instruct others in turn. In the same way, the Most Noble Messenger (s), and the Imāms (‘a) proclaimed and expounded the ordinances of Islam; they had teaching circles where they gave the benefit of their learning to several thousand people, whose duty it was, in turn, to teach others. That is the meaning implied in the phrase “and teach the people…”: disseminating the knowledge of Islam among the people and conveying to them the ordinances of Islam. If we believe that Islam is for all the people in the world, it becomes obvious to every rational mind that the Muslims, and particularly the scholars among them, have the duty of disseminating knowledge of Islam and its ordinances and acquainting the people of the world with them.
If we suppose that the phrase “and teach them to the people” does not belong to the end of the hadīth, then we must see what the Prophet (s) might have meant in his saying: “O God! Have mercy on those that succeed me: those that come after me and transmit my traditions and practice.” The tradition, even in this form, still would not apply to those who merely relate traditions without being fuqahā. For the divine practices and norms constituting the totality of the ordinances of Islam are known as the practice of the Prophet (s) by virtue of the fact that they were revealed to him. So anyone who wishes to disseminate the practices of the Most Noble Messenger (s) must know all the ordinances of God; he must be able to distinguish the authentic from the false, those of absolute from those of limited application, and the general from the specific. Further, he must be able to discern rational categories, distinguish between traditions originating in circumstances of taqiyyah[127] and those originating otherwise, and be fully conversant with all the necessary criteria that have been specified. Traditionists who have not attained the level of ijtihād[128] and who merely transmit hadith know nothing about all this; hence, they are incapable of discerning the true practice of the Messenger of God (s). Mere transmission could have no value in the eyes of the Messenger, and it was certainly not his desire that phrases like: “The Messenger of God said,” or “It is related on the authority of the Messenger of God” should gain currency among the people, if the sentences prefaced by these phrases were counterfeited and not his. What he desired instead was that his true practice should be disseminated among the people and the real ordinances of Islam spread among them. The tradition: “Whoever preserves for my people forty traditions will be resurrected by God as a faqīh”[129] and similar traditions praising the dissemination of hadith do not pertain to traditionists who have no concept of the nature of tradition. They pertain to those who are able to distinguish the true narration of the Most Noble Messenger (s) in accordance with the true ordinances of Islam. Such persons are none other than the mujtahids and the fuqahā; they are the ones able to assess all different aspects and implications of a ruling, and to deduce the true ordinances of Islam on the basis of the criteria they have inherited from the Imāms (‘a). They are the successors of the Most Noble Messenger (s), disseminating the divine ordinances and instructing men in the sciences of Islam. It is for them that the Prophet (s) prayed when he said, “O God! Have mercy on my successors.”
There is no doubt, therefore, that the tradition: “O God! Have mercy on my successors” does not relate to the transmitters of tradition who are mere scribes; a scribe cannot be a successor to the Prophet (s). The successors are the fuqahā of Islam. Dissemination of the ordinances of Islam, as well as the teaching and instruction of the people, is the duty of fuqahā who are just. For if they are not just, they will be like those who forged traditions harmful to Islam, like Samūrah ibn Jundab,[130] who forged traditions hostile to the Commander of the Faithful (‘a). And if they are not fuqahā, they cannot comprehend the nature of fiqh and the ordinances of Islam, and they may disseminate thousands of traditions in praise of kings that have been forged by the agents of the oppressors and pseudo-scholars attached to royal courts. It is easy to see what results they obtained on the basis of the two weak traditions that they set up against the Qur’an, with its insistent commands to rise up against kings and its injunctions to Moses to rebel against the Pharaoh.[131] Quite apart from the Glorious Qur’an, there are numerous traditions exhorting men to struggle against tyrants and those who pervert religion.[132] Lazy people among us have laid these aside and, relying on these two weak hadīths that may well have been forged by court preachers, tell us we must make peace with kings and give our allegiance to the court. If they were truly acquainted with tradition and knowledgeable about religion, they would act instead in accordance with the numerous traditions that denounce the oppressors. If it happens that they are acquainted with tradition, then we must conclude that, they do not have the quality of justice. For, not being just and failing to eschew sin, they overlook the Qur’an and all the narration that condemn the oppressor, and concentrate instead on those two weak hadith. It is the appetites of their stomachs that cause them to cling to them, not knowledge. Appetite and ambition make men subservient to royal courts; true tradition does not.
In any event, the dissemination of the sciences of Islam and the proclamation of its ordinances are the task of the just fuqahā—those who are able to distinguish the true ordinances from the false, and the traditions of the Imāms (‘a) arising in conditions of taqiyyah from those originating otherwise. For we know that our Imāms were sometimes subjected to conditions that prevented them from pronouncing a true ordinance; they were exposed to tyrannical and oppressive rulers who imposed taqiyyah and fear upon them. Naturally, their fear was for religion not themselves, and if they had not observed taqiyyah in certain circumstances, oppressive rulers would have entirely rooted out true religion.
There cannot be the least doubt that the tradition we have been discussing refers to the governance of the faqih, for to be a successor means to succeed to all the functions of prophethood. In this respect what is implied by the sentence: “O God! Have mercy on my successors” is no less than what is implied by the sentence: “ ‘Ali is my successor,” since the meaning of successorship is the same in both cases. The phrase “who come after me and transmit my traditions” serves to designate the successors, not to define succession, for succession was a well-known concept in the first age of Islam and did not require elucidation. Moreover, the person who asked the Prophet (s), whom he meant by his successors was not enquiring after the meaning of successorship; he was requesting the Prophet (s) to specify those whom he meant, as he indeed did in his reply. It is remarkable that nobody has taken the phrase: “ ‘Ali is my successor,” or “the Imāms are my successors,” as referring to the simple task of issuing juridical opinions; instead they derive the tasks of successorship and government from them, whereas they hesitated to draw the same conclusion from the words “my successors” in the tradition under consideration. This is solely because they have imagined that succession to the position of the Most Noble Messenger (s) has been limited or restricted to certain people, and that since each of the Imāms was a successor, the religious scholars cannot act as successors, rulers, and governors. The result is that Islam must be without any leader to care for it, the ordinances of Islam must be in abeyance, the frontiers of Islam must be at the mercy of the enemies of religion, and various kinds of perversion that have nothing to do with Islam are gaining currency.
Muhammad ibn Yahyā relates, on the authority of Ahmad ibn Muhammad, who heard it from Ibn Mahbūb, who was informed of it by ‘Ali ibn Abi Hamzah, that the Imām Abu ‘l-Hasan, son of Ja‘far,[133] (‘a) said: “whenever a believer dies, the angels weep, together with the ground where he engaged in the worship of God and the gates of heaven that he would enter by means of his good deeds. A crack will appear in the fortress of Islam, that naught can repair, for believers who are fuqahā are the fortresses of Islam, like the encircling walls that protect a city.”[134]
In the same chapter of Al-Kāfi, is another version of this tradition, which reads: “Whenever a believer who is a faqih…” instead of “Whenever a believer…” In contrast, at the beginning of the version we have cited, the expression “who is a faqih” is missing. Later in the second version, however, when the cause for the angels’ weeping is adduced, the expression “believers who are fuqahā” does occur. This makes it clear that the word faqih was omitted at the beginning of the tradition, particularly since the concepts “fortress of Islam” and “encircling walls” and the like are fully appropriate to the faqih.
The saying of the Imām (‘a) that “believers who are fuqaha are the fortresses of Islam” actually ascribes to the fuqahā the duty of being guardians of the beliefs, ordinances, and institutions of Islam. It is clear that these words of the Imām (‘a) are not an expression of ceremonial courtesy, like the words we sometimes exchange with each other (I call you “Support of the Sharī‘ah,” and you bestow the same title on me in return
. Nor do they have any similarity to the titles we use in addressing a letter to someone: “His Noble Excellency, the Proof of Islam.”
If a faqīh sits in the corner of his dwelling and does not intervene in any of the affairs of society, neither preserving the laws of Islam and disseminating its ordinances, nor in any way participating in the affairs of the Muslims or having any care for them, can he be called “the fortress of Islam” or the protector of Islam?
If the leader of a government tells an official or a commander, “Go and guard such-and–such an area,” will the duty of guarding that he has assumed permit him to go home and sleep, allowing the enemy to come and ravage that area? Or should he, on the contrary, strive to protect that area in whatever way he can?
Now if you say that we are preserving at least some of the ordinances of Islam, let me ask you this question. Are you implementing the penal law of Islam and the sanctions it provides? You will have to answer no.
So a crack has appeared in the protective wall surrounding Islam, despite your supposedly being its guardians.
Then I ask you: Are you guarding the frontiers of Islam and the territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland? To this, your answer may be: “No, our task is only to pray!”
This means that a piece of the wall has collapsed.
Now I ask you: Are you taking from the rich what they owe the poor and passing it on to them? For that is your Islamic duty, to take from the rich and give to the poor. Your answer may be, in effect: “No, this is none of our concern! God willing, others will come and perform this task.”
Then another part of the wall will have collapsed, and your situation will be like that of Shāh Sultān Husayn waiting for the fall of Isfahan.[135]
What kind of fortress is this? Each of the corners is occupied by some “pillar of Islam,” but all he can do is offer excuses when put to the test. Is that what we mean by “fortress”?
The meaning of the statement of the Imām (‘a) that the fuqahā are the fortresses of Islam is that they have a duty to protect Islam and that they must do whatever is necessary to fulfill that duty. It is one of the most important duties and, moreover, an absolute duty, not a conditional one. It is an issue to which the fuqahā of Islam must pay particular attention. The religious teaching institution must give due thought to the matter and equip itself with the means and strength necessary to protect Islam in the fullest possible sense, just as the Most Noble Messenger (s) and the Imāms (‘a) were the guardians of Islam, protecting its beliefs, ordinances and institutions in the most comprehensive manner.
We have abandoned almost all aspects of our duty, restricting ourselves to passing on, from one generation to the next; certain parts of Islamic law and discussing them among ourselves. Many of the ordinances of Islam have virtually become part of the occult sciences, and Islam itself has become a stranger;[136] only its name has survived.
All the penal provisions of Islam, which represent the best penal code ever devised for humanity, have been completely forgotten; nothing but their name has survived. As for the Qur’anic verses stipulating penalties and sanctions, “Nothing remains of them but their recitation.”[137] For example, we recite the verse: “Administer to the adulterer and the adulteress a hundred lashes each”(24:2), but we do not know what to do when confronted with a case of adultery. We merely recite the verse in order to improve the quality of our recitation and to give each sound its full value. The actual situation prevailing in our society, the present state of the Islamic community, the prevalence of lewdness and corruption, the protection and support extended by our governments to adultery—none of this concern us! It is enough that we understand what penalties have been provided for the adulterer and adulteress without attempting to secure their implementation or otherwise struggling against the existence of adultery in our society!
I ask you, is that the way the Most Noble Messenger (s) conduct himself? Did he content himself with reciting the Qur’an, then lay it aside and neglect to ensure the implementation of its penal provisions? Was it the practice of the successors of the Prophet (s) to entrust matters to the people and tell them, “I have no further concern with you”? Or, on the contrary, did they decree penalties for various classes of offender—whippings, stonings, perpetual imprisonment, banishment? Examine the sections of Islamic law relating to penal law and blood money: you will see that all of these matters are part of Islam and part of the reason for the coming of Islam. Islam came in order to establish order in society; leadership[138] and government are for the sake of ordering the affairs of society.
It is our duty to preserve Islam. This duty is one of the most important obligations incumbent upon us; it is more necessary even than prayer and fasting. It is for the sake of fulfilling this duty that blood must sometimes be shed. There is no blood more precious than that of Imām Husayn (‘a), yet it was shed for the sake of Islam, because of the precious nature of Islam. We must understand this matter well and convey it to others. You can be the true successors to the Prophet (s) as the guardians of Islam only if you teach Islam to the people; do not say, “We will wait until the coming of the Imām of the Age (‘a).” Would you consider postponing your prayer until the coming of the Imām? The preservation of Islam is even more important than prayer. Do not follow the logic of the governor of Khumayn[139] who used to say, “We must promote sin so that the Imām of the Age (‘a) will come. If sin does not prevail, he will not manifest himself!”[140] Do not sit here simply debating among yourselves. Study all the ordinances of Islam and propagate all aspects of the truth by writing and publishing pamphlets. It cannot fail to have an effect, as my own experience testifies.
‘Ali relates, on the authority of his father, from an-Nawfali, who had it from as-Sukūni, who was told it by Abu ‘Abdullāh (‘a), that the Most Noble Messenger (s) said, “The fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a), as long as they do not concern themselves with the illicit desires, pleasures, and wealth of the world.” The Prophet (s) was then asked: “O Messenger of God! How may we know if they do so concern themselves?” He replied: “By seeing whether they follow the ruling power. If they do that, fear for your religion and shun them.”[141] Examination of the whole of this hadith would involve us in a lengthy discussion. We will speak only about the phrase: “The fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a),” since it is what interests us here because of its relevance to the topic of the governance of faqīh.
First, we must see what duties, powers, and functions the prophets (‘a) had in order to discover what the duties of the fuqahā, the trustees and successors of the prophets (‘a), are in turn.
In accordance with both wisdom and the essential nature of religion, the purpose in sending the prophets (‘a) and the task of the prophets (‘a) cannot be simply the delivery of judgments concerning a particular problem or the expounding of the ordinances of religion. These judgments and ordinances were not revealed to the Prophet (s) in order for him and the Imāms (‘a) to convey them truthfully to the people as series of divinely appointed muftis,[142] and then to pass this trust on in turn to the fuqahā, so that they might likewise convey them to the people without any distortion. The meaning of the expression: “The fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a)” is not that the fuqahā are the trustees simply with respect to the giving of juridical opinions. For in fact the most important function of the prophets (‘a) is the establishment of a just social system through the implementation of laws and ordinances (which is naturally accompanied by the exposition and dissemination of the divine teachings and beliefs). This emerges clearly from the following Qur’anic verse: “Verily We have sent Our messengers with clear signs, and sent down with them the Book and the Balance, in order that men might live in equity” (57:25). The general purpose for the sending of prophets (‘a), then, is so that men’s lives may be ordered and arranged on the basis of just social relations and true humanity may be established among men. This is possible only by establishing government and implementing laws, whether this is accomplished by the prophet himself, as was the case with the Most Noble Messenger (s), or by the followers who come after him.
God Almighty says concerning the khums: “Know that of whatever booty you capture, a fifth belongs to God and His Messenger and to your kinsmen”(8:41). Concerning zakāt He says: “Levy a tax on their property”(9:103). There are also other divine commands concerning other forms of taxation. Now the Most Noble Messenger (s) had the duty not only of expounding these ordinances, but also of implementing them; just as he was to proclaim them to the people, he was also to put them into practice. He was to levy taxes, such as khums, zakāt and kharāj, and spend the resulting income for the benefit of the Muslims; establish justice among peoples and among the members of the community; implement the laws and protect the frontiers and independence of the country; and prevent anyone from misusing or embezzling the finances of the Islamic state.
Now God Almighty appointed the Most Noble Messenger (s) head of the community and made it a duty for men to obey him: “Obey God and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority from among you” (4:59). The purpose for this was not so that we would accept and conform to whatever judgment the Prophet (s) delivered. Conformity to the ordinances of religion is obedience to God; all activities that are conducted in accordance with divine ordinances, whether or not they are ritual functions, are a form of obedience to God. Following the Most Noble Messenger (s), then, is not conforming to divine ordinances; it is something else. Of course, obeying the Most Noble Messenger (s) is, in a certain sense, obeying God; we obey the Prophet (s) because God has commanded us to do so. But if, for example, the Prophet (s), in his capacity as leader and guide of Islamic society, orders everybody to join the army of Usāmah,[143] so that no one has the right to hold back, it is the command of the Prophet (s), not the command of God. God has entrusted to him the task of government and command, and accordingly, in conformity with the interests of the Muslims, he arranges for the equipping and mobilization of the army, and appoints or dismisses governors and judges.
This being the case, the principle: “The fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a)” means that all of the tasks entrusted to the prophets (‘a) must also be fulfilled by the just fuqahā as a matter of duty. Justice, it is true; is a more comprehensive concept than trustworthiness and it is possible that someone may be trustworthy with respect to financial affairs, but not just in a more general sense.[144] However, those designated in the principle: “The fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a)” are those who do not fail to observe any ordinances of the law, and who are pure and unsullied, as is implied by the conditional statement: “as long as they do not concern themselves with the illicit desires, pleasures, and wealth of this world”---that is, as long as they do not sink into the morass of worldly ambition. If a faqīh has as his aim the accumulation of worldly wealth, he is longer just and cannot be the trustee of the Most Noble Messenger (‘a) and the executor of the ordinances of Islam. It is only the just fuqahā who may correctly implement the ordinances of Islam and firmly establish its institutions, executing the penal provisions of Islamic law and preserving the boundaries and territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland. In short, implementation of all laws relating to government devolves upon the fuqahā: the collection of khums, zakāt, sadaqah, jizyah, and kharāj and the expenditure of the money thus collected in accordance with the public interest; the implementation of the penal provisions of the law and the enactment of retribution (which must take place under the direct supervision of the ruler, failing which the next-of-kin of the murdered person has no authority to act); the guarding of the frontiers; and the securing of public order.
Just as the Most Noble Messenger (s) was entrusted with the implementation of divine ordinances and the establishment of the institutions of Islam, and just as God Almighty set him up over the Muslims as their leader and ruler, making obedience to him obligatory, so, too, the just fuqahā must be leaders and rulers, implementing divine ordinances and establishing the institutions of Islam.
Since Islamic government is a government of law, those acquainted with the law, or more precisely, with religion—i.e., the fuqahā—must supervise its functioning. It is they who supervise all executive and administrative affairs of the country, together with all planning.
The fuqahā are the trustees who implement the divine ordinances in levying taxes, guarding the frontiers, and executing the penal provisions of the law. They must not allow the laws of Islam to remain in abeyance, or their operation to be effected by either defect or excess. If a faqīh wishes to punish an adulterer, he must give him one hundred lashes in the presence of the people, in the exact manner that has been specified. He does not have the right to inflict one additional lash, to curse the offender, to slap him, or to imprison him for a single day. Similarly, when it comes to the levying of taxes, he must act in accordance with the criteria and the laws of Islam; he does not have the right to tax even a shāhi[145] in excess of what the law provides. He must not let disorder enter the affairs of the public treasury or even so much as a shāhi be lost. If a faqīh acts in contradiction to the criteria of Islam (God forbid
, then he will automatically be dismissed from his post, since he will have forfeited his quality of trustee.
Law is actually the ruler; the security for all is guaranteed by law, and law is their refuge. Muslims and the people in general are free within the limits laid down by the law; when they are acting in accordance with the provisions of the law, no one has the right to tell them, “Sit here,” or “Go there.” An Islamic government does not resemble states where the people are deprived of all security and everyone sits at home trembling for fear of a sudden raid or attack by the agents of the state. It was that way under Mu‘āwiyah[146] and similar rulers: people had no security, and they were killed or banished, or imprisoned for lengthy periods, on the strength of an accusation or a mere suspicion, because the government was not Islamic. When an Islamic government is established, all will live with complete security under the protection of the law, and no ruler will have the right to take any step contrary to the provisions and laws of the immaculate sharī‘ah.
The meaning of “trustee,” then, is that the fuqahā execute as a trust all the affairs for which Islam has legislated—not that they simply offer legal judgments on given questions. Was that the function of the Imām (‘a)? Did he merely expound the law? Was it the function of the prophets (‘a) from whom the fuqahā have inherited it as a trust? To offer judgment on a question of law or to expound the laws in general is, of course, one of the dimensions of fiqh. But Islam regards law as a tool, not as an end in itself. Law is a tool and an instrument for the establishment of justice in society, a means for man’s intellectual and moral reform and his purification. Law exists to be implemented for the sake of establishing a just society that will morally and spiritually nourish refined human beings. The most significant duty of the prophets (‘a) was the implementation of divine ordinances, and this necessarily involved supervision and rule.
There is a tradition of Imām Ridā (‘a) in which he says approximately the following: “An upright, protecting, and trustworthy imām is necessary for the community in order to preserve it from decline,” and then reasserts that the fuqahā are the trustees of the prophets (‘a). Combining the two halves of the tradition, we reach the conclusion that the fuqahā must be the leaders of the people in order to prevent Islam from falling into decline and its ordinances from falling into abeyance.
Indeed it is precisely because the just fuqahā have not had executive power in the lands inhabited by Muslims and their governance has not been established that Islam has declined and its ordinances have fallen into abeyance. The words of Imām Ridā have fulfilled themselves; experience has demonstrated their truth.
Has Islam not declined? Have the laws of Islam not fallen into disused in the Islamic countries? The penal provisions of the law are not implemented; the ordinances of Islam are not enforced; the institutions of Islam have disappeared; chaos, anarchy, and confusion prevail—does not all this mean that Islam has declined? Is Islam simply something to be written down in books like al-Kāfi[147] and then laid aside? If the ordinances of Islam are not applied and the penal provisions of the law are not implemented in the external world—so that the thief, the plunderer, the oppressor, and the embezzler all go unpunished while we content ourselves with preserving the books of law, kissing them and laying them aside (even treating the Qur’an this way), and reciting Yā-Sin on Thursday nights[148]—can say that Islam has been preserved?
Since many of us did not really believe that Islamic society must be administered and ordered by an Islamic government matters have now reached such a state that in the Muslim countries, not only does the Islamic order not obtain, with corrupt and oppressive laws being implemented instead of the laws of Islam, but the provisions of Islam appear archaic even to the ‘ulamā. So when the subject is raised, they say that the tradition: “The fuqahā are trustees of the prophets” refers only to the issuing of juridical opinions. Ignoring the verses of the Qur’an, they distort in the same way all the numerous traditions that the scholars of Islam are to exercise rule during the Occultation. But can trusteeship be in this manner? Is the trustee not obliged to prevent the ordinances of Islam from falling into abeyance and criminals from going unpunished? To prevent the revenue and income of the country from being squandered, embezzled or misdirected?
It is obvious that all of these tasks require the existence of trustees, and that it is the duty of the fuqahā to assume the trust bequeathed to them, to fulfill it in a just and trustworthy manner.
The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) said to Shurayh[149]: “The seat [of judge] you are occupying is filled by someone who is a prophet (‘a), the legatee of a prophet, or else a sinful wretch.”[150] Now since Shurayh was neither a prophet nor the legatee of a prophet, it follows that he was a sinful wretch occupying the position of judge. Shurayh was a person who occupied the position of judge in Kūfah for about fifty or sixty years. Closely associated with the party of Mu‘āwiyah, Shurayh spoke and issued fatwās[151] in a sense favorable to him, and he ended up rising in revolt against the Islamic state. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was unable to dismiss Shurayh during his rule, because certain powerful figures protected him on the grounds that Abu Bakr and ‘Umar had appointed him and that their action was not to be controverted. Shurayh was thus imposed upon the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), who did, however, succeed in ensuring that he abided by the law in his judgment.
It is clear from the foregoing tradition that the position of judgment may be exercised only by a prophet (‘a) or by the legatee of a prophet. No one would dispute the fact that the function of judge belongs to the just fuqahā, in accordance with their appointment by the Imāms (‘a). This unanimity contrasts with the questions of the governance of the faqīh: some scholars, such as Narāqi,[152] or among more recent figures, Nā’ini,[153] regard all of the extrinsic functions and tasks of the Imāms (‘a) as devolving upon the faqih, while other scholars do not. But there can be no doubt that the function of judging belongs to the just fuqahā; this is virtually self-evident.
Considering the fact that the fuqahā do not have the rank of prophethood, and they are indubitably not “wretched sinners,” we conclude that, in the light of the tradition quoted above, they must be the legatees or successors of the Most Noble Messenger (s). Since, however, the expression “legatee of a prophet” is generally assumed to refer to his immediate successors, this tradition and others similar to it are only rarely cited as evidence for the successorship of the fuqahā. The concept “legatee of a prophet” is a broad one, however, and includes the fuqahā. The immediate legatee of the Most Noble Messenger (s) was of course the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), who was followed by the other Imāms (‘a), and the affairs of the people were entrusted to them. But no one should imagine that the function of governing or sitting in judgment was a form of privilege for the Imāms. Rule was entrusted to them only because they were best able to establish a just government and implement social justice among the people. The spiritual stations of the Imāms, which far transcend human comprehension, had no connection with their naming and appointing officials. If the Most Noble Messenger (s) had not appointed the Commander of the Faithful to be his successor, he would still have possessed the same sublime spiritual qualities. It is not that the exercise and function of government bestow spiritual rank and privilege on a man; on the contrary, spiritual rank and privilege qualify a man for the assumption of government and social responsibilities.
In any event, we deduce from the tradition quoted above that the fuqahā are the legatees, at one remove, of the Most Noble Messenger (s) and that all the tasks he entrusted to the Imāms (‘a) are also incumbent on the fuqahā; all the tasks that Messenger (s) performed, they too must perform, just as the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) did.
There is another tradition that may serve as proof or support for our thesis, one that is, indeed, preferable with respect to both its chain of transmission and its meaning. One chain of transmission for it, that passing through Kulayni, is weak, but the other, mentioned by Sadūq and passing through Sulaymān ibn Khālid[154] is authentic and reliable. This is the text of the tradition. Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq[155] (‘a) said: “Refrain from judging, because judging is reserved for an imām who is knowledgeable of the law and legal procedures and who behaves justly toward all the Muslims; it is reserved for a prophet (‘a) or the legatee of a prophet.”
Notice that the person who wishes to sit in judgment must, first of all, be an imām. What is meant here by imām is the common lexical meaning of the word, “leader” or “guide,” not its specific technical sense. In this context the Prophet (s) himself counts as an imām. If the technical meaning of imām[156] were intended, the specification of the attributes of justice and knowledge in the tradition would be superfluous. Second, the person who wishes to exercise the function of a judge must possess the necessary knowledge. If he is an imām, but unlearned in matters of law and juridical procedure, he does not have the right to be a judge. Third, he must be just. The position of judge, then, is reserved for those who posses these three qualifications—being a leader, and being knowledgeable and just. The tradition proceeds to clarify that these three qualifications can be found only in a prophet (‘a) or the trustee of a prophet.
I stated earlier that the function of judge belongs exclusively to the just faqīh; this is a fundamental aspect of fiqh, which is not a matter of dispute. Let us now see whether the three-fold qualifications for exercising the function of judge are present in the faqīh. Obviously we are concerned here only with the just faqīh, not with any faqīh. The faqīh is, by definition, learned in matters pertaining to the function of judge, since the term faqīh is applied to one who is learned not only in the laws and judicial procedure of Islam, but also in the doctrines, institutions, and ethics of the faith—the faqīh is, in short, a religious expert in the full sense of the word. If, in addition, the faqīh is just, he will be found to have two of the necessary qualifications. The third qualification is that he should be an imām, in the sense of leader. Now we have already stated that the just faqīh occupies a position of guidance and leadership with respect to judging, in accordance with his appointment by the Imām (‘a). Further, the Imām has specified that the three necessary qualifications are not to be found in anyone except a prophet (‘a) or the legatee of a prophet. Since the fuqahā are not prophets (‘a) they must be legatees or successors of the prophets (‘a). Therefore, we come to the conclusion that the faqīh is the legatee of the Most Noble Messenger (s), and in addition, during the Occultation of the Imām (‘a), he is the leader of the Muslims and the chief of the community. He alone may exercise the function of judge and no one else has the right to occupy the position of judgeship.
To whom should we recourse in social circumstances?
The third tradition relates to a signed decree of the Imām from which certain conclusions may be deduced, as I propose to do.
It is related in the bookIkmāl ad-DīnwaItmām an-Ni‘mah[157]that Ishāq ibn Ya‘qūb wrote a letter to the Imām of the Age[158] (may God hasten his renewed manifestation) asking him for guidance in certain problems that had arisen, and Muhammad ibn ‘Uthmān al-‘Umari,[159] the deputy of the Imām (‘a), conveyed the letter to him. A response was issued, written in the blessed hand of the Imam (‘a), saying: “In case of newly occurring social circumstances, you should turn for guidance to those who relate our traditions, for they are my proof to you, as I am God’s proof.”
What is meant here by the phrase “newly occurring social circumstances” (hawādith-i wāqi‘ah) is not legal cases and ordinances. The writer of the letter did not wish to ask what was to be done in the case of legal issues that were without precedent. For the answer to that question would have been self-evident according to the Shī‘i school, and unanimously accepted traditions specify that one should have recourse to the fuqahā in such cases. Indeed people had recourse to the fuqahā and made enquiries of them even during the lifetime of the Imāms (‘a). A person living in the time of the Lesser Occultation and in communication with the four deputies of the Imam (‘a), who wrote a letter to him and received an answer, must have known whom to refer to for the solution of legal cases. What is meant by hawādith-i wāqi‘ah is rather the newly arising situations and problems that affect the people and the Muslims. The question Ishāq ibn Ya‘qūb was implicitly posing was this: “Now that we no longer have access to you, what should we do with respect to social problems? What is our duty?” Or, he may have mentioned certain specific events and then asked: “To whom should we have recourse for guidance in these matters?” But it seems that his question was general in intent and that the Imām (‘a) responded in correspondingly general fashion, saying, “With respect to such occurrences and problems, you should refer to those who narrate our traditions, i.e., the fuqahā. They are my proofs to you, and I am God’s proof to you.”
What is the meaning of “God’s proof”?[160] What do you understand by this term? Can a single tradition count as a proof? If Zurārah[161] related a tradition, would that make him a proof? Is the Imām of the Age (‘a) comparable in authority to Zurārah, whom we follow in the sense that we act upon a tradition of the Most Noble Messenger (s) that Zurārah has narrated? When it is said that the holder of authority is the proof of God, does it mean that he is a “proof” purely with respect to details of the law, with the duty of giving legal opinions? The Most Noble Messenger (s) said: “I am now departing, and the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) will be my proof to you.” Do you deduce from this that after the Prophet (s) departed all tasks came to an end except delivering legal opinions, and that this was all that was left for the Commander of the Faithful (‘a)? Or on the contrary, does the term “proof of God” mean that just as the Most Noble Messenger (s) was the proof and authoritative guide of all the people, just as God had appointed him to guide people in matters, so too the fuqahā are responsible for all affairs and are the authoritative guides of the people?
A “proof of God” is one whom God has designated to conduct affairs; all his deeds, actions, and sayings constitute a proof for the Muslims. If some one commits an offense, reference will be to the “proof” for adducing evidence and formulating the charge. If the “proof” commands you to perform a certain act, to implement the penal provisions of the law in a certain way, or to spend the income derived from booty, zakāt, and sadaqah[162] in a certain manner, and you fail to obey him in any of these respects, then God Almighty will advance a “proof” against you on the Day of Judgment. If, despite the existence of the “proof,” you turn to oppressive authorities for the solution of your affairs, again God Almighty will refer to the “proof” as an argument against you on the Day of Judgment, saying: “I established a proof for you; why did you turn instead to the oppressors and the judicial system of the wrongdoers?” Similarly, God designates the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) as a “proof” against those who disobeyed him and followed false paths. Again, against those who assumed the caliphate, against Mu‘āwiyah and the Umayyad caliphs, against the Abbasid caliphs, and those who acted in accordance with their desires, a proof and argument is established: “Why did you illicitly assume rule over the Muslims? Why did you usurp the caliphate and government, despite your unworthiness?”
God calls to account all oppressive rulers and all governments that act contrary to the criteria of Islam, asking them: “Why did you commit oppression? Why did you squander the property of the Muslims? Why did you organize millenary celebrations?[163] Why did you spend the wealth of the people on the coronation[164] and the abominable festivities that accompanied it?” If one of them should reply: “Given the circumstances of the day, I was unable to act justly, or to relinquish my pretentious, luxurious palaces; I had myself crowned to draw attention to my country and the degree of progress we had achieved,” he will then be answered: “The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was also a ruler; he ruled over all the Muslims and the whole of the broad Islamic realm. Were you more zealous than he in promoting the glory of Islam, the Muslims and the lands of Islam? Was your realm more extensive than his? The country over which you ruled was but a part of his realm; Iraq, Egypt and the Hijāz all belonged to his realm, as well as Iran. Despite this, his seat of command was the mosque: the bench of the judge was situated in one corner of the mosque, while in another, the army would prepare to set out for battle. That army was composed of people who offered their prayers regularly, were firm believers in Islam; you know well how swiftly it advanced and what results it obtained!”
Today, the fuqahā of Islam are proof to the people. Just as the Most Noble Messenger (‘a) was the proof of God---the conduct of all affairs was entrusted to him so that whoever disobeyed him had a proof advanced against him---so, too, the fuqahā are the proof of the Imām (‘a) to the people. All the affairs of the Muslims have been entrusted to them. God will advance a proof and argument against anyone who disobeys them in anything concerning government, the conduct of Muslim affairs, or the gathering and expenditure of public funds.
There can be no doubt concerning the meaning of the tradition we have quoted, although it is possible to have certain reservations about its chain transmission. Nonetheless, even if one does regard the tradition as being in its own right, a proof of the thesis we have advanced, it serves to support the other proofs we have mentioned.
Another tradition that supports our thesis is the maqbūlah[165] of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah. Since this narration refers to a certain verse of the Qur’an, we must first discuss the verse in question as well as the verses that precede it in order to elucidate its meaning, before we go on to examine the tradition.
Verily God commands you to return trusts to their owners, and to act with justice when you rule among men. Verily, God counsels you thus, and God is all hearing, all seeing. O you who believe, obey God and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority from among you [i.e., those entrusted with leadership and government]. When you dispute with each other concerning a thing, refer it to God and His Messenger; if you believe in God and the Last Day, this will be best for you and the result, most beneficial. (4: 58-59)
In these verses, God commands us to return trusts to their owners. Some people believe that what is meant here by “trusts” is twofold: trust pertaining to men (i.e., their property), and those pertaining to the Creator (i.e., the ordinances of the sharī‘ah).[166] The sense of returning the divine trust would then be implementing the ordinances of Islam correctly and completely. Another group of exegetes believes instead that what is intended by “trust” is the imamate.[167] There is indeed a tradition that specifies: “We [the Imāms (‘a)] are those addressed in this verse,” for God Almighty commands the Most Noble Messenger (s) and the Imāms to entrust governance and leadership to their rightful possessors. Thus the Most Noble Messenger (s) entrusted governance to the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), who entrusted it to his successor, and each of his successors among the Imāms (‘a) handed it on in turn.
The verse goes on to say: “and to act with justice when you rule among men.” Those addressed here are the person who holdthe reins of affairs in their hands and conduct the business of government—not judges, for the judge exercises only a juridical function, not a governmental one. The judge is a ruler only in a limited sense; the decrees that he issues are exclusively judicial, not executive. Indeed, in forms of government that have emerged in recent centuries, the judges represent one of the three branches of power, the other two being the executive (consisting of the council of ministers) and the legislative or planning body (the assembly or parliament). More generally, the judiciary is one of the branches of government and it fulfills one of the tasks of government. We must therefore conclude that the phrase “when you rule among men” relates to all the affairs of government, and includes both judges and those belonging to the other branches of power.
Now it has been established that since all the concerns of religion constitute a divine trust; a trust that must be vested in its rightful possessors a part of the trust must inevitably be government. Thus, in accordance with this verse, the conduct of all governmental affairs must be based on the criteria of justice, or to put it differently, on the law of Islam and the ordinances of the sharī‘ah. The judge may not issue an incorrect verdict—i.e., one based on some illegitimate, non-Islamic code—nor may the judicial procedure he follows or the law on which he bases his verdict be non-Islamic and therefore invalid. For example, when those engaged in planning the affairs of the country draw up a fiscal program for the nation, they must not impose unjust taxes on peasants working on publicly owned lands, reducing them to wretchedness and destroying the land and agriculture as a whole through the burden of excessive taxation. If the executive branch of government wishes to implement the juridical ordinances of the law and its penal provisions, they must not go beyond the limits of the law by inflicting extra lashes upon the offender or abusing him.
After the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) had cut off the hands of two thieves, he showed such love and concern in treating them and attending to their needs that they became his enthusiastic supporters. On another occasion, he heard that the plundering army of Mu‘āwiyah had stolen an anklet from the foot of a dhimmi[168] woman. He became so distraught and his sensibilities were so offended that he said in a speech: “If a person were to die in circumstances such as mine, no one would reproach him.” But despite all this sensitivity, the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was a man who would draw his sword when it was necessary—to destroy the workers of corruption—with all the strength he could muster. This is the true meaning of justice.
The Most Noble Messenger (s) is the foremost example of the just ruler. When he gave orders for the conquest of a certain area, the burning of a certain place, or the destruction of a certain group whose existence was harmful for Islam, the Muslims, and mankind in general, his orders were just. If he had not given orders such as these, it would have meant neglecting the welfare of Islam, the Muslims, and human society.
Anyone who rules over the Muslims, or over human society in general, must always take into consideration, the public welfare and interest, and ignore personal feelings and interests. For this reason, Islam is prepared to subordinate individuals to the collective interest of society and has rooted out numerous groups that were a source of corruption and harm to human society.
Since the Jews of Bani Qurayza were a troublesome group, causing corruption in Muslim society and damaging Islam and the Islamic state, the Most Noble Messenger (‘a) eliminated them.[169]
Indeed, there are two essential qualities in a believer: he executes justice whenever necessary, with the utmost force and decisiveness and without exhibiting the least trace of feeling; and he displays the utmost love and solicitude whenever they are called for. In these two ways, the believer comes to serve as a refuge for society. Society, with both Muslim and non-Muslim members, will achieve security and tranquility as the result of government exercised by believers, and everybody will live in ease and without fear. The fact that men in our age live in fear of their rulers is because existing governments are not based on law; they are a form of banditry. But in the case of a government headed by someone like the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), that is, in the case of an Islamic government, only the traitors and oppressors—those who transgress and encroach on the rights of their fellows—suffer fear; for the public at large, fear and anxiety are nonexistent.
In the second of the two verses we have quoted, God Almighty says: “O you who believe, obey God and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority among you” (4:59).
According to a certain tradition, the beginning of the first verse (“return trusts to their owners”) is addressed to the Imāms (‘a), the next part of that verse, concerning rule with justice, is addressed to those who exercise command, and the second verse (“O you who believe…”) is addressed to the entire Muslim people. God commands them to obey Him by following his divine ordinances, and to obey His Most Noble Messenger (s) as well as the holders of authority (i.e., the Imāms) by adhering to their teachings and following their governmental decrees.
I have already said that obedience to the commands of God Almighty is different from obedience to the Most Noble Messenger (s). All the ordinances of divine law, whether or not they relate to worship, are the commands of God and to implement them is to obey God. The Most Noble Messenger (s) did not issue any commands concerning prayer, and if he urged men to pray, it was by way of confirming and implementing God’s command. When we pray, we too are obeying God; obeying the Messenger is different from obeying God.
The commands of the Most Noble Messenger (s) are those that he himself issued in the course of exercising his governmental function, as when, for example, he commanded the Muslims to follow the army of Usāmah,[170] to protect the frontiers of the Islamic state in certain way, to levy taxes on certain categories of people, and in general to interact with people in certain prescribed ways. All of these were commands of the Prophet (s). God has laid upon us the duty of obeying the Messenger (s). It is also our duty to follow and obey the holders of authority, who, according to our beliefs, are the Imāms (‘a). Of course, obedience to their governmental decrees is also a form of obedience to God. Since God Almighty has commanded us to follow the Messenger (s) and the holders of authority, our obeying them is actually an expression of obedience to God.
The verse we have cited continues: “When you dispute with each other concerning a thing, refer it to God and His Messenger.” Disputes that arise among people are of two kinds. First, there is the dispute arising between two groups or two individuals concerning a particular matter or claim. For example, someone may claim that there is a debt owed him, while the order party denies it; the truth of the matter must then be established, in accordance either with the sharī‘ah or with customary law.[171] In such cases one must turn to judges, who will examine the matter and deliver an appropriate verdict. The first kind of dispute then, is a civil one.
The second kind of dispute does not concern a disagreement of this type, but relates to oppression and crime. If a robber takes someone’s property by force, for example, or makes illicit use of people’s property, or if a burglar inters someone’s house and carries off his property, the competent authority to whom one should have recourse is not the judge but the public prosecutor. In such matters as this, which relates to penal not civil law (apart from some cases, which are simultaneously civil and penal), it is primarily the public prosecutor who is the guardian of the law and its ordinances and the protector of society. He begins his task by issuing an indictment, and then the judge examines the matter and delivers a verdict. The verdicts issued, whether civil or penal in nature, are put into effect by another branch of power, the executive.
The Qur’an says, then, in effect: “Whenever a dispute arises among you concerning any matter, your point of reference must be God and His ordinances and the Messenger (s), the executor of those ordinances. The Messenger (s) must receive the ordinances from God and implement them. If any dispute arises among you concerning a debt or loan, the Messenger (s) will intervene in his capacity as judge and deliver a verdict. If other disputes arise involving unlawful coercion or the usurpation of rights, again it is to the Prophet (s) that you should have recourse. Since he is the head of the Islamic state, he is obliged to enact justice. He must dispatch an official whose duty is to recover the usurped right and restore it to its owner. Further, in any matter where people had recourse to the Messenger, recourse must be to the Imāms, and obedience to the Imāms is, in effect, obedience to the Most Noble Messenger (s).”
In short, both of these verses with all their components embrace government in general, as well as judgehood; they are not restricted in any way to the function of judging, quiet aside from the consideration that certain verses of the Qur’an explicitly relate to government in the sense of the executive.
In the next verse, God says: “Have you not looked at those who claim to believe in what was revealed to you and what was revealed before you? They wish to seek justice from tāghūt [illegitimate powers], even though they have been commanded to disbelieve in therein” (4:60). Even if we do not interpret tāghūt as oppressive governments and all illicit forms of power that have revolted against divine government in order to establish monarchy or some other form of rule, we must still interpret it as including both judges and rulers. For customarily, one has recourse to the judicial authorities to initiate legal proceedings and obtain redress and the punishment of the offender, but then, the juridical verdict that they reach must be implemented by the executive power, which usually forms a separate branch of the government. Tyrannical governments—including the judiciary, the executives, and all other components of the state—comprise what is meant by tāghūt, for they have rebelled against divine command by instituting evil laws, implementing them, and then making them the basis of judicial practice. God has commanded us to disbelieve in them; that is, to revolt against them and their commands and ordinances. All who wish to disbelieve, in this sense, in the tāghūt —that is, to rise up in disobedience against illegitimate ruling powers —have a formidable duty that they must strive to fulfill as far as they are able.
Now let us examine the tradition known as the maqbūlah of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah to establish its meaning and intent. ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah says: “I asked Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) whether it was permissible for two of the Shī‘ah who had a disagreement concerning a dept or a legacy to seek the verdict of the ruler or judge. He replied: ‘Any one who has recourse to the ruler or judge, whether his case be just or unjust, has in reality had recourse to tāghūt [i.e. the illegitimate ruling power]. Whatever he obtains as result of their verdict, he will have obtained by forbidden means, even if he has a proven right to it, for he will have obtained it through the verdict and judgment of the tāghūt, that power which God Almighty has commanded him to disbelieve in.’” (“They wish to seek justice from illegitimate powers, even though they have been commanded to disbelieve therein” [4:60].)
‘Umar ibn Hanzalah then asked: “What should these two Shī‘ah do then, under such circumstances?” Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) answered: “They must seek out one of you who narrates our tradition, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well acquainted with our laws and ordinances, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as judge over you.”[172]
As both the beginning and the conclusion of this tradition make clear, and also the reference made by the Imām (‘a) to the Qur’anic verse, the scope of the question put to the Imām was general, and the instructions he gave in response were also of general validity. I said earlier that for the adjudication of both civil and penal cases, one must have recourse to judges, as well as to the executive authorities or general governmental authorities. One has recourse to judges in order to establish the truth, reconcile enmities, or determine punishments; and to the executive authorities, in order to obtain compliance with the verdict given by the judge and the enactment of his verdict, whether the case is civil or penal in nature. It is for reason that in the tradition under discussion the Imām (‘a) was asked whether we may have recourse to the existing rulers and powers, together with their judicial apparatus.
In his answer, the Imām (‘a) condemns all recourse to illegitimate governments, including both their executive and their judicial branches. He forbids the Muslims to have recourse in any of their affairs to kings and tyrannical rulers, as well as to the judges who act as their agents, even if they have some well-established right that they wish to have enforced. Even if a Muslim’s son has been killed or his house has been ransacked, he does not have the right of recourse to oppressive rulers in order to obtain justice. Similarly, if a debt is owed to him and he has irrefutable evidence to that effect, again he may not have recourse to judges who are the servants and appointees of oppressors. If a Muslim does have recourse to them in such cases and obtains his undeniable rights by means of those illegitimate powers and authorities, the result he obtains will be harām,[173] and he will have no right to make use of it. Certain fuqahā have even gone so far as to say that, in cases where property is restored, the same rule applies. For example, if your cloak is stolen from you, and you regain it through the intervention of an illegitimate authority, you have no right to wear it. This particular ruling is open to discussion, but there is no doubt in more general cases. For example, if someone has a debt owed to him, and, in order to obtain it, has recourse to a body or authority other than that specified by God, and he subsequently receives his due, he may not legitimately put it to use. The fundamental criteria of the sharī‘ah make this necessary.
So this is the political ruling of Islam. It is a ruling that makes Muslims refrain from having recourse to illegitimate powers and their appointed judges, so that non-Islamic and oppressive regimes may fall and the top-heavy judicial systems that produce nothing for the people but trouble may be abolished. This, in turn would open the way for having recourse to the Imāms (‘a) and those to whom they have assigned the right to govern and judge. The main purpose was to prevent kings and the judges appointed by them from attaining any form of authority, and people not to follow them. It has been declared to the Islamic nation that they are not authorities whom to be referred for God Himself had commanded men to disbelieve in kings and unjust rulers (i.e., to rebel against them),[174] and to have recourse to them would conflict with this duty. If you disbelieve in them and regard them as oppressors who are unfit to rule you must not have recourse to them.
What then is the duty of the Islamic community in this respect? What are they to do when new problems occur and dispute arises among them? To what authority should they have recourse? In the tradition previously quoted, the Imām (‘a) said: “They must seek out one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden”—that is, whenever disputes arise among them, they should seek to have them resolved by those who narrate our hadith, are acquainted with what God has made permissible or forbidden, and comprehend our ordinances in accordance with the criteria of reason and the sharī‘ah. The Imām (‘a) did not leave any room for ambiguity lest someone say: “So, scholars of traditions are also to act as authorities and judges.” The Imām (‘a) mentioned all the necessary qualifications and specified that the person to whom we have recourse must be able to give an opinion concerning what is permissible and forbidden in accordance with the well-known rules, must be knowledgeable with the ordinances of Islam, and must be aware of the criteria needed to identify the traditions originating in taqiyyah or similar circumstances (which are not to be taken as valid). It is obvious that such knowledge of the ordinances of Islam and expertise in the science of tradition is different from mere ability to narrate tradition.
In the same tradition the Imām (‘a) goes on to say: “I appoint him as ruler over you”—that is, “I appoint as ruler over you one who possesses such qualifications; I appoint anyone who possesses them to conduct the governmental and judicial affairs of the Muslims, and the Muslims do not have the right to have recourse to anyone other than him.” Therefore, if a robber steals your property, you should bring your complaint to the authorities appointed by the Imām (‘a). If you have a dispute with someone concerning debt or a loan and you need the truth of the matter to be established, again you should refer the matter to the judge appointed by the Imām (‘a), and not to anyone else. This is the universal duty of all Muslims, not simply of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah, who, when confronted by a particular problem, obtained the ruling.
This decree issued by the Imām (‘a), then, is general and universal in scope. For just as the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), while he exercised rule, appointed governors and judges whom all Muslims were bound to obey, so, too, Imām as-Sādiq (‘a), holding absolute authority and empowerment to rule over all the ‘ulamā, the fuqahā, and the people at large, was able to appoint rulers and judges not only for his own lifetime, but also for subsequent ages. This indeed he did, naming the fuqahāas “rulers,” so that no one might presume that their function was restricted to judicial affairs and divorced from the other concerns of government.
We may also deduce from the beginning and end of this tradition, as well as from the Qur’anic verse to which it refers, that the Imām (‘a) was not concerned simply with the appointing of judges and did not leave other duties of the Muslims unclarified, for otherwise, one of the two questions posed to him—that concerned with seeking justice from illicit executive authorities—would have remained unanswered.
This tradition is perfectly clear; there are no doubts surrounding its chain of transmission or its meaning. No one can doubt that the Imām (‘a) designated the fuqahā to exercise the functions of both government and judgeship. It is the duty of all Muslims to obey this decree of the Imām (‘a).
In order to clarify the matter still further, I will adduce additional traditions, beginning with that of Abū Khadījah.
Abū Khadījah, one of the trusted companions of Imām as-Sādiq (‘a), relates: “I was commanded by the Imām (‘a) to convey the following message to our friends [i.e., the Shī‘ah]: ‘When enmity and dispute arise among you, or you disagree concerning the receipt or payment of a sum of money, be sure not to refer the matter to one of these malefactors for judgment. Designate as judge and arbiter someone among you who is acquainted with our injunctions concerning what is permitted and what is prohibited, for I appoint such a man as judge over you. Let none of you take your complaint against another of you to the tyrannical ruling power.’ ”[175]
The meaning of the phrase “dispute concerning a thing” relates to civil disputes, so that the first part of the Imām’s decree means that we are not to have recourse to the malefactors. Concerning part of the tradition which says “I appoint such a man as judge over you” it becomes clear that ‘malefactors’ means those judges whom the rulers of the day and illegitimate governments have allowed to occupy the position of judge. The Imām (‘a) goes on to say “Let none of you take your complaint against another of you to the tyrannical ruling power.” That is to say, “Whatever personal disputes arise among you, do not have recourse to tyrannical authorities and illegitimate powers; do not seek their aid in matters relating to the executive.” The expression “tyrannical ruler” refers, in general, to all illegitimate powers and authorities (that is, all non-Islamic rulers) and embraces all three branches of government—judicial, legislative and executive. Considering that earlier in the tradition, recourse to tyrannical judges is prohibited, however, it appears that this second prohibition relates to the executive branch. The final sentence is not a repetition of the preceding statement. First, the Imām prohibits having recourse to impious judges in the various matters that are their concern (interrogation, the establishment of proof, and so on), designates those who may act as judge, and clarifies the duties of his followers. Then he declares that they must refrain from having recourse to illegitimate rulers. This makes it plain that the question of judges is separate from that of having recourse to illegitimate authority; they are two different subjects. Both are mentioned in the tradition of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah; there, the seeking of justice from both illegitimate authorities and judges is forbidden. In the tradition of Abū Khadijah the Imām (‘a) has appointed only judges, but in that reported by ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah the Imām (‘a) has designated both those who are to act as ruler and executive and those who are to act as judge.
In accordance with the tradition narrated Abu Khadījah, then, the Imām (‘a) designated the fuqahā as judges in his own lifetime, and according to that narrated by ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah, he assigned them both governmental and judicial authority. We must now examine whether the fuqahā automatically forfeited those functions when the Imām (‘a) left this world? Were all the judges and rulers appointed by the Imāms (‘a) somehow dismissed from their functions when the Imāms (‘a) left?
The governance of the Imāms (‘a) differs, of course, from that of all others; according to the Shi‘ah school, all the commands and instructions of the Imāms (‘a) must be obeyed, both during their lifetime and after their death. But, aside from this consideration, let us see what becomes of the functions and duties they have assigned in this world to the fuqahā.
In all existing forms of government whether monarchical, republican, or following some other model, if the head of state dies or circumstances change so that there is a change in administration, military ranks and appointments are not affected. For example, a general will not automatically be deprived of his rank, an ambassador will not be dismissed from his post, and a minister of finance or a provincial or local governor will not be removed. The new administration or successor administration may, of course, dismiss or transfer them from their posts, but their functions are not automatically withdrawn from them.
Obviously, certain powers do automatically terminate with death of the person who conferred them. Such is the case with ijāza-yi hasbiyyah, the authority given to someone by a faqīh to fulfill certain tasks on his behalf in a given town; when the faqīh dies, this authority expires. But, in another case, if a faqīh appoints a guardian for a minor or a trustee for an endowment, the appointments he makes are not annulled by his death but continue in force.
The judicial and governmental functions assigned by the Imāms to the fuqahā of Islam are retained permanently. The Imām (‘a) was certainly aware of all aspects of the matter, and there can be no possibility of carelessness on his part. He must have known that in all governments of the world the position and authority of individual officeholders is not affected by the death or departure of the head of state. If he had intended that the right to govern and judge should be withdrawn after his death from the fuqahā whom he had designated, he would have specified that to be the case, saying: “The fuqahā are to exercise these functions as long as I live.”
According to this tradition, then, the ‘ulamā of Islam have been appointed by the Imām (‘a) to the positions of ruler and judge, and these positions belong to them in perpetuity. The possibility that the next Imām would have annulled this decree and dismissed the fuqahā from these twin functions is extremely small. For the Imām forbade the Muslims to have recourse to kings and their appointed judges for obtaining their rights, and designated recourse to them as equivalent to recourse to the tāghūt; then, referring to the verse that ordains disbelief in tāghūt,[176] he appointed legitimate judges and rulers for the people. If his successor as Imām were not to have assigned the same functions to the fuqahā or to the new ones, what should the Muslims have done, and how would they have resolved their differences and disputes? Should they have had recourse to sinners and oppressors, which would have been equivalent to recourse to the tāghūt and thus a violation of divine command? Or should they have had recourse to no one at all, depriving themselves of all authority and refuge, which would have allowed anarchy to take over, with people freely usurping each other’s property, transgressing against each other’s rights, and being completely unrestrained in all they did?
We are certain that if Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) assigned these functions to the fuqahā, neither his son Mūsā (‘a) nor any of the succeeding Imāms (‘a) abrogated them. Indeed, it is not possible for them to have abrogate these functions and said: “Henceforth, do not have recourse to the just fuqahā for the settlement of your affairs; instead, turn to kings, or do nothing at all and allow your rights to be trampled underfoot.”
Naturally, if an Imām appoints a judge to a certain city, his successor may dismiss that judge and appoint another in his place, but the positions and functions that have been established cannot themselves be abolished. That is self-evident.
The tradition that I shall now quote supports the thesis I have been advancing. If the only proof I had were one of the traditions I have been citing, I would be unable to substantiate my claim. Its essence, however, has been proved by the traditions already cited; what follows now is by way of supplementary evidence. Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) relates that the Prophet (s) said: “For whomever travels a path in search of knowledge, God opens up a path to paradise, and the angels lower their wings before him as a sign of their being well pleased [or God’s being well pleased]. All that is in the heavens and on earth, even the fish in the ocean, seeks forgiveness for him. The superiority of the learned man over the mere worshipper is like that of the full moon over the stars. Truly the scholars are the heirs of prophets (‘a); the prophets bequeathed not a single dinār or dirham; instead they bequeathed knowledge, and whoever acquires it has indeed acquired a generous portion of their legacy.”[177]
The links in the chain of transmission of this tradition are all trustworthy; in fact, Ibrāhīm ibn Hāshim, father of ‘Ali ibn Ibrāhīm, is not moderately trustworthy but outstandingly so. The same tradition has been narrated with a slightly different text by another chain of transmission, one that is sound as far as Abū ’l-Bukhtūri although Abū’l-Bukhtūri himself is of questionable reliability. Here is the second version of the tradition: “Muhammad ibn Yahyā relates, on the authority of Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Īsā, who was told it by Muhammad ibn Khālid, to whom it was narrated by Abū ’l- Bukhtūri, that Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq (‘a) said: ‘The scholars are the heirs of the prophets, for although the prophets bequeathed not a single dinār or dirham, they bequeathed their sayings and traditions. Whoever, then, acquires a portion of their traditions has indeed acquired a generous portion of their legacy. Therefore, see from whom you may acquire this knowledge, for among us, the Family of the Prophet, there are in each generation just and honest people who will repel those who distort and exaggerate, those who initiate false practices, and those who offer foolish interpretations [that is, they will purify and protect religion from the influence of such biased and ignorant people and others like them].’ ”[178]
Our purpose in citing this tradition (which has also been referred to by the late Narāqi) is that it clarifies the meaning of the expression: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets.” There are several matters that must be explained at this point.
First, who are “the scholars”? Is it intended to mean the scholars of the Muslim community or the Imāms (‘a)? Some people are of the opinion probably the Imāms are intended. But it would appear that, on the contrary, the scholars of the community—the ‘ulamā—are intended. The tradition itself indicates this, for the virtues and qualities of the Imāms (‘a) that have mentioned elsewhere are quite different from what this tradition contains. The statement that the prophets (‘a) have bequeathed traditions and whoever learns those traditions acquires a generous portion of their legacy cannot serve as a definition of the Imāms. It must therefore refer to the scholars of the community. In addition, in the version narrated by Abū ’l-Bukhtūri, after the phrase: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets,” we read: “Therefore, see from whom you may acquire this knowledge.” It seems that what is intended here is that, indeed, the scholars are the heirs of the prophets, but one must be careful in the choice of a person from whom to acquire the knowledge the prophets have bequeathed. It will contradict the obvious meaning of the tradition, therefore, to maintain that the Imāms are intended by the expression “heirs of the prophets” and that it is from them that people must acquire knowledge. Anyone acquainted with the traditions that relate to the status of the Imāms (‘a) and the rank accorded them by the Most Noble Messenger (s) will immediately realize that it is not the Imāms but the scholars of the community who are intended in this tradition. Similar qualities and epithets have been used for the scholars in numerous other traditions; e.g., “The scholars of my community are like the prophets preceding me,” and “The scholars of my community are like the prophets of the Children of Israel.”
To conclude, then, it is obvious that the ‘ulamā—the scholars—are intended here.
There is a second objection that might be raised here, which calls for clarification. It might be said that the expression: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets” cannot be used as a proof of our thesis—the governance of the faqīh—since the prophets (anbiyā) have only one dimension of prophethood, which is that they derive knowledge from an exalted source by means of revelation, inspiration, or some other method, and this does not imply or require rule over the people or the believers. If God Almighty has not bestowed leadership and rule on the prophets, they can in no wise possess it; they are only prophets in the narrow sense of the word. If they have been ordained to communicate the knowledge they have received, then it will be their duty at most to communicate it to the people. For in our traditions, a distinction is made between the prophet (nabī) and the messenger (rasūl): the latter has the mission of communicating the knowledge he has received, while the former merely receives it. In addition, the state of prophethood (nubuwwat) is different from that of governance (wilāyat), and it is this titular designation of “prophet” (nabī) that has been used in this tradition. The scholars have been made the successors of the prophets with respect to this titular designation, and since this designation does not imply or necessitate governance (wilāyat), we cannot deduce from the tradition that the scholars are to possess governance. If the Imām had said that the scholars hold the rank of Moses or Jesus, we would naturally infer that the scholars possess all of the aspects and qualities of Moses or Jesus, including governance, but since he did not say this and did not assign to the scholars the rank of any particular person among the prophets, we cannot draw that particular conclusion from the tradition in question.
In answer to this objection, it must first be stated that the criterion for the understanding of traditions and their wording must be common usage and current understanding, not precise technical analysis, and we, too, follow this criterion. Once a faqīh tries to introduce subtle technical points into the understanding of traditions, many matters become obscured. So, if we examine the expression: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets” in the light of common usage, will it occur to us that only the titular designation of “prophet” is intended in the tradition, and that the scholars are heirs only to what is implied in that designation? Or on the contrary, does this expression provide a general principle that can be applied to individual prophets? To put it differently, if we were to ask someone who is aware only of the common usage of word, “Is such-and-such a faqīh a successor of Moses and Jesus?” He would answer—in the light of the tradition under discussion—“Yes, because Moses and Jesus are prophets.” Again, if we were to ask, “Is the faqīh an heir to the Most Noble Messenger (s)?” he would answer, “Yes, because the Most Noble Messenger is one of the prophets.”
We cannot, therefore, take the word “prophets” as a titular designation, particularly since it is in the plural. If the singular “prophet” were used in the tradition, then it might be possible that only the titular designation was intended, but since the plural is used, it means “every one of the prophets,” not “every one of the prophets with respect to that by virtue of which they are prophets.” This latter sense would indeed indicate that the titular designation exclusively was intended, as distinct from all other designations, so that the expression would come to mean, “The faqīh enjoys the stature of the prophet (nabī), but not that of the messenger (rasūl) nor that of the ruler (wali).” Analyses and interpretations like these, however, go against both common usage and reason.
For a third objection, let us suppose that the scholars are given the stature of the prophets with respect to their titular designation, with respect to that by virtue of which they are prophets. We must then regard the scholars as possessing all the attributes that God Almighty has designated the prophets as possessing, in accordance with this same equation of the scholars with the prophets. If, for example, some one says that so-and-so enjoys the same rank as the just and says next that we must honor the just, we infer from the two statements taken together that we must honor the person in question. This being the case, we can infer from the Qur’anic verse: “The prophet has higher claims on the believers than their own selves” (33:6) that the ‘ulamā possess the function of governance just as the prophet does. For what is implicit in having “higher claims” is precisely governance and command. In commenting upon the verse in question, the work Majma‘ al-Bahrayn[179] cites a tradition of Imām al-Bāqir (‘a): “This verse was revealed concerning governance and command”. The prophet, then, is empowered to rule and govern over the believers, and the same rule and governance that has been established for the Most Noble Messenger (s) is also established for the scholars for both in the verse quoted and in the tradition under discussion the titular designation “prophet” has been used.
We can, moreover, refer to a number of verses that designate the prophet as possessing various qualities and attributes, as, for example: “Obey God and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority from among you” (Qur’an, 4:59). Although a distinction is made in certain traditions between “prophet” and “messenger” with respect to the mode of revelation, rationally and in common usage the two words denote the same meaning. According to common usage, the “prophet” is one who receives tidings from God, and the “messenger” is one who conveys to mankind what he has received from God.
A fourth objection might also be raised. The ordinances that the Most Noble Messenger (s) left are a form of legacy, even though they are not designated technically as such, and those who take up those ordinances are his heirs. But what proof is there that the function of governance that the Prophet (s) exercised could be bequeathed and inherited? It might be that what could be bequeathed and inherited consisted only of his ordinances and his traditions, for the tradition states that the prophets bequeathed knowledge, or, in the version narrated by Abu ’l-Bukhturi, that they bequeathed “a legacy of their sayings and traditions.” It is apparent, then, that they bequeathed their traditions, but governance cannot be bequeathed or inherited.
This objection is also unjustified. For governance and command are extrinsic and rational matters; concerning these matters, we must have recourse to rational persons. We might ask them whether they regard the transfer of governance and rule from one person to another by way of bequest as possible. For example, if a rational person is asked, “Who is heir to the rule in such-and-such a country?” will he answer that the position of ruler cannot be inherited, or say instead that such-and-such a person is the heir to the crown and the throne? “Heir the throne” is a well-known current expression. There can be no doubt that rationally speaking governance can be transferred from one person to another just like property that is inherited. If one considers first the verse: “The prophet has higher claims on the believers than their own selves,” and then the tradition: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets,” he will realize that both refer to the same thing: extrinsic matters that are rationally capable of being transferred from one person to another.
If the phrase: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets” referred to the Imāms (‘a)—as does the tradition to the effect that the Imāms are the heirs of the Prophet (s) in all things—we would not hesitate to say that the Imāms are indeed the heirs of Prophet in all things, and no one could say that the legacy intended here refers only to knowledge and legal questions. So if we had before us only the sentence: “The scholars are the heirs of the prophets” and could disregard the beginning and end of the tradition, it would appear that all functions of the Most Noble Messenger (‘a) that were capable of being transmitted—including rule over people—and that devolved on the Imāms after him, pertain also to the fuqahā, with the exception of those functions that must be excluded for other reasons and which we too exclude wherever there is reason to do so.
The major problem still remaining is that the sentence: “The scholars are heirs of the prophets” occurs in a context suggesting that the traditions of the prophets constitute their legacy. The authentic tradition narrated by Qaddāh reads: “The prophets bequeathed not a single dinār or dirham; instead they bequeathed knowledge.” That related by Abū ’l–Bukhtūri reads: “Although the prophets did not bequeath a single dinār or dirham; they bequeathed their sayings and traditions.” These statements provide a context suggesting that the legacy of the prophets is their traditions, and that nothing else has survived of them that might be inherited, particularly since the particle “innamā” occurs in the text of the tradition, indicating exclusivity.
But even this objection is faulty. For if the meaning were indeed that the Most Noble Messenger (s) had left nothing of himself that might be inherited except his traditions, this would contradict the very bases of our Shi’ah school. The Prophet (s) did indeed leave things that could be inherited, and there is no doubt that among them was his exercise of rule over the community, which was transmitted by him to the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), and then to each of the other Imāms (‘a) in succession. The particle “innamā” does not always indicate exclusivity, and indeed there are doubts that it ever does; in addition, “innamā” does not occur in the text narrated by Qaddāh, but only in that related by Abu ’l- Bukhturi whose chain of transmission is weak, as I have already said.
Now let us examine in turn each of the sentences in the text narrated by Qaddāh in order to see whether the context does, in fact, indicate that the legacy of the prophets consists exclusively of their traditions.
“For whoever travels a path in search of knowledge, God opens up a path to paradise.” This is a sentence in praise of scholars, but not in praise of any scholar, so that we imagine the sentence to be uniformly praising all types of scholar. Look up the traditions in al-Kāfi concerning the attributes and duties of scholars, and you will see that in order to become a scholar and an heir of the prophets, it is not enough to study a few lines. The scholar also has duties he must perform, and therein lies the real difficulty of his calling.
“The angels lower their wings before him as a sign of their being well pleased with him.” The meaning of “lower their wings” is obvious to those who concern themselves with these matters. It is an act signifying humility and respect.
“All that is in the heavens and on earth, even the fish in the ocean, seeks forgiveness for him.” This sentence does not require detailed explanation because it is not relevant to our present theme.
“The superiority of the learned man over the mere worshipper is like that of the full moon over the stars.” The meaning of this sentence is clear.
“Truly the scholars are the heirs of the prophets.” The entire tradition, from its beginning down to and including this sentence, is in praise of the scholars and in exposition of their virtues and qualities, one of these qualities being that they are the heirs of the prophets. Being the heirs of the prophets becomes a virtue for the scholars when they exercise governance and rule over people, like the prophets, and obedience to them is a duty.
The meaning of the next expression in the tradition, “The prophets bequeathed not a single dinār or dirham,” is not that they bequeathed nothing but learning and traditions. Rather it is an indication that although the prophets exercised authority and ruler over people, they were men of God, not materialistic creatures trying to accumulate worldly wealth. It also implies that the form of government exercised by the prophets was different from monarchies and other current forms of government, which have served as means for the enrichment and gratification of the rulers.
The way of life of the Most Noble Messenger (s) was extremely simple. He did not use his authority and position to enrich his material life in the hope of leaving a legacy. What he did leave behind was knowledge, the most noble of all things, and in particular, knowledge derived from God Almighty. Indeed, the singling out of knowledge for mention in this tradition may have been precisely because of its nobility.
It cannot be said that since the qualities of the scholars are mentioned in this verse together with their being heirs to knowledge and not heirs to property, therefore, the scholars are heirs only to knowledge and traditions.
In certain cases, the phrase: “What we leave behind is charity” has been added to the tradition, but it does not truly belong there. Found only in Sunni versions of the traditions, it has been added for political reasons.[180]
The most we can say with respect to the context these sentences provide for the statement: “The scholars are heirs to the prophets” is that the statement cannot be taken in an absolute sense, which would mean that everything that pertains to the prophets also pertains to the scholars. Nor can the statement, because of its context, be taken in the restricted sense that the scholars are heirs only to the knowledge of the prophets. If that were sense, the tradition would contradict the other traditions we quoted earlier in connection with our theme and tend to neglect them. This restricted sense cannot be derived from this.
For the sake of argument, if it were true that this tradition means that the Most Noble Messenger (s), left no legacy but knowledge, and that rulership and governance can be neither bequeathed nor inherited, and if, too, we did not infer from the Prophet’s saying: “‘Ali is my heir” that the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was indeed his successor, then we would be obliged to have recourse to nass[181] with respect to the successorship of the Commander of the Faithful and the remaining Imāms (‘a). We would then follow the same method with respect to the exercise of governance by the faqīh, for according to the tradition cited above, the fuqahā have been appointed to the function of successorship and rule. Thus, we have reconciled this tradition with those that indicate appointment.
In his ‘Awā’id,[182] Narāqi quotes the following tradition from the Fiqh-i Razāvi:[183] “The rank of the faqīh in the present age is like that of the prophets of the Children of Israel.” Naturally, we cannot claim that the Fiqh-i Razāvi was actually composed by Imām Ridā (‘a), but it is permissible to quote it as a further support for our thesis.
It must be understood that what is meant by “the prophets of the Children of Israel” is indeed the prophets, not fuqahā who lived in the time of Moses and may have been called prophets for some reason or other. The fuqahā who lived in the time of Moses were all subject to his authority, and exercised their functions in obedience to him. It may be that when he dispatched them somewhere to convey a message, he would also appoint them as “holder of authority”—naturally, we are not precisely informed about these matters—but it is obvious that Moses himself was one of the prophets of the Children of Israel, and that all of the functions that existed for the Most Noble Messenger (s) also existed for Moses, with a difference, of course, in rank, station, and degree. We deduce from the general scope of the word “rank” in this tradition, therefore, that the same function of rulership and governance that Moses exercised exists also for fuqahā.
The Jāmi’ al-Akhbār[184] contains the following tradition of the Most Noble Messenger (s): “On the Day of Judgment I will take pride in the scholars of my community, for the scholars of my community are like the prophets preceding me.” This tradition also serves to support my thesis.
In the Mustadrak,[185] a tradition is quoted from the Ghurār[186] to the following effect: “The scholars are rulers over the people.” One version reads “hukamā” (“wise men”) instead of “hukkām” (“rulers”), but this appears to be incorrect. According to the Ghurār, the form “hukkām” is correct. The meaning of this tradition is self-evident, and if its chain of transmission is valid, it may also serve to support my thesis.
There are still additional traditions that may be quoted. One of them is quoted in Tuhāf al-‘Uqūl[187] under the heading: “The Conduct of Affairs and the Enforcement of Ordinances by the Scholars.” This tradition consists of two parts. The first is a tradition transmitted by the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) from the Commander of the Faithful, ‘Ali (‘a), and concerns the enjoining of the good and the prohibition of the evil. The second part is the speech of the Doyen of the Martyrs concerning the governance of the faqīh and the duties that are incumbent upon the fuqahā, such as the struggle against oppressors and tyrannical governments in order to establish an Islamic government and implement the ordinances of Islam. In the course of this celebrated speech, which he delivered at Mīnah,[188] he set forth the reasons for his own jihād against the tyrannical Umayyad state. Two important themes may be deduced from this tradition. The first is the principle of the governance of the faqīh, and the second is that the fuqahā, by means of jihād and enjoying the good and forbidding the evil, must expose and overthrow tyrannical rulers and rouse the people so that the universal movement of all alert Muslims can establish Islamic government in place of tyrannical regimes.
This is the tradition.[189] The Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) said: “O people, take heed of the counsel God gave His friends when he rebuked the rabbis by saying, ‘Why do their scholars and rabbis not forbid their sinful talk and consumption of what is forbidden [that is, such talk and consumption on the part of the Jews]? Truly what they have done is evil’ (Qur’an, 5:63). Again God says: “Cursed by the tongue of David and Jesus, son of Mary, are those among the Children of Israel who have failed to believe on account of their rebellion and transgression. They did not prevent each other from committing vile and corrupt acts; truly what they did was abominable!” (Qur’an, 5:78). God blamed and reproached them because they saw with their own eyes the oppressors committing vile and corrupt acts but did not stop them, out of love for the income they received from them as well as fear of persecution and injury. However, God orders us to fear Him, not men, and He says: “And the believing men and women are friends and protectors of each other; they enjoin the good and forbid the evil” (Qur’an, 9:71).
“We see that this verse, in the course of enumerating the attributes of the believers, the attributes that indicate mutual affection, solitude, and desire to guide each other, God begins with enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, considering this the prime duty. For He knows that if this duty is performed and is established within society, performance of all other duties will follow, from the easiest to the most difficult. The reason for this is that enjoining the good and forbidding the evil means summoning people to Islam, which is a struggle to establish correct belief in the face of external opposition, while at the same time vindicating the rights of the oppressed; opposing and struggling against oppressors within the community; and endeavoring to ensure that public wealth and the income derived from war are distributed in accordance with the just laws of Islam, and that taxes [zakāt and all other forms of fiscal income, whether compulsory or voluntary] are collected, levied, and expended in due and proper form.
“O scholars, you who are celebrated and enjoy good repute on account of your learning! You have achieved fame in society because of your devotion, the good counsel you impart, and the guidance you dispense. It is on account of God that men venerate and stand in awe of you, so that even the powerful fear you and feel compelled to rise respectfully before you, and men who are not subject to you and over whom you hold no authority willingly regard themselves as your subordinates and grant you favors they deny themselves. When the people do not receive their due from the public treasury, you intervene and act with the awesomeness and imperiousness of monarchs and the stature of the great. Have you not earned all these forms of respect and prestige because of men’s hopes that you will implement God’s laws, even though in most instances you have failed to do so?
“You have failed to enforce most of the rights you were entrusted to preserve. For instance, you have neglected the rights of the oppressed and the lowly, squandered the rights of the weak and the powerless, but pursed assiduously what you regard as your personal rights. You have not spent your money or risked your lives for the sake of the One Who gave you life, nor have you fought against any group or tribe for the sake of God. You desire, and regard it as your due, that He should grant you paradise, the company of the Prophet, and security from hellfire in the hereafter. You who have such expectations of God, I fear that the full weight of His wrath will descend upon you, for although it is by his might and glory that you have achieved high rank, you show no respect to those who truly know God and wish to disseminate their knowledge while you yourselves enjoy respect among God’s bondsmen on His account.
“I am also afraid for you for another reason: you see the covenants enacted with God[190] being violated and trampled underfoot; yet you show no anxiety. When it comes to the covenants enacted with your fathers, you become greatly disturbed and anxious if they are only violated in part, but the pledges you have given to the Most Noble Messenger[191] are a matter of complete indifference to you. The blind, the dumb, and the poverty-stricken cultivators of the land everywhere lack protectors and no mercy is shown them. You do not behave in accordance with your function and rank, nor do you support or pay any regard to those who do so behave and who strive to promote the standing of the religious scholars. You purchase your safety from the oppressive ruling powers with flattery, cajolery and compromise.
“All these activities have been forbidden you by God, and He has, moreover, commanded you to forbid each other to engage in them, but you pay no attention. The disaster that has befallen you is greater than what has befallen others, for the true rank and degree of ‘ulamā has been taken away from you. The administration of the country, the issuing of judicial decrees, and the approving of legislative programs should actually be entrusted to religious scholars who are guardians of the rights of God and knowledgeable about God’s ordinances concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden. But your position has been usurped from you, for no other reason than that you have abandoned the pivot of truth—the law of Islam and God’s decree—and have disagreed about the nature of the Sunnah, despite the existence of clear proofs.
“If you were true men, strong in the face of torture and suffering and prepared to endure hardship for God’s sake, then all proposed regulations would be brought to you for your approval and for you to issue; authority would lie in your hands. But you allowed the oppressors to take away your function, and permitted that the government, which is supposed to be regulated by the provisions of the sharī‘ah, to fall into their hands so that they administer it on the shaky basis of their own conjectures and suppositions and make arbitrariness and the satisfaction of lust their consistent practice. What enabled them to gain control of government was your fleeing in panic from being killed, your attachment to the transitory life of this world. With that mentality and the conduct it inspires, you have delivered the powerless masses into the clutches of the oppressors. While some cringe like slaves under the blows of the oppressors, and others search in misery and desperation for bread and water, the rulers are entirely absorbed in the pleasures of kingship, earning shame and disgrace for themselves with their licentiousness, following evil counselors, and showing impudence toward God. One of their appointed spokesmen mounts the minbar[192] in each city. The soil of the homeland is defenseless before them, and they grab freely whatever they want of it. The people are their slaves, and are powerless to defend themselves. One ruler is a dictator by nature, malevolent and rancorous; another represses his wretched subjects ruthlessly, plundering by imposing on them all kinds of burdens; and still another refuses in his absolutism to recognize either God or the Day of Judgment! Is it not strange—how can one not think it strange—that society is in the clutches of a cunning oppressor whose tax collectors are oppressors and whose governors feel no compassion or mercy toward the believers under their rule?
“It is God Who will judge concerning what is at dispute among us and deliver a decisive verdict concerning all that occurs among us.
“O God! You know that everything we did [that is, the struggle in which they had recently engaged against the Umayyads] was not prompted by rivalry for political power, nor by a search for wealth and abundance; rather it was done in order to demonstrate to men the shining principles and values of Your religion, to reform the affairs of Your land, to protect and secure the indisputable rights of Your oppressed servants, and to act in accordance with the duties You have established and the norms, laws, and ordinances You have decreed.
“So, O scholars of religion! You are to help us reach this goal, win back our rights from those powers who have considered it acceptable to wrong you and who have attempted to put out the light kindled by your Prophet. God the One suffices us—upon Him do we rely, to Him do we turn, in His hands lies our fate, and to Him shall we return.”
When the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) said at the beginning of this sermon: “O people, take heed of the counsel God gave His friends when He rebuked the rabbis,” his address was not restricted to a particular group of people—those present in the assembly, the inhabitants of a certain city, town, or country, or even all people alive in the world at the time. Rather it embraces all who hear the summons at whatever time, for it begins with the expression “O people” (yā ayyuha ’n-nās), which occurs in the Qur’an with the same universal meaning.[193] When God rebukes the rabbis—the Jewish scholars—and condemns their behavior, He is at the same time addressing His friends (awliyā) and advising them. The word “awliyā” means here those who have set their faces toward God and hold responsible positions in society, not the Twelve Imāms.[194]
God says in the verse we are examining: “Why do their scholars and rabbis not forbid their sinful talk and consumption of what is forbidden? Truly what they have done is evil.” Thus He reproaches the rabbit and Jewish religious scholars for failing to prevent the oppressors’ sinful talk—a term that includes lying, slander, distorting the truth, and so forth—and consumption of what is forbidden. It is obvious that, this reproach and upbraiding is not confined to the scholars of the Jews, nor for that matter to those of the Christians; it applies also to the religious scholars in Islamic society, or indeed, any other society. If the religious scholars of Islamic society are silent, therefore, in the face of the policies of the oppressors, they too are reproached and condemned by God; and here there is no distinction between scholars of the past, present, and future—they are equal in this regard. The Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) made reference to this verse of Qur’an so that the religious scholars of Islamic society would take heed, awaken, and no longer neglect their duty of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil or stay silent in the face of the oppressive and deviant ruling classes.
There are two points to which he draws attention by citing this verse. First, the religious scholars’ neglect of their duties is more harmful than the failure of others to perform their normal duties. If a bazaar merchant, for example, does something wrong, it is only he who suffers the harm that results. But if the religious scholars fail in fulfilling their duties, by keeping silent, let us say, in the face of tyranny, Islam itself suffers as a result. But if, on the contrary, they act in accordance with their duty and speak out when they should, eschewing silence, then Islam itself will benefit.
Secondly, although all things contrary to the sharī‘ah must be forbidden, emphasis has been placed on sinful talk and consumption of what is forbidden, implying that these two evils are more dangerous than all the others and must therefore be more diligently combated. Sometimes the statements and propaganda put forth by oppressive regimes are more harmful to Islam and the Muslims than their actions and policy, endangering the whole repute of Islam and the Muslims. God reproaches the religious scholars, therefore, for failing to prevent the oppressors from uttering dishonest words and spreading sinful propaganda. He says in effect: “Why did they not denounce the man who falsely claimed to be God’s vicegerent on earth and the instrument of His will, who claimed to be enforcing God’s laws in the right way and to have a correct understanding and practice of Islamic justice, even though he was incapable of comprehending what justice is? Claims like these are a form of sinful talk that is extremely harmful to society. Why did the religious scholars not prevent them from being made? The tyrants who uttered this nonsense talk and committed treason and brought evil innovations[195] into Islam; why did the religious scholars not stand in their way and make them desist from these sins?
If someone interprets God’s ordinances in a way displeasing to Him, thus introducing an evil innovation in Islam, or executes laws that are anti-Islamic, claiming to be acting in accordance with the requirements of Islamic justice, it is the duty of the religious scholars to proclaim their opposition. If they fail to do so, they will be cursed by God, as is apparent both from the verse under discussion and from this tradition: “When evil innovations appear, it is the duty of the scholars to bring forth his knowledge [by condemning them]; otherwise, God’s curse will be upon him.”
In such cases, the expression of opposition and the expounding of God’s teachings and ordinances that stand in contradiction to innovation, oppression, and sin, are also useful in themselves, for they make the masses aware of the corruption of society and the wrongdoing of the treacherous, sinful, and irreligious rulers. The people will then rise up in revolt and refuse to collaborate any longer with the tyrants or to obey corrupt and treacherous ruling powers. The expression of opposition by religious scholars is a form of “forbidding the evil” on the part of the religious leadership, which creates in its wake a wave of broad opposition and “forbidding the evil” on the part of all religiously inclined and honorable people. If the oppressive and deviant rulers do not bow to the wishes of such an oppositional movement by returning to the straight path of Islam and obedience to God’s laws, but attempt to silence it by force of arms, they will, in effect, have engaged in armed aggression against the Muslims and acquired the status of a rebellious group (fī’a bāghiya). It will then be the duty of the Muslims to engage in an armed jihād against that ruling group in order to make the policies of the ruling society and the norms of government conform to the principles and ordinances of Islam.
It is true that at present, you do not have the power to prevent the innovative practices of the rulers or to halt the corruption in which they are engaged. But at least do not stay silent. If they strike you on head, cry out in protest! Do not submit to oppression; such submission is worse than oppression itself. In order to counteract their press and propaganda apparatus, we must create our own apparatus to refuse whatever lies they issue and to proclaim that Islamic justice is not what they claim it is, but on the contrary, has a complete and coherent program for ordering the affairs of the family and all Muslim society. All these matters must be made clear so that people can come to know the truth and coming generations will not take the silence of the religious leaders as proof that the deeds and policies of the oppressors conform to the sharī‘ah, and that the perspicacious religion of Islam allows them to “consume what is forbidden,” or in other words, to plunder the wealth of the people.
Since the range of thought of some people is confined to the mosque we are now sitting in and is incapable of extending any further, when they hear the expression “consumption of what is forbidden,” they can only think of some corner grocer whose is (God forbid) selling his customers short. They never think of the whole range of more important forms of “consuming what is forbidden,” of plunder. Huge amounts of capital are being swallowed up; our public funds are being embezzled; our oil is being plundered; and our country is turned into a market for expensive, unnecessary goods by the representatives of foreign companies, which makes it possible for foreign capitalists and their local agents to pocket the people’s money. A number of foreign states carry off our oil after drawing it out of the ground, and the negligible sum they pay to the regime they have installed returns to their pockets by other routes. As for the small amount that goes into the treasury, God only knows what it is spent on. All of this is a form of “consumption of what is forbidden” that takes place on an enormous scale, in fact on an international scale. It is not merely an evil, but a hideous and most dangerous evil. Examine carefully the conditions of society and the actions of the government and its component organs, and then you will understand what hideous “consumption of what is forbidden” is taking place now. If an earthquake occurs in some corners of the country, it too becomes a means for the ruling profiteers to increase their illegal income: they fill their pockets with money that is supposed to go to the victims of the earthquake. Whenever our oppressive, anti-national rulers enter into agreements with foreign states or companies, they pocket huge amounts of our people’s money and lavish additional huge sums on their foreign masters. It is a veritable flood of forbidden consumption that sweeps past us, right before our eyes. All this is misappropriation of wealth goes on and on: in our foreign trade and in the contracts made for the exploitation of our mineral wealth, the utilization of our forests and other natural resources, construction work, road building, and the purchase of arms from the imperialists, both Western and communist.
We must end all this plundering and usurpation of wealth. The people as a whole have a responsibility in this respect, but the responsibility of the religious scholars is graver and more critical. We must take the lead over other Muslims in embarking on this sacred jihād, this heavy undertaking; because of our rank and position, we must be in the forefront. If we do not have the power today to prevent these misdeeds from happening and to punish these embezzlers and traitors, these powerful thieves that rule over us, then we must work to gain that power. At the same time, to fulfill our minimum obligation, we must not fail to expound the truth and expose the thievery and mendacity of our rulers. When we come to power, we will not only put the country’s political life, economy, and administration in order, we will also whip and chastise the thieves and the liars.
They set fire to the Masjid al-Aqsā.[196] We cry out: “Leave the Masjid al-Aqsā half-burned to the ground; do not erase all traces of the crime!” But the Shāh’s regime opens an account, sets up a fund, and starts collecting money from the people supposedly to rebuilt the Masjid al-Aqsā, but really to fill the pockets of our rulers while also covering up the crime committed by Israel.
These are the disasters that are afflicting the nation of Islam, and that have brought us to our present state. Is it not duty of the scholars of Islam to speak out about all this? “Why do their rabbis not forbid their consumption of what is forbidden”? why do our Muslims scholars not protect? Why do they say nothing about all this plundering?
To return to the sermon of the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a), he continues with a reference to the verse: “Cursed are those among Children of Israel who have failed to believe” (5:78). This is not relevant to our present discussion. Then he says: “God reproached and blamed them [the rabbis] because they saw with their own eyes the oppressors committing vile and corrupt acts but did not stop them.” According to the Doyen of the Martyrs, their silence was due to two factors: greed and baseness. Either they were covetous persons who profited materially from the oppressors, accepting payment to keep quiet, or they were faint-hearted cowards who were afraid of them.
Consult the traditions referring to enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. There the conduct of those who constantly invent excuses in order to escape from doing their duty is condemned and their silence is considered shameful. “God says: ‘Do not fear men, but fear Me’ (2:150). This verse means roughly: ‘Why do you fear men? Our friends (awliyā) have given up their lives for the sake of Islam; you should be prepared to do the same.’
“Elsewhere in the Qur’an God also says: “The believers, men and women, are friends and protectors to each other; they enjoin the good and forbid the evil;…they establish the prayer, pay the zakāt, and obey God and His Messenger’ (9:71). In this verse, God mentions the duty of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil first because He knows that if this duty is correctly performed, all other duties, whether easy or difficult, will fall into place. For enjoining the good and forbidding the evil means summoning men to Islam while at the same time remedying oppression, opposing the oppressor, making just distribution of the spoils of war, and levying and spending taxes in just and due form.”
If the duty of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil is properly performed, all other duties will automatically fall into place. If the good is enjoined and the evil forbidden, the oppressors and their agents will be unable to usurp the people’s property and dispose of it according to their own whims; they will be unable to squander the taxes taken from the people. For he who enjoins the good and forbids the evil actively calls men to Islam by remedying injustice and opposing the oppressor.
Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil has been made a duty primarily for the sake of accomplishing these high aims. We have restricted it, however, to a narrow category of affairs where harm is suffered chiefly by the individual who is guilty of a sin by deed or by omission. We have the idea firmly in our heads that the instances of evil we are called upon to combat (munkarāt) are only the things we encounter or hear about in everyday life. For example, if someone plays music while we are riding on the bus,[197] or the owner of a coffee house does something wrong, or someone eats in the middle of the bazaar during Ramadān,[198] we regard all these things as instances of evil we must denounce. Meanwhile, we remain totally oblivious to far greater evils. Those who are destroying the welfare of Islam and trampling on the rights of the weak---it is they whom we must force to desist from evil.
If a collective protest were made against the oppressors who commit an improper act or crime, if several thousand telegrams were sent to them from all the Islamic countries telling them to desist, to relinquish their errors, they certainly would desist. If every time a step were taken or a speech given against the interests of Islam and the welfare of the people, those responsible were condemned throughout the country, in every single village and hamlet, they would be obliged to retreat. Could they possibly do otherwise? Never! I know them; I know what kind of people they are. They are very cowardly and would retreat very quickly. But if they see that we are more gutless than they are, they will give themselves airs and do whatever they want.
When the ‘ulamā of Qum met and banded together on one occasion, and the provinces supported them by sending delegations and delivering speeches to show their solidarity, the regime retreated and canceled the measures we were objecting to.[199] Afterwards, they were able to cool our enthusiasm and weaken us; they divided us up and invented a separate “religious duty” for each of us. As a result of the differing opinions that appeared among us, they grew bold again, and now they do whatever they want with the Muslims and this Islamic country of ours.
The Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) speaks of “summoning men to Islam while at the same time remedying oppression and opposing the oppressors”; it is for the sake of these great aims that enjoining the good and forbidding the evil has been made a duty. If some poor grocer does something wrong, he has not harmed Islam, but only himself. In performing our duty of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, we must pay closest attention to those who harm Islam and those who, under various pretexts, plunder the people’s means of livelihood.
On occasion we read in the paper—sometimes it is stated humorously, sometimes seriously—that many of the items collected for the victims of floods or earthquakes are picked up by our rulers for their own use. One of the ‘ulamā of Malāyer told me that the people had wanted to send a truckload of shrouds for the victims of some disaster, but the police refused to let them through, and even tried to confiscate the load! “Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil” is more imperative in such cases.
Now let me ask you, were the subjects mentioned by the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) in his sermon addressed only to his companions who were gathered around him listening to his words? Does not the phrase “O people, take heed” address us too? Are we not included in “people”? Should we not profit from this address of the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a)?
As I stated at the beginning of this discussion, the subjects contained in the sermon of the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) were not intended for a single group or class. His address was more in the nature of a circular directed to all commanders, ministers, rulers, fuqahā—and in short, to the whole world, particularly those who are alive and fully conscious. The circulars he issued belong together with the Qur’an in the sense that they demand our obedience until the Day of Resurrection. The verse referred to in the address speaks only of the Jewish scholars and rabbis, but its purport is universal. The Jewish scholars and rabbis were condemned by God because fear or covetousness made them keep silent in the face of the misdeeds of the oppressors, whereas if they had spoken or cried out in protest, they could have prevented oppression from occurring. If the ‘ulamā of Islam likewise fail to rise up against the oppressors and remain silent instead, they too will be condemned.
After addressing the people in general, the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a) then turns to a particular group, the ‘ulamā of Islam, and tells them: “You enjoy prestige and standing in society; the nation of Islam respects and venerates you. You are held in awe and have high standing in society because you are expected to rise up against the oppressors in defense of the truth and to compel the oppressor to enforce the rights of the oppressed. Men have placed their hopes in you for the establishment of justice and the prevention of transgression by the oppressors.
“Thus you have reached a certain station and rank. But you have failed to perform the duties of your station. If some harm were to befall the father of one of you, or if—God forbid—someone were to insult him, you would be greatly distressed and would cry out in protest. But now that God’s covenants are being violated before your very eyes and Islam is being dishonored, you keep silent and are not distressed even in your hearts for if you were distressed, you would be bound to raise your voices in protest. The blind, the dumb, and the poverty-stricken cultivators of the land are being destroyed and nobody shows any concern; no one is concerned for the wretched, barefooted people.”
Do you imagine all that bombastic propaganda being broadcast on the radio is true? Go and see for yourselves at first hand what state our people are living in. Not even one, out of two hundred villages has a clinic. No one is concerned about the poor and the hungry, and they do not allow the measures Islam has devised for the sake of the poor to be implemented. Islam has solved the problem of poverty and inscribed it at the very top of its program: “Sadaqāt is for the poor.”[200] Islam is aware that first, the conditions of the poor must be remedied; the conditions of the deprived must be remedied. But they do not allow the plans of Islam to be implemented.
Our wretched people subsist in conditions of poverty and hunger, while the taxes that the ruling class extorts from them are squandered. They buy Phantom jets so that pilots from Israel and its agents can come and train in them in our country.[201] So extensive is the influence of Israel in our country—Israel, which is in a state of war with the Muslims, so that those who support it are likewise in a state of war with the Muslims—and so great is the support the regime gives it, that Israeli soldiers come to our country for training! Our country has become a base for them! The markets of our country are also in their hands. If matters go on this way, and the Muslims continue to be apathetic, the Muslims will lose all say in the commercial life of the country.
To return to the address of the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a): “You have not made proper use of your station. Not only you do nothing yourselves; you fail to support the person who does want to do his duty. The only source of concern and satisfaction for you is that you have the support and respect of the oppressor, that he addresses you as ‘Noble Shaykh’! What the nation suffers at the hands of the government is of no concern to you. The disaster that has befallen you is greater than what has befallen others for the true rank and degree of ‘ulamā has been taken away from you. The administration of affairs and the implementation of law ought to be undertaken by those who are knowledgeable concerning God and are trustees of God’s ordinances concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden. But that rank has been taken away from you.”
The Imām (‘a) could have said at this point: “What is my right has been taken away from me, but you have not come to my aid,” or, “The rights of Imāms have been taken away, but you have kept silent.” Instead, he spoke of those “knowledgeable concerning God” (al-‘ulamā bi-’llāh), meaning the religious scholars (rabbāniyūn) or leaders. Here he is not referring to the philosophers or mystics, for the person knowledgeable concerning God is the one who is learned in God’s ordinances. It is such a person who is designated as a religious scholar (rūhāni or rabbāni), naturally on condition that spirituality (rūhāniyyat) and orientation to God Almighty be fully apparent in him.
The Imām went on: “But your position has been usurped from you, for no other reason but that you have abandoned the pivot of truth and have disagreed about the nature of the Sunnah, despite the existence of clear proofs. But if you were to show strength in the face of hardship and suffering for God’s sake, then the conduct of affairs, as willed by God, would be restored to you; command and authority would be yours.”
If you were to act correctly and perform your duty, you would see that the conduct of affairs would be bound over to you. If the form of government willed by Islam were to come into being, none of the governments now existing in the world would be able to resist it; they would all capitulate. But unfortunately, we have failed to establish such a government. Even in the earliest age of Islam, its opponents hindered its establishment and prevented governments from being entrusted to the person chosen by God and His Messenger precisely in order to prevent what has happened.
“You allowed the oppressors to take away your functions.” When you failed to perform your duties and abandoned the task of government, it became possible for the oppressors to take over the position that was legitimately yours. “You allowed the affairs of God to fall into their hands, so they came to conduct them on the basis of their suppositions and arbitrary desires. What enabled them to win this control was your panic-stricken flight from being killed, and your attachment to the life of this world. You have delivered the powerless into their clutches, so that some of the people are now subjugated like slaves and others are deprived of even their livelihood.” All of this applies to the age we live in; in fact, it applies more fully to the present than to the time of the Imām (‘a). “The rulers are entirely absorbed in the pleasures of kingship, earning shame and disgrace for themselves with their licentiousness, following evil counselors, and showing impudence toward God. One of their appointed spokesmen mounts the minbar in each city to tell lies.” In those days preachers would praise the oppressors from the minbar. Today, radio stations fill the air with propaganda on their behalf and maliciously misrepresent the ordinances of Islam.
“The earth is defenseless against them.” Now, too, the oppressors can freely exploit the earth, without any obstruction; there is no one to stand in their way. “They grab freely whatever they want [of the earth]. The people are their slaves and are powerless to defend themselves. One ruler is an obstinate tyrant, while another represses his wretched subjects ruthlessly, and still another refuses in his absolutism to recognize God as the beginning and end of all things. Is it not strange—how could one not think it strange—that the world is in the clutches of cunning tyrants, oppressive tax collectors, and governors who have no compassion for the believers under their rule?
“It is God Who will judge concerning what is at dispute among us, and deliver a decisive verdict concerning all that occurs among us.
“O God! You know that everything we did was not prompted by rivalry for political power, nor by desire for the chattels of this world. Rather, it was done in order to demonstrate the signs of Your religion, to reform the affairs of your land, to protect the oppressed among Your servants, and to act in accordance with the duties, norms, and ordinances You have established.
“So, O scholars of religion! Help us reach our goal and obtain our rights. The oppressors will wax strong in their efforts against you and will attempt to put out the light kindled by your Beloved [the Prophet]. But God suffices us; upon Him do we rely, to Him we do turn, and to Him is our journeying.”
As we said, the entire address from beginning to end is addressed to the ‘ulamā. There is no indication that the person intended by the expression “those knowledgeable about God” are the Imāms (‘a). They are the scholars of Islam, the rabbāniyyūn. The designation rabbāni refers to one who believes in God, fulfills God’s ordinances, and is knowledgeable concerning those ordinances, as a trustee of God’s decrees concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden.
When the Imām (‘a) said that the conduct of affairs belongs to the ‘ulamā,he did not mean to restrict this function to a period of ten or twenty years, or simply to the city and people of Medina. It is apparent from the whole speech that his meaning was more universal, that he had in mind a vast community that would undertake the establishment of justice.
If the ‘ulamā who are the trustees of God’s decrees concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden, and who possess the two characteristics of knowledge and justice as set forth above—if they were to implement God’s ordinances, to execute the penal provisions of the law, and generally to conduct and administer the affairs of the Muslims, the people would no longer be hungry and wretched and the laws of Islam would no longer be in abeyance.
The tradition containing this noble speech, then, is part of the evidence supporting our thesis, the governance of the faqīh. Were its chain of transmission not weak, we could cite it as a direct proof. Even as it stands, we might say that the content of the tradition, being veracious, bears witness that it was uttered by one of the ma‘sūmīn.[202]
We have now completed our discussion of the governance of the faqīh; we have nothing further to say on the subject. There is no need to go into details such as the manner in which zakāt is to be collected or spent, or how the penal provisions of the law are to be implemented. We have set forth the main principles of the subject and shown that the same governance that was exercised by the Most Noble Messenger (s), and by the Imāms (‘a), is also the prerogative of the fuqahā. There can be no doubt about this. If there is any evidence, however, that in certain specific cases the faqīh does not possess the same right of governance, we naturally exclude such cases from the operation of the general rule.
As I stated previously, the subject of the governance of faqīh is not something new that I have invented; since the very beginning, it has been mentioned continually.
The ruling given by the late Mīrzā Hasan Shirāzi[203] prohibiting the use of tobacco was in effect a governmental ruling; hence all other fuqahā were obliged to follow it, and indeed the great ‘ulamā of Iran did follow it, with only a few exceptions. It was not a judicial ruling on a matter being disputed by a few individuals, based purely on his own determination. It was instead a governmental ruling based on the interests of Islam and the Muslims and his determination of a secondary consideration (‘unvān-i-sanavi).[204] As long as this secondary consideration obtained, the ruling retained its validity, and when the consideration no longer applied, the decree also ceased to apply.
Again, when Mīrzā Muhammad Taqi Shirāzi[205] gave orders for jihād—or “defense,” they called it—all the ‘ulamā obeyed, because his order was a governmental ruling.
It is related that the late Kāshif al-Ghitā[206] also used to expound much of what I have said. Among other modern scholars, the late Narāqi also was of the opinion that the fuqahā are entitled to exercise all the worldly functions of the Most Noble Messenger (s). The late Nā’ini also believed that the doctrine of the governance of the faqīh may be deduced from the maqbūla of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah.[207]
In any case, this subject is by no means new. I have simply examined it at greater length with reference to the different branches of government, to give the subject greater clarity for my listeners. In accordance with the commands of God Almighty, as expressed in His Book and by the tongue of His Most Noble Messenger (s), I have also set forth certain matters of importance to the present age.
We have stressed the main principles of the subject. Now it is up to the present and future generation to discuss it further and reflect upon it, and to find a way to translate it into reality, eschewing all forms of apathy, weakness and despair. God Almighty willing, by means of mutual consultation and the exchange of views, they will develop a method for establishing an Islamic government with all its various branches and departments. They will entrust the affairs of government to persons who are honest, intelligent, believing, and competent and remove traitors from the control of the government, the homeland, and the treasury of the Muslims. Let them be assured that God Almighty is with them.
Notes:
[91] It is referring to the Prophet’s appointment of Imām ‘Ali as his successor at a gathering near the pool of Khumm during his return to Medina from Mecca, after having performed the last pilgrimage in his life. See Muhammad Bāqir as-Sadr, Ghadīr (Qum: Ansariyan Publications); Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project, The Event of Ghadīr Khumm in the Qur’ān, Hadīth, History, http://www.al-islam.org/ghadir. An article entitled, Did the Prophet (s) Appointed a Successor translated in various languages of the world is available at: http://www.al-islam.org/nutshell. (Pub.)
[92] The attribution of errors to Abū Bakr and ‘Umar and deviations to ‘Uthmān is a part of Shī‘i belief and is entirely to be expected in this context. See Ibn Abil Hadīd, Sharh-i Nahj al-Balāghah, vol. 2, commentary on Sermon 30, pp. 126-161 and pp. 324-333; vol. 3, commentary on Sermon 43, 3-69; vol. 9, commentary on Sermon 135, pp. 3-30; and Al-Ghadīr, vol. 8, pp. 97-323. Worthy of note, however, is the statement here that Abū Bakr and ‘Umar adhered to the example of the Prophet in their personal lives. See also the statement on p. 37. (Pub.)
[93] Hijāz: the region in Western Arabia that includes Mecca and Medina.
[94] Bihār al-Anwār, vol. 40, p. 324.
[95] After the Revolution, extensive evidence came to light of misappropriation of the religious endowment. Land was being given to cabaret singers and members of the royal family by the state-controlled administration of the endowments. See the articles on this subject in the Tehran daily Kayhān, Isfand 27, 1357/March 18, 1979. Concerning attempts by the regime to build a cinema in Qum, see S.H.R., Barrasī va Tahlīlī az Nihzat-i Imām Khumaynī (Najaf? 1356 Sh./1977), pp. 103-104.
[96] A reference to the coronation ceremonies of 1967.
[97] Concerning the precise meaning of “justice,” see n. 21 above.
[98] Imām ‘Ali (‘a) said: “O men! The most qualified among men for the caliphate is he who is most capable and knowledgeable of Allah’s commands.” Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 172. See Al-Ihtijāj, vol. 1, p. 229; Bihār al-Anwār, vol. 25, “Kitāb al-Imāmah,” “Bāb Jamī‘ fī Sifāt al-Imām,” p. 116. (Pub.)
[99] The reference here is to certain shortcomings Shī‘ah traditionally perceived in the exercise of rule by Abū Bakr. See ‘Allāmah Hilli, Kashf al-Murād fī Sharh Tajrīd al-I’tiqād, ‘Destination’ (Maqsad) 5, ‘Issue’ (Mas’alah) 6. (Pub.)
[100] Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq (‘a) said: “The king is sovereign over the people while the scholar is the authority over the king.” Bihār al-Anwār, vol. 1, “Kitāb al-‘Ilm,” sec. 1, hadīth 92, p. 183. (Pub.)
[101] Fuqahā: the plural of faqīh (see n. 1 above).
[102] The words of God’s since they are Qur’anic, but in the context in which they appear, the speaker is Abraham. After asking God that prophethood be vested in his progeny, Abraham excludes any of his descendants who might be wrongdoers from exercising the prophetic function. For an elaborate commentary on this verse (Q 2:124), see Mīr Ahmad ‘Ali, Text, Translation and Commentary of the Holy Qur’an (Elmhurst, NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, Inc., 1988), pp. 146-154, http://www.al-islam.org/quran. (Pub.)
[103] Occultation: see n. 27 above.
[104] The “governance” (vilāyat) of the faqīh is extrinsic (i‘tibārī) to his person; he exercises it only by virtue of the acquired attribute of just faqīh.
[105] Taxable lands: those acquired by the Muslims under the Prophet (s) or the Islamic ruler. These lands belong to all Muslims and therefore non-sellable. The Islamic government leases them and their accrued income is called kharāj. (Pub.)
[106] The “governance” (vilāyat) of the Imāms is intrinsic to their persons, unlike that of the fuqahā; moreover, its scope is not limited to men but embraces the whole of creation. They therefore exercise “cosmic governance” (vilāyat-i takvīnī), in part through the performance of miracles. This form of vilāyat is common to the Imāms and to the foremost of the prophets, who exercised a governmental function while also propagating a divine message. The statement here that “no one can attain the spiritual status of the Imāms, not even the cherubim or the prophets” thus carries the strict sense that the Imāms are superior to those prophets whose mission lacked the dimension of governmental leadership. Concerning the different types of vilāyat, see Murtazā Mutahhari, Valīhā va Vilāyat-hā (Qum, 1355 Sh./1975), which was translated into English by Mustajab Ansāri under the title Master and Mastership (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publication, 1980) and by Yahyā Cooper as Wilāyat: The Station of the Master (Tehran: World Organization for Islamic Services, 1982); http://www.al-islam.org/mastership. (Pub.)
[107] Concerning these attributes of the Imāms, see Henri Corbin, Histoire de la philosophie islamique (Paris, 1964), pp. 74 ff; Sayyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi, Imamate: Vicegerency of the Prophet, anno. Sayyid Muhammad Akhtar Rizvi (Tehran: WOFIS, 1986);Sayyid Mujtabā Mūsāwi Lāri, Imamate and Leadership, trans. Hamid Algar (Qum: Foundation for Cultural Propagation in the World);Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, Shī‘ism Imamate and Wilāyat (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 2000). (Pub.)
[108] The archangel Jibrā’īl (Gabriel) accompanied the Most Noble Messenger on his mi‘rāj (ascension to the divine presence), but being of lowlier station than the Messenger, he was unable to endure the splendor of the divine presence. See Bihār al-Anwār, vol. 18, “bāb ithbāt al-mi‘rāj wa ma‘nāhu wa kayfiyyatah,” p. 382. (Pub.)
[109] A well-known tradition relating to the mi‘rāj.
[110] Fātimah, the daughter of the Prophet, shared in the exalted states of the Prophet and the Twelve Imāms in that she possessed the same quality of ‘ismat (divinely bestowed freedom from error and sin) that they did. As daughter of the Prophet and wife of the first Imām, she served, moreover, as a link between the Prophet and his successors. See Ibrāhīm Amīni and Sayyid Kāzim Qazvīni, Fatima the Gracious, trans. Abū Muhammad Ordoni (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[111] Ibn ‘Abbās: more fully, ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abbās ibn ‘Abdul Muttalib (3 B.H.-68 A.H.) was a cousin of the Prophet and ‘Ali, who learned the science of Qur’anic exegesis from the latter and known as “chief of the exegetes” and “scholar of the community”. He had been one of Imām ‘Ali’s commanders in the Battles of Jamal, Siffīn and Nahrawan. (Pub.)
[112] Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 33, p. 76. (Pub.)
[113] Nahj al-Balāghah, p. 50.
[114] Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 3 (Shaqshaqiyyah Sermon). (Pub.)
[115] Nahj al-Balāghah, pp. 188-189.
[116] Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 131 on p. 31 of the present volume. (Pub.)
[117] Mālik Ashtar: more fully, Mālik ibn Hārith from Nakha’a and famous as al-Ashtar, was among the prominent commanders of Imām ‘Ali’s army and the governor appointed to Egypt by Imām ‘Ali. He accompanied the Imām in the Battles of Jamal and Siffīn. On his way to Egypt, he was killed through the conspiracy of Mu‘āwiyah. For the text of the Imām’s famous instructions to him before setting forth to Egypt, see Nahj al-Balāghah, Letter 53, pp. 426-445. A complete translation is contained in William C. Chittick, A Shī‘ite Anthology (Albany, N.Y., 1980), pp. 68-82. (Pub.)
[118] Shaykh Sadūq: also known as Ibn Babūyah, one of the most important of the early Shī‘i scholars. He died in 381/991. For his short biography and works, see the introduction of Shaykh as-Sadūq, I’tiqādātu ’l-Imāmiyyah: A Shī‘ite Creed, 3rd Ed., trans. Asaf A. A. Fyzee (Tehran: World Organization for Islamic Services, 1999), pp. 6-23. (Pub.)
[119] Jamī‘ al-Akhbār: a collection of Shī‘I traditions. ‘Uyūn Akhbār ar-Ridhā: a collection of traditions relating to Imām Ridā, compiled by Shaykh Sadūq for Sāhib ibn ‘Abbād, celebrated minister of the Buwayhid dynasty and patron of learning. Al-Majālis: also known as al-Amali, the record of a series of discourses given by Shaykh Sadūq concerning all aspects of Shī‘i Islam.
[120] Musnad: a hadīth that goes back to the Prophet by an unbroken chain of transmission.
[121] Mursal: a hadīth whose chain of transmission goes only as far back as a “follower” (member of the second generation of Islam) who does not mention the name of the companion of the Prophet from whom he heard it.
[122] That is, there is a functional distinction between the scholar of hadīth and the faqīh, although it is possible for a single individual to embody the two functions.
[123] Kulayni: see n. 30 above.
[124] Shaykh Sadūq: see n. 73 above.
[125] Shaykh Mufīd: the common designation of Abū ‘Abdullāh Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Nu‘mān al-Hārithi (d. 413/1022) who was a great Shī‘ah jurist, traditionist and scholar of scholasticism. Notable among his disciples were Sayyid Murtadā ‘Allama al-Hudā, Sayyid Rāzi, Shaykh Tūsi, and Najashi. Aroung 200 works are attributed to him, from which we can cite Kitāb al-Irshad, Ikhtisās, Awā’il al-Maqālāt, ‘Amali, and Maqna‘ah.See Shaykh Mufīd, Kitāb al-Irshād: The Book of Guidance into the Lives of the Twelve Imāms, trans. I.K.A. Howard (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications), introduction, pp. xxi-xxvii; Martin J. McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd (Beirut: Dar al-Mashreq, 1978), introduction, pp. 8-45.(Pub.)
[126] Fiqh: jurisprudence; the discipline devoted to the study of the principles and ordinances of Islamic law.
[127] Taqiyyah: see n. 16 above.
[128] Ijtihād: see n. 4 above.
[129] A well-known tradition that has led to the compilation of anthologies of forty hadīth intended for memorization by those who wish to attain the promised reward.
[130] Samūrah ibn Jundab: more fully, Abū Sa‘īd Samūrah ibn Jundab al-Qazāri, a companion of the Prophet who accompanied him in numerous battles. He later settled in Basrah, where he temporarily acted as governor on a number of occasions during the rule of Mu‘āwiyah, first Umayyad caliph.
[131] One of the two weak traditions referred to here is probably: “The sultan is the shadow of God upon earth; whoever respects him, respects God, and whoever affronts him, affronts God.” For a critique of this alleged tradition, see Nāsir ad-Dīn al-Albāni, Silsilat al-Āhādīth ad-Da‘īfa wa’l-Maudū‘a (Damascus, 1384/ 1964), I, i, 98. The other weak tradition may be that says: ‘Whoever wishes long life for a king will be resurrected together with him’. See Islam and Revolution, p. 220.
[132] For example, there is a tradition that says: “A word of truth spoken in the presence of an unjust ruler is a meritorious form of jihād,” and two others close with the phrase “there is no obeying the one who disobeys God.” For these and similar traditions, see ‘Abdullāh Fahd an-Nafīsi, ‘Indamā yahkum al-Islām (London, n.d.), pp. 142-146.
[133] Imām Abū ’l-Hasan Mūsā, son of Ja‘far: seventh of the Twelve Imāms, and generally known as Imām Mūsā al-Kāzim. He was born in Medina in 128/744 and died in prison in Baghdad in 183/799.
[134] See Shaykh Abū Ja‘far al-Kulayni, al-Kāfi, Eng. trans. Sayyid Muhammad Hasan Rizvi (Tehran: WOFIS, 1398/1978), I, ii, 94-95.
[135] Shāh Sultān Husayn was the last monarch of the Safavid dynasty, which ruled over Iran from the beginning of the sixteenth century until the second decade of the eighteenth. Among the least competent of the Safavid rulers, he devoted his energies to debauchery and failed to organize the defense of his capital city, Isfahan, against Afghan invaders, to whom it fell in 1722 after a six-month siege. See L. Lockhart, The Fall of the Safavid Dynasty (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 144-170.
[136] See n. 2 above.
[137] Part of a long hadīth concerning a dream in which the Messenger foresaw the misdeeds of the Umayyads.
[138] The expression translated here as “leadership” is imāmat-i i‘tibāri; see n. 62 above.
[139] Khumayn: the native town of Imām Khomeini.
[140] Since the Imām of the Age—i.e., the Twelfth Imām—will emerge from his occultation at the time when injustice fills the earth, it has sometimes been thought that all positive action to remedy injustice must be postponed until his coming.
[141] See Kulayni, al-Kāfi, I, ii, 188-119.
[142] Mufti: a scholar who pronounces an authoritative opinion (fatwā) on a point of law.
[143] Usāmah: that is, Usāmah ibn Zayd, a beloved companion of the Prophet who was placed in charge of a military expedition when he was only eighteen. He died in 59/679.
[144] See n. 21 above.
[145] Shāhi: now obsolete, formerly the smallest unit of Iranian currency, worth one-twentieth of a rial.
[146] Mu‘āwiyah: first of the Umayyad caliphs and an adversary of Imām ‘Ali. He ruled from 41/661 to 60/680.
[147] See n. 30 above.
[148] Yā-Sīn is the thirty-sixth chapter of the Qur’an. Its recitation is recommended as particularly meritorious on certain occasions, among them Thursday night, because it leads into Friday, the best of all days.
[149] Shurayh: more fully, Abū Umayyah Shurayh ibn al-Hārith al-Kindi, judge of Kūfah appointed by ‘Umar. He retained this position under ‘Uthmān, ‘Ali, and the Umayyads and died a centenarian in 87/706. It is said that he sided with Ibn Ziyād and instigated the people against Imam Husayn in the ‘Āshūrā uprising. (Pub.)
[150] From Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah, a Shī‘i collection of traditions by Muhammad Hasan al-Hurr al-‘Āmili (d. 1104/1693).
[151] Fatwā: the plural of fatwā (an authoritative opinion on a point of law).
[152] Narāqi: that is, Hājj Mullāh Ahmad Narāqi, a scholar of importance in the early nineteenth century, d. 1244/1829. He not only was a prolific author, but also clashed repeatedly with the monarch of his day, Fath ‘Ali Shāh. See Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906 (Berkeley, 1969), pp. 57, 89.
[153] Nā’ini: that is, Mīrzā Muhammad Husayn Nā’ini, an important scholar of the early twentieth century, 1277/1860-1354/1936. Concerning his book on Shī‘i political theory, Tanbīh al-Ummah wa Tanzīh al-Millah, see ‘Abdul-Hādi Hā’iri, Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran (Leiden, Netherlands, 1977), pp. 165-220.
[154] Sulaymān ibn Khālid: more fully, Sulaymān ibn Khālid ibn Dehqān ibn Nāfilah, was a reciter, jurist, traditionist, and a trustee and confidant of Imāms al-Bāqir and as-Sāqid (‘a). (Pub.)
[155] Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq: sixth of the Twelve Imāms, 83/702-140/757. Also referred to as Imām Sādiq, he was particularly important for his role in developing the religious sciences. See Shaykh Mohammed al-Husayn al-Muzaffar, Imām Al-Sādiq, trans. Jāsim al-Rasheed (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1998). (Pub.)
[156] The technical sense of the word imām is that which it requires when applied to the Twelve Imāms, who were not only successors to the Prophet but also endowed with lofty spiritual virtues.
[157] Ikmāl ad-Dīn wa Itmām an-Ni‘mah: a work by Shaykh Sadūq on the occultation of the Imām.
[158] Imām of the Age: the Twelfth Imām. See n. 95 above.
[159] Muhammad ibn ‘Uthmān al-‘Umari: the second deputy of the Imām during the Lesser Occultation. See n. 27 above.
[160] The designation hujjat (“proof”) given to the Imāms has a two-fold sense. First, through the qualities they manifest, they are proofs of the existence of God and of the veracity of the religion He has revealed. Second, they constitute proofs to be advanced on the Day of Judgment against those who claim they were uninformed of God’s law. See ‘Abdul ‘Azīz ‘Abdulhussein Sachedina, Islamic Messianism (Albany, N.Y., 1980), pp. 66-67.
[161] Zurārah: more fully, ‘Abd Rabbih ibn A‘yan Shaybāni al-Kufi al-Zurārah, an authority on the traditions of the fourth, fifth, and sixth Imāms, d. 150/767. Scholars of ‘ilm ar-rijāl (science of hadīth transmitters’ biographies) have affirmed his reliability. He was known to have authored the books Al-Istitā‘ah and Al-Jabr. (Pub.)
[162] Sadaqah: voluntary payments collected by the Muslim state to be spent for purposes of charity.
[163] The Shāh organized his vulgar and criminally extravagant celebration of two-and-a-half millennia of monarchical rule in October 1971, some two years after these lectures were given in Najaf. Preparations for the event, however, were begun in the late 1960’s. See also Islam and Revolution, pp. 200-208.
[164] In 1967 the Shāh had himself and his wife crowned.
[165] Maqbūlah: a hadīth to which one may make acceptable reference.
[166] See, for example, Ismā‘īl Haqqi al-Burūsawi, Ruh al-Bayān (Istanbul, 1390/1970), II, 227-228.
[167] See, for example, Tabātabā’i, al-Mīzān, IV, 385.
[168] Dhimmi: one of the ahl adh-dhimmi, concerning whom see n. 35 above.
[169] The Bani Qurayza was a Jewish tribe inhabiting Medina. During the Battle of the Ditch (Ghazwat al-Khandaq) in the fifth year of Islam, they collaborated with a Meccan force that came to attack the city. The menfolk of the tribe were put to death for their treachery. See chapter 38, “The Last Stage of Mischief,” of Āyatullāh Ja‘far Subhāni’s The Message (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications), http://al-islam.org/message/index.htm. (Pub.)
[170] Usāmah: see n. 98 above.
[171] The reference to customary law (‘urf) is not intended to sanction, but merely to clarify, existing judicial practice.
[172] This tradition is contained in al-‘Āmili, Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah, XVII, 98.
[173] Harām: categorically forbidden by religious law.
[174] See Qur’an, 2:256.
[175] See al-‘Āmili, Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah, XVIII, 100.
[176] Here, “disbelief” implies disobedience. See p. 92.
[177] This tradition is quoted in Kulayni, al-Kāfi, I, ii, 85-86.
[178] Kulayni, al-Kāfi, I, 78-79.
[179] There are a number of works by this title. The reference here may be to the Qur’an commentary written in the eleventh/seventh century by Ziyā ad-Dīn Yūsuf Qazvīni. See Āqā Buzurg Tehrāni, Adh-Dhāri‘ah ilā Tasānif ash-Shī‘ah (Tehran, 1390/1970), XX, 23.
[180] After the death of the Prophet (s), his daughter Fātimah asked for the arable lands near Fadak (a small town near Medina) to be assigned to her as a legacy from her father, since in his lifetime the Prophet had used the produce of the land for the upkeep of his wives. Abū Bakr refused, citing the alleged words of the Prophet: “We prophets bequeath no legacies; what we leave behind is charity (sadaqah).” See al-Balādhūri, al-Futūh, ed. de Goeje (Leiden, Netherlands, 1886), pp. 29-33. For Shī‘i tradition, Fadak became a symbol of unjust denial. “The Shī‘ah traditionists and exegetes and some Sunni scholars write: “When the verse: Give the kinsmen his due, and the needy, and the wayfarer…(Sūrah Isrā, 17:26) was revealed the Prophet called her daughter Fātimah and made over Fadak to her” [Majma‘ al-Bayān, vol. III, p. 411; Sharh-i Ibn Abi ’l-Hadīd, vol. XVI, p. 248]. And the narrator of this incident is Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudri who was one of the distinguished companions of the Prophet.” Subhāni, The Message, chap. 44, “The Story of Fadak,” http://www.al-islam.org/message/45.htm.
[181] Nass: a clear and authoritative text, unequivocal in its meaning.
[182] Narāqi (n. 107 above) wrote a comprehensive book on the principles of fiqh entitled ‘Awā’id al-Ayyām min Qawā‘id al-Fuqahā al-A‘lam.
[183] Fiqh-i Razāvi: a work purporting to contain the legal pronouncements of Imām Ridā, of disputed authenticity. See Tehrāni, adh-Dhāri‘ah, XVI, 292-293.
[184] See n. 74 above.
[185] Mustadrak: that is, Mustadrak al-Wasā’il, a supplement to Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah (see n. 105) composed by Mīrzā Husayn Nūri (d. 1320/1902).
[186] Possibly Ghurār al-Farā’id was Durār al-Qalā’id, a work on the principles of fiqh by Muhsīn ibn Hasan al-A’raji (d.1227/1812). See Tehrāni, Adh-Dhāri‘ah, XVI, 41-42.
[187] Tuhāf al-‘Uqūl: a collection of sermons and aphorisms of the Imāms compiled by Shaykh Muhammad al-Halabi, a contemporary of Shaykh Sadūq and teacher of Shaykh Mufīd.
[188] Mīnah: a small town near Mecca.
[189] Imām Khomeini quotes the Arabic text of the tradition before giving his own translation in Persian. We have rendered into English only the Persian translation, which is slightly fuller in parts than the Arabic original.
[190] That is, the social contracts that establish the institutions of society and determine social relations in Islam. (Kh.)
[191] That is, Islamic relationships based upon the oath of loyalty sworn to the Prophet and similar pledge to obey and follow his successors, ‘Ali and his descendants, given to the Prophet at the pool of Khum. (Kh).
[192] Minbar: the pulpit in the mosque.
[193] See, for example, 2:168, 4:170, 7:150, 10:57, and many other verses.
[194] The word awliyā—like the cognate wilāyat—has numerous different meanings. It is used here in the general sense that can be deduced from Qur’an, 10:62-63: “Verily the friends (awliyā) of God—those who believe and guard against evil—shall suffer no fear nor shall they grieve.”
[195] Evil innovation: bid‘at, a belief or practice not compatible with either the Qur’an or the Sunnah.
[196] Masjid al-Aqsā: see n. 37 above.
[197] Among the different schools of Islamic law, the Shī‘I school manifests the greatest disapproval of music. Music in a public place is doubly reprehensible since it is an imposition on the unwilling listener.
[198] There are certain circumstances that may dispense one from fasting during Ramadān, notably illness, but out of respect for the sanctity of the month and the fasting of others, one must refrain from eating in public.
[199] A reference to the agitation against the new laws on the election of local councils promulgated by the Shāh’s regime on October 6, 1962. These laws no longer specified that candidates were to be Muslim, and they were seen as a prelude to increased participation in public life by the Bahā’is and eventual abolition of the Constitution of 1906. After a prolonged campaign against the laws, in which Imām Khomeini took a prominent part, they were annulled by the government on November 28, 1962. See S.H.R., Barrasī va Tahlīlī, pp. 142-187.
[200] Qur’an, 9:60.
[201] One indication of the close ties existing with Israel was the regular contacts that took place between Iranian generals and high-ranking members of the Zionist armed forces. For example, General Palizban met in Occupied Palestine with Moshe Dayan and Arik Sharon, most probably in 1974. Photographs of the meeting, showing all participants with cordial smiles, were discovered after the Revolution and published in the newspaper Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī on Shahrīvar 26, 1359/September 17, 1980.
[202] Ma‘sūmīn: those possessing the quality of ‘ismat (see n. 67 above); i.e., the Prophet, Fātimah, and the Twelve Imāms. See A Brief History of the Fourteen Infallibles (Tehran: WOFIS); Sayyid Murtadā al-‘Askari, The Twelve Successors of the Holy Prophet (s), http://www.al-islam.org/twelve. (Pub.)
[203] Mīrzā Hasan Shirāzi: a mujtahid, d. 1312/1894. After the production and marketing of tobacco in Iran had been made the monopoly of a British company, he declared in December 1891 that “the use of tobacco is tantamount to war against the Imām of the Age.” In obedience to his declaration, all of Iran boycotted tobacco, forcing the cancellation of the concession in early 1892. See Algar, Religion and State, pp. 205-215.
[204] “Secondary consideration”: ‘unvān-i sanavi, a contingent circumstance of legal significance. Tobacco as a substance was religiously unobjectionable; it was the circumstance of the British monopoly that furnished the legal grounds for its prohibition.
[205] Mīrzā Muhammad Taqi Shirāzi: a pupil of Mīrzā Hasan and an important Shī‘ah scholar, d. 1338/1921. He was a leading force in the resistance by the Shī‘ah ‘ulamā opposed to the imposition of British rule on Iraq at the end of World War I. See Muhammad Hirz ad-Dīn, Ma‘ārif ar-Rijāl (Najaf, 1384/1964), II, 215-218.
[206] Kāshif al-Ghitā: more fully, Muhammad Husayn Kāshif al-Ghitā, a leading Shī‘ah scholar of Iraq, 1295/1876-1373-1954. He was active politically as well as academically throughout his life. See the biographical introduction to his Asl ash-Shī‘ah wa Usūluhā, 7th ed. (Beirut, 1377/1957), pp. 7-21. The book is translated into English as The Origin of Shī‘ite Islam and Its Principles (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[207] See p. 79.
Written by The Late Imam Khomeini (R.A.)
Translated by Prof. Hamid Algar
Source: Imam reza network
Program for the Establishment of an Islamic Government
It is our duty to work toward the establishment of an Islamic government. The first activity we must undertake in this respect is the propagation of our case; that is how we must begin.
It has always been that way, all over the world: a group of people came together, deliberated, made decisions, and then began to propagate their aims. Gradually, the number of like-minded people would increase, until finally they became powerful enough to influence a great state or even to confront and overthrow it, as was the case with the downfall of Muhammad ‘Ali Mīrzā and the supplanting of his absolute monarchy with constitutional government.[208] Such movements began with no troops or armed power at their disposal; they always had to resort to propagating the aims of their movement first. The thievery and tyranny practiced by the regime would be condemned and the people awakened and made to understand that the thievery inflicted on them was wrong. Gradually, the scope of this activity would be expanded until it came to embrace all groups of society, and the people, awakened and active, would attain their goal.
You have neither a country nor an army now, but propagating activity is possible for you, because the enemy has been unable to deprive you of all the required means.
You teach the people matters relating to worship, of course, but more important are the political, economic, and legal aspects of Islam. These are, or should be, the focus of our concern. It is our duty to begin exerting ourselves now in order to establish a truly Islamic government. We must propagate our cause to the people, instruct them in it, and convince them of its validity. We must generate a wave of intellectual awakening, to emerge as a current throughout society, and gradually, to take shape as organized Islamic movement made up of the awakened, committed, and religious masses who will rise up and establish an Islamic government.
Propagation and instruction, then, are our two fundamental and most important activities. It is the duty of the fuqahā to promulgate religion and instruct the people in the creed, ordinances, and institutions of Islam, in order to pave the way in society for the implementation of Islamic law and the establishment of Islamic institutions. In one of the traditions we have cited, you will have noticed that the successors of the Most Noble Messenger (s) are described as “teaching the people”—that is, instructing them in religion.
This duty is particularly important under the present circumstances, for the imperialists, the oppressive and treacherous rulers, the Jews, Christians, and materialists are all attempting to distort the truths of Islam and lead the Muslims astray. Our responsibilities of propagation and instruction are greater than ever before. We see today that the Jews (may God curse them) have meddled with the text of the Qur’an and have made certain changes in the Qur’ans they have printed in the occupied territories.[209] It is our duty to prevent this treacherous interference with the text of Qur’an. We must protest and make the people aware that the Jews and their foreign backers are opposed to the very foundations of Islam and wish to establish Jewish domination throughout the world. Since they are a cunning and resourceful group of people, I fear that—God forbid!—they may one day achieve their goal, and that the apathy shown by some of us may allow a Jew to rule over us one day. May God never let us see such a day!
At the same time, a number of orientalists serving as propaganda agents for the imperialist institution are also active in endeavors to distort and misrepresent the truths of Islam. The agents of imperialism are busy in every corner of the Islamic world drawing our youth from us with their evil propaganda. They are not converting them into Jews and Christians; they are corrupting them, making them irreligious and indifferent, which is sufficient for their purposes. In our own city of Tehran now there are centers of evil propaganda run by the churches, the Zionists, and the Bahā’is in order to lead our people astray and make them abandon the ordinances and teachings of Islam. Do we not have a duty to destroy these centers that are damaging Islam? Is it enough for us simply to possess Najaf? (Actually, we do not even have Najaf
[210] Should we be content to sit lamenting in Qum, or should we come to life and be active?
You, the younger generation in the religious institution, must come fully to life and keep the command of God alive. Develop and refine your thinking, and lay aside your concern with the minutiae and subtleties of the religious sciences, because that kind of concentration on petty detail has kept many of us from performing our more important duties. Come to the aid of Islam; save Islam! They are destroying Islam! Invoking the laws of Islam and the name of the Most Noble Messenger (s), they are destroying Islam! Agents—both foreigners sent by the imperialists and natives employed by them—have spread out into every village and region of Iran and are leading our children and young people astray, who might otherwise be of service to Islam one day. Help save our young people from this danger!
It is your duty to disseminate among the people the religious knowledge you have acquired and to acquaint them with the subjects you have learned. The scholar or the faqīh is accorded praise and glorified in the traditions because he is the one who makes the ordinances, doctrines, and institutions of Islam known to the people and instructs them in the Sunnah of the Most Noble Messenger (s). You must now devote your energies to the tasks of propagation and instruction in order to present Islam more fully to the people.
It is our duty to dispel the doubts about Islam that have been created; until we have erased these doubts from people’s minds, we will not be able to accomplish anything. We must impress upon ourselves and upon the generation—and even the generation after that—the necessity for dispelling these doubts about Islam that have arisen in the minds of many people, even the educated among us, as the result of centuries of false propaganda. You must acquaint the people with the worldview, social institution, and form of government proposed by Islam, so that they may come to know what Islam is and what its laws are.
It is the duty of the teaching institution today in Qum, Mashhad, and elsewhere to propagate Islam, to expound this faith and school of thought. In addition to Islam, you must make yourselves known to the people of the world and also authentic models of Islamic leadership and government. You must address yourselves to the university people in particular, the educated class. The students have had their eyes opened. I assure you that if you present Islam and Islamic government to the universities accurately, the students will welcome it and accept it. The students are opposed to tyranny; they are opposed to the puppet regimes imperialism imposes; they are opposed to thievery and the plundering of public wealth; they are opposed to this consumption of what is forbidden and this deceitful propaganda. But no student could be opposed to Islam, whose form of government and teachings are beneficial to society. The students are looking to Najaf, appealing for help. Should we sit idle, waiting for them to enjoin the good upon us and call us to our duties?[211] Our young people studying in Europe are enjoining the good upon us; say to us: “We have organized Islamic associations; now help us!”[212]
It is our duty to bring all these matters to the attention of the people. We must explain what the form of government is in Islam and how rule was conducted in the earliest days of Islamic history. We must tell them how the center of command and the seat of the judiciary under it were both located in part of the mosque, at a time when the Islamic state embraced the farthest reaches of Iran, Egypt, the Hijaz, and the Yemen. Unfortunately, when government passed into the hands of the next generations, it was converted into a monarchy, or even worse than a monarchy.
The people must be instructed in these matters and helped to mature, intellectually and politically. We must tell them what kind of government we want, what kinds of people would assume responsibility for affairs in the government we propose, and what policies and programs they would follow. The ruler in Islamic society is a person who treats his brother ‘Aqil[213] in such a way that he would never request extra support from the public treasury (lest there be economic discrimination among the Muslims), and who requires to account for the guaranteed loan she has obtained from the public treasury, telling her, “If you do not pay back this loan, you will be the be the first woman of the Bani Hāshim[214] to have her hand cut off.” That is the kind of ruler and leader we want, a leader who will put the law into practice instead of his personal desires and inclinations; who will treat all members of the community as equals before the law; who will refuse to countenance privilege or discrimination in any form; who will place his own family on an equal footing with the rest of the people; who will cut off the hand of his own son if he commits a theft; who will execute his own brother and sister if they sell heroin (not execute people for possession of ten grams of heroin when his own relative operate gangs that bring into the country heroin by the hundred-weight).[215]
Many of the ordinances of Islam that refer to worship also pertain to social and political functions. The forms of worship practiced in Islam are usually linked to politics and the gestation of society. For example, congregational prayer, the gathering on the occasion of hajj, and Friday prayer, for all their spirituality, exert a political as well as moral and doctrinal influence. Islam has provided for such gatherings so that religious use might be made of them; so that feelings of brotherhood and cooperation may be strengthened, intellectual maturity fostered, solutions found for political and social problems, with jihād and collective effort as the natural outcome.
In non-Islamic countries, or Islamic countries ruled by non-Islamic governments, whenever they want the people to assemble like this, millions must be spent out of the national treasury or budget, and even then the result is unsatisfactory; such meetings lack spontaneity and spirit and are of no real consequence. In Islam, however, anyone who wishes to perform the hājj departs of his own will and goes on the hājj. Also people go eagerly to take part in congregational prayer. We must take advantage of these assemblies to propagate and teach religion and to develop the ideological and political movement of Islam.
Some people are completely unaware of this; they are only concerned about the correct pronunciation of “wa lā ’dh-dhāllin.”[216] When they go on the hājj, instead of exchanging ideas with their Muslim brothers, propagating the beliefs and ordinances of Islam, and seeking solutions to the universal problems and afflictions of the Muslims (for example, rallying to liberate Palestine, which is part of the Islamic homeland)—instead of doing all this, they exacerbate the differences that exist among Muslims. The first Muslims, on the other hand, used to accomplish important business on the occasion of hājj or at their Friday gatherings. The Friday sermon was more than a sūrah from the Qur’an and a prayer followed by a few brief words. Entire armies used to be mobilized by Friday sermon and proceed directly from the mosque to the battlefield—and a man who sets out from the mosque to go into battle will fear only God, not poverty, hardship, or his army will be victorious and triumphant. When you look at the Friday sermons given in that age and the sermons of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), you see that their purpose was to set people in motion, to arouse them to fight and sacrifice themselves for Islam, to resolve the sufferings of the people of this world.
If the Muslims before us had gathered every Friday and reminded themselves of their common problems, and solved them or resolved to solve them, we would not be in the position we find ourselves in today. Today we must start organizing these assemblies in earnest and make use of them for the sake of propagation and instruction. The ideological and political movement of Islam will thus develop and advance toward its climax.
Make Islam known to the people, then, and in so doing, create something akin to ‘Āshūrā.[217] Just as we have steadfastly preserved the awareness of ‘Āshūrā (peace be upon its founder) and not let it be lost, so that people still gather during Muharram and beat their breasts, we should now take measures to create a wave of protest against the state of the government; let the people gather, and the preachers and rawzakhwāns[218]firmly fix the issue of government in their minds.
If you present Islam accurately and acquaint people with its worldview, doctrines, principles, ordinances, and social system, they will welcome it ardently (God knows, many people want it). I have witnessed that myself. A single word was enough once to cause a wave of enthusiasm among the people, because then, like now, they were all dissatisfied and unhappy with the state of affairs. They are living now in the shadow of the bayonet, and repression will let them say nothing. They want someone to stand up fearlessly and speak out. So, courageous sons of Islam, stand up! Address the people bravely; tell the truth about our situation to the masses in simple language; arouse them to enthusiastic activity, and turn the people in the street and the bazaar, our simple-hearted workers and peasants, and our alert students into dedicated mujāhids.[219] The entire population will become mujāhids. All segments of society are ready to struggle for the sake of freedom, independence, and the happiness of the nation, and their struggle needs religion. Give the people Islam, then, for Islam is the school of jihād, the religion of struggle; let them amend their characters and beliefs in accordance with Islam and transform themselves into a powerful force, so that they may overthrow the tyrannical regime imperialism has imposed on us and set up an Islamic government.
Only those fuqahā who make people acquainted with the beliefs and institutions of Islam, and who defend and protect them, are truly “citadels of Islam.”[220] They must deliver rousing, impassioned speeches and lead the people in order to fulfill this function. Only then, if they live to be, say, 120, will the people feel that Islam has suffered a misfortune with their passing away and that a gap has appeared in the Muslim community, or as the tradition puts it, “A crack will appear in the fortress of Islam.” Will some irremediable deficiency occur in Islamic society now if one of us dies after spending his life at home reading books? What loss could our death mean? But when Islam lost Imām Husayn (‘a), then indeed the loss was irreparable. A loss occurs with the death of people who have preserved the doctrines, laws, and social institutions of Islam, like Khwājah Nāsir ad-Dīn Tūsi[221] or ‘Allāmah Hilli.[222] But what have you or I done for Islam that our passing should remind men of that tradition? If a thousand of us were to die, nothing would happen. The only explanation for this is that either we are not true fuqahā or we are not true believers.
No reasonable person expects our activities of propagation and instruction to lead quickly to the formation of an Islamic government. In order to succeed in establishing an Islamic government, we must have several kinds of continuous activities. Ours is a goal that will take time to achieve. Sensible people in this world lay one stone in position on the ground in the hope that someone two hundred years later will come to finish a building mounted upon it so that the goal will finally be reached. Once the caliph said to an old man who was planting a walnut tree: “Old man! Why plant this walnut tree, which will not bear fruit until fifty years from now, by which time you will be dead?” The man replied: “Others planted so that we might eat. We are planting so that others may eat.”
We must preserve in our efforts even though they may not yield their result until the next generation, for our service is devoted to Islam and the cause of human happiness. If it were for a personal cause, we might say: “Why trouble ourselves! Our efforts cannot benefit us, but only those who come later.” If the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a), who risked and indeed sacrificed all his material interests, had thought that way, acting only for himself and his personal benefits, he would have compromised with Yazīd[223] at the very beginning and settled the whole affair—the Umayyad rulers were only too anxious for him to swear allegiance to them and accept them as rulers. What could have been better for them than to have the grandson of the Prophet (s), the Imām of the Age, call them “Commander of the Faithful” and recognize their rule? But his concern was the future of Islam and the Muslims. So that Islam might be propagated among men in the future, and its political and social order established in society, he opposed the Umayyads, fought against them, and ultimately sacrificed himself.
Examine carefully one of the traditions I have cited above. You will see that Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) was subjected to pressure by oppressive rulers and therefore chose taqiyyah. He had no executive power, and most of the time he was confined under surveillance. Nevertheless, he kept informing the Muslims of their duties and appointing judges for them. What was the reason for this, and what benefit was there in appointing and dismissing judges?
Great men, with broad horizons of thought, never despair or pay attention to the circumstances in which they find themselves—imprisonment or captivity, for example, which may continue indefinitely; instead, they continue making plans for the advancement of their cause. Either they will carry out their plans themselves, or if they are not granted the opportunity, others will follow their plans, even if it is two or three hundred years later. The foundations of many great movements in history were laid in this way. Sukarno, the former president of Indonesia, conceived and drew up his plans in prison and later put them into practice.
Imām as-Sādiq (‘a) not only laid down plans; he also made appointments to certain posts. If his appointments had been intended for that time, naturally they would have been pointless, but in reality, he was thinking of the future. He was not like us, thinking only of ourselves and concerned with our personal predicaments; he was concerned with the ummah, with humanity as a whole, and he wished to reform mankind by implementing the laws of justice. Thus, more than a thousand years ago, he had to lay down a pattern of government and make his appointments, so that on the day when the nations awoke and the Muslims came to their senses, there would be no confusion and the form of Islamic government and its leadership would be known.
Generally speaking, Islam, and the Shī‘i school of thought, and indeed, all religions and schools of thought have advanced and progressed in this fashion. They all started with nothing but a plan, which came to fruition later because of the fortitude and dedication of the respective leaders and prophets.
Moses was a mere shepherd, and for years he followed that calling. When he was summoned to do battle with the pharaoh, he had no supporter or helper. But as a result of his innate ability and his steadfastness, he overthrew the rule of the pharaoh with a staff. Now imagine that staff in the hands of you or me would we have been able to achieve the same result? It takes the determination, seriousness, and resourcefulness of a Moses to make that staff capable of overthrowing a pharaoh; not everyone can perform such a feat.
When the Most Noble Messenger (s) was given his prophetic mission and began to propagate his massage, an eight-year old child (the Commander of the Faithful, upon whom be peace) and a forty-year old woman (his wife Khadījah) were the only people who believed in him; he had no one else. Everyone knows of the vexations that plagued the Prophet, the obstacles that were placed in his way, the oppositions that he faced. Yet he never despaired or said, “I am all alone.” He persisted and, with his spiritual power and firm resolve, was able to advance his cause from nothing to the point it has reached today, where seven hundred million people are gathered under his banner.
The Shī‘i school of thought also began from zero. On the day that the Most Noble Messenger (s) laid its foundations, he was greeted with mockery. He invited people to his house and told them, “The man who possesses such-and-such qualities is to be my minister,” meaning the Commander of the Faithful (‘a). At the time, the Commander of the Faithful had not yet reached adulthood, although he always possessed a great spirit, the greatest in the world. But no one rose to pay him respect, and some one even turned to Abū Tālib[224] and said to him in jest, “You are to march under the banner of your son now!”
Also on the day of the Prophet’s announcement to the people that the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) was to succeed him and govern, some expressed apparent admiration and satisfaction, but the opposition to him began on that very day and continued down to the end. If the Most Noble Messenger (s), had appointed him only as an authority to be consulted on legal problems, there would have been no opposition to him. Since he assigned him the rank of successor, however, and said that he was to rule over Muslims and be entrusted with the destiny of the Islamic nation, various sorts of discontent and opposition arose. If you, too, were to sit at home today, and not intervene in the affairs of the country, no one would disturb you. They trouble you only when you try to intervene in the destiny of the nation. It was because they intervened in the affairs of government and the country that the Commander of the Faithful and his followers were harassed and persecuted. But they did not abandon their activity and their struggle, with the result that today, thanks to their labors, there are about two hundred million Shī‘ah in the world.
To present Islam properly to the people, the religious teaching institutions must be reformed. The syllabi and methods of propagation and instruction must be improved; apathy, laziness, despair, and lack of self-confidence must be replaced by diligence, endeavor, hope and self-confidence; the effects left on the minds of some people by foreigners’ insinuating propaganda must be erased; the attitudes of the pseudo-saintly persons, who, despite their position within the teaching institution, make it difficult for people to gain a true appreciation of Islam and the necessity for social reforms, must be changed; and the court-affiliated ākhūnds,[225] who have sold their religion for worldly gain, must be divested of their garb and expelled from the religious institution.
The agents of imperialism, together with the educational and political apparatuses of the anti-national puppet governments they have installed, have been spreading poison for centuries and corrupting the minds and morals of the people. Those who have entered the religious institutions have naturally brought with them traces of this corruption, for the religious institution make up part of society and the people. We must therefore strive to reform, intellectually and morally, the members of the religious institution and to remove the traces left on their minds and spirits by the insinuating propaganda of the foreigners and the policies of corrupt and treacherous governments.
One can easily observe the effects of which I speak. For example, sometimes I see people who sit in the centers of religious institution saying to each other, “These matters are beyond us; what business are they of ours? All we are supposed to do is to offer our prayers and to give our opinions on questions of religious law.” Ideas like these are the result of several centuries of malicious propaganda on the part of the imperialists penetrating deeply into the very heart of Najaf, Qum, Mashhad, and other religious centers, causing apathy, depression, and laziness to appear; and preventing people from maturing, so that they constantly make excuses for themselves and say, “These matters are beyond us!”
These ideas are wrong. What are the qualifications of those who now rule the Muslims countries? What gives them the ability to rule that we allegedly lack? Who among them has any more ability than the average person? Many of them have never studies anything! Where did the ruler of the Hijāz ever go to study? As for Rizā Khān, he was totally illiterate, an illiterate soldier, no more! It has been the same throughout history: many arbitrary and tyrannical rulers have been totally lacking in any capacity to govern the society or administer the nation and devoid of learning and accomplishment. What did Hārūn ar-Rashīd[226] ever study, or any other man who ruled over realms as vast as his? Study—the acquisition of knowledge and expertise in various science—is necessary for making plans for a country and for exercising executive and administrative functions; we too will make use of people with those qualifications. But as for the supervision and supreme administration of the country, the dispensing of justice, and the establishment of equitable relations among the people—these are precisely the subjects that the faqīih has studied. Whatever is needed to preserve national independence and liberty is, again, precisely what the faqīh has to offer. For it is the faqīh, who refuses to submit to others or fall under the influence of foreigners, and who defends the rights of the nation and the freedom, independence, and territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland, even at the cost of his life. It is the faqīh, who does not deviate either to the left or to the right.
Rid yourselves of your depression and apathy. Improve your methods and program of propagation, try diligently to present Islam accurately, and resolve to establish an Islamic government. Assume the lead and join hands with the militant and freedom-loving people. An Islamic government will definitely be established; have confidence in yourselves. You have the power, courage, and sense of strategy it takes to struggle for national liberty and independence, you have succeeded in waking the people and inspiring them to struggle, casing imperialism and tyranny to tremble. Day by day, you are accumulating more experience and your ability to deal with the affairs of society is increasing. Once you have succeeded in overthrowing the tyrannical regimes, you will certainly be capable of administering the state and guiding the masses.
The entire system of government and administration, together with the necessary laws, lies ready for you. If the administration of the country calls for taxes, Islam has made the necessary provision; and if laws are needed, Islam has established them all. There is no need for you, after establishing a government, to sit down and draw up laws, or, like rulers who worship foreigners and are infatuated with the West, run after others to borrow their laws. Everything is ready and waiting. All that remains is to draw up ministerial programs, and that can be accomplished with the help and cooperation of consultants and advisers who are experts in different fields, gathered together in a consultative assembly.
Fortunately, the Muslim peoples are ready to follow you and your allies. What we are lacking are the necessary resolve and armed power, and these, too, we shall acquire, God willing. We need the staff of Moses and the resolve of Moses; we need people who are able to wield the staff of Moses and the sword of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a).
But the gutless people who now sit in the religious centers are certainly not capable of establishing and maintaining a government; for they are so gutless that they cannot wield even a pen or undertake any activity at all. The foreigners and their agents have filled our ears with their propaganda so often that we have begun to believe we are incapable of anything: “Go mind your own business! Attend to your schools, your classes, your studies. What business of yours are these matters? They are beyond your capacity!” I cannot disabuse some people of these notions and make them understand that they must become leaders of humanity; that they are at least the equals of others and are capable of administrating the country. What qualifications do others have that they lack? All one can say is that some of the others went abroad to enjoy themselves, and maybe studied a little while they were there. (We do not say they should not study. We are not opposed to study or learning. Let them go to the moon, found an atomic industry; we will not stand in their way. However, we have duties as well.)
Give them Islam; proclaim to the world the program of Islamic government; maybe the kings and presidents of the Muslim countries will understand the truth of what we say and accept it. We would not want to take any thing away from them; we will leave anyone in his place who faithfully follows Islam.
Today, we have 700 million Muslims in the world, 170 million or more of whom are Shī‘ah. They are all ready to follow us, but we are so lacking in resolve that we are unable to lead them. We must establish a government that will enjoy the trust of the people, one in which the people have confidence and to which they will be able to entrust their destiny. We need trustworthy rulers who will guard the trust the people have placed with them, so that protected by them and the law, the peoples will be able to live their lives and go about their tasks in tranquility. These are the things to which you should be devoting your thought. Do not despair; do not imagine that this task is impossible. God knows that your capacity and courage are not less than those of others—unless, of course, the meaning of courage is oppressing and slaughtering the people; that kind of courage we certainly do not have.
Once that man came to see me while I was in prison[227] along with Āqā-yi Qummi[228] (may God preserve him), who is under arrest again now. He said: “Politics is all dirt, lying, and viciousness; why don’t you leave it to us?”
What he said was true in a sense; if that is what politics really consists of, it belongs exclusively to them. But the politics of Islam, of the Muslims, of the guiding Imāms who lead God’s servants by means of politics, is quite different from the politics he was speaking of.
Afterwards, he told the newspapers: “An agreement has been reached to the effect that the religious leaders will not interfere in politics.” As soon as I was released, I denied his statement from the minbar. I said: “He is lying; if Khomeini or anyone else gives such a pledge, he will be expelled from the religious institution!”[229]
At the outset, they plant in your minds the suggestion that politics means lying and the like so that you lose all interest in national affairs and they can proceed with their business undisturbed, doing whatever they like and indulging all their vices. Meanwhile, you are to sit here offering prayers for their welfare: “May God perpetuate their rule!” They, of course, do not have the intelligence to elaborate such a plan themselves (thank God
; it is their masters and the experts who advise them that devised this plan. The British imperialists penetrated the countries of the East more than three hundred years ago. Being knowledgeable about all aspects of these countries, they drew up elaborate plans for assuming control of them. Then came the new imperialists, the Americans and others. They allied themselves with the British and took part in the execution of their plans.
Once when I was in Hamadān, a former student of the religious sciences, who had forsaken the religious garb but preserved his Islamic ethics, came to see me and he showed me a map on which certain places had been marked in red. He told me that those red symbols indicated all the mineral resources existing in Iran that had been located by foreign experts.
Foreign experts have studied our country, and have discovered all our mineral reserves—gold, copper, petroleum, and so on. They have also made an assessment of our people’s intelligence and came to the conclusion that the only barriers blocking their way are Islam and the religious leadership.
They have known the power of Islam themselves for it once ruled part of Europe, and they know that true Islam is opposed to their activities. They have also realized they cannot make the true religious scholars submit to their influence, nor can they affect their thinking. From the very outset, therefore, they have sought to remove this obstacle from their path by disparaging Islam and besmirching the religious leaders. They have resorted to malicious propaganda so that today, we imagine that Islam simply consists of a handful of legal topics. They have also tried to destroy the reputation of fuqahā and the ‘ulamā, who stand at the head of Islam society, by slanderous accusations and other means. For example, that shameless agent of imperialism wrote in his book[230]: “Six hundred of the ‘ulamā of Najaf and Iran were on the payroll of the British. Shaykh Murtadā[231] took the money for only two years before he realized where it was coming from. The proof may be found in documents preserved in the India Office archives.” Imperialism tells him to insult the ‘ulamā so that it may reap the benefits. Imperialism dearly wants to present all the ‘ulamā as being on its payroll so that they will lose the respect of the people and the people will turn away from them. At the same time, they have tried with their propaganda and insinuations to present Islam as a petty, limited affair, and to restrict the functions of the fuqahā and ‘ulamā to insignificant matters. They have constantly tried to persuade us that the only duty of the fuqahā is to give their opinion on legal problems.
Some people, lacking in correct understanding, have believed them and gone astray. They have failed to realize that all this is part of a plan designed to destroy our independence and establish control over all aspects of life in the Islamic countries. Unwittingly, they have assisted the propaganda organs of imperialism in carrying out its politics and reaching its goals. The propaganda institutions of imperialism have sought to persuade us that religion must be separate from politics, that the religious leaders must not interfere in social matters, and that the fuqahā do not have the duty of overseeing the destiny of the Islamic nation. Unfortunately, some people have believed them and fallen under their influence, with the result that we see. This result is what the imperialists have always desired, desire now, and will desire in the future.
Look at the religious teaching centers and you will see the effects of this imperialist propaganda. You will see negligent, lazy, idle, and apathetic people who do nothing but discuss points of law and offer their prayers, and are incapable of anything else. You will also encounter ideas and habits that are born of the same imperialist propaganda—for example, the idea that to speak is incompatible with the dignity of the ākhūnd; the ākhūnd and the mujtahīd should not be able to speak, or if they are, they should not say anything except, “Lā ilāha illa ’Llāh,” or may be one word more! But that is wrong, and contrary to the Sunnah of God’s Messenger (s). God has praised speech and expression, as well as writing and the use of pen. For example, He says in Sūrat ar-Rahmān: “He taught him [man] expression” (55: 4), counting the instruction in speech that He gave man as a great blessing and a source of nobility. Speech and expression are necessary for promulgating the ordinances of God and the teachings and doctrines of Islam; it is by means of them that we can instruct the people in their religion and fulfill the duty indicated in the phrase: “They instruct the people.”[232] The Most Noble Messenger and the Commander of Faithful both delivered speeches and sermons; they were men of eloquence.
These foolish ideas that exist in the minds of some people help the imperialists and the oppressive governments in their attempts to keep the Muslim countries in their present state and to block the progress of the Islamic movement. Such ideas are characteristic of those who are known as saintly but in reality are pseudo-saints, not true ones. We must change the way they think and make clear our attitudes toward them, for they are blocking our movement and the reforms we want to carry out, and are keeping our hands tied.
The late Burūjirdī,[233] the late Hujjat,[234] the late Sadr,[235] and the late Khwansari[236] (may God be pleased with all of them) had gathered in our house one day to discuss some political matter. I said to them: “Before anything else, you must decide what to do with these pseudo-saints. As long as they are there, our situation is like that of a person who is attacked by an enemy while someone else keeps his hands bound behind him. These persons who are known as saints but are pseudo-saints, not real ones, are totally unaware of the state of society, and if you want to do something—take over the government, assume control of the Majlis, stop the spread of corruption—they will destroy your standing in society. Before everything else, you must decide what to do with them.”
The state of Muslim society today is such that these false saints prevent Islam from exerting its proper influence; acting in the name of Islam, they are inflicting damage upon Islam. The roots of this group that exists in our society are to be found in the centers of the religious institution. In the centers at Najaf, Qum, Mashhad, and elsewhere, there are individuals who have this pseudo-saintly mentality, and from their base within the religious institution, they infect the rest of society with their evil ideas and attitudes. They will oppose anyone who tells the people: “Come now, awaken! Let us not live under the banners of others! Let us not be subject to the imposition of Britain and America! Let us not allow Israel to paralyze the Muslims!”
First, we must advise these pseudo-saints and try to awaken them. We must say to them: “Can you not see the danger? Do you not see that the Israelis are attacking, killing, and destroying and the British and Americans are helping them? You sit there watching, but you must wake up; you must try to find a remedy for the ills of the people. Mere discussion is not enough. Simply pronouncing opinions on points of law is of no use by itself. Do not keep silent at a time when Islam is being destroyed, Islam is being wiped out, like Christians who sat discussing the Holy Ghost and the Trinity until they were destroyed.[237] Wake up! Pay some attention to reality and the questions of the day. Do not let yourselves be so negligent. Are you waiting for the angels to come and carry you on their wings? Is it the function of the angles to pamper the idle? The angels spread their wings beneath the feet of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) because he was of benefit to Islam: he made Islam great, secured the expansion of Islam in the world and promoted its interests. Under his leadership, a free, vital, virtuous society came into being and won fame; everyone had to bow before him its might, even the enemy. But why should anyone bow before you, whose only activity is offering opinions on points of law?
If our pseudo-saints do not wake up, and begin to assume their responsibilities after repeated admonition and advice, it will be obvious that the cause of their failure is not ignorance, but something else. Then, of course, we will adopt a different attitude toward them.
The centers of the religious institution are places for teaching, instruction, propagation, and leadership. They belong to the just fuqahā, learned scholars, teachers, and students. They belong to those who are the trustees and successors of the prophets. They represent a trust, and it is obvious that a divine trust cannot be placed in the hands of anyone. Whoever wishes to assume such a weighty responsibility, to administer the affairs of the Muslims and to act as the deputy of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), to settle matters concerning the honor, property, and lives of the people, as well as the booty taken in war and the penal provisions of the law—such a person must be totally disinterested in the world and devoid of worldly ambition. Anyone whose efforts are oriented to this world—even in matters that are inherently legitimate—cannot be the trustee of God, and is not worthy of our trust. Any faqīh who joins the state apparatus of the oppressors and becomes a hanger-on of the court is not a trustee and cannot exercise God’s trust. God knows what misfortunes Islam has suffered—from its inception down to the present at the hands of these evil ‘ulamā! Abū Hurayrah was one of the fuqahā, but God knows what judgments he falsified for Mu‘āwiyah and others like him, and what damage he inflicted upon Islam. When an ordinary person enters the service of an oppressive government, he is to be accounted a sinner, but no greater harm will come of it. But, when a faqīh like Abū Hurayrah[238] or a judge like Shurayh joins such a government, he improves its standing while besmirching the reputation of Islam. When a faqīh enters the service of an oppressive government, it is as if the whole ulamā entered it along with him; it is no longer a question of a single individual. It is for this reason that the Imāms (‘a) strictly forbade their followers to join the government service, and told them that the situation they found themselves in had come about because some of them had done so.
The obligations that are incumbent on the fuqahā do not apply to others; on account of their position and function, fuqahā must avoid and relinquish even things that are otherwise licit. In cases where others are permitted to resort to taqiyyah, fuqahā may not. The purpose of taqiyyah is the preservation of Islam and the Shī‘i school; if people had not resorted to it, our school of thought would have been destroyed. Taqiyyah relates to the branches (furū’) of religion; for example—performing ablution in different ways. But when the chief principles of Islam and its welfare are endangered, there can be no question of silence or taqiyyah. If they try to force a faqīh to mount the minbar and speak in a way contrary to God’s command, can he obey them, telling himself “Taqiyyah is my religion and the religion of my forefathers”?[239] The question of taqiyyah does not even arise here. If a faqīh anticipates that by his entering the service of an oppressive government, oppression will be furthered and the reputation of Islam soiled, he must not enter its service even if he is killed as a result. There is no acceptable excuse he can offer, unless his entry into the service of the state has some rational basis, as was the case with ‘Ali ibn Yaqtīn,[240] whose motives in joining state service are well-known, and with Khwāja Nāsir Tūsi[241] (may God be pleased with him), whose actions resulted in benefits also well- known.
The true fuqahā of Islam are, of course, free of all guilt in this respect. From the beginning of Islam down to the present, their example is clear, and shines before us like a light; they are untouched by guilt. The ākhūnds who joined the service of governments in past ages did not belong to our school. Not only did our fuqahā oppose the rulers; they also suffered imprisonment and torture because of their disobedience.[242] Let no one imagine that the ‘ulamā of Islam have ever entered the service of the state or do so now. Upon occasion, of course, they have entered it in order to bring the state under their control or transform it; were such a thing possible now, it would be our duty to do so. But that is not what I am speaking of. Our problem is the people who wear turbans on their heads, have read a few books somewhere or other (or nor read them, as the case may be), and joined the service of the government in order to fill their stomachs or increase the scope of their authority. What are we to do with them?
Those persons are not Muslim fuqahā; they are people whom SAVAK has issued a turban and told to pray. If SAVAK cannot force the congregational imāms to be present on the occasion of government-sponsored festivities and other ceremonies, it will have its own people on hand ready to say: “Greater be his glory!” (Yes, they have recently begun to say, “Greater be his glory” when they mention the name of the Shāh.) These persons are not fuqahā; the people have recognized them for what they are. A certain tradition warns us to guard our religion against these people, lest they destroy it. They must be exposed and disgraced so that they may come to lose whatever standing they enjoy among the people. If their standing in society is not destroyed, they will destroy the standing of the Imām of the Age and the standing of Islam itself.
Our youths must strip them of their turbans. The turbans of these ākhūnds, who cause corruption in Muslim society while claiming to be fuqahā and ‘ulamā, must be removed. I do not know if our young people in Iran have died; where are they? Why do they not strip these people of their turbans? I am not saying they should be killed; they do not deserve to be killed. But take off their turbans! Our people in Iran, particularly the zealous youths, have a duty not to permit these ākhūnds, these reciters of “Greater be his glory!” to appear in society and move among the people wearing turbans. They do not need to be beaten much; just take off their turbans, and do not permit them to appear in public wearing turbans. The turban is a noble garment; not everyone is fit to wear it.
As I have said, the true ‘ulamā of Islam are free of all guilt in this respect; they have never joined the service of the government. Those who are affiliated with the government are parasites trying to grow fat on religion and on the ‘ulamā, but they have nothing to do with the ‘ulamā, and people recognize them for what they are.
We too have difficult tasks facing us. We must improve ourselves spiritually and improve our way of life. We must become more ascetic than before and completely shun the goods of this world. All of you must equip yourselves to protect the divine trust that has been vested in your. Become worthy trustees, and hold the world in less esteem. You cannot be like the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), who said that the world was no more to him than the snot of a goat; but turn away from the desire for worldly gain, purify your souls, turn toward God Almighty, cultivate piety. If your purpose in studying is—God forbid—to secure your future livelihood, you will never become fuqahā or trustees of Islam. Prepare yourselves to be useful to Islam; act as the army for the Imām of the Age in order to be able to serve him in spreading the rule of justice. The mere existence of righteous people has a beneficial effect on society—as I myself have observed, one becomes purified by walking with them and keeping company with them. Act so that your deeds, conduct, character, and aversion to worldly ambition will have an uplifting effect on people. They will imitate your example, and you will become models for them and soldiers of God. Only thus can you make Islam and Islamic government known to the people.
I am not telling you to abandon your studies. Indeed you must study, become fuqahā, devote yourselves to fiqh, and not permit fiqh to decline in the centers of the religious institution. Unless you are fuqahā, you will not be able to serve Islam. But while you study, be concerned, too, with representing Islam accurately to the people. Islam is now a stranger; no one knows Islam properly. You must convey Islam and its ordinances to the people so that they understand what Islam is, what Islamic government is, what prophethood and imamate mean, and in the broadest terms, why Islam was revealed and what its goals are. Thus Islam will gradually become known, and, God willing, an Islamic government will one day be established.
Let us overthrow tyrannical governments by: (1) severing all relations with governmental institutions; (2) refusing to cooperate with them; (3) refraining from any action that might be construed as aiding them; and (4) creating new judicial, financial, economic, cultural, and political institutions.
It is the duty of all of us to overthrow tāghūt; i.e., the illegitimate political powers that now rule the entire Islamic world. The governmental apparatus of tyrannical and anti-popular regimes must be replaced by institutions serving the public good and administered according to Islamic law. In this way, an Islamic government will gradually come into existence. In the Qur’an, God Almighty has forbidden men to obey the tāghūt—illegitimate regimes—and encouraged them to rise up against kings, just as He commanded Moses to rebel. There are a number of traditions encouraging people to fight against oppressors and those who wish to pervert religion. The Imāms (‘a), joined by their followers, the Shi‘ah, have always fought against tyrannical governments and illegitimate regimes, as one can easily see by examining their biographies and way of life. Most of the time they were subject to the pressures of tyrannical and oppressive rulers, and were compelled to observe taqiyyah out of extreme fear---not fear for themselves, of course, but fear for their religion, as is evident from an examination of the relevant traditions. Tyrannical rulers, for their part, stood in terror of the Imāms. They were aware that if they gave the Imāms the slightest opportunity, they would rebel and deprive them of their life, which was synonymous with pleasure-seeking and licentiousness. This is the reason we see Hārūn arresting Imām Mūsā ibn Ja‘far[243] (‘a) and imprisoning him for several years, and after him, Ma’mūn[244] transporting Imām Ridā (‘a) to Marv[245] and confining him there for many years before finally poisoning him. Hārūn and Ma’mūn acted as they did not because the Imāms were sayyids—i.e., descendants of the Prophet—and the rulers were opposed to the prophet; indeed, both Hārūn and Ma’mūn were Shī‘ah.[246] They were motivated entirely by considerations of state: they knew that the descendants of ‘Ali laid claim to the caliphate and that their earnest desire was to establish an Islamic government, considering this to be their duty. One day, it was suggested to Imām Mūsā ibn Ja‘far that he delineate the boundaries of Fadak[247] so that it might be returned to him. According to a certain tradition, he drew a map of the entire Islamic realm and said, “Everything within these boundaries is our legitimate right. We should rule over it, and you are usurpers.” The tyrannical rulers thus saw that if Imām Musa ibn Ja‘far were free, he would make life impossible for them and might lay the groundwork for a rebellion and the overthrow of their rule. So they did not give him the slightest opportunity. Have no doubt that if he had had the chance, he would indeed have rebelled and overthrow the ruling usurpers.
Ma’mūn similarly kept Imām Ridā under surveillance, cunningly and hypocritically addressing him as “Cousin” and “Descendant of God’s Messenger” out of fear that one day he might rise and destroy the foundation of his rule. Since he was indeed a descendant and a legatee of the Prophet (s), he could not be allowed to go free in Medina. The tyrannical rulers desired rule and were ready to sacrifice everything for its sake; they had no personal enmity with anyone. If—God forbid—the Imām (‘a) had frequented their court, he would have been shown the utmost veneration and respect; they would even have kissed his hand. According to tradition, when Imām Ridā came into the presence of Hārūn, the ruler ordered that the Imām be carried on horseback all the way to his throne and showed him all possible veneration. But when it was time to distribute the shares that were to be given from the treasury and it was the turn of the Bani Hāshim to receive their share, Hārūn awarded them only a very small amount. His son Ma’mūn who was present was surprised as the contrast between the veneration he had just witnessed and the allotment he now saw being made. Hārūn told him: “You do not understand. The Bani Hāshim must remain in this state. They must always be poor, imprisoned, banished, afflicted, even poisoned or killed; otherwise, they will rise up against us in revolt and ruin our lives.”
The Imāms (‘a) not only fought against tyrannical rulers, oppressive governments, and corrupt courts themselves, they also summoned the Muslims to wage jihād against those enemies. There are more than fifty traditions in Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah,[248] the Mustadrak, [249]and other books calling on the Muslims to shun tyrannical rulers and governments and to fill with earth the months of those who praise them, and threatening anyone who does so much as lend their panegyrists a pen or fill their inkwells. In short, the Imāms have given orders that all relations with such rulers be severed and that no one collaborate with them in any way. In contrast to these traditions are others that praise the learned scholars and the just faqīh, and emphasize their superiority over other men. Taken together, these two classes of traditions form a program for the establishment of an Islamic government. First, the people are induced to turn away from the tyrannical government of the oppressors and destroy their house of oppression; then the houses of fuqahā are to open their doors to the people: fuqahā who are just and ascetic and who fight in God’s way to implement the laws of Islam and establish its social systems.
The Muslims will be able to live in security and tranquility and preserve their faith and morals only when they enjoy the protection of a government based on justice and law, a government whose form, administrative system, and laws have been laid down by Islam. It is our duty now to implement and put into practice the plan of a government established by Islam. I hope that by presenting the system of government and the political and social principles of Islam to broad segments of humanity, we will create a strong new current of thought and a powerful and popular movement that will result in the establishment of an Islamic government.
O God, foreshorten the arms of the oppressors that are stretched out against the lands of the Muslims and root out all traitors to Islam and the Islamic countries. Awaken the heads of the Muslims states from their deep sleep so that they may exert themselves on behalf of their people’s interests and renounce divisiveness and the quest for personal gain. Grant that the younger generation studying in the religious colleges and the universities may struggle to reach the sacred aims of Islam and strive together, with ranks united, first, to deliver the Islamic countries from the clutches of imperialism and its vile agents, and then to defend them. Grant that the fuqahā and the scholars may strive to guide and enlighten the minds of the people, to convey the sacred aims of Islam to all Muslims, particularly the younger generation, and to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic government. From You is success, and there is neither recourse nor strength except in God, the Exalted, the Sublime.
Notes:
[208] On June 23, 1908, Muhammad ‘Ali Shāh carried out with Russian aid a military coup against the first Iranian Majlis. He was overthrown and constitutional rule restored on July 16, 1909, as a result of popular resistance, largely directed by the most important religious scholars of the day in Najaf. See Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, chs. 7-10.
[209] Soon after the Six-Day War, it was reported that copies of the Qur’an were circulating in the territories seized by the Zionists, as well as in African countries, from which all verses critical of the Jews had been excised.
[210] Najaf is the main center of learning in the Shī‘i world. The lament here that “we do not even have Najaf” refers to the restrictions and pressure placed on the Shī‘ah scholars of Najaf by the Ba‘athist regime of Baghdad. The Ba‘athist persecution of Najaf reached a highpoint in May 1969—ten months before these lectures were given—when a number of ‘ulamā were arrested and tortured and religious endowments were confiscated. See anon., Hayāt-e-Kareem, in Eng. (Karachi, 1973), pp. 73-84. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the crime of the regime in Baghdad was epitomized by torturing and cold-bloodedly murdering Āyatullāh al-‘Uzma Sayyid Muhammad al-Bāqir as-Sadr and his sister Bint al-Hudā in April 1980. (Pub.)
[211] Insofar as the “enjoining of the good” is the particular duty of the religious scholars, it would be shaming for them to need a reminder from students.
[212] Throughout his exile in Najaf, Imām Khomeini gave special attention to the Islamic associations of Iranian students in Europe and the United States, sending them guidance and encouragement. For an example of his messages to the Iranian Muslim students in North America, see Islam and Revolution, pp. 209-211.
[213] ‘Āqil ibn Abi Tālib: brother of Imām ‘Ali. After Imām ‘Ali assumed the caliphate, ‘Aqil is related to have asked him to withdraw 40,000 dirhams from the public treasury to enable him to settle a debt. When his request was denied, ‘Aqil abandoned his brother and joined the camp of Mu‘āwiyah in Damascus.
[214] Bani Hāshim: the Meccan clan to which the Prophet and his descendants belonged. See Subhāni, chap. 4, “Ancestors of the Prophet,” http://www.al-islam.org/message/5.htm. (Pub.)
[215] An allusion to the activities of Ashraf, the Shāh’s twin sister, who was reported in 1960 to have been detained by the Swiss police after large quantities of heroin were found in her possession. See Bahman Nīrūmand, Persien, Modell eines Entwicklungslandes (Hamburg, 1967), pp. 133-134.
[216] Wa lā ’adh-Dhāllīn: “not those who go astray,” a phrase occurring in the seventh verse of the opening chapter of the Qur’an that is recited in every prayer. The letter dh
#65213;) in ’dh-dhāllīn represents an Arabic sound that does not exist in Persian and it is generally pronounced by Persian speakers as a z. Nonetheless, there are those—in Iran and elsewhere—who devote excessive energy to the task of giving the letter its Arabic value when reciting the verse in prayer.
[217] ‘Āshūrā: the tenth day of Muharram; the day on which Imām Husayn was martyred in Karbala. See n. 11 above.
[218] Rauzakwāns: those who specialize in reciting narrations, often versified, of the martyrdom of the Imāms. The first part of the designation, rauza, is taken from the title of one such narrative, Rauzat ash-Shuhadā, by Husayn Vā‘iz Khāshifi (d. 910/1504).
[219] Mujāhid: those who engage in jihād, who struggle for the attainment of God’s purposes on earth.
[220] “Citadels of Islam”: see the tradition cited on p. 58.
[221] Khwāja Nāsir ad-Dīn Tūsi: one of the most outstanding of all Shī‘ah scholars, 597/1201-672/1274. He wrote voluminously not only on the religious sciences, but also on philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy. He joined the entourage of the Mongol conqueror Hulagu when he was passing through Iran on his way to Baghdad, a circumstance that has led many to accuse him of complicity in the conquest. Concerning his associations with the Mongols, see A.H. Hā’iri, “Nāsir ad-Dīn Tūsi: His Alleged Role in the Fall of Baghdad,” Actes du Ve Congress international d’Arabisants et d’Islamisants (Brussels, 1971), pp. 255-266.
[222] ‘Allāmah Hilli: more fully, ‘Allāmah ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli, another important Shī‘ah scholar who lived in the period of Mongol domination of Iran, 648/1250-716/1325. Concerning his scholarly and political activities, see Michel Mazzaoui, The Rise of the Safawids (Wiesbaden, 1972), pp. 27-34.
[223] Yazid: second Umayyad caliph and adversary of Imām Husayn. He ruled from 60/680-64/683.
[224] Abū Tālib: father of Imām ‘Ali. According to Shī‘i belief, he embraced Islam; but according to Sunni belief, he did not. For a discussion of his faith in Islam, see Subhāni, op. cit., chap. 21, “Death of Abū Tālib,” http://al-islam.org/message/22.htm; Islam of Abū Tālib (Part I-IV), http://al-islam.org/encyclopedia/chapter5a/4.html. (Pub.)
[225] Ākhūnd: see n. 5 above.
[226] Hārūn ar-Rashīd: Abbasid caliph who reigned from 180/186-193/809 and was the contemporary of the seventh and eighth Imāms, Mūsā al-Kāzim and Ridā.
[227] “That man” was Hasan Pakravan, head of SAVAK between 1961 and 1965, executed after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution. This visit occurred on July 2, 1963 when Imām Khomeini was being detained at the ‘Ashratābād garrison in Tehran. See S.H.R., Barrasī va Tahlīlī, p. 575.
[228] Āqā-yi Qummi: that is, Āyatullāh Hasan Tabātabā’i Qummi, religious leader of Mashhad who actively cooperated with Imām Khomeini in the movement of Khurdād 15.
[229] For the text of this speech, given at the Masjid-i A‘zam in Qum on March 6, 1964, see anon., Biyūgrāfi-yi Pīshvā, n.p., n.d., II, 109-138; Sahīfeh-ye Imām (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, 1379 Sh.), vol. 1, p. 269. (Pub.)
[230] The reference may be to a passage in Mahmūd Mahmūd, Tārīkh-i Ravābit-i Siyāsī-yi Īrān va Inglīs (Tehran, 1332 Sh./1953), VI, 1743. Sultān Ghāzī ad-Dīn Haydar of Oudh established an endowment of a hundred lakhs of rupees for the support of the needy in Najaf and Karbala. After his principality was absorbed into British India, the administration of the endowment passed into British hands. Concerning the Oudh bequest and its recipients, see Algar, Religion and State, pp. 237-238.
[231] Shaykh Murtadā: that is, Shaykh Murtadā Ansāri, first mujtahid to become the sole source of guidance (marja’-i taqlīd) of the Shī‘i world, 1216/1801-1281/1865. He was the author of al-Makāsib, a major work on Shī‘i jurisprudence. See Algar, Religion and State, pp. 162-164.
[232] See p.52.
[233] Burūjirdi: that is, Āyatullāh Husayn Burūjirdi, concerning whom, see p. xii. See also ‘Abbās al-‘Abīri, Āyatullāh Al-Broojerdi, trans. Muhammad Hasan Najafi (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[234] Hujjat: that is, Āyatullāh Muhammad Hujjat, a teacher for many years and an associate of Āyatullāh Hā’iri, 1310/1862-1372/1953. He was responsible for the building of Hujjatiyyah Madrasah. See Muhammad Sharīf Rāzi, Ganjinā-yi Dānishmandān (Tehran, 1352 Sh./1973), I, pp. 305-335.
[235] Sadr: that is, Āyatullāh Sadr ad-Dīn, 1299/1882-1373/1953, another of the chief associates of Hā’iri in Qum. See Rāzi, Ganjinā-yi Dānishmandān, I, pp. 326-335.
[236] Khwansāri: that is, Āyatullāh Muhammad Taqi Khwansāri, a religious scholar who combined militancy with learning, 1305/1888-1371/1952. He fought against the British occupiers of Iraq under the leadership of Mīrzā Muhammad Taqi Shirāzi (see n. 157) before joining the circle of Hā’iri in Qum. See Rāzi, Ganjinā-yi Dānishmandān, I, pp. 322-326; Hasan Iedrem, Āyatullāh Khonsāri: Through Sources of Witnesses, trans. ‘Abbās Abū Sa‘eedi (Qum: Ansariyan Publications). (Pub.)
[237] Possibly a reference to the Christological disputes of Byzantium.
[238] Abū Hurayrah: a companion of the Prophet (d. 59/679) who embraced Islam in 7 A.H. Even though his companionship with the Prophet hardly exceeded three years, he is reported to have narrated 5,374 of the Prophet’s traditions, more than any other companion. Even during the Era of the Caliphate, prominent companions used to complain against him. He was named governor of Bahrain by ‘Umar (but deposed later and was fined with 10 thousand dirhams due to misappropriation of public funds); judge of Medina by ‘Uthmān (for whom he concocted traditions, extolling his virtues); and governor of Medina by Mu‘āwiyah. It has been reported that during the Battle of Siffīn he kept aloof from taking side. Many a times he spent a day in the camp of Imām ‘Ali while in the midst of Mu‘āwiyah’s army in another day. He used to pray behind ‘Ali while giving preference to partake meals with Mu‘āwiyah. He said: “Mu’āwiyah’s food is more gorgeous whereas praying behind ‘Ali is more virtuous.” A number of traditions transmitted by him have been rejected by both Sunni and Shī‘ah scholars. See ‘Allāmah Sayyid ‘Abdul Husayn Sharafuddīn, Abū Hurayrah; Muhammad Abūzahrā, Abū Hurayrah: Shaykh al-Madīrah; Abī Abī ’l Hadīd, Sharh Nahj al-Balāghah, vol. 4, pp. 63-69; Ibn Abī ’l Hadīd, Dāyirat al-Ma‘ārif Islāmiyyah, vol. 1, pp. 418-419. (Pub.)
[239] A celebrated saying of Imām Ja‘far as-Sādiq.
[240] ‘Ali ibn Yaqtīn: an early Shī‘ah traditionist, 124/742-182/798. His father was a staunch supporter of the Abbasids during the Umayyad period. He associated with Mansūr, the second Abbasid caliph, and is said to have assisted him in planning Baghdad. (Pub.)
[241]See n. 173 above.
[242] Although a pattern of alliance between Sunni fuqahā and rulers can be discerned in Islamic history, it is worth noting that there have been numerous important exceptions, e.g., Abū Hanīfah (80/669-152/769), founder of the most widespread Sunni law school, who was imprisoned by the ‘Abbasid caliph Mansūr.
[243] See n. 88 above.
[244] Ma’mūn: Abbasid caliph from 198/813 to 218/833, and persecutor of Imām Ridā (see n. 48 above).
[245] Marv: a city in Transoxiana.
[246] Ma’mūn and his father Hārūn were Shī‘ah in the sense that they implicitly recognized the authority of Imām Ridā in their dealings with him.
[247] Fadak: see n. 134 above.
[248] Wasā’il ash-Shī‘ah: see n. 105.
[249] Mustadrak: see n. 159 above.
Written by The Late Imam Khomeini (R.A.)
Translated by Prof. Hamid Algar
Source: Imam reza network
The Principles Underlying the General Guardianship of the Jurist
The First Principle: Man is Gregarious by Nature
Man is gregarious by nature and he cannot meet his needs except though socialization and mutual help. However, often with socialization comes a clash of desires and a conflict of ideas, and there comes about a definite need for laws and a power to implement these laws in a just manner, so as to prevent transgression and conflict. This power (to implement laws) is what we mean by government.
This is why we see that the life of mankind, in all its stages- even in the stone age- was never free of a government no matter how small and simple, be it just or unjust. A system, even if it is oppressive, is better than the absence of any system and thus anarchy. The Commander of the Faithful (as) said: “people must have a leader, whether he is righteous or a transgressor”
There is no doubt that the Imam (as) does not mean to justify the leadership of a transgressor. Rather, he wants to show that it is, according to the intellect, more preferable than anarchy if the choice was only between the two.
The Second Principle: The Rule Belongs Solely to Allah
There is no doubt that Allah, the Exalted, is our Creator and that creation, nurturing and guidance are all in His hands. He is Omniscient of what would benefit His creation and slaves in their worldly and religious affairs. Similarly, the Almighty does not rule except that which would be beneficial for us as well as the system of existence.
No matter what level of knowledge mankind reaches, he will be unable to and will always fall short of fully knowing what would benefit him in both this world and the Hereafter.
Therefore, mankind must submit to Allah, His divine legislation and His just wise laws in all stages of his life. Allah, the Exalted says: “the rule is only for Allah, He declares the truth, and He is the Best Judge.” (6:57).
He also says: “He who does not rule by what Allah has revealed, they are the disbelievers…He who does not rule by what Allah has revealed, they are the oppressors…He who does not rule by what Allah has revealed, they are the transgressors’”
The Third Principle: Islamic Jurisprudence is the Constitution of Life, including Government
We discussed in the last chapter the necessity of the Imam and the ruler in most of the fields of jurisprudence, and that Islamic jurisprudence is not a set of individual rules of worship only. Rather, it includes the constitution of life including Islamic government.
It encompasses financial laws- such as in Khums, Zakat and Kharaaj- civil laws- such as in marriage and divorce- military laws- such as in Jihad, border security and rules of war captives- and punitive laws- such as in judgment, sentencing and blood-money.
Thus Islamic jurisprudence is the constitution of the Islamic government in its entirety. Because of this, al-Kashani called one of the chapters in his book ‘al-Wafi’: ‘there is nothing that people need except that there is a reference in the Book or the Sunna for it’.
The Fourth Principle: Islamic Government is a Necessary Part of an Islamic Society
The endurance of Islamic jurisprudence necessarily requires there to be an Islamic government which ensures that Islamic jurisprudence is put into practice and which takes up the role of implementing it. Otherwise, the divine laws will be overlooked, as is the current situation in many countries which are ‘Islamic’ by name.
The Fifth Principle: It is Necessary to Appoint a Leader who will take up the role of implementing the Islamic Laws in Order to achieve that Aim
The necessity of governments means the necessity of a trusted ruler who is well versed in the divine laws. Al-Fadhl ibn Shaathan narrated from Ali ibn Musa al-Ridha (as): “a person said: ‘why did He appoint guardians and command that they should be obeyed?’
He (as) said: ‘for many reasons. Among them: if He did not place for them an upright, trustworthy, protective Imam the community would have been overwhelmed and religion would have perished. The practices and laws would have been changed; the innovators would have added to the religion and the disbelievers would have subtracted from the religion, and they would have made things ambiguous for the Muslims’”
Since the Islamic Ruler must be the most knowledgeable of people about the laws of Allah and the most just amongst them, there is no doubt that in the presence of an infallible (as), there would be no room for the guardianship of anyone but him. This is why the truthful sect believed in the guardianship of the Commander of the Faithful (as) after the demise of the Prophet (pbuh), and that the Prophet (pbuh) and his infallible successors (as) have the right of general guardianship and the right of complete divine representation. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Tusi says: ‘the Imam is a blessing, his appointment is obligatory upon Allah the Exalted in order to achieve the desired aim’. This is all in relation to the time of their presence (as).
The Sixth Principle: it is not Permissible to Suspend Divine Laws in the Era of Occultation
There is no doubt that the laws of Islam do not become abrogated, and there is no doubt that they last till the Resurrection Day. Otherwise, it would mean that the greater period of time was excluded from these laws. It would also lead to the performance of prohibited acts as well as the spread of corruption during the period of occultation, and this is definitely something to be avoided in the view of the Legislator.
The author of al-Jawahir says: ‘…among the strange things is the doubt that people have about this, it is as if they have not tasted anything from the taste of jurisprudence…and in general the issue is one of the self evident facts that does not need any evidence.’
Therefore, in the period of occultation, and the time when the community is deprived of an infallible ruler, we have two choices. Either we ignore governance- and this goes against the fourth principle because it is ignoring something important which people need in order to organize their current and next life, as was discussed earlier- or we say that the Holy Legislator left it to the community to run their own affairs as they see fit, according to the doctrine of democracy or dictatorship or other political ideologies that may be common in any place or time.
The latter is invalid like the former, because in both cases an important need of the Muslim community is ignored. Which need is greater than the need for one who would manage the affairs of the community and maintain the order of the Muslim lands during the time of occultation, while maintaining the Islamic laws which cannot be implemented except at the hands of the guardian of the Muslims?
Therefore, no option remains except to specify a legislative ruler: the qualified jurist who is the closest person to the infallible. Because of this, Imam al-Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) says: ‘that which is a proof for Imamat is in itself a proof for the necessity of governance after the occultation of the Guardian of the Affair, may Allah the Exalted hasten his holy return’.
It is perhaps because of this that it is often said that the science which is responsible for proving the guardianship of the jurist is theology not jurisprudence.
If one argues: why is it not permissible that the ruler be one of the people with the jurist taking an advisory role only?
The answer would be: the evidence that proves in theology that it is not permissible to give precedence to one with a lower status to one with a higher status applies here also. Umar ibn al-Khattab used to take the advice of the Commander of the Faithful (as) at times, for otherwise there would be no meaning to his words: ‘Had it not been for Ali, Umar would have perished’. Despite this, he was a usurper of the right of the Commander of the Faithful (as). Allah, the Exalted, says: “is He then Who guides to the truth more worthy to be followed, or he who himself does not go aright unless he is guided? What then is the matter with you; how do you judge?” [46]
Moreover, the task of protecting the Islamic government is not carried out by mere advice, because the ruler who is not a jurist may not adhere to the advice of his advisors, as is the habit of rulers.
The Seventh Principle: The Consecutive Indications for the Necessity of the General Guardianship of the Jurist
1- The guardianship of the jurist in the roles which are agreed upon among the scholars- such as giving jurisprudential edicts and judging- necessitates the guardianship of the jurist in politics and in running the affairs of the community as well. This is because acting with regards to Khums, judgment and the implementation of judicial sentences is the role of a government.
Thus the qualified jurist during the period of occultation either has general guardianship in representation of the infallible Imam (as) or has no right of representation at all. This is because the wisdom for representation exists for whatever is confirmed to have been the role of the Imam in running the affairs of the community and is not limited to issuing edicts and the authority over Khums.
2- The strong prohibition against referring to the unjust judges and their scholars indicates indirectly that there is strong encouragement towards referring to the just judges and scholars. During the period of occultation, this means nothing except referring to the legislative ruler, who is the qualified jurist.
In other words, there is no guardian for the Muslim community during the period of occultation because the original guardian (atfs) is in occultation, while the one who claims specific representation of the Imam during the major occultation is a liar, and the one who has no right of representation from him (atfs) is a tyrant without any authority of guardianship over the community at all. Therefore, the guardianship of the general representative of the Imam (atfs) is established (as the only remaining sound option).
This general representative is the jurist, because of the definite principle: ‘the ruler (i.e. the just ruler) is the guardian of the one who has no guardian’, which is understood from some narrations.
This principle means that the jurist takes up the role of the guardian because there is no guardian other than him. Analogous to this is the consensus of the jurists without any disagreement that the legislative ruler is the guardian over the one who is not intellectually mature- due to insanity or similar things- and who has no family member who may be a guardian.
The ruler would, for example, have the authority to enter him into a marriage if this was beneficial for him. They have all agreed that the legislative ruler takes the role of the guardian because such a person has no guardian, and they based this on the above-mentioned principle.
3- The guardianship of the jurist on minor Hisbi affairs indicates, by precedence, his guardianship over government.
The Holy Legislator guides towards the performance of beneficial actions and the avoidance of harmful actions in one of the three following ways:
a- He requests that beneficial actions should be performed and that corrupt actions should be avoided from the Muslim individuals in a general, encompassing form, just as He commanded them to pray, give charity and perform other specific obligations.
b- He requests that beneficial actions should be performed and that corrupt actions should be avoided as a substitutive general obligation, just as He commanded to perform the prayer for the deceased as well as other substitutive obligations.
c- He requests that beneficial actions should be performed and that corrupt actions should be avoided without specifying a particular doer for these actions. These are what our jurists call the Hisbi (literally: reward or control) affairs, such as appointing a guardian for an orphan who has no guardian, or performing the funeral rites of a deceased person who has no guardian, etc.
Allamah Bahr ’ul-‘Uloom said: ‘Hisba means proximity, indicating any action with which one intends to gain proximity towards Allah (swt). It refers to any good action which one knows should be performed in the external world according to legislation, but which has no specific person to perform it’ The proof for this is the unconditional nature of the Qur’anic ayah: “and help one another towards goodness and piety”
Our scholars have agreed that the one who takes up these Hisbi affairs is the infallible (as) if he is able and present. In the narration of Hobaba al-Walibiya, she narrates: “I saw the Commander of the Faithful (as) among the enforcers of the law. With him was a whip with two tongues. He would strike with it the ones selling the impermissible types of fish (catfish, eel, zammar)”.
The scholars have also agreed that the one who should take up these responsibilities during the period of occultation is the jurist or his representative and that this is not permissible for anyone else.
There is also no doubt that one of the most important things which we know the Legislator wants to occur in the external world is the Islamic government. If we then assume that He had not appointed anyone to take up this affair specifically during the period of occultation, then surely it would be one of the Hisbi affairs which is one of the tasks of the jurist, and in fact the most important one.
Imam al-Khomeini said: ‘maintaining the order, defending the borders of the Muslims, protecting their youth from deviating from Islam, and stopping the spread of anti-Islamic propaganda and similar tasks are among the most clear of the Hisbi issues, and these goals cannot be achieved except by the formation of a just Islamic state. Thus even if we do not consider the evidence for Guardianship, there is no doubt that the ones that we are certain have the authority to perform this duty are the just jurists’.
Sheikh Mansour Leghaei
Source: Imam reza network
The Role of the Jurist in Different Areas of Jurisprudence
In this chapter we will conduct a quick survey in different areas of jurisprudence. As you will see, the survey shows:
1) The necessity of the existence of a legislative ruler (al-Hakim al-Shar’) in order to implement the divine laws, and that:
2) Governance is part of the system of Islamic jurisprudence.
1- Prayer
a- Congregational prayers: Islam has emphasised on congregational prayers even in the battle lines, in which case it is called the prayer of fear or prayer of pursuit.
b- Prayer for the deceased: it is narrated from Abu Abdullah (as): “if the Imam is present at the burial of the corpse then he is the most worthy to pray over it” It is also narrated from the Commander of the Faithful (as): “if a ruler from among the rulers of Allah is present at the burial of the corpse then he is more worthy of praying over it”. The meaning of ‘ruler’ and ‘Imam’ in these and similar narrations is more general than the infallible Imam (as) and the just jurist, as will come later. This is why Sheikh al-Tusi says in ‘al-Mabsoot’: ‘if the just Imam attends he would be more worthy of leading and it would be obligatory upon the guardian (of the deceased) to ask him to go forward to lead’. Therefore, the specification of the word ‘Imam’ to the infallible Imam by the author of al-Jawahir is out of place.
c- Burying the deceased Muslim who has no guardian, trustee or heir is the obligation of the legislative ruler.
d- Friday prayer: the one who should take up its establishment is the leader of the community or his representative. Al-Fadhl ibn Shathan narrated from al-Ridha (as): “if it is said: ‘why was the sermon put in place?’ It would be said: ‘the congregational prayer is a general gathering and so He wanted to make a way for the leader to advise the people and to encourage them towards obedience and frighten them from disobedience, and to help them towards that which is beneficial for their worldly and religious affairs, and to inform of all the harmful or beneficial events that are taking place across the globe.”
e- The Eid Prayers: it is narrated in the authenticated narration of Suma’a from Abu Abdullah (as): “there is no prayer on the day of Eid except with the Imam” [25].. This narration is relevant based on the possibility that ‘Imam’ in this narration is not referring to the leader of the congregational prayers but to the leader of the community.
2- Fasting and Ritual Self-Isolation (i’tikaf)
It is narrated in the authentic narration of Muhammad ibn Qays from Abu Ja’far (as): “if two witnesses witness in the presence of the Imam that they saw the crescent moon thirty nights ago the Imam would command the people to break their fast (the next day)” (Wasailul Shia) our jurists are in agreement that the term ‘Imam’ in this context means the (just) ruler.
3- Zakat
It can be understood from the Glorious Book and numerous narrations that Zakat is among the taxes of the Islamic government and that the one who is in charge of collecting and distributing the Zakat is the Legislative Ruler, through his workers. The following two narrations will be sufficient to prove the point:
a- The authentic narration of Zurarah and Muhammad ibn Muslim, in which they narrate from Abu Abdullah (as) regarding the interpretation of the Qur’anic ayah: “surely, charity is for the poor and the indigent...” that he (as) said: “the Imam shall give all of these people”
b- It is narrated from al-Ridha (as): “if a person who is overwhelmed with debt borrows money or seeks to borrow money rightfully, he would be given one year respite. After this year, if his situation does not improve, the Imam shall fulfil his debt from the public treasury.”
4- Khums, Anfal and Kharaj
There is no disagreement about the fact that Khums and Anfal belong to the Imam due to his leadership, and this is why they are passed on from the Imam to the next Imam and not to the heirs of the Imam. Abi Ali ibn Rashid narrated from Imam al-Hadi (as): “whatever belonged to my father because of his position of Imamat belongs to me, and whatever belonged to him for other reasons is inheritance.”
It is narrated from Imam al-Kadhim (as) that he said: “Khums applies to five things: war booty, treasures found while diving, treasures under the earth, the mines, and Salina. From each of these five things Khums should be extracted and allocated to those whom Allah (swt) allocated it to...
It should be divided among them according to the Holy Book and the Sunna such that it will suffice them for that year...and the earth which was taken by force with men and horses, it is given to those who work on that land, cultivate and maintain it, according to what the Ruler agrees with them as per their share; being a half, or a third, or two thirds, and according to what will be beneficial for them and will not harm them...
The rest of the Khums will go towards the sustenance of the assistants of the Ruler in establishing the religion of Allah, as well as what he sees fit to strengthen Islam and strengthen the religion, such as Jihad and other things which have a general benefit. None of it, whether a large or small amount, is for himself. Besides Khums, the Anfal belongs to him.
Anfal is any ruined land whose inhabitants have abandoned it, as well as any land that was not attacked by horses and horsemen but whose inhabitants reached an agreement and surrendered without fighting. To him also belongs the peaks of the mountains and the insides of the valleys, as well as the woods and any barren land with no caretaker...and he is the heir of the one with no heir”
5- Hajj
In the narration of Abdullah ibn Sinan from Abu Abdullah (as): “if people stopped making the pilgrimage of Hajj, it would be obligatory upon the Imam to force them to perform Hajj” (Wasailul Shia)
In another narration from Abu Abdullah (as): “if people did not perform Hajj, it would be obligatory upon the ruler to force them to do this, and to stay there. Also, if they stopped visiting the Prophet (pbuh), it would be for the ruler to force them to do this and to stay there. If they did not have the financial means, he would have to spend on them from the public treasury of the Muslims”.
6- Jihad
The obligation of Jihad in general is one of the necessities of the religion of Islam. The ayat regarding this obligation are numerous. Is it possible to imagine Jihad- whether it be defensive or pre-emptive- without a ruler or governor or army? Sheikh al-Tusi said regarding fighting those who oppose the Imam: ‘whoever rebels against a just Imam and breaks his allegiance to him and opposes him in his rulings, then he is a rebel and it is permissible for the Imam to fight him and battle against him’.
7- al-Hijr (to limit someone’s legal competence)
The necessity of a government in dealing with the affair of a Mahjour (the one who is restricted in accessing his wealth) is clear. In the narration of Safwan it is narrated: “I asked Abul Hassan (as) about a man who owed another man some money. The one to whom the money was owed died and left two trustees. Is it permissible to pay that debt back to one of the two trustees and not the other trustee? He (as) said: ‘this is not proper, unless the ruler had divided the wealth between them and placed half of it in the possession of one and half in the possession of the other, or they reached an agreement under the auspices of the ruler.’”
8- Marriage and Divorce
In the authentic narration of Abu Basir it is narrated: “I heard Abu Ja’far (as) saying: ‘if one had a wife and did not clothe her with that which would cover her ‘awra (the parts of the body which should be covered) and did not feed her with that which would give her strength, the Imam has the authority to separate them.’”
In another narration from Abu Ja’far (as) by Abu Basir: “if I had authority over people, I would teach them how to divorce, then I would not come across a man who went against this except that I would strike him painfully on his back.”
9- Judgment and Sentencing
There is no doubt that the task of judgment and implementation of punishments is one of the tasks of the government. In the narration of Hafs ibn Ghiyath it is narrated: “I asked Abu Abdullah (as): ‘who implements the punishments, the ruler or the judge?’ He (as) said: ‘the implementation of punishments is the task of the one who rules”
10- Judicial Punishment and Blood-Money
Jurists have defined judgment to be a legislative authority on behalf of the Imam (as) to look after the laws and benefits of the general public. The author of al-Jawahir says: ‘perhaps what is meant by their mentioning guardianship- since we know that the judges are not an example of it- is clarification that the role of making true judgments is a status and a role just like that of leadership and that it is one of the branches of the tree of general leadership of the Prophet (pbuh) and his successors (as)’.
Therefore, there is no doubt that implementing the judicial punishment and the rules of blood-money needs an Islamic government and a legislative ruler. One option is to say that these laws should be suspended during the period of occultation.
This is both impermissible legislatively and would mean that the greater part has been excluded, because the time of occultation is far longer than the time when the Infallibles (as) were present.
It is narrated from Abu Ja’far (as): “a legislative punishment implemented on earth purifies it more than it would be purified by forty days and nights of rain” [37]
In another narration from the Commander of the Faithful (as): “O Allah, You have said to your Prophet, may Your blessings be upon Him and His Progeny, in among that which he informed about: ‘whoever suspends a punishment from among My punishments then he has become stubborn against Me and asked through this My enmity.’” [38]
Therefore, the rules of judicial punishment and blood-money in Islamic jurisprudence indicate the necessity of an Islamic government more clearly than the sun in the middle of the day.
Sheikh Mansour Leghaei
Imam reza network
If the ruling of a Mujtahid goes against the ruling of the jurist guardian, which one must be followed?
The ruling of the guardian jurist is the one that should be followed in issues that relate to the management of the Muslim nation and the general affairs of the Muslims. As for issues which are purely individual, it is possible for every person to follow their own Marja’.
To be more precise, it is obligatory upon all, whether they be a lay person or a Mujtahid, to follow the rules of governance that emanate from the jurist guardian. An example of this from the narrations is the ruling of the Imam or the ruler about the visibility of the crescent moon.
In the authentic narration of Muhammad ibn Qays from Abu Ja’far (Imam al-Baqir a.s): “if two people witness in the presence of the Imam that they saw the crescent thirty days ago then the Imam should order people to break their fast” (Wasailul Shi’a) Note, that the term ‘Imam’ in these narrations means ‘ruler’ (whether an infallible one or not), as discussed in the second chapter.
If there are Multiple Islamic Countries, should there be one guardian jurist for all, or is it permissible for each country to have its own guardian jurist?
The textual and intellectual principles indicate by necessity that the entire Muslim community must have one leader who unites them and links them together and rules over them in issues which require general rulings. It should be such that these countries should be considered one powerful government, with one country able to help another. The presence of multiple rulers who are independent in their opinion and will in all affairs, without having one leader to unite them and judge with certainty in their disputes is a sure way to disunity and failure.
Sheikh al-Saduq has narrated from Imam al-Ridha (as): “If he says: ‘why is it not possible for there to be more than one Imam on earth simultaneously?’ It would be said: ‘for a number of reasons, among which are the following. The actions and plans of one person cannot conflict, whereas the actions and plans of two people never agree.
We never find any two people except that they have different intentions and wishes. If they were two and their intentions, wishes and plans were different, and it was obligatory to obey both, then neither would be more worthy of being obeyed than the other. This would lead to disagreement, conflict and transgression among people. No one would be in obedience of one leader without being disobedient to the other, and thus all the inhabitants of the land would be sinners…” [115]
This is with the assumption that this is possible. If however we assume that it is impossible to establish one Muslim nation which encompasses all Muslims, then there is no problem with establishing small countries based on the laws of Islam. This is better than ignoring the affairs of governance until the foreigners and tyrants become rulers over the Muslims and overpower them. This (i.e. the establishment of different Islamic countries) would become valid because of the principle ‘that which is possible should not be ignored because of that which is impossible’.
Sheikh Mansour Leghaei
Source: Imam reza network
Legislation in an Islamic State
Introduction
There are six different issues that we shall investigate in relation to the subject of legislation in an Islamic State. The very first question which arises in this connection is: who has the authority to legislate laws which are binding for all individuals in a society, and a breach of which calls for punitive measures?
From the viewpoint of Islam and reason, all human beings have been created equal; no individual enjoys any inherent right of sovereignty and guardianship (wilayah) over others. Race, nationality, geographical location, class‑none of these factors confers any right of sovereignty on any individual or group. God, the Almighty, is the Master of the universe, and it is He Who is the Sovereign over all creatures. All are equal before Him, and none enjoys any preferential right of sovereignty over others. This idea finds a recurring echo in several Quranic verses such as the following:
Say: `People of the Book! Come now to a word common between us and you, that we serve none but God, and that we associate not aught with Him, and that none of us shall take others as lords, apart from God ....' (3:64)
They (the Jews and the Christians) have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords apart from God .... (9:31)
The right of authority and sovereignty, solely a Divine prerogative, is referred to as `amr' in the Quran. This is the meaning of the word which occurs in such verses as the following:
...Verily, His are the creation and the command (amr) .... (7:54)
... The command (amr) belongs to God entirely .... (3:154)
The same meaning of amr is meant in the phrase uli al‑'amr (those in authority) in the verse 4:59:
O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you .... (4:59)
All mankind are of a single origin, and no race, nation or individual has any superiority over others, except on the grounds of piety and righteousness:
O mankind, We have created you from a male and a female, and made you nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Surely, the nobler among you in the sight of God is the more God‑fearing of you .... (49:13)
Accordingly, any law regardless of who legislates it, is not binding upon others. Only the Divine Law is valid and binding, on the basis of God's all‑embracing mastery and sovereignty over all things:
...Sovereignty belongs only to God; He has commanded that you shall not serve any but Him .... (12:40)
Indeed, We sent forth among every nation a Messenger, [saying]: Serve God, and eschew the taghut .... (16:36)
The above Islamic principle has been incorporated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which declares: `The Islamic Republic is a system based on: (1) faith in the One God, and His exclusive prerogative of sovereignty and legislation, and the duty to submit before Him ...."
Nevertheless, if God were to delegate His right of sovereignty to a human being, and bestow upon him the right to legislate and the authority to rule, then, as a consequence, within the scope of such delegated authority, he will have the licence to command and forbid and to ‑enact laws. In that case, his authority will represent Divine authority, his commands will be considered the commands of God, and disobedience to him will amount to disobedience to God. This type of authority, which the Holy Prophet (S) enjoyed, is mentioned in this verse:
Whosoever obeys the Messenger, thereby obeys God .... (4:80)
All prophets have implemented and enforced Divine laws, and, within the scope of the wilayah (i.e. guardianship or authority) delegated to them, obedience to them was obligatory for their followers. The following verse refers to the binding authority of the Prophet's judgements:
It is not for any believer, man or woman, when God and His Messenger have decreed a matter, to have a choice in the affair. Whosoever disobeys God and His Messenger has gone astray into manifest error. (33:36)
The Prophet’s Role
The Prophet (S) was a sovereign and a lawgiver in his life, and after him the right of sovereignty and the authority to legislate passed on to his successors appointed to the office of wilayah (i.e. khilafah and imamah) over the Muslim community, the Ummah. The Prophet's successor, while maintaining the authority of the Book and the Sunnah intact, possesses the right to legislate according to particular conditions and circumstances, and, on account of his wilayah, deserves obligatory obedience, as stated by the verse 4:59. His wilayah (like that of the Prophet) is derived from and dependent on the absolute wilayah of God.
However, since, on the one hand, the Quran does not specify any particular person for the office of wilayah (of the uli al‑amr), and on the other hand the Prophet (S) and his successors (the awsiya', i.e. the Imams [ A ] ) have determined its general transferability to anyone who possesses certain specified qualifications, the right to legislate is evidently also transferable to him. (This type of wilayah is called al wilayat al‑`ammah, whereas the wilayah of the Prophet [ S ] and the Imams [A], since it is conferred upon them specifically, is called al wilayat al‑khassah). According to the Shi'ah hadith, the office of al wilayat al‑`ammah has been assigned to any `adil faqih who fulfils the requirements of ijtihad. When there are several individuals who possess the requisite qualifications, an individual from among them or a group of them may be elected to take charge of this sovereign office.
It is on this basis that the Article 5 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran specifies that:
"During the time when the 12th Imam (may God expediate his appearance) is in occultation, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the leadership of the affairs and guidance of the people is the responsibility of a just and pious jurisprudent, aware of the contemporary issues, courageous, of drive and initiative, whom the majority of the people know and accept to be their Leader. In case no such jurisprudent enjoys confidence of such a majority, a Leadership Council consisting of jurisprudents meeting the above requirements will assume the same responsibility."
Whatever we have said until this point contains two points of difference between us and our brethren of the Ahl al‑Sunnah. The first is about the imamah or al‑wilayat al‑khassah of the twelve Imams (A). The second relates to al‑wilayat al‑`ammah of the qualified jurisprudent (faqih jami` al‑shara'it) during the period of occultation (ghaybah) of the Twelfth Imam (A). A group of Shi'ah `ulama' have also not accepted the doctrine of al‑wilayat al‑`ammah of the faqih (also called, wilayat al‑faqih).
In the case of absence of a qualified faqih, we are faced with the problem of proper governance and administration of the political affairs of the Muslim community. Does Islam offer any solution for this problem, or does it leave the people unguided, to grapple with the problem themselves? Is it conceivable that a religion which has meticulously specified duties in all minor and major affairs of life, should leave unsolved and neglect such a significant and vitae affair of the Muslim society? This question is relevant to all these three groups: firstly, the Ahl al‑Sunnah in relation to the post‑prophetic era; secondly, the Shi`ah who do not believe in the institution of wilayat al faqih in relation to the period of ghaybah of the Twelfth Imam (A); thirdly, for the Shi'ah who believe in wilayat al‑faqih in relation to the case when a qualified faqih is absent or unavailable. A brief prelude is necessary before we answer this question.
Society without a State
It is evident that a society without a State and a system of laws cannot hope to survive, and even if it does, presumably, it cannot be a society of a high order that can cater to all the needs and demands of the human nature. The existence of social order is an essential need confirmed by all Divine religions. In an anarchic society devoid of any system of law and order, neither prophethood can fulfil the objectives of its mission of guiding the people, nor is there any ready ground for the worship of God and implementation of His commands. In a state of social and political chaos, the goals mentioned in the following Divine verse cannot be achieved:
Indeed, We sent Our messengers with the clear signs, and We sent down with them the Book and the Balance, so that mankind may uphold justice .... (57:25)
The necessity of the existence of the State is a self‑evident axiom, readily accepted by reason and also affirmed by the Shari'ah. If there can be any argument about government and the State, it is with regard to their form and characteristics. Here, we arrive at the heart of our problem: In case of the absence of a God‑appointed sovereign (al‑wali al‑mansus), who should occupy the office of the sovereign?
That which can be stated on rational (`aqli) and canonical (naqli) grounds is that the office of the wilayah of Muslims should be occupied by the following in the descending order of priority: the Prophet (S); the successor appointed by the Prophet to the office of wilayah (i.e. al‑wali al‑mansus); an `adil faqih; an `adil believer (al‑mu'min al‑`adil); a fasiq believer (al‑mumin al‑fasiq). The last three types may hold the office of wilayah of Muslims; after the requisite conditions are met by individuals, the individuals are selected for the office, and after they formally take official charge of their duties. Moreover, obedience to their commands which are not contradictory to the Divine commands is essential.' Accordingly, they have also the authority to legislate laws and regulations for fulfilment of the various objectives of the Statesuch as legislation about economic, financial and commercial matters, defence, creation and maintenance of security, administration of justice, recovery of the rights of the weaker sections of the society from the more powerful, and so on. These are some of the essential reasons for the existence of the State, as Imam `All (A) points out in one of the sermons of the Nahj al‑balaghah
Mankind cannot dispense with a ruler, good or bad. [As a consequence of the general conditions of law and order provided] by his rule, the believer performs his acts [of righteousness] and the unbeliever attains his [worldly] enjoyments. In it God eases things to reach their ultimate destinations. Through it tribute is collected, the enemy is fought against, the security of the highways is maintained, and the rights of the weak are wrested from the powerful .... (Nahj al‑balaghah, sermon 40)
In another tradition, `Ali (A) is reported to have said:
In a Divine rule and an Islamic State it is an obligation of Muslims not to make any [collective] move before they select for themselves a chaste and knowledgeable leader who is pious, abstinent and well‑versed in administration of justice, who may collect for them tribute, taxes and charities, and take care of their hajj and [prayers in] congregation. (al‑Hayat, vo1.II, p. 421)
Al‑Imam al‑Sadiq (A) says:
... that, because the rule of an equitable sovereign and his officials ensures the revival of righteousness and justice in all their aspects, and promises the death of oppression, injustice and corruption of all kinds. For this reason, anyone who strives for the establishment of the power [of such a ruler] and assists him in enforcing his authority is one who endeavours for the cause of obedience to God and for the strength of His faith .... (al‑Hayat, vol.II, p. 421)
After admitting the need for a sovereign State in the Islamic society at all times and in all places, and accepting its right to legislate, we may now go on to deal with some other issues related with the subject of Islamic government which we mentioned at the outset. Presently we shall take up the two following problems:
A. Is legislation permissible? That is, may we legislate despite the existence of the ahkam (laws, rules) of the Shari'ah and how?
B. What is the role of ijtihad in legislation in an Islamic State?
Basically, in view of the fact that the enforceable laws in an Islamic State must be in conformity with the fundamental principles of Islam, and in view of the fact that the Divine ahkam are firmly embedded in the Book and the Prophet's Sunnah, we have to conclude that there is no room for legislation (in the secular sense), and expression of any opinion contrary to the explicit teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah is tantamount to apostasy:
... And whoever does not judge according to what God has revealed‑they are the unbelievers. (5:44)
There may not be any disagreement whatsoever between a law and the ahkam of the Shari'ah. However, what are meant here are not the variable but the fixed laws of Islam, such as those related to all the `ibadat (viz. issues relating to salat, sawm, zakat, khums, hajj, etc.); the personal laws (e.g. the ahhdm related to birth, heredity, marriage, divorce, inheritance, will (wasiyyah), death, etc.); and the penal laws (e.g. hudud, diyat, and qisas). The possibility of legislation is absolutely precluded in such matters. But in cases where the Shari`ah does not lay down any rule, or where the legal rules have been hitherto based on social acceptability, social habits and customs (`urf) and certain demands of social welfare (as in the case of legal rules relating to business dealings [mu'amalat]), or in cases where the Shari'ah has given powers to others (such as in the case of ta`zirat, or matters relating to the affairs of the State, regulations related to State administration, employment, relations with foreign governments, control over the borders and frontiers, etc.), the legislator has a licence and a free hand. He can, in conformity with the general and basic Islamic criteria, principles and objectives, and in accordance with the interests of public welfare, legislate laws. In other words, there are certain fixed Islamic principles and criteria which may be considered as constituting the `constitutional law' of Islam, and all other laws and regulations are valid only when they do not negate any of such principles and criteria as: the duty to establish justice; respect for the right of ownership; the obligation to safeguard life, property, honour, faith and sanity; the duty to pursue goodness and benevolence and to refrain from evil and malice in all things; the duty to support the oppressed and to fight for the removal of fitnah (sedition, persecution) and fasad (corruption); the ban on consumption of illegitimate acquisitions (money, assets); the illegitimacy of the khabaith and the permissibility of the tayyibat; the obligation to honour all agreements and treaties; the principle of exemption from `usr and haraj (hardship, difficulty); the principle of la darar wa la dirar (invalidity of all dealings and arrangements which involve loss, harm or injury to any of the parties involved); joint social responsibility (al‑takaful al‑ 'ijtima`i); public security, etc. Any legislation is valid only when it does not conflict with any of the above‑mentioned general principles. This is exactly what the Article 4 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic affirms: "All laws‑penal, financial, economic, administrative, educational, military, political, etc.‑and legislation controlling natural resources should be based upon Islamic criteria. This article generally and universally controls all other articles of the Constitution, as well as other laws and regulations, by the judgement of the jurisprudents of the Guardianship. Council." Besides, the Article 170 states: "The judges of the courts of justice shall be obliged to refrain from implementation of any of the Government's decrees and regulations which should be contrary to the Islamic laws and criteria, or should lie beyond the jurisdiction of the powers of the Executive. All individuals are entitled to apply to the administrative courts for annulment of such decrees and regulations."
Role of Ijtihad in Legislation
Here, the role of ijtihad in legislation also comes to light. Because, as mentioned, Islam has certain fixed laws which are not affected either by the passage of time or due to changes in the conditions of life or on account of differences of culture and region. Except in exceptional cases and within the limits of exigency, it is not permissible to violate them. Examples are, the ban on usury, on drinking of wine, gambling, and similar other cases mentioned earlier.
To legislate laws which are contrary to them is considered equivalent to belligerence against God.
Apart from these, there are the variable ahkam which are changeable in accordance with changing conditions. This is the secret behind the perpetuity of Islam, its capacity to sustain until the Judgement Day, and its adaptability to varying conditions and situations. In many cases the Shari'ah gives the legislator a licence to frame laws and regulations with due observance of the welfare of the society, or provides general guide‑lines for him. For instance, the following hadith is quite explicit about the cases where Islam has on purpose left the Islamic State free to make an independent decision:
Indeed God has assigned you certain duties which you must not neglect. Then He has prescribed for you certain limits which you must not transgress, and has made certain things infrangible, which you must not infringe on. There are certain things which He has passed over in silence, but not on account of oversight; therefore, do not impose them upon yourselves. (Nahj al‑balaghah, aphorism 105)
In such cases, characteristic temporal demands may require, at times, absolute permissivity; at times, absolute restraint; and at other times, specific restrictions. The free hand given to the hakim (judge, legislator) in the case of ta`zirat, which cover a wide range of punishments in Islam and in which the quality and quantity of punishment depend upon the discretion of the judge, thus allowing for differences of culture, is yet another example of the legislative licence. (There is no difference here whether by "hakim" we mean the judge or the State, because if the judge is a State authority and possesses executive power, he may select some particular ta`zirat and issue a circular to the regional judges, and his directive shall be considered valid. Some jurisprudents have explicitly confirmed this point.)
The principle of la `usr wa la haraj, and that of la darar wa la dirar are other important bases for variation of the ahkam. [2]Many of the ahkam al‑khiyarat (that is, those ahkam in which one of the parties is free to dissolve an agreement) have emerged in fiqh as a result of the principle of ld darar wa la dirar. The same is true of exigency (idtirar) and the Secondary Laws (al‑ ahkam al‑thanawiyyah).
The primary role of ijtihad in law‑making is to distinguish between the fixed and the variable ahkam. This is not an easy job because of the presence of numerous ambiguities (mutashabihat). Furthermore, the mujtahid has to undertake a close investigation, discriminating between the essentials and nonessentials of Islam in the fatwa's of the past mujtahidun, and employ his deductive skills‑which are evidently not free from the influence of his particular conditions and times'‑to deduce the hukum of the Shari'ah from the original texts and sources. In this way, he is able to confirm or deny the conformity of a certain proposed law with the Islamic principles. It is on this basis that the Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran states that: "In order to ensure that the laws passed by the Assembly do not contradict the Islamic laws and the Constitution, a Guardianship Council shall be formed, consisting of : (1) Six qualified jurisprudents who are aware of the needs of the time and contemporary problems. The nomination of such persons is the responsibility of the Leader or the Leadership Council. (2) Six lawyers qualified in various branches of jurisprudence from among Muslim jurists whose names are proposed to the Assembly by the Supreme Judicial Council. Their appointment is approved by the Assembly."
Notes:
End of Discussion
At the end of this discussion, it seems pertinent to call attention to certain points:
1. Some have considered legislation as exclusively a Divine prerogative, and deny that God has deputed any agent with legislative powers. Such legislative powers of a Divine agent are unacceptable to them even in the case of the Holy Prophet (S). The Prophet's Sunnah, or for that matter of all other prophets, is looked upon by them as fulfilment of the Law given in entirety by God. However, it is quite simple to accept this view with the explanation that the Sunnah of the prophets ‑and for that matter all the laws laid down by the uli al‑ amr ‑has a relation to the ahkam revealed by God corresponding to the relation between ordinary regulations approved by the cabinet of ministers to the constitution. Or perhaps it would be more correct to compare this relationship with that between ordinary laws and the constitution, admitting that in some cases the Prophetic Sunnah may be comparable to the regulations approved by the Executive.
2. The legislative powers of the Imams (A) are more restricted than that of the Holy Prophet (S). Therefore, they did not allow themselves the right of ijtihad in the presence of nass (i.e. explicit Divine or Prophetic text), and recommended the criterion of conflict with the Sunnah as a valid ground for rejecting a hadith as untrue. Nevertheless, some elements of the Prophetic Sunnah may be variablean issue which in itself calls for an elaborate discussion.
3. The distinction between the law and fatwa's of the mujtahidun is also clear. The fatwa is a product of ijtihad and the faqih's deductive endeavour. It is based on research in the four sources of fiqh, namely the Book, the Sunnah, reason and ijma` (the last of which is again derived from the Sunnah), and giving of final verdict on the basis of various proofs (adillah). At the end of this process the faqih declares his verdict that the hukm of the Shari'ah is such and such in such and such a matter. The issue may pertain to the `ibadat, the personal matters (al'ahwal al‑shakhsiyyah), or problems of political, economic, social or military significance. Of course, it is possible that such a fatwa may be proclaimed as a law by the State.
But the law, on the other hand, is approved by the State authorities with view to such factors as the needs of the time, demands of the welfare of the Ummah, and, occasionally; the requirements of exigency, with due observance of the general principles of Islam. The law derives its legitimacy from the power of the State. Of course, in an Islamic State the legitimacy of the State's authority is also derived from God. In other words, the distinction between the fatwa's of the mujtahidun and the law passed by the State with respect to the Divine ahkam is similar to one between a recommendation and an order.
4. Another issue is that of the policy of the Islamic State in regard to the problem of the diversity of fatwa's. In the Islamic State, like any other form of government, the sovereignty of the State laws should extend over the whole of society. Plurality of law, of whatever kind and in whatever form, is equivalent to anarchy and chaos.
However, the diversity of fatwa's, does not cause any difficulty as long as they are related to personal rituals and duties. But in relation to the affairs of the State where the law should ordinarily prevail, all citizens being obliged to obey it uniformly, if everyone followed a different fatwa, the affairs of the State would not only go out of the control of the authorities, but would also result in a general chaos on the level of the judicial and executive wings of the State itself.
Therefore, the only rational alternative is that all citizens should recognize the duty to obey one of the diverse fatwa's which is selected by the supreme legislative body of the State on the basis of the criteria of superior jurisprudential soundness and completeness of conformity with the demands of public welfare, and proclaimed as law. Moreover, this duty of general obedience to the State laws is based on the obligatory duty of a Muslim to obey the uli al‑'amr (the legitimate authority) and the rational need for prevalence of general law and order.
Also, there cannot be any valid objection from the viewpoint of the Shari'ah against this; because there is no proviso for validity of legislation except absence of contradiction with the Islamic principles and criteria, and agreement with one of the reliable non‑exceptional fatwa's.
From the viewpoint of the problem of diversity of fatwa's as far as I have knowledge at the moment, the late Sayyid Isma'il al‑Sadr has affirmed this position in his footnotes on al‑Tashri` al jina’i fi al‑'Islam ("Penal Legislation in Islam").
We may emphasize again that the consequence of following diverse fatwa's is something which cannot be accepted by anyone. No State will allow the right to different sections of the public to reject government regulations regarding, for example, compulsory military training, payment of taxes, commercial and trade laws, etc. under the pretext that they do not agree with the fatwa of the mujtahid whom they follow (marji` taqlid). This is especially true if we have on hand an anomalous faqih who considers every modern phenomenon as bid `ah (heresy), who justifies smuggling and contraband transactions on the basis that (the people have authority over their assets), who denies the right of ownership to the State, gives the right to legislate to none, and, ultimately, considering the State illegitimate and taghuti (non‑Islamic) because it does not conform to his views, wants to see the Islamic Republic toppled in the same way as we overthrew the regime of the ex‑Shah!
5. Nationality: Nationality is a kind of political relationship which connects an individual with a certain State or country, in a way that his rights and duties are derived from this relationship.
Nationality is one of the issues of international law and has been incorporated in the constitutions and civil codes of countries. The Iranian civil code, in imitation of the French civil code, assigns its Articles 976 to 991 to the matter of nationality or citizenship. It recognizes certain rights and duties for the country's citizens, which are not recognized for foreigners. In general, the bases for citizenship are blood and soil, that is, the country of birth and the nationality of the parents. In certain cases, the acquisition of citizenship on the basis of marriage is also allowed for. The Iranian civil code accepts both blood and soil in particular cases. Nationality in this sense is one of the notions accepted by all governments for exercising control over their country's frontiers and relations with other States.
However, citizenship or nationality in this sense is non‑existent in Islam (although we, in the Islamic Republic, are compelled to accept it for reasons of need and advisability. It is one of the instances in which the legislator in the Islamic State can legislate laws with due observance of the Islamic principles and welfare of the Ummah. To respect such laws is a duty in accordance with the obligation to obey the uli al‑'amr).
Islam is a universal religion and is not limited to any particular tribe, nation, race or region. The earth belongs to God and mankind are all His creation. Accordingly, the laws of Islam are uniformly enforceable in all places. Islam addresses its message to all human beings, Muslims and non‑Muslims, whether they live in Muslim lands or elsewhere; although, practically, its laws are enforceable only in relation to Muslims and that too only in the territories of an Islamic State.
From the viewpoint of Islam, the world is divided into dar al'Islam (the House of Islam) and dar al‑kufr (the House of Kufr). The dar al‑kufr may be either dar al‑barb (the House of war) or dar al‑'aman (the House of Amnesty). The dar al‑'Islam is the territory under the sovereignty of an Islamic State, wherein the Muslims can freely perform their religious duties. The dar al‑kufr is the territory under the control of non‑Muslim States, where the Muslims are not free to exercise their religious duties and practise Islam. If the dar al‑kufr should entertain hostilities with Muslims, it is called dar al‑harb. But if a treaty between it and the Islamic State exists, then it is called dar al‑dhimmah or dar al‑'aman.
The dar al‑'Islam has its own specific laws. In it persons of doubtful religious identity are treated as Muslims, and, for example, a slaughtered beast of doubtful legitimacy is treated as halal (permissible). On the other hand, in the dar al‑kufr, persons of doubtful religious identity are treated as non Muslims, and a slaughtered beast of doubtful legitimacy is treated as haram (forbidden). The Muslim, whatever corner of the world he may inhabit, is treated as a citizen of Islam and its subject; he has the same rights and duties as other Muslims, regardless of wherever he may live‑in the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. or China or somewhere else. However, if in the dar al‑kufr it is not possible for him to fulfil his Islamic duties, it is obligatory for him to migrate to another place. Also, from the viewpoint of execution of the hudud and ta`zirat, there is no difference whether the culprit is a resident of dar al‑ Islam or of dar al‑kufr. The non‑Muslim, regardless of wherever he may live, does not enjoy the privileges of a Muslim, although in respect of the universal sovereignty of Islam he is obliged to perform the duties imposed by Islam on all mankind.
The non‑Muslim is considered absolutely a foreigner regardless of whether he lives in a Muslim or a non Muslim country. If he is a dhimmi and fulfils what is required of the dhl al‑dhimmah, he enjoys the privileges of the ahl al‑dhimmah. Then his life, property, and honour are to be respected, and he enjoys certain freedoms within the limits specified in the Islamic Law. In exchange for his commitments, he is under the protection of the Islamic State. If he does not accept the conditions of a dhimmi, or violates them, he is treated as a muhdrib (in the state of belligerence).
If he is a mustamin, that is, a muharib granted amnesty by the Islamic State‑and in general such amnesty is provisional‑he is under the protection of Muslims and no one has the right to offend him. If he is in a state of belligerence with Muslims, there being no agreement or pact between him and the Muslims, his life and property have no guarantee of security.
To be certain, the Islamic hudud and ta`zirat in respect of criminals are the same for non‑Muslims as for Muslims, except for the offences of the ahl al‑dhimmah which are permitted by their canon.
To summarize, citizenship and nationality in Islam is on the basis of belief. Islam recognizes no other criterion except faith. Every individual acquires citizenship individually on the basis of faith. Even the husband and the wife do not derive their citizenship from each other. Children are subject to the parents' citizenship until maturity. If the parents are non‑Muslims, the children are also considered the same. If one of the parents is a Muslim, the children too are considered Muslims.
1. It is essential to note here that accepting the wilayah of a non‑ma'sum is a concession dictated by need; because only a ma'sum may properly hold sovereignty over people in his capacity as the vicegerent or deputy of God par excellence (khalifat Alldh); his commands being indisputable commands of God. However,in the case of the absence of the ma `sum, on the one hand, and the unacceptability of chaos and anarchy, on the other hand, we are forced to concede to the selection of a ruler in the descending order of priority mentioned here. At every level of choice, we are further forced to make concession in case of absence of a candidate with the desirable qualifications. Of course, the procedure and conditions for selection of the State authority call for an elaborate discussion, in its own right‑a matter which is beyond the scope of this article.
2. Al‑Shahid al‑'Awwal (Muhammad ibn Makki) in his work, al‑Qawa'id, says:
The permission to choose an easier and more practicable alternative (yusr) when practice of a hukm involves difficulty and hardship is based on the Divine verses: " ... He (God) has laid on you no impediment (haraj) in your religion ...." (22:78); and "... God desires ease (yusr) for you, and desires not hardship (`usr) .... " (2:185); and also on such traditions of the Prophet (S) as; "I have been sent with an easy and lenient Islam ...." and "Id darar wa la dirar fi al‑ Islam". All kinds of licences authorized by the Shari'ah are derived from this principle.
It is obvious that such cases of licence do not contradict, in the least, the hadith:
The halal and haram of Muhammad (S) are valid to the Judgement Day.
Or the statement of Imam 'Ali (A):
No one ever started a bid'ah without thereby discarding a sunnah (of the Holy Prophet). (al‑Wafi, vol. I, pp. 59‑60)
The above traditions relate to condemnation of bid `ah (innovation or heresy) in the faith; not to unchangeability of all the ahkdm of Islam.
3. One cannot deny the influence of such factors as social and geographical environments; personal temperament; major contemporary events and general conditions, such as war and peace; general and personal economic conditions such as plenty or famine, or prosperity or poverty; family background and education; degree of success or failure in life; the type of contemporary rule and rulers whether oppressive or not, and scores of such other factors on the process of deduction of the ahkam of the Shari'ah by a mujtahid. A faqih who has grown up in the dry and waterless deserts of Hijaz will not approach the issues of taharah and najasah (ritual purity and impurity) in the same way as a faqih who comes from a place like Mazandaran (with plenty of rainfall, rivers and streams‑a region covered with green, dense forests). A faqih used to poverty and destitution will differ in his interpretation and application of the ahkam of the Shari'ah from one who grows up in the midst of prosperity and general welfare. Their views will not agree about the meaning of istita`ah for the Hajj pilgrimage and they will hardly agree about what constitutes israf (wastefulness). A mujtahid of the days of Qajar rule may be expected to share few points of agreement with the faqih who has lived through the days of Islamic Revolution, about the issues of jihad and the duty of al‑ amr bi alma'ruf wa al‑nahy `an al‑munkar.
Unfortunately this point is not given sufficient attention. If due attention had been paid to this matter, it would have been much easier and simpler to revise many fatwa's and to recognize one's right to be sceptical about the juristic conclusions and opinions of the past. In any case, it is one of the essential requirements for a living practice of ijtihad in every era to recognize the variability and relativity introduced into the mujtahid's judgements on account of changing conditions and circumstances. It is as essential to understand the possibility that a later faqih may understand the same original sources differently and find in them things which were not visible to the earlier fuqaha'. If we understand this issue, it will give a greater dynamism to the Islamic fiqh and allow it to be more answerable to the needs of times. It is also evident that the influence of conditions of environment by no means deprives the faqih of the validity of his fatwa's. Otherwise, no fatwa of anyone would ever be valid. However, realization of this point can awaken us to the need for a living study of various problems in every age and the need for courage to reevaluate the opinions of others.
Source: Ahmad Jannati
Imam reza network
Guardianship of the Jurists (Fuqaha)
The guardianship of the Jurists is the process of continuity of Imamate. In this context according to several hundred traditions of the Holy Prophet which have been narrated by accredited companions of the Holy Prophet the number of infallible Imams is twelve. Eleven of the twelve exalted personages have been martyred after him through poisoning or with swords because they fought against the despots of their times. Our twelfth Imam, Imam Mahdi is in occultation and according to hundreds of reliable traditions he will reappear by Allah's command to establish a just government. Since people have not been able to accept his leadership, Allah has kept him in His Protection until an opportune time.
As for example when a certain government lights eleven lamps and the people extinguish them it will preserve the last lamp at a safe place and will not light it until people become so much mature and enlightened that they understand the utility of light.
Similarly when Allah sent eleven infallible Imams and the people tortured them, made them captives and martyred them, Allah has kept the twelfth Imam in His safe custody until the opportune time. On the other hand Allah has not left us to ourselves without guidance during the period of occultation of the twelfth Imam Mahdi but He has entrusted us to just, pious and virtuous jurists so that we may faithfully follow them.
Therefore, it is incumbent on all Muslims to protect the Islamic system and obey the commands of Allah which the just jurists issue.
Islam has such rules and regulations in different fields of activities, financial, economic, punitive, administrative and judicial that these cannot remain suspended, nor can they be controlled by ignorant and selfish people. Islam does not allow that a particular group of persons may start ruling the other. Thus Islam has entrusted the job of enforcing the rules and regulations to the jurists and pious people only so that they may issue decrees in accordance with the Divine Commandments. The obedience to these jurists by the people is as obligatory as it is to the Holy Prophet and the Infallible Imam.
The Role of the Jurist
Now a number of questions arises here. Do the Muslims need some system of Government? Should an Islamic State be protected and defended or not? Should the lands be safeguarded? Should laws be promulgated in an Islamic State? Should the right of the oppressed be restored to him? Should or should not the voice of Islam reach every nook and corner of the world? Were the teachings of the Prophets and the Imams confined to their time only or were they applicable to all places and all times? If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative and Islam has its own system of social structure and laws and regulations, and the rights should be honoured, and the land should be safeguarded then the form of government must be Islamic, because without a system based on just and correct lines, especially when the enemies of Islam have a big farcically alluring system with them, we cannot protect our religion, laws, country, life, property and honour.
If the government is necessary then the ruler is also necessary, because the government cannot be run without a ruler. Therefore, since Islam needs a government for enforcing its laws, we should find out the qualifications of the ruler and know whether he has a deep understanding of the Divine commandments, is just and competent, and can appreciate and face difficulties. If it is necessary that the ruler should be a true Muslim, well-informed, pious, virtuous and statesman, then that person must be a jurist, and his government will be called the government of the jurist.
Those, who do not believe in the concept of the guardianship of a jurist should study the following view-points and accept anyone of them.
(i) Islam is confined only to prayers, fasting, individual worship, moral values only and it does not envisage the solution of social problems, justice, political and economic problems.
(ii) Islam was only meant for the duration of the lifetime of the Holy Prophet only, and it was abandoned after him and now its important social problems are confined only in books.
(iii) Important social laws should be enforced by the ignorant and wicked persons only.
If none of the above-quoted view-points is acceptable or appeals to reason, then we must accept the guardianship of the jurist, which means that the enforcement of Islamic laws and solution of difficult problems should be solved by eminent Muslim scholars and thus we must not think that the guardianship of the jurist is unjustifiable.
Is it not narrated from Imam Ja'far Sadiq that "in the Holy Qur'an all the individual and collective needs of the society have been described". (al-Kafi, vol. I, p. 59)
Hence, are the government, ruler, administration and various fields of human activities not included among the important needs of the society?
The Holy Prophet said, "I am grateful to Allah that I have described all the requirements of the Ummah before my death".
Is there not the need of a ruler and the government during the occultation period of Imam Mahdi in the Islamic society?
Imam Ali Riza while dealing with the problem of guardianship says, "There is no nation which is without its leader and the social structure of a society is directly concerned with the leader and that people should manage the public treasury by keeping an account of its income and expenditure, organize the society, fight against the enemies and protect the society from internal dissensions and disunity. If there is not going to be any such leader, then the nation will break up into pieces and the Divine commandments and the teachings of the Holy Prophet will be tampered with at the command of despotic ruler". (Biharul Anwar, vol. VI, p. 60)
You will note that the question of leadership and the government has been stated to be the most important problem by Imam Ali Riza. It is obvious that for the benefit of the poor masses management of the public treasury, equitable distribution of wealth, struggle against enemies, administration of social institutions are not such that they are only concerned with the time of the previous infallible Imams and that the Ummah should be left to itself during the occultation of our living Imam Mahdi that is to say, there should be no need of a government or a ruler during the period of occultation.
Thus Islam acknowledges the existence of the society and the necessity of the government and its ruler, but what is important is that we should know the conditions and qualifications of the ruler, and what type of the government it should be and how it should carry on the administration.
According to common sense and keeping in view the various Islamic narrations, the responsibility of the government should be laid on the shoulders of the just jurist. We reproduce here excerpts from some narrations:
(i) The Holy Prophet considered the jurists as his caliph. 506
(ii) The living Imam Mahdi with his own hand wrote in reply to a letter: "You should refer to our narrators about your problems and difficulties for they are our argument and proof on you just as we are the argument and proof of Allah".
(iii) When Imam Ja'far Sadiq was asked about the problems which are referred to despotic administration for decision he said, "Referring to these departments is very bad because it is referring to the despot and if someone gets back his right from these despotic departments it becomes unlawful. On such occasions however, it is your duty to refer to those people who know our teachings and narrations fully well, because I declare them as the qazi (Judge) for you. Thus you should remember that if this jurist has given you his decision and you consider it worthless it is as if you have considered the Divine command as worthless. If anyone disobeys these jurists, it is as if he has disobeyed us, and whosoever disobeys us, has in fact disobeyed Allah and this action amounts to polytheism".
(iv) The Holy Prophet said, "Scholars are the successors of the Prophets". (Wasa'il, vol. XVIII, chapter 11)
(v) Imam Kazim said "Jurists are the fortresses of Islam". (Kitabal Bai', Ayatullah Khumayni)
(vi) Allah has taken an assurance from the scholars that they would not pass over the gluttony and oppression of the despots in silence and would not ignore the hunger of the poor. (Sermon—7, Peak of Eloquence, ISP, 1984)
Naturally in a society supporting the oppressed and crushing the tyrant do need a government or its operative agency.
(vii) In the Holy Qur'an we have been taught that in a society we should stick to justice. Can justice in a society be maintained without the existence of a government or a ruler?
(viii) Imam Husayn says, "Discharging of the duties and the enforcement of laws should be in the hands of the scholars, God-fearing and pious persons. These are the people who do not make any changes in the Divine commands pertaining to lawful and unlawful things, and who are the custodians of trusts". (Tuhaful 'Uqul, p. 242)
(ix) Imam Ali says, "Scholars are the rulers of the people". (Ghurarul Hikam, quoted from al-Hayat, vol. II, p. 293)
Thus it is deduced that in an Islamic society the head of the government should be a just jurist with all the prescribed qualifications. These very jurists are the authorized representatives of the infallible Imams during the period of the occultation of our living Imam Mahdi. If the authority and guardianship of the jurist is terminated, the despots would raise their heads and the Divine commandments will be altered.
• It is not known as to what is the objective of those people who oppose the jurist?
• Do they say that for Muslims no government and no administration is necessary?
• Do they say that some system is necessary but there is no necessity of an administrator, ruler or guardian?
• Do they say that guardians and the rulers of the people should be those who have no concern with Islam?
• Do they say that the ruler should be a jurist and Muslim but it is not necessary that he should be just and pious?
• Do they consider that guardianship of the jurist is some sort of a dominating force? Is the jurist a representative of a particular group or class of people?
• Does the selfishness of the jurist not nullify his sense of justice and fair-play by which his guardianship in the society will automatically cease to exist?
Is the acceptance of the jurist's guardianship tantamount to setting up various centres of authority and domination?
When it is meant that the laws and commandments which have passed through the channel of a just jurist may not be diverted to divergent and un-Islamic directions, their representatives are delegated all the powers to exercise their authority on their behalf. Hence there is no question of setting up independent centres of authority and power, as actually the authority and power only emanate from the Divine commands which are enforced by the just jurist only.
We would ask those who oppose the guardianship of the jurist as to whom they want to entrust the affairs of the Ummah? We ask whether the Muslims should not follow someone in their affairs or is their following restricted to worship of Allah only? Is there not the possibility of a lawful or an unlawful thing in matters of social problems such as strikes, rehabilitation, travels, disputes, agreements, pacts, appointments, dismissal etc.? Should we not follow some jurist in all those matters where there is a question of lawfulness and unlawfulness? Should the leadership of the Muslims be entrusted to an un-Islamic leader? Will it not be like handing over the administration of a medical college to a man who is not a physician himself?
Is the handing over of the Ummah to an unjust ruler not a great injustice to humanity?
Has the time not come when we should protect ourselves from false leadership, unscrupulous politicians and professional opportunists, we should come under the Islamic protection, and accept only that leadership, which is compatible with the standard laid down by Qur'anic revelations.
However, the topic of Imamate has become a little lengthy but it would have been an injustice if we had not dealt with the leadership of the people and its way and means during the occultation period of our present Imam Mahdi.
Muhsin Qaraati
Source: Imam reza network
A Glance at the Fundamentals of the Trusteeship of the Jurisprudent (Wilayat al-faqih)
Regarding the worship of the men, what is understood/derived from the Holy Quran is that the most perfect and outstanding attribute for the man is to be the servant of Allah, because the perfection of every being/creature is to move on the basis of its own genetic system. And since he himself is not fully aware of this route and its aim, Allah should guide him and clarify the reality of the man and the universe and the mutual relation of the man and the universe.
The relation/connection of the man with all the phenomena from the one hand and his ignorance/negligence to the quality of these relations from the other hand specify the necessity of a guide that is an absolute knowing.
If the man distinguishes this route properly, in other words if he is the servant of Allah and accepts His Lordship and His Awareness about all of these cases, then he will attain the best perfection.
Therefore, the most important perfection that the Glorious Allah propounds in the Holy Quran is “uboudiyah” that means ‘servantship or devotion’.
“ All praise is God’s’ Who sent down upon His servant the Book (the Qur’an)...” (Quran: XVIII, 1)
Just as isra’ and ascension (`urouj) are based on `uboudiyah, the revelation of the Divine Book and its descent are on the basis of `uboudiyah.
The man should fly from the platform of `uboudiyah if he wants to have isra’ or ascension (mi`raj) and likes/wills that his heart becomes the place of the descent of revelation.
The verses “Glory be to Him Who carried His servant (Apostle Muhammad) by night ... “ (Quran, XVII, 1) and “Then revealed He unto His servant what He did reveal.” (Quran: LIII, 10), and the verse “ All praise is God’s’ Who sent down upon His servant the Book (the Qur’an)...” (Quran: XVIII, 1) all are on the basis of `uboudiyah.
This fact is not special for the religious sciences [/knowledge if the religion] and the eternal sciences, but also the people who have wilayee knowledge and rule of the basis of inwardness guide the others, they too have attained this position on the basis of `uboudiyah.
While mentioning the story of Khidr (the prophet), Allah the Exhaled says: “Then found they one, from among Our servants...” (Quran, XVIII, 65).
Moses, the Interlocutor of Allah had already been appointed to benefit from one of special servants of Allah that has taken some advantage of intuitive knowledge (`ilm ladunni). So both Khidr and the Holy Prophet [of Islam] have attained this position through `uboudiyah and Allah’s Favor.
The nest point is that in order to attain the state of prophecy, caliphate, Imamate and similar states, `uboudiyah is the essential although not sufficient condition, whereas the Divine Favor and Grace and Allah’s knowledge to the futurity, all have efficient roles.
It is not true that if a person becomes a perfect servant of Allah, he will become a prophet or an Imam. However, he will become a friend (waliyy) of Allah and not his prophet of messenger, since “God knoweth best where to place His apostleship” (Quran: VI, 124). Furthermore the man himself should possess the perfection of `uboudiyah.
At times Allah grants the knowledge, spirituality and even greatness to some people but none of them are used properly. As the holy verse “Relate unto them the news of him whom We gave Our signs, but he withdrew (himself) from them...” (Quran: VII, 175) indicates, Allah grants the vital/key positions such as prophecy, caliphate, Imamate and so on to particular individuals but it is possible that He grants some greatness, intuitions and spiritual knowledge to other people as tentative positions, because the human perfection is through `uboudiyah and it is exclusively for Allah [/just Allah deserves it (`uboudiyah)]. “hAnd commanded thy Lord hath that thou shalt worship not (any one) but Him,…” (Quran: XVII, 23) that indicates that nobody deserves to be worshiped and worshipping other than Allah is not permissible.
Guardianship of the Saints (Righteous)
If it is proved that the perfection of man is amidst servantship, and man is exclusively a servant of Allah, so whosoever other than Allah cannot be the real guardian of anybody so that we could say that God is the genuine guardian. And whosoever other than Him, like the prophets and saints are subordinate guardians.
After it became clear that the guardianship of the prophets and saints is not genuine, the guardianship of jurisconsult (wilayat al-faqih) becomes clear and many doubts will be solved.
It is important to make it clear that how many real guardians in a linear sequence there are for man.
Consider the guardianship of a father or a grandfather upon the interdicted child. Either of them who executes the guardianship, there will be no opportunities for guardianship of the latter. Is the guardianship upon the society of this kind/category? Or is it in a linear sequence? ...
The intellectual argument that is confirmed by Quranic verses necessitates that the perfection of man is to submit/obey one who is aware of the reality of the man and the universe and the mutual relation/... between them. He is nobody but Allah; therefore, the worship and guardianship are exclusively for Him, that is the only guardian of man is Allah.
So it cannot be true that the man has many guardians some of them are genuine and the others are subordinate, in other words, some are close guardians and some are far ones, rather the man has one real guardian that is Allah.
Considering the lifestyle of the prophets, their most elegant courtesy is the monotheist courtesy. All their acts are based on this verse: “ Verily my prayer and my sacrifice, my life and my death, (are all, only) for God, the Lord of the worlds.” (Quran: VI, 162). Although this verse addresses the Holy Prophet, however, the life and death of all the prophets and the Infallible are for the sake of Allah.
While the Holy Quran ascribes the power, strength, glory/honor, bread and some other affairs to other than Allah, it concludes that these are exclusively for Allah.
Regarding glory/honor Allah bid: “But for God is all honor and for His Apostle and for the believers…” (Quran: LXIII, 8) At the same time in another surah He bid: “God’s (alone) is all honor...” (Quran: XXXV, 10). Concerning ‘power/might’ bid: “ (The Lord said unto Zachariah’s son) O’ Yahya! Hold thou the Book fast!” (Quran: XIX, 12). And addressed the children of Israel: “Hold ye fast that which We have bestowed upon you with the strength (of determination) …” (Quran: II, 63) and addressed the Muslim combatants: but at the same time then bid: “And prepare ye against them wgatever (force) ye can…” (Quran: VIII, 60).
Then Allah bid: “…Unto God belongeth all power…” (Quran: II, 165)
Another instance is ‘sustenance/bread’. Allah is introduced as ‘the Best Provider’, that indicates that there are some other providers but Allah is the best of them. However, in another verse Allah bid: “Verily, God He (alone) is the Bestower of sustenance, the Lord of unbreakable strength.” (Quran: LI, 58) According to Arabic rhetoric in indicates that God is the only provider.
Regarding intercession (shafa`ah), a number of intercessors are recognized in the Holy Quran as God says: “” It is denoted that there are many intercessors, however, in other verses emphasizes that the genuine intercession is only for God “Who is he that can intercede with Him but with His permission?” (Quran: II, 255).
It is true for guardianship. In surah Ma’idah God says: “Verily, your guardian is (none else but) God and His Apostle (Muhammad) and those who believe, - those who establish prayer and pay the poor-rate, while they be (even) bowing down (in prayer).” (Quran: V, 57). In this verse by assistance of the traditions the guardianship is proved for the Holy Prophet and the members of his household (Ahl al-Bayt). The issue is even clearer in surah Ahzab in which God says: “The Prophet (Muhammad) hath a greater claim on the believers than they have on their own selves” (Quran: XXXIII, 6). The guardianship of the Holy Prophet upon the lives and the properties of the individuals is higher than /prior to their own selves. That is why God says in surah Ahzab: “And it is not for a believer man or woman to have any choice in their affair when God and His Apostle have decided a matter...” (Quran: XXXIII, 36). Despite these three verses God underscores in another surah that guardianship is exclusively for God: “Or have they taken besides Him guardians? But God, He is the Guardian...” (Quran: XLII, 9).
This indicates that the guardianship of the apostle, the Infallible and the saints are not equal to that of Allah. And since the guardianship is exclusively for Him,
His guardianship cannot be an intermediary of affirmation of the guardianship for anybody except Allah.
As a [philosophical] example, if water is placed beside fire, it really gets warm. This nearness to fire is an intermediary for getting water warm. In this state the qualification of water to warmth is a real qualification, and this nearness to fire is an intermediary in affirmation and not in occurrence. But consider the same fire placed in front of a mirror. In the mirror you can see the flames of fire rising but it is only the reflection of fire, so the mirror does not get warm due to the flames reflected therein.
The verses * and * do not mean that the Glory of God is an intermediary for affirmation of glory for the Holy Prophet and the saints. Otherwise the Glory of God will become limited, because if a number of glories exist, then none of them can be unlimited. The infinite leaves no opportunities for another individual however limited, rather the Glory of God becomes the intermediary for occurrence of glory for them. The Holy Quran has an elegant term/statement in this regard that is that these are signs and tokens/symbols of God, namely if a believer is glorious, he is a sign and token/symbol of God’s Glory. Also if the Holy Prophet is a guardian, his guardianship is a symbol of God’s Guardianship. The saints of God are symbols of the Divine Guardianship, and they demonstrate the Divine Attributes, while others are dark and obscure and do not indicate the nominal, attributive or actual perfection.
Allamah Tabataba’i, our teacher said frequently: “This fact that the religion has declared that there is no creature in no conditions that is not the symbol/token of God, is an elegant expression. Because, if it is a symbol of God, then it is not independent, since if it was independent, then it could not reflect/manifest God.
Therefore, * and * are essentially (bi al-dhat), then * is accidental (bi al-`arad). By this explanation the interpretation of the verses *, * and * becomes clear.
Allah, the Exalted, asked Moses, the interlocutor:
- “Why didn’t you visit me when I was sick?”
Moses answered: “But You never become sick.”
- “That believer servant that was sick is my manifestation (incarnates Me). If you respected him, you would respect Me.”
These are not allusion, trope/allegory, metaphor and simile, rather they indicate seeing God reflected in the mirror of [the heart of] a believer. Then one understands that the others (other than Allah) are nothing, and Allah has not ** in anybody. The same as fire flame or sunshine that do not ** in the mirror, and do not unite with it. Thus the ** and the unification are impossible.
By the assistance of such a sight the divine guardian knows his position properly and is aware of being the creatures symbols/tokens [of God].
Guardianship upon the Elite
The guardianship of the Prophet and the Imam upon the society is not such as the guardianship upon the fool, the madman, and the interdicted persons.
Otherwise it is counted a contempt/disgrace to the people and a desecration to the guardianship of the jurisconsult.
He who undertakes the guardianship upon a madman, a fool or a young child, organizes/administrates them according to his own thought and opinions. So regarding playing, entertainment, sleeping, feeding and other affairs he treats according to his own desire and will. This is the indication of the guardianship upon the interdicted. However the guardianship of the Prophet, the Imam and his successor is not of this kind, rather their guardianship refers to that of Allah, that is the religion and its school themselves undertake the leadership and guardianship of the society. The reason is that whereas the people are under guardianship of the religion, the real personality of the Prophet and other infallible persons is under the guardianship of the religion and their legal personality.
For the Infallible - from the aspect that they are infallible – have nothing except from Allah. [For instance] if the Holy Prophet as a trustee of the divine revelation receives a verdict of fatwa from Allah and announces it to the people, it is obligatory for all, including the Prophet to act according to such a fatwa.
For instance, Allah has bidden: “They ask thee for a decree (about the Law): Say, (O’ Our Apostle Muhammad
God giveth you a decision...”(Quran: IV, 176) “This is Allah’s fatwa. Narrate it to the people.” Once this fatwa is announced to the people by the Prophet, it will become obligatory for all, even the Prophet, to act accordingly.
Another example is about the guardianship verdicts such as coming to a rupture with a certain tribe, or expelling/banishing, the Jews for instance from the city. So submitting such an injunction is obligatory and therefore, violating it is forbidden even for the Prophet.
It is also true for the judges. For instance, when two hostile parties attended the law court of the Holy Prophet, and he judged about them, once the judgement is finished and the verdict is issued, then violating that verdict is forbidden and therefore, following it is compulsory even for the Prophet. So there is no privilege for the Prophet in this regard. After the Prophet, the same is true for the Infallible Imam, and if he has a special deputy such as Malik Ashtar (Imam Ali’s companion) and Muslim ibn `Aqil (Imam Husayn’s deputy) the same position is true for them.
In case there is no special deputies, the same position is true for the general deputy (na’ib `amm).
Did the late Imam Khomeini have any [special] privilege to the Iranian nation in this regard? Whenever he issued a fatwa, it was obligatory even for Imam Khomeini himself to act accordingly. Or when he judged that the Israeli embassy should be wound up/closed, it was compulsory for all, including he himself to follow this judgement. Since he has no personal privilege in this regard, nobody can object that accepting the guardianship of the jurisconsult means that Iranian nation, for instance, are interdicted!
It has become clear that the guardianship of the jurisconsult is not of the kind of the guardianship upon the madmen or the interdicted, rather it is the guardianship of the school [of thought] (religion) guardian of which is an infallible person or his just deputy. The Prophet himself is under the guardianship of the school, in the other words, the real personality of the Prophet, the Imams or other individuals are the subset of the guarded, and his legal personality is the guardian.
Now that the meaning of guardian (waliyy) became clear, no harm would occur for the monotheism, that is accepting the guardianship of the saints becomes equal to monotheism. Because according to the verse: “But God, He is the Guardian...” (Quran: XLII, 9) the individuals in the society are the servants of Allah, and He is their real Guardian, while the saints are His symbols and tokens. Like a mirror that reflects the Guardianship of Allah and not like boiling water, for instance that got hot due to the fire.
In this state one takes pride in the guardianship, for he is under the guardianship of Allah. As an example, take a tree. It needs suitable water and air to grow. These two are of vital importance. The role of guardianship upon the society is like that of water and air for a tree. If one likes to become the blessed tree of Touba, he should follow this way.
The late Imam Khomeini emphasized: “Support the guardianship of the jurisconsult so that your country remain secure.” The reason was that the tree of humanity should grow in good conditions. Necessarily an expert in Islam who believes in it should take the reins of government so that when he issues an injunction, before the others he acts himself acts accordingly. This is the meaning of the guardianship of the jurisconsult that returns to the guardianship of jurisprudence and justice. Otherwise nobody has guardianship upon the others.
In the guardianship of a father upon his son the father is not obliged to act according to his order before his son, and subsequently the son cannot object why his father did not act accordingly first. While in the guardianship of the jurisconsult if he do not follow his order before the others, the nation has the right and option to object him.
Imam Ali, the master of the believers, said: “We never ordered you to do a certain duty unless we excelled you to act accordingly.” The message of prophet Shu`ayb (Jethro) in the Holy Quran is: “I desire not that in opposition to you I betake myself unto that which I forbid you from it....” (Quran: XI, 88)
It has become clear [through the past discussions] that if the guardianship of the Prophet and Imams is for the sake of their real and not legal personality,
thus the guardianship of the just jurisconsults too, is considering their legal personality that is jurisprudence and justice. So nobody can cheat the people that if they accept the guardianship of the jurisconsult it means the [recognition] that they are interdicted. Because the people are intelligent and understand whether this guardianship is that of upon the interdicted or that of upon the free human beings.
Genetic and Legislative Guardianship
Guardianship is divided in two kinds: genetic (takwini) and legislative (tashri`i). As examples of the first kind, Allah is the guardian of man and universe. The human self has guardianship upon its inner powers/faculties and also upon every kind of application of the imaginative and imaginary faculties, as well as upon its healthy members/parts of body. Once the self orders to see or to hear, the eye and the ear will submit provided the member is not paralyzed or maimed.
This kind of wilayah returns to cause and effect. Each cause is the wali of the effect, and every effect is under guardianship of a cause. The causality of the cause is either as reality or as a manifestation of the real cause. If the causality of a thing is real, its wilayah will be real, too, and if its causality is a manifestation of the real cause, its wilayah too will be a manifestation of the real wilayah.
Legislative guardianship means that one person is the guardian of the others according to law. A part of this kind of guardianships refers to jurisprudential issues, another part returns to the ethical affairs, while the rest refer to the theological issues.
In the genetic guardianship it is impossible to violate. For instance, once the self has determined to imagine an image in the mind, it will be drawn in the mind instantly
If man wills to bring, for instance, the holy shrine of Imam Riza in his mind, once he wills, the imaginary image of that place will come to his mind. It is not true that if one’s internal system/organ is healthy, in case he wills a matter, the system does not submit. Or he wills to see a place but will not be able to. So, in case the member/body part the member is not paralyzed or maimed, then it would be under the protection/guardianship (wilayah) of the self, while the self is the protector/guardian (wali) of the healthy member.
However, the matter is different in the legislative kind of wilayah, since this kind may be violated. In the other words the man can follow or violate a law and an ordinance related to responsibility (taklif), because he is free, and this freedom is a matter of his perfection. A part of the legislative wilayah is discussed under the topic of ‘Interdiction’ (hajr), where certain individual are interdicted due to immaturity, foolishness, madness, and bankruptcy. And subsequently a guardian will be determined for them.
In some cases a guardian and supervisor is needed because of the death. For instance, a deceased person needs a guardian (wali), and his heirs are prior to the other to be his wali concerning the funeral rituals. Another instance is the killed person, so that his heirs have guardianship upon his blood (to take revenge). This is the jurisprudential kind of wilayah that is discussed in different chapters of jurisprudence such as Purity (taharah), Punishments (hudoud), and Blood-money (diyah). But the legislative wilayah that is discussed under the topic of wilayat-e faqih is loftier than these issues. It is not of the type of wilayah that is discussed in such different jurisprudential parts of Interdiction (hajr), Purity (taharah), Blood vengeance (qisas), and Blood-money (diyah).
The Islamic community neither is deceased person nor an immature, a fool, a madman, and a bankrupted to require a wali.
All the attacks and the criticisms of both the local and abroad writers against wilayat-e faqih are initiated from this misunderstanding that they deem it is of the wilayah discussed in the jurisprudence under the title of Interdiction, while it is not relevant to it at all, rather it means supervision and protection.
The holy verse : "Verily, your guardian is (none else but) Allah and His Apostle (Muhammad) and those who believe, - those who establish prayer and pay the poor-rate, while they be (even) bowing down (in prayer)." (Quran: V, 57) addresses the wise and responsible persons and not the irresponsible or the interdicted.
Allah, the Exalted, never addresses the interdicted, the madmen, the immature and the bankrupts by the holy verse “The Prophet (Muhammad) hath a greater claim on the believers that they have on their own selves …” (Quran: XXXIII, 6), or the verse: V, 57, or the verse “O’ ye who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Apostle and those vested with authority from among you” (Quran: IV, 59). The meaning of this wilayah is to supervision and administration to which refers the essence of wilayah related to the legal personality of the waali and not his real personality.
It means that when Imam Ali, the Commander of the Faithful writes in his letters that this is a message you receive from your wali. Imam Ali from the aspect that he is the son of Abu Talib, is the same as other individuals and locates under the wilayah of his own Imamate. Because of he wants to issue a fatwa, it is obligatory even for him to act according to his fatwa. And when he issues a verdict of judgment, he is not permitted to violate it, and should act accordingly. And when he rules as a ruler, even he himself should follow it and cannot violate.
Therefore, it has been made clear that Imam Ali is under wilayah considering his real personality, and is the wali, and the Commander of the Faithful considering the fact that he has received this post denoted by the holy verse (Quran: XXXIII, 6) due to the Event of Ghadir and the like.
Position of wilayah in the theological discussions
One can discuss on wilayat-e faqih from two aspects: jurisprudential and theological.
The first one is that in case such a law exists, is it obligatory to act accordingly? This is a matter propounded by a jurisprudent that is the submission compulsory for us and consequently is the disobedience forbidden? Do some of the individuals of the Islamic community have the right to take the reins of government, and is it permissible for them?
These two issues are jurisprudential. In the other words, whatever is propounded regarding the ruler (waali) from the aspect that he is responsible (mukallaf), and any issue subject of which is the act of responsible (person), are jurisprudential. Is it obligatory for the people to obey the waali from the aspect that they (people) are mature, wise, intellectual, erudite and responsible? The answer to this question, whatever it could be (positive or negative), is a jurisprudential answer.
But the theological approach to wilayat-e faqih is that: Has Allah issued any commandments regarding the occultation period?
The subject of such discussion is Allah's Act and necessarily the act of the responsible.
If Allah has ordered, its submission is obligatory both for the ruler (waali) and the people. Because Ali, the commander of the faithful, said:
" If people had not come to me and supporters had not exhausted the argument …" (Nahj al-Balaghah, sermon 3). If those who gave alliance and also the companions were not available, argument (hujjat)) would not be perfect for me and subsequently I would not accept it.
The reason is that propounding a jurisprudential discussion, for instance, if we proved in jurisprudence that it is obligatory for people to submit the wali-ye faqih, or if we prove that a full authority jurisprudent has such a right, duty or responsibility, although it is a jurisprudential issue, necessitates the fact that Allah has commanded such a way. Because unless Allah has issued such a commandment neither the jurisprudent nor the people become responsible.
So it has become clear that as a formula, if the subject of a discussion is Allah's Act, then this discussion is a theological one, while if the subject is the act of responsible (person), then the discussion is a jurisprudential one.
The reason that Imamate is one of the parts of the principles of our branch of Islam (Shi'ism) while the Sunni branch does not recognize it as a principle of the religion, is that the Sunni branch holds that it is not obligatory for Allah and the Prophet, and Allah has not given any commandments regarding the leadership of the Ummah. It is people that should elect a leader. So Imamate is their attitude is an application like other jurisprudential applications.
But in our attitude we hold that this task is an Act of Allah, for we believe in infallibility. So we hold that Allah has commanded his Prophet to introduce Ali as his successor.
Now the discussion has reached this point that Allah is aware of all corpuscles of the universe, (“And doth not concealed from thy Lord (even) the weight of an atom in the earth nor in the heaven, …” Quran, X: 61), He knows that His Infallible Saints (awliya') are present for a limited period and the last Infallible Saint (that is Imam Mahdi) will be under occultation for a long period. Has Allah issued any commandments/instructions/ injunctions for occultation period, or has abandoned the nation (Ummah)? This is a theological discussion.
If the Islamic thinkers have propounded wilayat-e faqih doctrine as a theological discussions, is based on this fact and not because they believe it as the rank of prophecy or Oneness of Allah. Then, every discussion object of which is Allah's Act, is theological but the reverse is not true (It is not true that each theological discussion is a part of the principles of the religion.
Guardianship in the Traditions (hadiths)
One of the definitions of wilayah is to supervise (as a guardian) and administrate the society. In addition to the Holy Quran, in the traditions transmitted to us from the Infallible the very same meaning has been applied. We mention some of these traditions below as examples:
1. Imam Ali has used this meaning for wilayah (that is guardianship and administration) in different phrases of Nahj al-Balaghah, for instance:
A. In Sermon 2 after describing the members of the Prophet's household (Ahl al-Bayt) as: " They are the trustees of His secrets, shelter for His affairs, source of knowledge about Him, center of His wisdom, valleys for His books and mountains of His religion. With them Allah straightened the bend of His religion's back and removed the trembling of its limbs." then says that by the Ahl al-Bayt -that are the basis of the religion- many problems are solved. "They possess the chief characteristics for vicegerency (khalafah). In their favor exists the will and succession (of the Prophet)." Exclusion of the wilayah is due to these facts.
This statement is frequently used by Imam Ali in the sermons of Nahj al-Balaghah whenever he introduces himself to the public as waali and wali, and states that he has the right of wilayah upon them and they are under his wilayah. This does not mean that Imam is the guardian of the people and the people are interdicted.
B. In Sermon 216 delivered at the Battle of Siffin, Imam said: "So now, Allah the Glorified, has, by placing me over your affairs, created my rights over you," In the same sermon in the paragraphs 6 and 7 is mentioned: "The greatest of these rights that Allah, the Glorified, has made it obligatory, is the right of the ruler over the ruled and the right of the ruled over the ruler … Consequently, the ruled cannot prosper unless the rulers are sound, while the rulers cannot be sound unless the ruled are steadfast." . Here the walis and the wilayah or the waalis (rulers) regarding guardianship (administrating) the society is intended.
C. (Nahj al-Balaghah, letter 42)
When Imam Ali decided to set out towards the enemies, wrote a letter addressing `Umar ibn Abu Salamah Makhzoumi, the governor of Bahrain and summoned him to the capital. Replacing him with another person Imam explained: "The reason that I have recalled you and sent another person instead of you is not because you managed there improperly, rather since I am in an important travel, you can assist me in the military tasks. As long as you were the ruler of Bahrain, you performed the right of the wilayah properly and perfectly." "... Therefore, proceed to me when you are neither suspected nor rebuked, neither blamed nor guilty. I have just intended to proceed towards the recalcitrant of Syria and desired that you should be with me because you are among those on whom I rely in fighting the enemy and erecting the pillars of religion, if Allah wills…"
In the Treaty of Malik Ashtar the Imam has frequently used the term wilayah in this definition (guardianship):
III. A. "... Because you are over them and your responsible Commander (Imam) is over you, while Allah is over him who has appointed you." (Nahj al-Balaghah, Letter 53, paragraph 4)
III. B. "... Because people do have shortcomings and the ruler is the most appropriate person to cover them. Do not disclose whatever of it is hidden from you..." (Nahj al-Balaghah, Letter 53, paragraph 8)
III. C. " … their good wishes prove correct only when they surround their commanders (to protect them). Do not regard their positions to be a burden over them."
(Nahj al-Balaghah, Letter 53, paragraph 20)
3. Imam Muhammad Baqir said: "Islam is founded on five pillars: prayers (salat), zakat, hajj, fasting (sawm), and wilayah" (See: Wasa'il al-Shi`ah, volume one, p...).
This wilayah has three discussions two of which are jurisprudential that are located at the same level of fasting and hajj. But the third discussion is a theological one that may not lay at the level of these two.
If we observe that the Holy Prophet has allocated the wilayah for Imam Ali and has appointed him Imam and the Commander of the Faithful, just because Allah ordered him to do so (and to address people whosoever I am his Mawla, Ali is his mawla too), then this is a theological issue.
Now that the Prophet has announced this command in accordance with the holy verse "(O Our Apostle Muhammad
Deliver thou what hath been sent down unto thee from thy Lord ... " Quran: V, 67), then it is obligatory for the Prophet, Imam Ali, the companions and other individuals to act accordingly. The Prophet cannot refrain to recognize Imam Ali as caliph, can he? He is also responsible, and therefore, it is obligatory for him, too. The holy verse " The Prophet believeth in what hath come down unto him from his Lord" (Quran: II, 285) indicates that the Prophet recognizes Ali as the caliph. This is a jurisprudential issue in which there is no difference between the Prophet and others, also between the Imam and his followers.
As a conclusion two aspects of the wilayah mentioned in this hadith are jurisprudential: firstly, it is obligatory for Imam Ali himself to accept this position, and secondly, it is obligatory for the community to accept Ali as their waali. The reason is that the subject of such issues is the act of the responsible (person).
But considering that Allah commanded His Prophet to announce the caliphate of Imam Ali, so its subject is the Act of Allah, and consequently is a theological issue.
4. Another tradition similar to this hadith was narrated by Hurayz from Zurarah, that Imam Muhammad Baqir said:
"Islam is founded on five pillars: prayers (salat), zakat, hajj, fasting (sawm), and wilayah." Zurarah asked the Imam: "Which one is the predominant?" The Imam answered: " Wilayah is." (Wasa'il al-Shi`ah, volume one, p. 40; Usoul al-Kafi, Vol. I, p. 462).
To justify their aloofness from the ruling and guardianship some people assume that wilayah means the belief in the Imamate of the Imams and the affection to this family. (As denotes the holy verse: “Say thou (O’ Our Apostle Muhammad): “ I demand not of you any recompense for it (the toils of the Apostleship), save the love of my relatives” Quran: XLII, 23) But Zurarah asked the Imam the predominant. After the Imam underscored Wilayah as the predominant, then added: "Because it acts as the key for them (i.e. the five pillars) and the waali is the guide towards them". It means the waali (namely the ruler) is discussed.
Thus, it has been clear that the wilayah means guardianship, a guardianship upon the elite and not upon the mad persons. If one analyzes properly, he will find out that the waali has both a real personality that is mukallaf to the divine commandments, at the same time he has a legal personality that is appointed (granted) by Allah. That real personality is the subset of the legal one. In this case there will not be any privileges for him. Which act has been obligatory for the Prophet but not for the community? Which sin is forbidden for the community and not for them (the prophets)? Which fatwa is obligatory for the community and not for them? Which judgment and wilayee verdict violating of which is forbidden for the community and not for them? So, it is clear that they are responsible persons (mukallaf) as we are. We can conclude that wilayah is a legislative (tashri`i) matter and it means to protect and supervise the wise human society.
The Role of the Assembly of Experts in Wilayah issue
Where is the position of the Assembly of Experts? This assembly specifies a full-authorized jurisprudent according to the constitution and then introduces him to the public. The people consider him as wali and not attorney. While the constitution was being edited for the first time, some members of the Assembly suggested the phrase "the people select him" but at the very place it was amended as "the people accept him". Some asked the difference between the two phrases, I replayed that to appoint an attorney (tawkil) differs from accepting the guardianship (tawalli).
The wali should possess some privileges that refer to his theoretical and practical theosophy. While he is wali, at the same time his is equal to the individuals in front of the law.
In fact this is his jurisprudence and justice that governs; but the issue that which person is the wali, is not a scientific issue, rather it is a matter of subject that must be recognized by the Assembly of the Experts.
It is probable that in your point of view a certain person is fully authorized while in my viewpoint another person is fully authorized.
The Necessity of waali from the intellectual point of view
In the recent discussion of Religion and Development, some have stated that there are no discussions of development, management and leadership in the religion; rather this is the responsibility of science and wisdom. They assume that wisdom contradicts the religion, while the wisdom and the tradition act as the two eyes of the religion. All the books that deal with the principles of the jurisprudence (usoul al-fiqh) stipulate that the rich sources of the jurisprudence are the Book, Sunnah, consensus and wisdom. The consensus refers to the Sunnah, while the wisdom is independent. For instance, planning for the development and the improvement of the country, and also regulating the local and foreign policies if are done through the common sense and away from the carnal desires, then they are attributed to the religion. Since all matters and details have not been mentioned through traditions, then the other eye of the religion that is wisdom will complete it.
Their misunderstanding is that they have summarized the religion exclusively in the Holy Quran and the tradition, and hence have put the scientific management opposite to the jurisprudential one, and conclude that the religion is incomplete! While the religion recognizes whatever the wisdom finds out. As the traditional reason introduces some of the affairs as the inherent obligation and introduces some others as the prior obligation, the rational reason has the two kinds of obligations.
The issue of leadership and management of the community are a rational one. Let us suppose that a clear injunction had not come in the verses of Quran or the tradition, the common sense judges clearly, and this rational judgment is the Command of Allah.
All the jurisprudents that thought of the philosophy of jurisprudence have obviously understood the necessity of the "waali". In this regard one can refer to the statements of such great jurisprudents as Ayatollah Hasan Najafi (d 1900, the compiler of the book Jawahir al-Kalam) and Imam Khomeini.
While propounding the issue of war and enjoining right conduct and forbidding indecency in his great book Jawahir al-Kalam, Ayatollah Najafi said:
"This fact becomes clear by deliberation in the texts and observing the status of the Shiites specially the Shiite scholars.
The decree (tawqi`) of Imam Mahdi towards Shaykh Mufid declaring respect and honor for Mufid is a good instance. Had not there been the generality of wilayah, a great deal of the affairs respective to the Shiites would have remained idle. It is strange that somebody doubt to accept, as if they have not savored the taste of the jurisprudence at all!” (See: Jawahir al-Kalam, vol. 21, p 397)
What this honorable jurisprudent underscores on is an intellectual issue. After deliberating on a dense amount of commandments in different fields, he concluded that such great amount of commandments and orders definitely need an executer or an administrator otherwise, the affairs respective to the Shiites in the occultation period of Imam Mahdi would have remain idle. He finally reaches to this conclusion that whosoever ... in the issue of wilayat-e faqih, it seems as if he has not tasted the savor of the jurisprudence (fiqh) and has not found out the mystery of the words of the Infallible Imams (a.s).
He even has proceeded to the point that holds: " It is improbable that a fully qualified jurisprudent (faqih) does not possess the authority to summon for primary jihad (contrary to defensive jihad).
The late Imam Khomeini had not reached this lofty position at the beginning and held that the primary jihad is not authorized for the jurisprudent (faqih), but later in Najaf, he too reached that level and recognized the primary jihad with its own conditions one of the authorities of the fully qualified faqih.
Wilayah and Politics
It is occasionally said that wilayah does not correspond with government, ruling, and politics, because wilayah defined as guardianship is always concerning the individual and not the society and the procedures of ruling a country.
The answer is that the wilayah as it is defined as the guardianship upon the interdicted discussed in "Interdiction" (hajr) part of the jurisprudence (fiqh), and the wilayah concerning performance of funeral rites of the deceased person or the wilayah that the avenger of blood possesses, none correspond with governing the community. It is not relevant to this holy verse at all: "Verily, your guardian is (none else but) Allah and His Apostle (Muhammad) and those who believe, - those who establish prayer and pay the poor-rate, while they be (even) bowing down (in prayer)." (Quran: V, 57) Because this wilayah means: ruling and supervision (/administration).
If the message of the above verse is that your guardians and supervisors are the Holy Prophet and Imam Ali (the Commander of the Faithful), then this wilayah is addressed to the elite, the faithful, the scholars, the sage people, and not the mad persons.
Therefore, both in genetic and legislative systems the wilayah having the meaning of supervision and administration belongs to Allah essentially since Allah said: "... But Allah, He is the Guardian." (Quran: XLII, 9) and said: " … there is none besides Him a Protector." (Quran: XIII, 11).
It is exclusively for Allah to be a waali and genetic supervisor and administrator. This is the exclusion of the absolute wila' (wilayah) for Allah the Exalted, both from genetic and legislative aspects. Allah said: "There is no judgment but Allah’s … " (Quran: XII, 40)
So it has been clear that if one states that there is no wilayahs indicating/ defining supervision and administration, it will be a false statement. While if one declares that wilayah with the meaning of the mandate of the interdicted is not respective to our community (Iranian community), it will be a true statement because, those who hold the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih, do not state that the wilayah composed/compiled for the faqih in the constitution (of the Islamic Republic of Iran) is of the kind of wilayah concerning the interdicted or relating to the ritual bathing of a Moslem's corpse, or the wilayah of blood vengeance (qisas), blood-money (diyah), and punishments (hudoud), because none of them is relevant to supervising the community. The concept of wilayah mentioned in the holy verse (Quran: V, 57) is the supervision of the community, that the wilayat al-faqih is the manifest of which, that administrates the community in accordance with the scales /measures of injunctions and the intellectual and transmitted sagacity and expediency.
Role of the people for electing a wali-e faqih
It is occasionally said that wilayat al-faqih is one of the insolvable problems of the Islamic Republic since its existence necessitates its non-existence! In the other words, if wilayat al-faqih exists, then wilayat al-faqih does not exist, and vice-versa. Because from one hand in the Islamic Republic, the people have elected, directly or indirectly, a person as their leader, therefore, the people have vote, and subsequently they are not interdicted and do not need a guardian (wali). From the other hand if the jurisprudent (faqih) is the guardian/ trustee (wali) of the people, so the people do not have vote. That is why no one noticed this insolvable problem that is reconciling the wilayat al-faqih with people's vote and acceptance. Because the people have voted not to have vote!
This doubt originates from the point that they have restricted the wilayah
in that of the part "interdiction", while if wilayah is defined as the supervision/trusteeship upon the elite, the wise and the men possessed of minds like what is dealt with in the verse "Verily, your guardian is (none else but) Allah and His Apostle (Muhammad) and those who believe, - those who establish prayer and pay the poor-rate, while they be (even) bowing down (in prayer)." (Quran: V, 57) and also the Event of Ghadir and the holy verse “The Prophet (Muhammad) hath a greater claim on the believers that they have on their own selves …” (Quran: XXXIII, 6), then the above doubt will be solved. Was the wilayah of Imam Ali (the Commander of the Faithful) in the Event of Ghadir as the guardianship upon the interdicted or it was as trusteeship upon the men of understanding (ulul albab)?
Waali does not mean the guardian of the interdicted; rather it means the trustee (supervisor/ administrator) concerning the affairs of the elite of the society.
Such a wali or ruler/governor is either completely well known for the people, or not in case he is not well known the people refer to the experts and ask them for information in this regard.
Like when the Holy Prophet asked first for the approval (and acknowledgement) of the audience (in Ghadir Event) saying: “Have I communicated you what (the mission) I was responsible for and I should communicate you or not?” -“Yes”, the audience replied. Then the Holy Prophet asked: "Do you approve that I have a greater claim on you than you have on yourselves?" (See: Al-Kafi, the Book of the Divine Proof [Kitab al-Hujjah]) "Yes”, they replied. Then the Holy Prophet said: " For whomever I am the authority and guide Ali is also his guide and authority.” And the people accepted.
Can we declare that this is a fact that the existence of which necessitates its non-existence and vice-versa?
(It is true that) if the meaning of wilayah is restricted in the guardianship upon the mad persons (for instance), then the wilayah may not be compatible with the people's vote, because the wilayah of the wali is proved by the vote of the interdicted, while the interdicted person has not vote!
The Prophet himself propounded the Islamic republic and holding a referendum and said that the regime should be Islamic, it is based on the revelation. It must be democratic. It is based on the acceptance of the people. He said that he has been living for forty years among the community and has taken his (social) examinations successfully.
"I lived among you an edge before it; What! Then (yet) ye understand not?" (Quran: X, 16)
After taking a lifetime examination, aren't you wise enough to understand? If not, then accept my demonstration since I am your trustee.
This statement of the Holy Prophet that is "I lived among you an edge before it;” is the republic aspect of the Islamic regime; it means that you accept the fact that all the affairs have been provided from Allah's side: The revelation has sent down, my position has been determined, the prophetic mission, the prophethood, the wilayah and the trusteeship have been provided all, what remained is your acceptance and act accordingly. Then added: "Demonstrate, this is my miracle.”...
Such a thing contains no paradox within itself. In the other words, what is relevant to the law and the commentators of it - that is the Ahl al-Bayt themselves- and what is defined as the explainer and teacher of the Book and Wisdom and the purifier of the souls and what is as the executer of the punishment laws, all have been provided within this religion. Only the acceptance of the people has remained. This acceptance is related to as to be the wali of the people and not the client/lawyer of them. Never there will be contradiction/contradiction with the acceptance of the people. All the posts are approved for the Infallible but to take affect such posts needs the people's vote. Such a commentary on the wilayah is free from the injury of dreaming the contradiction.
Alteration of the posts and the necessity to the experts
Since the true posts are perfection, therefore, the false posts are countless contrary to it. The range of it oscillates from the Lordship to the faith. Some instances are presented below so that it clears that opposite a truth there is a falsehood that claims being truth. Concerning the lordship that means that Allah is the Lord of the worlds and there is no lords but He, some attempted first to struggle/fight against the notion of lordship from its basis, but when they found out that the man is in need of the Lord at last, then they declared that yes, the man is in need of the lord, and the lord exists but it is not Allah, rather we are the lords! " And (Pharaoh) said: 'I am your Lord, the most High!'" (Quran: LXXIX: 24), " And said Pharaoh: 'O' Chiefs! I know not any Allah for you other than me,'" (Quran: XXVIII, 38). Pharaoh did not say this at first, but after refusing the notion of Lordship and not taking a good result of it declared: “I agree that the society is in need of a Lord, but the Lord is me and not whoever you claim.”
After the lordship, the prophethood may be dealt with. While the prophets were sent from Allah, the Exalted, the heads of oppression and blasphemy fought against the notion of prophecy and prophetic mission, but since they did not get a good result, reacted that the prophethood is true. It is true that certain individuals (prophets) are appointed by God and are sent from Him to guide the people, but "A" is the prophet and not "B".
In case of advent of a true prophet, many false prophets appeared in contrary.
When certain heads of the Ignorance were asked: "Why didn't you believe in the Prophet in spite of all his miracles, but you have approved the statements of Musaylimah, the liar instead?"
"Because he is a member of our tribe", they replied.
Caliphate and Imamate were the same as this. At first they said that the Prophet has not appointed anybody as his successor, a guardian and a leader for the community. Then they concluded that it was impossible that the Prophet has declared everything (of lesser importance) but has neglected the most important part of the religion that is, the leadership. Then they claimed and quoted plenty of the virtues for the others and announced (publicized) false and faked hadiths concerning the caliphate of some of them.
At the next step the clergymen and the scholars were dealt with. The oppressor countries struggled with the scholars and the religious intellects, but when they realized their popularity in the society and that the clergy is a genuine and popular institution, then they established court clergymen to issue verdict to satisfy their wills.
In the fifth phase we confront the populace and observe the process of faith among them. The hypocrites fought the faith as far as possible at the first step, but when they realized that the faith is a welcomed fact among the community, pretended to be faithful.
"And when they meet with those who believe, they say, "we believe" but when they go apart to their devils, they say, " surely we are with you, verily, we did but mock." (Quran, II, 14)
It has been clear so far that (in a range) from the "Lordship" to the "Faith" and from the faith to the "divinity" there always has been a false and fake process contrary to the true and genuine one.
In case the offices are being altered, and the truth and untruth are being mistaken how the people can distinguish between the truth and the falsehood (that is the true person and the false one)?
People's vote is for the very same reason that they think and select the truth, therefore, it necessitates to refer to the experts and it becomes compulsory to establish the Assembly of Experts.
The Paradox Between Wilayat al –faqih and People's Election
It is said that wilayat al-faqih contradicts the ruling, democracy, liberty of the individuals, elections, and establishing the Assembly of Experts, etc. Therefore, a regime that is based on wilayat al-faqih is false, and consequently all contracts whether national or international signed with such a regime is invalid and void according to the religious rites, and thus the latter party of the contract can vindicate his/her own rights.
They propound two evidences:
1. Since the term 'wilayah' means guardianship upon the interdicted, so it contradicts the people's vote, election for the Assembly of Experts and the like.
That is whether the people directly elect the jurisprudent (faqih) or empower someone to elect the guardian (wali) for them, indicates in the both cases that from the one hand the people are wise and sagacious, and have the vote, and consequently do not need a guardian, from the other hand if the jurisprudent is a guardian (wali) upon the people, then the people do not have vote.
Considering the contradiction available in the regime based on wilayat al-faqih indicates that such a regime is a paradoxical one!
2. Considering the general sense of the contracts, any kind of conditions that opposes and contradicts the text and purport of the contract, will cause the contract to be invalid and void.
The examples below may make the matter clearer:
The content of the contract is divided in four categories:
- Ownership of the essence/substance (`ayn)
- Ownership of the benefit/profit (manfa`ah)
- Ownership of the exploitation (intifa')
- The right of receiving enjoyment (istimta`)
Instances:
1. Such as the (act of) purchase and sale
2. Such as the contract of renting /leasing
3. Such as the contract of borrowing
4. Such as the matrimonial contract
The instance of the first kind is dealing (purchase and sale) and the compromise that has the ordinances/ injunctions of the purchase and sale. The content of such a contract is that the vendor becomes the possessor of the price, while the buyer becomes the owner of the commodity. The content of purchasing contract is the possession of the substance (`ayn), while in renting; the content of the lease is the possession of the profit (manfa`ah) (for the lessor/landlord) and not the substance.
He, who takes a commercial unit or a residential one on lease, it denotes that the property itself is for the lessor, however, in exchange for the lease, the leaseholder becomes the owner of the profit of it.
The third kind that is the ownership of the exploitation is that when, for instance, the borrowing contract was signed, the borrower that, for instance has borrowed a vessel that is the loaner has given the borrower the loan of it.
And this contract/agreement was done either verbally or practically (mu`aataat) the borrower can exploit that vessel but is not the owner of its profit.
This case is different from hiring a vessel from the stores that let out vessels and kitchen utensils. For, in these cases one owns the profits of the vessels while he who borrows a vessel from his/her neighbor is the owner of the exploitation of it and not the profit of it.
In the contract of matrimony the husband possesses the right of receiving enjoyment by the marriage formula (contract) and becomes the mahram (ritually intimate) with his spouse.
The question that is raised now is that in case a forbidden condition that does not contradict the necessity of the contract whether or not invalidates the contact.
Some jurisprudents hold that the forbidden condition does not invalidate a contract, although it contradicts the Book of God, and also is invalid (fasid); but in the event that a condition contradicts the explicit text of the contract (neither opposing the general application of the contract nor its requisite) there is not controversy that such a condition is both invalid and invalidating the contract.
For instance, the two parties stipulate within the deal contact that a party sells a house to the latter party provided that the buyer does not become the owner of the house! Or on the condition that the vendor does not own the price of it!
Such a condition that contradicts the necessity of the contact is both invalid and invalidating the contract.
Another instance is that, one leases a trade or a residential unit provided that the lessee does not own its profit, and that at the same time the landlord does not possess the rent!
The third instance is that one lends a vessel on the condition that the borrower does not have the authority of exploitation.
The fourth instance is that the contract of matrimony is arranged is such a way that it is conditioned within it that the spouses do not become ritually intimate (mahram) with one another.
All of the above conditions contradict the necessity of the contract and consequently are invalid and they invalidate the contract.
Some (of the jurisprudents say that) the issue of wilayat al-Faqih is same as these cases, that is, the people sign a contract (election) with the fully qualified jurisprudent and undertake mutually and vote that they do not possess the vote and will not interfere the contracts. For, the meaning of the wilayah is that all the authority is in the hands of the wali-e faqih, and the people are under the guardianship, are interdicted, and have not the authority to comment.
And they conclude that these kinds of referendums and elections are invalid and necessarily invalidating, for, they contradict the content of the contract and the mutual undertaking, and consequently, the referendums held so far are invalid and invalidating, and the government in which they resulted in are invalid. And also, all kinds of the deals whether local or international are invalid.
The Answer
It is true that a condition that contradicts the necessity of the contract/pact is invalid (fasid) and corrupter (mufsid), but two points should not be neglected: First, the term wilayah having the meaning of supervision and being a wali is separated from the wilayah discussed under the topic of interdiction (hajr) in the Islamic jurisprudence.
If one speaks about the issues of the Islamic government, the Islamic policy, and the trusteeship of the jurisprudent (wilayat al-faqih), he should totally dispense with the wilayah (guardianship) upon the immature, the dead, and so on and should just think of the verse (Quran: V, 57).
Whatever this holy verse carries as a message, it is true first for the prophets, then the Infallible Imams, and then their special deputies, such as Muslim ibn `Aqil and Malik Ashtar, and then for those who are appointed generally by them, like the late Imam Khomeini.
Secondly, both the opponents and pro-wilayat al-faqih have accepted two instances of wilayah of the fully qualified jurisconslut.
The first instance is that when the people accept an authority (that is a leading jurisprudent), do they select him as their attorney (wakil) or as wali in fatwa?
Indeed, the religion has appointed the fully qualified jurisprudent for this position, whether the people refer to him or not, but to put this appointment in practice depends upon the acceptance of the people.
Many a time a fully qualified jurisprudent that can be a leading faqih (jurisprudent), but since he has not made himself known, or the people do not know him by one reason or another, therefore, his authorization will not be put into practice, at the same time another faqih having the same scientific conditions my be welcomed and accepted by the people.
Now the question is that such a person that is recognized as the authority, whether is the attorney of the people, or he has been appointed this position by God, but since the people have found such a merit and quality in him so, they have referred to him. Therefore, such a person cannot be their attorney at all, for the attorney does not posses any authority, unless the people entitle it to him by establishing the contract of empowering. The approval of the power of attorney is conditioned to the establishment of empowering by the people, while concerning the approval of being an authority it is not like that the people and the followers submit him the office of being an authority.
Another instance is the judgment of the fully qualified jurisprudent during the period of occultation. It has been acclaimed by all, that the fully qualified jurisprudent has the right of judging. Is the fully qualified jurisprudent in the position of judgment the attorney of the people? Has the religion of Islam appointed him judge? [The true answer is that] he is the judge, and the people give no positions to him. If the people refer to him and accept him, then his judgment will be put into practice.
These two instances are not of the kind of the power of attorney, rather are a part of trusteeship (wilayah), that is the fully qualified jurisprudent being an authority, is the wali of decree (fatwa) and not the people’s attorney (wakil) in issuing a decree (ifta) for his followers. Such an authority should be submitted obligatorily. The same is true for the fully qualified jurisprudent that is a judge, the difference is that one of them informs/advises (ikhbar) while the latter establishes (insha'); like a fully qualified jurisprudent that has occupied the position of judgment and issues decrees.
So the people refer to positions that the religion has granted/allocated to the fully qualified jurisprudent and realized them and then recognized them. If the fully qualified jurisprudent has a worldly reputation – like Shaykh Ansari – then there will be no need to testimony/certification of two just witnesses.
The followers can refer to him directly. In case several scholars equal from the aspect of justice, or one was more knowledgeable than the others but was not as famous as the rest, then the people consult the experts to know who is the most knowledgeable or who equal with one another. So in these cases when one refers to a scholar in fact he has recognized his authority position. It is not true that he has given that scholar the authority, therefore, that attorney of the people in giving decree or in judgment.
This acclamation of the people is not power of attorney; rather it is the acceptance of wialyah.
If, for instance, the people accept/recognize the authority of a person provided that to be silent and submissive in lieu of his jurisprudential decrees, is this condition opposing the exigency/necessity of this pact?
If some people accept the position of judgment of a fully qualified jurisprudent and declared within their acceptance that they trust (in) the judgment and the sovereignty of his juridical system, provided that they be silent and submissive against the decrees given by him, then is this condition opposing /contradicting the exigency/necessity of such a pact?
If the people selected a group as experts to introduce to them the competent leading authority, are these selections and voting contradicting the recognition /acceptance of the authority and being silent and submissive before the decrees (fatwas) of the authority?
So those who oppose the wilayat al-faqih, accept two samples of the fully qualified jurisprudent, but dispute in the third sample, that is the trusteeship (wilayah) upon the community and the policy declaring that this kind of voting to a jurisprudent is equal to lack of voting, and that this condition contradicts the necessity of the pact.
(As the answer) we say that when the fully qualified jurisprudent became (was elected/designated as) the waali of the community, and the elite wise and intellectual people acclaimed his wilayah, and declared that the (Divine) command (Quran: V, 57) is originally for the Infallible Imam, and then for his special deputy, and in the event that the special deputy was not available, then it will be for the common deputy in the third rank. The also state that they have accepted the wilayah of them (the Imam or his deputies) to act according the Book of God and the Sunnah of his Apostle. Does this indicate that whatever business/deals that jurisconslult has made, or the contracts and pacts he has established are of the interfering types and consequently invalid?!
The fact is that, the people have accepted the religion and believe that they have no votes opposite it, and since they are elite they say that they have not another statement in front of God, and they do not practice independent reasoning (ijtihad) against the clear terms (nass).
When a person accepts the religion, this acceptance is the truth. When he verified the religion and realized that it is the truth, and then accepted it, therefore, admits that the fatwas of the religion are the truth and his will does not contradict the truth, and that he does not possess any ijtihad in front of the nass.
The believers that acclaimed the wilayah of Imam Ali, the Commander of the Faithful, did they accept him as their attorney? Or they recognized him as their wali?
God, the Exalted, said to the Prophet: (O’ Our Apostle Muhammad
Deliver them what hath been sent down unto thee from thy Lord (Quran: V, 70)
He communicated the message of God to the people saying: " For whomever I am the authority and guide, Ali is also his guide and authority."
The people accepted saying: "May this position be pleasing to you O' the Commander of the Faithful!"
And gave him their allegiance. Did they designate him as their attorney, indicating that the Imam had no positions without the vote of the people?! Or did they recognize him as their wali? If one holds that Imam Ali was the attorney of the people, it means that so long as the people have not voted to him and have not recognized, he will have no rights, while, if we hold that he was appointed by God, then he has the right and authority of guardianship (and supervision), and (consequently) the people recognized this fact and accepted it.
Therefore, (it is concluded that) any kind of the contracts the Islamic waali signs or it is signed on his behalf, is in accordance with a good will of the people, for the people recognized that this school of thought is true, and voted in its favor, and appointed one who knows this school of thought well, believes in it, and is the executer of it, as the responsible of this task; indeed, they have accepted his responsibility, so, it is not the case of empowering him. Such a condition never contradicts the necessity of the contract.
It is concluded that, firstly, the power of attorney (wikalah) differs from trusteeship (wilayah); secondly, the wilayah is divided into several kinds, thirdly, the wilayah that is propounded in the issue of governing and ruling is not of the kind of wilayah discussed in the chapter of "the interdiction", rather it is of the kind discussed in the holy verse "Verily, your guardian is (none else but) Allah and …” (Quran: V, 57), fourthly, both positions are true for the jurisprudent , but one is (given) originally while the other one is subordinately and as a deputy.
Therefore, if one states that the fully qualified jurisprudent is the Imam's attorney (wakil), it is true, and if he states that he (the jurisprudent) is the attorney, or the deputy of or appointed by Imam Mahdi, it is also true; but if he states that the fully qualified jurisprudent is an attorney on behalf of the people or is appointed by them, this would be a false statement.
The difference among these four matters is that, the Infallible Imam and (particularly) Imam Mahdi- may our lives be scarified for him - can do two tasks:
One option is that he appoints a person to represent him (the Imam) and to act as his attorney to do certain tasks; it means that he becomes the Imam’s attorney and deputy; this is true. Another option is that he establishes the trusteeship (wilayah) for a person. For instance, in the event that there are endowed properties that are lacking of a custodian (due to his death or because a custodian has not been appointed for it so far), the Imam appoints a custodian for it. This is the establishment of trusteeship (wilayah) for him.
In case, an authority (a leading mujtahid) empowered a person or persons, once this authority dies, the power of attorney of his attorney will be nullified, for, the validity of the power of attorney is dependent upon the life of the client (i.e. the authority); while if that authority appoints a person as the custodian of a certain endowed property, the custodianship of him will endure continuously even after the death of that authority. So, to empower is different from the establishment of trusteeship.
These are two instances in which the Infallible Imam can both empower a person (i.e. as his attorney) and establish the trusteeship for a person. But the people have not the authority in neither of these tasks concerning the religious issues. It is not true that the people empower the leading authority, or establish the office of trusteeship (wilayah) for him. The people neither establish the power of attorney in the judgment for the fully qualified jurisprudent, so that he becomes their attorney to be a judge, nor they establish the office of trusteeship for judging so that he becomes the custodian of judgment, and to have the trusteeship upon judgment on behalf of the people.
Rather the offices that the religion has granted to the fully qualified jurisprudents, whether the people accept or not, that jurisprudent possesses this authority in a demonstrating manner (thuboutan), but the intellectual pious people identify the individuals that deserve such offices, then recognize and accept the office of one who is fully qualified. As it is the recognition and acceptance in the discussion of the position of an authority (marji`iyyah) and not the empowering, concerning the jurisprudent that has trusteeship upon the people, the discussion is also the recognition and acceptance and not the empowering.
In some cases the people accept the trusteeship of the Special Deputy (of the Imam), like those who accepted the wilayah of Muslim ibn `Aqil and Malik ibn Ashtar. As they accept the trusteeship of the General Deputy in the other cases.
So, it is not true that trusteeship of the jurisprudent is an invalid condition and invalidates the contract so that the local and international treaties of the Islamic System to be unauthorized.
So, it has been (clearly) concluded in brief that the wilayah discussed in the Holy Quran and in the traditions in some cases denote undertaking the affairs of a dead (deceased) or he who is tantamount to him/her; and in the other cases it means the tenure of the affairs of the community.
The following contain two series of some Quranic verses for instance, concerning the two different meanings:
- The verses indicating the wilayah upon a dead (deceased) or he who is tantamount to him/her:
1.A. The wilayah upon a dead (deceased)
And whoever is slain unjustly, then indeed have We given his heir the authority by God that surely we will suddenly attack by night, him and his family, and then surely we would say unto his heir we witnessed not the murder of his family, … (Quran: XXVII, 49)
1.B. the wilayah upon the interdicted who are tantamount to a dead
But if he who oweth be witless or infirm, or if he be not able to dictate himself then let his guardian dictate justly … (Quran: II, 282)
They said: “Swear ye to one another by God that surely we will suddenly attack by bight, him and his family, and then surely we would say unto his heir we witnessed not the murder of his family, …” (Quran: XXVII, 49)
- The verses denoting the trusteeship (wilayah) upon the Islamic Community:
"Verily, your guardian is (none else but) Allah and His Apostle (Muhammad) and those who believe, - those who establish prayer and pay the poor-rate, while they be (even) bowing down (in prayer)." (Quran: V, 57)
“The Prophet (Muhammad) hath a greater claim on the believers that they have on their own selves …” (Quran: XXXIII, 6)
Either kinds of wilayah has its respective terms and conditions (ordinances) that were discussed in this article in brief. Wilayat al-Faqih is of the second kind. Therefore, it is not at all the question of being the Islamic Community an interdicted one; and none of the ordinances of the wilayah upon the interdicted – discussed in the Islamic jurisprudence including the chapters of the funerals, taking reprisals, reduction (of the punishment), pardon, blood-money, wali of the blood of the slayed (maqtoul), or the chapter of the interdiction - are applicable in this case.
Grand Ayatollah Jawadi Amuli
Imam reza network
War and Peace in Islam
“In the name of Allah Most Gracious, Most Merciful. Verily We have granted you a manifest Victory.”
We are here in this spiritual gathering today to commemorate two great occasions; the passing away of the most noble creature of God, the Holy Prophet of Islam (saww), and the martyrdom of the second infallible Imam, the first grandson of the Prophet; Imam Hasan (a.s.).
The topic I am going to deal with today is “Peace and War in Islam” a very controversial issue nowadays. The reason I have chosen this topic is
that unfortunately there is a misunderstanding among some Shiites who don’t have enough Islamic education. They assume that Imam Hasan was a man of peace whereas Imam Husain was a man of war. As a result, conservatives praise Imam Hasan and claim to be his followers, while the extremists blame Imam Hasan and accuse him of seeking a comfortable life. Imam Husain, on the other hand, is an extremist for the first group and a role model for the second. According to the second group, armed struggle is the only duty upon every Muslim, he is Yazidian otherwise.
This argument in fact goes back to the question of whether Islam is the religion of peace or does it advocate for war? In other words, was Islam in its early days spread by sword or were there other factors involved? Is Islam the religion of violence or it is the religion of peaceful coexistence? Are Muslims allowed to sign any peace treaty with a non Islamic state that they are in conflict with, or they are bound to fight, whatever the circumstances are?
These and many such questions have occupied the minds and the time of many contemporary intellectuals.
It may not be an exaggerated claim that many people in the West hold that Islam is a terrorist religion and hence the term Islam sounds obnoxious to them. Such a false belief, to the best of my knowledge, is one of the main barriers between Westerners and real Islam. Should they become familiar with the true image of Islam regarding war and peace, I can assert many of them who are already perplexed and seeking asylum would embrace Islam. Such an illusion has not of course come to their mind out of the blue. Millions of dollars have, and are still being allocated by the enemies of Islam, especially in the last decades to inject this illusion into the minds of people, to introduce Islam, as a frightful evil which no one would be daring enough to get close to.
To cut a long story short, we believe Islam in its nature is a peaceful religion advocating a wise coexistence. The following are some of the proofs that wars have never been the cause for the spread of Islam:
1. Indonesia is the most populated Islamic state with more than 100 million Muslims. Yet, there has never been any Islamic military attack to that country.
2. Millions of Muslims in China are worshipping Allah and yet, Islam has never entered China by military force.
3. Many African countries as well as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, have all embraced Islam without being forced by any Islamic groups.
4. In the contemporary world, many people in the West, from black Americans, including their inmates, as well as Europeans including their migrants, to Australians, New Zealanders to Aborigines are coming towards and embracing Islam without any military force.
5. The Mongol leader Genghis Khan was one of the great conquerors in the history of the world, born C.1167. In his series of destructive, savagely and bloody invasions of much of the Asian mainland, he invaded Iran which was an Islamic state by then. Yet, after one or two generations instead of Iranian Muslims being converted to the Mongolian religion, they themselves embraced Islam.
6. Many Ayat as well as Ahadith in different ways and means condemn all types of corruption on earth. Needless to say, human wars and the shedding of blood are one of the best examples of corruption.
Q. With all respect to the previous proofs, still we do have some examples of Islam being spread by the sword. Iran is one of the vivid examples which was conquered by Muslim Arabs in early Islam. As a result, Iranians had to become Muslims and give up their previous religion, i.e. Zoroastrianism.
A. Hundreds of wars have taken place in the history of mankind, yet the conquerors have never been able to force their religion upon the conquered peoples, as the Mongolians failed to do so. Hence, Iranians did not embrace Islam because of the sword of Muslims. As a matter of fact, it is impossible to penetrate into the hearts of people by sword. The power of the sword is not more than for cutting the flesh. The sword is not capable of influencing the conscience and the belief of human beings. In short, the main reason for people like Iranians accepting Islam rests on other issues. Iranians were impressed by the justice found in Islam, after being sick of the vicious discrimination from the Sasanian dynasty.
Types of War
Although Islam is the religion of peace, and unlike some of the Western thinkers, such as Freud and Nitche, who did not acknowledge war as a natural phenomenon in human life, Islam prescribes war under a few circumstances.
In general, there are two types of war.
1. War in the sense of blood shedding, murdering, massacres and plundering for the sake of power, as a struggle for survival.
2. War in the sense of protecting the life of the innocent by destroying the evil people who try to destroy human life and wisdom. Such a war is like a surgical operation for the sake of saving the rest of the body by amputating the decayed organ or limb. The sword of Islam is nothing more than a surgical knife in the hands of a wise surgeon. It is like a small shovel to uproot the weeds from the gardens of humanity.
To this end, war in Islam is not only a form of worship, but holy worshipping.
The Islamic Jihad (holy war) has never been mentioned in the Quran without having the preliminary statement ‘for the sake of God’. That, then, is what makes Islamic wars different from other types of human war which are fought for the sake of power, sovereignty and profit.
Peace in Islam
Since the man of Islam has surrendered to Allah, he is a warrior when war is required, based on the above explanation, and he is the most peaceful person when it is time for peace.
The Holy Quran in Sura 8 Aya 61 states: “And if the enemy incline towards peace, you should also incline towards peace, and trust in Allah..”
The history of Islam has presented many examples in which the Holy Prophet (saww), as well as his infallible successors have welcomed peace when it would be of benefit to the Ummah. Islamic victory does not necessarily mean fighting and conquering. If the victory can be gained in a peaceful way, then war is not prescribed in Islam. Therefore, to be a warrior or a peaceful man in Islam depends upon the circumstances in which a man of Islam finds himself.
Two vivid examples of peace in Islam
1. The Peace of Hodaybiah: Hodaybiah is a small village near to Mecca in which the treaty between the Prophet and the infidels of Qoraysh was concluded in the year 6 AH.
In short, in the year 6AH the Prophet along with his companions who it is estimated were around 1600 people, left Madina to pilgrimage to Hajj. As part of their good will, and to show that their only reason for the journey was the performance of Hajj, they did not carry any weapons. However, the Qoraysh, who were informed of the Muslims journey, took an oath that they would not allow Muslims to enter Mecca. The Holy Prophet sent an ambassador to them with some gifts, explaining to them that the Muslims did not wish to confront the Qoraysh. In return, the Qoraysh killed the camel of the ambassador, and death, too, was close for the ambassador himself.
For the second time the Prophet appointed another ambassador to deliver the message. Omar Ibn Khattab was the appointed one, though he refused, his excuse being that many of the Qoraysh hated him and his life may be danger.
Finally, a treaty was made between the Qoraysh and the Prophet, named the Treaty of Hodybiah. The scribe of the treaty was Imam Ali (a.s.). He initiated the treaty with the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. The agent of the Qoraysh objected to that, saying: if we believed in Allah we would not fight you. The name was omitted. Again, when the name of the Prophet was mentioned in the treaty as the messenger of Allah, the agent of Qoraysh objected saying : ‘If we believed you were the messenger of Allah we wouldn’t fight you’.
In short, although most parts of that treaty seemed against Muslims, the Prophet did not reject it, for that situation required peace which could later bring greater victory that sometimes may not be gained by the sword. Ignoring this fact, Ibn Hisham, the famous historian has narrated that upon acceptance of the peace treaty, Omar Ibn Khattab objected to it, going to the Prophet and surprisingly, questioning him as to whether he was the messenger of God!
-Yes, I am, replied the Prophet.
- Aren’t we Muslims ?
-Yes, said the Prophet.
-Aren’t they infidels ?
- Yes, added the prophet.
- Then why should we humiliate ourselves?
The Holy Prophet said: “I am the servant of God and His messenger and will never disobey Him, as He will never leave me alone.30”
Although the treaty seemed bitter to the taste of some of the Muslims who were not able to foresee the future, nor did they surrender to God, it paved the way for many great victories, to the extent that the Holy Quran has mentioned that treaty as a vivid victory: “Indeed, We have granted you a manifest victory”. In fact, the treaty of Hodaybiah paved the way to conquer Mecca as well as Khaybar in two years time. Muslims strengthened themselves and within two years easily interred Mecca; the capital of the infidels of Qoraysh. To this end, Imam Sadiq (a.s.) says: There was no event in the history of Islam, as blissful as the treaty of Hodaybiah.
2. The Peace treaty of Imam Hasan (a.s.)
The peace treaty between Imam Hasan and Mo’awia is one of the bitter events in the history of Islam. This treaty has even been used by some of the adversaries to blame and accuse Imam Hasan of being a man who was, God forbid, seeking his material comfort to the extent that some of them have shamelessly accused him of blasphemy. In fact, the state of Imam Hasan’s oppression is more than that of his brother Imam Husain. For, Imam Hasan was oppressed by both his companions and those historians partial to Ahlul-Bait .
Safadi shamelessly says: “(Imam) Hasan Ibn Ali said to Mo’awia that he had a debt. If Mo’awia would pay his loan off, then he was willing to give up the Caliphate to him. Mo’awia paid off his loan and Hasan Ibn Ali gave up the Caliphate to Mo’awia.”( Safadi : Sharh Laamia 2:27)
Dr. Philip Hitti following Safadi with utmost impudence says: “People of Iraq appointed Hasan Ibn Ali, who was the oldest son of Ali and Fatima the daughter of the Prophet to be their spiritual leader. However, Hasan, who was a pleasure seeking person!, not a statesman, was not suitable for the position and hence resigned being satisfied with an annual ration he received from Mo’awia”.(Philip Hitti, Al-Arab. p. 78)
The followers of Mo’awia have never provided any historical documents for their false claims.
The Causes of Peace
Before shedding some light on the reasons why Imam Hasan was forced to agree to the Peace Treaty, we should ask ourselves:
Did not the Prophet of Islam sign a peace treaty with the infidels? Of course he did. So, can we say the Prophet (saww) was, God forbid, a man seeking pleasure and not a statesman? Was not Imam Ali, the courageous man of Islam, forced to accept the peace treaty which was imposed on him in the battle of Seffin? Moreover, no doubt, peace is accepted in Islam when the circumstances allow, as I have already explained.
Above all, it is a big mistake to assume that making peace with the enemy is equal to seeking pleasure but that constant fighting is courage and bravery. In contrast, the man of Islam is seeking God’s satisfaction. His reason for fighting is the same as his reason for making peace. To him, both peace and war are to be used in their due place. Therefore, different circumstances require different treatment and strategy. Do not forget that Imam Husain who is known to us for his courageous devotion in Karbala, continued the peace strategy of his brother with Mo’awia for ten years. In short, there is no single difference between our Imams. Had either of them been in the other’s situation, he would have done the same. It is the circumstances which make the difference.
By the way, among many reasons which forced Imam Hasan to accept the Peace Treaty, the following were the main ones:
1. The rumor of peace:
Cold War is one of the methods used in wars. Spreading rumors against the enemy and weakening the morale of the opposing soldiers has always been one of the methods of defeating the enemy.
Mo’awia, utilising this method, appointed some of his spies to spread rumours among the army of Imam Hasan to the effect that the Imam had corresponded with Mo’awia accepting peace.( Ibn Abil-Hadid 4:13-15) The army of Imam Hasan was impressed so much by the rumors that some of them accused Imam Hasan of blasphemy saying: “The man has become an infidel!”
2. Division, Impatience and tending to material pleasures:
Imam Hasan, prior to accepting the peace, delivered a lecture to the public explaining to them the reasons behind their being defeated by Mo’awia.
One part of the lecture reads:
“We were fighting people of Damascus by the power of coexistence, unity and patience, until you were divided and lost your patience. Before, you used to prefer your belief to your material comfort, and now your material comfort is what you care for. Mo’awia has invited us to a peace treaty in which you will lose your dignity. Nevertheless, if you are willing
to sacrifice, then we will fight him.” The crowd shouted: “Accept the peace. Accept the peace.”( Ibn Athir, Al-Kaamil 3:406)
In fact, Mo’awia had purchased the high officers of Imam Hasan. Obaidullah Ibn Abbas was the first commander of Imam Hasan and yet, Mo’awia was able to buy him with one million Dirhams, half to be paid cash and the rest on credit. The companions of Imam Hasan were so unfaithful that they even made attempts upon his life. If the tents of Imam Husain were plundered by his enemies face-to-face, the tent of Imam Hasan was plundered by his own so-called soldiers. They pulled away the mat on which he was praying. If Imam Husain was wounded by the arrows of the army of Yazid, Imam Hasan was wounded by his own officer Jarrah Ibn Senan. It was under such circumstances that Imam Hasan accepted the peace. He then carried on another mission, i.e.: to train faithful soldiers, if not for his time, they were trained for the time of his brother, Imam Husain who was going to carry the same message. As a matter of fact, the peace treaty that Imam Hasan agreed upon, paved the way for the revolution made by Imam Husain.
To this end, the Holy Prophet (saww) is quoted to have said: “Hasan and Husain are both Imams, whether they rise up or sit down.”
Slow Death
After accepting the peace, Imam Hasan left Kofa forever for Madina. After which, he opened another chapter in his life.
At this stage, he was gradually being sacrificed. Unlike a soldier in the battle front who has a quick death, the dear Imam suffered a slow death throughout 10 years.
During the last 10 years of his life he carried yet another mission. The Ummah was not prepared to fight the devil. They needed to be educated and that was the mission of the Imam. Despite the rumors that Mo’awia was spreading against the Imam, his personality was an influence on people.
Such great men as our infallible Imams reach a point where both their lives and deaths are a real threat to the oppressors. They attempt to destroy their personalities by spreading rumors against them. But their transcendental personalities are too high to be reached by those devils.
Mo’awia was encountering this puzzle which had made him confused, until a vicious plot was arranged. He bribed Jo’dah, the wife of the Imam who was suffering from the inferiority of infertility, to poison her husband.
Half a century had passed since the migration of the Prophet, and the Imam was at the age of 47.
On a day whilst fasting, Jo’dah poisoned the cup of milk with which Imam Hasan was supposed to break his fasting. Immediately after drinking the milk, the poison corrupted his digestive system and the Imam faced death. He called upon his brother Imam Husain. These were the last seconds of the life of Imam Hasan… two brothers cordially hugging each other. This was one time that Imam Husain hugged one of his brothers. The second time was at Karbala when Abbas called upon Husain while both his arms were brutally chopped off…
Sheikh Mansour Leghaei
Source: Imam reza network
Muslim Ummah at the Threshold of 21st Century
(This is translation of an article by Prof. Khurshid Ahmad published in Tarjumanul Qur'an, November,1997)
Twentieth Century is moving swiftly towards its end. It started when Western colonial powers had gained strength at world level. It was also the time when mechanization started and the might of steam engine had totally dominated minds of these powers. Industrial movement, French revolution, freedom of USA coupled with its economic attainments and the wide spread invincibility notion attached to Western powers, were the important events of that time. In short, the whole world and particularly the Islamic world (a world power before and after renaissance) came under total spell of European powers during the first quarter of 20th century.
Britain alone controlled a quarter of the world major part of which comprised of Muslim territory. Britain had a vanity that it was controlling the sea all-over the world and that sun never set on its dominion. France had under its control a third of Africa besides a good number of Far-Eastern states. Even countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal were controlling a number of places around the world. The colonial powers were using resources of the whole world to strengthen their economic, political and cultural dominance. Similarly, Tzarist Russia had under its thumb the Central Asian States (a galaxy of republics, which once symbolized epitome of Islamic glory.
Lost Grounds
The whole Muslim Ummah was under the autocracy of Western powers with no hope and signs of improvement from anywhere. Turkish Ottoman Empire (a symbol of Islamic world power with its borders stretching from Morocco to Central Europe (had become the "Sick-Man" of Europe. Balkan wars and World War I had forced her to retreat and ultimately confined to a limited area around Anatolia. Even here the great empire had to fight for survival and was coerced to adopt secularism in guise of Kamalism. It had to compromise on elimination of Ottoman Empire and destroy its historical, religious and cultural identity to secure political and geographical entity.
For the Middle East the Western colonial powers had a horrible plan. Pan-Arab nationalism and lust for power were the destructive instruments applied to snatch political freedom from the Middle-Eastern Muslim rulers. About a dozen powerless states under the European command emerged on world map as a result of Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) and Balfour Declaration (1917).
As such, the plan was to divide Middle East into pieces on one hand and on the other to create conditions facilitating creation of a Jewish state among Arabs. The machination ultimately bore fruit and Israel was established in the heart of Muslim Ummah with due understanding among USA, UK and USSR with connivance of UN. This way, all those rulers, tribes and people who once enjoyed power, pelf and freedom were eliminated from world politics forever. Muslims, who enjoyed world leadership status for more than 12 centuries, were thus deprived of this position for the first time in history. Except in a few semi-independent states (Afghanistan, Turkey, Yemen and Arab Peninsula), the Muslim might and political authority - the symbols of Muslim Ummah's dignity – was totally eliminated from around the globe.
Future Perspective
These were the conditions under which the Muslim Ummah entered into the 20th century. Now, when we review the past 100 years' political conditions of Muslims, we find signs of hope since revival and the struggle of the Muslim Ummah has set in all spheres of life. This resurgence has no other explanation but what the Qur'an Says: "and (the unbelievers) plotted and planned, and God too planned, and the best of planners is God." (S III-54)
The colonial powers had planned to make Muslim Ummah ineffective forever. But history stands witness that if Muslims retreated at a front they demonstrated strength at another, e.g., when Baghdad was destroyed, Muslims were dominating power in Africa and Spain; the weakness of Arabs was compensated by the advancement of Central Asian Muslim states; the destruction of Haspania and surrender in Qartabah and Gharnatah was equated by bringing Constantinopal under the command of Ottoman empire which symbolized the 'Rise of Islam.'
During this period Muslims captured vast areas of Asia and Africa. This important feature of Muslim history has disrupted in the recent past. But just as a day follows the night, the Muslim Ummah during the past five decades have, to a large extent, overcome the miserable conditions of the past and started reform at world level.
At present Muslim population is about 1.6 billion which makes roughly 22 per cent of world population. About 1000 million Muslims live in 56 Muslim states and are part of UN and OIC. The rest 600 million Muslim are spread in different countries. There is hardly any place on earth, which is not inhabited by Muslims. A significant number of Muslims (200 million) live in India.
In Europe and America, Muslim population though insignificant in the past has now increased manifold. Widespread migrations at world level have introduced Muslims to those areas, which hitherto stood untended for centuries from the teachings of Islam. Numerical strength plus the Muslim states' geographical location have given Muslim a strategic position in today's world.
Seen in the geo-strategic outlook, the politically independent Muslim states virtually command one-fourth of the world; from Morocco to Indonesia and Kazakhstan to Turkey and Bosnia. Muslim bloc can be divided into two big geographical zones; one, a large chain starting from Morocco/Senegal and through Pakistan entering Central Asia, and two; the most important zone of Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia.
The two zones are of strategic importance for all sea, land and air transport routes. Dead Sea, Red Sea and Caspian are in the center of Muslim states. A number of Muslim countries have seacoasts on Indian and Atlantic Oceans. The important sea gateways like Damial, Suez, Port Said, Djibouti and Aden are under Muslim control. Muslim world is impregnate with important economic resources like agriculture, oil, electricity, coal, iron, uranium, tin, rubber, copper, etc. About 1/4th of the Muslim world is not simply in a position to achieve sustained economic growth and provide adequate education and other social infrastructure to their citizens, but can also play an important role in the economic and technological development of brother Muslim countries, e.g.
Turkey has the skill to manufacture F-16 fighter planes; Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Kazakhstan have economic strength to help other Muslim countries financially; Pakistan, despite strong Western resistance, has successfully advanced with its peaceful nuclear energy agenda in a period almost half that other countries might take, and; the change in oil prices of 1972 and 1980 has tilted the balance of economic strength towards Islamic countries. In nutshell, we can safely conclude that the strength and centrality which the Muslim Ummah enjoy today has no match in its history (a fact which should never be ignored. It is another sore subject why Muslim world could not take full advantage of its present powerful position on the world checkerboard.
Materializing the Goal
Only human resource development or political and economic strength is not enough to achieve the cherished goal. Most important aspect is the brainy movement to direct and portray the religious and ideological identity of Muslim Ummah. This century can rightly be termed the century of Islamic revival; political and economic aspects being mere parts of it. The plight of Muslims climaxed at the close of 20th century and so did the revival. In fact, it was the lowliness of Muslim Ummah, which touched many Muslim thinkers’ minds and souls who attended to the urgent call and engaged themselves to find cause of Muslim downfall and to identify measures for revival.
The enemies of Islam assumed that by politically dominating the Muslims; dividing them into small states, nationalities and tribes; imposing secular system through secular rulers; and by crafting Western political, economic, educational and cultural agendas, Muslim Ummah can be neutralized for ever. But the ultimate prudence of God Almighty was different. The sense of extreme deprivation played the role of activator.
The modernist liberal West could not liquidate Muslim Ummah’s strong Islamic creed. After doing away with the slavery, the Muslim Ummah started struggle for revival and reverted to its roots. The great Muslim scholars of the recent times urged the Ummah to submit to the will of God Almighty and strictly follow the teachings of Muhammad (peace be upon him). The Qur’an and the Hadith (the pious traditions set by the Prophet) were dignified as the cornerstone of the movement. In order to eliminate slavery and make Shari’ah (Islamic precepts of religion) supreme, efforts were made to interpret Islamic principles so as to meet the modern day requirements.
The causes of Ummah’s descent were identified while at the other end hollowness of Western Hedonistic philosophy was fully exposed. The Muslim scholars were successful in highlighting Western powers' strong points which had such a damaging impact on culture, ideology and moral values of Muslim society. Principles of Islam for self-reliance and development were reincarnated. And history proved the dictum that Islam has an in built natural flexibility which helps it to react with full force against oppression.
The current Islamic resurgence comprises of two very important aspects: First, its extensive manifestation in terms of:
Political emancipation;
Economic development;
Promotion of education;
Creation of new political and economic institutions such as Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI), International Islamic Universities (IIUs);
Integration of Islamic banks (presently 105 interest free banks with assets exceeding $80 billion operate around the globe);
Rejection of Western culture;
Search for means to extend cooperation and coordination among Muslim countries;
Creation of a number of similar other institutions which are symbols of unity of Muslim Ummah and indicators of their ideological awareness
Second and an equally important aspect is the rational which is the real force behind this comprehensive revival movement. In fact, it is this force, which have played the most significant role in changing the ideological and cultural pattern of Muslims virtually on entire globe. In the Indian Sub-Continent, movements led by Syed Ahmed Shaheed, Shah Ismail Shaheed and in Bengal the movement of Haji Shariatullah and then the efforts of Iltaf Hussain Hali, Shibli Naumani, Maulana Abuul Kalam Azad, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi and Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar reactivated Muslims on intellectual, moral, cultural and ultimately on political fronts. Revival movement of Allama Iqbal, Syed Maududi's literary and intellectual work and the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, all converged on a nation-wide political movement and ultimately resulted in creation of separate Muslim abode in 1947.
This nascent yet strong movement of the early half of 20th century gained ground in the later half and gradually spread all over the Islamic world. The Muslim nations started fighting for freedom from colonial powers with principle motive to protect and promote their Islamic identity. Some times it appeared as if nationalism was the fighting force for freedom, yet it is an acknowledged fact that even behind nationalism the one and the only force was resurgence of Islamic thought.
Kentole Smith in Islam and Modern History (Princeton University Press, 1957, p.77) admits: "Muslims have never accepted any concept of nationalism under which the principles of loyalties are outside the jurisdiction of Islam." He says: "besides (as far as Muslims are concerned) in the past only and only Islam has been the driving force which has provided to Muslims the discipline, strength, and desire for freedom."
Jamalud Din Afghani, Muhammad Abdullah, Muhammad Rashid Raza and the founder of Ikhwanul-Muslimoon, Imam Hasan-al-Banna Shaheed, led and promoted the revival movement in Arabic World. In Turkey, in the depressed secular state, Saeed Noorsi, Adnan Mandrees and Najmud Din Irbakan have kept alive the Islamic movement. In North Africa, Abdul Qadi, Ahmed Badees, Ibrahim Aljazairi, Sanosi Malik bin Banni and presently Abbas Madani, Ahmed Bilhajj, and Rahid Ghanoshi have strengthened the Islamic movement. Similarly, in Sudan, Mehdi Sudani followed by Inssar and Ikhwanul-Muslimoon have given life to the movement. And now under the dynamic leadership of Dr. Hassan Tarabi, Sudan is going through a unique experiment of Islamization. In Iran, the religious and popular movement of Imam Khomeini and Ayatullah Khamnaee has started a new era.
The Conflict Element
Essence of Islamic movement and the general revival of Islam at world level are the real forces which are shaping the future of Muslim Ummah. This is an era of conflict as a result of which a new epoch is emerging. But, certainly the Islamic movements are going to succeed in the future unlike the remains of colonialism which do not possess spark to revive. The Western nations and their friends consider Islam a danger primarily for this trait.
Once Communism is dead, personalities like Richard Nixon, Ronald Regan, ex-secretary general and the present secretary general of NATO, the policy makers, scholars and Western educationists, all portray Islamic revival movement as a threat. They are making last ditch efforts to create conflict situation between the West and the Muslim Ummah. The terrorist act at Oklahoma has been, without any justification, attributed to Islam. The American culprit's death sentence subsequently bespeaks the bias which Americans reserve for Muslims.
A Muslims majority Bosnian State is unacceptable to West as it holds central position in Europe. Procedures are applied to force Arabs agree to Israeli-styled peace. They are being forced to open their markets for Israel. As a result of Afghan war Eastern European nations now stand liberated; Berlin war has been erased to ground; Russia, is indebted to West and the World Bank; Central Asian Muslim States are free; and Communism at world level has totally shattered.
But, the people of Afghanistan are not allowed to take benefit of their struggle. Muslim heroes of Afghan war are now branded as fundamentalists. Arabs' highly praised participation in Afghan war, is now a stigma. Democracy, propagated globally, is denied per force to Algeria because the Islamic Movement has the potential to win elections. And all this is being done under the hocus pocus imaginary threat.
Muslim Ummah has no territorial conflict with the West rather it seeks its inherent right to develop individual and social life in accordance with its own set of religious doctrine, culture and history where family is central to real target for bringing change. But, this change is presented as a threat to the West.
The reason behind this expertly crafted notion is West’s inability to guide humanity in the right direction; its lack of knowledge and bigotry towards Islam. The experiment of secular culture has failed. Despite West’s total command over the world for about 500 years it could not establish an equitable and just system. There has certainly been a tremendous industrial growth and increase in wealth in the West but it was unable to provide welfare, justice and peace to mankind.
Even now 1/4th of the world population is without basic food. The West possess in itself the poverty problematic 14-15 per cent population. On average the unemployment is above 10 per cent. Despite spectacular achievements in the medical science, humanity confronts new and complex diseases. Western family structure has totally collapsed. The number of single-parent children (born without formal marriages) has exceeded above legal children.
The number of single family parent has reached 40 per cent and 30 per cent in USA and Europe, respectively. The rise in crime has seized the freedom of society and the younger generation is in particular morally corrupt. Material growth cradles mental-sickness and suicide which is on the rise. The historians hypothesize with fear that a civilization born of material growth is not conducive for human beings. Famous poet Iqbal says: "In spite of significant findings about Universe and control over nature through scientific development, the West could not eradicate the evils plaguing humanity."
In fact it is the weakness of the West which is making it fearful of the potential strength of Islam, otherwise, Muslims militarily, politically or economically pose no threat to it. The real conflict lies in ideology and moral values. This is an area where West is like a spent force with no new system or message for the humanity at hand. It is here that Islam has the potential to bring the humanity light and fresh thinking.
Islam has a message for humanity; a live message for their present living, a promise for attractive destiny and a glorious future. The spread of this message had neither been due to violent force in the past nor it needs such force today. In fact it is filling the gap where humanity is trapped. This is the real danger for the West, otherwise it is a total blessing for the humanity making no distinction between East and the West. Recently, The Economist (London), analyzed the past and future of mankind after the fall of Communism and dislodging of Berlin Wall. It particularly concluded that fall of Communism did not indicate any good message for the humanity. It was apprehended that fundamental Muslims and Christians believe that they have a new message for the humanity.
To portray Islam as potential danger for humanity is suicidal. The resurgent movement is a message which can save humanity and this movement has the potential to open a new era. Instead of treating it as a friend and great savior of humanity, it is being considered a danger and an enemy by the West.
The sagacious Western leadership must clearly understand that in Islam Jehad does not mean the use of brutal force. Jehad is the name given to that discipline and struggle which is applied to achieve the positive goals of life.
It is a constructive force which helps to achieve high human values. This was the force that was used by an ill-equipped Afghan army to push belligerent Russia off its shoulders and thus change the history and the course of time. And now this is the force behind Intifaadah movement in Palestine which has forced Israel to a point that it has to seek cooperation of PLO for peace. The same force has neutralized huge oppressing forces in Kashmir, Tajikistan and Chechnya. Henceforth, portraying such a liberating force as a negative one shall serve nothing to mankind.
Currently, USA is the greatest military power. With 6 per cent of population it controls about 25 per cent of world economic potential. In spite of this it could not overcome the ordinary men in Vietnam and preferred to retreat after the loss of about 50,000 troops. In the Middle-East war with Iraq, USA with its 29 allies, equipped with the most modern technology, had to employ about 40 per cent of its tactical Air Force and 70 per cent of tank power to ensure a minimum loss of life on its side. It was feared that only about 2,000 American coffins would have forced America to withdraw its forces. This happened in Somalia where America pulled out its army when 23 of its troops were killed.
Thus, the military force of the West is no guarantee to control the world. Things have significantly changed. A nation having firm belief, high moral values and the will to struggle and sacrifice can no more be deprived of its freedom.
Under the conditions explained above, it is quite obvious that Islam is the only constructive force for the future. Indeed much has yet to be done. It has to strengthen its moral values, gain intellectual creditability in order to motivate the masses.
It is also utmost desirable to get rid of those rulers of the Muslims countries who are under the influence of the West. Once the masses and the leadership work for the same ideology and destination and instead of confrontation the energies are used for new and positive objectives, change is sure to come. In order to achieve this objective firm belief, determination and continuos efforts are essentially required. God willing, the Ummah is going to have new and bright future in the 21st Century.
(This is translation of an article by Prof. Khurshid Ahmad published in Tarjumanul Qur'an, November,1997)
Khurshid Ahmad
Source: Imam reza network
The Divine Cultural Revolution
In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Lord, open my breast, and ease for me my task. Unloose the knot upon my tongue that they may understand my words. May peace be upon the Messenger, the trustee and the firm rope of Allah, our Master and lord, the last of prophets, Abu 'l Qasim Muhammad (S); and peace be upon the immaculate Imams from his household. May peace be upon us and the righteous servants of Allah.
Man is a cultural being. Many thinkers regard man as an economic being more than anything else, and thus base all estimations on this judgement. Actually man is a cultural being. He creates a specific culture and desires to live with it. A human culture, however, has its roots and various dimensions. It has economic, emotional, spiritual and instinctive dimensions as well, which include his need for food, clothing and shelter, his craving for love and affection, his ambition for power and status, and his quest and pursuit of God.
If we carefully study the culture of an individual or of a society, we shall notice all these elements in it. Some of them may, however, be more conspicuous in certain societies. In some societies, religious and spiritual tendencies are predominant and play a decisive role, while in others the economic trends serve the same purpose. In some of the societies, ambition for power and position is displayed and in others the love for carnal pleasures is distinctly exhibited. In certain societies the aesthetic strains are more distinguished, while in others the tendencies of mammonism are more pronounced.
But what are the main factors responsible for influencing the human life and determining the character of his collective' culture? Which are its primary components and what form do they take in its constitution? What are its sources and what are the factors that determine the direction of its evolution?
The morality and behaviour of every individual are manifestation and expression of the collective entity which is culture. It is the sum total of our outlook, behaviour and norms. For this very reason, a person's world outlook, i.e. his attitude towards the world and towards the purpose of its creation, is regarded as the infrastructure of his behaviour. Some cultures regard man as a material being and consider the universe as a sheer material entity. According to this view, the human beings are born in this material course to grow, to live, to get old and die, or die before getting old. On the contrary, there is another view which holds that man's existence is more comprehensive than his physical existence, which is confined to a limited span of time between life and death. According to this view, the present life is only a phase of his existence, which transcends the limits of physical death. These different views cause people to differ in their outlooks regarding the problems of everyday life.
What is it that gives real meaning and purpose to human existence and is also relevant to our cultural revolution? What is the philosophy of life and the philosophy of being and becoming from the Islamic viewpoint? These are, of course, a series of familiar problems which I aim to deal with in a methodical way in order to reach the desired conclusion.
As Muslims, we believe that this physical and phenomenal world is the manifestation of the Creator of nature and matter. It is the manifestation of the creative fountainhead of life, God, the Source of all being, that exalted sublime Being, that infinite Power and that tremendous magnet that constantly attracts and aligns all being scattered through space and time. Any failure to harmonize themselves with His power transforms beings into meaningless insignificant and wandering non entities. In the case of human beings the relationship of man's alignment and union with Divine Essence is dependent upon man's choice and his self consciousness.
It is God who is the reality of being and the meaning of existence. Everything is meaningful only in the light of God's existence. To speak of a world without God, is like speaking in absurd and meaningless terms. Such is the view of a believer in God's existence, of a Muslim and a `natural man' regarding his relationship with the universe and its Creator. This is the conviction of a Muslim who believes in the Quran, in the Day of Resurrection and the Day of Judgement.
The Quran equally emphasizes both the worldly life and the life after death. According to the Quran, man's existence is subject to a lengthy course. Obviously, a person with such an outlook cannot plan his life within the framework of physical life and death, while planning his future; a realistic and foreseeing person makes schemes and plans. In the early five or six years of his life, he does not possess any plan regarding his future and merely lives in the present. It is about the age of thirteen or fifteen years that men attain enough maturity to think about their future and become aware enough to cogitate upon their future and prepare themselves to face it. This is the time when a person of foresight plans and programmes his life keeping in mind his wants and needs. However, the span of life in this world is just a section of man's real life, though most of the time he is engaged in the matters of this transitory life. The acts performed in this life are indicative of the life in the other world which is certainly much more long than the life in this world. Isn't it here, in this life, that he should decide what he would do in the next, just as he does during his school years?
Usually, one decides about his future profession during his school days. This phenomenon bears but a faint similarity with the process of equipping oneself for the life after death the life in eternity. The thing which is common for both the courses is to live with the remembrance of God and His love, acquiring the peace of soul and spiritual bliss with God's light in one's heart:
Those only are believers who when God is mentioned, their hearts quake, and when His signs are recited to them, it increases them in faith, and in their Lord they put their trust. (8:2)
And
In God's remembrance are at rest the hearts of those who believe and do righteous deeds. (13:28)
His remembrance transforms all mental worries, anxieties, fears and tensions into peace and tranquility.
The Theme of Discussion
Whatever has been said till now was meant to be a background for our discussion regarding the philosophical understanding of the most sublime dimension of our social and cultural revolution. In this regard, the `remembrance of God' is the most important doctrine that can assist and promote our aims in the most effective way. The `remembrance of God' should be reinforced in our personal as well as in our social lives. To do so is both very easy and difficult. Easy, since we believe more or less in God. We are not completely alienated from God. The ritual prayers that we offer, at morning, noon and at night, are after all an evidence of the commitment between us and God. For, if it were not, we would not have offered our prayers when we are all alone and there are no parents, wives, children, or neighbours to remind or to reproach us. We do say our prayers, both when alone and in the presence of other people. So, it is because of the importance of the `remembrance of God' in our lives that we say our prayers regardless of whether anybody is present to see us or not. Even this much of faith is enough to benefit our existence. We should augment this asset by adding to it His remembrance and love so that it may give light and warmth to our existence.
It is evident that a materialist isolates himself in the darkness of ignorance of God's existence a darkness where the rays of the Divine light do not touch him and he remains severed from God and His sacred remembrance, rendering his own life meaningless and absurd, or at least lacking in meaning and light. Those who have studied and keenly observed the circumstances of our times may have noticed that nihilism is the natural fate of those who imprison their lives within the walls of materialism.
Our cultural revolution should lead our society through the enlightened path of God's love, so that the Divine light may illuminate the life of every one of us and influence our behaviour in a profound and creative way. This is a very difficult task and requires a lot of willpower, endeavour and vigilance. It is essential that the cultural revolution should carve out a programme for the followers of every age group and design a plan to provide the grounds for their intellectual and spiritual development.
The Cultural Revolution
The cultural revolution is a very complex and complicated process. It is not so simple as it is imagined. It needs a lot of industry and dedication on the part of all those who are concerned: the university teachers and students, the religious leaders and thinkers, the planners and intellectuals, and in short all the followers of the path of God, to determine the starting point so that the rest of the way should be determined by traversing this path and through unceasing effort.
The cultural revolution is not a simple enterprise to be accomplished in a short time. The cultural revolution is a revolution which needs to be launched and advanced with great care and dedication. It cannot progress and advance automatically by itself without any application of effort on the part of its participants. The participants, the human individuals, are themselves not any automatic, mechanical beings. One of the most crucial mistakes committed during the century of scientism was the assumption about man that he is a fully automatic machine. Specially ever since the automatic and self regulating machines have been invented, this view has gained currency. This type of thinking dominated the human minds nearly throughout this century of scientism. Anthropology was regarded as the study of a complex machinery with sensitive delicate wires. But fortunately, since the last thirty or forty years, this attitude is gradually changing. The thing which was regarded as a super automatic, complex and delicate machinery was discovered to be the human body alone, and the body an insignificant fraction of the whole human existence.
Man an Unknown Being
Of course, it is understandable that those aspects of human life that resemble those of biological organisms could be, to some extent, compared with the complicated mechanism of a super automatic machine. But these are not the only things that constitute a human being. Man is not a human being just because of these physical characteristics. It is culture which fashions a real human being. When we arrive at this point, all sorts of evaluations and estimations based on physics or physiology regarding man break down totally; since they have failed to offer an acceptable understanding of the human being. During the last forty years the human sciences have come to the conclusion that man is as yet an unknown being.
Perhaps one of the best books on this subject to appear during the recent decades is by Alexis Carl entitled Man: The Unknown Being. A prominent physician and a product of the age of scientism, he believes that man cannot be defined in the terms of scientific criteria or formulae. Not even the most advanced discoveries of empirical sciences such as physics, biochemistry and biology can satisfactorily explain human existence. He goes even further and says that these scientific disciplines are inept even in the treatment of his physiological ailments, where it is not possible to ignore his spiritual strengths. His being evades the criteria forged by science. Yet, a cultural revolution can open new venues for understanding of this elusive being which is man.
However, one cannot be sure that he will follow this secure route of assured salvation without any interruption if he is left to himself. Now we can properly understand the meaning of: "Guide us in the straight path", that we recurringly utter at least five times a day.
I remember, during the early days of my youth, very involved discussion used to be held on diverse subjects among the people of younger generation. It was approximately thirty six or thirty seven years ago that the problems of ideological significance like materialism, Marxism and ancient Iranian notions became topics of our hot discussions. The subjects varied over a wide range, more vast and richer perhaps than those discussed today. Since, after a long spell of repression and restraint, an era of independence and freedom had begun which nevertheless lacked any kind of experience of struggle and conflicts that occurred during these last eight to ten years preceding our revolution. That is why the questions that were asked and answers that were sought varied over a wide range. During those days, as a devout Muslim youth, I was sometimes involved in fiery discussions with other youths. At times we had ardent and excited debates. One of the questions that were often, raised was regarding the verse:. (Guide us in the straight path). It was asked, what does it signify that we every day repeat it in our prayers: guide us in the straight path? Is it not that we are Muslims? If Islam is the straight path, are we not already on the right path being Muslims? If God has shown us the right path, what is the point in asking Him to guide us in a straight path? Does it not imply doubt in the way we follow? Why do we then believe in Islam and say prayers? Since the very act of saying prayers implies the fact that we believe in Islam. I remember how some people used to make improper remarks and gave inadequate explanations. They used to give misleading and immature replies which themselves may lead to dire consequences causing serious deviations and misunderstandings.
Mans Need for Constant Guidance
It is a fact that the notion of "Guide us in the straight path," has not only been formulated for the purpose of uttering it in every prayer, but because man is always in need of Divine guidance. Why? Because human life is not similar to the highly automated cycles of a machine or a computer that work according to certain predetermined designs or programme. Man, on the other hand, is ever in the process of making choice and selection, and this condition requires a constant guidance. Man is a perpetual seeker and explorer, and an explorer is ever in need of a guide. Who can be a better guide than Allah whose guidance can lead man through the complex intricacies of worldly life, and invigorate and revive in him the consciousness and awareness that can warn him of dangers and remind him of his duties. It is of course possible that some people may become overly conscious in this regard to imagine that whatever they do is wrong and harmful. This is sickness, not awareness. We need to be alert and conscious, not suspicious and whimsical. Being whimsical and hesitant can prove to be harmful to the same extent as the correct thinking can prove to be beneficial. It has repeatedly been emphasized in the Quran through various verses, that the prophets were sent to deliver the people from the clutches of ignorance and forgetfulness through self realization and remembrance of God. The Quran cautions man about the dangerous and hazardous path that he has to tread.
Therefore we need to revive, restore and to preserve in ourselves the sense of consciousness and responsibility towards our duties which springs from our quest of God by means of this cultural revolution. We have to achieve a state of permanence of this form of consciousness, which is of course not an easy task. In order to make the difficulty of this task more comprehensible, I shall give a few examples. A person who interprets all problems of life in a state of alienation from God and evolves a set of attitudes and perspectives, he may advance in life without any apprehension or fear of the consequences. But it is not possible for a Godfearing person to adopt any of these attitudes as unmindfully and without examining the consequences. There are certain people who adopt a policy of pursuit of comfort and convenience. As children they grow up with this attitude, and as grown ups they prefer to lead a safe and secure life free from all pains, hardships and dangers. This type of outlook is typical of a person whose main aim is to avoid pains and troubles. But when a person having commitment to God tries to evade his duties towards God, his conscience ceaselessly reproaches him for his irresponsible behaviour. His conscience calls him to face all kinds of difficulties for the sake of objective and demands for the sacrifice of his well being, his property or even of his life: he should be too ready and willing to sacrifice everything in order to execute God's will. His inner voice demands that he should not be afraid of getting hurt or being killed, and that he should embrace the idea of sacrificing his life for the sake of God.
Each time we pay a visit to the hospitalized youths, wounded or crippled for the sake of our revolution or on the war fronts, we are surprised and filled with admiration on seeing them. Their radiantly happy faces reflect their inner joy, while we know they suffer from severe pain and unsound physical condition. Those brave warriors of Islam, lie on their sick beds greeting us joyfully with smiles' on their pale faces, though they !night have been restless with pain. I remember once I went to pay a visit to one of these high spirited heroes of our Islamic Revolution. He was a middle aged fellow. Obviously the wounds sustained by him were extremely painful, but his face was bright and peaceful. The Quranic verse reads:
Those only are believers who, when God is mentioned, their hearts quake, when His signs are recited to them, it increases them in faith. (13:28)
It should be remembered that although he (the wounded warrior) was overwhelmed with pain and the fever caused by his inflammatory wounds was so high that he could hardly open his eyes, yet his face was happy and beaming, reflecting his inner soul.
What was actually active within him that caused his soul to overpower his ailing body? It was actually his thriving faith and trust in God and the belief that God watches him and his deeds. His behaviour was not under the control of a desire for comfort. It shows how the domination by a Divine culture transforms the human behaviour, and that too in such a distressing condition of physical pain and torment. Such a human being cannot be made to drift from the path of God to some other path. The people who are on the other side are of peevish and reckless nature, who cannot live if they do not quarrel. Such a person is ever looking for an opportunity to pick a quarrel. It is almost impossible for him to remain peaceful without clashing with someone. There are certain people and their number is not few who knive others and get knived and severely injure themselves, but they little care about their pains. The wounds they suffer, bitterly hurt them, but they overcome the pain on account of their extraordinary love of "heroic" exploits.
A hero and a scoundrel both resemble in many ways. Both act in the midst of danger. Great dangers do not alarm them. But call back the anti social rogue to return to the path of God, to sheathe his sword and lay down his knife, and submit to duty. When he was in the dark regarding his duties towards God, he had a certain line of action and operation, and was quite happy and content with his unmindful, callous way of life. But now that he has committed himself to a certain ideology and a specific cue, he has become careful and knows well what should be his appropriate and fitting course of action. Now he possesses full awareness.
The Conscious Choice
Dear sisters and brothers, the greatest pain a human being undergoes is the strain of making a free and conscious choice; when one finds himself in a state of hesitation regarding various problems and enigmatic situations that need to be attended according to God's directions. It is the time when one has to abandon his reckless non commitment to tread the sublime path of Islamic culture and adopt a painful life of choice and awareness. A reckless ruffian indifferent to comforts, who would easily abdicate his health, his limbs, even his life to satisfy his craving for adventure would be overwhelmed with the pain and agony of choice characteristic of a worthy warrior.
It becomes still more difficult when, like Ali (A), he has to choose his course of action upon the chest of his enemy, with a bare sword in his hand. The same moment he resolves to cut his throat, within seconds an incident occurs which no automatic and the most sophisticated warning system could have predicted. What should be done? His opponent insults him by spitting in his face. What should be done? The angry and revengeful as well as a victorious man within him commands to chop up the rival's head without any delay, but a more conscious and honest choice guided and directed from above admonishes him and tells him that drawing the sword for the sake of quenching the personal thirst of revenge does not suit a man brought up in the Islamic culture and tradition. He gets up and sheathes his sword.
Islam's Goal
The aims and objectives of a common politician are known to everyone. He is after a high political position, social status and power. He is ambitious to the extent of indulging in any sort of crime in order to achieve his selfish ends. He would not refrain from any crime, intrigue or murder in that fiendish direction. Whatever he does is aimed at the same purpose. He hatches plots and conspiracies and takes advantage of every opportunity to defeat his rivals. He tries to demolish his rivals through all sorts of tricks, strategies and conspiracies with the help of his allies until either defeating the rival or facing defeat himself. His aims and ends are clear.
If you try to trace the causes of various political clashes that occurred for the sake of power and status, throughout history, from the times when battles were fought with the most primitive weapons to the present days of modern propaganda warfare, you will notice that the mobilization of forces and resources had the common purpose of power and aimed at bringing the enemy to his knees. However, if these questions are posed to the politician: What is my power for? What would
I do with the office I so much cherish? These questions would negate the assumption that power is an end in itself. It would imply that power and position is not a means to satisfy his lust for wealth and riches, but a means to realize the Divine ideals before which every human being is accountable. When one reaches such a position he is expected to be careful and watchful of his every step. He is constantly in need of Divine guidance. Before taking any step he has to first carefully consider how to confront the opponents. How is he to fight them? Should he speak to them? Should he crush them? Should he be kind or harsh with them? Should he gain their heart? Should harsh and abusive words be used, or whether they should be subdued through kind and affectionate words? The purpose is not whether harshness or mildness with enemy would end in his vanquishing and increase of one's power; the criterion now is not power but adherence to a Divine duty. To subjugate or to destroy the enemy is not the goal in the Islamic culture; it is educating and instructing of an enemy. No such constraint exists for a person who is merely involved in a power struggle and who is not committed to the ideals of God, since, he is mainly interested in defeating the enemy. But for one who believes in the Divine logic, the end is that an enemy should be delivered and educated to follow the right path not to crush him into obedience and surrender but to guide him into obeying God.
Divine Presence
If we are committed to Divine duty in all our choices, we should be extremely cautious in our ways, behaviour, tactics and strategies. You will acknowledge that this is an extremely difficult task that requires constant guidance from God and inspiration from our Divine school of thought.
An individual holding a responsible position in a Divine society, must be perfectly conscious of God's guidance while performing his duties: He is constantly in need of this Divine guidance and the Divine light through the source of Islam, to show him the right path and to guide him in a right way of performing his duties. He is likely to be contacted regarding business matters for various purposes by different people: a close friend or a neighbour may approach him. From the point of view of ordinary prudence, his course of action may be clear: he does a favour to a friend or a neighbour. But as an honest and sincere Islamic administrator, he is expected to act in an equitable and impartial manner. He should treat everyone equally. Equity and impartiality should be his criterion . To him, friend or stranger, kin or alien, neighbours and others, countrymen and foreigners, the people speaking the same language and those. speaking other languages, the people sharing the same religious faith and those having a different faith, all are equal and the same. He should not differentiate among them except in certain cases, and that too within the framework of Islam. Man should always contemplate and judge his actions, not by means of ordinary social norms, but through the Divine humanistic standards, in order to fulfil the Divine ideal. We should always verify and judge ourselves according to it. This is the Divine philosophy ruling over the lives of the dedicated citizens of the Islamic Republic, who have aligned themselves with this Revolution. Now we can see for ourselves how far we have succeeded in our attempts and to what extent this philosophy has been actualized in our lives. How far have our youths advanced in this direction of functioning according to the will of God, and how far they still have to go?
Caution
Here I have a word of caution for the young and the middle aged persons, who constitute the bulk of the active generation, never to assume that you cannot change yourselves on account of age. According to the logic of the Quran, no one is ever too old. One of the most sublime Islamic principles regards man as a being who is always in the process of becoming. From the very first day of his life to its last, a man is always in the process of development and change; a state similar to that of an ever changing fluid. The Quran says in this regard:
Say, `O my servants! Who have been prodigal against yourselves, do not despair of Allah's mercy; surely Allah forgives the sins altogether, surely He is the All forgiving and the All compassionate.' (39:53)
Thus, it is desirous of all the middle aged and the elderly people to be active and determined in the support of the cultural revolution, and resolved to cultivate the manners and attitudes according to the Divine system. Their behaviour and the relationship of the people with one another, everything, should be according to the Divine spirit and congenial to the sense of Divine duty and God's remembrance. And if it is felt that our condition has not improved much, and old faults still persist here and there, we should admit that our inner cultural revolution has not progressed to the desired degree of profundity.
Indeed, if the cultural revolution with its philosophical dimension, and its dimensions of consciousness and world outlook as its basic elements, is expected to advance, it should lead the individual and society, both, in the direction of the Quranic and Islamic ideal. Instead of contemplating everything in the selfish and narrow terms of personal conformity and discord, or dignity and indignity, people should attune themselves to evaluate their life, choices and deeds in the broader perspective of the Quran and Islam. They should erase such imaginary presumptions from their minds as were prevalent during the pre revolution days.
Perpetuation of the Revolution
If we examine the extent of the advancement of our revolution, we shall notice that we still have a very long way to go. In fact it would be found vital for the life of Islam and the Revolution that it should continue perpetually and indefinitely into the future. The economic, civil, administrative, military, and other such problems should be given supplementary and secondary importance. Our main and principal aim should be to maintain our administration, politics, our armed forces, our production and commercial activities, export and import in subservience to the Islamic ideal. Everything should be subordinated to the Islamic essence, to Islamic consciousness and the Islamic perspective. If we neglect the sovereignty of the Islamic world outlook over all the aspects of our existence, our revolution is likely to fall into jeopardy.
The Most Important Dimension of the Islamic Revolution
Which is the most important and the principal aspect of this revolution? The answer is: the cultural aspect.
This revolution, fortunately, started as a cultural movement. It was due to the reason that in the last few years we had successfully changed this aspect of our collective entity and our political system. Other revolutions do, of course, begin with a certain specific cultural note; but this Islamic Revolution of ours has surpassed all other revolutions in this regard. We may rightfully attribute its victory to the predominant Islamic spirit of self sacrifice and wish for martyrdom among our people. As long as this had not happened victory was impossible. Will it not be a great tragedy if this revolution, which is the result of a cultural movement, should transform itself into something other than what it was at its birth? Unless we guard it with great care this victory can any time change into something else. It is our responsibility that every one of us should resolve never to lose the sight of the main thread of our cultural movement. I hope, with every day that passes, we will find ourselves more and more advanced in this direction. I hope we shall utilize the alchemy of God's remembrance to transform our behaviour and manners, speech and thought, morals and sensibilities, everything , in the direction pointed out by Islam, the Quran, the sunnah, and the Islam of leadership that inspired our constitution. Insha' Allah.
Wa al S'alam.
Sayyid Muhammad Husayni Beheshti
Source: Imam reza network
Unity of Islamic Ummah, the Architect for Reviving the Divine Civilization
"And hold fast, All of you together, to the cord of Allah, and do not become disunited "(Al-i Imran 3:103)
Lo! Allah loveth those who battle for His cause in ranks, as if they were a solid structure.(As-Saff 61:4)
The believers are but a single brotherhood ; so make peace between your brothers ; and fear Allah so that you may receive mercy. (Al-Hujurat 49:10)
The Muslim Ummah today is 1500 millions strong and constitute one fourth of the entire mankind with diverse ethnic and linguistic origins. Their geographical location is stretched over the four corners of the globe with magnificent and unique Civilization heritage.
At present Muslim population is about 1.8 billion which makes roughly 30 per cent of world population. About 1300 million Muslims live in 56 Muslim states and are part of UN and OIC. The rest 500 million Muslim are spread in different countries. There is hardly any place on earth, which is not inhabited by Muslims. A significant number of Muslims (220 million) live in India. In Europe and America, Muslim population though insignificant in the past has now increased manifold. Widespread migrations at world level have introduced Muslims to those areas, which hitherto stood untended for centuries from the teachings of Islam. Numerical strength plus the Muslim states' geographical location have given Muslim a strategic position in today's world.
Seen in the geo-strategic outlook, the politically independent Muslim states virtually command one-fourth of the world; from Morocco to Indonesia and Kazakhstan to Turkey and Bosnia. Muslim bloc can be divided into two big geographical zones; one, a large chain starting from Morocco/Senegal and through Pakistan entering Central Asia, and two; the most important zone of Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia.
The two zones are of strategic importance for all sea, land and air transport routes. Dead Sea, Red Sea and Caspian are in the center of Muslim states. A number of Muslim countries have seacoasts on Indian and Atlantic Oceans. The important sea gateways like Damial, Suez, Port Said, Djibouti and Aden are under Muslim control. Muslim world is impregnate with important economic resources like agriculture, oil, electricity, coal, iron, uranium, tin, rubber, copper, etc.
About 1/4th of the Muslim world is not simply in a position to achieve sustained economic growth and provide adequate education and other social infrastructure to their citizens, but can also play an important role in the economic and technological development of brother Muslim countries, e.g. Turkey has the skill to manufacture F-16 fighter planes; Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Kazakhstan have economic strength to help other Muslim countries financially; Pakistan, despite strong Western resistance, has successfully advanced with its peaceful nuclear energy agenda in a period almost half that other countries might take, and; the change in oil prices of 1972 and 1980 has tilted the balance of economic strength towards Islamic countries.
In nutshell, we can safely conclude that the strength and centrality which the Muslim Ummah enjoy today has no match in its history (a fact which should never be ignored. It is another sore subject why Muslim world could not take full advantage of its present powerful position on the world checkerboard.
Throughout the last fourteen hundred years of Muslim history, even in the extreme political slumber of the last few centuries, Islamic way of life has played the most influential role in shaping the human destiny. With its divine creed and superb natural codes of practices, Islam's dynamic and assertive appeal has the edge over all other faiths or man made ideologies.
The meteoric rise and enduring might of Islamic Civilization were the result of the birth of a "best community" (khaira ummatin, Al-Qur'an 3:110) or a "middle community" (ummatan wasatan, Al-Qur'an 2:143) which Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta'ala, SWT) had raised for mankind.
However, that role has undergone a serious setback in the past centuries due to their own indulgence and negligence. The most devastating disease of the Ummah today is their disunity and discord characterized by political, theological, sectarian and tribal conflict. Thus the most important and heart-felt requirement of the Ummah today is the need for unity - the unity of mind and action as well as the unity of hearts and emotional feelings among its members. The Muslim hearts today are beating all over the world for their lost unity - the unity of belief, hopes and aspirations in order to seek the pleasure of Allah (SWT).
What is Islamic Unity?
Why did the Muslim Ummah, the architect of the longest and most powerful as well as divine Civilization in human history, lost that unity? How can this be regained in the context of the complex internal and external factors that are dominating the Muslim world?
Moreover, isolated examples of cooperation, Islamic brotherhood and unity at times of necessity between the Muslims and their rulers had always occurred throughout the history. Military assistance to the Sultan of Granada by the Ottoman Sultan in 1483 CE. [History of the Ottoman Turks, E.S. Creasy, Beirut, 1961, p.122] and the unique military help to the Indian Muslims by the ruler of Afghanistan in 1761 are exemplary events of mutual assistance among the Muslim leaders, even in the decadent period of Muslim history.
The most outstanding attempt for global unity of the Muslim Ummah in the last century CE was led by Jamal al-Din Asadabadi famous as Afghani (1838-97 CE ), a leader of towering personality. His Pan Islamic Movement created a political sensation and psychological whirlwind in the Muslim world which was by then the underdogs of the world community.
Asadabadi considered Islam the potential source of Muslim unity and political strength and to this end devoted most of his life. [The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 5th Ed., Vol.10, 1977, p.20]
Afghani was a pragmatic leader who realized that, at that particular time, a single government for the whole Ummah would not be acceptable. He expounded, I am no pleading that a government of one single ruler should be accepted by all (these countries), because to accomplish this is probably very difficult. But I do really expect the predominance of the Qur'anic rule over all of them, and they should make Islam a means of their unity. [Al-Urwat al-Wuthqa, Jamal al Din Afghani, Cairo, 1957, p.72]
The other pioneering Movement was launched in British occupied India for the demand of the restoration of Khilafah when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished in 1924. The Khilafah Movement, as it was called, was based on the spirit of Islamic unity under a universal caliphate. It was an important historical event for the Muslims of India, but had little impact outside.
The conference of 1926 in Cairo by the Muslim religious and political leaders from a number of countries was an emotional attempt to revive the Caliphate. As they were non-governmental delegates, they decided to hold a Grand Assembly of the Ummah
" in a country which shall be chosen by the delegates of the Islamic peoples - in which the delegates of the Muslim people shall meet to discuss the measures to be taken with a view to the establishment of the Caliphate fulfilling all the conditions prescribed by the Shari'ah (Islamic law)" [OIC, Abdullah al-Ahsan, IIT, Herndon, VA, USA, 1988, p.11-12].
However, the gifted Muslim leaders continued their strenuous effort to construct a common platform for the Ummah. By then, the idea of creating a separate Muslim state on the Indian subcontinent was growing. It was not an ideal way to unify the Ummah as Allama Iqbal, the most accomplished thinker of the modern Muslim world, emphasized. [Atlas of the Islamic World Since 1500, Francis Robinson, UK, 1982, p.149]
Our essence is not bound to any place;
the vigor of our wine is not contained
in any bowl ; Chinese and Indian
Alike the shard that constitutes our jar,
Turkish and Syrian alike the clay
Forming our body ; neither is our heart
Of India, or Syria, or Rum,
Nor any fatherland do we profess
Except Islam.
(Rumuz-i-Bekhudi, 1918; trans. Arberry)
However, he came to terms with the reality of the Indian situation and started campaigning vociferously for the creation of Pakistan where the "Islamic Shari'ah could be enforced".
The recent works on regeneration of the Ummah and thus realization of global Islamic unity through going back to the pristine purity of Islam were initiated by two towering personalities in 1928 and 1941. Sheikh Hasan al Banna's Ikhwanul Muslimin in the Arab world,Imam Musa Sadr in Lebanon,Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Baquir al-Sadr Shaheed in Iraq, Maulana Sayyid Mawdudi's Jama'at-e-Islami in Indian sub-continent and finally Hadrat Imam Khomeini(R.A.) in Islamic Republic of Iran have been instrumental in molding the characters of millions in modern Muslim history. The glorious Islamic Revolution under the dynamic leadership of Hadrat Imam Khomeini(R.A.) has strengthened the Islamic Ummah and the Islamic Revivalist Movements throughout the world.
The necessity of unity was only felt by the Muslim leaders when, after the occupation of Jerusalem by Israel in 1967 war, Al-Aqsa mosque was desecrated under Zionist occupation on 21 August, 1969. A Summit Conference representing 24 Muslim countries was held in Morocco on 22-25 September, 1969 with a view to "promoting among themselves (Muslim governments) close cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural and spiritual fields, inspired by the immortal teachings of Islam".
This is the forerunner of OIC (The Organization of Islamic Conference) whose membership has increased to 46 countries. But apart from being an ornamental body, the OIC has so far failed to exhibit any ray of hope for genuine Islamic unity the Ummah is so eagerly waiting for.
So if we aspire to be united we should have that ideal in our mind. We might never attain to that high level, but we should at least keep it as a goal, and as a criterion by which we judge how far towards the unity we have gone.
The characteristics of that community are:
First, `Imaan'(beliefs)
Secondly, `ibaadah(worship)
Third is akhlaq(moral behavior) and this is the fruit of eemaan and `ibaadah.
The fourth point is defending Islam
The last point is that of political unity and following the Ulil Amr Muslimeen and without any doubt Hadrat Ayatullah al-Uzma Sayyid Ali Khamene'i is the Ulil Amr Muslimeen.
The solution for the cause of disunity would be to grab a hold of the righteous path and live by it. That path is the Holy Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) and his Holy Ahlul Bayt(A.S.).
A perception of one-Ummah feeling is to be created among the Muslim people all over the world. As burning of a finger aches the whole body, so should be the sensitivity of the Muslims. The sufferings of the Palestinians, Afghans and Iraqis, for example, should be so felt by them that the whole Ummah cry out together and come up with realistic help.
Equality and justice need to be established within the Ummah on the basis of Islamic brotherhood.
The Holy Qur'an says:
... Lo ! the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. (Al-Hujurat 49:13)
But Iran has already dealt with the above issue and so can we. The solution that is adopted by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the glorious Islamic Revolution of 1979 is workable all over the Muslim world. It is clearly stated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the law of the land in Iran would be based on Fiqh Jafari, but the followers of all other schools would be free to practice their own Fiqh in their private and personal affairs. This highly ingenious but equally simple and uncomplicated approach represents a really enlightening lesson for the entire Muslim Ummah.
In 1990,the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ayatullah al-Uzma Sayyid Ali Khamene'i established "The World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought" to carry out extensive ecumenical research to explore the practical ways and measures in bringing about the proximity and understanding between all the Islamic schools of thought. This unique organization which belongs to the Islamic Ummah regularly issues the journal "Risala-tul-Taqrib" in Arabic and has published many books to bring about proximity and understanding in the Islamic Ummah.
"The World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought" has established the "Islamic Schools of Thought University" in Tehran, which is first of its kind and unique in the world where the Ulama from all the leading Islamic schools of thought teach the Islamic seminary students belonging to all the leading Islamic schools of thought hailing from various countries.
Every year on the auspicious occasion of the Birthday of the Holy Prophet of Islam(S.A.W.) which is celebrated as the "Unity Week" (12-17 Rabi al-Awwal) between the Muslims of the world an international seminar is regularly conducted by this organization in Tehran to bring about better understanding between the 1800 millions strong Muslim Ummah.
The mass-involvement in the socio-political and cultural affairs of the Ummah need to be the part and parcel of the Muslim world. The power of a nation lies on its people. A nation can only prosper when the hopes and aspirations of those people are in harmony with those of its leaders.
Exhortation of patience and tolerance is to be practiced by the Ummah in matters of mutual affairs. The Holy Prophet's affirmation that "Diversity of opinion is a blessing, while disunity a curse" must be accepted by the Ummah with sincerity and broadmindedness. The Holy Qur'an also says
... And help one another unto righteousness and pious duty, but help not one another unto sin and transgression... (Al-Maidah 5:2)
The political spirit of the institution of Hajj needs to be restored so that it works as a platform for mutual understanding and cooperation between various Muslim groups and communities as well as Muslim countries. This will also help forging a global link among the Ummah to collectively fight the evils of modern Jahiliyah.
Inter-Governmental bodies OIC and other governmental agencies, global or regional, should initiate to strengthen the cause of Muslim unity by increasing their commitment to their own declared objectives and charters. Economic cooperation, science and technology exchange as well as information and cultural cooperation should be strengthened between the Muslim countries.
These should include cooperation in the promotion of the features and history of Islamic Civilization, academic and research link in various areas of mutual interest as well as information-related and humanitarian activities. Cooperation in defending Muslim rights and Islamic values in Muslim-minority countries can lead to a better understanding among the Muslim countries.
Islamic Movements
After the victory of the glorious Islamic Revolution in Iran the determination and dedication of the most gifted section of the Ummah have produced a rich blend of a cluster of Islamic Movements around the world.
The open aggression on the Muslim people by the global Kufr, with their powerful politico-economic and propaganda weapons, and the persecution of Islamic workers by secular westernized Muslim rulers have augmented the strength of the Islamic Movements. What is seriously needed from these Islamic Movements is realistic strategy and their effective implementation.
The first target of the Islamic Movements is, thus, to build an Islamic state through which they can work for global Islamic reunification of the Ummah.
Organized and comprehensive Tabligh of Islam is an obligatory duty for the Ummah, individually and collectively.
Call unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way. (An-Nahl 16:125)
And who is better in speech than him who prayeth unto his Lord and doeth right, and saith : Lo! I am of those who surrender (unto Him). (Fusilat 41:33)
Absence of tabligh or an ineffective one reduces the Ummah to an introvert community who gradually become sluggish in all walks of life. For the light of Allah, al-Islam, to be transmitted to four corners of the globe, the active members of the Ummah must open their illuminated hearts to the millions of His servants, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Greater Islamic unity is not only in the interests of the majority but also of most of the rest of the world as well. As the contemporary Muslim world is passing through a phase of self-analysis and internal reawakening, Islam is becoming more and more relevant as well as guiding light (Sirajam Munira) for the reconstruction of individual and social life of the Ummah. The reality of Islamic unity now lies on the Ummah's firm resolve to build a universal society on the foundations of Islam.
The concept of universal relationship brotherhood among the Muslims is the cornerstone of Islamic unity and is the charter of worldwide Islamic Movement. Brotherhood is a notion based on faith, fraternity and equality without denying the reality of human differences in attitudes. It originates from mutual love, respect and emotional feelings for one another as in the case of a united family. It unites mankind on the basis of ideology and convictions. Anybody from any part of the globe, irrespective of racial or linguistic origin, can join the house of Islam through the testimony of Islamic faith and the needful actions.
Global reunification of the Ummah is neither a myth nor an impossibility, as the western theorists or secularized Muslim leaders tend to describe it in order to dampen the spirit of the Muslim people. It is a divine requirement. However, its attainment depends on two conditions - Allah's (SWT) favor and the Ummah's turning back to Islam.
However, the yearning for unity and the ideals of Islamic brotherhood had always persisted in and kept illuminating the hearts of the Muslim masses throughout the history, in spite of political and theological trauma that the Islamic Ummah have passed. The target to unify the Ummah remained a guiding factor for the Islamic Revivalist Movements that emerged later on.
The Century of Islamic Revivalism
This century can rightly be termed the century of Islamic revival; political and economic aspects being mere parts of it. The enemies of Islam assumed that by politically dominating the Muslims; dividing them into small states, nationalities and tribes; imposing secular system through secular rulers; and by crafting Western political, economic, educational and cultural agendas, Muslim Ummah can be neutralized for ever. But the ultimate prudence of God Almighty was different.
Equally important aspect is the rational which is the real force behind this comprehensive revival movement. In fact, it is this force, which have played the most significant role in changing the ideological and cultural pattern of Muslims virtually on entire globe. In the Indian Sub-Continent, movements led by Syed Ahmed Shaheed, Shah Ismail Shaheed and in Bengal the movement of Haji Shariatullah and then the efforts of Altaf Hussain Hali, Shibli Naumani, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi and Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar reactivated Muslims on intellectual, moral, cultural and ultimately on political fronts. Revival movement of Allama Iqbal, Syed Abul Aala Maududi's literary and intellectual work and the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, all converged on a nation-wide political movement and ultimately resulted in creation of separate Muslim abode in 1947.
This nascent yet strong movement of the early half of 20th century gained ground in the later half and gradually spread all over the Islamic world. The Muslim nations started fighting for freedom from colonial powers with principle motive to protect and promote their Islamic identity. Some times it appeared as if nationalism was the fighting force for freedom, yet it is an acknowledged fact that even behind nationalism the one and the only force was resurgence of Islamic thought. K.Smith in Islam and Modern History (Princeton University Press, 1957, p.77) admits: "Muslims have never accepted any concept of nationalism under which the principles of loyalties are outside the jurisdiction of Islam." He says: "besides (as far as Muslims are concerned) in the past only and only Islam has been the driving force which has provided to Muslims the discipline, strength, and desire for freedom."
Jamalud Din Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Muhammad Rashid Raza and the founder of Ikhwanul-Muslimoon, Shaykh Hasan-al-Banna Shaheed, Imam Musa Sadr in Lebanon, Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Baquir al-Sadr Shaheed in Iraq, led and promoted the revival movement in Arabic World. In Turkey, in the depressed secular state, Saeed Nursi, Adnan Mandres and Najmud Din Arbakan have kept alive the Islamic movement. In Iran, the religious and popular movement of Imam Khomeini(R.A.) has started a new era for the Islamic world.
Future Perspective
The Muslim Ummah entered into the 21st century. Now, when we review the past 100 years' political conditions of Muslims, we find signs of hope since revival and the struggle of the Muslim Ummah has set in all spheres of life. This resurgence has no other explanation but what the Holy Qur'an Says: "and (the unbelievers) plotted and planned, and Allah too planned, and the best of planners is Allah." (Al-i Imran-3:54).
The colonial powers had planned to make Muslim Ummah ineffective forever. But history stands witness that if Muslims retreated at a front they demonstrated strength at another.
This important feature of Muslim history has disrupted in the recent past. But just as a day follows the night, the Muslim Ummah during the past five decades have, to a large extent, overcome the miserable conditions of the past and started reform at world level.
The Conflict with Modern Jahiliyah
Essence of Islamic movement and the general revival of Islam at world level are the real forces which are shaping the future of Muslim Ummah. This is an era of conflict as a result of which a new epoch is emerging. But, certainly the Islamic movements are going to succeed in the future unlike the remains of colonialism which do not possess spark to revive. The Western nations and their friends consider Islam a danger primarily for this trait.
Muslim Ummah has no territorial conflict with the West rather it seeks its inherent right to develop individual and social life in accordance with its own set of religious doctrine, culture and history where family is central to real target for bringing change. But, this change is presented as a threat to the West.
Modern Jahiliyah which is leading mankind far away from Truth and Justice. This has, in effect, robbed peace from the surface of the earth. Man has downgraded himself from the position of his Creator's vicegerency to a status which is unworthy of human dignity. Humanity is suffering from an unparalleled identity crisis.
However, like all the empires of the past, the West has invented its own monster, the adulation of extreme materialism. The melting pot is becoming too hot to maintain one's exclusive characteristics.
The proliferation of consumer culture and entertainment industry is eating away the spirit of innocence from the younger people. The display of erotic adverts in public places and the mass circulation of pornographic tabloids are inviting people towards promiscuity. Radical feminism, modeling, glorification of extra-marital sex and homosexuality have become the tools of modernity. The effect is the erosion of morality, the disintegration of family structure, child abuse and other social ills.
The reason behind this expertly crafted notion is West's inability to guide humanity in the right direction; its lack of knowledge and bigotry towards Islam. The experiment of secular culture has failed. Despite West's total command over the world for about 500 years it could not establish an equitable and just system. There has certainly been a tremendous industrial growth and increase in wealth in the West but it was unable to provide welfare, justice and peace to mankind. Even now 1/4th of the world population is without basic food. The West possess in itself the poverty problematic 14-15 per cent population. On average the unemployment is above 10 per cent.
Despite spectacular achievements in the medical science, humanity confronts new and complex diseases. Western family structure has totally collapsed. The number of single-parent children (born without formal marriages) has exceeded above legal children. The number of single family parent has reached 40 per cent and 30 per cent in USA and Europe, respectively. The rise in crime has seized the freedom of society and the younger generation is in particular morally corrupt. Material growth cradles mental-sickness and suicide which is on the rise. The historians hypothesize with fear that a civilization born of material growth is not conducive for human beings. Famous poet Iqbal says: "In spite of significant findings about Universe and control over nature through scientific development, the West could not eradicate the evils plaguing humanity."
In fact it is the weakness of the West which is making it fearful of the potential strength of Islam, otherwise, Muslims militarily, politically or economically pose no threat to it. The real conflict lies in ideology and moral values. This is an area where West is like a spent force with no new system or message for the humanity at hand.
It is here that Islam has the potential to bring the humanity light and fresh thinking. Islam has a message for humanity; a live message for their present living, a promise for attractive destiny and a glorious future. The spread of this message had neither been due to violent force in the past nor it needs such force today. In fact it is filling the gap where humanity is trapped. This is the real danger for the West, otherwise it is a total blessing for the humanity making no distinction between East and the West.
Under the conditions explained above, it is quite obvious that Islam is the only constructive force for the future. Indeed much has yet to be done. It has to strengthen its moral values, gain intellectual creditability in order to motivate the masses.
The realization is growing that Islam is, in fact, the only solution to the evil remains of Colonialism and the only answer to the threat of New World Order.
Conclusion
The unity of the Ummah is a necessity not only for the Muslim people but also for the entire humanity. Although Islam, as a message and a model, was completed 1400 years ago, the main task of bringing all mankind into its fold has not yet materialized. Islamic unity is a major step towards achievement of the universal brotherhood of mankind. A peaceful world based on human dignity, equality and justice can only be established if the Muslim Ummah forcefully play their global role and guide humanity. Thus, the unity of Islamic Ummah is the chief architect for reviving the 'Divine Civilization' in human history.
I pray to Allah (S.W.T.) to join our hearts and unite Muslim Ummah to revive the 'Divine Civilization' in human history. Ameen
Haider Reza Zabeth
Source: Imam reza network
Socialism and Communism
In socialism, there are many creeds the most famous of which is the socialist creed, which is based on the Marxist theory, and argumentative materialism, which is a certain philosophy of life and a materialistic comprehension of it according to the dialectical method. Dialectical materialists have applied this dialectical materialism to history, sociology and economy. So, it has become a philosophical creed in world affairs, a method to study history and sociology, a creed in economy and a plan in politics. In other words, it formulates all of mankind into a particular structure as regarding his way of thinking, his attitude towards life and his practical method therein.
There is no doubt that the materialistic philosophy and the dialectical method have never been innovations or creations of the Marxist creed. The materialistic trend has lived within the philosophical field for thousands of years, once in the open and once hidden behind sophistication and absolute denial. Also, the dialectical method of reasoning is deeply rooted in the lines of human thinking. Its lines were perfected at the hands of Hegel, the well known idealistic philosopher. Karl Marx only adopted such "reasoning" and philosophy. He tried to apply it in all fields of life; so, he made two researches: One of them is his purely materialistic, in a dialectical method, interpretation of history. The other is his claim therein that he found out the contradictions within the capital and surplus value which the capitalist steals in his creed from the labourer[7][5].
On these "achievements" has he erected his belief in the necessity of abolishing the communist and socialist societies which he considered to be a step for mankind to completely apply communism. The social field in this philosophy is one of battling contradictions, and every social situation which prevails on such field is but a purely materialistic phenomenon which harmonizes with the other phenomena and materialistic climes and is affected by them. But he at the same time carries his own self-contradiction in the essence, and a battle of contradictions will then be waged within its context until all contradictions assemble to cause a change in that situation and prepare for another one.
Thus does the battle linger until all mankind form one single class, and the interests of every individual will be represented in the interests of that unified class. At that moment will harmony prevail and peace become a reality, and all bad effects of the democratic capitalist system will be completely removed, for they resulted only from the existence of many classes within one society, and such multitude resulted from dividing the society into a producer and a labourer. Therefore, such a division has to be stopped by abolishing (private) ownership. Here, communism differs from socialism in the main economic outlines, for the communist economy hinges on:
First: Abolishing private ownership and its complete eradication from the society, giving wealth to the public and placing it in the hands of the State since the latter is the legal representative of the society in managing and utilizing it for the common welfare. The communist belief in the necessity of this absolute nationalization is due to the natural reaction of the consequences of private ownership in the democratic capitalist system.
This nationalization has thus been justified: It is meant to abolish the capitalist class and unite the society into one class in order to put an end to that struggle and to forbid the individual from utilizing different means and methods to accumulate his wealth in order to satisfy his greed, motivated by his own selfish interest.
Second: Distribution of products according to individuals’ consumption need. It can be summed up thus: From everyone according to his capacity, and for everyone according to his need. This is so because every individual has natural needs without which he cannot live. So, he gives the society all of his endeavour so that the society may provide him with his living necessities and take care of his livelihood.
Third: An economic procedure planned by the State, in which it combines the society's need with production in its volume, diversity and limitation, so that the society will not be inflicted with the same line in the communist economy, that is, the abolishment of private ownership, has been substituted with a moderate solution: nationalization of heavy industries, foreign and domestic trades, putting all of them under government monopoly; in other words, abolishing large mass capital by freeing the simple industries and trades, leaving them to the individuals.
The wide line of the communist economy collided with the reality of the human nature, to which we referred above, for the individuals started neglecting the performance of their duties and of being active in their jobs, running away from their social obligations; the system is supposed to guarantee their livelihood and the fulfilment of their needs.
Also, it is supposed not to exert any further effort; therefore, why should the individual exert himself and sweat as long as the result is already in his calculation, the result of both states of laziness and activity? Why should he rush to provide happiness for others, trading the convenience of others for his own sweat, tears, life and energy, since he does not believe in any principle in life except that of a purely materialistic nature?
Therefore, the advocates of such a creed were forced to freeze absolute nationalization. They were also forced to adjust the other line in the communist economy by allowing wages to vary in order to push the labourers to be active and perfect in their jobs, making the excuse that these variations are only temporary, and that they will disappear once the capitalist mentality is crushed and man is created anew.
For the latter purpose, they continuously create changes in their economic methods and socialist modes in order to follow the failure of an old method by trying a new one. They have not yet succeeded in getting rid of all basic cornerstones of the capitalist economy. For example, the interest loans have not been totally abolished, although they are, in fact, the basis of social corruption in the capitalist economy.
All of this, however, does not mean that those advocates have had shortcomings, or that they have not been serious in their creed or unfaithful to their doctrine; rather, it means that they have clashed with reality while trying to put them to practice, finding their path full of obstacles and contradictions put forth by the human nature before the revolutionary method of the "social reform" which they have been promising. Reality, then, forced them to go back on their word in the hope that a miracle would sooner or later take place.
As regarding the political aspect, communism, in its long run, aims in the end at erasing the "state" from the society when the miracle takes place and the "social mentality" prevails on all humans, so much so that all people will be thinking of nothing but of the materialistic social welfare. Before then, as long as the miracle has not taken place yet and people are not unified into one "class", when the society is still divided to capitalist and proletariat forces, it is necessary that the government should be purely proletariat; so, it is a democratic rule within the circle of labour and also a dictatorship regarding the masses. They have reasoned thus: Proletariat dictatorship of government is necessary in all stages passed by mankind, using the individual mentality for the protection of the interests of the working class, strangulating capitalism and forbidding it from coming to the field again.
In fact, this creed, represented by Marxist socialism then by Marxist communism, is distinguished from the democratic capitalist system in its reliance on a particular materialistic philosophy which adopts a particular concept of life to which all idealistic principles and values are not ascribed and which is analyzed in a certain sort of analysis which does not leave room for a Creator above the natural limits, nor to an anticipated compensation beyond the borders of this limited materialistic life. This contrasts democratic capitalism, for although it is a materialistic system, it has never been based on a precise philosophical foundation.
The accurate linkage between the realistic understanding of life and the social issue as accepted by materialistic communism versus democratic capitalism has neither believed in this theory, nor has it tried to explain it. Hence, the communist creed is worthy of a philosophical study and of a test through tackling the philosophy on which it has hinged and from which it has been derived.
Judging any system is dependent on the extent of the success of its philosophical concept in portraying and comprehending life. It is easy to comprehend, when we cast the first glance at the simplified or "accomplished" communist system, that its general nature is the fusion of the individual into the society, making him a tool for the achievement of the general criteria which it enforces. It completely contradicts the free capitalist system which puts the society at the service of the individual for the achievement of the latter's interests.
It seems that it has been predestined for the individual and social personalities, according to the precepts of both systems, to clash and to duel with each other. The individual personality has become victorious in one of them, the one based on the individual and his own personal benefits, inflicting the society thereby with economic catastrophes which have shaken its existence and mutilated life in all its sectors. The social personality has won in the other, which has come to correct the mistakes of the previous one, assisting the society and reducing the individual personality to dissolution and annihilation, inflicting the individuals with severe dilemmas which ruined their freedom, personal existence and natural rights of selecting and rationalizing.
Communism Criticized
Actually, although the communist system has treated several inflictions of free capitalism by abolishing private ownership, such a treatment has had some natural consequences which have made such a treatment very costly and the method to put it to use very exerting and cannot be used except when all other ways and methods fail. On the other hand, it is an incomplete treatment which does not guarantee the eradication of social corruption, for it has not really been successful in its diagnosis of the ailment and the discovery of the point from which evil has set out to subjugate the world to the capitalist system, keeping that point maintaining its position in the social life of the communist creed. Therefore, mankind has not won a definite solution to his greatest problem, nor has he obtained the medicine to medicate his ailments and uproot his sickening symptoms.
As regarding the consequences of this treatment, they are, indeed, great: They can put an end to the freedom of individuals for the sake of substituting communist ownership for private ownership. The case is so because this tremendous social change contradicts the general human nature upto, at least, the present time, as its promoters admit, since materialistic man still thinks subjectively, calculating his interests through his own limited individualistic eyes.
Establishing a new structure for the society in which the individuals dissolve completely, a structure which totally puts an end to personal motives, requires a strong power to hold the society's reins with iron hands, suppressing any resisting voice, strangulating any opposition, monopolizing all means of news media and the press, enforcing a belt around the nation nobody can by any means go beyond, and becoming habituated to charging and doubting, so that the rein of authority may not suddenly slip out of its hands.
This is natural in every system desired to be imposed on the nation before the mentality of such a system ripens in it and its spirit prevails. Yes, if materialistic man starts reasoning socially, realizing his interests in a social mentality, with his own personal feelings, desires and inclinations melting through his own self, then a system in which individuals "melt" can be established, leaving in the arena none but as huge “social” giant.
But the achievement of this in the materialistic man, who does not believe except in a limited life without knowing any meaning for it except materialistic pleasures, needs a miracle to create paradise on earth and to bring it down from heaven. The communists promise us such a paradise, waiting for that day when the factory changes the human nature, creating him anew with idealistic thoughts and deeds even if he does not believe the weight of an atom in ideal values or ethical principles. If such a miracle happens, then we will have a talk with them.
As for the time being, the position of the social structure which they desire calls for the confinement of individuals within the limits of this structure's idea and its guarantee for protection by the group that believes in it and using caution concerning it by suppressing the human nature and the psychological emotions, forbidding them by all possible means from setting themselves free.
Even when he wins a total assurance and a social guarantee of his livelihood and needs, for the social wealth provides him with all of these during the time of need, the individual who lives in the shade of a system like this will be better off if he can get such an assurance without losing the pleasure of breathing the fresh air of cultivated freedom rather than being forced to melt his personality in fire and drown himself in the tumultuous social sea.
How can he have a desire for freedom, in any field, when he is deprived of freedom in livelihood, while sustaining his life is totally tied to a particular "committee", although economic and sustaining freedom is the basis of all other norms of freedom? The advocates answer this question by still asking: "What can man do with freedom and enjoyment of his right to criticize and publicize his opinions while moaning under a horrible social burden? What benefit can his discussion and opposition bring him when he needs accurate nutrition and guaranteed life more than opposition or the fuss freedom brings him?"
Those who ask such questions look only at capitalist democracy as if it is the only social issue which competes with their own in the field; therefore, they underestimate the value of the individual dignity and its rights, for they see it as a menace to the general social torrent. But humanity has the right not to sacrifice any of its principles or privileges as long as it does not have to. It has but to choose either a dignity which is an ideal privilege of humanity, and a need which is its materialistic privilege, only if it lacks the system which can combine both aspects and succeed in solving both problems.
The man whose energy is being squeezed by others, without finding a good and comfortable life or a fair salary and an assurance during the time of need, is indeed one deprived of enjoying life, separated from a stable and quiet life. Also, a man threatened every moment, questioned about every movement, liable to be arrested without a trial and be imprisoned, banished or even killed for any reason, is indeed one who lives in fear and terror; horror forbids him from enjoying the pleasures of this life.
The third man, the one whose life is comfortable, feeling assured of preserving his dignity and safety, is indeed humanity's sweet dream. So, how can such a dream become a reality? When will it become an existing actuality? We have said above that the communist solution to the social problem is incomplete, in addition to its consequences to which we have also referred. For he, although human emotions and feelings breathe within him, is evoked by the general social pressure which caused some thinkers to resort to the new solution, but they did not put their hands on the causes of corruption so that they could eradicate it; rather, they eradicated something else; therefore, they were not successful in their medication.
The concept of private ownership is not the one responsible for the sins of absolute capitalism which shook the world and its felicity, so much so that it is not the one that forces millions of labourers to be idle for the sake of the investment of a new machine which put an end to their industry, as it happened at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, nor is it the one that forces the capitalist to destroy large quantities of his products in order to maintain their price and in preference of extravagance to satisfy the need of the poor thereby.
Nor is it the one that invites him to make his wealth a gaining capital multiplied through usury, absorbing the civilians' endeavour without production or toil. Nor is it the one that pushes him to buy all consumption goods from the market in order to monopolize them and raise their prices. Nor is it the one that forces him to open new markets, even when the freedom and rights of nations will be violated by them and their prestige and freedom weakened. All of these terrifying calamities have not resulted from private ownership; rather, they are the breed of the materialistic individual interest which has been made the criterion of life in the capitalist system and the absolute reason for all acts and dealings.
When a society is based on such an individual criterion which is self-advocate, nothing can be expected from it except what has already befallen. It is from the nature of this criterion that all curses and calamities befall the entire human race, not from the principle of private ownership. If the criterion is changed, and a new cultivated objective for life is put forth, one that harmonizes with the human nature, only then will the real remedy of the greatest human problem become a reality.
Notes:
[8][5] I have explained these theories and undertaken a detailed scientific study of them in my book Iqtisaduna.
Author: Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr
Source: Imam reza network
Form of Democracy Acceptable to Islam
The second meaning of democracy has been accepted with certain conditions and qualifications. No legislative authority has the right to oppose the definite laws of Islam which is how we accept democracy. Meanwhile, concerning democracy as a method of solving differences, it must be said that as long as Islamic values are sufficient to solve differences, they shall take precedence, but in case of differences where Islamic laws have no specific way of solving them and there is also no competent arbiter, the majority view shall be preferred.
For example, a number of people form a committee within the framework of law to decide an important matter and all believe in Islam and observe Islamic values, but do not arrive at a consensus on the issue as the majority has a certain opinion while the minority has another opinion and there is no basis to prefer one view over the other—the majority view will take precedence, and opposing majority view shall be considered an undue preference.
As such, whenever we have no preferable option, we can obtain a sound opinion from the majority view which will be credible and preferred. If through the majority view of ignoramuses, we can not obtain a sound opinion, preferring that opinion will be rationally reproachable and incorrect. This method is credible to a certain extent, but it is not correct to abuse it by placing the majority of people against a minority of experts. For example, let us assume that for sketching a military plan there are ten military experts and one thousand common people who are unfamiliar with military issues.
If attention is given to the view of common people who are unfamiliar with military issues while the view of experts is rejected, this act is unreasonable. Every intelligent person says that the view of the experts takes precedence over the view of non-experts. Thus, democracy as a means of solving differences with certain limits and conditions is credible, but as the basis of giving preference to every majority over every minority it is not credible
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Islam’s Ideal Form of Democracy
As to which of these administrative forms is acceptable to Islam, we have said earlier that if democracy in legislation means that whatever is approved by the majority of people—that is, 50% plus 1—is a credible, official and binding law even if it were against the text of the Qur’an, then Islam does not accept such democracy in legislation. Islam that has its own explicit laws in various administrative affairs, judiciary, economics, management, and related to other organs of the country does not allow a law against the explicit text and fixed decree of the Qur’an to be recognized officially. To officially recognize such a law is tantamount to rejection of Islam.
What needs further explanation and which I promised to discuss is the executive dimension of democracy, the role of the people in electing those who want to enact the laws within the framework of Islamic foundations, viz. the deputies in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. In cases where Islam has not enacted fixed and permanent laws, there is the need to enact new laws for new issues and needs, Islam has authorized the legitimate government apparatus to enact necessary laws for this domain while observing the general principles and standards of Islam and not contradicting the framework of Islamic laws, labeled by the late Shahid (Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir) Sadr as “free zone” [mantaqah al-firagh]. The driving and traffic laws stipulate the side to move—right or left—and the speed of a vehicle. Evidently, the Qur’an and traditions have no text in this regard.
The people’s role in determining the legislators and executives that enact and implement temporary laws can be materialized by observing Islamic standards. In other words, democracy and the vital role and participation of people are practiced in our country observing limits and conditions set by Islam by electing those who qualify. Electoral candidates must be Muslims committed to Islamic laws and observe Islamic standards in enacting laws and rules. In addition to the conditions set for deputies in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, with the exception of a few deputies of religious minority groups, the rest of the representatives must be Muslims committed to observe Islamic laws.
Lest there were negligence and shortcomings and Islamic laws were not observed in enacting laws, a number of experts constituting the so-called Council of Guardians are duty-bound to conform the ratified bills of the Majlis to the Constitution and religious standards and then validate them. In the case of their nonconformity, the said bills are returned to the Majlis for review. This is the type of legislative and executive mechanism accepted in our country and no one opposes it.
Similarly, executives with the President at top must observe Islamic laws and standards. First of all, the President must possess the conditions, qualities and merits mentioned in the Constitution which are taken from Islamic laws, and in taking charge of the government he must be, so to speak, authorized by God, the Exalted in the sense that after garnering the majority vote and endorsement of the people, he must be designated by the wali al-faqih. In this case, his government shall be legitimate and credible. This is something which is implemented in our country.
With the aim of understanding the role of the people and the domain of their involvement in the Islamic system, let me cite an example. Let us assume that we were living during the caliphate of the Commander of the Faithful(‘a) and in our own city we knew of a righteous person who deserved to be the city ruler and we endorsed him to the Imam (‘a). After receiving the endorsement, the Imam (‘a) possibly designated him as the new ruler. Now, if the majority of people had such endorsement, the Imam(‘a) would highly regard their view and designate the said person as governor of one of the regions under his jurisdiction.
So, the role of the people in the government structure and administrative decision-making, in terms of theory and legitimacy, is that people decide who is the most meritorious in enacting or enforcing the law and then cast their vote in his favor. The vote of the people is equivalent to a recommendation to the leadership. In reality, it is a pact they forge with the wali al-faqih that if he designates the recommended person to the presidency, they will obey him. It is on this basis that during the time of the eminent Imam (‘a), when the majority of people elected a person to the presidency, he would say, “I do hereby designate him, who is endorsed by the people, to be the President.” That is, “the vote of the people is like an endorsement for me to accept him.”
This is the theory of the Islamic government which has no contradiction whatsoever with the second meaning of democracy. It is functioning in our country since the Revolution and no (theoretical) problem has ever emerged. Yet, if democracy means that religion should have no role in the affairs of society and none of the religious symbols be seen in the government institutions, such a thing is incompatible with Islam!
Democracy in its third sense, as interpreted by the Global Arrogance that wants to impose it on others is absolutely opposed to Islam, for it means the negation of Islam. However, democracy in its second sense has been accepted by observing the conditions set by Islam for rulers, legislators, implementers, and judges. That is why the people should seriously elect individuals who deserve to legislate and implement laws, and thus, prove their cooperation and support for the Islamic state and regard themselves as participating in the affairs of the country. This form of democracy is accepted in Islam and practiced in our country. If there are violations in some cases, they are also committed elsewhere, and one should be vigilant lest they are repeated.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Connection of the Immutable Laws of Islam with Government Structure and Alterable Laws
As said earlier, people argue that laws and ordinances needed by our society must be enacted and ratified in the legislative assembly. If we only rely on those mentioned in Islamic texts such as the Book and Sunnah, the needs of society can never be met. Considering that in the Islamic republican system laws are ratified by the Majlis deputies—based on the system observed in other democratic countries—why do we insist on calling our system “Islamic government” and introducing the laws ratified in the Majlis as “Islamic laws”?
There is no doubt that in every country the people’s representatives act according to the culture dominant there and respect the values of society while ratifying laws. As a matter of course, in our country whose people are Muslims and dominated by a particular culture and values, the Majlis deputies more or less observe the religious culture and values. But in any case, the process of legislation in our country is the process observed in democratic countries. Therefore, what is the need of saying that our government is Islamic and that Islamic laws are implemented in our country?
As we have said, the reply to this objection is that laws of Islam are divided into two: (1) immutable laws and (2) alterable laws that also change according to the circumstances of time and place. With changes and transformation in human societies and the emergence of diverse conditions in time and place, there is no change in the immutable laws of Islam. Their form and substance remains immutable and fixed. They must be acted upon under all circumstances at all times. Now, if in ratifying the current laws of the country the inalterable laws of Islam are not observed and the ratified laws are against the laws and decrees of Islam, those laws are not Islamic even if they are unanimously ratified by people’s deputies.
Any law that is against Islam has no legitimacy and legal standing. In fact, it cannot be regarded as a law at all. As stipulated in Article 4 of the constitution of our country, all laws and ordinances of the Islamic country must be consistent with Islamic laws and standards. If a ratified bill is against religious principles, it shall have no legal value.
Therefore, the immutable laws of Islam that have been mentioned in the Qur’an, and mutawatir, authentic traditions, must be observed and no sort of change or abrogation can affect them. Meanwhile, we have a set of alterable laws that are determined by the competent authority according to the needs and conditions of time and place.
In today’s culture the alterable laws are known as statutory laws that are enacted and ratified in legislative organs, but in Islamic culture and juristic parlance alterable laws are the same administrative laws whose enactment and ratification are within the discretion of the wali al-faqih who may enact and implement special ordinances consistent with the changing needs of society. At least, the ratified ordinances to be implemented must be endorsed and approved by him.
Of course, sometimes the wali al-faqih directly enacts laws and ordinances and at times these laws are ratified by different experts in the advisory body of the wali al-amr al-muslimin after sufficient study and deliberation. In any case, according to Islam, the credibility of statutory laws and ordinances lies in the permission and approval of the wali al-amr al-muslimin; otherwise, they are not binding at all.
The wali al-amr al-muslimin or any other legislative authority has no right to enact statutory laws and ordinances according to their personal whims by neglecting the general principles, standards and values of Islam. In other words, statutory laws and alterable ordinances must be codified and ratified within the framework of general immutable laws and decrees of Islam by the faqih or expert in religious and juristic questions who has the ability to apply them to particular cases.
Since it is a difficult task, it is stipulated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the bills ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must finally be approved by the Council of Guardians which is composed of outstanding jurists and legal experts to see to it that those laws and ordinances ratified by the Majlis are not against Islamic standards.
Primary and secondary laws and the secondary laws’ alleged conflict with Islam
Some people imagine that temporary administrative decrees and laws enacted according to certain circumstances of time and place are in some cases against the laws of Islam. It is because people always tend to consider only primary laws as the divine laws of Islam, without knowing that the secondary laws enacted for special conditions are also treated as religious laws. Islam also has a set of other laws that are called “secondary laws” and related to emergency cases and special conditions. Some of these secondary laws are also mentioned in the Book and Sunnah while others are mentioned in other religious sources. To enact them is under the discretion of the wali al-amr al-muslimin.
For example, it is obligatory upon us to perform ablution [wudhu] before saying our prayers. If bathing [ghusl] is wajib for us before prayer, then we have to perform ghusl. The obligatory nature of wudhu and ghusl is part of the primary laws for common situations when our bodies are physically sound and water is not harmful for us and there is available water. But under exceptional situations when, because of ailment, we cannot perform ablution as water is harmful to our health, or we have no access to water, to perform dry ablution [tayammum] shall become wajib in lieu of wudhu and ghusl as a secondary law. For this reason, it is said that if you have no access to water or if water is harmful to your health, tayammum is regarded as the emergency substitute of wudhu and ghusl.
Once the primary laws and also the secondary laws which are likewise called “emergency laws” are mentioned in the Qur’an and traditions, we cannot observe any difference between them because in practice, the subject of the primary law, like wudhu and ghusl, is one who has access to water and to whose health water is not harmful, while the subject of the secondary law, like tayammum, is one who has no access to water and to whose health water is harmful. As such, some people are commanded to perform ablution and others are commanded to perform dry ablution.
In some cases, however, opposite to the primary laws are special laws that are suitable to exceptional and emergency situations and not particularly mentioned by religion. Here, it is said that primary laws must be implemented unless they cause hardship and embarrassment because Islam does not want the servants of God to undergo intolerable hardship and embarrassment in discharging their obligations:
...وَ مَا جَعَلَ اللهُ عَلَيكُم فِي ٱلدِّينِ مِنْ حَرَجٍ...
“and has not placed for you any obstacle in the religion.”[44]
...يُرِيدُ اللّهُ بِكُمُ الْيُسْرَ وَلاَ يُرِيدُ بِكُمُ الْعُسْرَ...
“Allah desires ease for you, and He does not desire hardship for you.”[45]
The noteworthy point is that in some cases emergency laws and their substitution of primary laws are mentioned in religion and in other cases other emergency or secondary laws are not mentioned. But it is at the discretion of the wali al-amr al-muslimin to determine the obligation of the people if certain primary laws cannot be implemented and their implementation brings about unbearable hardship and embarrassment. So, what the wali al-faqih announces according to Islamic standards are secondary laws of Islam, because Islam has enjoined him to determine the obligation and duty of people in case of hardship and embarrassment because of which the implementation of certain primary laws can be suspended.
Thus, since they are only acquainted with the primary laws of Islam, when the wali al-amr al-muslimin or the legislature of the Islamic government approves a law contrary to primary laws, some people claim that such a law is against Islam. The fact is that the said law is neither against Islam nor religious laws. It is rather contrary to primary laws of Islam as it is part of the secondary laws. Indisputably, the secondary laws are also considered part of Islamic laws.
As stipulated by Islam, a traveler is not supposed to fast but a resident or non-traveler must fast. No one regards the non-fasting of a traveler as against the commandment of Islam because Islam itself has explicitly ordained that a traveler or sick person must not fast. Similarly, regarding social, civil, judicial, and commercial laws, if acting upon pertinent primary laws brings about unbearable hardship and embarrassment for the people, the implementation of those laws shall be suspended. According to special rules and regulations, the wali al-amr al-muslimin will enact a new law or decree consistent with the demands of time and place. Definitely, the said secondary law is not against Islam. It can be contrary to primary laws of Islam but Islam includes both primary and secondary laws.
In view of new needs that consistently emerge in Islamic society as a result of changing social conditions—such as the expansion of roads, or the need to administer a city and keep its cleanliness and beautification, or the need for a water and sewage system, electric supply and others which did not exist before—and because of the complexity of social conditions, population explosion and other socio-environmental factors, those needs can no longer be met by the people alone as they are not like the needs of past societies which could be met by people themselves. So, special ordinances must be enacted by the concerned authorities.
Our point is that these ordinances are not without basis and they are not formulated purposelessly according to personal whims. In fact, these secondary laws and ordinances must be within the framework of the general laws of Islam. It makes no difference whether these secondary laws indicate preference of what is more important over what is important, or their enactment depends on the demands of time and place. In our system this part of secondary laws is usually ratified in the Islamic Consultative Assembly with the endorsement and approval of the wali al-faqih. Hence, such laws are not outside Islamic laws because either they are ratified through a decree of the wali al-amr al-muslimin or they are codified according to special rules and regulations like “hardship and embarrassment” [‘usr wa haraj], “no harm” and other tenets [qawa’id] in jurisprudence.
As such, on the mere pretext that in the Islamic government some temporary ordinances and alterable laws are not mentioned in the Book and Sunnah, one cannot discard the Book and Sunnah and enact laws according to the will and dictates of the people. The immutable laws of Islam must definitely be implemented and alterable laws should also be enacted by the wali al-faqih or those who are granted authority by him within the framework of primary laws and general decrees.
Shortcomings of the democratic systems
As we have said before, the government structure is like a pyramid with three sloping sides, viz. (1) legislative power, (2) executive power (3) and judicial power. This pyramid-like of the government gained currency since the time of Montesquieu who raised the theory of separation of powers.
Up to the present, government has three branches but it does not necessarily mean that the same arrangement has to continue in future. Due to new advancements or the emergence of new social conditions, there may be a change in the structure of government. For example, additional branches of government might be created that will in turn make the government structure quadruple or perhaps pentagonal. Yet, it must be noted that the basic rule and principle in our system is that all powers that constitute government structure meet on top of the pyramid.
That is, once we liken the government structure which is composed of different powers and chains of command to a pyramid, the more we go down in each of its sides, the more we will find the powers decentralized and dispersed. At the base of the pyramid we will observe considerably huge, vast and multiple government departments. But as we gradually go up, the powers and structures of government become more centralized and integrated until finally all these powers meet on top of the pyramid and these dispersed and multiple powers attain unity and clarity.
In the pyramid of power, the three sides of powers gradually meet at the top, and that point is the spot of conjunction and union of all powers. So to speak, the discretion of the powers and branches of government join together and it is from there that they are divided and scattered on different sides—executive, legislative and judiciary—and each power has its own hierarchy of power or chain of command.
Exigency of the powers’ coordinating agency
It is true that a government system is composed of the three powers—executive, legislative and judicial—but they must be linked to each other. Since all of them constitute a single government apparatus, there must be a coordinating agency or unifying factor among them. Because of the absence of this unifying factor in many democratic systems in the world, the lack of coordination can be noticed which sometimes even leads to a national crisis. With the aim of avoiding such crises, certain measures have been conceived in some systems. One of these measures is the granting of veto power to the president.
For example, the legislature has the right to enact and ratify laws, and according to its function, the members of the congress ratify a bill after extensive debate and deliberation. Then, the said bill is approved by the members of the senate. However, as the president has the right to veto and suspend bills ratified by parliament, he may veto a ratified bill and suspend its implementation even if it be for a limited time. If legislation were the right of the legislative and the executive had no right to interfere in the affairs of the legislative, how would the executive veto a bill ratified by the legislative and suspend its implementation? So, a total separation of powers is not practical. There is always a sort of overlapping of functions between the legislative and executive.
Similarly, because of the absence of the coordinating agency and unifying factor, in some countries there are sometimes tensions among the three powers as an outcome of political differences among parties. It sometimes leads to a point where the country is deprived of any government or cabinet and thus practically paralyzed. For example, a government or cabinet is formed and granted authority but after a while it is dissolved by the parliament and thus collapses.
It is also possible that for a certain period, a new government or cabinet cannot be formed because the one who aspires to become the prime minister and form the government cannot garner the majority vote in parliament. In the parliamentary systems, the ruling party that can form a government is that which has absolute majority of seats in the parliament or can garner the majority vote through an alliance with other parties.
Recently one of our neighboring countries had no government or cabinet for sometime because the one nominated for premiership could not garner the majority vote of the MPs. The MP’s also attend to the current affairs of the country but whenever the prime minister and his deputies are temporarily appointed, the natural tendency is that they do not take their work seriously. A country whose officials are tardy and careless for a period of six months, for instance, will obviously incur great losses.
In some political systems, the president has the right to temporarily dissolve the parliament in special circumstances. Thus, executive power openly interferes and even dissolves the legislature. No doubt, such interferences lead to tension, discord and even intense crises. The reason behind it is that either the preeminent and influential factor to prevent such crises has not been premeditated in the laws of those systems, or the premeditated factor is not that effective. For example, in some systems the presidency is regarded as a mere ceremonial position and has not the executive power. At times, when the country is facing a crisis, it is he who gives stability by resolving the crisis. Actually, he demonstrates his role and function only during a crisis.
The coordination of powers in the wilayah al-faqih system
In current systems in the world measures have been taken to save the country from a crisis as a result of interference in one another’s affairs, but none of these measures or solutions is sufficient, and the problem or difficulty remains as before. However, in the wilayah al-faqih system—which is unfortunately presented as reactionary by some biased writers—such situations have been taken into account. Whenever the country faces a crisis, he guides the nation, solves the crisis with prudence and astuteness, and does not allow the country to plunge into perdition.
Like other countries, we also have executive power headed by the president and judicial and legislative powers which are separate from each other. But they are powers of the same system and join together on top of the political pyramid. All these powers converge at one point. The central and main point of the system at the top of the pyramid is the wali al-faqih who unifies all the powers and brings them together.
In contrast to other systems which either do not have the coordinating agency or unifying factor, or if there is any it is very weak and feeble, in the wilayah al-faqih system the three powers are under the leadership and supervision of the focal point of the system, viz. the wali al-faqih. He is also the protector of the Constitution. He sees to it that Islamic laws, values, objectives and ideals of the Revolution are not violated. He also serves as the coordinating agency between the three powers, inviting all to camaraderie, unity, amity, and understanding. If the country happens to face any serious tensions, he eases them and saves the country from the brink of disaster.
In the course of more than twenty years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution,[46] whether during the time of the eminent Imam (q) or that of the Supreme Leader (may Allah prolong his sublime presence), in numerous cases the country experienced intense crises caused by particular disputes and tensions that willy-nilly happened in society. If it were not because of the sagacious management of the Leader, our country would have succumbed to crises that countries like Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan are experiencing today. Fortunately, by the grace of the presence of this holy personality and position, and the love and affectionate relationship between him and the people, such crises were undermined.
The wilayah al-faqih system’s superiority over other systems
By comparing the Islamic system of our country to the democratic systems in the world that are presently known as the most advanced government systems, it is worth enumerating the distinctions of the Islamic systems:
1. Internal cohesion
The first distinction of our system is its internal cohesion. We have shown a sample of the internal contradictions of those systems, saying that no power is supposed to interfere in another’s affairs but in actuality we do not know of any system in which the three powers are totally independent and do not interfere in one another’s affairs, and in which the law has not sanctioned a certain extent of interference in one another’s affairs, not to mention the illegal interferences, violations and pressures exerted by one power over another.
We can actually observe one branch of the government enjoying authority and exerting pressure on others. Once the military and disciplinary forces, economic and financial means, and the budget of a nation are at the disposal of the executive, in practice all instruments of pressure are at its disposal, and whenever the chief executive wants, he can abuse his power.
So, a sort of internal contradiction can be observed in the democratic systems in the world. In our system, however, that contradiction does not exist in spite of the fact that the three powers are separate from one another and each of them has independent discretions. It is because in our system there is the coordinating and unifying element called the wali al-faqih who, by virtue of his authority over the three branches of government, coordinates and brings them together.
As the pivot of the system, he prevents the emergence of any crisis. We have even witnessed how in many instances the Supreme Leader has prevented the emergence of tension among officials of the three powers. Whenever there was a crisis, the chief executive officially asked him to solve it by exercising the power vested in him, which he did. The wali al-faqih is directly not the head of any of the three powers but he designates the head of each of these powers and in the expression of the constitution, he confirms [tanfidh] the vote of the people. By virtue of his confirmation or designation, the position and function of each of the heads of the three powers acquire legitimacy and official status.
2. Internal and external executive guarantee
The second distinction of our system is the internal and external executive guarantee that exists in the people. This internal executive guarantee arises from the sense of religious responsibility in observing laws and ordinances of this Islamic state. Such an internal guarantee or control does not exist in other systems. In almost all other systems laws are imposed upon the people by force and violence. Whenever people sense more freedom and less control over them, they avoid being subjected to the laws.
It can be heard frequently that some people talk about the observance of law and order in European countries. They claim, for instance, that in Western or European countries the people spontaneously and instinctively act upon laws and ordinances and pay taxes. This outward discipline and order is due to an advanced system of control which compels people to observe laws and pay taxes. Because of it, only a few can violate laws.
The system of tax collection there, because of many centuries of experience especially in the last half century has a complex, yet accurate, mechanism. On this basis, taxes are collected from people in different ways and the masses willingly pay their taxes. However, by collaborating with national officials and establishing connection with power-holders, giant companies are trying to evade paying taxes.
At this point, I deem it necessary to tell those who are infatuated with the West that their talk about order, discipline and high-level culture is nothing but empty rhetoric and far from the truth. For example, it is claimed that in Western countries drivers observe traffic rules faithfully and maintain exemplary order and discipline. This claim is not true. I will mention an instance that refutes this claim.
I was invited to deliver a speech at the University of Philadelphia in the United States. In order to see the cities and towns along the way, I took a car from New York to Philadelphia. Along the way, I noticed that the car driver used to place a devise in front and remove it after a while. He repeated it many times. This incited my sense of curiosity and I asked him about the utility of the devise.
He said that in America the speed limit was 90 miles per hour. In order to detect any violation the police had installed radar along the highways. Since the traffic and speed of vehicles is monitored by radar the devise in question is used to undermine it. This devise can easily be sold and bought in the market. Knowing this, policemen are stationed along the highways to stop and fine drivers who, by using the devise undermine the police radar, and drive beyond the speed limit. As such, by installing the said devise they can drive at whatever speed they like. Whenever they approach a policeman, they hide it, and install it again afterwards!
You can see that in order to circumvent the rules and render futile the law-enforcers’ monitoring devise, they invented a counter-devise which was sold abundantly in the open market. Yet, we imagine that the Americans have such a progressive culture that they willingly and cheerfully obey ordinances and maintain order and discipline. Criminal cases reportedly happening there everyday have a long story. An acquaintance who returned to Iran after many years of residence in America said that there was no high school in America without armed policemen. Yet, every now and then we witness killing in those schools. For example, an armed student recently shot his classmates and teacher, killing them! This is an example of order and discipline in that country!
The main factor that prompts people in the West to abide by law is an external factor—fear of fine, imprisonment or physical punishment. If they were not only afraid of this deterrence and could render ineffective the monitoring devise of law-enforcers, most of them would not hesitate to violate laws. In the Islamic system, however, apart from this external deterring factor which exists, there is a more important factor which if cultivated among people has great potential to solve social problems. It is the internal deterrence which makes people obey ordinances and laws.
This factor stems from faith in the necessity of abiding by laws and ordinances of the Islamic state. In reality, people regard obedience to laws as part of their religious duties. If the Islamic system or state had not established and the Imam as leader and source of emulation [marja‘ at-taqlid] had not declare obedience to laws of the Islamic state as religiously obligatory, people would have obeyed the laws only in order to be immune from physical punishment or fine.
Nowadays, in obedience to the wali al-amr al-muslimin the religious and revolutionary people of Iran act upon the laws and ordinances of the state although, in certain cases, they know that those laws are not in their favor. This internal executive guarantee which stems from the faith of people and is a very important and valuable factor in persuading people to abide by the laws exists in our society and we do not fully comprehend its value.
This factor makes people consider laws of the Islamic state as laws of God and obeying them as pleasing to Him, and thus, having a sense of religious and divine responsibility they follow them and regard their violation a sin. Of course, we do not deny that there are also cases of law violation in our system but compared to the cases of obedience to laws these violations are insignificant. If the percentage of violations was greater than that of obedience, there could no longer be progress and the system would disintegrate.
3. The Leader possessing the highest degree of piety and merit
The third distinction of our system in comparison to other systems is that the Supreme Leader must possess the highest level of piety, moral integrity, and personal standing because he is the deputy of the Prophet (s) and the Imam of the Time (‘a). The people recognize him as the manifestation and embodiment of the personality of the Imam of the Time (‘a). As such, they also extend to him their love and affection for the Prophet (s) and the Imam of the Time (may Allah, the Exalted, expedite his glorious advent).
If the Supreme Leader, who holds the highest post and exercises all political powers, commits a violation or sin that leads to debauchery and injustice, he shall be automatically dismissed from the station of wilayah over the Muslims, and there will be no need for a court hearing or trial to prove the offense, just dismissal. The fact that he commits an offense, God forbid, makes him lose his justice and stand dismissed. The only function of the Assembly of Experts is to declare his incompetence because his dismissal results from his losing his sense of justice!
There is no political system in the world in which the high-ranking officials have the moral integrity that the Leader in our system has. In fact, the leaders of some countries are openly involved in moral corruption and sin. For instance, in the U.S. of America, one of the so-called greatest, civilized and progressive countries of the world, the president was accused of moral and sexual corruption.[47] Certain witnesses bore testimony to his debauchery and offense and he himself made a confession. However, when the issue of his impeachment was brought up in Congress and then moved to the Senate, a majority of Senators acquitted him of the charge.
Thus, he remained in power as president until the end of his term and no problem emerged thereafter.[48] All people of the world knew that he committed adultery and perjury but due to the political collaboration of some Senators the required number of votes to impeach the president was not reached, and that embodiment of moral corruption remained in his position! There are many similar cases about senior officials who openly violated their own laws and were even convicted in a court, but remained in their posts thanks to their political connections. They have also been elected for another term sometimes.
According to Islam if the Leader lacks even a single qualification and commits an offense, he is dismissed from his post because by committing a major sin he falls from justice and becomes a transgressor. Hence, he is not competent to lead the Muslims. There is no more need for any trial or the vote of the Assembly of Experts to prove his offense. No system in the world has shown such severity with respect to national officials, especially the highest official, i.e. the Leader.
4. Observance of the spiritual and real interests of human beings
Finally, one of the most important distinctions of our system is the observance of the real interests of human beings. As Muslims we believe that God knows best the interests of human beings, and we want those interests to be realized in society. This important pursuit cannot succeed except by acting upon religious laws and decrees. On this earth, it is only the Islamic Republic of Iran whose constitution (Article 4) has stipulated that all current laws and ordinances of the country should be ratified and implemented on the basis of Islamic standards. If a law or ratified bill is against the general principles of religion, it is of no legal value. Therefore, the only country whose laws guarantee the real interests of human beings is our country.
Everybody knows that this system achieved and accomplished its goals because of the sacrifices of our people and the blood of martyrs especially that of the Tir 7 martyrs.[49] By sacrificing their lives and offering their valuable blood to the Revolution, they gave us honor, nobility and lofty values. We must be vigilant not to ungratefully lose those values. Today, hands are at work to besmirch the essence of Islam, wilayah al-faqih, the system, and the Islamic principles because these values are like thorns in their flesh. They have been trying their best to destroy them, and render them a blow, using all their ability, skill and artfulness.
Sometimes, they question the essence of Islam and Islamic laws in their speeches and newspapers with wide circulation, saying: “Today, it is no longer the time for us to talk about wajib and haram. We have to set the people free to decide for themselves and elect what they like!” They also dare to insult wilayah al-faqih. Had the high cultural officials not been highly tolerant, they would be legally prosecuted and punished. But these officials are not taking necessary action.
It is here that as revolutionary Muslims and followers of the Imam and the Supreme Leader, we have the duty to identify these impudent and insolent elements and not allow the sacred religion of Islam, Shi‘ism and values that are the means of our felicity in this world and the next to be sold at a meager and miserable price in the trade fair of deceitful politicians and identity-less culture effacers, and this would bring nothing to us but ignominy, disgrace and the curse of God, the Apostle (s), the angels and the future generations. Let it not be.
Notes:
[44] Surah al-Hajj 22:78.
[45] Surah al-Baqarah 2:185.
[46] Now, it is almost 30 years after victory of the Islamic Revolution. [Trans.]
[47] It alludes to the sexual scandal involving ex-US president William Jefferson “Bill” Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, a former White House intern. The US House of Representatives approved two articles of impeachment against Bill Clinton on December 19, 1998, making him only the second president in US history to be impeached. Article I accuses him of perjury in his grand jury testimony about his relationship with Lewinsky while Article III accuses him of obstruction of justice and witness tampering. The US Senate began an impeachment trial against him on the two articles approved by the House of Representatives, but on February 12, 1999, the Senate acquitted him of the charges against him. The Associated Press, December 19, 1998. [Trans.]
[48] It is worthy of note that throughout the controversy, polls showed that a large majority of Americans thought the president was doing a good job and that he should not be impeached or removed from office. [Trans.]
[49] It refers to the bomb explosion at the Islamic Republican Party Headquarters perpetrated by the hypocrites on Tir 7, 1360 AHS (June 28, 1981) where the first Judiciary Chief Dr. Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Beheshti and 71 other members of the judiciary, thinkers, writers, and revolutionary figures were. [Trans.]
Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Relationship between Wilayat al-Faqih and the Marja'iyat
Question: What is the relationship between governance of a jurist (wilayat al-faqih) and authority in jurisprudence (marja’iyat)?
Brief Answer
Wilayat is a part of marja’iyat in the culture of the Shi’as. The great maraji’ not only guided people with respect to the divine Law, but they also led people in the particular problems of society—even judging between people in particular matters and domestic disputes. But if we separate the two matters and associate the former with marja’iyyat then a number of questions arise:
1. Is it permissible to separate marja’iyyat and wilayat?
2. If we suppose that it is permissible, then is it possible to have multiple mara’ji and leaders?
3. If it be possible to separate the marji’ and the leader, is it possible to follow other than the leader in rules relating to society and the individual?
The answers to the aforementioned questions are as follows: The reason that the jurisprudent is an authority in matters of the law is because of his specialization in jurisprudence and his power to derive the rules of Allah (awj) from their sources. While the reason that a leader is what he is, is because aside from the above mentioned qualities, he has the ability to manage society according to the principles and values of Islam. It is because of this that it becomes possible for a person to be chosen as a leader due not so much to his aptitude in jurisprudence as much as to his better management skills.
In lieu of this reality, the separation of the offices of the marji’ and the leader becomes a reasonable, and in some instances, a necessary expedient.
In principle, leadership is confined to a single person, whereas the marja’iyyat is applicable to numerous individuals. But the possibility for the reverse situation also holds; just as does the possibility that the two offices should be combined in a single individual. Since following the orders of the leader is obligatory upon all people—including other jurisprudents—and it is forbidden to disobey his orders, hence it is not possible for people to follow other than the leader in matters related to the social order and the running of society.
What was said above regarding the authority of the jurisprudent was in reference to the individual order and to matters of a personal nature; it is in these matters that people can follow other than the leader.
Detailed Answer
The Noble Prophet (ص) of Islam had three mandates:
1. To propagate Allah’s (awj) message; teaching the laws of religion and guiding the people;
2. To judge between people when they differed;
3. To lead and manage society.
All of these qualities and functions exist for the jurisprudents in the time of the occultation of the Imam. They too have three functions:
1. Acting as judges and resolving disputes that arise between people;
2. Giving edicts in law and expounding the general rules of the Divine law for the people. This can be considered a type of guidance of the people;
3. Leadership.
Wilayat is a part of marja’iyat in the culture of the Shi’as. The great maraji’ not only guided people with respect to the divine Law, but they also led people in the particular problems of society—even judging between people in particular matters and domestic disputes. But if we separate the two matters and associate the former with marja’iyyat then a number of questions arise:
1. Is it permissible to separate marja’iyyat and wilayat? In other words is it possible that one individual is the one people refer to in the general matters of the law while another person is the leader of the Islamic nation?
2. If we suppose that it is permissible, then is it possible to have multiple maraji’ and leaders? Is there a difference between them in this regard?
3. If it be possible to separate the marji’ and the leader, is it possible to follow other than the leader in rules relating to society and the individual?
Before we answer the aforementioned questions it is necessary for us to give a brief explanation of the “edict” that the leader issues.
When the jurisprudent refers to the religious sources in order to obtain the general rule of Allah (awj) regarding a certain problem and uses the special techniques that exist for obtaining the rules of the Law, it is called giving an edict or “fatwa”. When the leader pays attention to the general rules of Allah (awj), the various systems in Islam, and the conditions of the time, and according to these delineates a person’s or a specific group’s responsibility with regards to a certain matter, this is called giving an order or a “hukm”. In doing this, he not only pays attention to the general rules of Islam and the lofty aspirations of the religion, but also to the specific conditions that exist in that time. As long as those conditions exist, the order issued by him or his representative is binding. Of course from the point of view of the Law, the rules of Allah (awj) and the edicts of the jurisprudent who has all the necessary qualifications are also binding, just like the rulings of the leader, but with this difference that the jurisprudent’s rulings are binding on him and his followers only, while everyone must follow the orders of the leader.
With this in mind we will now answer the first question, in other words the separation of the marja’iyyat and the leader. According to the logic of the “leadership of the jurisprudent” and its proofs, the jurisprudent takes upon himself the management of society and in accordance with the values of Islam, he takes on the responsibility of leadership. But marja’iyyat means simply to issue an edict and is a completely different matter. In order to understand marja’iyyat it is necessary to explain taqlid first.
In the Persian language, taqlid means to follow someone without a proof. Taqlid in the parlance of jurisprudence means that someone follows a specialist in a specific matter that is in line with his specialty. The first meaning is considered bad in the eyes of all sane people, but the second is totally sound and accepted by them. The most important proof as to the permissibility of taqlid lies in the fact that the person who is not a specialist in a particular field must refer to the specialist of that field. All of the proofs that are contained in the traditions and verses of the Qur`an regarding taqlid point to this very fact. Like for example the verse that says,
“We did not send [any apostles] before you except as men to whom We revealed—ask the People of the Reminder if you do not know.”[394]
With this explanation it becomes clear that the reason that the jurisprudent is an authority in matters of the law is because of his specialization in jurisprudence and his power to derive the rules of Allah (awj) from their sources while the reason that a leader is what he is, is because aside from the aforementioned qualities, he has the ability to manage society according to the principles and values of Islam.
It is because of this that it becomes possible for a person to be chosen as a leader due not so much to his aptitude in jurisprudence as much as to his better management skills.
In lieu of this reality, the separation of the offices of the marji’ and the leader becomes a reasonable, and in some instances, necessary expedient.
With regards to the second question (i.e. whether the leadership and the marja’iyyatis confined to one person or is open to more than one person) and assuming that a separation of the two is possible, we must remember that when someone refers to the marji’ he does so because the marji’ is a specialist in the field of law and the one who refers, is not. This being the case, it is possible that there be numerous specialists in society. Moreover, this is something that is to be sought after so that everyone can refer to them with ease and obtain their rulings.
But the leadership of society, because it is tied up with the order of society and because the multiplicity of centres of decision making would cause a disturbance–since it is necessary for everyone to follow the leader in his rulings–dictate that the leader be one. This is especially true because according to Islam there is only one nation of Islam. Of course it is possible that specific conditions dictate that specific areas have their own leaders, but all of these leaders should cooperate with one another. But it is not necessary that various jurisprudents issue one edict in order that society not be disturbed. Rather, every jurisprudent issues his edict according to his judgment and the general rules of deriving the laws from their sources.
In principle, leadership is confined to a single person, whereas the marja’iyyat is applicable to numerous individuals. But the possibility for the reverse situation also holds true.
As to the third question (i.e. the possibility of following someone other that the leader in all matters) we must not lose sight of the fact that when the leader issues an order or a ruling he looks at all aspects of the situation from the perspective of the various systems and realms within Islam, and after such an appraisal and due to his position it is his opinion which has the final say.
If it were permissible for people to follow other than the leader in all matters, while the orders of the leader remain binding upon them, then in certain cases this would lead to a serious problem. In other words, it is possible that in a specific matter of social order the leader could issue an edict and say that if my ruling was other than this I would have said so, while on the other hand the marji’ of the people could issue a ruling other than his. In this situation how can we expect the people to follow the edict of the ruler?
It is with regards to this problem that it seems necessary that people do not follow other than the leader in social and state matters, since to disobey his order is forbidden according to all the jurisprudents. Therefore what was said above regarding the authority of the jurisprudent and marji’ was in reference to the individual order and to matters of a personal nature; it is in these matters that people can follow other than the leader.
Notes:
[394] Surat al-Nahl, (16), verse 43:
Mahdi Hadavi Tehrani
Source: Imam reza network
Sources of Legislation in Islam
The Shia: The Real Followers of the Sunnah
Sources of Legislation for the Shi'ah
Anyone who follows up the Imamiyyah Shi'ah fiqh,will verily see them devoted absolutely, in (taking) all fiqhi rules -except the recently originated ones110 to the Prophet (S) through the Twelve Imams of Ahl al-Bayt (A).
They follow only two sources of legislation: The Book and the Sunnah, with which I mean the first source i.e. the Holy Qur'an, and the second one being the Prophetic Sunnah, upon its bearer be the best of benediction and peace.
These are the beliefs of the Shi'ah in the past and lately, and rather of the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt, of whom no one claimed of exerting his opinion or issuing a rule according to his conjecture.
The first Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib is the best example, as when they have acknowledged him as a caliph provided that he should rule according to the Sunnah of the Two Shaykhs (Abu Bakr and 'Umar), he replied; I will never rule but according to the Book of Allah and His Messenger's Sunnah.111
In the forthcoming chapters, we will clarify that he (A) has been all the time adhering to the Prophet's Sunnah without deviating from it, doing his best to restore people to follow it. This practice has resulted in exciting the Caliphs' rage, and people's turning away from him, due to his hardness and devotion in God's Essence (Dhat Allah), and clinging to the Prophet's Sunnah.
Further, al-'Imam al-Baqir (A) used to say: "If we debate with you according to our opinion we shall be misguided as happened to those before us, but we give you an evidence from our Lord, that He has revealed upon His
110. We mean by it the ijtihad of the 'ulama, concerning that for which not text is revealed, as occurred after occultation of the Twelfth Imam.
111. In some narrations he said: "and other than them, I exert my opinion", which is false addition by the followers and the supporters of ijtihad. As al-'Imam 'Ali has never claimed to exert his opinion, but he used to extract the rulers from the Book of Allah and His Messenger's Sunnah, or used to say: We have al-Jami'ah, which contains whatever needed by People even the minute points. This Sahifah is dictated by the Messenger of Allah and written by 'Ali. We refered to al-Sahifah al-Jami'ah in the chapter "Ahl al-Sunnah and Obliterating the Sunnah" in this book.
Prophet,who in turn has manifested for us"
In another place he (A) said: "O Jabir, if we were used to talk to people according to our opinion we would have perished, but we disclose to you traditions we have hoarded up from the Messenger of Allah (S) as others hoard up gold and silver.
Al-'Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (A) has also said:
By God we never utter anything according to our desire nor to our opinions, but our utterance is exactly as revealed by our Lord (God). Whatever replies I give you are verily reported from the Messenger of Allah, and by God we never follow our opinion in everything.
All men of letters and investigation are aware of this fact about the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt, as they have never reported from any of them exerting the opinion, or to act by qiyas (analogy) or istihsan or anything other than the Qur'an and the Sunnah.
When referring to the contemporary great religious authority (marji), Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (may God be pleased with him), we see him saying in his treatise (risalah), "al-Fatawa al-wadhiha": It is necessary to refer briefly to the references upon which we mainly depended in deducing in the outset of our speech, the Holy Qur'an and the Prophetic Sunnah, reported from trustworthy pious narrators, wherever be their madhhab112 (school of thought). We do not see any legislative justification to depend upon analogy and istihsan (approval), or alike things.
Concerning what is called the rational evidence (al-dalil al-'aql), that mujtahidun and muhaddithun have differed as to whether acting according to it was permissible or not. Though we believe that is justifiable to apply it, but we have never found even one rule (hukm) whose establishment (ithbat) relies solely on the rational evidence with this meaning, but rather, what is established by al-dalil al-'aql, is
112. Here it is proved how the Shi'ah 'ulama' refer to the righteous trustworthy men whatever be their madhhab, which is a good refutation against the claimants that the Shi'ah never trust the Sahabah. While the fact is that the Shi'ah reject the ahabi's hadith only when it contradicts what is narrated by Ahl al-Bayt Imams.
already established at the same time by the Book or the Sunnah.
As regards the so-called ijma' (unanimity), it cannot be considered a source (of legislation) beside the Qur'an and Sunnah. It is unreliable but only due to its being a means for affirmation in some cases.
Therefore it is confirmed that the Qur'an and the Sunnah have been the only two sources of legislation. We implore the Almighty to make among those clung to them. "Whoever graps them has grasped a firm hand-hold which will never break. Allah is Hearer, Knower".113
So this phenomenon is prevalent among the Shi'ah throughout history, as the only dependable sources of legislation being only the Qur'an and the sunnah, and none of them has issued even one fatwa (verdict) derived from qiyas or istishan. The episode of al-Imam al-Sadiq with Abu Hanifah is quite known for all, when he forbade him from applying qiyas (analogy). He (A) said to him: "Don't use qiyas in regard of God's religion, since the Shari'ah (Islamic law) will be obliterated when qiyas is applied on it, and the first one who applied qiyas was Iblis when he said (to God): I am better than him (Adam) as You have created me from fire but You created him out of clay.
These are the sources of legislation for the Shi'ah, from the time of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib till the present day. What are the sources of legislation for Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-jama'ah?
113. Al-Fatawa al-wadihah, by the Martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, p. 98.
Sources of Legislation for Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah
By tracing back the sources of legislation for Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah, we see that their number beings so large that they exceed the limits of the Book of Allah, and the Sunnah ordained by Allah and His Messenger.
The sources that they depend upon-beside the Book and Sunnah-include: The Sunnah of al-Khulafa'a al-Rashidun, sunnah of the Companions, sunnah of the Tabi'un who are the 'ulama' of trace, sunnah of the rulers which they call sawafi al-'umra', qiyas (analogy), istihsan (approval), ijma' (unanimity), and sadd bab al-dhara'i (closing the door of pleas).
They constitute altogether ten sources which they regard to domineer Allah's religion. In order not to utter anything without a convincing evidence, or be accused of exaggeration, it is inevitable to cite some proofs taken from their own sayings and books, to manifest the truth for the dear reader.
We are not going to debate Ahl al-Sunnah regarding the first two sources, i.e. Book and the Sunnah, about which there is no disagreement, being the wajib that was recognized by naql (transmission), 'aql (reason) and ijma' (unanimity). It is as stated in the Al-Mighty's saying: "And whatever the Messenger giveth you, take it. And whatever he forbidden, abstain (from it)", (59:7) and His saying: "Obey Allah and obey the Messenger" (5:92), also His saying: "...when Allah and His Messenger have decided an affair" (33:36), beside other manifest verses indicating the wujub (obligation) of legislation the rules only from the Book of Allah and Sunnah of His Messenger, but we debate them concerning the other sources that they have added from their fabrication.
First: The Sunnah of al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun:
They (Ahl al-Sunnah) have argued with the hadith "Adhere to my sunnah and the sunnah of the Rightly-guided successors after me. Hold on to it and cling on it stubbornly".114
We have stated in the Book 'Ma'a al-Sadiqin "that those who are meant by al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun (Rightly-guided successors) in this hadith are in fact the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt, and I intend here to mention more proofs for those who missed reading that Book.
It is reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim and other traditionists, that the Messenger of Allah has confined his successors in twelve ones, when he said: "The successors after me are twelve (men), all of whom are from Quraysh". This sahih hadith indicates explicitly that he meant by them the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them), not the Caliphs "rulers" who have usurped the caliphate.
Someone may raise this question: Wheather by "the successors" are meant the Twelve Imams of Ahl al-Bayt as the Shi'ah believe, or the Four Guided Caliphs as Ahl al-Sunnah believe, the sources of legislation are only three: the Qur'an and the (Prophet's) Sunnah and the Calips' sunnah?
This is right in the opinion of Ahl al-Sunnah, but the Shi'ah never accept it, as the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt have never legislated (rules) according to their ijtihad and opinions, but whatever they uttered was but the sunnah of their grandfather the Messenger of Allah. They have learned it from him, and preserved it for manifesting it to people when necessary.
But the books of Ahl al-Sunnah are replete with inference from the sunnah of Abu Bakr and sunnah of 'Umar, as a source for the Islamic legislation, even if it contradicts the Book and the Sunnah.
We will be more certain that Abu Bakr and 'Umar
114. It is reported by al-Tirmidhi, Ibn Mjah, al-Bayhaqi, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal.
were not meant by the Prophet's hadith, by knowing that 'Ali has refused to rule according to their sunnah when the Sahabah stipulated this as a condition for acknowledging him (as a caliph). Had the Prophet meant them by al-khulafa al-Rashidun, it would not have been permissible for 'Ali to refute the Prophet's hadith and reject their sunnah, so it is ascertained that Abu Bakr and 'Umar are not among al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun.
However, Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah mean by al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun: Abu Bakr and 'Uthman alone, since 'Ali had not been counted among them, but he was added to them lately as mentioned before. In fact he had been cursed over pulpits, so how could they follow his sunnah??!
This fact will be even more verified by reading what is reported by Jalal al-Din al-Sayuti in his book Ta'rikh al-Khulafa', when he quoted Hajib ibn Khalifah as saying: I heard the Caliph 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz addressing the people saying:
"Whatever is prescribed by the Messenger of Allah (S) and his two companions is a religion we adopt and end at, and we put aside whatever is prescribed by others".115
In fact most of the Sahabah and Umayyad and 'Abbasid rulers were of the opinion that whatever was prescribed by Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthman being a religion they adopt and end at.
And as these three Caliphs have embarked on preventing the Messenger's Sunnah from reaching people as we realized earlier, so nothing is left then of the Sunnah except what they have prescribed, and of the rules except what they have confirmed.
Second: The Sahabah's Sunnah in General:
Many proofs and numerous evidences are available
115. Al-Suyuti's Ta'rikh al-khulafa', p. 160.
which attest the fact that Ahl al-Sunnah have been following the Sunnah of the Sahabah in general with no exception.
They argue with a false hadith, which we have elaborately discussed in the book 'Ma'a al-Sadiqin". The hadith reads thus: "My Companions are like the stars (nujum), whichever of them you follow, you shall be guided rightly", and Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah has argued with this hadith against the argumentation of the Companion's opinion.116
This fact has also been admitted by al-Shaykh Abu Zuhrah, when he said: "We have found all of them (fuqaha' of Ahl al-Sunnah) adopt the fatwa' of the Sahabi". Then he adds another statement: To argue with the Companions 'sayings and fatawa, has been the conduct of the multitude (al-jamhur) of fuqaha, and they were contradicted by the Shi'ah,117 but Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah has supported al-Jamhur with about forty-six aspects, all being strong arguments (hujaj)...".
We address al-Shaykh Abu Zuhrah, and question him: How could the argument (hujjah)--that contradicts the Book of Allah and sunnah of His Prophet--be strong?! All the arguments (hujaj) cited by Ibn al-Qayyim are as frail as the spider's house, and you (to Abu Zuhrah) have demolished them yourself when you said: "But we found al-Shawkani say: It is true that the companion's opinion is not a hujjah, as Allah --the Glorious and Exalted -- has never sent to this Ummah except our prophet Muhammad (S). We do not have but one messenger, and all the Companions and those who succeeded them are equally charged with following his Shar' in the Book and Sunnah, and whoever opines that the hujjah in God's religion can be established with other than them, he will be as that who has opined regarding God's religion with improvable belief, and has confirmed a law (shar') not commanded by Allah".118
Thus al-Shawkani has said the truth, and was never affected by the school of thought, so his utterance came to be
116. A'lam al-muqi'in, vol. iv, p. 122.
117. This being another testimony from Al-Shaykh Abu Zuhrah, affirming our saying that the Shi'ah never acknowledge for legislation of Allah except the Qur'an and Prophetic Sunnah.
118. Kitab al-Shaykh Abi Zuhrah, p. 102.
in consonance with that of the Imams of guidance, the Pure 'Itrah...may God be pleased with him if his acts comply with his sayings.
Third:The Sunnah of Tabi'un (Ulama' al-'Athar):
The other source upon which Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah have depended (for deriving rules), used to be the opinions of the Tabi'un, whom they used to call as 'Ulama' al'Athar, who include: Al-Awza'i, Sufyan al-Thawri, Hasan al-Basri, Ibn 'Uyaynah, and many others. They also concur on adopting the interpretations (ijtihadat) of the Imams of four schools, and imitating them, though they being the followers of the followers.
The Companions themselves confess of committing errors many times, and of uttering what they know not.
When Abu Bakr, for instance, was asked about a matter, he would reply: "I will give my opinion in its regard, if I be right it is from Allah, but if I err it is from me or from Satan". 'Umar also has once said to his followers: "I may enjoy you to things that happen to be not for your convenience, and forbid you from things that happen to be for your benefit."119
So if this be their level of knowledge, and they just follow conjucture which assurely can by no means take the place of truth, so how can a Muslim, being aware of Islam, give himself the right to make the acts and sayings of such people as a sunnah to be followed, and as one of the sources of legislation? After this discussion will there remain any trace of the hadith "My Companions are like stars"?
If the Companions who attended the Prophet's majalis (meetings) and learned from him, utter such discourses, so what to say about those who succeeded them, adopted their opinions and took part in the sedition?
If the leaders of the four schools exert their opinions
119. Ta'rikh Baghdad, vol. xiv, p. 81.
regarding God's religion, with explicitly admitting the possibility of committing an error, as one of them says: I think this (rule) is correct, and may be any others opinion is correct, so what made the Muslims obligate themselves to follow and imitate them?!
Fourth: The Rulers' Sunnah:
Ahl al-Sunnah call it "Sawafi al-'umra" and they cites as an evidence for it the holy verse: "Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger and those of you who are in authority" (4:59).120
In their view, those in authority are the rulers even if they are controlling the rule by force and suppression, as they believe that Allah has invested them with authority over people, so it is incumbent upon everyone to obey them and adopt their sunnah.
Ibn Hazm al-Zahiri has vehemently refuted Ahl al-Sunnah, by saying: "On the basis of what you say, the rulers are authorized to annual from and increase in the shara'i' (laws) ordained by Allah and His Messenger as they desire, there being no difference between addition and deletion, in this respect. Surely this is infidelity on the part of whoever permits it".121
Al-Dhahabi has refuted Ibn Hazm by saying: "This is verily an invalid report and an exorbitant mistake, as it is unanimously agreed by all the Ummah --except Dawud ibn 'Ali and whoever followed him--that those in authority (Ulu al-'amr) have the right to rule according to opinion (ra'y) and (ijtihad), when there being no text revealed (in the Qur'an). And they say: It is unlawful for them (those in authority) to rule according to opinion and ijtihad, despite their awareness the of presence of a revealed text regarding the matter, thus they are allowed to increase in the shar' to the limit permitted by shar', but are allowed to invalidate from the shar' whatever they desire".
120. We have explained with evidence in Ma'al-Sadiqin that Ulu al'amr (those authority), are the guidance Imams of Ahl al-Bayt, and not th usurping rulers, as it is not possible that Allah commands to obey the oppressors, debauchees and infidels.
121. Ibn Hazm's Mulakhkhas ibtal al-qiyas, p. 37.
We ask al-Dhababi that: "How do you claim the unanimity of the Ummah, while you have accepted Dawud ibn 'Ali and whoever followed him?! Why haven't you identified those who followed him by names? Then whey haven't you accepted the Shi'ah and Imams of Ahl al-Bayt, is it because that they are not considered among the Islamic Ummah in your view?! Or that your sycophancy to the rulers has made you permit them to add to the shar', in order that they increase your gift and fame?
Have the rulers, who ruled over Muslims in the name of Islam, been aware of the Qur'anic and Prophetic texts (nusus) so that to stop at their limits?
Had the two Caliphs Abu Bakr and 'Umar deliberately contradicted the Qur'anic and Prophetic nusus, as we mentioned in previous chapters, how would those who succeeded them have adhered to those texts, which have been substituted, changed and obliterated?
If the fuqaha' of Ahl al-Sunnah give a verdict for the rulers to opine in God's religion whatever they will, so no wonder to see al-Dhahabi follow and imitate them.
It is reported in Tabaqat al-fuqaha', form sa'id ibn Jubayr that he said: I questioned 'Abd Allah ibn 'Umar about ila' (insertion)? He said: Do you intend to say: Ibn 'Umar said so, Ibn 'Umar said so?
I replied : Yes, and we accept whatever you say and are convinced with it, Ibn 'Umar then said: The opinion regarding this is as stated by al-'umara' (rulers), or rather as stated by Allah and His Messenger, and whoever reports from them.
It is also reported from Sa'id Jubayr that he said: "Rafa' ibn Hayat has been regarded the most knowledgeable faqih in Sham, but when you instigate him you find him to be a Shami, saying: 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan has issued a so and so ruling in such a mtter".122
It is also reported in Tabaqat Ibn Sa'd, from
122.Tabaqat al-fuqaha', translated by Sa'id ibn Jubayr.
al-Musayyab ibn Rafi 'that he said: "If any question (mas'alah) is to be solved by the ruler, that it is not exposed in the Book (Qur'an) and Sunnah, it is called "Sawafi al-'umara', so it will be handed to them (rulers), and scholars will be gathered for (debating) it, whatever attains their unanimity will be counted as truth." 123
We say to them: "And if the Truth had followed their desires, verily the heavens and the earth had been corrupted ..." (23:71) and: "Nay, but he bring them the Truth; and most of them are haters of the Truth".(23:70)
Fifth: Other Sources of Legislation (for Ahl al-Sunnah):
Of them we mention: qiyas (analogy), istihsan (approval), istishab (accompaniment), sadd bab al-dhara'i (closing the door of pleas), and ijma (unanimity) which are very well known and common among them.
Al-'Imam Abu Hanifah was so much known of applying qiyas and refuting the traditions (of the prophet). Al-'Imam Malik was known of resorting to the acts of Ahl al-Medinah and sadd bab al-dhara'i. Al-'Imam al-Shafi'i was known of acting according to the fatawa of the Companions whom he classified into divisions and ranks, in the following order:
-The priority for the ten promised with Paradise,
-Then the earlier Muhajirun (Emigrants),
-Then the Ansar (Helpers),
-Then come Muslimat al-Fath, with whom he means al-Tulaqa'(the set-free prisoners), who embraced Islam after Fath Makkah (conquest of Mecca).124
It was about Ahmad ibn Hanbal that he never practiced ijtihad, and never issued fatwas but the adopted the opinion of any companion whosoever.
Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi has reported from him that: someone has inquired from him regarding a matter related to
123. Tabaqat Ibn Sa'd vol. vi, p. 179.
124. Manaqib al-'Imam al-Shafi'i, vol. i, p. 443.
halal and haram, whereat Ahmad said to him (the question): May God protect you, you can ask some other one. The man said: O Abu 'Abd Allah, we wish to know your reply. Said he again: May God protect you, you may ask some other one, you can ask the fuqaha', ask Abu Thawr.125
Al-Maruzi has also reported from him his saying: Concerning the hadith we have been relieved of it, and regarding the masa'il (matters, questions), I have made up my mind not to give reply to anyone questioning me.126
Undoubtedly it was Ahmad ibn Hanbal who has insinuated the idea of the justice (adalah) of all the Sahabah with no exception, so his school has impressed Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah.
It is reported by al-Khatim in the second volume of his book Taraikh Baghdad through the chain (isnad) reaching to Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sayrafi that he said: We said to Ahmad ibn Hanbal: If the Prophet's Companions differ regarding a question, is it permissible for us to probe into their opinions to recognize with whom lies the truth (sawab), so that to follow him?
He replied : It is not permissible to probe into the opinions of the Prophet's Companions. I said : What to do then? He said : You can imitate whomever you like (of them) .
We say to him: Is it permissible to imitate one who cannot recognize truth from falsehood? How strange to see Ahmad (ibn Hanbal) issue a fatwa--while he avoids giving verdicts --to imitate any of the Companions without investigating their opinions, to realize where the truth is!
After presenting this brief survey about the sources of the Islamic legislation for the Shi'ah and Ahl al-Sunnah, we come to know explicitly that the Shi'ah have been the true followers of and adherents to the Prophet's Sunnah and never thought of following other than it, till it has become a motto for them as admitted and witnessed by their opponents.
Whereas Ahl al-Sunnah, on the other hand, follow
125. Ta'rikh Baghdad, vol. ii, p. 66.
126. Manaqib al'-Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, p. 57.
the sunnah of any Companion, any Tabi'i, and any ruler, whomsoever.
Their books and sayings are before us, give evidence against them, with which we suffice as a witness. God-willing we will, in a forthcoming chapter, discuss their acts and conduct to see that they have nothing to do with the sunnah.
I will leave to the reader to conclude and recognize for sure, who are Ahl al-Sunnah, and who are Ahl al-Bid'ah (heretics).
An Inevitable Commentary to Complete the Research
It is noteworthy to mention that the Shi'ah have adhered faithfully to the Book and Sunnah as sources of legislation, without adding any other source to them, due to availability of sufficient texts (nusus) with their Imams, for each and every matter and question (mas'alah) needed badly by people.
Some people may be surprised at this and regard as importable, that the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt possesses texts containing all rules and solutions for all matters and problems facing people, for all ages and times till the Doomsday.
For the sake of exposing this fact, it is inevitable to indicate the following points:
If any Muslim believes that Allah--Subhanahu--has delegated Muhammad with a Shari'ah that perfects all previous shara', and prevails over them for continueing the march of humanity on earth, to return thereafter to the eternal life. "He it is Who hath sent His Messenger with the guidance and the Religion of Truth, that He may cause it to prevail over all religion".(9:33)
If a Muslim believes that Allah --Subhanahu --wanted man to be submissive to His rule and commandments in all of his sayings and acts, and to commit himself completely to the will of God."Lo! religion with Allah (is) the surrender (to His will and Guidance)".(3:19)
"And whoso seek as religion other than the Surrender (to Allah) it will not be accepted from him". (3:85)
If this be the case, God's rules should be perfect and all-inclusive for meeting all man's need in his tiresome progress toward overcoming all obstacles, and withstanding life challenges to attain the aspired aim.
About this fact, the Almighty Allah has stated in the Qur'an :
"We have neglected nothing in the Book of our decrees" (6:38).
On this basis, nothing is there but being mentioned in the Book of Allah- the Exalted -but man, due to his limited mentality, cannot perceive all things Allah, the Glorified, has mentioned (in Qur'an) for an extreme wisdom, known only for men of letters. This fact has been expressed by the Almighty Allah:
"And there is not a thing but hymn His praise; but ye understand not their praise..."(17:44)
The phrase (there is not a thing) indicates man, animal, and substance, with no exception, all praise (God). Man may accept the praise of animal and living creatures, like plants, but his brain is unable to perceive the praise-hymn of stone for example, God has said:
"Lo! We subdued the hills to hymn the praises (of their Lord) with him at nightfall and sunrise". (38:18)
When admitting and believing in this, we should believe that Allah's Book contains all the rules that people badly need till the Day of Resurrection. But it is infeasible for us to perceive them unless we refer to the man unto whom the Book was revealed, and who apprehend all its meanings, being the Messenger of Allah, as stated by the Almighty Allah:
"And We reveal the Scripture unto thee as an exposition of all things..." (16:89)
If we admit that Allah -Subhanahu-has exposed all things for His Messenger, so that he can expose to mankind what is revealed to them, we should admit that the Prophet (S) have verily exposed and explained everything needed by people till Doomsday, and has never neglected anything without a rule.
If we could not get access to that exposition, or being unaware of it today, it is due to our inertia, remissness and ignorance, or it is resulted from the betrayal of the medium between them and him (Prophet), or due to the Companions' ignorance and not comprehending what the Prophet (S) has exposed.
But Allah -the Glorified, the Exalted -is aware that all these probabilities are imminent, so for the sake of safeguarding His Shari'ah against loss and negligence, He has elected Imams from among His bondmen, giving them the knowledge and exposition of the Book as inheritance, so that no plea will remain for mankind to raise against Allah. The Almighty has said: "Then We gave the Scripture as inheritance unto those whom We elected of Our bondmen". (35:32)
The Messenger of Allah (S) verily undertaken the task of exposing for people whatever they need, singling out his wasi' Ali with everything needed by people after him till the Doomsday, due to the merits possessed by 'Ali, from among all Companions, including infinite intelligence, sharp perception, strong memorizing and consciousness of whatever reaching his ear. So the Prophet taught him ('Ali) all the knowledge he (S) had, leading the Ummah to follow him as he being the gate from which people should enter (to get the knowledge).
Someone may argue that Allah has sent the Prophet unto all mankind, so he is not entitled to single out only one of them, with his knowledge, and deprive all others. Our reply is thus: The Messenger of Allah has no right whatsoever in this matter, since he is just a commanded bondman, executing whatever is revealed unto him from Lord. In fact he has been ordered by Allah to do so, since Islam is a religion of monotheism (tawhid) and established on unity in everything. It is necessary to unify people an gather them under one leadership, which is an intuitive matter determined by the Book of Allah, and approved by reason ('aql) and conscience. The Almighty Allah said:
If there were therein gods beside Allah, then verily both (the heavens and the earth) had been disordered". (21:22)
He also said:
"...Nor is there any god among with Him; else would each god have assuredly championed that which he created, and some of them would assuredly overcome others..."(23:91)
Also, had God sent two messengers at a time, mankind would have divided into two nations, and have turned to be to rival parties. Allah-the Exalted- said: "...And there is not a nation but a Warner hath passed among them ".(35:24)
Further, for every prophet there has been a wasi (executor), to succeed him among his folk and ummah, to prevent their scattering and segregation.
This being a natural matter known by all, whether being learned or ignorant, believer or infidels. It is fact that every tribe, and every party and every state should have one head (president), to head and lead it, being impossible for them to be ruled by two chiefs at the same time.
That is why Allah-Subhanahu- has elected apostles from among angels and mankind, honoring them with the task of leading His bondmen, and making them example (imams) to guide people to His religion. Allah--the Exalted --said: "Lo! Allah preferred Adam and Noah and the family of Abraham and the Family of 'Imran above (all His) creatures". (3:33) The Imams, Allah has elected to seal the Muhammadan message, are the Imams of guidance from the Prophet's Kindred ('Itrah), all being from the family of Abraham, a progeny descending from the other. It is them who have been referred to by the Messenger of Allah (S) by saying: "The successors (khulafa') after me are twelve ones, all being from Quraysh".127
For every time there should be a certain Imam, whoever dies without being aware of the Imam of his time, his death is that of ignorance. Certainly when Allah -Subhanahu wa ta'ala -elects one as an Imam, He verily purifies him, guards him (against error), and gives him knowledge, as He never gives wisdom but to those deserving it.
127. This hadith is reported in Sahih al-Bukhari, vol viii, p. 127, and Sahih Muslim, vol. vi, p. 3. In other narrations he said: All of them are from Banu Hashim, instead of Quraysh. Whether they are from Banu Hashim or Quraysh, all of them are as it is known, from Abraham's household.
Should we return to the point, that is the Imam's being aware of the rules of Shari'ah needed by people, through the texts revealed in the Scripture and the Sunnah, which keep pace with the march of humanity till the Doomsday. No one among the Islamic Ummah can claim having this merit except the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt (A), who have recurring disclosed their possessing al-Sahifah al-Jamiah (the all inclusive sheet), that was dictated by the Messenger of Allah and written by 'Ali ibn Abi Talib containing all things (rules) needed by people till the Doomsday, even arsh al-khadash (the smaller trouble) .
We have referred to this al-Sahifah al-Jamiah, that used to be held by Ali everywhere, and it was mentioned by al-Bukhari and Muslim in their Sahihs, so no Muslim ever deny this.
On this basis, the Shi'ah, who have devotedly followed the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt, have ruled in the Shari'ah according to the texts (nusus) of the Qur'an and Sunnah, never being coerced to follow other than them throughout three centuries -the lifetime of the Twelve Imams.
But Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah have resorted to ijtihad and qiyas and other alike percepts, due to the absence of nusus and their Imams' unawareness of them, from the earlier days of caliphate. This being natural for them, when knowing that their caliphs have burn the Prophetic texts, beside preventing and hiding them, and when hearing their head say: We are sufficed with the Book of Allah, neglecting and ignoring thus the Prophetic Sunnah, which exposes the rules of the Qur'an itself.
We are all aware of the scarcity of the apparent Qur'anic rules, and that they are generally in need of the Prophet's exposition. So Allah-the Exalted -has said: ''And We have revealed unto thee the Remembrance that thou mayst explain to mankind that which hath been revealed for them..." (16:44)
If the Qur'an is in need of the Prophetic Sunnah to expose its rules and meanings, and if Ahl al-Sunnah have burnt the Sunnah that exposes the Qur'an, so they are left with no texts to expose the Qur'an and to expose the Sunnah itself.
They had no choice but to apply ijtihad and qiyas, and consult their 'ulama', adopting istihsan and that which meets their temporary convenience. It has been natural for them to be in need of all these acts due to their lack for the texts (nusus).
Muhammad al-Tijani al-Samawi
Source: Imam reza network
Government in Islam
In many cases it is the duty of every individual to support what is right and to see that law is enforced in an equitable manner. But there are cases in which this duty requires more energy, more specialized knowledge and more powerful machinery than an individual can possess. The vital duty of `exhorting to good and restraining from evil' demands that in such cases all people should co‑operate to set up a powerful social organization having enough authority to undertake the required task. In an ideological society the organization charged with this responsibility is called "Government".
Under the social system of Islam a government comes to power in one of the following three ways:
(1) By appointment by Allah, which automatically means its recognition by the people.
(2) By appointment by the Prophet, which also means recognition by the people.
(3) By appointment, or in other words election by the Muslims.
Appointment by Allah
Appointment by Allah in the then newly‑founded society of Medina the holy Prophet was in charge of the government. He was assigned this post by Allah. The Muslims were told by the holy Qur'an to obey him in their social affairs.
"Say: Obey Allah and the Messenger". (Ale Imran, 3:32). "Obey Allah and His Messenger and do not quarrel among yourselves lest you lose your courage and strength ". (Surah al‑Anfal, 8:46).
This government began with the proclamation regarding the formation of the Muslim ummah and the issue of certain charters, following the arrival of the holy Prophet in Medina. The pledging of their allegiance to the holy Prophet by the representatives of Medina shortly before his migration (Hijrah), and by the various groups of the Muhajirs and the Ansar on other occasions, was a national and popular recognition of his Divine appointment.
During this period the governors, the judges, the army commanders, the treasury officers and other important functionaries were appointed by the Prophet himself, and had to discharge their duties within the framework of Islamic law. Their powers were also normally determined by the Prophet. In ideological societies the founder of the movement, which culminates in the formation of a society naturally holds the reins of the government himself, for, being the founder of the ideology, he knows its dimensions and implications better than anybody else. Moreover, his competence and efficiency having already been proved, naturally he is the fittest person to assume the leadership of the new society.
(2) Appointment by a Prophet
In many cases a Prophet appoints somebody to manage the affairs of the society. Such appointments have two forms:
(a) In his lifetime he appoints, in the territory under his control, governors, judges and commanders. As his appointees, these people exercise the power given to ‑them by the Prophet. They are in reality his deputies. They derive their authority to rule from the order of the Prophet. They are just like the officials appointed to various posts by the central authority of any country.
(b) The second forts of an appointment by a Prophet is that of his own successor. According to the Shi'ah belief, the holy Prophet appointed Imam Ali (P) to succeed him as the head of the Muslim ummah. The Shi'ah in this respect rely on a number of traditions which have been reported by the authentic Sunni sources also. The tradition of al‑Ghadir is one of them.
Tradition of al‑Ghadir
In the 10th year of the Hijri era, while returning from his last pilgrimage, the holy Prophet assembled his companions at a place called Ghadir al‑Khum and spoke to them. From his talk on various occasions during this journey, people were apprehending that the end of his life was imminent. Naturally at this stage they expected him to make clear as to who would succeed him as the head of the newly‑founded Islamic society. As expected, he took up this question in his speech and said:
"Have I not more authority over the Muslims than they have over themselves?"
All the Muslims exclaimed with one voice:
"Yes, you have; you are the Prophet of Allah". The holy Prophet then said:
"Ali is the master of him whose master I am. May Allah be the friend of him, who is the friend of Ali, and the enemy of him who is the enemy of Ali. May He love him, who loves Ali, and hate him who hates Ali. May He support him who supports Ali and let down him who lets down Ali". (Kanz al‑Ummal, vol. 6 p. 403).
This tradition has been handed down by 110 companions of the Prophet and is recorded in authentic books.
Besides this tradition, there are other sayings of the Prophet in which he referred to the leadership (Imamate) and succession (Caliphate) of other Imams. For example, he is reported to have said that the number of his successors would be twelve. (al‑Sahih by Muslim, vol. 1 p. 119 and al‑Sahih by Bukhari, vol. 4 p. 164). According to another tradition he once pointed to Husayn ibn Ali (P) and said:
"He is an Imam, son of an Imam, brother of an Imam and father of nine Imams". (al‑Minhaj by Ibn Taymiyyah, vol. 4 p. 210).
The traditions are largely accepted by all or most of the non‑Shi'ah Muslims also but they interpret them differently. For example, concerning the tradition of al‑Ghadir they say that in his speech the Prophet did not appoint Ali to be his successor, but only introduced him as a fit person to succeed him, subject to his selection by the people.
It is evident that on the basis of this interpretation also the net result is the same, for the founder of an ideology being the best judge of the level of the faith, knowledge and competence of his associates, and because of his love for and interest in the expansion and consolidation of the principles propounded by him, will naturally introduce only that person for the leadership of the society who is most fit for that position and most loyal to the cause dear to him.
As such, it is the duty of the people also to accept the person so introduced, and pledge their allegiance to him, if they are really loyal to the ideology and give it preference over their personal inclinations and desires. In fact at the time of the Prophet's demise the majority of the newly‑founded Muslim society consisted of neophytes who did not have deep knowledge of Islam. Their pagan nature had not undergone a total change, and they were not yet fully accustomed to new intellectual and social values. Hence, it was too early for the ummah to be in a position to use its discretion in the selection of its leader. The same is still the case even in many ideological societies of the 20th century.
Anyhow, a ruler appointed by the Prophet is both a leader and a ruler of the society like the Prophet himself. The society being ideological, naturally its head is expected to take measures to safeguard its ideological borders as well as to guide the people to mould their lives according to its principles.
According to a tradition what Imam al Sadiq (P) has said in this connection comes to this: A leader is a religious guide also. It is his duty to work for the progress and prosperity of the Muslims. Leadership is the basis as well as the principle of Islam.
Salat, Saum, Zakat, Hajj and Jihad are performed under the aegis of the appointed leader (Imam). Under him the public treasury expands and the injunctions of Islam, and its penal laws, are enforced. The frontiers become safe. (Usul al‑Kafi, vol. 1 p. 198 ‑ 205).
(3) Election by the people
This form of government is accepted by all Muslim sects, with the difference that the Shi'ah regard it as justified only during the occultation of the Imam of the Age. Otherwise the Shi'ah, give preference to those who were appointed or designated by the Prophet and the Imams. But according to the Sunnis immediately on the death of the holy Prophet, this form became the only right form of the government.
From the Shi'ah point of view, since the major occultation of Mahdi, the Imam of the Age in 329 A.H. no particular person has been appointed to be the Head and Leader of the Muslim ummah. That is why in the traditions related to leadership during this period only the general qualities and characteristics required to be possessed by a leader have been mentioned. This shows that it is up to the people themselves to choose a person as their leader, having those qualities and characteristics.
Main qualifications of a ruler during the period of occultation
(1) Faith in Allah, His revelations and the teachings of His Prophet.
The Qur'an says:
`Allah will never let the disbelievers triumph over the believers". (Surah al‑Nisa, 4:141).
(2) Integrity, adherence to the laws of Islam, and earnestness about their enforcement. When Allah told the Prophet Ibrahim (P) that he had been appointed the Imam and Leader, the latter asked whether anyone of his family would also attain that position: In reply Allah said:
`My covenant does not include the wrong‑doers". (Surah al‑Baqarah, 2:124).
The Prophet Daud (P) was told by Allah: "O Daud! We have made you Our ‑representative on the earth. Therefore judge rightly between people". (Surah Sad, 38:26).
(3) Adequate knowledge of Islam, appropriate to his prominent position.
"Is he who guides the people to the truth more worthy to be followed or he who does not guide unless he himself is guided?" (Surah Yunus, 10:35).
(4) Enough competence for holding such a position and freedom from every defect not in keeping with Islamic leadership.
(5) His standard of living being equal to that of the low‑income people.
In this connection there is enough material in the sermons of Imam Ali (P) and in the epistles he sent to his officials. In a number of epistles it has been emphasized that an administrative officer should be free from love of money, ignorance, inefficiency, outrage, timidness, bribery, and violation of Islamic injunctions and traditions and should not be guilty of shedding blood.
The commander of the Faithful Imam Ali (P) says:
"You should remember that it is most inappropriate that a person, under whose charge the honour, the life, the property and the laws of the Muslims are placed should be:
• A lover of money and consequently should attempt to mis‑appropriate the property of other people;
• An ignorant person and consequently should mislead them;
• An unreliable person with whom others do not like to have relations;
• Discriminative in his treatment and favouring the influential people only;
• Accepting bribe and deviating from the course of justice and law, disregarding the laws and divine traditions and thus injuring the interests of the ummah". (Nahj al‑Balaghah).
In his charter to Malik al Ashtar Imam Ali (P) said:
"You must strictly refrain from shedding the blood of the innocent. There is nothing more provocative, more catastrophic and more destructive than indulging in that". (Nahj al‑Balaghah).
Once Imam Ali (P) received a report that a certain commander of a town in Persia was corrupt and fond of wine and women. He immediately wrote a letter to him, in the course of which he said:
"A man of your character is not fit to be entrusted with the defence of the borders or to be allowed to issue any order. Such a man is not fit to be promoted and no confidence can be reposed in him". (Nahj al‑Balaghah).
By this very letter the Imam recalled the officer concerned and asked him to relinquish his post.
These qualifications of those who are appointed to a high
office, are the natural corollary of an Islamic government.
As we have already stated:
• The Muslim ummah is an ideological society;
• Islamic law is the basis of the administration of this society;
• It is the joint responsibility of all the people to see that this law is implemented.
• In many cases it is inevitable to set up a vast organiza tion for this purpose.
• As this organization, including its head, is set up with a view to realize the aspirations of Islam and to establish the system and the laws of this religion, it is necessary that its leaders and functionaries should be aware of these aspirations and should have faith in them. They should be honest, competent and efficient. Should they not have these qualifications, the basic aims and objects of the organization can hardly
be realized.
Role of Shura and Bay’at
In this study we propose to deal with two questions namely consultation (Shura) and role of allegiance (Bay’at) briefly:
Role of consultation
In Islam consultation has an important role in connection with social questions.
(a) Administrative affairs
In the Qur'an the holy Prophet was commanded:
"Hold consultation with them in regard to the conduct of affairs". (Surah Ale. Imran, 3:159).
Describing the characteristics of the believers the Qur'an says: "Whose affairs are a matter of counsel". (Surah al‑Shura, 42:38).
In the life account of the holy Prophet we find many instances of his consultation with his companions. For example, on the occasion of the Battle of Badr when he received the report that the caravan of Quraysh had escaped and was beyond the reach of the Muslims, and that the well‑equipped enemy had moved from Mecca with the intention to fight, he consulted his companions as to the action to be taken. It was with their consent that he decided to join the battle. He made consultations on the occasions of the Battle of Ohad and the Battle of the Ditch also. When Imam Husayn Ibn Ali (P), while on his way from Mecca to Kufah, received the report of the martyrdom of Muslim Ibn Aqeel he consulted his companions whether he should continue his journey.
From such evidence we learn that the management of government affairs and social questions should not be despotic and dictatorial.
(b) Election of the ruler
Certain Muslim sects are of the opinion that the election of a ruler (or Head of the State) is dependent on the voting of men of integrity, knowledge, virtue, and sound judgement. (al‑Ahkam al‑Sultaniyyah by Mawardi pp. 5 ‑ 6).
There is a difference of opinion as to the number of the voters necessary to form an electoral council. Some people (like Ahmad Ibn Hanbal) are of the view that a meeting of all men of opinion among the Muslim ummah is necessary. Others think that a meeting of a lesser number is also enough. According to a certain sect, the competent persons only nominate someone as a candidate for the caliphate, but the real factor in determining his election is the vote of the people. This sect regards the pledge of allegiance as a vote and considers the vote of the majority to be enough. (al‑Shakhsiyyah al‑Dawliyyah by Muhammad Kamil Yaqut p. 463).
Our comments in this connection are briefly as follows:
In those cases in which there is no special evidence that the holy Prophet designated a particular person to be the Head of the State, it is the general duty of the Muslim society to elect an eligible candidate to enforce the Islamic injunctions in the best possible manner. As a head of the state or ruler he must have certain qualifications. It is the duty of those who influence public opinion to introduce such persons to the masses and prevent the nomination of every Tom, Dick and Harry.
Secondly, none of the electoral councils held since the demise of the holy Prophet aimed at the introduction of a nominee. They were always held for the purpose of election and appointment. Thirdly the pledge of allegiance by all other people did not amount to election. That was only a proclamation of their loyalty to the ruler elected or appointed by the council.
(2) Role of the pledge of allegiance
The pledge of allegiance is a sort of covenant of loyalty and obedience which is concluded with a new ruler, or in certain cases it is a renewal of a covenant already existing. In the latter case it amounts to a vote of confidence in the government in power facing some extraordinary situation.
Usually the pledge of allegiance is accompanied by giving hand to the ruler in token of an undertaking to give him full support in all battles of life.
On several occasions on which the Muslims took the pledge of allegiance to the Prophet, the undertaking they gave was quite definite. At Aqabah the representatives of the people of Medina undertook to support him against his enemies in any battle anywhere.
A special undertaking was included in the text of the pledge taken at Hudaybiyah, known as Bay'at al‑Rizwan. (Surah al‑Fath, 48:18). The same was the case with the pledge taken by the immigrant women. (Surah al‑Mumtahina, 60:12).
Anyhow, though a pledge of allegiance concerns the government affairs, it has nothing to do with the appointment of a ruler. It only means the acknowledgement of his power and influence by the person taking the pledge, who declares his loyalty to the ruler concerned.
We know that Islam has emphatically enjoined adherence to all covenants in more than 30 verses of the Qur'an. To live up to one's commitments is necessary for the maintenance of one's good relations with others. All agreements, whether they are at the limited level of the individuals, or are concluded between the ummah and the rulers or between the Muslim society and other societies should be respected. Anyhow a pledge of allegiance should not be construed to mean that loyalty is obligatory in all conditions. There are two pre‑requisites of the validity of a pledge: Firstly it should have been taken under proper conditions; and secondly the ruler must be abiding by the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and must not personally have done anything to make him unfit for holding his office.
Loss of eligibility to rule
If a leader of congregational prayers loses his integrity, he is no longer fit to lead prayers. If the guardian of a minor becomes mentally unsound, he will be removed from guardianship by the authorities concerned. We have already said that a ruler must have certain qualifications. If he loses these qualifications, for example, he becomes lax in his faith in Islam, infringes Divine laws, misappropriates funds out of public treasury, or governs tyrannically, in all these cases he is no longer fit to be the Head of a Muslim State.
However, the deposition of a ruler being a very grave matter affecting the interests of the whole nation, it must be thoroughly discussed at the meeting of a general assembly and the final decision in this respect should be taken by competent persons only. Everybody cannot express his individual opinion on such a vital question. Some authorities are of the opinion that the question of the deposition of a ruler should be decided only by the Islamic Legislative Assembly after due deliberations. (al‑Shakhsiyyah al‑Dawliyyah by Muhammad Kamil Yaqut).
According to the Shi'ah doctrine, this question cannot arise during the government of the Imams designated to Imam by the holy Prophet. According to the Shi'ah view all Imams are infallible and immune from every sin and slip. Their position is above that of ordinary integrity and purity. Anyhow, this question can arise even for the Shi'ah during the occultation of the designated Imam. In any case, the purity and fitness of the ruler is a vital question in the social system of Islam, and it is a big social duty of the Muslims to keep a constant watch over the activities of the rulers.
Caliphate and Imamate
Caliphate: Caliphate is another term signifying the supreme social and religious leadership. It also implies the question of the succession to the holy Prophet. A caliph is a person who, as a successor to the Prophet, assumes the leadership of the Muslims in regard to their secular and religious affairs.
The rulers who came to power after the demise of the holy Prophet invariably called themselves the caliphs, or successors to the Prophet, irrespective of the fact whether they were good or bad. The designation of Caliph continued till the downfall of the Ottoman Government in 1922.
The question of Caliphate has two aspects:
(1) Historical aspect in the sense that every Umayyad, Abbasid and Ottoman ruler, and even the Umayyads of Andalus, the Fatimid rulers of Egypt, and the rulers of several other dynasties, called themselves caliph of the Prophet and ruled under this designation. This is a historical fact and there can be no controversy about it.
(2) Legal aspect in the sense whether anyone of them was really fit to hold this position in accordance with the true standards of Islam, which were valid not only in those days but which are valid for all times. To deal with this aspect of the question, we have to go through a detailed discussion of the various questions related to the government:
Does the accession to the position of Caliphate depend on designation by the holy Prophet as is maintained by the Shi'ah in respect of the succession of the twelve Imams on the basis of authentic evidence?
Or is the question of succession to be decided by a council? If so, by which council and consisting of how many people? Does the opinion of the people decide the question of accession to Caliphate, or is their duty only to pledge their allegiance and to declare their loyalty?
For a person to accede to Caliphate is it enough to have been designated by the preceding caliph or is it necessary that this designation be ratified by a council or by a general election?
What are the conditions of the accession to Caliphate? Can a caliph be deposed? If so, by which authority? These are the questions which the Muslim scholars have discussed exhaustively in their detailed or short books.
Imamate: With the advent of the Prophet of Islam and the express declaration by the Qur'an that he was the last Prophet, the age of Prophethood came to an end. Now no new religion can be revealed. Islam is the last Divine religion. But still there are certain needs of the Muslim society which should be met, such as:
(1) All the functions of a ruler and a government, including the settlement of legal disputes and maintenance of law and order.
(2) Propagation of Islam and the expansion of the sphere of its social and governmental influence.
(3) Exposition of the Qur'an and the religious law.
(4) Constructive education of the people, in the sense that the imam being a model of all virtues and being free from all sins and faults sets a practical example and a standard of virtuous life. People can, without any hesitation, acknowledge him to be their leader and attain salvation under his guidance.
According to the Sunnis the first two duties are within the jurisdiction of the caliph. During the period of the companions of the Prophet, the third was also to some extent included among his functions, in the sense that his exposition of the Qur'an and the law was authentic. But in this respect he was not distinguished from other companions, because this function did not exclusively pertain to him.
As for the fourth function, especially at its full‑fledged level, they do not consider it to be a necessary qualification of a caliph.
In contrast, the Shi'ah believe that all these functions are combined in the person of an imam designated by the holy Prophet. Anyhow, the governmental functions, dispensing justice, and taking action to expand Islam through propagation and jihad, are possible only when the reins of governmQnt are actually in the hands of an Imam, otherwise when he does not have `a free hand', that is, he is not in power, he cannot practically perform these functions, though he possesses all the necessary qualifications and capabilities to do so.
As for the other two functions, they imply complete knowledge of Islam and moral leadership of the highest calibre. This is a position which can neither be assigned nor withdrawn, by anybody. It is not subject to voting or the issuance of an order. An imam has full knowledge of the Divine commandments and Islamic standards. He possesses all the virtues, and is the mirror of Islam. His knowledge and worth are an undeniable fact and a Divine gift. They are not conferred on him by any human being. To enable you to comprehend the Shi'ah logic in this respect let us quote a portion of the lengthy sermon of Imam al‑Riza (P) from Usul al‑Kafi, volume one.
• "Imamate is religious leadership. It entails the management of the affairs of the Muslim society and
improving and exalting the position of the Muslims.
• An Imam protects the Divine bounds; defends the Divine religion and invites the people to Allah by
means of logic, argument and good advice.
• An Imam is a trustee of the people appointed by Allah.
• He is His sign and His vicegerent on the earth.
• He is immune against all sins and free from all defects.
• He is peerless in his time. None can attain his position.
• No scholar can equal him.
• All virtues are manifested in him.
• He has many kinds of knowledge which cannot be polluted by ignorance.
• He is an indefatigable guardian of the ummah.
• He is the source of purity, piety, knowledge and devotion.
• He is truly fit to be a leader. He knows the intricacies of politics.
• He is infallible; enjoys Divine support and is free from every fault and slip.
• Allah has given him such a position that he is His sign to the people and a model of virtue and excellence".
In short just as the Prophet of Islam was elevated to the rank of Prophethood on account of his superior qualities, his successor also should at least be the second to Prophet.
In view of these basic criteria of the ruler and leader of the ummah, and in pursuance of what the holy Prophet said about the chiefship of Imam Ali (P), a number of prominent Muslims and well‑known companions of the Prophet seriously supported the selection of Ali (P) as the ruler immediately after the demise of the holy Prophet. They believed that he alone could lead, on correct lines and to its logical end, the movement started by the Prophet and advance to a fruitful stage for the deliverance of humanity from all anti‑God and anti‑man propensities.
This group of the supporters and followers of Ali (P) and the believers in the necessity of his rulership came to be known as Shi ah.
The word, Shi ah means a group of friends and followers. It is better if we quote the words of Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib (P) in regard to the origin and interpretation of this word.
In one of his letters Imam Ali (P) says:
"This letter is from the servant of Allah ‑ Ali, Amir al‑Mo'minin to his Shi'ahs; and this name ‑ Shi'ah ‑ is the name which Allah adores, and has put it down in the Qur'an; Surely one of his (Noah's) Shi'ahs was Ibrahim (P). [54] And you are (in fact) the Shi'ah of the Prophet Muhammad (P)".
The Qur'an says:
"One of them belonged to his Shi ah (supporters) and the other an enemy". (Surah al‑Qasas, 28:15).
Here Shi'ah means a group of supporters.
There are certain sayings of the holy Prophet in which he referred to the Shi'ah of Ali (P).
Once he pointed to Ali (P) and said: "By Him in whose hands my life is, this man and his Shi'ah will be successful on the Day of Resurrection". (al‑Durr al‑Manthur ‑ commentary on the verse 7 of Surah al‑Bayyinah ‑ by Suyuti).
On other occasions also he used similar expressions. Such instances have been mentioned in Sawaiq al‑Aluhriqah by Ibn Hajar Shafi'i and in Nihayah by Ibn Athir.
Thus the Muslims from the Prophet's time were conversant with the idea that Ali (P) would be an Imam and would have followers who would be a model of true Muslims.
After the demise of the holy Prophet while the Hashimites and some of his other companions were busy in arranging his funeral, a group of the Muhajirs and the Ansar assembled at Saqifah to decide the question of Caliphate.
This group at last announced that Abu Bakr had been elected the ruler of the Muslim ummah. The Hashimites and some other companions refused to pledge their allegiance and openly criticized the decision. They held that Ali (P) was superior in every respect, and the holy Prophet had already hinted at his imamate. Imam Ali (P) himself said:
"By Allah! We are the most deserving of Caliphate, because we belong to the House of the Prophet. Among us there are people who understand the Qur'an, have enough knowledge of the Qur'an and the Sunnah and are conversant with the problems of the society. They defend the rights of the people against all violations and distribute wealth equitably. Such persons deserve to hold the reins of the government". (al‑Imamah wal‑Siyasah by Ibn Qutayba).
Some other companions of the Prophet, like Salman and Abuzar made similar statements in public and before. (Ibn Abil Hadid Mo'tazali vol. 2 p. 17 and Tarikh Ya'qubi vol. 2 p. 148).
But as the newly‑founded Islamic society was threatened by the danger of external enemies and internal hypocrites, Imam Ali (P) avoided to take action against the government and did not like to disrupt Muslim unity in those critical circumstances. He declined to accept the proposal of Abu Sufyan to declare himself to be the caliph and start a struggle and join fighting.
Anyhow, the question of the fitness of Ali (P) for Caliphate could not be shelved. A number of the companions of the Prophet stuck to this position. Gradually his supporters or the Shi'ah became a distinct body. Some scholars have collected, from various sources (e.g. Isabah, Usud al‑Ghaba, Isti'ab) 300 names of the companions who were Shi'ah.
The second caliph came to power on the basis of his nomination by the first. This added to the worry of the Hashimites and the close associates of Imam Ali (P). They apprehended that in future also, in contravention of the instructions of the Prophet, the caliphs would be appointed on the basis of their nomination by their predecessors.
The six‑member committee appointed by the second caliph, though it included Imam Ali (P), was formed in a way that he was left out, and Uthman was appointed to be the third caliph.
The foundation of the Umayyad power was laid in Syria during the time of the second caliph. Now as Uthman belonged to this family, the power of the Umayyads was further increased and consolidated. The administration of several other areas of the Muslim territory was handed over to the relatives of the caliph. Gradually justice and equality of Islam gave place to discrimination and partiality, and an oligarchical government was set up.
These events added to the resentment of the people and strengthened the Shi'ah movement. Abuzar, the wellknown companion of the Prophet was expelled from Medina because he criticized the rulers for their hoarding of money and mishandling of public property. He was continuously persecuted, till he died. Another companion, Abdullah ibn Mas'ud, who raised his voice against the expulsion of Abuzar earned the displeasure of the caliph. He was also harassed till his death.
At last the resentment of the people reached its boiling point. Some people revolted. Uthman was killed. Under the pressure of public opinion Imam Ali (P) became caliph. But it was too late.
The Umayyads, who were old enemies of Islam, were now appearing in the garb of the defenders of the faith and by means of their unlimited wealth and power had entrenched themselves in Syria and several other points of the Muslim territory.
A new class of aristocrats having huge income had sprung up. Naturally Imam Ali (P), who was dedicated to upholding justice and equality and doing away with paganism and corruption, could not put up with this situation.
He dismissed Mu'awiyah and restrained the aristocrats from playing with public treasury. Bat the resistance of the deviators and self‑seekers increased, and by and by three groups rose to fight against Imam Ali (P).
(1) The haughty aristocrats who instigated the Battle of the Camel. They were defeated, but this conflict cost the Muslims dearly.
(2) The Umayyads under the command of Mu'awiyah, the supporters of aristocratic and racist government and the revivers of despotic imperialism who caused the Siffin affair. When they were about to be defeated, they resorted to a ruse to stop fighting. Mu'awiyah was able to continue his unlawful government.
(3) The foolish pietists who during the Battle of Siffin were instigated to rise against Imam All (P). They caused the Battle of Nahrawan. During this struggle the way of Imam Ali (P) became distinct from that of others and all the good Muslims who liked him rallied round him.
After the martyrdom of Imam Ali (P), the field was open to the old enemies of Islam to do what they liked. The Umayyads were now masters of the whole Muslim world. They trampled on the Islamic principles and standards to the utmost possible extent. Their tyrannies and massacres, their open violation of the Islamic laws, their hostility to the Shi'ah and the members of the Holy Family, who were the champions of Islamic justice, and above all the tragedy perpetrated by them at Karbala, and the massacre at Medina a year later, made the position of the Shi'ah extremely difficult. But these events also galvanised the Shi'ah and turned them into a compact body, having as their distinctive feature two important doctrines in the Islamic and social fields. These doctrines of Imamate and justice were derived from the Book of Allah and the sayings of the Prophet and the Shi'ah regarded their observance as a pre‑requisite of being a perfect Muslim.
Doctrines of Justice and Imamate
According to the Shi'ah belief, one of the principles of the Islamic Faith is that of human freedom and responsibility and Divine justice with regard to the prescription of duties and the recompense and retribution on the basis of the deeds performed out of free will. The Shi'ah also believe in the setting up of a just system of the distribution of wealth, equal opportunities of employment and respect for the rights of all individuals.
The Shi'ah deduced the principle of justice from the fundamentals of Islam and wanted it to be observed both by the rulers and the ruled. But the rulers gradually propagated the philosophy of predestination. They wanted the people to believe that all their misfortunes were the outcome of a preordained fate, to which they had no alternative but to submit patiently. These rulers insisted that the people should exercise no free will, should make no efforts to change the existing situation and should not feel any responsibility towards the social events.
Further, the rulers maintained that their own actions should be interpreted on the basis of a sort of ijtihad. In other words it should be conceded that they had a right to have their own private opinions and could not be blamed even if they were wrong.
The Shi'ah strongly opposed this attitude. They declared that according to the teachings of Islam man was a responsible being who could exercise his will, that society was a product of human determination, and that changes in history could be brought about by the efforts of resolute and purposive men.
At the same time they put forward definite criteria of ijtihad so that every selfish and irresponsible opinion might not be termed as such.
Doctrine of Imamate
With regard to the Imamate and headship of the ummah the Shi'ah believe that:
Firstly, the head and the ruler of the Muslims should be a person, whose individual and social life may be the best model of the Islamic way of life. Not only his Muslim followers should be able to accept him as an object of imitation, but even the non‑Muslims may find in him and his leadership the best example of Muslim conduct.
Secondly, if it is known that Allah or His Prophet has designated a person to be the leader of the Muslims, he will automatically be given preference over all others. Our being obedient to Allah and His Prophet necessitates that we must not accept any Imam in the presence of one designated by them. There can be no doubt that to know the worth and capability of an individual there is no source more reliable than Allah and His Prophet.
Evil consequences of the infringement of this doctrine
(a) The violation of this doctrine culminated in the total collapse of the Islamic system of government. Gradually it took on the colour of hereditary despotism. In the name of Islam, paganism, egotism and feudalism of the Roman and Sasanid emperors were revived in a new form. Injustice and chaos prevailed and all‑round human development, freedom of thought, equitable distribution of wealth and the selection of competent persons for the administration of public affairs came to an end.
Lady Fatimah‑tuz‑Zehra (P), daughter of the holy Prophet in her last public address delivered before the Muhajirs and Ansar women, said:
"I wonder what characteristic of Ali displeased the people that they ceased to support him. By Allah! They did not like his sharp sword, his steady steps, and his strictness in the implementation of the Divine commandments. But by Allah! they themselves are the losers. People never suffered injustice under Ali. He always took them to the spring of justice and knowledge, and slaked their thirst".
Then she made the following forecast:
"What they have done is like a pregnant she‑camel. Wait till it delivers. Then you will draw from it a bowl of blood and deadly poison instead of milk. That is how the doers undergo a terrible loss and the coming generations reap the unlucky fruit of what their predecessors sowed. Rest assured that commotion and turmoil will overtake you. I warn you that you will be confronted with sword, coercion, chaos and despotic tyranny. Your property will be carried off as booty and your people will be threshed like ripe corn". [55]
(b) Muslims lost competent authority on Islamic knowledge
Those, who were the interpreters of revelation and the exponents of Islamic knowledge, were cast aside, while what the companions of the Prophet had learnt from him was limited. For a long time the caliphs did not pay attention to the recording of hadith. They even discouraged that.
With the expansion of the sphere of Islamic influence the needs and the problems of the society increased. In these circumstances there was the need of a reliable source fully aware of the spirit of the Qur'an to impart knowledge like the Prophet himself on a scale commensurate with the expansion of the Muslim world. Especially the need of a source above all suspicion of selfishness and serving the cause of any evil power was strongly felt.
Though such a source actually existed, unfortunately the Muslim society could not be benefited by it. On the other hand, the evil rulers, with a view to advance their own selfish ends, employed some prominent scholars and heavily bribed them out of public treasury to fabricate traditions in their interests and against those of their rivals. This false propaganda was rampant during the time of the Umayyads.
Anyhow, the Shi'ah never forgot the doctrine of Imamate, nor did they accept the validity of the evil governments. They continued to be guided by the traditions of the imams, for they knew that the Prophet had said:
"I am leaving two precious things with you: the Book of Allah (Qur'an) and my Progeny (Ahl al‑Payt). They will not be separated from each other". And that is no wonder, because an ideological school and its leader are not separable. Without a suitable leader there can be no certainty of its continuance.
Back to the main discussion
What we have said so far makes it clear that the Shi'ah do not believe in anything additional to the fundamentals of Islam and its teachings. In actual fact they are the upholders of true Islamic principles and advocates of a right and just government. It is significant that in their most serious clashes with the rulers of the time, these very objectives were always conspicuous. Let us mention a few instances: Ibn Ziyad said: "Ibn Aqeel, you are a bad man. The people of this city were living calmly. There was no disunity. You came here and provoked discord. You are instigating one group against another".
Muslim Ibn Aqeel said:
"No, that's not true. The people here believe that your father killed many pious and freedom‑loving persons out of them, and caused the blood to flow. He revived the traditions of Khusrow and Caesar. I have come to invite the people to justice and to the commandments of Allah". Ibn Ziyad said:
"Do you think you have a claim on this government?" Muslim said: "It's not a question of thinking. We're sure". [56]
During the imamate of Imam Husayn (P), Mu'awiyah received certain reports about him. He wrote a letter to him, warning him against creating trouble. In reply Imam Husayn (P) wrote a detailed letter to Mu'awiyah, enumerating many of his (Mu'awiyah's) crimes, including the killing of those who opposed his tyranny, and the innovations he had introduced in the religion. In the end Imam Husayn (P) wrote:
"You ordered your assignee (Ibn Sumayyah) to kill those who adhered to the religion of Ali, and he carried out your orders. You know well that the religion of Ali is the same as that of the Prophet. It is because of your using the name of this very religion that you are occupying your present position. You say that I should not create trouble. But I do not find any trouble bigger than your government. In these circumstances I think the best thing I can do is to fight against you". (al‑Imamah wal‑Siyasah vol. 1 p. 190)
Zayd ibn Arqam was shocked at the criminal treatment which was being meted out to the Prophet's family by the Umayyads. Once addressing the close associates of ibn Ziyad, he said:
"You people are no better than slaves. You killed the son of Fatimah and made Ibn Marjanah your ruler. He kills the pious, and he has enslaved you. You submit to humiliation. What an unlucky lot you are !" (Tabari)
In the course of all these encounters there was a talk of injustice, humiliation, slavery, manslaughter, trampling of the rights, and also of religious injunctions, rightful government and the supremacy (walayat) of the Holy Family. All this talk is purely Islamic.
It wants to defend only what is right and just, for that is what Islam connotes. In a wider sense it wants but to defend men and his humanity.
All these events took place before the insurrection of the Iranians against the Umayyads and their rallying round the Holy family. Hence the notion that Shia'ism is an Iranian invention is only fantastic. It is either a selfish distortion of history or a biased exaggeration of the Iranian role in the big changes in the history of Islam.
Historical investigation shows that the Iranians opposed the Umayyad government because of its injustice, tyranny and undue discrimination against the non‑Arab Muslims
The inception of the Safawid government in Iran and its wars with the Ottomans in the early 10th century also have nothing to do with the beginning and development of Shia'ism. The events and the movements of the early Islamic years and the philosophical and scholastic studies of the Shi'ah preceded the Safawids by centuries. Hence how can it be imagined that they had any hand in the development of Shia'ism?
Martyr Muhammad Husayni Beheshti & Martyr Muhammad Jawad Bahonar
Source: Imam reza network
The establishment of an Islamic government as one of the highest religious duties
With governmental support, tenets of religions and schools of thought could be implemented in society. Because of this, every group wants to establish a government in order to attain and implement its own objectives. Islam, which is the most superior heavenly creed, also pursues the establishment of an Islamic government and it considers the formation and preservation of the government of truth as one of the highest religious duties.
The Noble Prophet of Islam (S) exerted all his efforts in establishing an Islamic government and strove to lay its foundation in the city of Medina. After his death—despite the inspiration of the infallible Imams (‘a) and the distinguished ‘ulama’ to continue this Islamic government—the governments that came into being, with the exception of a very few cases, have not been divine, and till the time of the advent of Hadrat Mahdi (‘a) most governments will be based on falsehood.
The hadiths that have been transmitted to us from the Prophet (S) and the Imams (‘a), describe the governments prior to the uprising of al-Mahdi (‘atfs) in general terms. We will now point out some of their characteristics.
The Despotism of Governments
One of the ills which human society will suffer before the advent of the Imam (‘a) is injustice and tyranny perpetrated by governments against the people. In this regard, the Messenger of God (S) said: “The world will be filled with tyranny and injustice such that there will be fear and war in every house.”[1][12]
Hadrat ‘Ali (‘a) said: “The world will be filled with tyranny and injustice such that there will be fear and grief in every house.”[2][13]
Imam al-Baqir[3][14] (‘a) said: “Hadrat Qa’im[4][15] (‘a) will not rise up except at a time full of fear and dread.”[5][16]
This fear and dread will mostly stem from the rule of despotic and obstinate rulers in the world before the advent of al-Mahdi (‘a).
In this regard, Imam al-Baqir said: “The Mahdi (‘a) will rise up at a time when the helm of affairs would be in the hands of tyrants.”[6][17]
Ibn ‘Umar said: “(At the end of time) a noble man having wealth and children will wish for death because of the suffering and adversity he will experience from the rulers.”[7][18]
It is worthy of note that the followers of the Prophet (S) will suffer not only from the aggression and encroachment of alien powers but also from their own despotic and self-centered governments in such a way that the earth, notwithstanding its expanse, will become too small for them. Instead of experiencing a sense of freedom, they will feel that they are in bondage. Even now in the Muslim world many leaders in Muslim countries are not on good terms with Islam and the Muslims are alien to them.
In this context, it is thus narrated in the hadiths: The Noble Messenger of Islam (S) said: “At the end of time, a great calamity—greater than which has not been heard of—will be experienced by my ummah[8][19] in such a manner that the vastness of the earth will become narrow for them, and the earth will be filled with injustice and despotism to such an extent that the believer will not find a sanctuary in which he could seek refuge.”[9][20]
Some hadiths have emphasized the Muslims’ entanglements with self-centered leaders and give glad tidings of the advent of a universal savior after the rule of oppressive rulers. This set of hadiths has made mention of three types of government that will emerge after the Noble Messenger of Islam (S). These three types of government are the following: the caliphate, the emirates and kingdoms, and finally the tyrants.
The Noble Prophet (S) said: “After me the caliphate will rule; after the caliphs the emirs will come, followed by kings, and after them tyrants and oppressors will rule, then the Mahdi (‘atfs) will reappear.”[10][21]
The Composition of States
If those who administer the government are righteous and efficient individuals, the people will live in comfort and ease. However, if unworthy individuals rule, the people will naturally experience suffering and agony. It is exactly the same condition which will prevail in the period prior to the advent of Hadrat Mahdi (‘atfs). At that time, states will be formed by treacherous, transgressing and oppressive individuals.
The Noble Prophet of Islam (S) said: “A time will come when rulers will be oppressors; commanders will be treacherous; judges will be transgressors; and ministers will be tyrants.”[11][22]
The Influence of Women on Governments
Another problem that is discussed concerning governments during the end of time is the dominance and influence of women, who will either directly rule over the people or subject the rulers under their sway. This subject has various ramifications. In this regard, Hadrat ‘Ali (‘a) said: “A time will come when corrupt and adulterous individuals will live in coquetry and bounty and the ignoble will acquire position and status while the just men will become weak.” It was asked: “When will this period come to pass?” He said: “It is at the time when women and bondswomen take charge of the affairs of the people and youngsters become rulers.”[12][23]
The Rule of the Young
Rulers are supposed to be well-experienced and good managers in order for the people to live in comfort and ease. If, in their stead, youngsters or feebleminded people would take charge of affairs, one should seek refuge in God from the evil of the sedition (fitnah) that will arise.
In this regard, it will suffice to mention two hadiths:
The Noble Prophet (S) stated: “Seek refuge in God from the first seventy years and the rule of youngsters.”[13][24]
Sa‘id ibn Musayyib said: “A sedition (fitnah) will come to pass and its beginning will be the game of the young.”[14][25]
The Instability of Governments
A government with political stability is the one capable of serving the people of a country, for if it is in a state of continuous change, it would be incapable of undertaking great tasks in the country.
The governments at the end of time will be in a shambles, and sometimes a government will assume office at the beginning of the day and will be removed by sunset. In this regard, Imam as-Sadiq[15][26] (‘a) said: “How will you be when there would be no Imam to guide; would you remain without knowledge and learning; and be fed up with each other? (It will be) the time when you would be put to a test and the good and the bad from among you will be separated from each other and the chaff shall be separated from the grain. At that time swords will be sheathed and unsheathed alternately while war will be a blaze. A government will assume office at the beginning of the day and will be deposed and removed with bloodshed by the end of the day.”[16][27]
The Impotence of Powers in Administering Countries
Before the advent of the Imam of the Time (‘atfs), repressive governments will be weakened and this will pave the way for the people’s acceptance of the global government of Hadrat Mahdi. In this regard, Imam as-Sajjad[17][28] (‘a) has said concerning the noble ayah (verse):
حَتَّى إِذَا رَأَوْا مَا يُوعَدُونَ فَسَيَعْلَمُونَ مَنْ أَضْعَفُ نَاصِرًا وَأَقَلُّ عَدَدًا
“When they see what they are promised, they will then know who is weaker in supporters and fewer in numbers.”[18][29]
“The promise that has been given in this verse is related to Hadrat Qa’im (‘a), his companions, supporters, and enemies. At the time when the Imam of the Time rises up, his enemies will be the weakest of enemies and will have the least number of forces and armaments.”[19][30]
Najmuddin Tabasi
Source: Imam reza network
An Examination and Criticism of the Theory of Separation of Powers
The government has acquired the image of a pyramid since the beginning. Aristotle portrayed government as having three ‘sides’. One side of government was allotted to the elite group of society. This section which is presently called “legislative power” was composed of those who used to ratify necessary ordinances for the political system by using their intellect. The other ‘sides’ were equivalents of executive and judicial powers called:
(1) the governors and administrators of society and
(2) those who rendered justice.
In the past, Western political philosophers had also subscribed to the triple dimensions of government, and finally, Montesquieu identified the three branches of government, viz. legislative, judiciary and executive. For this purpose, he wrote the book The Spirit of the Laws[28] (1748; trans. 1750) in which he elaborately discussed the structure and framework of each of these powers. His intellectual effort and new ideas popularized the theory of separation of power so much so that some have identified him as the founder of the theory.
Nowadays, the constitutions of most countries, including ours, are codified based on the theory of separation of powers, considering the independence of three powers from one another as one of the principles of democracy. Internationally, a country is considered democratic if its legislative, judicial and executive powers are independent and no single power dominates the other two.
Reasons behind the separation of powers
1. The functions and responsibilities of government are complex and multiple and their performance requires awareness, knowledge, experience, and expertise which is beyond the capability of one person, and necessitates division of labor and separation of powers. As such, all the functions performed by the government are classified into three. Of course, most of them belong to the executive branch. For example, taking command of war and defense affairs, attending to deprived members of society, administering training, education, health and medical affairs pertain to executive power. In fact, judiciary engages only in rendering justice and the legislature in lawmaking. Attending to the needs of society are among the responsibilities of the executive.
In view of the extensiveness and enormity of the executive branch, it can be said that placed alongside legislative and judicial powers, executive power is one of the branches of government. However, in the pyramid of power it definitely has more ‘sides’ than one. At least, in the division of power in which one ‘side’ of the pyramid is allotted to every power, the scope and extent of executive power is far greater.
The issue to be questioned is this: Can the diversity of responsibilities of government be a sufficient justification for the division of powers and their independence from one another? The answer is that the diversity of responsibilities can only justify the separation and independence of powers. It can never be regarded as the sole reason for the separation of powers. When we examine executive power, we observe different responsibilities which are not related to one another such as war, defense, and health concerns. Yet, they are all within the scope of responsibility of the executive power. If diversity of responsibilities and functions causes the separation of powers, then we ought to have more than ten powers, each assuming a distinct set of responsibilities.
2. The main reason and justification for the separation of powers which prompted Montesquieu to introduce the theory of separation of powers is that man naturally or inherently tends to dominate and oppress others. If all three powers remain under the control of a person or a group, the ground for despotism and abuse of power will be much greater because a single person or group engages in legislation, adjudication and implementation of laws.
The inclination to enact laws, implement them, and adjudicate for personal benefits is greater. In view of this tendency, Montesquieu believed that in order to mitigate this power, combat despotism and abuse of power, the three powers must be separated from are another.
We realized that if the powers are separated from each other and become independent, the ground for abuse of executive power is restricted, because once the judiciary is totally autonomous, all are equal before law, none is immune from punishments, and all are obliged to respond to summons from the judiciary. The judiciary has the opportunity to summon to a court of law even the highest ranking executive officials of the country, and convict and penalize them if they are proven to have violated laws.
Similarly, if the legislative power violates the constitution and Islamic laws in some cases, the judicial power will have the chance to investigate it. In the same way, if the legislature is independent, it will not be influenced by any pressure exerted by the judiciary or executive. During the time of ratifying bills, members of the parliament can think independently and not be dictated by other powers.
The impossibility of totally separating and delineating the powers
Political philosophy theorists opine that the realization of real democracy depends on the independence and separation of powers both in theory and practice. A political system may possibly be established on the basis of separation of powers and pretend that the three branches of government are totally independent and not influenced by the others, but in practice one power, for certain reasons, may interfere in the domain of other powers and attempt to dominate and control them.
If we examine the political systems established under the name of democracy in the world, we will find that it is rare to find a government in which the three powers are totally independent, or the judiciary and legislature are not somehow influenced by the executive. Once the budget and facilities are at the disposal of the executive, and elections are conducted and supervised by it, chances that those who are in the executive will gain the upper hand over their rivals in multiparty elections. Maintaining power after the elections, the other branches of government will also come under their control.
For this reason, we see executive power and its high officials openly or secretly interfere in other branches of government and exert pressure on them. This is especially true in countries with a parliamentary form of government, where the high-ranking officials of executive power are also elected by parliament from among the deputies or MPs. That is, the MPs are directly elected by the people and then through a majority vote the executive officials and ministers are elected from among the MPs.
In presidential systems, in which people directly elect the president, executive power is totally in the hands of the president. The executive also interferes and influences the legislature and judiciary. This is especially true in many countries where the constitution has granted the president the power to veto and nullify certain ratified bills of the congress and cabinet. This means that the legislature does not impose its views on the executive and control it. The members of parliament who have the legislative right sit together and ratify a bill through a majority vote after holding discussions and deliberations, but since the constitution itself grants the president this veto power, a ratified bill of congress can be rendered null and void.
I do not know any country whose three branches of government are totally independent and not under the influence of each other, and in which one branch does not somehow interfere in the affairs of other branches. As such, the separation of powers stipulated in the constitution is only on paper. In actual practice, there is no such thing as separation of powers or their independence from one another. The executive actually overshadows the other two.
In view of this interference among powers, it is worth reflecting on the real possibility of delineation of functions and scope of responsibility of each of the three powers; the separation of essentially legislative issues from the executive power, and reciprocally, the separation of essentially executive issues from the legislative domain. We can see in our country as well as others that some functions of legislative nature have been entrusted to the government, i.e. the executive.
For example, within the framework of the constitution, the cabinet passes a bill and implements it as a law. Of course, the said bill also requires the approval and signature of the head of the legislature but sometimes just informing the parliament is sufficient. In some forms of government, there is no need of even that. The mere fact that executive orders and bylaws are ratified and issued by cabinet legally makes them binding and subject for execution. But even in cases where the approval and signature of the speaker is considered a requisite, that approval or signature is essentially ceremonial. In practice, whatever the cabinet ratifies or issues will be approved by the speaker of the house. Assuming that the signature of the speaker is not ceremonial in essence, with his approval will it not be considered ratified by members of parliament?
Some issues and functions are legislative in nature but because they are urgent and need to be implemented immediately, they are included in the functions of the executive, and the constitution has granted authority to the executive to ratify them. Meanwhile, some functions are essentially executive in form but because of their vital role and importance, the constitution stipulates that their implementation depends on the endorsement and approval of the legislative. For example, signing of international treaties and pacts on military and economic issues and granting of rights to foreign companies to explore and exploit ground resources have executive underpinnings, but as stipulated by the constitution, they must be approved and ratified by the legislative body. Our point is that theoretically the total separation of functions of the legislative from the executive is an incorrect and illogical venture.
Furthermore, in various forms of government, apart from the parliament there are other parallel councils and assemblies which perform legislative functions. For example, in our country the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution[29] passes bills which are treated as laws.
The nature of these laws requires that they be ratified by the deputies to the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), but because of the importance of cultural issues for our political system legislation of major cultural matters must be entrusted to those who have the required expertise in formulating cultural policies and resolutions. There are also other special institutions which are considered an integral part of the executive. Their officials give decisions as law enforcers and have no legislative functions. For instance, the Supreme National Security Council and Supreme Economic Council are composed of experts who, compared to others, are more talented with profounder insight in their relevant fields and meticulously study, examine and identify the key strategic issues and make important decisions for the country.
It should have become clear from our discussion that total or absolute separation of the three powers, especially the separation of responsibilities and functions of the executive from the legislative is theoretically onerous and practically unrealistic. In most countries, the executive openly or secretly interferes in functions of the legislature and judiciary. Therefore, in order to limit and control this interference and meddling, there is a need for a sort of contract and agreement.
Need for an institution that coordinates and supervises the three powers
Even if absolute separation of the three powers is really possible and we can have an autonomous legislature, executive and judiciary, in terms of policymaking and administering the country we will face a serious problem splitting up the political system. It would seem as if there are three governments ruling over a given country, each of which administers a part of national affairs and whose jurisdiction has nothing to do with that of the other two.
In a nutshell, the necessity of maintaining the cohesion of its political system, a country requires the existence of an axis in the government which maintains the unity and solidarity of the system, cooperation between the three powers and supervises the performance of each power.
There is a need, therefore, for a supreme coordinating institution which can solve differences, frictions and clashes among the powers, and at the same time, be the axis of unity in society; for, a society ruled by three autonomous powers may not be treated as a unified society and it may willy-nilly lead to dispersion and disunity.
In a bid to solve the abovementioned problem we shall deal with the approaches represented by Islam.
Wilayah al-faqih as the unifying axis of society and the political system
In the Islamic system the best way of solving the abovementioned problems is to make sure that an infallible person occupies the highest position in the political hierarchy. Naturally, once such a person occupies the highest government post, he will serve as the pivot of unity and the coordinator of the different powers and solve any friction, differences and discord among the powers. Moreover, being immune from any form of egoism, profit-seeking, and partisanship, he will never be under the influence of ungodly motives and intentions. (Of course, as we said earlier, the ideal form of Islamic government will only be realized during the time of an infallible Imam.
In the second and lower form of Islamic government, the person who occupies the highest government post is the most similar to the infallible Imams (‘a). Apart from his possession of the required qualifications, he has the highest level of piety and sense of justice after the Infallibles (‘a). That person who is to be recognized as the wali al-faqih is the pivot of unity of society and government, the coordinator of the three powers, and the observer of the performance of public servants. He is the overall guide of government and the chief policymaker.
In order for power-holders not to abuse their authority, Montesquieu and others advanced the theory of the separation of powers which is universally accepted and effective to some extent. But it does not solve the main problem. If government officials in the three branches do not have true piety and moral integrity, corruption in society and government will also mutate and permeate the three branches of government. In this case, if we observe that the corruption in the executive branch has decreased, it is because the said branch has been limited, constituting only one of the three powers. But we should not think that corruption in the government has decreased, because it has permeated the judiciary as well as the legislature which is usually under the sway of the executive.
Therefore, the only way to prevent corruption and one power’s interference and meddling in other powers’ affairs is that we should lay more emphasis on piety and moral virtue. Every administrator or official who shoulders a particular set of responsibilities must have a certain degree of piety commensurate to the importance and level of his position.
Naturally, the person who occupies the highest government post is supposed to be the most pious of people, officials and administrators. Similarly, he must be preeminent in knowledge of laws and management. Thus, if there are shortcomings and deficiencies in the three powers, through the leader’s lofty efforts and blessings, affairs will be set right and problems will gradually be solved. As an example, throughout the twenty years[30] of existence of the Islamic government in our country, we have witnessed and do witness the vital, pivotal and enlightening role of the Supreme Leader.
Notes:
[28] Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). An electronic text of the book is available online at http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/montesquieu/spiritoflaws.pdf. [Trans.]
[29] Imam Khomeini issued a decree on Khordad 23, 1359 AHS (June 13, 1980) on the formation of the Cultural Revolution Headquarters. On Adhar 19, 1363 AHS (December 10, 1984) he made a directive regarding the formation of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution to replace the Cultural Revolution Headquarters. [Trans.]
[30] It is almost three decades now. [Trans.]
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Different Levels of Understanding the Islamic Government
In previous discussions we described the structure of the Islamic system and described the Islamic government as a pyramid having at its top a person who is directly or indirectly designated and appointed by God. This idea is advanced in political philosophy as a theory, but to prove that this idea is indeed the theory of Islam and the best one that can be presented about governance and the macrocosmic management of Islamic society, requires meticulous academic study and examination. There are relevant questions which the experts and fuqaha must answer after conducting extensive academic research. These questions can be answered on three levels.
1. General understanding
Sometimes, in order to know their responsibilities and duties people refer to an expert or specialist who can answer their questions and specify their responsibilities according to his knowledge. For example, laities refer to maraji‘at-taqlid [sources of emulation], asking them questions and requesting them to determine their practical responsibilities in religion. It is also like the referral to the experts of every field. For example, patients consult their physicians and ask for medicine that will cure them. People refer to a civil engineer for their house design and plans. In these cases, general and practical answers are given and there will be no mention of the intellectual basis of an answer. Actually, the product and extract of extensive scientific efforts, ijtihad and assiduous investigations are presented to people.
Evidently, our society already has a general knowledge of the Islamic government because of the establishment of the Islamic system in our country. Perhaps, prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution, there might had been people here and there who were unaware of the Islamic government or the theory of wilayah al-faqih and who needed to be informed. But now no one asks about the realization and establishment of the Islamic government. Of course, it does not mean that the notion of Islamic government does not need any elaborate, comprehensive and complete explanation. Rather, the point is that the theory of wilayah al-faqih and the Islamic government has already been settled and clarified to our society so much so that even opponents and foreigners are aware of it although they sternly oppose Islam and the Islamic Revolution.
Our people who have discerned the truthfulness of our system faithfully defend the great achievements of the Islamic Revolution, i.e. the Islamic government or the wilayah al-faqih system, and will continue to do so in future. While facing the enemies of the Islamic Revolution and system, these people chant the slogan “Death to the anti-wilayah al-faqih” [marg bar dhidd-e wilayat-e faqih] as a political symbol and emblem of opposition to the opponents of wilayah al-faqih. They even chant it as a supplication and form of worship in political and religious gatherings as well as in mosques.
Apart from a general reply to the question on the Islamic government and wilayah al-faqih, there are two other levels of examining it. One is the high level of academic and jurisprudential examination of the theory of wilayah al-faqih for the experts and authorities. The other is an average level for the students and researchers.
2. Specialized and technical understanding
An accurate, scientific, intensive or academic study of the subject of Islamic government and wilayah al-faqih shall be done by those who occupy a high academic standing, by utilizing their utmost knowledge, talent, means and time. For example, the doctoral student who wants to write his dissertation on the Islamic government or one of its branches must have a comprehensive and intensive knowledge of the subject. He must take into account all its aspects, spend many years studying and examining it, refer to authentic and reliable authorities, consult professors specialized in the field and entertain their suggestions in order to present his arguments, so that his dissertation is approved.
An endeavor similar to this extensive academic research, is also being conducted in our religious seminaries. Those taking advanced studies [bahth al-kharij] to obtain the license to exercise ijtihad sometimes conduct a thorough study and examination of a specific and seemingly simple subject, reading tens of books and consulting and discussing with fuqaha and scholars, so that they can finally express their expert opinion. In all theoretical discussions on beliefs, ethics, secondary laws, social, political and international issues, meticulous, comprehensive and intensive studies are conducted by authorities in order to preserve the richness, loftiness and dynamism of the Islamic culture. It must be noted, however, that this level of examination of the Islamic government or wilayah al-faqih is neither necessary nor useful for the public.
3. Average understanding
While dealing with the average level of understanding we will neither present a general answer on the Islamic government as a rector [mufti] or marja‘ at-taqlid answers a question [istifta’] and explains an issue in his treatise on the practical laws of Islam [risalah al-‘amaliyyah], nor approach the issue in an academic and elaborate manner which requires many years of research, studies and reading of many reference books. Our aim is to give the different strata of society an average awareness and understanding so that they can counter the objections raised by enemies and opponents and confront conspiracies and threats.
Culturally, the present state of affairs in our society is like that of a society facing a contagious disease like plague, and are on the verge of being afflicted with an epidemic. In combating this disease or plague it is not enough to give only a single piece of advice or only an expert’s opinion in the newspapers or other media. Through constant reminders as well as necessary and sufficient admonitions, the level of awareness of the masses should be elevated to attain a healthy cultural condition to combat a social plague. Besides admonition, holding seminars, roundtable conferences, sufficient explanations and information drives must be held so that the people are fully informed of the ever looming threats.
Now, I would like to present the average understanding with information about the Islamic government and wilayah al-faqih because I feel that our new generation does not have sufficient information about the issues of the Islamic Revolution including the issue of wilayah al-faqih which is the main pillar of this system, and wicked whisperers have led them to the verge of deviation and misguidance.
Our future inheritors of this revolution need to become aware of these issues and not be afflicted with cultural plagues and satanic mischief. I am offering average level discussions to pave the necessary social and cultural ground to improve their insight and certainty on the theory of wilayah al-faqih to enable them to struggle and resist deviant eclectic ideas prevalent in society today. Also, if someone asks them about their acceptance of the Islamic government and the exigency of wilayah al-faqih, they can answer and defend their beliefs. If they are asked questions that require a thorough study and more profound knowledge, they must refer them to the concerned authorities. With this aim in mind, I have divided this series of discussion into two parts, viz. (1) legislation and (2) statecraft.
A review of the characteristics of law and its necessity
The first part of the discussions came to the following conclusions:
(1) Man in his social life is in need of law because life devoid of law means chaos, disorder and savagery, and leads to the collapse of human values—something which cannot be denied by any intelligent person.
(2) According to Islam, any law considered for the social life of man must ensure his material and spiritual interests. Some philosophers have asserted that no law can cover both worldly and otherworldly issues. A political system must be either world-oriented whose only pursuit is to ensure worldly and material interests, or otherworld-oriented that should not interfere in worldly interests and material needs. This criticism is the most ignominious of all those ever expressed against the Islamic political system. Unfortunately, some of those who hold government posts misguide others by employing a grandiloquent style while criticizing our political system.
The bedrock of Islamic thought is that life in this world is a prelude to life in the hereafter and what we do in this world can be a source of our eternal felicity or endless perdition in the hereafter. Religion is essentially meant to lay down a set of programs and plans for this worldly life which ensure comfort and prosperity in this world besides guaranteeing eternal bliss in the otherworld.
By following the set of programs received by the prophets (‘a) from God for the guidance of mankind, man’s success in both worlds is guaranteed. In view of the clarity and self-evident nature of these points, it is surprising that those who have enough knowledge of the Qur’anic verses and traditions and cannot be regarded as ignorant, spitefully close their eyes to the truth and introduce in their talks issues and matters related to the world as separate from those related to the hereafter.
They say, Religious affairs and otherworldly interests are dealt with only in the temples, churches and mosques. Also, social and worldly problems can only be solved by the human mind and experience, and religion cannot and should not play any role in them! This satanic assertion of Muslims who say they know the fundamentals of religion is against the essential principles of all revealed religions, Islam in particular.
(3) The third preliminary point is that it is incumbent upon human beings to secure their material interests through acquired experience, use of intellect, skills and various sciences, but they can not secure their spiritual and otherworldly interests[31] because they do not have any spontaneous knowledge of their spiritual and otherworldly interests. Man does not know what is useful for his eternal felicity in the other world simply because he has no experience of life in the hereafter. Neither can he benefit from the experience of others as no one has any experience of the hereafter. As such, he cannot find the way to a blissful life in the hereafter on his own.
Keeping in view what has been said, it is clear that worldly and otherworldly interests can only be identified by God and those who are endowed with divine knowledge, and the law that emanates from God the Exalted, must be implemented in society to secure worldly, otherworldly and spiritual interests.
Another review of the qualities of the implementers of Islamic laws
During the “legislation” part of the discussion, we enumerated three main qualities that a person with divine connections must possess, if his main duty is implementation of the law which guarantees worldly and otherworldly interests.
First condition or qualification: The implementer of law and any Islamic ruler, in general, must know the law. Of course, there are different degrees and levels of knowledge and learning, the ideal one being impeccable knowledge of divine laws. He who possesses this quality and attains this station is an infallible person who does not err in his gnosis, perception and discernment and knows the law revealed by God perfectly. Naturally, in the presence of such a person, i.e. an Infallible, his sovereignty over society becomes indispensable and exigent. But in the absence of the Infallibles, the government and the implementation of laws shall be delegated to the person who knows the laws better than anyone.
Second condition or qualification: The implementer of law should not be influenced by personal or factional interests, whims and caprice. In other words, he must have moral integrity. Like intellectual competence, moral integrity also has different degrees and the ideal degree can be found in an infallible person who is never influenced by ungodly motives, threats and temptations. He will never sacrifice collective interests before the altar of personal, familial or factional interests. Of course, in the absence of the Infallibles, the person who is morally nearest to them has the right to rule and implement law.
Third condition or qualification: The possession of managerial skill and talent to apply general laws to specific cases. He is supposed to know their various applications and how to implement them so that the spirit of law and purpose of legislation are preserved. Of course, to reach this degree of managerial skill requires specific experiences and wisdom that a person acquires throughout his life of management. The highest level of this quality is also possessed by the Infallibles. They are immune from any error in knowledge and understanding of divine laws, not influenced by carnal desires, and possess special divine blessings. They do not deviate or err in discerning what is good for society while applying general laws to particular cases.
Theoretical connection of Islamic government with ideological principles and foundations
It will be easier for a person to believe in the truthfulness of the Islamic political system who acknowledges that human society must have law that ensures both material and spiritual interests of human beings, and is convinced of the qualifications of Islamic rulers and administrators. Of course, the acceptance of these preliminaries is itself based upon certain presumptions. First and foremost, man has to accept that there is God and that a prophet has been commissioned by God to expound divine laws.
He has to equally accept that beyond this life man has an eternal life in the hereafter, and life in this world and the other have a causal relationship. These presumptions are the essence of the subject of our discussions. Their proofs are included in theology, scholasticism and philosophy. One cannot deal with each of them in a social, legal and political discourse as it would take many years before one arrives at a conclusion.
Our addressees are Muslims who believe in God, religion, revelation, the Day of Resurrection, apostleship, and the infallibility of the Prophet (s), and who want to know whether Islam has a distinct political system or not. They are not those who deny God, or say that man can demonstrate and chant a slogan against God! They do not reject the religion and laws of Islam or say that even the Prophet might have committed an error in understanding the revelation.
Similarly, others who oppose us in principle are not the focus of our present discourse. If they are open to dialogue and willing to listen, we must discuss our ideological principles by means of rational and philosophical proofs, and persuade them to believe that there is God and the Day of Judgment; that God has revealed ordinances for the felicity and prosperity of mankind in this world and the hereafter; obliged His Apostle (s) to convey them to His servants; also, the Apostle (s) is immune from committing error in understanding the revelation; otherwise, he could not have been a prophet.
Can any intelligent person accept another person on top of the hierarchy of power notwithstanding the presence of a person who is infallible in knowledge and action and the best one to identify what is good for society? Everybody knows that preferring the inferior to the superior in optional affairs is shameful and indecent, and no intelligent person accepts it. Our talk is not meant for those who claim to be Muslims but deny the existence of a ma‘sum, believing that neither the Apostle nor the Imams have been infallible. We have no business with them. My assumption is that we all accept the thematic principles of the discussion and acknowledge that the Apostle (s) is ma‘sum and according to Shi‘ah beliefs the Imams (‘a) are also infallible.
Now, assuming that a ma‘sum is present in society, should the government and the implementation of law be entrusted to a fallible person? Delegation of the affairs to a non-ma‘sum is tantamount to allowing error in understanding law. Permitting what is not supposed to be permitted [tajwiz] means that one prefers his interests to that of society, sacrificing the latter before the altar of the former. Tajwiz means that one who has no competence in managing society becomes the ruler! All of these forms of tajwiz are condemnable and rejected by reason.
Therefore, in the presence of a ma‘sum no intelligent person will ever deny that it is expedient for the ma‘sum to rule, and to choose another person instead of him is an irrational and foolish act. No one has any qualms in accepting this proposition. Reason dictates it and we do not need to cite Qur’anic verses and traditions to prove it, indicating that it is obligatory to obey the Apostle (s) and the Imams (‘a), such as these:
يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَطِيعُوا اللّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَأُوْلِي الأَمْرِ مِنكُمْ...
“O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Apostle and those vested with authority among you…”[32] and
مَّنْ يُطِعِ الرَّسُولَ فَقَدْ أَطَاعَ اللّهَ...
“Whoever obeys the Apostle certainly obeys Allah...”[33]
Logical and rational basis of Islamic government’s linear degrees
In connection with the exigency of the rule of a ma‘sum when he is present and accessible, our argument is rationally acceptable. But our main concern is to present the Islamic viewpoint for the period of occultation of Imam al-Mahdi (‘a) when the people are deprived of his presence and have no access to him to benefit from his government. We are also concerned with the period when a ma‘sum was present but the oppressive powers deprived him of ruling over the Muslims, or the social circumstances were not conducive for him to assume political power.
For any post or position, certain conditions and qualifications are laid down. The one who possesses all the qualifications is chosen. If such a person cannot be found, the one who possesses most of these qualifications is chosen. Let us cite another example. If you know a doctor who has thirty years of medical experience, but you consult a young doctor who has recently opened a clinic, and he aggravates your condition instead of curing you, will you not be condemned by both reason and the reasonable?
They will ask you why you left the proficient and consulted the inefficient. You could be excused if the proficient doctor was demanding a huge amount as medical fee, or you had to travel abroad in order to be treated by a specialized doctor and could not afford it. But our assumption is that you had access to a proficient and specialized doctor and the medical fee he was demanding was less than the rest, or the same. In this case, if you consulted a neophyte doctor and your health condition got worse, you will not be excused by the reasonable. Everybody will reproach and criticize you.
The above rational rule is applicable in all social affairs and acceptable to all reasonable people, Muslims and non-Muslims. Its support is the dictate of reason and needless of religious proof. According to this rule, if the ideal form of Islamic government which is rationally also the best form of government is not possible and we have no access to an infallible person with the most knowledge, piety and skill, what will be the dictate and verdict of reason? Will our reason give us freedom to do whatever we like and choose anyone we like as the ruler?
Or, will our reason demand that in case of the unavailability of an infallible person who is the ideal one to rule, we have to choose the most competent person who is the most proximate to the station of the Infallibles? If the perfect grade is not available, we have to choose the grade of 99, 98, 97, so on and so forth. Once the perfect grade is unobtainable, all other grades should not be treated identically and count 99 as equal to 1 on the pretext that our target being the ideal was not available, so it made no difference whom we chose! Undoubtedly, reason will not accept it.
We have to look for the person who is competent to rule over the Muslims and who is nearest to the Infallibles in knowledge, piety and managerial skill. This rational proposition can easily be grasped and understood by every intelligent person and there is no need to substantiate it with intricate juristic and theological proofs.
Presenting some questions regarding Islamic government
There are other questions regarding Islamic government which must also be addressed. Has Islam, only laid down the conditions and qualifications of the person who heads the government and not specified the form of government? That is, does Islam only recommend who must head the government and leave other things including the form of government to the whims of people and change according to the changes in social circumstances?
A more technical question which is comprehendible and understandable to those who are acquainted with juristic and legal discourses is this: Is the government a foundational [ta’sisi] or conventional [imdha’i] matter? A set of Islamic laws or juristic rulings is foundational. Before their actual forms are shown to the people, the sacred religion mentions these laws as well as describes their actual manifestations. For example, the ritual prayer [salah] is a foundational form of worship.
The religion of Islam has mentioned it and the manner of performing it has also been demonstrated to the people by God through the Prophet (s). Besides, before this obligatory act and the manner of its performance were conveyed to the people, no one had been aware of it. In general, the forms and manners of all ritual acts of worship are foundational as the people learned them from the Prophet (s).
For example, obligatory acts like fasting, Hajj pilgrimage and other devotional laws are all foundational.
In contrast to these foundational laws of Islam, there is a set of Islamic laws which in the parlance of jurisprudence [fiqh] is called ‘conventional’. That is, in their social interactions and intercourses, people have formulated a series of rules, regulations, contracts, and agreements, some of which are unwritten but people are bound to them; for example, trade and barter.
At the beginning the sacred religion had not ordered the people to engage in trade or barter whenever they needed a commodity. The people of wisdom knew of the necessity of this affair and they formulated the ways and manners of engaging in them. Then, religion approved this wise practice and gave it a religious credence, stating, for example:
وَأَحَلَّ اللّهُ الْبَيْعَ...
“Allah has allowed trade.”[34]
God allowed and made permissible [halal] the same trading and transactions practiced by people. This approval and permission of trade is a conventional [imdha’i] and not a foundational [ta’sisi] religious ruling. It is like the acceptance of a system formulated by people of wisdom on how to conduct their mutual transactions.
Now, this question is raised concerning government: Before God ordered people through the prophets (‘a) to abide by the divine government, had the people themselves founded a particular form of government which was later endorsed by religion? Or, did people also acquire knowledge of the form of government from God, and that if the prophets (‘a) had not ruled over people by God’s leave and permission and people were not obliged to follow and obey them, they would not have known the form of government?
In sum, once we say that the Islamic government is a well defined system with a religious legal standing and God has made it incumbent upon people to submit to it, the question asked is whether this government has been ordained and founded by God? Or, did the people themselves choose this form of government and found it on the basis of a social contract and God only endorsed and approved it, and therefore, this government has been considered Islamic as it has been endorsed, approved and sanctioned by God?
Notes:
[31] Of course, worldly interests can be secured only by securing the otherworldly interests. Without benefiting from the divine ordinances and revelation, man could not be able to secure his material interests.
[32] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:59.
[33] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:80.
[34] Surah al-Baqarah 2:275. [Trans.]
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
The Connection between the Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist and the Islamic Government Establishment
Whenever a responsibility is entrusted to a person or a duty is assigned to him, certain prerogatives must be granted to him so that he can exercise them in discharging his duty or responsibility. The heavier responsibilities of the Islamic state in terms of magnitude and scope demand greater prerogatives and facilities than those of other governments in order to do justice to them. We shall cite an example in order to make this point clearer and more empirical.
With incessant technological advancement and transformation in the recent past, new conditions and situations have emerged in human society requiring a change in the manner of interaction, way of living and attitude towards the environment. New vistas like exploration of outer space have been opened to mankind. When cars were not yet invented, people had contracted roads and narrow pathways which could give way to only horses and the like. In some parts of ancient cities such a condition still exists. Yet, when the number of vehicles multiplied, people had no option but to commute within the city through vehicles. They had to expand the narrow roads and construct streets and highways to make traffic easy and comfortable and prevent any possible dangers and accidents.
Once the state and its officials want to construct and expand roads and streets, they have no option but to exercise authority over the lands and houses of people and demolish them. If the state is expected to make traveling comfortable, but not authorized to demolish some houses (along the streets to be expanded or constructed), such a demand is absurd, illogical and impractical. So, the state must have such authority to be able to discharge its duty. The state has to compensate for the damage caused and rehabilitate the affected people somewhere else.
Connection between absolute guardianship (wilayat-e mutlaq) and government prerogatives
In Shi‘i jurisprudence [fiqh], the Islamic government’s possession of necessary and sufficient prerogatives for the performance of its responsibilities in line with discharging of responsibilities is attributed to the absolute guardianship of the faqih.
In the Qur’an, traditions and statements of jurists [fuqaha], usually the word “guardianship” [wilayah] is used instead of “government” [hukumah]. Apart from that, the word wilayah is more appropriate than the word hukumah—just as the Supreme Leader Ayatullah al-‘Uzma Sayyid ‘Ali Khamene’i pointed out, the connotation of the word hukumah is laden with a sense of dominance and imposition—as the word wilayah is more profound and associated with love and affection. At any rate, the word wilayah can be used in lieu of hukumah, as one who regards “government” as necessary for society also feels the same about “guardianship” for society in juristic parlance and usage.
Given these introductory remarks, we argue that if this wilayah enjoys all prerogatives through which all responsibilities can be discharged and all needs of society addressed in accordance with Islamic and legitimate standards, it can be said that this wilayah is absolute. But if the wali al-amr [Guardian or Master of the Affair] has wilayah only to the extent necessary, i.e. only in cases where the lives of some people are in danger that we believe in him to have the right to exercise authority over the properties of people, and no authority in city development and beautification as well as construction of green zones (parks) and squares, it is said that this wilayah is limited and conditional.
People’s skepticism on absolute guardianship
We are explaining these things because some people, in a bid to misguide the people in general and the youth in particular, are poisoning their minds by pointing out certain fallacies in the theory of wilayah al-faqih. Initially, they objected to the word wilayah, saying that “guardianship” [wilayah] is applicable to children and the mentally retarded. Wali means “guardian” and is needed by those who do not have the necessary intelligence and capability to administer their daily lives. So, anyone who advances the theory of wilayah al-faqih, in reality regards the people as having low intelligence quotients (IQs) and needful of guardians.
This fallacy is very clear and self-evident. Just as the wilayah of the Ahl al-Bayt (‘a) does not literally mean their guardianship of people and the latter’s need for a guardian, wilayah here is used to mean hukumah, i.e. administering social affairs and overall management of society. Wilayah al-faqih means that certain individuals are authorized by God to administer the primary affairs of society, and it is not that those who are under the rule of wilayah al-faqih and Islamic government are children, the mentally retarded or psychopaths!
They have further committed a fallacy with respect to the word mutlaq [absolute]. They have claimed in some of their writings that “absolute guardianship” is tantamount to polytheism [shirk]. Thus, accordingly, those who believe in “absolute guardianship” are polytheists and have associated deities to God because apart from Him who is the Absolute, they have also recognized the wali al-amr as “absolute”! Sometimes, one does not know how to react to these childish and silly claims.
Let me say briefly that firstly, in the Islamic texts, the Qur’an and traditions in particular, the word mutlaq has never been used for God, and in Arabic lexicon it is not correct to associate the word mutlaq to God. If ever out of carelessness or modification of the meaning of mutlaq, we associate it to God, it implies that God, the Exalted, is unlimited without any weakness, defect and deficiency.
No one has such a belief about anyone other than God. We believe that the One and Only God has Absolute Perfection without having any defect and deficiency and He has all the eternal Attributes. Obviously, this belief does not necessarily mean that the Islamic state should not have the necessary prerogatives to perform its duties. Basically, these two points have no connection with each other.
“Absolute guardianship” means that the ruler, leader and head of the Islamic ummah has the necessary prerogatives to discharge his duties and do what is good for Islamic society, and the wali al-faqih may interfere or exercise authority whenever necessary. In order to make this point clearer, we shall explain the Islamic government theory further, though we have already dealt with it earlier.
Investigating the structure of Islamic government
Once the structure and nature of Islamic government is talked about, some people refer to political philosophy books and mention the different types and forms of governments established in human society since time immemorial such as oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, and democracy. Nowadays, democracy is divided into republicanism and constitutional monarchy, and republicanism into presidential and parliamentary.
They ask us whether the Islamic government is one of those mentioned forms of government or something distinct. If the Islamic government is republican, it is the same democracy or “government of the people for the people by the people” and thus Islamic government is in no way different. If it is said that Islamic government is a monarchy, then why is the government in Iran called “Islamic Republic”? In any case, has Islam no idea about its form of government, or does it grant freedom to the people to choose the type and form of their government, or has it stipulated a distinct form of government?
In reply to the question on the structure of government according to Islam, many of them have said that Islam does not endorse a particular form of government. To some extent this answer is correct, but it is not devoid of ambiguity. To explain this, I deem it necessary to highlight two points which must not be neglected.
1. The extensiveness and irrevocability of Islamic laws
The first point is that Islam and its laws are not confined to a particular time and place. The inalterable and constant laws of Islam have been enacted in such a way that they are applicable to all ages and societies. Meanwhile, a government may be established in a small and limited territory or an island with a small population. It may equally be founded in a country with a population of one million or a country like India or China with a population of about one billion or more than a billion. In any case, the government may assume numerous forms. A small community of one hundred families may have a government of its own.
A country with a population of one billion may also have a government of its own. It is even possible that one day a global government will be established on earth. In view of the diversity of governments, can a model or laws for a government be proposed that would encompass all governments? Or, is it that a particular form should not be determined for the government, and if ever a particular form is presented, it will not be suitable for some societies and not applicable to other societies? For example, if we claim that during the advent of Islam its laws were initially applicable to the small community at Medina, and the government founded by the Messenger of Allah (s) was suitable for the society at that time whose population probably did not exceed a hundred thousand.
Is the model and form which Islam wants to present as the Islamic government the same model and form of the government of the Prophet (s) during the early period of Islam with features and characteristics suitable for a small population of that time with particular moral and cultural elements? Or, is it that Islam is not only devoid of a particular model and form of government but also has not set any pertinent limits, conditions, requirements and rulings?
The fact of the matter is that the Islamic approach is neither of the two. In fact, apart from presenting a specific form of government suitable to its inalterable and constant laws, Islam has introduced a general or overall framework which can integrate changes, variations and numerous or diverse forms. Islam has neither given total freedom to the people to do whatever they want nor presented a limited and narrow form of government applicable only to a certain age and place. The general framework introduced by Islam has a broad scope and span, containing all correct and reasonable forms of government.
We describe this general framework of government as the Islamic government. This framework emerges at a given time with a particular structure and form, and with a different structure and form at another time. Neither of these two forms and structures or any other form or structure for that matter is incompatible and repugnant to the Islamic nature of the government in question.
In other words, Islam does not endorse a particular form or type of government. Its guiding principle is the observance of the general framework; the structure of government should neither be beyond it nor inconsistent with it. The inalterable and constant laws of Islam which have been enacted for all societies up to the Day of Resurrection have a general structure. In contrast, secondary and alterable laws conducive to particular times and places are also enacted. Among these alterable laws are administrative laws which are issued or approved by the wali al-faqih. To obey and follow these laws in their forms or shapes is obligatory.
2. Presentation of government models derived from Islam
The second point is that the goal of the Islamic government is to reach and realize a set of ideal and desirable conditions. But since it is not always possible to achieve them, there is no option but to consider a substitute of the ultimate choice. That is, if the ideal condition is not available, the second choice will replace it, and if the second choice cannot be achieved, the third choice will replace it. This implies that our value system is neither monolithic nor considers value as confined only to all that is ideal. Instead, in the Islamic value system values have a multilayered structure and diverse degrees as well as the most ideal and supreme value. Below this zenith of value, other degrees are also valuable in their own rights. It is not correct that if the ideal value cannot be realized, we should totally give up and not resort to an equally valuable option below it.
The point is that Islam has set an ideal form of government which can be established whenever the said government is headed by the Prophet (s) or an infallible Imam. This ideal option has been explicitly emphasized by God in the Noble Qur’an:
يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَطِيعُوا اللّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَأُوْلِي الأَمْرِ مِنكُمْ ...
“O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Apostle and those vested with authority among you…”[22]
In another verse, He says thus:
وَمَا آتَاكُمُ الرَّسُولُ فَخُذُوهُ وَمَا نَهَاكُمْ عَنْهُ فَانتَهُوا...
“Take whatever the Apostle give you, and relinquish whatever he forbids you...”[23]
The foremost view of Islam is that an infallible person must head the government and hold the reigns of power so that he can manage and supervise the political apparatus. But a ma‘sum is not always present among the people to directly hold the reigns of government. Even when a ma‘sum is present, it does not follow that he is in a position of strength to establish a government and exercise power.
In fact, among our Imams, only the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) and Imam Hasan al-Mujtaba (‘a) for a very short period were able to rule. Since the time of Imam al-Husayn (‘a) the circumstances were not suitable for the infallible Imams (‘a) to establish an Islamic government. Either the people or majority of them did not support them to establish an Islamic government or an influential section of society prevented them from establishing it. As such, each of the Imams (‘a) was forced to distance himself from the government of the day.
Precedence of the notion of “state within a state” in Islam
In case the government is not under the control of an infallible Imam or a just ruler but an oppressive and taghuti regime is established, should people leave all affairs to an illegitimate and tyrannical ruler and totally relinquish government affairs? Are righteous and pious individuals not supposed to properly attend to government affairs at any level and guide society to the extent possible? Undoubtedly, the reply of Islam is in the negative.
In such cases, Islam has set emergency substitutes and maintained that if an infallible Imam is present but has no support in establishing a government, or he is not present and the government is outside the control of his righteous and just successor, the people may, as much as possible, refer in matters related to government to a person who is most similar to a ma‘sum.
Indisputably, conflicts and disputes always occur in society about personal, family, social, commercial and matters of inheritance. For example, two partners may have a dispute over their shares; inheritors may fight over the inheritance; spouses may have a quarrel. Certainly, in order to resolve these differences people are in need of government decisions. They have to refer to a legal authority that will investigate the differences and discords.
Under the pretext that the government of truth does not exist and an infallible Imam or a just ruler is not in control of government, people are not supposed to be contented with the taghuti government, do whatever it commands and reject an alternative. In fact, in particular and limited cases if there is a chance to refer to a person who issues and implements the correct Islamic decree, it is expedient to refer to him. As such, the infallible Imams (‘a) have introduced a scheme for such circumstances and conditions which in modern parlance is described as establishing a “state within a state”.
If the government is in the hands of tyrants and usurpers and the people do not have sufficient power and means to rise up and overthrow them and establish the government of truth, in relation to administrative matters the people are supposed to refer to the fuqaha and those who, though not infallible, have been trained in the school of the Ahl al-Bayt (‘a) and occupy the highest station of piety and knowledge of religion and who in knowledge and moral conduct are nearest to the infallibles. In relation to their administrative problems people must refer to the faqih who has the intellectual capability to deduce and apply the correct Islamic law, has the necessary managerial skill to adjudicate and issue a verdict, and has the highest decree of piety, trustworthiness and credibility.
This statement or the notion of a “state within a state” means that within the vast jurisdiction of an illegitimate state, small and limited ‘states’ that can to some extent become the sanctuary of people in their administrative problems must be established. In our Islamic culture, such a government is described as “restricted guardianship” [wilayat-e muqayyad]—a kind of guardianship which fuqaha had even during the time of the infallible Imams (‘a). With the permission of the Imams (‘a), fuqaha had the authority to adjudicate, bid and forbid.
Even during the period of occultation [ghaybah] the fuqaha, though incapable of establishing a government, used to exercise authority in certain cases of litigations, disputes, quarrels, urgent matters, and what is described in our jurisprudence as “financial affairs” [al-umur al-hasbiyyah]. In terms of form, substance and extent of prerogatives, however, “restricted guardianship” was considerably different from the “absolute guardianship of the jurist” [wilayat-e mutlaq-e faqih].
Throughout the history of Shi‘ism, “restricted guardianship” has been enjoyed by the fuqaha, and people, with full satisfaction and confidence used to refer some of their social problems, disputes and differences to them and ask for correct solutions. Perhaps, it is because of this historical precedence that theoreticians are less skeptical about it, and it does not meet much opposition. On the contrary, on account of its lack of long historical precedence in the recent past, and its strictness towards malevolent xenophiles and their illegitimate interests, the “absolute guardianship of the jurist” has been a subject of pusillanimous objection and attack.
Imam Khomeini’s presentation of “absolute guardianship of the jurist”
From the time of occultation of Hadhrat Wali al-‘Asr (may Allah expedite his glorious advent) up to the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the possibility that one day a rightful and truthful government will be established by a duly competent faqih was more akin to a dream and illusion.
Even if the people in our country were told, as late as thirty or forty years ago, that one day a faqih will topple down the taghuti regime, no one would believe it and consider such an idea as nothing but mere daydreaming. It would be like someone saying that a time will come when we will fly without the help of instruments and facilities, for it is believed that such an event will happen only in dreams and never take place in real life.
At that time, it was funny for people to hear someone claiming that a cleric in place of the taghut will take control of the country. The people would ask, “Is it possible? How could a person who, could hardly find his daily bread, was not secure even in his home, whose house could be raided, and he, banished, imprisoned and tortured, acquire the power to establish a government?!
It is true that wilayah al-faqih was not actually implemented in the past as it did not seem reasonably probable, but since its assumption was possible, some prominent fuqaha advanced the theory of “absolute guardianship of the jurist”. They examined the question: If one day conditions for the faqih to rule are provided and he actually takes charge of government, would his wilayah be absolute or limited?
Contrary to those periods of the infallible Imams (‘a), when on the one hand, they practiced dissimulation [taqiyyah] in a position of weakness, deprived of their right to interfere in administrative issues, and people referred some of their problems like disputes and differences to them only in private and acquired their verdicts; and, on the other hand, when the fuqaha distanced themselves from the government and were robbed of the chance to interfere in administrative matters; if a chance appeared for a faqih to rule and he became politically strong enough to establish a government, should he exercise wilayah only in “urgent matters” and interfere only in “financial affairs”? Or, should all limitations, conditions and “specific restrictions” on the faqih’s exercise of authority, imposed during the reigns of taghuts and tyrants, be removed, and, exactly like an infallible Imam who is politically capable of establishing a government, should the faqih also have all the prerogatives that an infallible Imam has in the overall administration of society? This option has been presented as the theory of “absolute guardianship of the jurist”.
Among our prominent figures, the one who, in addition to expounding the theory of “absolute guardianship of the jurist” as a juristic proposition, regarded the same as practically realizable, was His Eminence Imam Khomeini (q). Forty years ago, he used to mention in his lectures that there is the possibility of a faqih establishing a government in a certain geographical location.[24] The faqih would have all the prerogatives of a religious ruler and his authority would not be confined to financial affairs and urgent matters. As far as the interests of Islamic society were concerned, he could exercise authority within the framework of religious standards and Islamic precepts.
At that time, when the Imam discussed this theory, his students accepted it intellectually with good intention, good opinion and affection for him. Yet, they could not imagine that it would be implemented until finally, the Islamic movement in Iran gained momentum and gradually the Revolution triumphed and the Islamic government was established.
So, the “absolute guardianship of the jurist” means that the one who, according to Islam, is competent to rule, and in terms of knowledge, piety and managerial skill is most similar to a ma‘sum, and is able to establish a government will have all the prerogatives of an infallible Imam in managing the affairs of society. Once the wali al-faqih enjoys these extensive prerogatives, all laws, executive orders and ordinances to be passed in the Islamic government under the command of the wali al-faqih will be deemed legitimate only through his permission and approval. Without his permission, no one else will have the direct and independent right to legislate or implement a law.
All administrative affairs shall become official by his permission and authority. Under his government, individuals shall implement laws through his designation, or if they are elected according to predetermined laws and arrangements, their assumption of office shall become official through his approval and permission. Thus, without the permission and authority of the wali al-faqih no step shall be deemed official and legitimate.
The Imam used to say time and again: If a government is formed without the approval and permission of the wali al-faqih, it is taghuti. It means that we have no more than two essential types of government: the government of truth and the government of taghut. The government of truth is that which is headed by the wali al-faqih who is the supreme authority in all administrative affairs and issues, and all matters shall acquire legitimacy through his permission and approval. If it is not so, then it is the government of falsehood and taghut, and as the Qur’an states,
...فَمَاذَا بَعْدَ الْحَقِّ إِلاَّ الضَّلاَلُ
“…So what is there without the truth except error?”[25]
Description of wilayat al-faqih in the maqbulah of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah’
In view of what has been said, the prerogatives of the faqih are confined to sacred religious standards and laws and do not go beyond them, making it clear that belief in the “absolute guardianship of the jurist” does not mean polytheism or considering someone other than God as absolute. As a matter of fact, according to some narrations transmitted from the infallible Imams (‘a), anyone who disobeys the decree and order of the wali al-faqih is a polytheist [mushrik].
As narrated in the maqbulah of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah, concerning two believers who had a dispute over religious issues or worldly matters like inheritance, they asked Imam as-Sadiq (‘a) whom they should refer to for judgment and solving of their conflict. The Imam (‘a) dissuaded them from referring to a taghut or tyrant ruler but instead ordered them to refer to the narrators of hadiths, religious scholars and experts, saying:
...فَإِنّي قَدْ جَعَلْتُهُ عَلَيْكُمْ حَاكِمًا، فَإِذَا حَكَمَ بِحُكْمِنَا فَلَمْ يَقْبَلْهُ مِنْهُ فَإِنَّمَا إسْتَخَفَّ بِحُكْمِ اللهِ وَ عَلَيْنَا رَدَّهُ وَالرَّادُّ عَلَيْنَا الرَّادُّ عَلىٰ اللهِ وَ هُوَ عَلىٰ حَدِّ الشِّرْكِ بِاللهِ...
“…For I appoint him as judge over you. Anyone who rejects his judgment is as if he belittles the judgment of Allah and rejects us, and anyone who rejects us is as if he rejects Allah, and rejection of Him is tantamount to associating partners with Him.”[26]
According to the abovementioned tradition, if the duly competent faqih establishes a government or takes charge of government affairs, anyone who opposes him and rejects his orders and words is as if he opposes the infallible Imams (‘a) and opposition to them is tantamount to polytheism [shirk]. This polytheism is not in the ontological Lordship [rububiyyat-e takwini] of God but rather polytheism in the legislative Lordship [rububiyyat-e tashri‘i]. The explanation for this is that monotheism [tawhid] has different classifications and degrees:
(1) monotheism in creation, i.e. belief in the Unity or Oneness of the Creator of the universe;
(2) monotheism in Divinity [uluhiyyah] and servitude [‘ubudiyyah], i.e. belief that no one is worthy of worship but God who is the Absolute Lord and Legislator; and
(3) Divine Unity [tawhid-e rububi] which is divided into two: (a) ontological Lordship and (b) legislative Lordship.
“Ontological Lordship” means that we have to consider that the designing and management of the entire universe lies with God and to believe that the rotation of the sun and moon, the taking place of day and night, life and death of man and animals, and the protection of the world and all its inhabitants from destructive collisions and clashes all depend on God. It is He who protects heaven and earth. All beings that come into existence in any part of this vast universe, grow and die, procreate, do anything that manifests their existence are all under the supervision and control of God. No phenomenon is outside His Lordship.
“Legislative Lordship” is only related to the discretional management of human beings whose movement, impact and evolution, contrary to that of other creatures, depends on their own discretion. For example, God introduces the straight path to man and acquaints him with good and evil, and enacts and issues laws and ordinances for the individual and social life of man.
Based on what has been said about monotheism and its different categories, anyone who denies the legislative Lordship of God, even if he recognizes the ontological Lordship or the Unity of God in creation and servitude, is a polytheist. The same kind of polytheism was committed by Satan who recognized God as the One and Only Creator and His ontological Lordship. As such, he said:
قَالَ رَبِّ بِمَا أَغْوَيْتَنِي لأُزَيِّنَنَّ لَهُمْ فِي الأَرْضِ وَلأُغْوِيَنَّهُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ
“He said: My Lord! As You have consigned me to perversity, I will surely glamorize [evil] for them on earth, and will surely pervert them all.”[27]
It can be noticed that Satan believed in God’s ontological Lordship, regarding Him as his Cherisher and Sustainer. What he denied or rejected was the legislative Lordship and thus he became a polytheist (nay, the first polytheist). Since God the Exalted, makes it obligatory to obey any of the infallible Imams (‘a), anyone who refuses or declines to obey actually denies the legislative Lordship of God and is tainted with polytheism in the legislative Lordship.
Similarly, when an infallible Imam (‘a) appointed or designated a person and made it incumbent upon others to obey him, anyone who did not recognize him or submit to him was tainted with polytheism in the legislative Lordship. So, if Imam as-Sadiq (‘a) said that opposition to the wali al-faqih is tantamount to associating partners with Allah, it was not a hyperbole as he spoke the truth, for it was polytheism in legislative Lordship, which Satan was also tainted with.
Based on what has been said, according to Islam the structure of the Islamic government has different degrees. Its ideal degree can be reached whenever the Prophet (s) or an infallible Imam (‘a) takes control of government. Its lower degree is when government is entrusted to the duly competent faqih who in terms of knowledge, piety and managerial skill is the nearest to the infallible Imams (‘a). One degree lower than this one is that if there is no duly competent faqih, or the faqih accessible to people lacks the competence to manage society, the wilayah and government shall be entrusted to ‘just believers’ because society cannot be abandoned without any government.
Thus, in the presence of an infallible Imam his government or wilayah is most ideal and during his absence the faqih who is most akin to the infallible Imams (‘a) should take control of government. In the absence of such a faqih, a just believer whose sense of justice and piety are such that people trust him and are satisfied with his implementation of laws shall take hold of government though his knowledge and learning is not equal to that of a faqih.
Of course, we hope that the ‘ulama’ and figures that are capable of guiding and managing society are always present so that they can shoulder this responsibility of guiding society. God the Exalted, favored us by blessing us with the dear Imam who guided our society remarkably well. After the Imam, He preserved his righteous student and successor for us, the nearest to the Imam in piety, asceticism, political insight, consideration for the interests of Muslims, management and leadership of Islamic society, and other outstanding characteristics.
Islam’s view on separation of powers
Another subject which needs to be dealt with at present is the separation of powers and government responsibilities. According to Islam, the government does not have a specific form or type suitable to a society with particular characteristics. According to Islam, the government may have a structure or form which is suitable to a small society composed by a limited number of families, or to a country with one billion-strong population or even a global society. Naturally, all the responsibilities and special functions of the government that bespeak of the raison d’être of the state—especially in densely populated societies—cannot be shouldered by a single or two persons.
Issues related to internal security, defense against foreign enemies, supervision of economic activities and international affairs, conduct of international relations, the observance of Islamic rites and the implementation of Islamic laws are also extremely heavy responsibilities. So, the option is to have division of labor. This division of labor can be done in two ways, viz. horizontally and vertically. That is, both sections of government activities are located in two separate compartments comprising two triangular shanks which do not intersect each other at the middle and finally end at the top of the pyramid.
In plain language, the best and most expressive similitude of government is a pyramid, hence, the term “pyramid (hierarchy) of power” has been chosen by political philosophers for government. The hierarchy of power is like a pyramid which has its own specific features. It consists of a triangular base and different sloping sides that meet in a point at the top.
Once we consider the government in its general sense, each side of the pyramid represents a section of government responsibilities. Based on the division of power in the political and legal philosophy of Montesquieu government power is divided into three branches—legislative, judiciary and executive—the three ‘sides’ or sections of government deal with legislation, adjudication and implementation. One part of government activities consists of codifying general and particular laws and ordinances; another part is related to the resolution of conflicts and differences according to law; yet another part deals with implementation of laws and management of society.
Grounds for overlapping of functions
It is true that division into three is appropriate and proper, but it must be noted that drawing dividing lines is not an easy job. In practice we can never totally remove enactment and codification of laws and ordinances as well as ratification of bylaws from the executive branch and not allow executive power at any level to engage in the enactment of executive orders and bylaws. Nowadays, in all democratic countries that have recognized the separation of powers, there is willy-nilly a degree of overlapping between legislation and implementation. The most evident form of overlapping of functions can be observed in parliamentary systems. Meanwhile, democratic systems are classified into two: parliamentary and presidential:
1. The parliamentary system of government is formed on the basis of the fusion of power. That is, all powers are concentrated in parliament. After the election of members of parliament (MPs) from among electoral candidates of various parties and the formation of parliament, high-ranking executive officials, such as the premier and cabinet ministers are elected from among the MPs. Under this system, parliament grants authority to ministers to head different ministries and it may also take back that authority.
2. The presidential system of government is based on the principle of separation of powers. Under this system, the president or chief executive is not elected by congress. Ministers are directly appointed by the president and the legislature cannot remove them. Reciprocally, the legislature is separate and independent from the executive. Under this system, the essential and irreconcilable difference between membership in congress and membership in cabinet is that the president cannot appoint an MP to a cabinet position unless the said MP resigns from his post in congress.
In the presidential system the president is directly elected by the people, and an overlapping of functions is observed. The codification of some ordinances and bylaws is delegated to the cabinet of ministers. Nowadays, in our country an executive order is legally sufficient to undertake some social, economic and other transactions. That is, the cabinet holds a meeting, and after a series of discussions and deliberations, issues an order which it also implements. Thus, the cabinet has been authorized to enact and ratify a set of ordinances in some cases.
Meanwhile, the function of parliament is legislation and ratification of bills but it also assumes executive functions in some cases. For example, signing contracts with foreign states is an executive matter, and as a rule, the executive has to directly sign them, but because of the importance and sensitivity of this issue, observance of all precautions, prevention of any abuse, essential scrutiny of the conditions of such contracts and necessary investigations and precautions are observed by the cabinet, then deliberated upon by the legislative house and implemented only after ratification and approval by the deputies.
In conclusion, the notion of separation of powers demands that the three powers—judiciary, legislative, executive—function independently but in practice there is overlapping of functions experienced by the varying political systems in the world. Of course, the more the separation of powers is observed, the more autonomous each power will be, and the chances of abuse of power and interference in each other’s functions will automatically decrease.
Notes:
[22] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:59.
[23] Surah al-Hashr 59:7.
[24] See Imam Khomeini, Islamic Government: The Governance of the Jurist, trans. Hamid Algar (Tehran: The Institute for the Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, 2001). http://www.al-islam.org/islamicgovernment [Trans.]
[25] Surah Yunus 10:32.
[26] Usul al-Kafi, vol. 1, p. 67; Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 1, chap. 2, p.34.
[27] Surah al-Hijr 15:39.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: al-islam.org
Categorized Models of Islamic Government
The basis of values in Islam is not “all or none” or of a single level. Values have varying degrees which begin with the lowest degree up to the highest. The same is true of the Islamic political system. Islam presents an ideal form of government which can materialize under particular circumstances by those who have exceptional qualifications, capabilities and merits that cannot be found in others. In reality, that form of Islamic government can be run only by those who possess infallibility [‘ismah] and do not have the least defect and blemish in their thinking, speech or action.
This is the highest form of Islamic government that can be described so far—the government headed by the one who not only refrains from thinking of sin but also does not unconsciously make a mistake. He has no blemish of any sort and completely abides with what is good; he perfectly knows the code of Islamic laws and implements them exactly. This is exactly the ideal form of government which was implemented by the prophets including the Prophet of Islam (s) and during the short reign of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a).
Of course, more ideal than this can also be imagined but it is impossible to implement, and that is the form of government whose chief executive as well as commanders, governors and mayors are all infallible [ma‘sum].
As we have said, this form of government will never be realized because in no period of time will the number of infallible personages be such that all government posts can be occupied by them. The only ideal form which can materialize is that a ma‘sum heads the government hierarchy. Besides, this ideal form will only materialize at the time of the presence of a ma‘sum after removal of all impediments to his rule.
Therefore, in the Islamic political system various stages and degrees have been considered for the government. After failing to establish the highest form of Islamic government headed by a ma‘sum, (during this period of occultation [ghaybah]) we should not give up trying to establish an Islamic government.
In the case of inaccessibility of an infallible Imam we have to entrust the government to one who in terms of knowledge, God-wariness and management—whose highest degree can be found in a ma‘sum as he has infallibility in knowledge, motive and action—is nearest to an infallible Imam. In the absence of such a person, the government must be entrusted to the one who is lower to him in station, one after the other, until it reaches the turn of the one who has the least qualification to run the government. With a degree lower than that, the government objectives will never materialize. Under no circumstances should this form of government be chosen.
Rational proof of the wilayah al-faqih system
The ideal and highest form of Islamic government which is the sought-after according to Islam is the rule of a ma‘sum. When its ideal form cannot be established due to the absence of a ma‘sum, the one chosen to rule should be one who is nearest to the infallibles in both knowledge and action. He can be no other than a duly competent jurist [faqih] who, on account of merits, capabilities and proximity to the infallibles in terms of knowledge, behavior and managerial skill, is regarded as the successor to the infallible Imam.
So, the justification of the wilayah al-faqih system is that when there is no direct access to the infallible Imam, the duly competent faqih who is superior to the rest in the knowledge of laws, in piety, even in sociopolitical matters, in the observance of social justice and enforcement of laws, in possessing political acumen to manage society and practical skill in ways of implementing laws, in struggling against evil and carnal desires and preferring the interests of Islam to personal and factional interests, has to take charge of government affairs.
In this regard, one may possibly say: Since we do not have direct access to a ma‘sum, the qualifications required for the Islamic ruler are no longer necessary nor credible—neither the expertise in Islamic jurisprudence, God-wariness nor managerial skill. Anyone may file his candidacy to rule over the Muslims, and once the majority of people accept him, his authority should be credible and binding. In reality, this hypothesis is anchored in the principle of “all or none”.
That is, if the highest form of qualifications which only a ma‘sum possesses is unavailable, those qualifications in their lower forms are no longer credible. Once the piety of a ma‘sum is not possessed by anyone, piety is not necessary at all for a ruler. A corrupt person who commits a cardinal sin can also occupy the highest post in an Islamic government. One who does not have a rudimentary knowledge of jurisprudence can also occupy the highest post in an Islamic government. According to the Islamic political system, this notion has no justification at all and is rejected. It can only be justified in the Western democratic theory.
In Muslim countries, some intellectuals who have a superficial and scanty knowledge of Islam have mixed their understandings of Islam with the tenets of Western culture and succumbed to eclecticism. In supporting the democratic model, they show in practice that they have accepted the notion of “all or none”. These narrow-minded Muslims believe that in the presence of an infallible Imam, he must rule over the Islamic society. In his absence the criterion should be the opinion of the majority, and no condition other than popular acceptability be binding. Such a view is in no way compatible and concordant with the Islamic perspective and the dominant spirit of Islamic laws.
Islam has laid down different levels for its laws. In its value system, it has also considered different degrees of values. With respect to social issues, we can equally observe that it has taken into account special or particular conditions for some social matters. In case of failure to meet all the required conditions, those conditions that can be met are acceptable. With the aim of elucidating this point, we shall deal with the issue of pious endowment [waqf] which is one of the social laws of Islam.
It is stated in the rulings on waqf that if a pious bequest [mawqufah] is endowed with a particular use, it must be utilized for only that particular use. Now, if that particular use is practically no more available and has no external manifestation, the pious bequest must be utilized in something which is most similar to the intended utility. For example, our predecessors had endowed many pious bequests to provide the forages of riding animals of pilgrims to the holy shrine of the Doyen of the Martyrs (‘a). The income of these endowed properties was spent on the forages of horses and camels mounted by pilgrims to the mausoleum of Imam al-Husayn (‘a) in Karbala’.
However, since that utility is no longer applicable now as no one goes to Karbala’ for pilgrimage riding a horse or camel anymore and traveling is done by air, rail or road, shall we dispense with those endowed properties and not consider any utility for them on the basis of the “all or none” thesis, or as the Islamic perspective or approach demands, shall we choose the other options which are the most similar to the previous utility to provide fuel for airplanes and vehicles of pilgrims to Karbala’?
Similarly, if an endower [waqif] wills that after him any one of his sons who becomes a mujtahid will assume the custodianship of his waqf, yet none of his sons is a mujtahid though one of them has almost attained ijtihad or is a quasi-mujtahid, will the waqf remain without any guardian since none of the potential guardians is fully qualified? Or, shall we choose the second most qualified in the absence of the perfectly qualified guardian, i.e. choose the one who has almost attained ijtihad in the absence of a mujtahid?
In religious and sociopolitical issues there are many examples that both reason and religion regard as having an array of degrees. Similarly, in the Islamic government different degrees have been considered for the ruler. In the case of unavailability of the highest degree, i.e. an infallible Imam like in this period of occultation, the government should be entrusted to the one who is the deputy of the infallible Imam (‘a) and the nearest to him in every respect, and that is no one other than the duly competent faqih.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Islam’s non-judgmental approach in value-giving and assigning duties
In contrast to the above single level and one-dimensional value system, in some systems concerning personal and individual actions as well as sociopolitical changes, various levels and diverse schemes have been functioning. In the first place, an ideal scheme is presented and then other schemes with lesser degrees, advantages and conditions, and finally, emergency schemes. In various cases and situations, there is also the “case-to-case basis” permission in Islam.
For example, in Islam it is incumbent upon any person who reaches the age of puberty to perform prayer with utmost concentration and sincerity including all other conditions. But this ruling is not fixed but alterable in emergency and exceptional situations. It is applicable only to the situation when a person is capable of performing prayer with all its conditions and parts, whereas in exceptional and emergency situations some of its conditions and parts are no longer required. In a situation when the person praying must take a bath [ghusl] but there is no water available, or water is harmful for him; or he must perform ablution [wudhu] but cold water (which is the only available) is harmful for him; or he cannot perform ablution, Islam does not accept the notion of “either all or none”.
Islam does not say that one should pray only when all conditions can be fulfilled and do so with utmost concentration and sincerity or not pray. In such cases, instead, Islam has offered man alternatives commensurate with the exceptional and emergent situation he may be in. In the abovementioned example, it has ordained that if a person is incapable of taking a bath or performing ablution, as the case may be, he still has to pray after performing dry ablution [tayammum]; if he cannot stand and pray, he should sit and pray; if he cannot pray while sitting, he should pray lying down. Even in a situation when a person is still conscious but cannot move his body including his tongue, Islam has not exempted him from prayer. Even in such a critical and bad situation he has to pray, but it is commensurate to his condition or situation.
This shows that in the Islamic value system different qualitative and quantitative degrees have been taken into account for sociopolitical and religious obligations, each of which has a value commensurate to its nature. In the first place, the lofty and ideal degree is considered and below it are the second and third degrees until the lowest degree which is related to an emergency or an exceptional situation. The obligation of man in the latter situation is the least that can be expected from him.
Worship has different degrees of value
Another example that can show the fundamental distinction and difference between the Kantian theory and the Islamic viewpoint is the value of worship [‘ibadah] and its different degrees. The highest form of worship is that which is done solely because of love and reverence for God—the same worship the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) described in one of his litanies [munajat]:
اِلٰهى مَا عَبَدْتُكَ خَوْفاً مِنْ عِقَابِكَ وَ لاَ طَمَعًا فِي ثَوابِكَ وَلٰكِنْ وَجَدْتُكَ أهْلاً لِلْعِبَادَةِ فَعَبْدتُك
.
“My Lord, I have not worshipped You out of fear of Your chastisement or out of greed for Your reward, but I found You worthy of worship so I worshipped You.”[20]
In another place, Imam ‘Ali (‘a) divides the worshippers into three groups:
إِنَّ قَوْماً عَبَدُوا اللهَ رَغْبَةً فَتِلْكَ عِبَادَةُ التُّجَّارِ، وَإِنَّ قَوْماً عَبَدُوا اللهَ رَهْبَةً فَتِلْكَ عِبَادَةُ الْعَبِيدِ، وَإِنَّ قَوْماً عَبَدُوا اللهَ شُكْراً فَتِلْكَ عِبَادَةُ الاَْحْرَارِ
.
“A group of people worship Allah out of desire for reward; this is the worship of traders. Another group worship out of fear; this is the worship of slaves. Yet another group worship Allah out of gratefulness. This is the worship of free men.”[21]
In his statement, Imam ‘Ali (‘a) regards the worship done solely out of gratitude and reverence to God as the highest and most superior, and Islam wants that all believers perform that kind of worship. However, it is clear that not all have the station, capacity and dedication to perform such worship. Such worship can only be done by the sincere awliya’ of Allah whose station is so sublime that they have been annihilated in the Beauty of the Beloved, and even if they are thrown into hellfire, they will not desist from worshipping and calling unto Him. Or, even if they are not admitted to paradise, they will not stop worshipping Him. No doubt, such individuals can hardly be found in millions.
Now, once we accept Kant’s notion of “all or none” and believe that an act is morally good only when it fulfils all necessary conditions and capabilities without even an iota lacking in it, it means that the only acceptable worship is that of the highest degree which is done solely because of gratitude and reverence to God; only the worship of the sincere awliya’ of Allah is accepted, and not the worship of those who desire paradise or are afraid of divine chastisement. Islam does not accept this myopic and bigoted view.
In order to facilitate the servants of God and remove any hardship or difficulty along their way, Islam has considered varying degrees as far as worship and other obligatory acts are concerned—degrees which begin with the least required capabilities and conditions, i.e. possession of the minimum valuable quantities, up to the highest degree or level which has all the required capabilities and conditions and to reach it means attainment of the highest spiritual station of man.
It is like the worship of personages such as the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) and the students of his school [maktab] who have attained the most exalted station and gnosis and reached the highest degree of servitude to God. But the worship of those who are below them and have reached lower stations and worship God out of desire for spiritual rewards and recompense is also acceptable. So is the worship of those who are even lower than them and worship God out of fear of His punishment. Their worship also has some value.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi Source: Imam reza network
Requisites of Legislation and Its Station in Islam
In Islamic legislation the goal of law is to protect the material and spiritual interests of human beings. Subsequently, a question is raised: Who should be the legislator? There are different views regarding this. Generally, the credibility of two conditions among political and legal philosophers is common: One is that the legislator must be one who knows the purpose of law. The second is that he should not sacrifice the interests of society before the altar of personal interests.
Legislator’s qualifications as exclusive to God
Here, apart from taking into account the above two qualifications, Islam holds that the legislator must definitely be aware of all the material and spiritual interests of man and not favor personal and group interests at the expense of the interests of society. Islam also highlights the point that legislation is basically the right of the one who can bid and forbid human beings. Even if certain individuals have great knowledge of the interests of society and consider the interests of society as more important than individual and group interests, still the right of legislation does not essentially belong to them because every law consciously or unconsciously contains command and prohibition.
In the session in which we talked about the relationship between right and duty, we explained that every law explicitly, implicitly, or suggestively commands and prohibits. Sometimes it says, “Don’t encroach upon the property of people,” which is an explicit prohibition, or “Honor the property of others,” which is an explicit command. At times, the language of law is bidding and forbidding. For example, it says that the right of so-and-so is established so others should observe this right. This is a command which is embedded in law. Similarly, others are not supposed to transgress this right, and this is a prohibition which is embedded in law.
Thus, the legislator must have the right to bid and forbid others and this right essentially belongs to God. The first condition is that the legislator must have the most knowledge and awareness of the interests of men and the highest form of such a condition is present in God because He is the most knowledgeable of what is good for His servants. Also, the second condition is that the legislator should not consider the individual interests as more important than the social interests and the highest form of such a condition is present in God because He acquires no benefit from the actions of His servants.
For all people to be faithful does not benefit Him whatsoever. Also, for all people to become infidels does not harm Him whatsoever. Observing or violating laws does not affect Him at all. Meanwhile, the third condition is something which none except God intrinsically possesses, which is the right over others to bid and forbid. What right do some people have to rule over others? All are equal before God and it is He who is the Owner of all human beings. The entire human race solely belongs to Him and it is only He who has the right over people to bid and forbid.
In other words, human beings should recognize God’s Lordship and give His right of Lordship. Thus, Lordship manifests itself in two senses: one in the ontological sense; that is, man has to regard the management of the universe as intrinsically belonging to God. He should believe that God has set innate laws in the universe. The sun and moon move by His leave and command, and the transformations in the universe take place according to His will. Thus, He is the cosmic Lord and Cherisher of the universe, Master of the Command, and the Regulator and Maintainer of the universe. Similarly, he has to believe that God also has the legislative Lordship. During the previous session we discussed the point that legislative Lordship belongs to God and monotheism in the legislative Lordship requires that man should acquire ranks from God alone, obtain the law from Him, while the implementer implements it in society by God’s permission.
Objection on the necessity of legal authorities’ plurality
This gives rise to skepticism thus expressed: You say that the law must be enacted by God for this is what monotheism in the legislative Lordship demands, but we see that in society we need laws which God has not enacted. The people enact these laws and were they not to do so, society would be left in abeyance. For example, so many laws in our Islamic society are enacted by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. These laws, needed by society, have not been enacted by God and the Prophet (s) and an illustrious example of these laws which everybody is familiar with are traffic laws. Without the existence of these rules, there would be so many accidents in the world endangering the lives and assets of people.
On the one hand, society is in need of such laws, and on the other hand, God has not enacted these relevant laws. Any driving and traffic rule is present neither in the Qur’an nor in the words of the Prophet (s) and the Imams (‘a). So, how can all laws be divine and godly and enacted by God? If common laws enacted by human legislators are also binding, it follows that we have two sources of legislative authority; one is God and the other, the people—which according to you is tantamount to polytheism in religious legislation. This skepticism is expressed in various forms, and already been addressed, but unfortunately, it is not understood the way it should be.
Reply to the first objection
In replying to the legitimate question raised, we need to pay attention to two points. One is that the law has numerous terminologies. Sometimes, law is referred to as general rules and does not include specific laws, executive orders and instructions. At times, the term “law” is so broadly understood that it includes even an administrative instruction issued by the head of an office to his subordinates. In other words, law is a term with general and specific meanings and both are correct.
The second point is that in Islam there is a set of fixed laws which under no circumstances can be amended. They are fixed for all people and at all times. There is also a set of alterable laws which follow the circumstances of time and place. While keeping in view the general principles elucidated in Islam, the mujtahidin, religious scholars and fuqaha have to legislate and enact these alterable laws.
What needs emphasis is that fixed laws are promulgated by God, and general frameworks are to be determined for alterable laws. It is impossible for all fixed and alterable laws to be enacted by a legislator uniformly and evenly all over the world. The alterable laws needed at all times and places are not limited and confined. The mental and intellectual capacity of man cannot contain all alterable laws needed from the beginning to the end of the world. As such, every part of these laws must be enacted at a particular time.
Assuming that during the early period of Islam when there was no trace of automobiles and vehicles, if it was said that drivers must keep to the right, the people would never understand and comprehend it. These laws must be enacted in every period according to specific requirements and circumstances, but they have a framework already determined by God. Those who enact these laws should follow that framework. There is a set of values which should not be neglected. This important task should be shouldered by those who know the fixed laws and the framework for alterable affairs better than everyone else.
Thus we mean that laws, which are divine and from God, are fixed and eternal laws. Secondly, God has already determined the framework for alterable laws which are the criterion for identifying the merit of alterable laws. In this regard, the Qur’an has an emphatic expression:
وَوَضَعَ الْمِيزَانَ ٭ أَلَّا تَطْغَوْا فِي الْمِيزَانِ
“And set up the balance, declaring, ‘Do not infringe the balance!’”[38][164]
What the divine and monotheistic outlook emphasizes and demands is that since law includes both command and prohibition, the one who has the right to enact law is he who has the right to bid and forbid the people and that is no one but God. Human beings have essentially no right to bid and forbid one another, let alone enact and implement laws. If alterable laws suitable to the requirements of time and place are supposed to be enacted, the authority to enact laws must come from God because it is He who has the intrinsic right to command and forbid. He has to grant others that right so that laws they enact become binding.
Second objection: absence of God’s will in legislation
Another objection being raised is that considering the authority of God as a requisite in legislation is nothing but empty rhetoric. It is not that given this requisite, changes are really taking place in the legislative process. Mere playing with words is taking place. For example, in the Islamic Consultative Assembly a certain number of people gather and deliberate what law they will enact about a particular alterable social affair at a given period.
Finally, they enact a certain law. What difference will it make whether God has granted authority or not? This is mere rhetoric. The criterion of the law’s credibility is that a number of experts examine the pros and cons and enact a law after identifying its merits. Is there any difference whether this law is enacted by individuals who have so-called legislative authority, or by other experts? The objection is noteworthy.
Reply to the second objection
The objection asserts that for a person to authorize another to do a certain work does not change the reality of the work. I ask, can social life be established without these authorizations? Assume that a person has parked his vehicle and you need it due to an emergency. Can you drive his vehicle without his permission, go, attend to the emergency, and return? Prior to his permission, do you have the right to use his vehicle? If you used it without his permission, then you did something against the law, giving him the right to sue you in court and ask for your conviction because he had not given you permission.
Consider as another example a man and a woman who want to marry each other. They have known each other for years. They have been working together in an office and are familiar with each other’s character. They are well- acquainted with each other’s families. Yet, as long as the wedding contract is not signed or a ceremony acceptable in their custom not held, their intimate relationship will be illegitimate. It is true that the marriage contract is mere verbal pronouncement that is observed through the consent of both parties, but it is an utterance that renders thousands of unlawful things lawful and also thousands of lawful things unlawful.
The social life of man depends on the same authorization. In principle, social life exists through the same authorization, permission, signing, and rejecting. Another example; assume that somebody is supposed to be appointed as your city mayor, but his letter of appointment is yet to be issued and the meeting for his appointment is awaited, does he have the right to go to the mayor’s office, occupy the mayor’s seat and start working? He has no such right and the employees will kick him out and say, “This is the table of the mayor!” If he says, “This table belongs to me, and a month from now I’m supposed to be your new mayor,” they will reply, “As soon as we receive your appointment, you will be our mayor.” If he says, “It’s only a matter of a signature and authority to be issued by the minister.” They will say, “Yes, it’s the same signature that will give you authority.” All social transactions acquire official status through a signature; so with legislation. When legislation is a prerogative of God, as it really is, only through His authority can rules enacted by others become binding; otherwise, those rules will never acquire legitimacy and credibility:
قُلْ ءَاَللّهُ أَذِنَ لَكُمْ أَمْ عَلَى اللّهِ تَفْتَرُونَ
“Say, ‘Did Allah give you the sanction [to do so], or do you fabricate a lie against Allah?’”[39][165]
In the absence of God’s authority, what right do you have in saying that a certain act is permissible or not, halal or haram? This is the meaning of enactment of law—that is, this act is permissible while that act is not permissible. In simple terms, this is halal and that is haram. In the absence of authorization from God, can you issue such decrees? The difference between the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the National Assembly of the ex-regime lies in this—this assembly is formed through the one who is designated by God.
That is, the wali al-faqih gives it the permission to enact alterable laws and his authorization gives credit to the bills of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Once the wali al-faqih is granted this right by the Imam of the Time (may Allah expedite his glorious advent), others do not have such a right. Also, once the Imam of the Time (may Allah expedite his glorious advent) is granted this right by God, others do not have such a right. The one who has been authorized by God directly or indirectly can exercise authority with respect to the affairs of others and command them to do or not to do a thing. But the one who has no authority has no right to bid and forbid, and his command and prohibition are not binding.
(In my theoretical discussions, I do not want to cite quotations from individuals, but Imam Khomeini cannot be placed in the rank of other individuals. His statements were derived from the Book and the Sunnah. As such, I shall quote his statements.) In one of his speeches, he explicitly said: “If the President is not designated by the wali al-faqih, he is taghut and it is not permissible to obey him.”[40][166]
The President is elected by the people through a general suffrage, but if he is not granted authority by the wali al-faqih, he is taghut as said by the Imam. His command and prohibition are not binding and it is not permissible to obey him. In all his decrees of confirmation [tanfidh] of the President, the Imam said: “I do hereby designate [nasb] you.” (In some instances, he stipulated: “By virtue of the divine guardianship [wilayat-e ilahi] I have, I do hereby designate you to the Presidency.”) This was in spite of the people’s vote, and their vote was confirmed to be valid.
Of course, the people are supposed to participate in social activities. It is their religious duty to get involved in elections. As such, during elections, the Imam would say: “It is a religious duty to participate in the elections. In the end, however, the religious credibility of the act of every legislator or designated authority must be traced back to God for it is He who is the Authority in the world. God has granted the Prophet (s) and the Imams (‘a) the authority to rule and legislate. The other person would be one designated by the Prophet (s) and the infallible Imam (‘a) through a general designation such as in the case of the wali al-faqih, or through a specific designation as in the case of the governors and deputies during their time. Such a person acquires legitimacy through the authority of any of the infallible personages. Once he is given authority, he acquires credibility.
So, having or not having authorization, having approval or not is the difference which exists in all social issues. What is the difference between a “mayor” whose appointment is not yet announced and the others? What is the difference between the “Minister” of Training and Education whose appointment is not yet announced and the others? It is true that the appointment is soon to be released but today he has no right to engage in any kind of official transaction. When he receives his letter of appointment, he will be officially commissioned and by means of a single signature, exercise authority over the public treasury.
A person may turn over his millions worth of property to you, and grant you the authority to spend it in whatever way you like. He may also give it as a public endowment. In any case, by uttering a single sentence, “I do hereby give my wealth,” everything is finished, and to exercise authority over his wealth becomes halal and permissible. But in the absence of his authority and grant, it is haram to exercise authority over his wealth. Anyone who exercises authority over his wealth shall be deemed criminal. In general, all social affairs follow this sort of authorization. In the absence of this permission and authority, nothing in social affairs can be deemed official. Given this, how can it be said that anyone who under the name of God wants to rule over the people and bid and forbid them is needless of any authority?
Is it possible to rule over the servants of God without His permission? As the people are not our servants, we have no right to rule over them. They are servants of God. The ruler and the ruled are equal before God. In the absence of God’s authorization, the president and the presided, the leader and the led are equal. When God authorizes a person, his command and prohibition become binding on others.
Man’s mastery over his destiny
Another issue is the concept of man’s mastery [hakimiyyah] over his destiny raised in newspapers and even in some speeches of the intellectuals and roundtables organized by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) saying that “human liberties are honorable because according to the Constitution, people are masters over their destiny,” It is thus, necessary to explain the various dimensions of this subject.
The word “hakimiyyah” (mastery or sovereignty) is discussed in two fields of law. (Of course, since the two terms are synonymous, those who do not have enough information tend to use them interchangeably.) One is in public international law in which it is said that every nation has mastery over its destiny (sovereignty). As a principle in public international law, this term governs the relations between countries, their position in relation to one another and against imperialist countries.
During the 18th and 19th centuries, especially in the Western world, the sphere of colonialism was extended. Any state that possessed power and force occupied a land at the point of the bayonet or through trick and ruse, or placed a satellite state there, or sent its envoy to rule over there. That is, the destiny of a nation was controlled by others, or it became the protectorate of another country. In essence, the term “mandate” [qaymumiyyah] is a term used in international law. After the people became aware of this global oppression and rose up to claim their rights, the principle of sovereignty of nations was raised.
Gradually, it was established in international law that every nation had mastery over its own destiny. That is, others have no mandate or colonial right over any nation. “National sovereignty” means that every nation is independent in relation to another and has mastery over its own destiny. No nation has the right to regard itself guardian of other nations and no state has the right to consider itself mandatory of other states .This is the terminology used in international relations.
The second term is sovereignty of individuals within a society. This principle is related to basic rights. A society is comprised of factions and groups, but no faction or group has the right of dominance over another faction or group. This is opposed to the class-oriented views that existed in many countries throughout the world in which the ruling class was already specified and defined. For example, a family with one thousand members had the right to rule and anyone who wished to rule had to belong to that class. The rulers belonged to the noble class, landowners, or a specific race. This principle of mastery of every person over his own destiny negates the dominance of a particular class or person. So, within society no person can automatically say, “I have dominance over other people.” No group, class or race has the right to regard itself dominant over other groups, classes, or races. This is the principle of human rights.
All these rights and principles apply to the relationship between human beings, and not the relationship between man and God. Those dealing with these principles—whether they profess any religion or not—have never considered the relationship between man and God, let alone saying that God also has no right to exercise sovereignty over man. They were not interested in it. Instead, their interest was determining relations between people—i.e., did a country have the right to exercise sovereignty over another country? Did a certain group, faction, class or individual have the right to dominate others and shoulder the burden of determining their destiny?
That every person is master over his or her own destiny does not mean that God also does not have that right. Now, let us assume that all those who drafted these laws and stipulated these principles professed no religion and did not believe in God. But it is enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic that the people have mastery over their own destiny, provided God is the absolute Sovereign. The evidence is the tens of provisions in the Constitution which stipulate that divine laws must be implemented. Given the existence of these provisions, how can a person imagine that this right of sovereignty stipulated for individuals negates the sovereignty of God?! Can any intelligent person have such an understanding of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic?
Lack of contradiction between mastery of man and sovereignty of God
For clarity sake, I shall cite an example from psychology on the issue of “self-confidence”. It is said that man should have self-confidence. This sentence can be heard and read in books more than often. One of the outstanding pivots and dimensions of many discussions conducted daily in radio and television, especially in discussions on child-rearing and family discourses, is relevant to the issue of self-confidence. For example, it is said that a child must be brought up in such a manner that he or she acquires self-confidence.
Dealing with the youth must be such that they acquire self-confidence. Similarly, when raising moral issues it is much emphasized that individuals must have self-confidence and must not depend on others. Meanwhile, in Islam we have another concept called “trust and reliance in God” [tawakkul]. That is, man should not expect anything from himself vis-à-vis God. He has to seek everything from Him and to regard Him as the Omniscient and Omnipotent:
وَإِنْ يَمْسَسْكَ اللّهُ بِضُرٍّ فَلاَ كَاشِفَ لَهُ إِلاَّ هُوَ وَإِن يُرِدْكَ بِخَيْرٍ فَلاَ رَآدَّ لِفَضْلِهِ يُصِِيبُ بِهِ مَن يَشَاءُ مِنْ عِبَادِهِ وَهُوَ الْغَفُورُ الرَّحِيمُ
“Should Allah visit you with some distress, there is no one to remove it except Him; and should He desire any good for you, none can stand in the way of His grace: He grants it to whomever He wishes of His servants, and He is the All-forgiving, the All-merciful.”[41][167]
Benefit and loss comes from Him and the will of man vis-à-vis the will of God is nothing. Compared to the majesty of God’s other creatures, he is utterly insignificant. In the teachings of Islam and the Qur’an, there has been an endeavor for man to be trained in such a manner that he always regards himself insignificant, humble and abject before God. The foundation of Islamic training rests upon the Lordship of Allah and the servitude of man.
They might ask: How is it possible for man to have self-confidence and at the same time regard himself insignificant before God? Is belittling oneself before God consistent with self-confidence, self-esteem, personality development, and similar concepts tackled in psychology especially in educational psychology?
This is similar to the objection they raised about sovereignty [hakimiyyah] which belongs to political issues and is related to the question of dominance over a person while this objection is raised in relation to psychological, moral and educational issues. Concerning the psychological question, the emphasis is on self-confidence vis-à-vis reliance on other people—the child must be trained in such a manner that he or she does not need to rely on his or her parents, friends, neighbors or relatives and can stand on his or her own feet. That means not to rely on other people and be dependent on them; but it does not mean to regard oneself independent of God.
Essentially, the discussion is related to a person’s relationship with other people. The concept of “self-confidence” means that you should behave and train yourself in such a way that you do not rely on others, and this is also emphasized in Islam. In the conduct of the Prophet (s) and the pure Imams(‘a) it is highlighted and emphasized, but unfortunately, we pay little attention to them, thinking they have been newly arrived at by the West.
During the time of the Holy Prophet (s) his companions were trained in such a manner that if someone was riding a horse and the whip in his hand fell on the ground, he would not ask his comrade who was moving beside his horse to pick it up for him. He would dismount, pick up the whip and ride again! This is the Islamic training which urges us to stand on our own feet, to carry our own load, not to be dependent on others, and not to covet others. But this does not mean that we should also regard ourselves independent of God:
يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ أَنتُمُ الْفُقَرَاءُ إِلَى اللَّهِ وَاللَّهُ هُوَ الْغَنِيُّ الْحَمِيدُ
“O mankind! You are the ones who stand in need of Allah, and Allah—He is the All-sufficient, the All-laudable.”[42][168]
Is it possible for man who is in a state of total poverty and need to regard himself needless of God? This is also a form of polytheism. Not to rely on God is diametrically opposed to the spirit of Islam and the entire message of the Qur’an. There are hundreds of Qur’anic verses and traditions in this regard which enjoin man to regard himself as nothing before God and to ask Him for everything. Self-confidence is meant to determine the relationship between human beings, and teach them not to rely on other people because no one is more capable than another.
This is the reply to the question on self-confidence and reliance on God Similarly, in the realm of political issues such as that of individual sovereignty and national sovereignty, the case is the same. National sovereignty means that every nation should stand on its own feet and others should not exercise a mandate over it. Individual sovereignty means that a person has no spontaneous right to rule and dominate others. It means the individual and national right of sovereignty is subservient to the sovereignty of God. In essence, sovereignty belongs to God, and by extension, anyone who has been given authority to rule has the right to rule to the extent that God has granted him. In the absence of God’s permission, no person has the right to dominate another person.
Notes:
[43][164] Surah ar-Rahman 55:7-8.
[2][143] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:150-151.
[3][144] Akhund: a word of uncertain etymology that originally denoted a scholar of unusual attainment, but was later applied to lesser-ranking scholars, and then acquired a pejorative connotation, particularly in secularist usage.
[5][146] Surah al-Baqarah 2:34: “He was one of the faithless.”
[6][147] Surah al-Hijr 15:36-39.
[7][148] Surah Al ‘Imran 3:64.
[8][149] Surah at-Tawbah (or, Bara‘ah) 9:31.
[9][150] Surah an-Nahl 16:116.
[10][151] Surah Yunus 10:59.
[11][152] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:59.
[12][153] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:80.
[13][154] Surah an-Najm 53:3-4.
[14][155] Maqbulah: a hadith to which one may make acceptable reference. [Trans.]
[15][156] The maqbulah tradition is the tradition of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah who asked Imam as-Sadiq (‘a) whether it was permissible in the event of a disagreement between two Shi‘ah concerning a debt or a legacy to seek the verdict of the ruler or judge. He replied: “Anyone who has recourse to the ruler or judge, whether his case is just or unjust, has in reality had recourse to the taghut (i.e., the illegitimate ruling power). Whatever he obtains as a result of their verdict, he will have obtained by forbidden means, even if he has a proven right to it, for he will have obtained it through the verdict and judgment of the taghut, that power which God Almighty has commanded him to disbelieve in: “They desire to seek the judgment of the Rebel, though they were commanded to defy it” (Surah an-Nisa’ 4:60).” Imam as-Sadiq then advised the Shi‘ah to refer to one of the fuqaha, i.e. one learned in the principles and ordinances of Islamic law or, more generally, in all aspects of the faith. See Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 18, the section on the attributes of judges, pp. 98-99. [Trans.]
[16][157] Marfu‘ah: ‘traceable’ – refers to any tradition that can be traced back to a Ma‘sum (infallible – referring specifically to the Prophet (s) and the Imams (‘a)), regardless of the continuity in its chain of transmission.
[17][158] Abu Khadijah, one of the trusted companions of Imam as-Ṣadiq (‘a), relates: “I was commanded by the Imam (‘a) to convey the following message to our friends (i.e., the Shi‘ah): ‘When enmity and dispute arise among you, or you disagree concerning the receipt or payment of a sum of money, be sure not to refer the matter to one of these malefactors for judgment. Designate as judge and arbiter someone among you who is acquainted with our injunctions concerning what is permitted and what is prohibited, for I appoint such a man as judge over you. Let none of you take your complaint against another of you to the tyrannical ruling power’.” Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 18, p. 100. [Trans.]
[18][159] Usul al-Kafi, vol. 1, p. 67; Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 18, 98.
[19][160] Surah adh-Dhariyat 51:56.
[20][161] Surah Luqman 31:13.
[21][162] Surah Yunus 10:59.
[22][163] Surah an-Nahl 16:116.
[24][150] Surah an-Nahl 16:116.
[25][151] Surah Yunus 10:59.
[26][152] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:59.
[27][153] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:80.
[28][154] Surah an-Najm 53:3-4.
[29][155] Maqbulah: a hadith to which one may make acceptable reference. [Trans.]
[30][156] The maqbulah tradition is the tradition of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah who asked Imam as-Sadiq (‘a) whether it was permissible in the event of a disagreement between two Shi‘ah concerning a debt or a legacy to seek the verdict of the ruler or judge. He replied: “Anyone who has recourse to the ruler or judge, whether his case is just or unjust, has in reality had recourse to the taghut (i.e., the illegitimate ruling power). Whatever he obtains as a result of their verdict, he will have obtained by forbidden means, even if he has a proven right to it, for he will have obtained it through the verdict and judgment of the taghut, that power which God Almighty has commanded him to disbelieve in: “They desire to seek the judgment of the Rebel, though they were commanded to defy it” (Surah an-Nisa’ 4:60).” Imam as-Sadiq then advised the Shi‘ah to refer to one of the fuqaha, i.e. one learned in the principles and ordinances of Islamic law or, more generally, in all aspects of the faith. See Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 18, the section on the attributes of judges, pp. 98-99. [Trans.]
[31][157] Marfu‘ah: ‘traceable’ – refers to any tradition that can be traced back to a Ma‘sum (infallible – referring specifically to the Prophet (s) and the Imams (‘a)), regardless of the continuity in its chain of transmission.
[32][158] Abu Khadijah, one of the trusted companions of Imam as-Ṣadiq (‘a), relates: “I was commanded by the Imam (‘a) to convey the following message to our friends (i.e., the Shi‘ah): ‘When enmity and dispute arise among you, or you disagree concerning the receipt or payment of a sum of money, be sure not to refer the matter to one of these malefactors for judgment. Designate as judge and arbiter someone among you who is acquainted with our injunctions concerning what is permitted and what is prohibited, for I appoint such a man as judge over you. Let none of you take your complaint against another of you to the tyrannical ruling power’.” Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 18, p. 100. [Trans.]
[33][159] Usul al-Kafi, vol. 1, p. 67; Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 18, 98.
[34][160] Surah adh-Dhariyat 51:56.
[35][161] Surah Luqman 31:13.
[36][162] Surah Yunus 10:59.
[37][163] Surah an-Nahl 16:116.
[39][165] Surah Yunus 10:59.
[40][166] Ṣahifeh-ye Nur, vol. 9, p. 251.
[41][167] Surah Yunus 10:107.
[42][168] Surah Fatir (or al-Mala’ikah) 35:15.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: al-islam.org
Legislation and Sovereignty in Islam
Hence, according to the Islamic perspective and legislative Lordship, it accrues that the Legislator in principle must be God and beside Him, no one has the right of legislation. Now, the question here is: Is there no other type of legislation which is legitimate? In reply, it has been stated before that subordinate to God’s legislation and not parallel to Him, there are those who have the right to enact law by God’s leave, and that law is credible and binding with the permission of God.
وَلاَ تَقُولُوا لِمَا تَصِفُ أَلْسِنَتُكُمُ الْكَذِبَ هَـذَا حَلاَلٌ وَهَـذَا حَرَامٌ لِِِتَفْتَرُوا عَلَى اللّهِ الْكَذِبَ إِنَّ الَّذِينَ يَفْتَرُونَ عَلَى اللّهِ الْكَذِبَ لاَ يُفْلِحُونَ
“Do not say, asserting falsely with your tongues, ‘This is lawful, and this is unlawful,’ to fabricate lies against Allah. Indeed those who fabricate lies against Allah will not be felicitous.”[24][150]
As such, one should not say to himself, “This is halal and that is haram” for halal and haram do not depend on your opinion and preference. This is a form of polytheism. You have to see what God has said. In another place, the Qur’an thus states:
قُلْ ءَاَللّهُ أَذِنَ لَكُمْ أَمْ عَلَى اللّهِ تَفْتَرُونَ
“Say, ‘Did Allah give you the sanction [to do so], or do you fabricate a lie against Allah?’”[25][151]
Yes, God gave the Prophet (s) authority to legislate and to bid and forbid the people, saying: “Obey Allah and obey the Apostle”[26][152] and “Whoever obeys the Apostle certainly obeys Allah.”[27][153]
Of course, the Messenger of Allah (s) would not act according to his own desire. Rather, his action was based on divine inspiration and revelation. At times when a verse would not be revealed to him, he used to receive divine inspiration [ilham] and non-Qur’anic revelation [wahy] by the legislative will of God:
وَمَا يَنطِقُ عَنِ الْهَوَى ٭ إِنْ هُوَ إِلَّا وَحْيٌ يُوحَى
“He does not speak out of [his own] desire: it is just a revelation that is revealed [to him].”[28][154]
Therefore, if a person is authorized by God to enact laws, any law he enacts becomes respected and binding. The Shi‘ah believe that such an authority granted to the Holy Prophet (s) is also granted to the infallible Imams (‘a). Of course, in scholastic theology [‘ilm al-kalam] clear proofs substantiating this claim have been presented. One of these proofs is the tradition about the two weighty things [hadith ath-thaqalayn] in which the pure Imams (‘a) are treated as partners [‘idl] of the Qur’an:
إنِّي تَارِكٌ فِيكُمُ الثَّقَلَيْنِ: كِتَابَ اللهِ وَعِتْرَتِي أهْلَ بَيْتِي، مَا إنْ تَمَسَّكْتُمْ بِهِمَا لَنْ تَضِلُّوا بَعْدِي أبَداً
.
“Verily, I am leaving among you two weighty things [thaqalayn]: The Book of Allah and my progeny [‘itrati], the members of my Household [Ahl al-Bayt]. If you hold fast to them, you shall never go astray.”
Here we are not in pursuit of presenting and proving the Shi‘ah doctrines but to point out that those who believe in this principle acceptable to the Shi‘ah regard the infallible Imams (‘a) besides the Holy Prophet (s) to also have such authority. On the contrary, there are also those who say that only the Messenger of Allah (s) was infallible and incumbent upon us to follow. But this difference in opinion does not make such a difference as far as our subject is concerned.
Assuming that we were living at the time of the Holy Prophet (s) who appointed a governor of a city and asked us to obey the governor, was it obligatory to obey the governor under the aegis of obedience to the Holy Prophet (s), or not? Was obedience to him inconsistent with obedience to the Prophet (s) and God and the sovereignty of Allah? The answer is negative because that person was the representative and envoy of a prophet who in turn had been designated by God. Our belief is that the infallible Imams (‘a) also have the same prerogative.
For the present time, they have also designated individuals on the basis of quality and not personality, and the one who is closest to the Infallibles (‘a) and the most righteous is appointed by them to rule. Now, sometimes this belief can be proved through the Maqbulah[29][155] of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah,[30][156] Marfu‘ah[31][157] of Abu Khadijah[32][158] and other traditions, and at times through rational proofs. Through various statements fuqaha have engaged in proving it.
Thus, the essence of the theory is that just as the Holy Prophet (s) during his lifetime appointed a person to rule and govern a region of the Islamic land and obedience to him was incumbent upon the people of the region, or just as the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) during his caliphate appointed individuals as governors and rulers of Islamic territories such as Bahrain, Ahwaz, Egypt, and others and obedience to them was obligatory, during this period of occultation [ghaybah] those who are like Malik al-Ashtar in political acumen and knowledge of jurisprudence and have the competence, merit and capability to lead and administer the Islamic society are designated to take charge of the government according to the principle of wilayah al-faqih and obedience to them is incumbent upon us.
This is not in conflict with the legislative Lordship of God. In fact, their sovereignty is under the auspices of Divine Lordship. Since God has commanded His Prophet (s), and the Prophet (s) in turn, appointed them as governors, or since the infallible Imam (‘a) designated his specific or general deputies, it is incumbent upon us to obey them. In other words, obedience to the governor is obedience to the Prophet (s) and God. On the contrary, opposition to him is tantamount to opposition to the Prophet (s) and opposition to the Prophet (s), in turn, is tantamount to opposition to God.
In the same vein, obedience to the wali al-faqih is obedience to the infallible Imam (‘a) and the Prophet (s), and thus, to God, and disobedience to him is disobedience to the infallible Imam (‘a) and the Prophet (s), and thus, to God. This point has been categorically stated in the Maqbulah of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah when Imam as-Sadiq (‘a) says:
يَنْظُرُ إِلىٰ مَنْ كَانَ مِنْكُمْ قَدْ رَوىٰ حَدِيثُنَا وَ نَظَرَ في حَلاَلِنَا وَ حَرَامِنَا وَ عَرَفَ أَحْكَامَنَا فَلْيَرْضُوا بِهِ حَكَمًا فَإِنّي قَدْ جَعَلْتُهُ عَلَيْكُمْ حَاكِمًا. فَإِذَا حَكَمَ بِحُكْمِنَا فَلَمْ يَقْبَلْهُ مِنْهُ فَإِنَّمَا إِسْتَخَفَّ بِحُكْمِ اللهِ وَ عَلَيْنَا رَدَّ وَ الرَّادُّ عَلَيْنَا الرَّادُّ عَلىٰ اللهِ وَ هُوَ عَلىٰ حَدِّ الشِّرْكِ بِاللهِ
.
“They must seek out one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well acquainted with our laws and ordinances, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as judge over you. So, anyone who rejects his judgment is as if he belittles the judgment of Allah and rejects us, and anyone who rejects us is as if he rejects Allah, and rejection of Him is tantamount to associating partners with Him.”[33][159]
The Imam (‘a) said that it “is tantamount to associating partners with Him” because polytheism is the opposite of monotheism, and one of the pillars of monotheism is belief in the legislative Lordship. Now, if we accept the sovereignty of God, and under His auspices, the sovereignty of the Prophet (s) and the Imam (‘a) and those who are designated by God through the Imam (‘a), it follows that we have accepted monotheism in the legislative Lordship.
And if we reject it, it means that we are committing polytheism in the legislative Lordship. Thus, “rejection of them” means that if a person rejects the fuqaha designated to rule over the people it is as if he has rejected the Imams (‘a). That is, if a person says, “I do not recognize wilayah al-faqih,” he is saying, “I do not recognize the infallible Imam” and if a person does not accept the Imam (‘a), he has in a sense associated partners with God because he has rejected an aspect of His legislative Lordship. Of course, this is spiritual and esoteric polytheism and it does not render a person ritually impure [najis].
As such, it is established that if a person accepts that sovereignty intrinsically belongs to God alone, he has to accept also that at a lower level, it also belongs to the Messenger of Allah (s). It is under the auspices of God’s sovereignty that the sovereignty of the Messenger of Allah (s) and that of the Imams (‘a) and their deputies are realized and acquire legitimacy. If we uphold the legitimacy of rule in a different way, we have actually upheld a form of polytheism in sovereignty.
Therefore, the rational reason why the Islamic system must be based on divine laws and under a ruler designated by God is the legislative Lordship of God. If we try to properly understand tawhid, we will arrive at the same conclusion, and if certain people reject this conclusion, their faith is essentially weak and their [state of belief in] tawhid is impure and tainted with shirk.
One may ask, “Why must laws of society be divine”? If certain people do not believe in God and His law and enact and implement laws by themselves, will the society not be reformed? If so, how have certain societies in the world reached a certain stage of life without acting upon God’s law? This is a skepticism raised by many “intellectuals” who ask, “Why should law be promulgated by God?” They are of the opinion that by using their intellect people can make laws and act upon them, without arising any problem.
Reasons behind God’s legislative monopoly
In order reply to this skepticism, it must be noted that man is a unitary being but he has various organs, senses and dimensions, and these dimensions are linked and knitted together. Man does not have an economic dimension alone. So long as one enacts laws for the economy and administers the economic dimension of his society, his condition shall be in order. His economy is related to his polity. His polity is related to his civil and social laws. His civil laws are related to his criminal laws, and all these are related to the international law. Their totality is firmly connected to man’s spiritual, psychological and moral dimensions.
Man does not constitute ten beings. He does not have ten souls either. Man has a divine spirit which has different dimensions and aspects, all interconnected. So, if there is a defect in one dimension, it will naturally affect the others. God who has created man and ordained social life for him has endowed his natural disposition [fitrah] with elements which naturally and innately draw him toward the establishment of social life. Therefore, God has a purpose in the creation of man which is to attain human perfection under the aegis of social life, and advance all dimensions of his existence which are at the service of the spiritual and religious dimension toward perfection, and finally, achieve the ideal:
وَمَا خَلَقْتُ الْجِنَّ وَالْإِنسَ إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُونِ
“I did not create the jinn and humans except that they may worship Me.”[34][160]
What is said must take place under the auspices of worship [‘ibadah] which is inextricably interwoven with tawhid and rububiyyah; otherwise, human perfection will not materialize. Of course, through another way, outward order may also be established in society which is worthy of reflection; for example, the “order” which exists today in countries whose symbol is America. It can be observed that in all high schools in the model of “civilized” countries in the world armed policemen must be stationed. Notwithstanding the presence of armed units, killing and crimes take place daily in these high schools. This is the order established by mankind. The same is true in cases of other corruption and crimes.
Even assuming that without acting upon divine laws and paying attention to the spiritual dimension of man, outward civil order can still be established in society, yet the ultimate purpose of his life can not be ensured. Is the life of man that of a termite? Or, is human society similar to bees which can be established through an outward order? All these systems, security measures, advancement, growth, science, industry, and technology are means to evolve the human soul and get closer to God. Who can grasp this relationship?
Who can identify which type of food or manner of living will contribute toward achieving proximity to God? Who ascertains whether eating pork and drinking wine will contribute toward the achievement of happiness? Notwithstanding their progress in the science of medicine, medical scientists of the world conclude that excessive consumption of alcohol may be harmful for the brain cells, but they do not know whether it affects the eternal bliss of man because they have no experience in this regard being beyond empirical observation.
Man’s life must be codified in such a manner that all dimensions are taken into account and the focus is not only on his physical health and wellbeing and political-economic condition. The interrelationship of all dimensions must take place in a cohesive and harmonious system. No one except God the Creator, with his all-embracing knowledge can establish a relationship between these dimensions and guide them toward ultimate perfection. This is the reason why it is God who must enact the law. Furthermore, which legislator will set his personal interests aside at the moment of legislation? It is clear that any group that gains power tries to enact and implement laws which serve its interests. For instance, in Muslim countries, as soon as an administration assumes office, it enacts new rules and regulations which are mostly in favor of the ruling party. It makes no difference whether it is leftist or rightist. This is human nature, and by the way, most human beings are fallible.
Only God is immune from individual or group favoritism and His interest is not served in any way. The laws of God are neither favorable nor unfavorable to Him. His only concern is what is good or bad for human beings. Thus, on one hand, His knowledge is boundless, and on the other hand, He has no personal interest in enacting laws. Moreover, He has the right of Lordship over His creatures. If man wants to attain perfection, he has to observe the right of Divine Lordship. This is another subject that requires explanation which is not possible in this limited time.
Human beings have rights over one another and they know of latitudinal rights [huquq al-‘Ardht] like the right of the farmer over the worker and vice versa, or the right of the ruler over the people and vice versa. The people know these rights, yet do they know the right of God over the people and the manner of granting it? The hallmark of the Islamic outlook is that above all rights is the right of Allah [haqq Allah]. Therefore, it must first be granted so that the rights of people can be given under the aegis of God’s right. Can the rights of men be considered in statutory laws without taking the right of God into account? It is certainly unjust if not cruel, to deny the rights of God! With this ingratitude, can one attain human perfection?
Which ingratitude is greater than ingratitude to God which the Qur’an points out: “Polytheism is indeed a great injustice”?[35][161]
The greatest of injustices is injustice toward Divine Lordship. As such, if we do not take into account the right of God, we will commit a great injustice. How then will we be just to others? How can a person be just who is unjust to his Creator? As we have said, one of the forms of shirk is the belief in other than God’s having the right of legislation.
Since God is perfectly aware of our interests, gains no benefit in legislation and has the right of legislative Lordship over man, the law of God must be observed, and rules obeyed which have been introduced by those who are designated by God as far as they are authorized, so that man is not guilty of what the following verse describes:
قُلْ أَرَأَيْتُم مََا أَنزَلَ اللّهُ لَكُم مِّن رِزْقٍ فَجَعَلْتُم مِنْهُ حَرَامًا وَحَلاَلاً قُلْ ءَاَللّهُ أَذِنَ لَكُمْ أَمْ عَلَى اللّهِ تَفْتَرُونَ
“Say, ‘Have you regarded what Allah has sent down for you of [His] provision, whereupon you made some of it unlawful and [some] lawful?’ Say, ‘Did Allah give you the sanction [to do so], or do you fabricate a lie against Allah?’”[36][162]
And in another verse, it is stated:
وَلاَ تَقُولُوا لِمَا تَصِفُ أَلْسِنَتُكُمُ الْكَذِبَ هَـذَا حَلاَلٌ وَهَـذَا حَرَامٌ لِتَفْتَرُوا عَلَى اللّهِ الْكَذِبَ إِنَّ الَّذِينَ يَفْتَرُونَ عَلَى اللّهِ الْكَذِبَ لاَ يُفْلِحُونَ
“Do not say, asserting falsely with your tongues, ‘This is lawful, and this is unlawful,’ to fabricate lies against Allah. Indeed those who fabricate lies against Allah will not be felicitous.”[37][163]
Therefore, in order to observe the right of legislative Lordship of God, one should first refer to the law of God and then examine whom He has granted the authority to enact laws or whom He has granted the authority to implement them. The reason for this is that if the implementation of those laws is beyond His command, exercise of authority [tasarruf] over the servants of God without the permission of their Master will again take place.
In the divine perspective, exercise of authority even on oneself is not permissible if it is against the pleasure of God, let alone exercise of authority over others. As such, man has no right to commit suicide. In Western liberalism, it may possibly be said that since man owns himself, he has the right to commit suicide if he wants to, but in the divine system it is not so. Man has no ownership of himself as he belongs to God. Thus, he has no right to commit suicide because God has not permitted him to do so. The authority over the life and soul of man is with Him and with none else. Hence, how can one who has no right to kill himself, grant permission to others to kill him?
None has the right to amputate his hands or blind his eyes because the Owner of these body limbs is God who has not given him that permission. How can a person give authority to another to amputate the hand of a thief or imprison a person? No one has such a right because others are also servants of God and without the permission of God, one cannot exercise authority over them. Thus, in legislation as well as in the implementation of laws, the permission of God is binding. In a nutshell, the Islamic political theory in this regard stands on the proposition that God’s legislative Lordship is a pillar of tawhid and he who does not observe this pillar commits kufr similar to that which is committed by Iblis.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
The Islamic Government, Challenges and Cultural Plots
Our concern was to elucidate the Islamic political theory which states that the law which is either directly stipulated by God the Exalted in the Holy Qur’an or enacted by the Holy Prophet (s) and the infallible Imams (‘a), or by a person designated by an infallible Imam (‘a), is binding in society. In any case, the law must be pleasing to God and in accordance with Islamic standards. Those who oppose the idea that religious laws must rule and be implemented in society can be divided into three. The first group essentially does not accept religion. Such people do not want particular religious laws to be implemented in the country. Thank God such people are very few in our society.
The second group is of the opinion that the jurisdiction of religion is separate from that of society and politics. It regards religion as concerned with personal affairs and the relationship between God and man, saying that problems pertaining to social life have nothing to do with religion. This trend is generally called “secularism” or the separation of religion from the problems of life.
The third group really believes that Islam has sociopolitical laws but it is unconsciously influenced by eclecticism and Western culture. Some of its views are inconsistent with Islam.
The clergy and its crucial duty of guidance
In any case, in accordance with the duty set by God, the Exalted, we need to point out these truths as much as possible in order to clarify the Islamic stance and prevent intellectual, ideological and religious deviations. Some of our friends and well-wishers think that engaging in these discussions in these particular sociopolitical conditions is unnecessary, while others think that it is harmful, as it encourages differences in opinion and conviction.
They imagine that the more we strive for intellectual and ideological unity and avoid issues that lead to dispersion and separation is beneficial for society. Out of good intention, there are also some who say, “Instead of holding such discussions, engage in more positive activities in society, assume positions of authority and render services which are beneficial for society.”
Let me say to these colleagues most of whom are well-wishers and with good intentions: Our concern is the religious duty which God, the Exalted, has placed upon our shoulders. It is incumbent, first and foremost, upon the prophets and infallible Imams (‘a) and then upon the ‘ulama’.
It is a tortuous path full of dangers, not mere verbal opposition, but accompanied by abuse, calumny, foul language, and at times, exile, imprisonment, torture and libel, and sometimes, even assassination. These difficulties have been experienced throughout history by the prophets and infallible Imams (‘a). On our part, we have no choice but to tread this path even if our friends reproach and criticize us. As God, the Exalted, says:
إِنَّ الَّذِينَ يَكْتُمُونَ مَا أَنزَلْنَا مِنَ الْبَيِّنَاتِ وَالْهُدَى مِن بَعْدِ مَا بَيَّنَّاهُ لِلنَّاسِ فِي الْكِتَابِ أُولَـئِكَ يَلعَنُهُمُ اللّهُ وَيَلْعَنُهُمُ اللَّاعِنُونَ
“Indeed those who conceal what We have sent down of manifest proofs and guidance, after We have clarified it in the Book for mankind—they shall be cursed by Allah and cursed by the cursers.”[13][133]
Those who are aware of the truth of religion and conceal it on account of personal gains and group interests will incur the curse of God, the angels and holy saints [awliya’]. As mentioned in the noble hadith,
إِذَا ظَهَرَتِ الْبِدَعُ فِي أُمَّتِي فَلْيُظْهِرِ الْعَالِمُ عِلْمَهُ وَ إِلاَّ فعَلَيْهِ لَعْنَةُ اللهِ...
“When innovation in religion [bid‘ah] emerges in my ummah, it is incumbent upon the scholar [‘alim] to reveal his knowledge (of the religion) otherwise the curse of Allah shall be upon him…”[14][134]
Based on this, we have two options: Either we endure the reproaches and criticism of friends and the calumny of enemies, and in return, seek the pleasure of God, or prefer the praise of some people and thus, incur the curse of God. We prefer to endure slanders and not incur the curse of God. Thus, this crucial responsibility is placed upon our shoulders and for the likes of us, dealing with these matters is more urgent than anything else.
It is true that today we have problems along our borders, and, in future military dangers may arise. It is true that members of our consular staff and 35 drivers are held captive by the deviant and retrogressive Ṭaliban in Afghanistan, which has upset our nation and government and prompted public demonstrations, protests and been referred to international commissions.
In our opinion, however, the danger of the capture of 40 to 50 Iranians by enemies is not greater than the danger of the capture of thousands of our Muslim youth in universities by the agents of America. The bondage of our youth by the agents, functionaries and proponents of Western culture is far more dangerous than the capture of a number of Iranian citizens by a deviant group. It is true that they are experiencing difficulties and tribulations but they shall be rewarded by God.
When our dear youth, especially the children of martyrs and freed prisoners of war, however, are on the verge of intellectual and religious deviation and bondage, what could be more serious? Should no one feel a sense of responsibility in this regard?
(Some people may say, “You are thinking erroneously.” Well, if man is free to express his views, at least as a person who is engaged in religious and Islamic sciences for more than 50 years I also have the right to express my views.)
Our concern is their opposing our claim that Islamic and divine laws must govern society, and raising doubts already mentioned in previous discussions. They say that implementing the laws of Islam in society is discordant with the natural rights of man. One of the natural rights of man is freedom which is manifested in freedom of thought, expression, religion and political views.
By nature, every person has the right to choose whatever religion he or she likes, change his or her religion; express and promote any view and belief he or she has. If Islamic laws must govern this country, there will be some who do not want these laws. They all have the right to express their views, cast their vote and say that “We do not want these laws”. Those who totally reject religion to express such a view is not surprising, but unfortunate when the same is sometimes expressed by those who claim to be religious, and worse, even use an Islamic appellation for themselves, and introduce themselves as followers of the Imam!
Promotion of destructive Western freedom in the national press
This state of affairs has reached a point where it is posed in newspapers—sometimes with a serious tone and at times as humor, sometimes as a quotation from a certain writer, a young man or a woman—Why, in principle, a man can have many wives while a woman cannot have many husbands. They also suggest that a communal wedding be held and a number of men share a single wife!
It is worth noting that these issues are not from periodicals of communist countries. Instead, such issues are presented in newspapers of the Islamic Republic! There is also someone who delivers a speech in an Islamic university, which he describes as an Islamic institution, in which he says, “Today, opposing a leader or the Prophet is nothing. Even if people want to demonstrate against God, no law has the right to prevent them!”
If these words are uttered in a non-Muslim country or by a person who is an infidel or a polytheist, it will not surprise. But in reality, these words have been uttered in the Islamic Republic, under the sovereignty of Islam and under the rule of wilayah al-faqih, in universities, and no one is confronting them. Sometimes, a student protests but it is of no avail. It is for this reason that I feel a sense of responsibility and I hereby declare that these utterances are dangerous innovations in religion and are repugnant to the foundation of Islam.
If there are people who want to make these utterances in their speeches, at least they should not do so in the name of Islam, so that the difference between Islam and kufr remains clear. This freedom of religion and freedom of expression is a fruit of Western culture which is deceitful and ostensibly pleasant but innately venomous. It might be appropriate for Western culture, but certainly not to this extent for our Islamic culture.
Religion in Western culture today, is a matter of taste, like inclination toward a political party. If for example, in a country a number of political parties are already functioning and the following day, another party is registered and announces its existence, transferring from one party to another, is not surprising. The same applies to religion in the West, especially in America, where every day a new religion or sect is founded. This is astonishing for us. More than a century ago, someone named “Bab” emerged saying, “I founded a new Islam and the Imam of the Time expected by the Shi‘ah has already appeared.”
This set everybody wondering how someone could claim that a new religion had emerged. (Of course, outside Iran particularly in America, this corrupt sect is publicized as “modern Islam”, where it is not surprising at all.) But every year, a number of religious sects are founded in Canada, America and European countries. For instance, the main Christian denominations are Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism and Protestantism. Protestantism alone has more than 500 sects officially registered in Western countries.
Last year, I visited some Latin American countries. I noticed that several new sects were founded whose preachers were busy propagating their respective sects. Such innovations are very common there. It is announced in a newspaper that a priest has founded a new religion or a new sect, and people easily transfer from one sect to another. This is what they called “freedom of religion”.
“Islamic Protestantism” as a conspiracy against Islam
Some expect that there shall also be freedom for the religion in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus, for a long time they have suggested the emergence of “Islamic Protestantism”. As far as I know, it was Fath-‘Ali Akhundzadeh (Akhundof) who first proposed that there should be a “protestant sect” in Islam. After him, other “intellectuals” promoted this in their speeches and books, suggesting that “Islamic Protestantism” should come into being in Iran.
Today, in America, it is propagated that there should also be a new “Martin Luther” in Iran, a new “protestant religion” and a “modern Islam” which is consistent with modern conditions, insisting that the Islam which came into being 1,400 years ago is of no use in life today!
One should not be surprised if America makes such a suggestion because their goal is to obliterate Islam. They themselves have said that for this task they have a particular program and allotted a specific budget. They have confessed repeatedly that their Archenemy at this stage is Islam.
But what is surprising is that gradually this propaganda is gaining ground in our country, and there are those who explicitly question the essential and fixed laws of Islam in newspapers and magazines. For instance, they question the injustice between man and woman in laws of inheritance, woman given no right to have many husbands, or the like, and sometimes, they ridicule the essential laws of Islam.
As you may recall, during the initial years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, when the bill regarding the law of retaliation [qisas] was passed, they said, “The bill regarding qisas is inhuman,” and the Imam (q) said that if they had made this utterance consciously, their Muslim spouses would be haram for them and the right of ownership for their property would be transferred to their Muslim inheritors and their lives would no more be held in honor. Of course, laws pertaining to apostasy [irtidad] are not only confined to the person who denies qisas and its laws.
Denial of any essential law is tantamount to apostasy. But we can observe today, that without any shame and hesitation, individuals explicitly reject the essential laws of Islam in newspapers and magazines of the Islamic Republic, and sometimes in newspapers founded through grants from the Muslims’ public treasury. Some people should remind them that the decree of the Imam pertaining to the deniers of qisas is not only confined to the issue of qisas.
It can sometimes be observed that laws unanimously accepted by the Shi‘ah and Sunni fuqaha and are not opposed even by the Sunnis are questioned and mocked! Should the concerned authorities not address these problems?
Should they not be reminded that such dangers pose threats to our young generation? Those who have neither heard the speeches of the Imam nor studied his lectures can be influenced by the questions raised in newspapers published in the Islamic Republic and think that the Islamic political system and the Islamic state also agree with these ideas and that the same are Islamic ideas! There should at least be a venue to announce that these ideas have nothing to do with Islam.
The notion that religion is a matter of taste and that man can choose whatever religion he likes and then change it once he no longer likes it, is dangerous. In Western countries, sometimes a teenager goes to the church with his friend who says, “I like so-and-so church more,” and thus changes his religion. The said teenager will also be influenced and in following his friend, he will also change his religion. They think that religion is like a garment which a person can wear today and change tomorrow. Islam does not endorse the view. “Choose whichever you accept for the state guarantees this freedom as a natural right of the people.” Islam regards religion as the most important matter in the life of man and that felicity and perdition in this world and the hereafter depends on ‘choosing the right religion.’
So, the reason behind these discussions is the existence of such dangers which we can feel, discern and even witness sometimes, and by struggling against them discharge our duty.
Real meaning of natural right
The best definition of “natural right” is that it is a need demanded by the nature of man and no one should deny it. So, talking and expressing views are among the demands of man’s nature and no one should prevent them. We have said that eating and drinking are also among the demands of man’s nature. In fact, it is the most natural right of every man to eat, but merely because eating is a demand of man’s nature, does a person have the right to eat anything that belongs to others? Is there no law that specifies which is halal and which is haram, and whose property a person has the right to consume and whose property a person has no right to consume?
Is there any reasonable person who can accept the notion that man is free to take whatever he likes from anybody. Talking is also a natural right of man, but it does mean that he can express anything everywhere and for whatever reason and motive. How can the law afford to dictate what things to eat or not to eat, and how can religion decree that pork and alcoholic beverages should not be consumed, when eating and drinking are natural rights of man? The same is the case with talking: The subject of talk, its time, place, and limitation are determined by law.
More or less, this idea has been accepted everywhere in the world. Regarding religion, however, the Westerners say, “You can say whatever you like because religion is a personal matter of taste which is irrelevant to the serious concerns of life and at most, it is related to the relationship between man and God and this relationship assumes different forms. Choose whatever form of relationship with God you like.
This religion is a straight path; that religion is another straight path. Idol-worship is a straight path; Islam is also a straight path!” But what Islam states is something else; of course, we mean Islam which has been propagated by Hadhrat Muhammad (s) and not the “modern Islam” to be brought by Babs and Martin Luthers. We are referring to Islam which Hadhrat Muhammad ibn ‘Abd Allah (s) introduced.
Traditional interpretation as the only authentic interpretation of Islam
They say, “Yes, we also accept the same Islam but it has diverse interpretations. You express a particular interpretation of it.” One of the products of Western culture is to advance different interpretations and understandings of religious texts. As I have mentioned before, sometime ago a Christian sect was founded in Canada. The founding priest of the said Christian sect was asked, “What is your opinion about homosexuality?” He replied, “For the meantime, I do not want to express my opinion but I tell you that the Bible should be interpreted anew!” This is because homosexuality is explicitly condemned in the Torah and the Gospel just as it is condemned in Islam. These gentlemen also say, “Islam and the Qur’an must be interpreted anew!”
We declare that we are among those who regard as credible the 1,400 year-old interpretation of Islam by the Shi‘ah and Sunni ‘ulama’. The “Islam” we are talking about is that which has been interpreted by the pure Imams (‘a) and thereafter by the ‘ulama’ of Islam for the past fourteen centuries. We take that interpretation as the criterion. If new interpretations arise according to which Islam and all its laws must be changed and a new “Islam” be formulated, we do not accept and have nothing to do with that “Islam” and also, I don’t think that our Muslim people would be attached to such “modern Islams” to be brought by Babs and Martin Luthers.
The Islam which we know, talk about and adhere to is the one whose sources are the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet (s) and the pure Imams (‘a) and whose essential and definite laws have been elucidated by the Shi‘ah and Sunni fuqaha for the past fourteen hundred years, especially those laws about which the Shi‘ah and Sunnis have no difference of opinion.
This Islam tells us, “Just as you have to observe limitation and regulation in eating and drinking, limitation and regulation must also be observed in talking.” Religion is not a garment to be worn today and be removed tomorrow. One must conduct research and accept the religion of truth.
In the domain of Islam, there is ample proof to establish its truthfulness and no one can say that the issue has been obscure for him and that he failed to identify the truth unless there were shortcomings in his research. If a person in a Micronesian island says, “I failed to grasp the truthfulness of Islam,” he might be excused. But living in the domain of Islam, in which for the past fourteen hundred years the greatest ‘ulama’ of Islam have written the most valuable and important books about Islam, if a person says, “I failed to identify the truth,” I don’t think that he can be excused.
In any case, the Islam we know states, “Just as you need to observe limits in eating and drinking, you need to do likewise in talking. You have no right to say whatever you like. You must follow the Islamic rules. Once you act beyond the Islamic rules, it is to the detriment of Islamic society. As you know, one of the prohibited acts mentioned in the treatises on practical laws of Islam [risalah al-‘amaliyyah] is to buy and sell deviant books. Islam does not grant the right to anyone, especially the one who does not possess the power to distinguish truth from falsehood, to go everywhere, listen to any talk or read any writing. As this noble verse explicitly states,
وَإِذَا رَأَيْتَ الَّذِينَ يَخُوضُونَ فِي آيَاتِنَا فَأَعْرِضْ عَنْهُمْ حَتَّى يَخُوضُوا فِي حَدِيثٍ غَيْرِهِ...
“When you see those who gossip impiously about Our signs, avoid them until they engage in some other discourse…”[15][135]
And regarding the faithful, the Qur’an forbids them to mingle and sit together with those who put religion into question:
وَقَدْ نَزَّلَ عَلَيْكُمْ فِي الْكِتَابِ ان إِذَا سَمِعْتُمْ آيَاتِ اللّهِ يُكَفَرُ بِهَا وَيُسْتَهْزَأُ بِهَا فَلاَ تَقْعُدُواْ مَعَهُمْ حَتَّى يَخُوضُواْ فِي حَدِيثٍ غَيْرِهِ إِنَّكُمْ إِذًا مِّثْلُهُمْ إِنَّ اللهَ جامِعُ المُنَافِقينَ وَ الْکَافِرينَ فی جَهَنَّمَ جَمِيعاً...
“Certainly He has sent down to you in the Book that when you hear Allah’s signs being disbelieved and derided, do not sit with them until they engage in some other discourse, or else you [too] will be like them. Surely Allah will gather hypocrites and disbelievers, all together, into hell…”[16][136]
Thus, those who talk about Islam but establish relationship with the enemies of Islam and promote their words are the same hypocrites [munafiqun] whose abode, together with the infidels [kafirun], is hellfire.
Once again, I emphasize that Islam commands: “Go and search for the truth and argue with the enemies of Islam. With the truth that Islam teaches, you shall overcome them. However, as long as you have not acquired enough capability to defend your doctrines and values, you should not accompany and mingle with the misguided and wicked ones.” It is like the advice given to an athlete to undergo training before participating in wrestling. A youngster who has not yet undergone enough training should not challenge a veteran wrestler as he shall surely be defeated and his backbone broken. This does not mean campaign against freedom. This is an admonition to a youngster to learn Islamic sciences and teachings and then argue with the enemies.
In any case, the Islam we know has limited freedom, and regards as untenable the argument that since talking is a natural necessity of man, talking must be free because man also has other instincts such as the sexual instinct; eating and drinking can also be considered as natural rights that should not be restricted. Just as the consumption of every food is unacceptable to a reasonable person, the same is true of talking. Being an innate necessity does not justify its unbridled use. Reason and religion should determine its limits based on the material and spiritual interests of society which have been specified and introduced by religion.
Legitimate freedom
While interpreting my petitions, there are those who have said, “So-and-so commits a fallacy because we have not said that freedom must be absolute. Our point is that there should be legitimate [mashru‘] freedom.” I ask: What do you mean by mashru‘? Do you mean that which is acceptable to religious law [shar‘]? In lexicography, there are two meanings of the word “mashru‘”. Its first meaning is what religious law [shari‘ah] has declared as lawful. (Of course, it is improbable that they refer to this meaning of mashru‘ because those raising these issues are not attached to the shari‘ah.)
So, if mashru‘ is that which shari‘ah permits, it means that freedom must be within a framework permitted by the shari‘ah. The other meaning of mashru‘ is that which is legal. According to this meaning also, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as stipulated in the Constitution, the law must be concordant with Islam. Our Constitution consistently points out that all rules and decrees must be concordant with Islam, and in essence, the raison d’être of the fuqaha in the Council of Guardians as reflected in the Constitution is to examine the bills to be ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly—whether they are consistent with Islam or not.
Even assuming that all the people and deputies in the Majlis (apart from the deputies of minority groups whose rights are also protected) are Muslim, religious and devoted, they may sometimes tend to be negligent and approve a bill which is against Islam. In keeping with the Constitution, the ratified bills of the Majlis are examined by the Council of Guardians—whether they are consistent with the Constitution and Islam, or not. The fuqaha of the Council of Guardians confirm the Islamic nature of the ratified bills while the lawyers of the Council confirm the consistency of these bills with the Constitution.
If our Constitution does not regard it necessary for all laws to be Islamic, then what is the raison d’être of the Council of Guardians? And for what purpose is all the emphasis on the sovereignty of Islam and the absolute guardianship of the jurist [wilayat-e mutlaq-ye faqih] stipulated in provisions of the Constitution? One should not be surprised if so-called lawyers say, “Since the Constitution stipulates that freedom must be observed, no religion or law has the right to limit that freedom!”
Does the Constitution clearly stipulate that freedom should be mashru‘, or not? It is you who say “azadiha-ye mashru‘” [legitimate freedom]. What do you mean by “legitimate freedom”? If mashru‘ is derived from shar‘ [religious law], then “legitimate freedom” means freedom which the religious law endorses. And if mashru‘ means “legal” [qanuni], then according to the Constitution, freedom which has been approved by the religious and canonical laws are “legitimate freedom”.
Religion and law as restrainers of freedom
Freedom cannot be above law. Those who claim that freedom is above religion and law should answer these questions: In principle, what is the purpose of religion and law? What is the essence of law? Is law meant to point out that an action should be done in a specific manner? Does it permit and forbid certain acts or not? I have no option but to repeat some of the previous points. Every law explicitly or implicitly says actions should be restricted and must be done within a certain framework.
Thus, in principle, the essence of law is to restrict freedom. If law and religion do not permit the restraining of freedom, their existence is useless. As it includes sociopolitical laws, religion filters and restricts the social and political actions of man and decrees that certain actions should be done within a specific framework. If religion means other than this, what is the purpose of its existence?
If religion has been revealed so that everyone should behave in whatever way he or she likes, what then is its function? And what is its role? The existence of religion and law has no meaning other than limiting the liberties of man. Hence, to say that freedom is above both religion and law is absurd. Yes, under the name of religion some people may suppress the legitimate freedom of people and prohibit what God has made lawful through superstitions and ethnic customs.
For example, in some parts of our country, some ethnic tribes unfortunately still prohibit what God has made lawful and in the culture of our present society some lawful things are also still considered abominable. Had it not been for such an attitude in society, so many types of sexual corruption would have been prevented. The Commander of the Faithful (‘a) said:
لَوْ لا ما سَبَقَ مِنِ ابْنِ الخَطّابِ فِي الْمُتْعَةِ ما زنى اِلاّ شَقِىّ
.
“Had (‘Umar) ibn al-Khattab not prohibited fixed-time marriage [mut‘ah],[17][137] no one would ever commit adultery and fornication [zina] except a wretched person.”[18][138]
Regrettably, in our culture this thing made lawful by God, which is a key solution for many problems, is still considered abominable. Yes, if there are those who under the name of religion want to declare lawful that made unlawful by God, it is abominable. Apart from being abominable, it is also unlawful [haram] and it is a kind of religious innovation [bid‘ah]. The same is true for its opposite. Forbidding the lawful is also an innovation:
انَّ اللهَ يُحِبُّ اَنْ يُؤْخَذَ بِرُخِصِهِ كَما يُحِبُّ اَنْ يُؤْخَذَ بِعَزائِمِهِ
“Verily, God loves people to benefit from the permissible [mubahat] and lawful [halal-ha] things just as He loves them to perform the compulsories [wajibat] and shun the unlawful [muharramat] things.”[19][139]
Thus, under the name of religion, or under the name of tribalism or local, ethnic and clannish prejudices nobody has the right to declare unlawful what has been made lawful by God. In the same manner, setting limits on freedoms is unlawful and an innovation. But if what is meant by “freedom” is illegitimate freedom, no one should expect religion not to oppose it! This is because freedom can either be legitimate or illegitimate. If legitimate, both religion and law declares it lawful and is not opposed to it, and there is no point in saying that religion or law has no right to deprive society of legitimate freedom. If a religion permits something, how can it prohibit what it has permitted? This is contradictory in itself. But if a certain freedom is illegitimate and religion has prohibited it, it is meaningless to say that religion has no right to prohibit it. This is another form of contradiction.
Necessity of restraining freedom
It can thus be deduced that we also regard freedom as a very noble element permitted by God and a prerequisite for the material and spiritual exaltation, advancement and perfection of man. We believe that if man does not possess the gift of freedom, he cannot consciously choose a religion and act upon its commandments, for his conviction will have no value. The advancement and perfection of man lies in his conscious acceptance of religion. This is also the meaning of “There is no compulsion in religion.”[20][140] We believe that freedom is one of the greatest gifts of God, but is most beneficial when used within limits specified by the Giver of the gift:
...وَمَن يَتَعَدَّ حُدُودَ اللّهِ فَأُوْلَـئِكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ
“…And whoever transgresses the bounds of Allah—it is they who are the wrongdoers.”[21][141]
Transgressing the bounds set by Allah leads to wretchedness and deprivation of the divine gift. The same thing which leads to man’s felicity will result in his misery. Once a person consumes food beyond limit, he will get sick and it may even cause his death. Once gratification of the sexual instinct which is a divine gift goes beyond limits, it will bring about social corruption and inflict dangerous diseases and sometimes even the extinction of society. The Islamic state not only guarantees legitimate freedom but at the same time, it has to prevent illegitimate freedom.
The skepticism expressed in newspapers is that by holding these discussions, I allegedly want to omit the article on national sovereignty from the Constitution. They say, “According to the Constitution, the people are masters of their own destiny. So, if they are compelled to follow religion only, they will no longer be masters of their own destiny!” This skepticism is so deceptive. I say to them: Is this the only thing mentioned in our Constitution? Is it not stipulated in the same constitution that sovereignty belongs to God the Exalted?
Does not the same constitution say that the laws to be implemented in the country must be in agreement with Islam? Are these facts not mentioned in the Constitution with the article that people shall be the masters of their own destiny? It may be said that these two articles of the Constitution are contradictory and are in need of interpretation and solution. But if we try to analyze them carefully, we will understand the purpose of the two articles. Once it is stated in the first article that sovereignty belongs to God and then it is stated that the people are masters of their own destiny, it means that under the aegis of God’s sovereignty, the people are masters of their own destiny.
Thus, those who are outside Islamic society and not among the people of this country have no right to impose their own ideas, preferences, religion, and law on us. America has no right to impose its law on us. It is the people of this country who are supposed to vote for their own desirable law and they have already voted in favor of Islamic law.
In his speech at Ahwaz University, a certain person has said: “Even if the people demonstrate against God, the law is not supposed to prevent them!” Is this what the sovereignty of the people means? Does the Constitution say so? If a certain person who is unfamiliar with the Constitution makes such utterances, it is understandable.
What is surprising is that a certain person who regards himself a legal expert makes such a claim! He may say, “We do not accept your interpretation of the Constitution.” In reply, it must be said that if there is an ambiguous point in the Constitution, its authorized interpreter is the Council of Guardians. If you accept this constitution, you will see that it does not give you the authority to interpret it. If you really believe in this law, you have to seek its interpretation from the Council of Guardians. It is this Council of Guardians which is the guardian of Islam and the Constitution and is composed of Muslim jurists whose function is to guard and protect Islamic laws. Once your view is approved, you have the right to trample Islam under your feet!
Notes:
[22][133] Surah al-Baqarah 2:159.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: al-islam.org
Legislation in Islam and Democracy
We mentioned in the last session that conciliation between Islam and democracy in legislation cannot be established. Democracy means populism or government of the people. In other words, it means upholding the people’s will and view. Now, the question is: Is credibility based on the will of people limited or not? When we say that the criterion and basis is the people’s will, is it so even if it is against the will of God? Or, is the credibility of the will of people so perfect that it is not in conflict with the law and will of God? What is intended by this concept and terminology in the West is that the people’s view is the main criterion and no other power in heaven and earth has the right to interfere in people’s destiny and legislation for them. The law is what the people want.
At this point, this question is relevant: Is the consensus of opinion of all people the criterion of the law’s credibility, or is majority vote enough? The consensus of opinion of all people is impossible in actuality, and if the majority vote is enough, what will be the duty of the rest, and should the majority vote be binding on them? In reality, today’s democracy is a mixture of democracy and elitism. That is, the people elect an elite group to enact laws for them.
Now, if there is a conflict between the view of the majority of people and their elected representatives, which view shall prevail? Of course, the representatives usually enact laws in accordance with the will of the people; otherwise, they will not be elected in the next round of elections. Since they have to fulfill the wish of the people, they enact laws as per the desire of the people. There are also cases, nevertheless, when the people’s view differs with that of the majority of representatives.
There are those who have explained that their aim is to replace the Islamic government—the government of the clergy and wilayah al-faqih—with a democratic government in Iran. “Democratic” implies that apart from the will of the people, nothing has a say in determining the law. Can the Muslims accept it or not?
Meanwhile, to those who claim that Islam is harmonious with democracy, this question is posed: Is the vote of the people binding even if it were against the definite decree of God, or not? If it is not binding, it follows that democracy has not been established. If the criterion of the law’s credibility is the vote of the people even if it were contrary to the definite decree of God, in this case democracy is not harmonious with Islam. Is Islam other than obeying God and the Apostle (s)? Do we have another Islam?
Nowadays, it is said that there are many interpretations of Islam but the interpretation on the basis of which this Revolution has come into being is that the decree of God and divine values must prevail in society. The interpretation of those who staged this Revolution, have defended it up to the last drop of their blood and will do the same in future.
Thus, if democracy in the legislative dimension means giving precedence to the will of people even if the enacted laws were against the decree of God, such a democracy from the viewpoint of Islam and the Muslims is unacceptable. However, if democracy has another meaning such that while preserving the Islamic foundations, principles and values, the people could get involved in the legal and social issues of their society by electing their representatives and enact specific laws for certain circumstances of time and space. This is something which exists in our country. That is, the people elect their deputies in the Majlis.
The Majlis’ deputies engage in a debate and deliberate about a bill and afterwards ratify it. However, the ratified bills are credible provided that they are not against the laws of Islam.
In any case, for the people to elect their representatives to determine the variable laws according to specific circumstances of time and space is something existing in our country. The Imam endorsed the same process and our Constitution also approved it. If democracy in legislation refers to it, such a democracy exists and nobody opposes it.
The binding law in the Islamic government
An important question is that when the people’s representatives ratify a bill in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, is this ratified bill credible because the people’s representatives have ratified it and in principle the people have elected their representatives for this purpose, or is it because the ratified bill is in a sense confirmed by the wali al-faqih? Theoretically, we believe that the foremost right that man should observe in his life is the right of Allah [haqq Allah].
If we are supposed to observe certain rights, the right of Allah takes precedence and the foremost right of Allah over the people is the right of Lordship [haqq-e rububiyyat] which has two types, viz. cosmic Lordship [rububiyyat-e takwini] and legislative Lordship [rububiyyat-e tashri‘i]. Legislative Lordship denotes that whatever God commands is obligatory upon man. So, if God prohibits a thing, it must not be done, and violation of the divine laws and decrees is an infringement upon the divine right of Lordship, and denying and regarding it as non-binding is a form of shirk.
As such, the law which is pleasant to God will be credible in Islamic society. If God prohibited a law, it shall not be binding because the right of Allah is violated and by violating the right of Allah, the rights of men will also be violated. Does God acquire any benefit from legislation? In bidding and forbidding us and enjoining a decree, does God want anything other than the welfare of man? So, whenever an act is against the dictum of God, it is also against the welfare of man. In conclusion, the main pillar of the law’s credibility is that once the preservation of the interests of man is endangered, the right of Allah is also violated.
As such, such a law shall not be binding. It is on this basis that after the ratification of the bill by the people’s representatives, there is another filter, and that is, certain lawyers and fuqaha have to adapt a bill to the religious standards and check whether it is against the law of God or not. This is the function of the Council of Guardians.
If the credibility of law depends only on the people’s vote, what are the fuqaha of the Council of Guardians then supposed to do? The people have cast their vote. Their representatives have ratified and enacted the law they requested and the said law has become binding! In the Islamic Republic system, the first and foremost function of the Council of Guardians (and of course, they have other duties) is to check the conformity of the statutory laws of the Majlis with Islam; that is, what the people have voted for through their representatives.
One reason why you see the Westernized elements, and those who pour water into the enemy’s watermill, talk about the abolition of the Council of Guardians is that they want the absence of a filter that checks the conformity of laws with Islam. Today, I am making this statement for you to be informed—perhaps you cannot believe, and God willing, it will not happen—that the liberals and Westernized elements are trying to remove Islam and wilayah al-faqih from the Constitution. By His will, God will not give such a chance to the enemies of Islam and the Islamic system.
Note:
[2][107] Surah Al ‘Imran 3:64.
[3][108] Surah al-‘Ankabut 29:46.
[4][109] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:171.
[5][110] Surah Maryam 19:90.
[6][111] Surah an-Nahl 16:36.
[7][112] Surah al-Bayyinah 98:5.
[8][113] Surah az-Zumar 39:3.
[9][114] Surah Luqman 31:22.
[10][115] Surah al-Ma’idah 5:38.
[11][116] Surah al-Baqarah 2:4.
[12][117] Surah adh-Dhariyat 51:20.
[13][118] Surah at-Tawbah (or, Bara‘ah) 9:45.
[14][119] Surah ?ad 38:8.
[15][120] Surah al-‘Ankabut 29:65.
[16][121] Surah Al ‘Imran 3:185.
[18][115] Surah al-Ma’idah 5:38.
[19][116] Surah al-Baqarah 2:4.
[20][117] Surah adh-Dhariyat 51:20.
[21][118] Surah at-Tawbah (or, Bara‘ah) 9:45.
[22][119] Surah ?ad 38:8.
[23][120] Surah al-‘Ankabut 29:65.
[24][121] Surah Al ‘Imran 3:185.
[26][123] Surah al-Baqarah 2:159.
[27][124] Surah al-Kahf 18:29.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: al-islam.org
Theocracy and Democracy
The Meaning of Theocracy
The concept of theocracy or the sovereignty of God, admittedly, would sound strange and remote in a society as today's. Centuries and ages have passed without such ideas and concepts making any impression on the minds of those who have ruled and administered human societies or there being any discussion about them. Moreover, the intellectual arena has been occupied by cults of sovereignty of kings or that of the people. That is why any scheme of deliverance of mankind from the bondage of egoism and self‑alienation appears vainglorious and farfetched. Henceforth, it is the demand of a humane and truth‑seeking logic not to surrender our search in the despair and fear of an artificial intellectual atmosphere created by power‑hungry and egocentric rulers. Undaunted by the fearsome gallery of idols, we should courageously examine every kind of beneficial and promising truth. But before everything, let us try to clear up the heavy mists that lurk around the concept of Divine sovereignty and dissociate it from the many layers of prejudice and ignorance that conceal its real face. There are two elements in the term theocracy: God (theos, god) and sovereignty (Kratein, to rule). We shall examine each of them beginning with God.
1. God: Obviously the concepts forged in common minds about God, or the ideas of some suffering from some kind of allergy regarding that Supreme Being cannot be of much value for obtaining the knowledge of that Supreme Being. The strangest of intellectual aberrations is observed in this regard: the necessity of differentiating between the crude and commonplace notions of a reality and the specialist's version of it, is acknowledged in. every scientific discipline; nevertheless this rule is not observed in the case of God!
To illustrate what we have said, a botanist in his research about a certain kind of shrub or herb is not content to take the coarse opinions of a shepherd, who has never been out of his village or valley, as the last word about a variety of herb of that species common in his village.
However with regard to the meaning of the word "God," it is considered sufficient to rely on the most rudimentary notions.
God: an old king in heaven,
Squatting on the roof of the great sky;
His courtroom, an impeccable magnificence;
Wherever he goes, his entourage follow him.
They don't know the God known by Ibrahim al‑Khalil, Musa ibn Imran, `Isa ibn Maryam and Muhammad ibn `Abd Allah (S). They have not the remotest idea of what "God" meant for men like `Ali ibn Abi Talib. Further, on a level much lower than those great spiritual figures, they don't understand the discovery of Divine made by such persons as Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, Shaykh Mahmud Shabistari, Jalal al‑Din al‑Rumi and Decartes, who said: "If someone were to allow himself to doubt the existence of God, I would consider him incapable of proving to me even the self‑evident principles of Mathematics."
When we speak of "the rule of God upon earth and upon men," our conception of what we mean by "God" makes all the difference. Is it `an old man in heaven squatting on the roof of the world,' or is it the Being worshipped as their Lord by men such as 'Ali ibn Abi‑Talib, or Abu‑Dharr, his pupil, and such others as the poet Rumi?
The Deity whose rule on earth and upon mankind is implicit in the concept of theocracy, is the Omnipotent Being the imprint of Whose Will is clearly manifested in the wonderful order of the universe. It is the All‑powerful, All‑knowing Being, Who, through His absolute power and wisdom, `reveals' human models for liberation from egoism and the worship of earthly pleasures. It is the God Whose discovery has been expressed in differing words by all aware and enlightened human beings in all human societies from the most ancient times to the present. It is the God, the relation between Whose `radiance' with all other beings is similar, though not identical, to that of light passing through transparent bodies. It is the God Who has given the capacity and power to the pure human nature, and the magnificent conscience of man, to discover Divine Will, judge truth and falsehood, and select rational life, through the means of prophetic revelation and reason. It is the God who has endowed all human beings with the capacity of direct or indirect contact with Him. It is the God who has bestowed man with the power of acquiring perfection, and shown him the way to it. It is the God who exalts him into His Presence on having acquired a higher awareness. It is the God who originated the creation of the universe and man on the basis of justice, and has condemned injustice against even the most insignificant of living things. It is the God, the ways of approach to Whom, are as numerous as the number of the souls of creatures: The ways towards God are as numerous as the number of souls of the creatures.
Yes. This is what is meant by "God" in our discussion of the concept of theocracy or the sovereignty of God. It is not the "god" fabricated by vulgar minds, or invented by egocentric men of the world, whose minds have been retarded in the most elementary stages of gnosis by a social environment forged by egoistic and power‑hungry demagogues and despots.
2. Sovereignty: The same kind of intellectual delusions and aberrations that surround the conception of God also exist in the case of the concept of theocracy. There might be some who imagine that what is implied by theocracy is that, God, having personified himself in a stately form, sits down behind a table stacked with files and scribbles out "laws" on sheets of paper ...and having written them down, gets up swinging a lash and determined to see them implemented! To others it means that God plans to impose His will upon men through his selfrighteous henchmen and tyrannical priests, whose dictates He expects all mankind to obey. There are still others who think that theocracy means the sovereignty and domination of a priestly class who profess spirituality in a way similar to professionals and craftsmen of various kinds. Such kinds of misconceptions about theocracy proliferate in the minds of untutored populace. However, their value for an understanding of the significance of theocracy, is the same as the worth of dumping grounds of the garbage of a big city for knowing the life‑style of its scholars and geniuses.
The relationship of God with human beings can be compared to the relationship of the soul with the activities of the body. However, the caution is necessary that it is only an approximate metaphor; for, nothing can be likened to God in accordance with the Quranic verse: Nothing is like Him. (42:11)
Nevertheless, this obviously imperfect allegory can be used to illustrate the concept of Divine sovereignty. It is impossible to deny that the human "ego," "self," "soul," or whatever we may name it, is the active principle behind the administration of the total personality of the human being. The "self," through its various faculties, administers and manages the realm of an individual's existence. If we extend this metaphor to the domain of human society, we can say that the most developed intellects of humanity, and the purest and unpolluted nature and consciousness of man in the form of God‑sent prophets and messengers, are the agency and means of God's sovereignty and rule. In other words the meaning of sovereignty of God, is manifestation of Divine Will in 'human society, through the medium of Divine apostles and through undeviated human reason and consciousness. It is comparable to the human will centered in the "self" which causes the body's limbs to be moved in accordance with its volitions through the agency of nerves and muscles. The question may arise whether it is possible to accept this interpretation for the possible actualization of the potential sovereignty of God. Our reasons for considering it as acceptable are the following:
1. There can be no doubt that except for the devotees of Machiavellan politics and unabashed advocates of social Darwinism seeking to offer theoretical justification for the lusts of egocentric tyrants and despots, it has been the sincere endeavour of all leading thinkers of humanity in the realms of economics, politics, human sciences and education, and every other sphere of human endeavour, to search for things and discover that which can be truly beneficial for human happiness and felicity. The Holy Quran describes this sacred phenomenon in these words: As for the scum, it vanishes as jetsam, and what profits men abides in the earth. Even so God strikes His similitudes. (13:17)
This is a kind of Divine sovereignty that operates through the laws of creation (hakimiyyat al‑tahwin, creative sovereignty). As to the legislative sovereignty (hakimiyyat al‑tashri`), it operates in the manner described in the following Quranic verse: Indeed We sent Our Messengers with the clear signs, and We sent down with them the Book and the Balance so that men might uphold justice. (57:25)
Is not the essence of justice, whose achievement the Quran regards as being the goal of Divine laws and the mission of apostles, innate and ingrained within human conscience, consciousness and reason, in their state of purity? The fact that no school of thought has ever had the power to explicitly contradict the idea of justice, is a testimony to the truth of the above statement. This is the meaning of `sovereignty of God,' which acts through the agency of Divine messengers, and which has no other purpose than to reinforce the positive traits ingrained in human nature.
2. All philosophers and thinkers who have endeavoured to understand human nature, with all their difference of opinion and divergence in their outlook of the universe and man, are united in the opinion that man in the process of his movement towards perfection is capable of attaining the independence and sublimity of a being symbolized by `rational life,' by cultivating the foundations of his destiny and bringing it to fruition. The unceasing endeavours of the benefactors of humanity, for the realization of this independence and sublimeness, have been so preponderant through the course of history that the egocentric power‑worshipping followers of Machiavellian politics have failed to reduce their significance. This sublimity and independence rests on the basis of that freedom of man which can afford him to attain the station of self‑determination. The human propensity for a serious, unceasing search for this freedom, independence and self‑determination, is the basic manifestation of Divine sovereignty upon human beings. It is not possible to ascribe this urge for emancipation from extraneous coercive agents and passion for attainment of self‑determination to a bundle of natural or instinctive factors. It was the endeavour for this emancipation that has always saved man from annihilation. This self‑determination, which means a fully blossomed freedom dedicated to goodness and perfection, is impossible without acceptance of a Supreme Being and without a sense of commitment to the highest of human values. Consequently, the meaning of Divine sovereignty is that God, the Supreme, has planted the seeds of goodness and perfection in the nature of man, and arranged for the conditions of their growth through inspired reason and conscience, and revelations conveyed through Divine messengers, and demanded their steady cultivation from mankind.
3. It is well‑known that a group of leading thinkers have seriously favoured the idea that rulers should be righteous philosophers. Plato, in his Republic, after distinguishing between genuine and counterfeit philosophers, argues that the former are fit to be the Guardians of the state. In a dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon, in the Book VI of the Republic, the following characteristics of the true philosophers are enumerated:
1. an eager desire for the knowledge of all real existence;
2. hatred of falsehood, and devotion to truth;
3. contempt for the pleasures of the body;
4. indifference to money;
5. highmindedness and liberality;
6. justice and gentleness;
7. a quick apprehension, and a good memory;
8. a musical, regular, and harmonious disposition.
If we ponder upon these sublime human qualities pointed out by Plato as requisite for rulers, we shall find that the rule of such persons is in fact the sovereignty of God upon earth. This is not an outdated idea of an ancient mind, but a reality that shall be acknowledged by every researcher of insight and enlightened conscience interested in fathoming the problem of government with all due sincerity and seriousness. For instance, those familiar with the political thought of Rousseau, know that despite his support for a government and society based on the concept of democracy, he is of the opinion that "to discover the rules of society that are best suited to nations, there would need to exist a superior intelligence, who could understand the passions of men without feeling any of them, who had no affinity with our nature but knew it to the full, whose happiness was independent of ours, but who would nevertheless make our happiness his concern." From these criteria that Rousseau draws for an optimum lawgiver, he comes to the conclusion that only "gods would be needed to give men laws." Obviously only Divine messengers and God's deputies on earth ‑ as they are called in the terminology of the Islamic religion ‑ can fulfill the role envisaged by Rousseau for "gods" as the perfect lawgivers. Perhaps, that is what Rousseau ‑ being a Christian and a monotheist that he was ‑ in fact implied. In another place he writes: A sublime reason, which soars above the heads of the common people, produces those rules which the lawgiver puts into the mouth of the immortals, thus compelling by divine authority persons who cannot be moved by human prudence. But it is not for every man to make the gods speak, or to gain credence if he pretends to be an interpreter of the divine word. The lawgiver's great soul is the true miracle which must vindicate his mission.
The salient difference between Plato's stand and that of Rousseau is that, while Plato considers a group of qualities as necessary for rulers, Rousseau regards a Divine dimension in the lawgiver as being the essential condition. A close examination of the opinions of these two thinkers will bring us to a truth recognized by Islam: it is necessary for the legislator to possess a Divine dimension: a condition fulfilled by God‑sent messengers and infallible Imams, both of whom are equipped with Divine morals. The same qualification is required in Islam for leaders and rulers; that is, the rulers hold sovereignty by virtue of a relation with the Divine. In the case an apostle is a ruler, his link with the Divine exists by virtue of his Divine morality and through the medium of revelation. In the case where the ruler is an infallible Imam, his link with the Divine exists by virtue of his immaculate personality and Divine morals without the presence of revelation.
In the light of what has been said above, the sole solution of the problem of true democracy framed by Plato and Rousseau is the existence of Divine personalities among human beings, without which the problem of selection of ruler and legislator is absolutely insolvable. The conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion is that sovereignty of God over man is not contradictory to the precept of participation of people in determining their own destiny or for attaining a "rational life" dependent on Divine principles and interpretable according to the highest criteria of life.
Earlier in our discussion we mentioned the imperfect metaphor of relationship of God with mankind as resembling the one between the soul and its activities. This is partially borne out by the following statement of 'Ali ibn Abi‑Talib (A): [God is] inside things without intermingling and outside them without exclusion.
Accordingly, the relation between sovereignty of God upon human beings and democracy, is like the relation between the soul and its activities. For example, when the people, or a group of wise men of wholesome minds and undeviated consciousness, recognize a truth, a law based upon this perspective and implemented by the people will be enforcement of Divine sovereignty by people upon the people. The criterion behind this is what is called `the authority of reason' based upon the principle, which means every judgement given by reason >s the same as the judgement of the Shari'ah, and is called `the principle of concurrent necessity of reason and the Shari'ah.'
Most of us know that the reason and conscience of the masses are handicapped on account of their restricted perspective and vague vision of the ultimate purposes of life, and also on account of continued darkening of their intellectual horizon by the clouds of lusts and egocentric inclinations. These factors, together, deprive reason of its efficiency and of its effective role in administration of public life. Rather, it may be said that the higher spheres of `rational life,' throughout history, have remained outside the arena of popular consciousness. That is why, there arises the necessity for the mission of the God‑sent prophets, who, by virtue of their direct link with God, through the agency of revelation, strive to liberate mankind's intellect and conscience from bondages and clinging impurities gathered through egoism and materialism. It is for this reason that the reliable Islamic traditions refer to the intellect as "the inner testimony," and to the Divine messengers as "the outer testimony" of God. Imam Ja'far al‑Sadiq (A) is related as having told his disciple Hisham: O Hisham, God has two (kinds of) testimonies (hujjatayn) against mankind: the outer (or the manifest) testimony (hujjah zahirah) and the inner testimony (hujjah batinah). The prophets, messengers and imams are the manifest testimony, and the intellect (`aql) is the inner testimony.
Another tradition refers to prophets as men of perfect intellects: God has not sent any prophet or messenger, unless that He perfected his intellect. A prophet's intellect is superior to that of every individual of his nation.
Yet another tradition refers to `aql (intellect) as being the guide of a true believer (mumin): Intellect (or reason) is the guide of a mu'min.
`Ali, Amir al‑Mu'minin (A), in the first sermon of the Nahj al-balaghah, considers fruition of people's intellects as being one of the aims of prophetic mission: ...and they (the prophets) bring to surface the buried treasure of (the people's) intellects.
Now, the question arises whether it is possible that there may sometimes be a contradiction between the two forms of testimony, that is, intellect and prophethood? According to Islam, such a situation is impossible; because, it would be absurd for the prophets first to introduce reason or intellect as a collaborator in their mission, and, later on, to discover it to be opposed to their teachings! Moreover, the perfect harmony between intellect and prophetic revelation is also confirmed by the matter that, in Islamic jurisprudence, reason is considered as one of the sources of Islamic law; the other three being: the Book, the Prophet's sunnah (practice) and consensus (ijma`). On the basis of what has been said hitherto, it may be asserted that a society whose laws are based on the people's uncorrupted intellect, and in which, these laws, thus framed, are implemented by a ruler of fully developed intellect, has a government of the people upon themselves through the means of laws and regulations derived from prophetic revelation and human reason (the inner and outer testimonies of God).
A Metaphor: According to the conclusion reached above, the government of the people over themselves, in Islam, is similar to the sovereignty of the soul over human activity and behaviour. The real objective of such a government is to support and strengthen the material and spiritual dimensions of the society, to eliminate the causes of distress of the people, and to insure their movement towards the goal of highest felicity referred to as `rational life'. The establishment of such a government is not possible through merely material and purely physical or natural means based on diverse selfish interests of the people.
The government in Islam is the manifestation of God's sovereignty upon the earth, and a state based upon such a vision is by no means in harmony with oppression, injustice and any of the various forms of social idolatry. It is comparable to the authority of the human soul adorned with all sublime human qualities, and it is not possible for such a soul to become a source of physical oppression, injustice and tyranny. To further explain this point, we may say that the meaning of government of the people over themselves, is not that a handful of men may forcefully impose general policies and frameworks of social life on the rest of individuals. Nor it is true democracy that a section of society should be able to impose its whims and baseless fancies on the rest of people. Similarly, it is not democracy that a group may have the power to impose upon others whatever they imagine as being fit or as being in the interest of the people; because, the real purpose of the state is to lead people towards the goal of `rational life' and to bring about harmony and coordination among their ranks for realization of this goal.
We should remember that movement towards `rational life' is not a naturally existing current in the society; instead, such a current has to be created. The currents that naturally exist in every society are those which are based on the natural animalistic instincts that operate in a self‑perpetuating fashion in the social atmosphere. For the creation of `rational life' for a society, the state is an absolute necessity so as to guide the purely physical and biological entity towards the ideal of rational social existence; so that, the crude biological reality is transformed into a refined spiritual ideal which does not come into existence by itself. Therefore, the meaning of government of the people over themselves is the sovereignty of their pure unspoiled consciousness and intellect rather than the sovereignty of force and power, personal or group bias, fancies, prejudice's, and the like.
We think no supporter of the sovereignty of the people, however staunch, will have anything significant to add to what we have discussed above as the criteria for righteous government. We do not think any thinker, in his right mind, and familiar with human nature, and moreover cognizant with various aspects of social and individual existence, will ever advocate power and force, people's prejudices and baseless fancies as the criteria of true democracy. Not even Machiavelli, who, in the view of most thinkers, has committed the gravest treachery against mankind's political existence, will claim the above devious criteria as being the basis of a state. If Machiavelli can possibly offer any apology for his perverse work, he may say that he had only tried to discuss unscrupulous means for despots and rulers to perpetuate their rule.
In any case, it may be regarded as indubitable that true democracy lies in the sovereignty of the pure and unadulterated intellect and consciousness of men. It is comparable to the management of human activities by the human soul or spirit and is a direct manifestation of God's sovereignty over mankind.
The Role of Consensus
The issues of consensus and counsel (ijma `and shura) on the level of Muslim community have great significance in Islamic sources. Statements such as the following are found in plenty in the Islamic texts: With group lies Divine mercy.
The hand of God is with the group or community.
These two traditions point out to a basic reality that individuals, when organized in groups, can benefit from one another's understanding, intellect and conscience for attainment of a predetermined goal. The least that can be said about people coming together for mutual consultation is that their individual understanding increases in arithmatical and sometimes in geometric progression. A prophetic tradition gives high worth to the opinion of a person who relies on the counsel of others: The most merited of men in matters of opinion is one who regards others' counsel as indispensable.
Two Quranic verses point out the significance of counsel‑taking from others: It was by mercy of God that you (the Prophet (S)) were gentle to them; had you been harsh and hard of heart, they would have scattered from about you. So pardon them, and pray forgiveness for them, and take counsel with them in affairs; and when you are resolved, put your trust in God; surely God loves those who put their trust in Him. (3:159)
Whatever thing you have been given is the enjoyment of the present life; but what is with God is better and more enduring for those who believe and put their trust in their Lord. And those who avoid the heinous sins and indecencies and when they are angry forgive, and those who answer their Lord, and perform the prayer, their affair being counsel between them, and they expend of that We have provided them, and who, when injustice affects them help owe another. (42:36‑39)
The above two verses require some explanation. The first verse does not mention any qualification far those who should be consulted. This has led some to imagine that all persons irrespective of their intellectual development can provide useful advice. This does not appear to be correct; because, mutual counsel always occurs among a group of persons about a subject that is not self‑evident, and around which all members taking part in a consultation express their personal opinions and beliefs. The members of a council attempt to illuminate an issue that is unclear at the beginning, and try to find a solution to maximize profit or benefit of their community and minimize its losses and dangers. In view of this objective of a council, if, supposedly, all members participating in the process of consultation lack in the necessary qualities of commitment, knowledge and perception required to deal with the issues, the results of their consultation will be most undesirable: It may be said, therefore, that a person lacking in the qualities of commitment, knowledge and perception has nothing to offer for the benefit of other human beings through his opinions. Accordingly, to disregard the necessity of commitment, knowledge and perception for discovery of the best and the most beneficial opinion in the favour of the interests of the people‑which is the ultimate goal of counsel and consultation‑is a mistake that no committed ruler of any society can afford to make. In addition, it may be pointed out that the aforementioned Quranic verse is, in the first place, addressed to the Holy Prophet (S) himself. Is it acceptable that the Prophet (S), with his supreme knowledge of all things beneficial and detrimental for his people's lives, should be asked to equate his intellect with the mind of a person utterly devoid of knowledge and perception? Consequently, we are led by reason to adopt the interpretation of this verse pointed out above; that is, the members of a council should possess the necessary qualifications. Aside from what we said, the second verse quoted above clarifies the exact meaning of counsel enjoined by the first one. The latter verse defines the eligible members of a council as those who possess the following qualifications:
1. They are free of major sins, deviations and indecencies;
2. They are serene and forgiving in anger;
3. They, in general, answer Divine call and observe Divine commands as for salat;
4. They assist others out of what God has provided them with;
5. When their brothers are subject to injustice and oppression, they hasten to their support and assistance.
It is clear from the above explanation that awareness and knowledge about the subject of consultation is as essential as the qualities of justice, commitment and taqwa (godfearing). There is a prophetic tradition quoted by the late Ayatullah Aqa Mirza Muhammad Husayn Na' ini O companions, advise me.
At the time of the Battle of Uhud, the Prophet (S), and a number of companions, were of the opinion that they should face the enemy while remaining inside the city of Medina. But, since the majority of the Prophet's companions wanted to go out of the city to fight the enemy, the Prophet (S) gave his consent. However, it later became clear that the Prophet's suggestion was right. Similarly, in the Battle of Ahz5b (Khandaq), the majority of the companions was against conciliation with the tribe of Quraysh. The late Ayatullah Na'ini, linking the principle of shura (counsel) with the general ,Sirah of the Prophet (S), writes: "The books on the history of the Prophet's life, bear out in detail the fact that the principle of counsel is firmly based on the sunnah of the Prophet and such statements of the Prophet (S) as `O companions, advise me."'
The issue of shura has received special treatment in the discourses of Imam Ali, Amir al‑Mu'minin (A).In one of his sermons, Ali (A) says: Do not flatter me for the obligations I have discharged towards Allah and towards you; I have done nothing more than discharge my continuing obligations and have performed by obligatory duties. Do not address me in the manner despots are addressed. Do not treat me with the affected caution and reserve with which tyrants are usually treated. Do not think that when truth is said in my presence, it would be hard upon me. For, if one finds it difficult to hear a word of truth and justice, he would find it much more difficult to act upon it. Therefore, do not abstain from mentioning the truth and do not hold back from me your honest advice. 1 do not regard myself above erring and 1 am not secure from it except that God, who has more power over my self than I myself, sages me from it. Certainly, I and you are slaves of Allah, besides whom there is no lord. He rules over that part of ourselves which is beyond our own control. It is He who has raised us from the lowest state of life to the sublime station of humanity. He gage us guidance which replaced misguidance, and bestowed upon us vision which took the place of blindness.
The above quotation throws light on the significance of counsel. It lays great emphasis on the necessity of accepting truth without pride or irritation. Expression of truth, even if it is not in the shape of counsel, is enjoined and encouraged. Imam Ali (A) enjoins people not to withhold their candid advice from him. Elsewhere he says:
There is no backing like counsel.
There is no backing firmer than counsel.
And
Counsel is to guidance what eyes are to the body. Confining solely to one's' own opinion as risky and dangerous.
Ali (A), in his lifetime, was a staunch adherer to the principle of shura. As the late Ayatullah Na'ini points out, during the time of his caliphate and at the most sensitive times of his rule, All (A) acted according to the opinion of the majority, even though he strongly disagreed with it. During his confrontation with Mu'awiyah, he had to yield to arbitration as demanded by the majority‑a matter which added immensely to Ali's difficulties. Later, when they realized their error, Ali (A) told them, "I had advised you against it. I tried to convince you that justice was on your side in the battle against Mu'awiyah, but you did not accept." That regrettable incident of Islamic history bears unequivocal testimony to the legal validity of the opinion of the people. The Islamic texts, the Quran, hadith (traditions), and the lives and practice of Divine leaders of Islam, all confirm the fact that shura or counsel is one of the most evident and necessary Islamic principles, denial of which can be explained by either ignorance, malice or conceit.
The Basis of Shura: In the light of the Quranic verses and traditions quoted in the course of our discussion, it may be asserted that human reason and prophetic revelation are the inner and outer sources of Divine sovereignty. In view of our discussion about the ultimate aim of consultation or shard as a collective rational means for arriving at truth, it may be added that the legitimacy of the principle of shura in Islam is supported both by reason and by prophetic revelation. Therefore, the outcome of a right kind of consultation conducted among those who possess the five qualities mentioned earlier, has the necessity of a law attached to it.
On the other hand, we know that the opinions of the people, no matter how much free of deviations and delusions they may be, are not secure from error; because, the individual intellects of the people generally lack the necessary qualities of awareness, aptitude, understanding and psychological stability. These qualities are not so common so as to consider the opinion of a section, or even that of the majority of persons in a society, as a realistic means for reaching a desirable goal. Bertrand Russell, the Western thinker of reknown says: "Possession of a balanced intellect is a totally relative matter. Very few individuals have completely balanced minds. Almost everyone has a certain angle of madness in him."
In one of his books at first he poses this question: one of the difficulties facing man is that he seems incapable of doing anything with moderation; if possibly he begins some work in a good manner, he soon pushes it to some kind of extreme; will man, after all, learn to tread the path of moderation? Then, in reply Russell says: "I am hopeful and confident that man will at last find the middle path. It is my belief that it is most necessary and that it is totally possible. I do not consider those dark prophecies as a word of revelation." Alfred North Whitehead writes: "Human nature has become so much entangled that the worth of programmes charted out for correct management of society is considered less than rubbish by statesmen." A little amount of study is enough to provide plenty of similar examples from all thinkers of the East and the West.
With the assumption that moderation of thought and balance of intellect is found in a very restricted number of persons, how is it Possible to vindicate and consider as valid the outcome of consultation and deliberation among persons? The Islamic answer to this question can be put as follows:
Firstly, Islam regards the perpetual education, training and guidance of individuals in an Islamic society and upliftment of their level of awareness, knowledge of the real world and spiritual purification as a fundamental social duty. Preparation of the people for thinking in a correct manner is a duty that can be of considerable assistance in laying the foundations of `rational life'. This can also be inferred from the inspiring words of Ali (A) in which he puts the complete responsibility of the multi‑faceted development of human beings on the shoulders of their `guardians' at all social levels: All of you are tenders of your flock and responsible for it.
Secondly, the principle of counsel is a great blessing of God that allows people to rely on themselves. It makes them aware of their hidden constructive capacities and talents and awakens them to the significance of mutual understanding for creation of social consensus and harmony. By confirming this principle, God has confirmed man's capacity for organizing his life on the basis of reason and intelligence. The fact that the opinion of the majority, or even a total social consensus does not necessarily lead to the right view, is evident and indubitable; but it does not invalidate the basis of the principle of counsel; because, God, who has asked man to follow the right path, has also provided the means of attaining righteousness and laid down a law for movement towards that goal. That law is that man, in search of the `rational life', should orient himself towards reality with all his existence. That is, in a room where he can have access to sunlight itself by moving aside the curtains from windows, he should not light a dim lamp and deceive himself. When he cannot reach out for the sun, he should not enshroud himself in total darkness, but should make use of any secondary source of light that he can get hold of Shura, or counsel, is that secondary source of light that can deliver human beings from total darkness when there is no possibility of approaching reality itself. It is just this degree of deliverance from darkness and access to reality that is acceptable to the Creator of life and death, who says: And their affair is through counsel among them. (42:38)
This is a just one aspect of the utility of counsel. Another aspect of shura is that it affords individuals to express their opinion in accordance with their highest intellectual perceptions, and, since awareness, justice and stability are the requisite conditions of participants in a council, even if the product of their counsel is opposed to what it should have been, it does not reduce anything from its true worth and value. Because, their decision‑making errors do not necessarily indicate ignorance, corruption or perverseness on the part of the members of the shura; rather, it reflects an inadvertent weakness and shortcoming for which no one may be blamed. Now we can proceed to discuss the most fundamental issues of shura from the point of view of Islam.
The Subject of Shura In Islam
From our foregoing discussion it became clear that shura means assembly of a group of persons who are capable, reliable and well informed about a subject, for the purpose of reaching a truth related with that subject through consultation.
The subject (maudu`) of shura in Islam, that is the affairs which are subject to counsel and consultation, consists of all the spheres of human life as well as the background for determination of the secondary laws (al‑ahkam al‑thanawiyyah). To explain this further, it may be said that all matters of opinion surrounding the individual and collective life of Muslims are divided into two categories: hukm and maudu'
1. Hukm. Hukm or command applies to the primary (awwali) and the secondary (thanawi) laws.
The Primary Laws: The al‑ahkam al‑awwaliyyah (the primary laws) constitute all Islamic duties and obligations deduced and inferred by jurists (fuqaha' or Mujtahidin) from the four sources consisting of the Book, sunnah, ijma` (consensus) and `aql (reason), and are communicated to all Muslims. The al‑ahkam al‑awwaliyyah, or the primary laws, constitute the duties of all responsible (mukallaf) Muslim men and women. These laws, since they are by no means subject to change or variation, are never set forth for consultation or shura, such as the five categories of acts, which are, wajib (obligatory), muharram (forbidden), mustahabb (enjoined but not obligatory), makruh (distasteful and undesirable) and mubah (permissible). None of the acts of a mukallaf are outside these five categories, such as, salat, saum, hajj, zakat, khums, jihad, and defence. Other primary laws relate to the commerical dealings, punishments (hudud), compensation (diyyah, blood money or indemnity for bodily injury), and yet others relate to the process of trial, testimony and litigation et al. The general definition for this category is that these laws are those which, being based on the Quran, sunnah, ijma` and `aql, with due consideration of the physical and spiritual nature of man and its proneness to various deviations and defects, and with view to various things which are to its benefit and advantage, are not subject to any form of change whatsoever; although they are subject to modulation, depending on the varying states and conditions of a mukallaf (a responsible Muslim). These varying conditions of a muhallaf may be such as travelling, presence in home‑town, compulsion, exigency, or any other ordinary or extraordinary condition.
There‑ is a very important point related to these laws, and which must be duly observed, is that, in view of the close social relations of Muslims with one another and also their relations with non Muslim communities, the variance of opinion among jurists‑a natural consequence of the controversial nature of the jurist's material and sources‑‑should not be the cause of disturbance and confusion in the social life of Muslims. For this reason, it is necessary that the fatawa (legal opinions) and laws related with social affairs should be issued through a council of leading jurists; if not, variance of legal opinion can cause considerable confusion and disturbance in the Islamic society.
The Secondary Laws: The secondary laws, or al‑ahkam al‑thanawiyyah, are those issued by someone who is a faqih jami` al‑shara'it (a faqih well‑versed in all spheres of the Islamic Shari`ah, an all‑rounder jurisprudent) with due consideration of the circumstances and conditions of an individual or society. An example of this category of laws is the famous fatwa issued by the late Ayatullah Aqa Mirza Muhammad Husayn Shirazi‑may God's mercy be upon him forbidding the use of tobacco.
The difference between the primary and secondary laws can be put as follows:
1. The former are directly based on the four sources, namely, the Book, the sunnah, ijma` and `aql, and which being the class of unchanging Islamic laws, together with the fundamental doctrines of the faith, constitute the framework of Islam. The secondary laws, on the other hand, do not directly correlate with the four above‑mentioned sources, but are the product of juristic inference drawn in view of the provisional conditions of an individual or the community. This does not, however, mean that the secondary laws deduced by a faqih jami ` al shara'it have no connection with the four sources of law. It means that the faqih jami` al‑shara'it, in consultation with other jurisprudents, issues a fatwa or legal verdict for the benefit of the Muslim society or in order to thwart a danger threatening it through inspiration from general principles and laws that specify the duty to safeguard the existence of the Islamic society.
2. An important point to note in connection with the secondary laws is that they relate to the category of actions and affairs that are generally considered mubah or permissible, as in the case of tobacco, which is mubah, and was forbidden by the late Ayatullah Shirazi. The primary laws, on the other hand, are not changeable on any account.
3. The primary laws, which are suspended in case of idtirar (exigency), ijbar (coercion), or karahiyyah (reprehensibility), should not be confused with the secondary laws (al‑ahkam al‑thanawiyyah). For instance, in case of insecurity of roads and sea‑routes the faqih may suspend the obligation of the hajj pilgrimage. This is not a secondary law because the duty of hajj is suspended or prohibited since `ilm (knowledge), ikhtiyar (freedom) and qudrah (power) are the fundamental requirements for the application of a wajib.
4. With the disappearance of the cause and motive behind the secondary laws, their validity expires and the domain (maudu`) of its application returns to the sphere of primary laws.
References
1. The late Ayatullah Aqa Mirza Muhammad Husayn Na'ini, in his book Tanbih al‑ummah wa tanzih al‑millah, p. 17, rejects this misconception in these words: In the same way as submission to the whims of tyrants and despots is a form of slavery in the sphere of politics, so also uncritical surrender to the dogmas and dictates of religious figures put forth in the name of religion, is also another form of slavery.'
2. Jean‑Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, p.84, English translation by Maurice Cranston, Penguin Books, 1978.
3. Ibid. p. 84.
4. Ibid. p. 87.
5. Kulayni, Usul al‑Kafi, vol. I, p. 16, Tehran.
6. Ibid. p. 25.
7. Ibid. p. 13.
8. Abd al‑Wahid Amadi, Ghurar al‑hikam wa durar al‑kalim, p. 429.
9. Ayatullah Aqa Mirza Muhammad Husayn Na'ini, Tanbih al‑ummah wa tanzah al‑millah, p. 34.
10. Ibid. p. 56.
11. Ibid. p. 34.
12. Nahj al‑Balagha, Sermon 214, vol. III, p.p. 226‑227.
13. Ibid. vol. III, p. 478.
14. Maudu or subject of a law, means the domain or sphere of personal or social life to which the law applies. More specifically, every relation between man and the world that constitutes a field of activity, can be considered as the maudu ` of a law. For example, agriculture is an important field of human activity. It is said to be a maudu` or subject of one or more laws. For instance in case of its necessity for human existence it may be declared a wajib. Marriage is yet another maudu` subject to various laws depending on its degree of necessity; that is, it may be specified as a wajib in some cases, and as a mustahabb in others. Similarly, the issues of war and peace between Muslims and non‑Muslims are domains subject to various laws depending on the varying conditions. Also activities such as production, distribution, exploitation of underground resources education and so on, are all different domains subject to a variety of laws depending upon varying conditions of the individual or society.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Jafari
Source: Imam reza network
Special Functions of State and Islamic Perspective on Public Participation
Apart from the necessity of guaranteeing implementation of laws, there are also other reasons behind the exigency of government or executive power. It is by means of considering the aggregate of these reasons that it becomes possible to logically explain and justify the government’s set of obligations and prerogatives. If the duty of government were only implementation of laws and ensuring their implementation, such purpose would be met by organizing the armed forces. Yet, governments, including the Islamic government, have other obligations, such as providing for public needs of society, which are beyond the limited domain of individual action.
Sometimes, we study the life of man and examine his needs as an individual. Naturally, the person concerned must meet these needs through hard work by acting within the framework of rules and regulations. However, some needs are related not only to the family or a certain person but to the whole society or a wide section of it. For example, internal and external security is a public need. Designing the necessary means to combat domestic violence, law violation and insecurities and organizing a potent defense force to resist external enemies that threaten the Islamic country are not related to a specific section of society. They are related to all members of society. Since a certain person or a few people are unable to meet such needs, they must be met by the whole society. No doubt, by introducing rules and taking necessary steps, the government on behalf of society can meet such needs.
An organized movement and effective and appropriate military force is needed once there is a threat along the borders. In reality, the all-out participation in a defensive war must be based on law. Here, personal and subjective operations and activities based on personal preference cannot bring any good result and cannot stop the enemies’ satanic forces and their organized and well-planned military manoeuvres. Through efficient programs and schemes designed by an organization which is comprised of military experts, who are familiar with the dangers posed by the enemy and their level of facilities and capabilities, military forces must be organized for war operations. Such need can be met only by an organ which enjoys full authority over all members of that society.
By designing special programs and rules, it is the government which can mobilize people to participate in the war to thwart the danger to their country. In addition, to be prepared to confront external and internal threats, necessary defensive armaments and facilities must be acquired and efficient military training of individuals must be taken into account so that the country can have sufficient guards for external threats, as well as for internal security. This important task can only be shouldered by the government whose orders are obeyed and regarded as binding by the people.
The examples mentioned in relation to the second reason behind the need for government, i.e. meeting the public needs of society, give importance to defense issues of the country and confronting external enemies. In our country, the armed forces, comprising of the army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), are discharging this crucial and vital duty. Also, the examples we mentioned in relation to the first reason, i.e. guaranteeing the implementation of law, pertain to the maintenance of internal security and practical ways of compelling offenders to obey the law. This important duty has been placed upon the disciplinary forces.
Among public needs which cannot be met by individuals and must be addressed by the state are the medical needs of society. Society has always been on the verge of succumbing to contagious diseases some of which pose serious threats, and if not prevented can cause heavy human loss. In the past, human societies had been afflicted with contagious and infectious diseases such as cholera, plague, and small pox which caused heavy human losses because of the lack of advanced knowledge in medicine and hygiene and overall programs. Through interstate programs and the use of obtained knowledge and facilities in medicine today, prevention and elimination of those diseases became possible.
For instance, infantile paralysis (poliomyelitis or polio) caused heavy human loss to us, but through planning, grand medical activities and initiation of vaccination programs, our country has obtained valuable results. Undoubtedly, without state planning and public participation, such programs could not have materialized. A power superior to that of individuals, i.e. the government, by planning, providing facilities, issuing required orders, and codifying special rules and regulations must take a step in the scene of action and people must follow government orders so that society’s health need can be met and the root of diseases that threaten society be eliminated.
Similar to the above is the war against the smuggling, distribution and use of narcotic drugs, for this ruinous catastrophe seriously threatens the physical, psychological and emotional wellbeing of society. Without interference of the state, serious steps and well planned programs, it will not be uprooted, nor the limited measures of individuals make considerable difference. As such, because of the multiplicity of those needs and the difference among them, a ministry has been considered for meeting each of them
Of course, individuals can meet many needs of society, but the motive to meet them does not exist in everybody nor is it equally strong. Left to individuals, they cannot be met satisfactorily and sufficiently. Some sections of society will still be deprived of those facilities and needed things. Therefore, meeting those needs has also been delegated to the government so as to avoid any shortcoming. For example, people can be entrusted with the construction of schools, learning centers, academic curricula and provision of the budget needed by those centers throughout the country as done before.
Today, in some advanced countries, the administration and maintenance of many of these centers has been entrusted to the people but, unfortunately, all individuals do not have a strong motive to construct or provide the budget for those educational institutions where children can pursue their studies on different levels. Of course, we do not deny that there have always been philanthropists who shoulder heavy expenses of construction of schools, but their activities are limited and do not cover all levels of society. If the government delegates this need to volunteers, the interests of society will not be ensured.
Therefore, the government must have a pertinent program and policy in order to serve the interests of society. The budget for these needs must be allocated by the people. That is, by levying taxes and other custom duties and considering necessary ways, the government must make people pay the expenses for those needs, or itself provide the budget through national resources. Whatever means are employed, education must be at the disposal of all members of society for its welfare. If circumstances change and some volunteers shoulder the expenses of building and administering academic centers, a heavy burden will be removed from the government’s lot.
Dual structure of functions of state
Certain responsibilities may be delegated to the people. But the government cannot delegate some important duties to the people; for example, the portfolio of defense and war with the enemy cannot be handled by unorganized individuals and groups. Policymaking, planning, budget allocation, and meeting the needs of this vital and fundamental issue must be entrusted to government alone. Of course, after assuming the responsibility of war and defense, planning, policymaking and facilitating ways, the government can permit people to voluntarily take part in the war as popular mobilizing [basij] forces, and defend the Islamic country and government.
Therefore, there is no need for the government to assume all social responsibilities. In fact, people themselves can shoulder many responsibilities and voluntarily provide the pertinent budget. It is true that the government must play a pivotal role in order to have cohesion and avoid any discordance, make room for public participation and assumption of responsibilities, design overall and long-term programs. The main role of some ministries is policymaking and the rest of the work is done by the people.
For example, the main function of the Ministry of Trade is not to engage in trade, as, in principle, domestic and foreign trade must be carried out by people. Because of abuses committed by those affiliated with the monarchy during the previous regime, in high-level commercial transactions whose benefits the masses were deprived of, it is stipulated in the Constitution that trade and high-level commercial transactions will be carried out by the government.
In principle, business and commercial activities must be carried out by the people and not the government. It is known that the government is not a suitable trading agent. Once it directly engages in commercial activities, it fails because in trade and industry, and in economic affairs in general, personal motivation and group competition play a very important role, and when properly guided, such motivation brings about progress, development and dynamism in trade and industry. Once trade becomes a state affair, motivation no longer exists. As a result, no progress is made.
In totalitarian governments and centralized states such as the socialist and communist regimes in China, Cuba, the erstwhile Soviet Union, and countries of the former Eastern Bloc, the state directly assumes all activities, policymaking and planning, and in all economic, commercial, industrial, and agricultural activities people do not play any role as the state’s executive agents. All affairs are entrusted to the state, and the people, i.e farmers and factory workers, work as public workers and wage-earners. Contrary to this, the Islamic government believes in principle that functions that can benefit by being entrusted to the people should be handed over to them and their ownership and autonomy respected.
Need for organizations dealing with low-income strata of society
As indicated, public centers must be established in society so that the low-income strata that cannot meet some of their needs can benefit from the facilities and services of those centers. For example, there is a need for special medical centers with free medication to serve those who cannot afford their medication expenses. As such, hospitals have been built for this purpose within the framework of social insurance law. In advanced countries such centers render extensive services to the people by exempting them from paying medical fees, and the state is obliged to provide medical expenses for people through taxes or national resources.
Once the taxation system is formulated for the procurement of a part of the state budget, including social and medical insurance, the people are obliged to pay their taxes according to the low. In advanced countries complex methods are used through which no one can evade taxes. The tax-payers also enjoy the benefits and utilities of taxes, but the low-income and vulnerable strata benefit from the free services of social and medical insurance. But the question is: Is it better to entrust public welfare activities and building medical centers to the people so that patients can benefit from their services, or the state should compel people to pay taxes and itself engage in constructing medical centers so that the low-income strata can benefit from their services?
Indisputably, the first option is better and more desirable. This option is preferred in the philosophy of Islamic laws. In Islam the people have been recommended to spend some of their earnings on public welfare works and let others benefit from them, for in this way, the value of charity will be preserved and the doers will attain self-perfection and otherworldly rewards, while the needs of society will be met. But if people are compelled to give a portion of their earnings, the value of volunteerism will be lost and they will not earn any spiritual reward nor acquire perfection.
The institution of pious endowments is an example of the voluntary work of charity by our benevolent Muslim people throughout history which has brought enormous benefits to our society. It can be said that there is no village in this country which has no pious endowment benefiting people. However, in recent years, unfortunately, this endowment has diminished and fewer people establish pious endowments, notwithstanding the value, nobility and sanctity of this pleasing-to-God work. In addition, we have many pious endowments which are either forgotten or not properly managed.
No doubt, if a pious endowment were revived and its status recognized again, many of the needs of the state would be met, and if many pious endowments were reestablished, a heavy burden would be removed from the state, and thereby, the people would also receive more spiritual rewards. Once the people engage in charity work out of their own freewill and volition with more freedom and autonomy of action, the more rewards they will receive.
However, if people do not take any action and social needs are not sufficiently addressed, the state becomes duty-bound to compel people to pay their taxes through the enactment and implementation of compulsory laws, and satisfy social needs.
The Islamic paving of ground for public participation
Entrusting affairs to people and paving the ground for public participation in various social arenas, like meeting extensive social needs, is recognized as among the characteristics of civil society. Of course, “civil society” and many other terms that originated in the West have different meanings and are sometimes exploited. However, we consider those terms in accordance with concepts acceptable to us. For instance, different, and at times contradictory, conceptions and interpretations of “civil society” have been presented.
One of the meanings of “civil society” is that as much as possible, social works must be taken from the state and entrusted to the people themselves. As much as possible, the people should voluntarily be ready to engage in social activities and only in times of necessity should the state interfere. Of course, in all countries overall policymaking in social affairs is undertaken by the state and practical programs and various phases of implementation are undertaken by the people.
Undoubtedly, the above conception of civil society is a fundamental Islamic principle in which Islamic society, and the City of the Prophet (s) [madinat ’un-nabi] has been anchored since the beginning. Initially, the Islamic government or state was not undertaking all social activities. It was the people who were undertaking most of the social activities but gradually, with the progress of society and the emergence of new needs, the state of affairs became such that common people could no longer meet their needs and an organized institution like the government had to meet those needs.
For example, the need to illuminate a city before could be met by placing torches in the alleys and streets, and by doing so, the people could pass by at night. Naturally, the said need at such level could be met by people themselves. Nowadays, however, by using electricity to illuminate a city and its residential areas, the people alone cannot meet this need satisfactorily. So, the state has to provide the necessary means to meet that need.
Factors undermining public participation
Generally, two factors undermining public participation in meeting public needs can be mentioned. The first factor is the daily increase of needs and the complexity and specialization of the process of meeting those needs. This condition practically deprives people of meeting those social needs and makes it the government’s responsibility to fill the existing vacuum.
The second factor is the weakening of moral and religious values and the prevalence of profit-oriented Western culture among people which urges them to help themselves rather than others. Western culture is based upon profiteering, individualism and freedom from responsibility, which prevailed in the West after the Renaissance and gradually permeated Muslim countries and weakened the spiritual and moral motives of Muslims.
It dissuaded man from thinking for others and helping the needy and activated the sense of indifference towards fellowmen. This culture persuades a person to avoid accepting social responsibilities and only pursue his interests. This culture is diametrically opposed to Islamic culture which has been prevalent for centuries among our people, urging them to think about the interests of society and serve the needy.
Heedlessness to Islamic traditions and values and penetration of Western culture in recent years has hindered the thriving of the noble tradition of pious endowment [waqf] and the number of endowed buildings and lands has tremendously decreased compared to the past. Also, other voluntary public welfare works have diminished and the spirit of civility which existed in Islamic society has weakened. As a result, the government’s obligation has multiplied and its burden has become heavier. If by the blessing of the Islamic Revolution, Islamic and human values are revived and people pay heed to their spiritual, moral and religious responsibilities by engaging in charitable work, the government’s burden of responsibility will decrease and it could entrust some of its responsibilities to the people. This state of affairs, in a sense, will be a return to Islamic civil society.
Status of civil society in Islam
I would like to emphasize that civil society in this sense is rooted in Islam and the apostolic invitation of the Prophets (‘a), but having drifted away from Islam, we have drifted away from it. Now, with the blessing of Islam, we need to return to it. The West is not supposed to guide and direct us towards the establishment of civil society. It is actually we who are supposed to hold them under obligation, for during the apex of Islamic civilization most of the Western societies were quasi-barbarians. Islamic culture and civilization gradually civilized them and they acquired the civil society from Islam. Today they claim to be exporting the salient features of Western culture to our country and civilizing us!
Thus, the ideal civil society is rooted in Islam and Islamic civilization, and by returning to Islam this civil society will materialize. Yet, “civil society” has also other meanings which are unacceptable to us. Nowadays, in the West “civil society” is used in opposition to “religious society” and it refers to a society in which religion does not rule and has no role whatsoever in social organizations and activities. In such an irreligious civil society—which is extensively promoted today—all members of society have equal opportunity to occupy all government and public posts.
If they say that Iranian society must be transformed into a civil society, it implies that a Jew could also become the president of Iran because all human beings are equal in humanity and we have no first or second class human beings. Under the rubric of “civil society” they are striving for the official recognition of an atheistic and deviant sect affiliated with Zionism. Under the pretext that all human beings are equal, they want members of notorious groups inclined towards America and Zionism to also have the chance to occupy important positions, such as the presidency.
If we claim that to some extent distinction among citizens is present and accepted, this is because in occupying certain political posts, some qualifications have been laid down in the Constitution, and God also says, thus:
وَلَن يَجْعَلَ اللّهُ لِلْكَافِرِينَ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِينَ سَبِيلاً
“And Allah will never provide the faithless any way [to prevail] over the faithful.”[10]
Such a view is not inconsistent with civil society. According to Islam, “civil society” in which disbelievers and Muslims have equal rights and opportunities to occupy political posts is not acceptable. We openly announce that Islam does not allow disbelievers to prevail over Muslims in Islamic society. Neither does it allow a Zionist-affiliated atheistic sect and party to obtain official recognition. It makes no difference whether they label this difference in rights and qualifications as “discrimination in citizenship” or any other.
New ways of opposing Islamic criteria for selection
Today, those who are associated with the Global Arrogance inside the country are striving to promote Western liberalism and democracy by raising the slogan of equality among men and citizens. They want to inculcate the belief that there is no difference between human beings as they enjoy equal rights, and their views must receive equal attention while codifying laws of the country. Of course, human beings do not belong to different classes according to Islam. In this regard, God says:
يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ إِنَّا خَلَقْنَاكُم مِن ذَكَرٍ وَأُنثَى وَجَعَلْنَاكُمْ شُعُوبًا وَقَبَائِلَ لِتَعَارَفُوا إِنَّ أَكْرَمَكُمْ عِندَ اللَّهِ أَتْقَاكُمْ...
“O mankind! Indeed We created you from a male and a female, and made you nations and tribes that you may identify with one another. Indeed the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the most God-wary among you...”[11]
In the above verse, human beings have been declared equal in their intrinsic and essential qualities, and thus, difference or classification among them is inconceivable. However, the latter part of the verse points to the contingent [‘aradhi] differences.
That is, some valuably acquired characteristics and attributes make some of them superior to others. As such, the God-wary people have a sublime station in the sight of God, and it cannot be said that all human beings are equal before God. Similarly, in view of differences between individuals due to possession of merits and qualifications, they differ in capability and cannot hold any post that requires specific qualifications. For example, in all parts of the world an illiterate person can not be President. Can it be said that considering the condition of literacy for the assumption of the presidential post is contrary to the equality of men? Does it mean that human beings have two classes the literate and illiterate?
In all parts of the world special conditions are taken into account for key positions such as the Presidency. The Islamic nature of our political system has also laid down certain conditions. The President must have sufficient literacy and education, be a devoted supporter of Islam and not be associated with an enemy of Islam. These are in accordance with Islamic principles. So, if the condition of being Muslim is stipulated for becoming a Majlis deputy or occupying other posts, this does not mean discrimination of human beings according to classes. In Islamic society, commensurate to the rights and obligations that Muslims have in lieu of the khums and zakat they pay, distinct rights and obligations are considered for followers of other religions. This does not signify a discrimination of human beings according to classes, though it can be said that those differences are related to classes of citizenship.
To claim that the position of the Supreme Leader, Presidency or other key and strategic posts can be held by those opposed to Islam and the Islamic system and who do not accept the Constitution, is equivalent to entrusting Islam to its enemies! Such a thing is neither rational nor possible, and if, God forbid, some would like to do so, Islam will not allow them because God has not given the faithless dominion over the Muslims and does not accept such domination over Muslims. This is our belief and we do not care if they accuse us of classifying citizens.
Need to preserve Islamic values and principles and counter enemy plots
Equality in humanity does not necessarily mean equality in rights. It is true that human beings are all equal in humanity but they are not so in human virtues. In Islamic society, therefore, many posts and positions must be entrusted to people who have the necessary merits and qualifications. As such, the Leader must be a faqih so that he can supervise the implementation of Islamic laws, for he can not successfully supervise if he is not familiar with Islam. Also, the President must be a Muslim. A Jew or a Christian cannot rule over a population of 90% Muslims.
We should not worry if newspapers and pens in the hands of those who are affiliated with the Global Arrogance accuse us of believing in second class citizens. Nothing more than this can be expected from them; they even deny the essentials of Islam. Through the Islamic system, we must strive to present Islam as it is to the world and not as its enemies project it.
If we say or write something which pleases the American hegemonic power newspapers and mass media and makes them applaud us, we should not be glad. In fact, we should be anxious and worried. It is known that when it was said to Aristotle, “So-and-so applauded you,” he started crying. When he was asked why he was crying, he said: “I do not know what foolish act I have done that has pleased that ignorant person!” If we do something for the benefit of our enemies and present Islam in a manner that is pleasant to them, we have served the enemies and not Islam! We have to defend the Islam which has been introduced by the Prophet (s) and the Ahl al-Bayt (‘a) to us, and not the “Islam” which the enemies dictate to us.
We cannot consider Muslims and non-Muslims as equal in holding key national posts. How can Islam allow us to officially recognize a religion which is affiliated with International Zionism, for the sake of “civil society”?
Notes:
[10] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:141.
[11] Surah al-Hujurat 49:13.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: al-islam.org
The Government’s Legitimacy in Islam
From the Islamic point of view, the same intellect that tells man that an action is good and another is bad and that his parents, teacher and the people have rights over him and he must give them their rights, tells him that the rights of God, who created the world, him and all human beings, are greater and more profound than that of others, and that he must admit that. Now, if God—who is our Master and has created us, and by whose will everything comes into being and will cease to exist if He wills—designates a person to implement His laws and decrees, his position is legitimate regardless of the acceptance or non-acceptance of people.
When God who has the greatest rights over human beings—nay, all rights belong to Him—grants the right to rule or guardianship [wilayah] over the people to the Apostle (s), an infallible Imam or the deputy of an infallible Imam, he has the right to implement the divine laws in society because he has been designated by the One to whom belongs all creation.
Therefore, the Islamic political theory on the basis of which the Islamic ruler has the right on behalf of God to implement divine laws and decrees and punish violators and criminals does not have inconsistency of any sort, and this theory is harmonious with rational principles. Of course, it is acceptable to those who believe in God. Those who do not believe in God will certainly not accept this theory. At the outset, we will have to prove to them the existence of God and the essence of monotheism [tawhid].
Should they accept God and embrace Islam, then we should sit together and discuss Islamic political theory. Thus, for those who believe in God, the Apostle (s) and the religion of Islam, the most rational legitimacy of government that could ever be conceived is that the Lord of the universe delegates the right to rule over people to one of His servants and designates him as ruler.
By knowing Islam and understanding its political theory, we will find out that above the rights that human beings have over one another, there is another right and that is the right of God over people.
Accordingly, if God commands His servant to do something—even if it is harmful to him—he must do so because he is a subject of God and belongs to Him, and being the Master, God can exercise authority over any of His servants. Of course, out of His infinite grace, benevolence and mercy, God does not bid or forbid anything detrimental to His creatures. He does not desire to harm anyone. His commandments and prohibitions are for the benefit, welfare and interests of human beings both in this world and the hereafter. In case they suffer by acting upon His commandments—for example, they are deprived of certain material enjoyments and blessings for a couple of days—God shall compensate them in the hereafter and recompense them a thousand times or more.
The prophets and their way of guiding people
God sends His apostles (‘a) to invite the people towards what is good and blissful in this world and the hereafter. At the beginning, the apostle or prophet of God guides and invites them to the truth and reads to them passages from a revealed scripture. By informing them and elevating the level of their understanding and knowledge, he paves the ground for their acceptance of the truth and divine duties. In reality, at this stage the apostle plays the role of “detached or external intellect” [‘aql-e munfasil]. Without exerting pressure and compelling the people and depriving them of liberty, he enhances their level of understanding in order to guide them towards their free choice and decision to willingly accept Islam and its lofty decrees.
An apostle is commissioned by God to inform the people of truth and falsehood and let them freely choose one of the two ways—truth or falsehood. For this reason, he cannot invite the people to his call by force and impart his teachings to them by pressure as this is against divine will. God wants people to choose whichever they like after knowing the truth and falsehood. So, at the beginning of his mission, the messenger of God has to establish contact with people, interact and talk with them, convey to them his message by means of rational proof and divine signs and miracles, and inform them of the truth.
In inviting the people to God and His signs and establishing divine order, the apostles of God do not employ any sort of compulsion or imposition on the people. As a policy, they pay special attention to human freedom and their conscious choice. In fact, they respect the liberty of people more than what is observed in other ideological systems. They make sure that in dealing with the invitation and system offered, the people have an absolutely free choice. It is because the purpose of God in creating man is for him to be a free and choosing creature, to accept truth freely and be guided by it. The use of compulsion and force by the apostles of God in the establishment of divine order is repugnant to divine purpose.
If man is supposed to choose a way by compulsion and force, chances are he would not know the truthfulness of the way and he may even possibly think that the way is not the correct one. In order to discern the correctness and truthfulness of the way, man must be informed and made aware at the outset, and the way must be paved for his free choice.
Again, since divine purpose is to allow man to freely, consciously and knowingly accept the path of truth and divine signs, God does not impose the path of truth on people by showing miracles. He does not desire to deprive the people of a conscious choice even by means of showing miracles and interfering in their free choice so that they accept the truth involuntarily and not resist it. As such, God said:
لَعَلَّكَ بَاخِعٌ نَّفْسَكَ أَلَّا يَكُونُوا مُؤْمِنِينَ ٭ إِنْ نَشَأْ نُنَزِّلْ عَلَيْهِم مِن السَّمَاء آيَةً فَظَلَّتْ أَعْنَاقُهُمْ لَهَا خَاضِعِينَ
“You might kill yourself [out of distress] that they will not have faith. If We wish We will send down to them a sign from the sky before which their heads will remain bowed in humility.”[55]
The need to remove obstacles along the way of guidance
God wished to guide the people by means of His messengers and separate the path of truth from that of falsehood for them to choose the correct path with knowledge, understanding and free choice. The arrogant profiteers, who had accumulated excessive wealth by exploiting the ignorance of people considered the invitation of the apostles (‘a) as a great obstacle along their satanic objectives and interests. They rose up against the Messenger of Allah (s) and did not allow him to talk to the people and recite verses of truth to guide them.
By employing excessive torture, persecution, harassment and unbearable problems, they hindered the guidance of people. In the Holy Qur’an, God called this group “the leaders of unfaith” [a’immat al-kufr] and the chiefs of corruption and vice, and ordered the Apostle (s) and his companions to fight them and get rid of them because their presence and satanic activities hindered the realization of the divine purpose. God wants all human beings to be guided and be able to distinguish the path of truth from falsehood, but they obstruct His divine purpose:
...فَقَاتِلُوا أَئِمَّةَ الْكُفْرِ إِنَّهُمْ لاَ أَيْمَانَ لَهُمْ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَنتَهُونَ
"Then fight the leaders of unfaith—indeed they have no [commitment to] pledges—maybe they will relinquish.”[56]
If a person driving along a road is obstructed by a rock or big stone, he has no option but to remove it to continue driving. As such, he will try his best and do everything in order to get rid of the said obstruction. Basically, every rational person removes any hindrance along his way. Similarly, for the realization of His purpose, He commands the Apostle (s), his companions, and all Muslims throughout history to fight and eliminate the obstructions to guidance, i.e. the oppressors in the world, monarchs, tyrants, money-worshippers, and all satanic powers that hinder the path of guidance.
God does not enjoin you to smile at them and cheerfully request them to allow the people to be guided! If they were listening to requests and had desisted from their wicked acts, they would not have been arrogant. They are essentially arrogant, wicked and corrupt. They want others to become their servants and subjects and exploit them to the fullest and not allow their own interests to be threatened.
As such, they do not allow people to be guided to the path of truth and become followers of the Messenger of Allah (s). Certainly, for the faithful and people of guidance there is no other way but to confront them violently. For this reason, in the Qur’an God commands the Holy Apostle (s) to fight them and deal with them violently, severely and sternly—the same Apostle (s) who is described by God in the Qur’an in this manner:
فَبِمَا رَحْمَةٍ مِنَ اللّهِ لِنْتَ لَهُمْ وَلَوْ كُنْتَ فَظًّا غَلِيظَ الْقَلْبِ لاَنفَضُّوا مِنْ حَوْلِكَ...
“It is by Allah’s mercy that you are gentle to them; and had you been harsh and hardhearted, surely they would have scattered from around you...”[57]
Elsewhere in the Qur’an, God commands him to fight and be severe with the faithless:
يَا أَيُّهَا النَّبِيُّ جَاهِدِ الْكُفَّارَ وَالْمُنَافِقِينَ وَاغْلُظْ عَلَيْهِمْ وَمَأْوَاهُمْ جَهَنَّمُ وَبِئْسَ الْمَصِيرُ
“O Prophet! Wage jihad against the faithless and the hypocrites, and be severe with them. Their refuge shall be hell, and it is an evil destination.”[58]
In yet another verse of the Qur’an, God orders the Apostle (s) to retaliate in kind against those who have threatened the lives and properties of Muslims and fight them with utmost severity:
وَقَاتِلُواْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللّهِ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَكُمْ... ٭ وَاقْتُلُوهُمْ حَيْثُ ثَقِفْتُمُوهُمْ وَأَخْرِجُوهُم مِنْ حَيْثُ أَخْرَجُوكُمْ...
“Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you… And kill them wherever you confront them and expel them from where they expelled you...”[59]
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Grand Strategies in the Realm of Governance and Implementation
In initial discussions on Islamic political philosophy, I stated that, like any political system, the Islamic government has two basic axes: (1) law and legislation, and (2) management and implementation of law. Previous discussions were essentially about the first axis, dealing with the importance of law, characteristics of ideal law, legislation in Islam and its conditions, while addressing the skepticism regarding the above.
The present topic is management and implementation of law. In order to have a clear understanding of the topic, we will realize that the more transparent and clear the goal and objective of an institution or organization, the easier it will be to understand its structure, working conditions and qualities in the people elected as its members. Therefore, to discuss the executive branch of Islamic government, i.e. its managerial aspect, we must be familiar with the reason for establishing the government including the goal of its management.
Notwithstanding the trend which considers government unnecessary, the majority of political philosophers regard the existence of government in society as necessary. That is, they believe that in society there should be a body which must issue orders, oblige people, implement ordinances acceptable to society and apprehend and punish violators. This premise is accepted by almost all thinkers and its need realized by every society. In Islam this premise is also affirmed, and in the words of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) recorded in Nahj al-Balaghah: even if a society does not have an upright and meritorious government, a tyrannical government is still better than the absence of any government.[4] It is because in the absence of government or the executive, there will be chaos, the rights of individuals violated and the interests of society trampled upon. So, according to Islam, one of the most important social obligations of people is the establishment of an upright government so as to guarantee the interests of society.
Different approaches on objectives of executive power
We all know that executive power is for implementation of law, and thus, its objective is implementation of laws, but the nature and structure of the law which the state is trying to implement must be seen. The objectives of law are nothing but two: material and spiritual. In general, all those who are involved in debates on political philosophy acknowledge the fact that the state must secure material interests of people, but there is a difference of opinion about guaranteeing spiritual interests of people; whether they should be reflected in law, the government implement such a law and guarantee its implementation.
Since long, many schools of philosophy have believed that the government must also guarantee spiritual values and the law guaranteed by the government must take human virtues into account. Even in non-religious schools of philosophy some ancient Greek philosophers like Plato regarded paving the ground for the flourishing of human virtues as the duty of government. He asserted that the government must be run by men of wisdom and those who are the best in terms of moral virtues. The saying “The men of wisdom must rule” is attributed to him. So, non-Muslim and non-religious philosophers—those who are not followers of the religions with heavenly origin—have also laid stress on spiritual issues and moral virtues. Even the philosophers with no religious beliefs have emphasized the observance of moral virtues in society and the creation of an atmosphere for the moral growth of people.
After the spread of Christianity in Europe, the Roman Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Christianity and his propagation of it in Europe, and adoption of Christianity as the official religion of civilized countries in Europe, religion was attached to government and the goal of government was to secure religious objectives. That is, the statesmen also used to implement what they had accepted as Christianity. Since the Renaissance, the Westerners experienced an intellectual revolution and endeavored to separate moral issues from the realm of government concerns.
After the Renaissance many developments took place in Europe which became the origin of the new Western civilization, and their hallmark is the separation of religion from the realm of social concerns. It was during that time that philosophers discussed about politics, wrote books, founded schools of thought, and consigned moral virtues and spirituality to oblivion.
Among these philosophers was Thomas Hobbes, the English philosopher, who believed that the only function of government was to prevent anarchy. According to him, like wolves, human beings by nature would be at each other’s throats and destroy one another. Accordingly, a body was needed to curb the wolf’s instinct in them and prevent their aggression against one another. Following him, John Locke, who was the founder of Western liberal thought and whose ideas are still discussed and more or less accepted in all political and academic circles in the world, presented maintenance of security as the purpose of government.
According to him, what human beings need in life is a controlling agent called “government” in the absence of which social order will not come into being, anarchy will prevail, security will be lost, and the life and property of people will be endangered. He says, “We want government to fill this vacuum, other matters have nothing to do with government.”
Of course, the separation of religion from government and social affairs does not mean that none of these theoreticians gave importance to moral virtues and spiritual values. In fact, they said that individuals would have to pursue these matters themselves because they had nothing to do with government. Those who believe in God have to go themselves to the temple, church or anywhere they wish and engage in worshipping God. Similarly, moral virtues such as honesty, good conduct, respecting others, attending to the poor, and others are valuable, but considered personal matters. Individuals themselves have to strive to acquire these pleasant moral virtues, for government has nothing to do with them.
So, the objective of social law, i.e. what government must implement, is only maintenance of security in society so as to protect the life and property of people. Likewise, executive power has no function except maintenance of security and protection of people’s lives and properties. In the words of Locke, apart from protection of life and property, protection of personal freedom is also considered part of security. Regarding moral and spiritual interests, the maximum thing he said was that social law must be such that it does not conflict with morality nor hinder the worship of God.
With respect to preservation of moral values, however, social law and government would not assume the responsibility of preserving religious values and creating an atmosphere for spiritual and religious growth. Nowadays, this statement of Locke is the gospel and constitution of most schools of philosophy. Their principal motto is that the only duty of government is preservation of security and freedom, and it has no responsibility towards religious and moral affairs. This is the fundamental difference between Western thinkers in the world today and Islam.
Aim of prophets (‘a) in establishing government
The view of prophets (‘a), especially the Great Prophet of Islam (s) is that apart from securing the materials needs and interests, securing the spiritual interests is also part of the duty of a government. In fact, securing spiritual interests takes precedence and is more important than securing material interests. The government must implement the law whose ultimate objective is to secure the spiritual, religious, moral and human interests—the same things regarded by religion as its ultimate purpose, because the perfection of man depends on them. It considers the purpose of the creation of man, endowed with freewill, to know and pursue this lofty objective.
The axis of these matters is nearness to God which is, thanks to God, well entrenched in Islamic culture today. In fact, it has gained currency among Muslims and even those who do not correctly know its meaning are familiar with its expression. Common people who do not know how to read and write, daily use the expression “qurbatan ilallah” [for the sake of nearness to Allah].
Law that is implemented in society must be geared towards the realization of the ultimate goal and purpose behind the creation of man which is nearness to God. The social life of man should progress in this direction and other issues and animal dimensions are valuable provided they are a prelude to his progress, spiritual perfection and proximity to God.
The goal of state can also be identified once it is proved that the purpose behind the codification of social laws is to secure both spiritual and material interests, as a matter of course. The state must consider protecting the life and property of citizens, paving the ground for the spiritual growth of human beings and combating anything that is against the realization of this objective, as part of its duty. This is in reality a preliminary and not the main goal. That is to say, it is a means to achieve a loftier goal. Hence, laws to be recognized officially in Islamic society should be totally concordant with religious foundations and geared toward the spiritual and religious growth of human beings. For them not to be inimical to religion is not enough; they must be attuned to the goals of religion. The Islamic state must also combat religious disbelief and hostility to religion and materialize religious objectives.
In a religious society, it is possible that certain material needs may not be provided temporarily because of the expediency to attend to some spiritual affairs. If the ordinances of Islam are implemented, in the long run material interests of people will also be better secured than in any other system. However, if to provide for all material interests will undermine religion within a limited period, one should only provide for material interests that will not undermine religion, because spiritual interests take precedence. But in Western countries what we have said is not credible. They are only concerned with material objectives and the state is not responsible for spiritual interests.
Impact of social challenges on conduct of liberal system
Sometimes, people protest that in the West spiritual and religious interests are also attended to. Westerners also offer sacrifices and pay attention to social problems. Of course, this contention is correct and we acknowledge that not all Westerners are individualistic. Prevalence of liberal thought does not mean that all people in the West are influenced by it. What we mean is that liberalism dominates Western societies and because of social necessities they are sometimes compelled to act contrary to the dictates of their philosophy.
That is, because of some exigencies even those who are individualistic and liberal have social considerations, and in order to prevent an uprising and revolt by the majority of people, they have to consider the deprived. In practice, in many countries ruled by socialists and social democrats, a great portion of the taxes levied are spent on social services. Their materialist philosophy does not make such a demand but in order to maintain security, they are compelled to provide these facilities.
The point is that liberalism demands one thing and the action of its proponents exhibit something else. In fact, this criticism is leveled at them— liberalism and individualism does not expect them to take these things into account; so, why do they provide social securities and facilities which are in favor of the deprived? The reply to this question is that these facilities are meant to safeguard the capital of the capitalists and prevent communist uprisings and Marxist revolutions. Before Marxist thought was put into practice in Marxist countries, it was prevalent in Western countries. Karl Marx, a German scholar who lived in the U.K, initially promoted his ideas and books there. Studying his works, the English statesmen realized the perils Marx had brought them and parried them in anticipation.
The Labor Party and socialist tendencies that came into being in Britain and the programs in favor of the deprived implemented there were all meant to counter Marxist tendencies, because it was predicted that the advancement of capitalism would urge the majority of people to stage an uprising. In order to preempt that they attended to the poor and silenced them.
This attitude was beyond the dictates of their capitalist school but it aimed at protecting the interests of the capitalists. In any case, liberalism asserts that the state does not have any responsibility in relation to spiritual affairs.
Possibly, they would complain to us, saying: “In principle, in the Western countries the state levies taxes from people for the church. Why do you accuse them of being heedless to religion and spirituality?” This is the reply: This is also not dictated by liberal thought. In fact, their purpose is to win the hearts of the religious and make use of the power of the church.
Our concern here is their philosophy and their frame of mind. If ever they engage in some religious activities, it is meant to protect their own interests. In a bid to win elections, they strive to win the hearts and votes of the religious. Sometimes, during the presidential elections in the U.S of America, presidential candidates are seen going to church and drawing the attention of people. It does not mean that they are proponents of religion in the affairs of government.
Reason behind individuals’ inclination towards liberalism
According to Islam, protection of spiritual interests which can be realized under the auspices of religion is among the essential and primary objectives of government. This is the key point of difference between Islam and other schools of philosophy dominant in the world today, and we cannot follow the West with respect to the mode of governance and duties of government because of this fundamental and basic difference with them. Once the objective is forgotten, the structure, conditions, duties, and prerogatives will change accordingly.
In reality, the reason behind the ambiguity and deviation in ideas and thoughts of individuals—even those who are not spiteful—and the ambiguities and deviations they express in their newspapers and books is that they have not paid attention to the objective of law and government from the Islamic viewpoint and the difference between Islam and other schools. They have accepted the essence of Islam. They also really believe in God, say their prayers and observe fasting. They do not deny and reject religion either. Practically, however, they totally follow the West in sociopolitical issues. They no longer enquire whether a certain method is consistent with Islamic thought or not. They say, “Today, the world is administered in this way and we cannot go against the dominant current in the world. Today, the world’s civilization is Western civilization and the dominant culture is the liberal culture. We cannot go against this trend!”
We, however, must first understand what Islam theoretically says; whether it accepts whatever is practiced in the West or not. Secondly, in practice we have to see whether we can implement the commandments of Islam or not. Assuming that we cannot implement them in practice, at least we have to know that Islam does not accept the liberal approach and attitude. So, we should not attempt to present a non-Islamic approach as Islamic. During the time of the taghut, we could not also put into practice the Islamic methods but we knew that that government was not Islamic and some of its policies were anti-Islamic. Thus, the absence of the ground for implementation of the commandments of Islam does not make us say that Islam has been changed.
Even today, in some cases, we may not be able to implement Islam yet we are not supposed to say that Islam is exactly what we are doing. We have to understand Islam as it really is, and if we cannot practice an aspect of it, we have to beseech the forgiveness of God for our failure to do so, and if ever we have any shortcomings, God forbid, then we have to ask apology from the Muslim nation for our shortcomings in implementing Islam. So, we should not make any change in Islam and we should bear in mind that Islam is the same religion which was propagated by the Prophet of Islam (s) 1,400 years ago.
A perspective on the structure of Islamic government and state
Therefore, the objective of the Islamic government is definitely the realization of Islamic and divine values in society and under its auspices the realization of material interests, and not the opposite. We also need to know the structure of the Islamic government and the qualities of those who should take charge of government.
No doubt, the principal duty of executive power in any political system is the implementation of law, and this point is acknowledged by everybody. The Islamic state guarantees the implementation of Islamic laws and the realization of the objectives of those laws. Now, the question is: In any political system—whether Eastern, Marxist, Western liberal, or any other existing system—what qualities and features should the institution that wants to implement laws have? In reply, it must be stated that law-enforcers in any political system should possess at least two qualities:
1. Knowledge of law: How can the person who wants to guarantee the implementation of a law implement it if he does not know and understand it? Knowledge of law is the first condition and quality that the state must possess if it wants to guarantee the implementation of laws for if it has no correct knowledge of the laws’ dimensions and angles, it will probably commit mistakes in implementation. As such, the ideal option is that the person who heads the government must be the most knowledgeable in law so as to commit the fewest possible mistakes in implementation.
2. Ability to implement law: The institution that wants to guarantee the implementation of law must possess sufficient power and capability to implement it. If it wants to rule over a nation of 60 million people, nay a nation of one billion people like China, and implement laws and ordinances for them, it must possess sufficient power and capability to implement them. This point is so important that nowadays in many schools of philosophy, “government” has been treated as synonymous with “power” and one of the key concepts in political philosophy is the concept of “power”. In any case, we should bear in mind that the government must have power.
Since time immemorial, along with developments in human society, there existed different concepts of power. In simple and primitive governments—like the tribal governments which existed thousands of years ago in approximately all parts of the world—power basically focused on physical power which existed in the tribal chief or ruler. In those societies, the person who was physically the strongest was recognized as ruler; for, if there were any violator, the ruler used his physical power to punish him. Thus, in those days, power was only physical.
When social conditions became complex and there was further social growth and advancement, the physical power of a person was transformed into the power of an institution. That is, even if the ruler was not physically strong, he could have people at his disposal that had considerable physical strength. He could have a strong army and military force composed of strong men. With the advancement of knowledge, power went beyond the physical realm and was transformed into scientific and technological power. That is, the ruler was supposed to possess instruments that could successfully perform physical tasks.
With progress and development in societies and advancement of various industries and technologies, including the daily qualitative and quantitative advancement of military equipment, the state had no option but to acquire and equip the military with sufficient physical, industrial and technological power, to be able to suppress any uprising, prevent violations and people from embezzling property and endangering lives, by means of the power at its disposal.
The government must be accepted by the people
The power or force we have so far mentioned is confined to bodily or physical power which was considered important in primitive and advanced forms of government and which is still utilized. We can also observe that states strengthen their military and defense structure and stockpile military arms and equipments to make use of them in times of need. It must be noted, however, that the power and capability of a government is not confined to this. In fact, in progressive societies the power and authority of a state largely emanates from social influence and popular acceptability.
Not all demands and programs can be imposed on society by means of violence or brute force. Essentially, the people voluntarily and willingly accept and implement laws. So, the person who is entrusted with implementing laws and is at the helm of affairs must be accepted by people, as in the long run, the mere use of physical force and power will not do anything.
Thus, the executive official must also possess social authority and acceptability. As such, in order to prevent any problem in the domain of management and pursue social interests, the distinctive qualities of executive officials must be determined so that they can guarantee the objectives of the government and law. That is, they really qualify to run the government and guarantee implementation of law. This is discussed in various forms in political philosophy and is usually known as social legitimacy and popular acceptability.
It means that the government must have a rational basis and adopt the correct way of implementing law, and people must consider it legally credible. In addition to the fact that the executive official must enjoy physical power to be able to prevent violations, the people must believe in his credibility and regard him deserving to rule. Thus, we have three types of authority. The first two types have been recognized in all societies. Of course, there are differences in forms of implementation in different schools and forms of government. Yet, what is most important for us is the third form of authority.
Notes:
[4] “The fact is that there is no escape for men from rulers, good or bad. The faithful persons perform (good) acts in his rule while the unfaithful enjoy (worldly) benefits in it.” Nahj al-Balaghah, Sermon 40.
Government as perpetually needed by human society
In order to theoretically explain the need for government to our people and keep them away from committing certain fallacies, it must be noted that the said theory is based on the reality of human societies. A person who closes his eyes to reality and human nature, and engages in analysis and concludes that humans are angelic, have a pure disposition and are only in pursuit of goodness and virtue, is sadly mistaken.
According to him, if correct education and training is provided to people their moral motive will bind them to abide by the law and never violate it, and, if true laws, individual and social interests, and harms of violating laws are clearly explained to people and they are given the freedom to choose, no one will engage in corruption anymore and everybody will act according to law. It will be as simple as a person who knows that a given food is poisonous refrains from eating it. Similarly, people will accept what is good for them and avoid what is harmful. In this case, there will be no need to impose laws on people by means of brute force and pressure!
Such a notion is both illusive and idle. Those who know the reality of human life and society, are familiar with the history of mankind and can never imagine that in the near future, a time will come when as a result of the spread and promotion of moral values among people, all will spontaneously perform good deeds and not resort to evil—nobody will lie, commit treason, encroach upon the property and honor of people, violate others’ rights and no country invade its neighboring lands.
Need for government according to Islam and the Qur’an
Islam also regards it absurd and unrealistic to say that society is needless of government and brute force even when it possesses sound training, knowledge of law and what is beneficial and harmful. In the verses about the creation of Hadhrat Adam (‘a), the creation of man has been explained in such a manner that his weakness and possibility of going astray is clearly indicated:
وَإِذْ قَالَ رَبُّكَ لِلْمَلاَئِكَةِ إِنِّي جَاعِلٌ فِي الأَرْضِ خَلِيفَةً قَالُواْ أَتَجْعَلُ فِيهَا مَن يُفْسِدُ فِيهَا وَيَسْفِكُ الدِّمَاء وَنَحْنُ نُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِكَ وَنُقَدِّسُ لَكَ قَالَ إِنِّي أَعْلَمُ مَا لاَ تَعْلَمُونَ
“When your Lord said to the angels, ‘Indeed I am going to set a viceroy on the earth,’ they said, ‘Will you set in it someone who will cause corruption in it, and shed blood, while we celebrate Your praise and proclaim Your sanctity?’ He said, ‘Indeed I know what you do not know’.”[5]
When the angels recount the social corruption and bloodshed of human beings, God does not deny it. Instead, He highlights the wisdom beyond the creation of man which is unknown to the angels.
Similarly, in some other verses God mentions some moral weaknesses of man, as in the following verses:
إِنَّ الْإِنسَانَ خُلِقَ هَلُوعًا ٭ إِذَا مَسَّهُ الشَّرُّ جَزُوعًا ٭ وَإِذَا مَسَّهُ الْخَيْرُ مَنُوعًا
“Indeed man has been created covetous: anxious when an ill befalls him and grudging when good comes his way.”[6]
إِنَّ الإِنسَانَ لَظَلُومٌ كَفَّارٌ
“Indeed man is most unfair and ungrateful!”[7]
It is interesting to note that in the latter verse God describes man as “zalum” which is the superlative degree [Sighah al-Mubalighah] and means “most unfair”. This description indicates that inequity, insolence and ungratefulness in human beings is such that it cannot be neglected, and human societies will always be replete with injustice and ingratitude. The notion is unacceptable that through education, training, enlightenment, admonition and counsel, people can build a society whose members are all well-mannered and refined and no one violates laws and moral values, and where there would be no need anymore for government and the police force.
The Qur’an also opposes this notion and indicates that in human societies with different motives there will always be violation. Of course, social scientists are discovering and identifying the factors behind individuals’ violation and commission of crime, and have identified some as ignorance, illiteracy, genetic and environmental factors. This is not our concern at present as we only intend to state that violation of law and commission of crime and sin always existed, and will be the same in future.
Of course, we believe that by the grace and blessing of God, a time will come when through Hadhrat Wali al-‘Asr (may Allah expedite his glorious advent) the ideal Islamic and divine society will be established. It must be noted, however, that even that society will not be totally free from violation of law, in addition to the fact that it will also not persist forever. It is even mentioned in some traditions that some will revolt against the Imam of the Time (may Allah expedite his glorious advent) and cause his martyrdom.
It cannot even be expected therefore that during the rule of Hadhrat Mahdi (‘a) society will become totally ideal and desirable and completely devoid of sin and transgression. Of course, the structure of that government and his exercise of authority will be such that no oppression and corruption will continue unanswered, the implementation of justice will be all-encompassing, and violations in social and public life will diminish, but they will not be uprooted in total. This is because man will not acquire an angelic nature. As in the past, there will always be room for insolence, sin, violation, and transgression in him.
Thus, paying attention to reality prompts us to acknowledge the exigency of state and government. One must mingle with people and observe their conduct and behavior—see how even good and meritorious individuals commit sins and offences sometimes. Naturally, in order to deal with and prevent violations, sound and necessary laws must be implemented (and I dealt with the necessity of codifying and enacting them), for if laws for implementation and execution in society are codified, they must have implementers and executive guarantors. The fundamental reason for having a government is to guarantee the implementation of laws at all levels of society. This is the point we are presently concerned with. God willing, we shall deal with the duties and prerogatives of government, its organizational structure and other related issues in future discussions.
The exigency and source of power
A government possessing brute force and sufficient power must be established so as to manage affairs, implement laws, defend beliefs and values, maintain internal and external security, prevent violations, thwart conspiracy, and hamper external aggression to Islamic society. For this reason, in political philosophy the concept of power is pivotal. In fact, some have even described “politics” as “the science of power”. Admitting the necessity of a government or executive power possessing power and authority, the question arises: What is power and on what basis do certain people acquire power and authority to implement laws and deal with violations?
Some members of human society always tend to commit crimes due to various reasons such as weakness of intellect, lunacy, bad upbringing, and the like. They set a place on fire, open fire on innocent people, or commit crimes which, thank God, are rarely committed in our Islamic society. But statistics show that that same usually happens in the most advanced Western or European countries. As stated in reliable sources, in the capital of one of those countries, a certain number of murders are committed every minute.
These statistical records are reflected in the official papers of those countries. But if a murder or another crime is committed in a certain part of our country of 60 million people,[8] we will be surprised why such a crime is committed in the Islamic republic! In a bid to confront and deal with these crimes, there must be an institution possessing physical and material force to guarantee the implementation of laws.
Thus, the first condition in guaranteeing implementation of laws and dealing with violators is the possession of material, physical, and even bodily force and power. With the advancement in science and technology, sophisticated arms, instruments, tools and electronic devices are at the disposal of law-enforcers to penalize criminals. Keeping in view this necessity, each government—big and small, advanced or not—has a disciplinary force for dealing with crimes and maintenance of internal security.
The quantity and quality as well as the arms and equipment at the disposal of the disciplinary force are concordant with the type and structure of the government employing it. That is, the smaller and not-so-advanced governments tend to have meager forces and simpler military equipment while the more advanced, extensive and complex governments tend to have larger forces and more sophisticated and powerful arms, equipment and arsenal.
Without possession of brute force, implementation of laws cannot materialize. There must be brute force to call criminals to account, punish them and act as a deterrent.
Similarly, in order to protect and defend the frontiers against external enemies, the exigency of a potent deterrent force with sufficient equipment and facilities can be well understood. In the structure of states, the burden of this responsibility is shouldered by the army and disciplinary forces so as to defend the country’s frontiers.
Administrators must be God-wary and morally sound
However, mere possession of bodily power and physical ability is not enough for assuming an executive post and guaranteeing law. Anyone who wants to achieve this objective must also be God-wary and morally sound; for, if he is impious, he does not deserve the power at his disposal nor will he benefit society but will cause problems and exploit that power and position.
During the period of struggle of the Iranian nation against the regime of the taghut prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Imam (q) said that arms must be placed at the disposal of righteous and meritorious individuals so that aside from struggling against the regime of the taghut they can pursue the rights of people and the sovereignty of Islam, and not only think of acquiring power. Once arms are at the disposal of undeserving individuals, power is actually at the disposal of powerful devils who bring nothing to society except corruption and destruction.
Of course, the implementer of law must have enough knowledge of law and its different dimensions and aspects. As law enforcer, each of the executive officials, in whatever political echelon, must have enough knowledge of law; otherwise, even if the person does not want to act according to his own desire and is determined to act upon the law, he will commit errors in practice and not apply the law correctly. Although such a person has no bad intentions and is morally sound, his lack of knowledge of law and incorrect interpretation will lead to misguidance and deviation, and in practice, trample upon the interests of society.
Therefore, the one who is in charge of implementing law must have knowledge of it, enjoy executive power and be pious and morally sound. In the religious texts, these three qualifications are described as: expertise in jurisprudence [fiqahah], God-wariness [taqwa] and executive and administrative acumen. Of course, each of these three general qualifications has its own secondary parts and aspects which are not part of our present concern. Presently, we will focus more on the general rather than the particular.
An examination of the legitimacy of government in political philosophy
This is one of the profound topics in political philosophy which has been examined in various forms based on different schools of thought and is expressed diversely. One of these expressions is “social power” which government officials must possess. The question now is: From where does a government acquire “social power” legitimacy, the right to take charge of government and implement law? On what basis does a person acquire the right to occupy the highest post in government? In a country of 60-million population with many experts, highly educated and meritorious figures, why is it that only one person occupies that highest post? Who grants him this power? Basically, what is the criterion of legitimacy of government and government officials?
The different political and legal schools have given diverse answers to the abovementioned questions, but the answer which is shared by the world today is that power is granted by people to the ruling body and chief executive. This power is granted to a person only through the general will and approval of people, and other ways of transferring power are illegitimate. It is not possible for a person to inherit such power from his father. In monarchical systems the notion is that power or sovereignty is hereditary. When a monarch dies, power is transferred to his son as an inheritance. This hereditary power is transferred from father to son, and people have no role in it.
This form of government still exists in some countries but the dominant culture in the world today and world public opinion does not accept this system and theory. Assuming that a person deserves to rule the people, it does not follow that after him his son is definitely the most competent person to take charge of government. People do not consider it as the most appropriate option. Besides, they clearly witness that there are others far more competent than the person who inherits political power.
It is on account of the unpopularity of the monarchical system that monarchy has become ceremonial in nature and its power delegated to a person elected by the people, for example, the prime minister. In reality, in those countries only the royal title remains for the monarch and actual power lies with the elected representative.
In the dominant democratic system of today, the person who is competent to take charge of government and executive power is the one who is elected by the people, and it is only through their will that the government acquires legitimacy. Of course, there are different forms of elections and the people’s will is manifested in different countries in different ways. In some countries, the chief executive is elected through the direct vote of the majority of people while in other countries the chief executive is chosen by parties and deputies elected by the people. In reality, the parties and members of parliament serve as the medium between the people and the chief executive. In any case, once a person is directly or indirectly elected by the majority of people, the power to rule is granted to him and thereby, as the chief executive he assumes the function of leading and guiding society.
According to this contract, during a temporary period of two years, four years, eight years or even a lifetime, the people are subject to the command and order of the elected ruler in accordance with the law accepted in various systems and countries.
Under this assumption, the power of the law enforcer or his government is derived from the people. He will not succeed, if the people do not approve of him. This idea or theory has various dimensions; philosophical, anthropological, conventional and empirical. Having experienced and observed the various forms of government, a given form of government has been identified as the best and most efficient form.
Once the legitimate government is formed, the people are bound to accept its laws and agree on following and obeying it. The Islamic system tackled and accepted this matter prior to its discussion in other schools and societies. The participation of people, their election of government officials and public consensus on it has long been theoretically discussed in Islamic society. Besides, it has also been put into practice. Imposing authority on others on the basis of inheritance or by the use of force is not only doomed to failure but also condemned by Islam. Thus, though Islam acknowledges the necessity of public consensus the question is: Is public consensus and people’s acceptance enough for the legitimacy of government according to Islam, or legally speaking, does the Islamic government only do what is approved by the people?
In some newspapers, articles and books, it is written that in the world today acceptability [maqbuliyyah] and legitimacy [mashru‘iyyah] go hand in hand. The basis and proof of a government’s legitimacy and right to rule is that the majority of people vote for it. In other words, legitimacy emanates from acceptability. Once the people accept a person and vote for him, his rule shall be legitimate and legal. This is the democratic viewpoint generally accepted by the world today. Our question is: Does Islam accept this view?
Difference between Islamic and liberal perspectives on legitimacy
In reply, it must be stated that what is discussed in the wilayah al-faqih theory and preferred above all forms of democratic governments is that the basis of a government’s legitimacy and legality in Islam is not the people’s vote. However, the people’s vote is like the body while the soul of legitimacy is the permission of God. A Muslim regards the universe as God’s dominion and believes that all people are His servants, and for this reason, there is no difference among individuals as they are all equal in servitude to God. As the Holy Prophet (s) says,
أَلْمُؤْمِنُونَ كَأَسْنَانِ الْمَشْطِ يَتَسَاوُونَ فِي الْحُقُوقِ بَيْنَهُمْ
“The believers are like the teeth of a comb; they are all equal in rights.”[9]
So, as servants of God, all are equal and as such there is no difference and distinction between them. All humans are equal in humanity and none is superior to others. Man and woman, white and black are all equally and essentially human. How, it can be asked, and on what basis does a person acquire power through which he exercises sovereignty over others? We accept that the law enforcer must possess brute force which he can employ in times of need. We stated that executive power without brute force cannot perform its duties and the raison d’être of executive power is nothing but brute force through which it compels people to obey the law.
Now, if brute force is not at work and the government can call on the people to obey the law by means of mere counsel and admonition, the presence of the ‘ulama’ and moral teachers would suffice. The philosophy behind the existence of brute force is that it can be employed in times of need to deter any violation of law, so that anyone who infringes upon the property and honor of another can be apprehended, imprisoned or punished.
The execution of punishments prevalent in the world today and also determined by Islam for violators—one of which and the most known is imprisonment—deprives man of some liberties. A person forcibly confined to an enclosed space has been deprived of his most fundamental freedom. The question is this: On the basis of which right can a person deprive a violator of his freedom? Law enforcers’ power to deprive a violator of law of his liberty and rights must be legitimate and rightful.
It is true that the offender must be punished, but why is this punishment exercised by a certain person and not just anyone? Selection of a given person for implementation of law and bestowing of legitimacy to his action must have some basis, because his action is an exercise of authority over human beings. He who imprisons the criminal actually exercises authority over his being—depriving him of freedom and rights, confining him to a limited space and not allowing him to go wherever he likes. He is like a king who is punishing his own slave.
Since dealing with criminals and violators means deprivation of their freedom and rights and is an exercise of authority over human beings, in the Islamic perspective, the basis of legitimacy of executive power is something more than majority vote. The basis of legitimacy is the permission of God because human beings are all servants of God and He has to grant permission to others to exercise authority over His criminal servants. All people—including criminals—have freedom and this freedom is a divine grace bestowed on all human beings and no one has the right to deprive others of this freedom. The one who has the right to deprive others of freedom is the Master of them all and that Master is none but God.
As such, in the Islamic perspective and approach, in addition to that which is regarded in all humane and rational systems as necessary for the formation of executive power and in essence government, another basis or criterion is also necessary which is rooted in Islamic beliefs and tenets. According to our beliefs, God is the Lord and Master of the universe and mankind. Such belief demands that exercise of authority over His creatures must definitely be done by His leave. On the other hand, laws that define crooked actions and consequently restrain liberties cannot be implemented by the citizens themselves as it requires an institution to pursue their implementation. Consequently, a government or executive power possessing brute force must be formed.
Undoubtedly, a government or executive power cannot function without exercising authority over God’s creatures and restricting the liberties of individuals. We have stated that exercise of authority over creatures, though only in the form of restriction of freedom of the criminals and offenders, is justifiable for the One who has such a prerogative, and this prerogative or merit is delegated to others by God only because He is the Master and Lord of mankind and He may authorize the government to exercise authority over His creatures.
The advantage of the theory of wilayah al-faqih over other theories about government introduced in political philosophy is that it is rooted in Islamic doctrines and monotheism [tawhid]. Under this theory, the government and the exercise of authority over people must be sanctioned by God. On the contrary, to believe that to exercise legal authority on the action and liberties of others does not require the permission of God is a sort of polytheism [shirk] in the Divine Lordship [rububiyyah].
That is, if the law enforcer believes that he has the right to exercise authority over the servants of God without His permission, he actually claims that just as God has the right to exercise authority over His servants, he also has the same right over them, and this is a form of shirk. Of course, it is a form of shirk which does not render a person as apostate [murtadd]; rather, it is a lower form of shirk which is equivalent to transgression and disobedience, which is a not a minor sin. How can a person consider himself equal to God and claim that just as God exercises authority over His servants, he also has the right to exercise authority over them by relying on their vote? Do the people have any authority that they can delegate to others? The people are all servants of God and the authority over them is in the hands of God.
If we correctly analyze the Islamic perspective and approach on governance, we will arrive at the conclusion that in addition to that which is acceptable to all rational people in the political systems in the world, there is another thing that must be taken into account, and that is the government’s need for the permission of God to exercise authority over His servants. According to this theory, the legitimacy of government is derived from God while the acceptance and vote of the people is the condition for the formation of government.
Notes:
[5] Surah al-Baqarah 2:30.
[6] Surah al-Ma‘arij 70:19-21.
[7] Surah Ibrahim 14:34.
[8] Based on the 6th Population and Housing Census conducted in October-November 2006, Iran has a population of approximately 70 million. [Trans.]
[9] Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 9, p. 49.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: al-islam.org
Functional difference between Wilayah al-Faqih and other systems
Those who always talk about popular and democratic governments and feel ashamed that their government is based upon wilayah al-faqih are heedless of the services rendered by him in this country. They are heedless that based on the theory of wilayah al-faqih laws and decrees of the Islamic state and statutory laws of the Islamic Consultative Assembly after confirmation by the Council of Guardians are religiously incumbent upon Muslims because they are authorized by the wali al-faqih, and his authority, in turn, is based on the authority of God.
This is a great merit that this system has. But if we do not accept the wilayah al-faqih system, then obedience to laws and decrees is based on the commitment of people to laws in accordance with their demand. They can withdraw from their commitment, review their demand, and change an article of law as they like. So, in the democratic system there is no religious underpinning of the people’s obedience to laws.
In an Islamic government, laws become binding with the authorization and approval of the wali al-faqih. Apart from enjoying people’s commitment and customary requirement backed by their vote, there is also the religious underpinning going against which is a sin that invites divine wrath. This is the difference between abiding by the laws of the Islamic government and obedience to laws whose legitimacy and credibility are only supported by the majority will. Since majority of the Majlis deputies are elected by the people, they deem it incumbent upon themselves to obey these laws.
Now, rationally speaking, to what extent are deputies who have not voted in favor of the laws, or the minority who have not voted for the deputies who approved those laws, obliged to abide by those laws? When a law is approved by the deputies of the majority of people, should the minority who opposed the law psychologically and emotionally be obliged to obey it? How can they be bound by majority will?
Obedience to Islamic laws which are ratified by the Majlis deputies and approved by the wali al-faqih has been made obligatory by God, and even those who have not voted in favor of those laws are religiously bound to abide by them. Of course, the Muslims are aware of this fact and are sincerely committed to obey the laws of the Islamic state that have divine legitimacy. They do not oppose these laws because they are familiar with the structure and rules of the divine Islamic government. This level of obedience and acceptance of laws and rules is among the merits and salient features of the divine system which has materialized in our country under the label of wilayah al-faqih system.
Through a survey of the Islamic movement and Revolution, we realized that widespread obedience of people to the Leader- Jurist-Guardian, and sincere submission to His Eminence’s commands and instructions was the key factor in our advancement and victory during the Revolution and after its victory. Also, the same factor was the reason why our nation emerged victorious with honor in the unequal war (imposed by Iraq).
Is there anyone in the world who does not know that one of the important factors of the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran was the people’s religious belief in the exigency and indispensability of obeying their religious leader? Then, as an injustice of the highest order, in a country where the Islamic system is established by the sacrifices and selflessness of martyrs who struggled and waged jihad by the order of their leader and religious reference authority, some elements write and claim, thus: “The Imam sailed smoothly over the wave of the people’s movement and portrayed it as the Islamic movement and Revolution!”
Is this claim true? If the Muslims of Iran had not been present on the scene of the Revolution and discharged their spiritual and religious obligations and opened their breasts vis-à-vis the bullets, could the Revolution succeed? Had it not been for the order of the Imam, would they have done these things? It is unfair for us to forget and deny these realities. The truth is that religion and the Imam’s leadership played the leading and crucial role in the occurrence of the Revolution, its continuity, and then victory in the war after enduring all adversities, difficulties and problems. God willing, through the leadership of the competent successor of the eminent Imam (q) and his astute policies, these standings will continue as before under the auspices of the unity and solidarity of the self-sacrificing people of Iran, and under the shadow of the wali al-faqih’s leadership (may Allah, the Exalted, protect him), the people will reach further stages and degrees of perfection and advancement.
Summing up, categorization of citizenship is something accepted by all political systems of the world and the difference in classes of citizenship is not something we have originated. This difference in classes of citizenship has nothing to do with their essential humanity. From the perspective of their being human, all people are in the same class. However, either they naturally possess certain qualities that may be a source of difference in duties and rights, or they have acquired qualifications, qualities, capabilities, and talents which are the reason why they have to discharge certain duties, and likewise, to enjoy certain rights. So, the source of difference in rights and duties is either natural differences or differences arising from individual choice and freewill. For example, professing a certain religion, or acquiring necessary qualities and capability for the assumption of a post or position, including the acceptance of certain principles and foundations, can be contributory in the status of their citizenship or nationality.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
The Nature and Essentials of Islamic Government
Those who have accepted the above classification by the West and believe that governments are classified only into two—either dictatorial, or democratic and popular, ask: Is the Islamic government dictatorial? Does he who attains power, e.g. in our time the wali al-faqih, impose his authority on the people by force and rule according to his whims and caprice? Or, is it the democratic government of the West which is the opposite of dictatorship? Or, is it a third form of government?
According to the twofold classifications that have been accepted, the Islamic government is one of the two above mentioned types which is either dictatorial or popular. In case it is a popular government, it has to follow the same methods and ways existing and acted upon in Western countries and democratic governments. Or, it is not an Islamic, popular government and it is dictatorial and is based on the desire and will of an individual, and there is no third option. It is expedient for us to answer this important question and declare whether the Islamic government is dictatorial, akin to Western democracy, or follows a third option.
Among the questions being raised are the following: What are the preliminaries and main pillars of the Islamic government? Which elements must be preserved and observed in ruling and managing society so as to actually realize the Islamic government? Those who are familiar with our culture and jurisprudence know, for example, that there are some essentials of prayer which if abandoned intentionally or unintentionally, invalidate the prayer, for, without them, the essence and identity of prayer cannot be realized.
The Islamic government is also founded on certain pillars. In the presence of those pillars and columns, we call a government “Islamic”. If there is some defect or deficiency in those pillars and columns, the Islamic government will not be realized. Now, in view of the vital role of these pillars and columns, it is necessary for us to be aware of them, because unless we recognize the criterion and basis of the Islamic nature of government will be not be able to distinguish the form and nature of an Islamic government from non-Islamic governments. It is therefore necessary to answer to this serious question.
The form of Islamic government and the scope of prerogatives and duties
Another question raised is: Has Islam determined a specific form of government? As you are aware, there are many forms of government extant today, e.g. absolute and constitutional monarchy, presidential and parliamentary republic, and theocracy.
Has Islam accepted one of these forms, determined a specific form of government which is different from the abovementioned forms, not determined a specific form, or only determined a set of values and criteria of government which must be observed anytime and in every form of government? Islam has ordained that a government must observe justice, but the form observed depends upon the circumstances of time and space. Islam is not concerned with a specific form, as the proper form of government, according to Islam, depends on the observance of the criteria.
Assuming that Islam has determined a specific form of government, is this form of government according to Islam fixed and unchangeable, or a form which is more or less changeable? These kinds of questions are raised in relation to the form of Islamic government which must not remain unanswered.
Another question which is posed in connection with the philosophy of government is: What are the prerogatives and responsibilities of the ruling body or the ruler, in the Islamic government? Governments differ from one another in terms of prerogatives and responsibilities. In some governments, the prerogatives and duties of the government are limited. The government is only obliged to perform certain functions. The overall function of preserving the system is delegated to the government while other functions are given to the people.
In some forms of government, however, the government has vast prerogatives and equally heavy responsibilities. It assumes important responsibilities which it has to discharge. It can neither delegate them to the people nor shirk its duties because it is the people’s right to demand the performance of those responsibilities and duties from the government. It must be clarified that in the political philosophy of Islam, what prerogatives and duties dose Islam have set for the government. Undoubtedly, the performance and duties must be proportionate and balanced. It is not correct to delegate a duty to a person without providing him the necessary grounds to discharge the duty. So, the next question is: What duties and prerogatives does the Islamic government have?
The role of people in Islamic government and some other questions
Among the very serious questions which are raised today in society and periodicals is this: What is the role of the people in the Islamic government and what are their duties and prerogatives? Finally: What was the form and structure of the government during the early period of Islam, such as the time of the Holy Prophet (s),[9][8] the time of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) and the initial part of Imam Hasan al-Mujtaba’s (‘a) time? Similarly, to what extent were the governments of the Umayyads and the ‘Abbasids that ruled over Muslim territories Islamic; and, which of the abovementioned governments we can present as the Islamic government? How has the formative course of Islamic governments throughout history led to this form of Islamic government, which finally materialized in Iran by the blessings of the Islamic Revolution?
Of course, alongside the aforesaid questions, secondary questions are also raised, some of which are as follows: Is our government one hundred percent Islamic, and does it fulfill all Islamic standards and essentials of an Islamic government? In case this government possesses all the essentials of an Islamic government, has it discharged all its duties, fulfilled its mission and faithfully observed all values? Finally, what are the defects and deficiencies of this government?
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: al-islam.org
Difference between Islamic and Liberal Approach
One of the issues discussed nowadays is that only minimum effort must be made in the enactment of law. This is the liberal approach which believes that the legislature is not supposed to interfere in the life and affairs of people because the less the interference, the more society will progress.
The above approach has a sociological underpinning based on one of the two viewpoints discussed in sociology. The first viewpoint maintains that laws must be comprehensive and encompass all spheres of human life and that freedom must be at minimum level. The second viewpoint propounds that the individual should enjoy maximum freedom and social laws must be at minimum level in order to limit their infringement on man’s freedom. That which is prevalent in Western society today is exactly this individual-oriented approach from which liberalism has emanated which holds that laws should be at the minimum level while people enjoy maximum freedom and do whatever they like.
Before stating the Islamic viewpoint, it is worth mentioning that the issue of maximum or minimum scope of law has something to do with some fields of social sciences such as philosophical sociology (individual-oriented or society-oriented), moral philosophy (the criterion of moral values, morality and its values above law or determined by law), legal philosophy, and political philosophy.
According to Islam, all aspects of human life are connected to their ultimate destiny. That is, any effort exerted in this life will affect our eternal bliss or perdition. The Islamic perspective is that “This world is the sowing field for the hereafter.” In other words, whatever man sows in this world will be reaped in the hereafter and will either lead to his success, or wretchedness and damnation.
If we take this perspective as authentic, is there anything in the life of man which is not in need of law? Here, law has to show the way, method and approach that will enable man to reach his goal. That is, if society yearns for security, no one should have the right to encroach upon the property and dignity of people; otherwise, his property and dignity will also be assaulted. It should not be that:
ببرى مال مسلمان و چون مالت ببرند
%%%داد و فرياد برآرى كه مسلمانى نيست)
You take away Muslim property, but when they take yours,
Raise a hue and cry, “This is not a Muslim practice!”
Man is selfishly profit-oriented by nature. He leaves no stone unturned by hook or by crook to gain profit, but once his interests are threatened, he seeks refuge in law. So, in order to remove contradictions and conflicts and foster cooperation and security in society there should be law that deters us from oppressing and encroaching upon others, defines the rights of everyone, specifies the bounds of justice and oppression on the basis of which people know which acts are considered just and iniquitous. Otherwise, all rights will be violated by all, and as a result, neither security nor tranquility, peace of mind nor otherworldly felicity will remain, and no one will achieve his innate goals.
In the Islamic perspective, therefore, all our movements and pauses, whether in individual and family life or social life and even international relations, follow an order and rules. Islam has a legal code for all aspects of human life, legal and social laws included. Islam even has a law regarding man’s imagination and thought, saying that a person has no right to keep in his heart whatever he or she likes, entertain any fancy in his or her mind, and think ill of others—“Indeed some suspicions are sins.”[18][103]
Just as non-observance of health tips leads to sickness, endangering the wellbeing of individuals and society, society will also be destroyed for not observing Islamic rules.
What has been said is that no aspect of human life is beyond the scope of Islamic laws and that man should control even his heart and mind but it does not mean obstruction of man’s freedom. It rather means showing him the correct use of freedom and lighting a torch along his path so that he can rightfully enjoy his freedom. Of course, as long as they are not related to man’s social life, these laws do not stipulate penalty in this world but only chastisement in the hereafter. However, if there is a violation of social rules and laws, and social interests are trampled upon, penalty in this world shall be taken into account.
In reality, penalty in this world is a requisite of all legal laws and it is not confined to the legal laws of Islam only. Every legal system that wants to enact laws for the maintenance of order and social security has no option but to consider a set of penalties for violators and offenders. This is because social life can not be established without laws that restrict individual freedom and liberty. As social relations increase and expand, the need for social laws and their guaranteed implementation will also increase.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Distinctive Feature of Islam in the Realm of Politics and Government
Once we say that government is meant to implement law in society, or in other words, the two main pillars of government are legislation and implementation, law must have some criteria and authority on the basis of which rules and regulations are enacted. As such, this fundamental question is raised in political philosophy—what is the aim of forming a government? It was briefly touched upon in previous discussions. In this session, we shall examine it elaborately. Initially, we shall mention the three views on the purpose of forming a government so as to identify the logical connection between government and law. Then, we shall delve into the subject.
1. Individuals such as Thomas Hobbes, from among political philosophers after the Renaissance, are of the opinion that the objective and function of government is only to establish peace and order in society. In a broader sense, the objective is to establish domestic and external security. That is, the main duty of the government is to implement rules and regulations that prevent chaos and disorder in society and have a defense force against external threats so as to ensure the country’s survival and territorial integrity.
2. Some have said that apart from maintaining and guaranteeing security, law and government need to implement justice in society. A profound debate on the relationship between law, justice and freedom, especially among the political sociologists, has started and many books have been written in this regard.
Once we accept that in addition to the maintenance of security, the duty of the state is to implement justice, the question arises: What does justice mean by itself? Many interpretations on the nature of justice and its manifestations have been offered by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. Among them, the comprehensive and generally agreed upon concept of justice is that everyone must be given his or her rights. However, they differ on definition and scope of “rights”. Since the term “rights” is included in the definition of justice, we have no option but to embark on another discussion, and that is the relationship between freedom, law, rights, and justice.
For example, what is the relationship between rights and justice? Finally, the discussion concludes that the right of every person is that his or her natural interests and welfare should be ensured, and the just law is that which ensures the rights of individuals, i.e. what their natural needs demand, under the aegis of social life.
Now, this question is raised on the issue of rights: Who are those who have rights in social life? Do all the human beings have similar rights in social life? Or, who are those who have the right to share social benefits? In other words, some handicapped people cannot render any service to society. They are confined to hospitals and sanatoriums and cannot play any role in social life nor contribute anything to society. Do they have any rights? If rights emanate from services rendered by members of society, then such individuals have no right at all.
Of course, possibly some handicapped people can contribute to society intellectually, but do the handicapped, who since birth, have been deprived of all physical and mental capabilities have any rights? Another case is that of a person who, while strong, offered valuable services to society and later became physically disabled and could not render any form of service to society anymore. Does he have any right in society anymore?
According to some sociological tendencies, such individuals do not have any right in society and the state does not have any duty toward them. In the Marxist regime ruling the ex-Soviet Union, such individuals who made no contribution to society were eliminated under a certain pretext. Such tendencies also exist in other societies. Are rights linked with services individuals render to society? Does the handicapped have any rights for being a human being, born and living among other human beings? Unfortunately, those who say that right is commensurate with the service rendered to society do not consider any rights for such individuals, saying that if out of compassion and humanitarian feeling, some people want to serve this stratum of society and build sanatoriums for them, they may do so. Yet, no one shall be responsible for their death!
3. The third viewpoint on the purpose of forming a government and state is the Islamic viewpoint which emphasizes—apart from maintaining security, implementing justice and providing material welfare—the satisfying of spiritual and religious needs.
Difference between the special function of the Islamic government and that of other governments
In Islam, maintenance of security, defense against foreign enemies, establishment of justice, and ensuring the rights of those rendering services to society are considered a part of government obligations. In addition, benevolence [ihsan], i.e. service to the indigent and those who lack any potential to offer any service to society, is also a duty of the government. As God says in the Qur’an,
إِنَّ اللّهَ يَأْمُرُ بِالْعَدْلِ وَالإِحْسَانِ...
“Indeed Allah enjoins justice and kindness...”[1][169]
The duty of Muslims is not only to observe justice. Beyond that, they should also be benevolent. On account of their being human, the indigent, the disabled, and the handicapped, especially those born handicapped, have their legitimate rights in human society, and the Islamic state has to provide for their primary needs.
The other difference between Islam and other schools of thought is that Islam does not confine itself to material and physical needs but considers psychological, spiritual and otherworldly needs also. The burden of responsibility on the Islamic state is far heavier than that of liberal states. Logically, apart from providing the needs of individuals offering services to society, liberal states have no other responsibility. However, the Islamic state, in addition to satisfying the needs of those rendering service in the society, should help the handicapped.
As such, laws must be enacted and implemented in the Islamic state to ensure the provision of individual and social, material and spiritual, worldly and otherworldly needs of human beings, and not only provide the material needs for the active members of society.
The next question raised is: What is the proof of correctness of the Islamic theory and how can we know that the other theories are not correct? In a bid to reply to this question, there is a need to go a step backward and pose this question: What essentially is the reason behind the formation of human society?
Islam’s view on the essence of human society
Before examining the reason behind the formation of human society, let me ask: Is man, like the termite or the bee, inherently a social being? Is social living something that man has selected and chosen by himself? There are many views but I shall touch upon two basic views in this regard. One is that social life has an optional humane objective. The second view is that social life has no purpose. For instance, it cannot be said why the bee has a social life and what its purpose in social life is.
Obviously, the bee has a natural and instinctive purpose and that is to produce honey and live. There is no other purpose of the bee’s social life. Of course, God, the Exalted, has a purpose in creating these creatures, one of which is to serve mankind. However, setting aside the creational and divine aspect, the bee is not pursuing a volitional objective in its social life. Is the social life of man also a natural process which has spontaneously arisen without having any purpose? Or, does it have a purpose which necessitates relations which, in turn, require orders?
From the religious point of view, the purpose of social life is human progress under the blessings of social living and getting closer to their objective. Then, you may ask: What is the purpose behind the creation of man? According to the divine perspective, the ultimate goal of man is nearness to God and this is the zenith of human perfection.
If we accept that the purpose behind creation is perfection attained under the auspices of nearness to God, then social life is a means for man to achieve this goal in the best way possible. In the absence of social life, human beings cannot acquire necessary knowledge and perform necessary acts of worship, nor attain ultimate perfection.
Therefore, it is under the blessings of collective life that teaching and learning are done; human beings identify better ways to live; conditions to continue on the way are provided; and as a result, human perfection becomes attainable. Once we accept these preliminary proofs, we can conclude that the objective of social living is to pave the way for human advancement and perfection not only in the material dimension but in all dimensions of man’s existence.
Man is a multi-dimensional being who has diverse facets and dimensions. Therefore, the perfection of all dimensions constitutes true perfection; not only material perfection, industrial advancement, social progress, and economic growth. So, the best law is that which paves the way for the growth of man in all these dimensions and gives priority to the ultimate goal which is nearness to God.
Necessary qualities of the legislator
The Islamic government has to implement laws that encompass all dimensions of man’s existence and ensure his interests in all dimensions, because such laws need perfect awareness of all aspects of man’s existence. Depending on his expertise, each of the human beings that we know is aware of only some aspects of his existence. Earlier the philosophers made such claims, but nowadays, the ignorance of man has become manifest to him. In some cases, economic progress may conflict with spiritual or religious advancement.
Of course, we believe that the great divine system guarantees all human interests. But it is possible that in a certain society at a given time or place, a sort of conflict among the interests of people might emerge. As such, these interests must be categorized so that in case of conflict, the concerned authorities know what needs priority. Thus, it is the duty of the legislator also to identify the priorities, and it is here that the impotence of man to discern such a law manifests itself.
Apart from having a complete knowledge of all dimensions of man’s existence, the more important quality of the legislator is that he should empty himself of all personal and group desires, and give priority to the interests of society over individual, group or factional interests. Nobody can do this. In case of conflict between his and others’ interests, and between his group’s interests and that of others’, any great man would overlook his personal and group’s interests and voluntarily give priority to the interests of society over his personal interests. To find such persons from among members of society is problematic, and perhaps impossible. So, the legislator should also have the capability of giving preference to the interests of society over his own.
It is here that the superiority of divine law over all man-made laws becomes clear because, firstly, God, the Exalted, is the One fully aware of all the interests of human beings. Secondly, God does not acquire any benefit or loss from the actions of human beings for His interest to conflict with that of others. In Islam, however, we say that assuming that all the interests of human beings are ensured in their mundane life and social relations, still that society is not desirable and ideal because the ultimate and loftier perfection is under the auspices of nearness to God. This nearness to God can materialize only through worship, devotion, servitude, and obedience to God.
Physical wellbeing, peace and order of society, defense against enemies, justice, and social rights of individuals are a prelude to man’s communication with God. The essence of humanity lies in this communication with God, and unless it is established, true humanity cannot materialize. Proximity to God is not a mere slogan. Rather, it is the true and spiritual communion of people with God. Human beings pass through different stages of life, traverse and ascend until they attain this station. Common people cannot discern that such a station exists for man, or that they can attain such a spiritual and celestial station.
Now, as God is not in need of our worship, why did He create man for worship and say, “I did not create the jinn and humans except that they may worship Me”?[2][170] The answer is that the ultimate perfection of man cannot be achieved except through the worship of God. So, one should recognize God and obey Him so that man can tread the path toward true perfection. It is through attention to these preliminaries that we say that the law desirable is that which, apart from ensuring the material needs of the active members of society, also guarantees the needs of those who make no contribution to society, such as the impotent, disabled and handicapped for, they also have rights. The Islamic state has to provide their needs for they are also servants of God and born in society. It is for this reason that in addition to justice, the Qur’an mentions kindness:
إِنَّ اللّهَ يَأْمُرُ بِالْعَدْلِ وَالإِحْسَانِ
“Indeed Allah enjoins justice and kindness.”[3][171]
This injunction of God is not only a moral admonition. Rather, it is an obligatory command which must be obeyed. Thus, just as the observance of justice in society is obligatory, so is the observance of kindness because rights are not only established by rendering service. Rather, there is a series of rights that God has considered for every person. Even the one who is in the worst condition, deprived of eyes, ears and mobility has rights for the mere fact that he is alive. And the Islamic state must guarantee these rights.
So, we should not think that the sole responsibility of the state is the thing mentioned by Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and other Western thinkers for, either they have not paid attention to the sublime stations of man, or they have imagined man to be wolf-like or an insect like the bee and termite. According to Islam, however, man is far ahead of such animals though they also live collectively.
Thus, law has to consider all the needs of man along his pursuit of ultimate perfection. Now, if law were to consider all interests, could it give man every kind of freedom? Can man move along any path and achieve this objective? Can those who have not recognized God, denied Him, stood up against Him and His worshippers, attain human perfection? Is not the worship of the One God the way to attain human perfection? If the duty of the Islamic state is to pave the ground for human perfection in all dimensions, the spiritual and religious dimension in particular, then the desires should, in a sense, be regulated, restrained and controlled, and a framework for them determined which does not conflict with sublime human interests.
Difference between Islamic laws and liberal laws
The difference between Islamic laws and man-made laws —especially laws of the liberal societies that consider right for the people in lieu of the services they render in the society— can be examined through the following perspectives:
1. Liberal societies, do not consider any rights of individuals who, due to physical disabilities or social deprivations, cannot contribute to society. Islam, however, gives rights to them as well. In order to guarantee these rights, the desires of others need to be restrained and a portion of public wealth allocated for these individuals, which is not liked by other people. So, their dislike should be restrained.
2. In social life, rights are given to society, which prevail in case of conflict with rights of individuals. The question on which rights should prevail in case of conflict is based on individual-oriented and society-oriented tendencies existing in Western societies today. Of course, the dominant and ruling tendency in the Western world is individualism; however, socialistic tendencies, more or less, exist. In Western societies today, socialist and social democratic governments are gaining momentum compared to other forms of government.
In contrast to the individualistic tendency in liberal societies, Islam gives preference to the rights of society. Liberal governments are willing to burn or throw millions of tons of foodstuff into the sea in order to prevent the market price from breaking down and the capitalists from incurring loss. They are willing to let millions of people die of hunger only to protect their material interests. Yet, Islam can never permit such a thing. The desire of such elements should be restricted according to Islam. Economic freedom must not be ensured in any manner or any way, it should be limited. Just as the interests of the deprived stratum of society and the handicapped restrict the interests of society, similarly individual desires must be limited for the sake of ensuring the general interests of society.
3. In Islamic society, there are concerns which are basically related to the individual, but since it leaves an imprint on society, it is reckoned as part of social concerns. For example, if a person commits a sin in isolation at home while no one else is informed or a witness, obviously his sin is personal in nature, and the laws that restrict this kind of action are “moral laws” (without considering whether the use of the term “moral” in this context is correct or not).
That is, the jurisdiction of the state is related to society and not to the individual. But if the individual action is done in such a manner that it more or less affects others, at least encourages others to commit such a sin, it acquires a social dimension. If a person commits a sin in the street or in front of other members of the family, its hideousness will diminish and people will be encouraged and inclined to commit it, his action will no more be personal in nature. Do we have no right to interfere because it will only harm him? According to Islam showing of perversion is a social act. If a person commits a sin in front of others, it becomes a legal crime (in contrast to moral turpitude), and the state may interfere. The law that prevents such a sin is an administrative law backed by the state’s police force.
4. Damaging material interests of society is a crime. Morally damaging acts are also crimes. In every society, an attack on the integrity and honor of others, even if it is not a physical attack (libel, insult and mockery) is considered a crime and the state has the right to pursue the offender and penalize him. In such cases, the executive guarantee is law. In Islamic society, insult to religious sanctity is the most serious violation of the rights of Muslims. In Islamic society there is nothing more valuable than religious sanctity. Muslims are willing to sacrifice everything they have for its sake.
It is on this basis that the decree against apostasy [irtidad] and insult to religious sanctity can be justified and understood. This is why anyone who insults the Holy Prophet (s) and other religious sanctities is condemned to death by Islam. That is because he has committed the greatest of crimes. There is nothing more sacred than these sanctities for Muslim people and insult to these sanctities is the worst of crimes. This is also a fundamental difference between Islamic and liberal perspectives.
Offence against Islamic sanctities is not an offence against an individual for it to require a private complainant. Anyone who insults the Islamic sanctities in newspapers and speeches is condemned according to Islamic law. It is not a personal and individual issue but rather criminal and penal. No one can pardon this crime because it is a right that belongs to all Muslims, nay it is a right related to God.
These are issues which Muslim scholars, especially the students, should pay attention to and not imagine that the political and legal issues of Islam follow the limited and monolithic Western framework that only pays attention to the material, mundane and individual concerns in this world. According to Islam, the rights of society take precedence over individual rights.
In view of what has been discussed, we can assess the distinctive features of Islamic law and the reason behind its superiority over other laws.
We can understand why individual desires are more limited in Islamic society than in secular and liberal societies. It is because in those societies the only thing that limits individual desires are individual and material interests. But in Islamic society spiritual and otherworldly interests require particular limitations. This is something which the nature of the Islamic government anchored in religious belief demands, and we shall defend these beliefs with utmost clarity and courage.
Notes:
[4][169] Surah an-Nahl 16:90.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Wilayah al-Faqih in the Islamic Republic
During the first year of the victory of the Revolution, i.e. in 1979 when a referendum for the Islamic Republic was to be held, different options were suggested as to the forms of government from which the people could choose. Some of the selections were “republic,” “democratic republic,” “Islamic democratic republic,” and “Islamic republic”. But the Imam said: “‘Islamic republic’, no more, no less.” Ninety-eight percent of the people of Iran also voted for the Islamic republic.
That is, the Islamic description of the government cannot be removed and be replaced by the word “democratic”. Now, if democracy is something above Islam, why did the Imam not allow this word to be inserted in the name of the Islamic government? And if republicanism is the same as democracy, there is no more need for the label “democratic”. Why did they insist on the label “democratic republic” and why did the Imam and the people in obedience to him oppose it? It is obvious that democracy could have different meanings, and certain things beyond its meanings could be applied to republicanism which would be negated and reliance on public opinion would outdo Islam.
Our system is an Islamic republic whose pillar is supported by the people. It was these people who staged the Revolution and who will keep it going with its Islamic substance and framework. The late martyred professor Mutahhari (may Allah the Exalted, be pleased with him) has an explanation which serves as a guidance for us in this context. He used to say: “Republicanism speaks of the form of government while ‘being Islamic’ speaks of the substance of government.”
The substance of government is the implementation of the commandments of Islam, but its form is republicanism in contrast to monarchy. So, our regime will not be a monarchy. Rather, its form is republic while its substance is Islamic. Authenticity is with the Islamic concepts, laws and values, and we do not have anything below or beyond Islam.
The Imam used to say time and again that the legitimacy of every system and every government position in the Islamic Republic depends on the authority of the wali al-faqih, upon which the theory of wilayah al-faqih is based. We have learned from the fuqaha, especially from the Imam, who also confirms its rational and textual proofs. Since the wali al-faqih is the authorised successor of the infallible Imam (‘a) who, in turn, is authorized by God, the legitimacy of the system comes with the wilayah al-faqih. Of course, this theory is not compatible with those who have been accustomed to Western culture.
We insist on this theory because this theory is consistent with the intellectual basis derived from monotheism and rooted in the Islamic viewpoint and not from the inclination of the clerical establishment. As I have explained before, the legislative Lordship of God demands that divine authority must be observed both in legislation and execution of laws; otherwise, a kind of polytheism is committed. This does not mean, however, that the people in this society do not have any role. The people have a total role in this system within the framework determined by Islam, and in this domain nothing else can replace the role and impact of the people. But one should make a difference between the legitimacy [mashru‘iyyah] and acceptability [maqbuliyyah] of a system.
The explanation for this is that since the Renaissance, there is no place in Western legal, philosophical and social discussions for God and religion. When, for example, they stipulate human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the relationship between man and God is not mentioned there. If freedom of religion is also mentioned there, it is because as a choice, human beings have the right to choose any religion. There is no mention of truth and falsehood, or whether God exists or not.
Whenever social rights, including fundamental rights, civil rights and criminal rights, are stipulated for individuals, there is no association of those rights with God. It is never discussed whether God has rights over man or not; whether man has duties toward God or not. They do not like to consider God in issues pertaining to their rights, but if in accordance with our own beliefs, we want to base the legal system of our country upon the teachings of Islam and divine rights, they do not have any authority to deprive us of this right. As believers in God, monotheistic people and followers of Islam, we believe that in all legal issues—social, civil, criminal, and political—God must be taken into account. Above all rights is the right of Allah. With respect to Him, we have duties and responsibilities that we must discharge.
On the other hand, the rights of men are not the only discussed issue. In fact, rights and duties must be discussed together, the most important being the duty of man toward God. The right of legislative Lordship of God over human beings is for them to accept His laws in sociopolitical affairs. If a person does not believe in God, we will not compel him to accept Islam, but as Muslims we have the right to apply our beliefs in politics and the means of administering our country. In the constitution of our country, this has been accepted and as such it is significant to the highest degree for us. Our respect to the Constitution is the same as giving value to Islam.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Islam and Different Forms of Government
During the last session we dealt with a question related to the form of government—Has Islam specified a form of government or delegated it to the people? If it has specified the form, is it confined to a specific period or can be applied at all times to all places? Or, does it constantly change with the change in social circumstances? Some say: “It is true that during the time of the Holy Prophet (s) there was a specific form of Islamic government, but it was related to that period only.
The sacred religion specified that form of government only for the time of the Prophet, and thereafter new forms had to be chosen. It is even possible that at a given period, social conditions will demand the establishment of an Islamic government within the framework of a liberal democratic government, since these two forms do not contradict each other. Just as we have applied some Western modes of implementation—for example, the parliamentary system, constitutionalism[35] and now republicanism and believe both are not against Islam—it is possible that a time will come when we will accept the liberal democratic model and come to believe that it is not repugnant to Islam!?”
In reply to the above, it is necessary to point out the ambiguity and erroneous thinking surrounding it. As we all know, the Islamic Republic was established in our country by the great architect of the Islamic Revolution, His Eminence Imam Khomeini (q) and at its very inception, the Constitution was drafted and ratified by the people and approved by the Imam. Similarly, with his approval the foundation of the government was laid down and in the course of time some changes were also made in some of its parts. It is clear that neither the structure of our system is rooted in the time of the Holy Prophet (s) nor a system with the Islamic characteristics established during the period of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a).
The separation of powers existed neither during the time of the Prophet (s) nor that of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) but the principle of the separation of powers has been accepted in our constitution, and the governments has three branches—executive, legislative and judiciary. Under this system the person who occupies the highest government post and formulates the general policies is the Supreme Leader. Next to him is the President. The chief justice heads the judiciary and the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly heads the legislature.
They are recognized as the highest officials after the Supreme Leader and the President. Twenty years after the Revolution, the Constitution has undergone some amendments related to the structure of some branches of government. In the beginning, the prime minister used to be the chief executive and form the cabinet subject for approval by the President and Islamic Consultative Assembly. After an amendment of the Constitution, premiership was omitted and the President became the chief executive. This structure has no precedence in Islam and Islam has no specific decree or program in this regard. So, one cannot claim that Islam explicitly ordered people to vote and elect their president and also play their role in choosing the heads of other powers.
Some people think that the reason behind what we have said is that Islam has not specified any form of government. So, we should acknowledge that Islam has delegated this affair to the people who have the right to choose the form of their government as well as their legal code. Similarly, other affairs of the government are relegated to the people. Therefore, the contention that the government must be determined by God is in conflict with people’s political self-determination, and there is contradiction between what is being practiced and the claim that the government must be determined by God.
Even the notion of “Islamic republic” is self-contradictory, because “republicanism” means that people take control of government and determine its form. On the other hand, once we add the modifier “Islamic” to the “republic” and say that the wali al-faqih must head the government especially if we believe that wilayah al-faqih acquires legitimacy from God and the Imam of the Time (may Allah expedite his glorious advent), we regard the system as divine and not popular.
That is, the legitimacy of this system is acquired from above. Initially, God gives legitimacy to the government and then the Prophet (s) and the infallible Imams (‘a) are designated and granted legitimacy by God and then the wali al-faqih by the living infallible Imam (‘a) and the political organs under his authority are granted legitimacy. If the government is a republic, these issues should no longer be raised, and whatever the people have chosen should be granted official status.
Refuting the abovementioned skepticism and stating the Islamic viewpoint on the form of government
Unfortunately, this skepticism is reflected in our own newspapers and magazines and presents the Islamic government in Iran as self-contradictory and religious despotism. As such, we need to tackle these issues lucidly and examine their bases from the Islamic viewpoint.
Once we say that our system is an “Islamic republic”, does ‘Islamic’ mean that the form and structure of government have been determined by God and introduced in the Qur’an, traditions, and at least, in the conduct of the Holy Prophet (s) and the pure Imams (‘a)? If the Islamic nature of the system does not imply that its structure has been introduced by God—just as pieces of evidence show—then what is the criterion for the Islamic nature of the system?
No one claims that Islam has mentioned the specified form and structure of government. It is not claimed in the Qur’an and traditions, the conduct of the Infallibles, the words of the late Imam (q), the Supreme Leader and other leaders of the system that the Islamic government is a government whose structure and hierarchy of power have been determined by God and the leaders of religion, and that Islam, for example, has ordered that the wali al-faqih must be the highest authority and then the president, and that the three powers must be separated from one another. So, if its organizational structure and the separation of powers are not Islamic, the Islamic nature must be sought somewhere else.
The impossibility of presenting a fixed government structure
At this point the skeptics say: Is the non-specification of the structure and form of government not an indication of Islam’s shortcoming? Is Islam not a complete religion and has it not indicated all the individual and social needs of man? Then, why has it not specified the form of government?
In reply, we have to say that Islam, which administered a small society within a short period during the time of the Prophet of Islam (s) also wants to administer the most complex and extensive human societies and even a global government, so, it cannot present a specific and fixed structure of government. The government founded by the Prophet (s) controlled a population of about ten thousand people whose way of life and culture were simple and most of whom were nomads and villagers along the suburbs of Medina.
Naturally, the government had a simple and restricted structure consistent with the social fabric and demographic density of that time. Gradually, the domain of Muslim countries and territories expanded and during the periods of the caliphs including the time of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a) only half a century after the advent of Islam, the Islamic government encompassed countries like Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Hijaz, and Yemen. In view of the expansion of the territories under the control of Islam, it was not feasible to adopt the same form of government of the Holy Prophet (s) in Medina.
If the structure and form of government suitable for vast Islamic territories and large populations had been introduced by the Messenger of Allah (s), it would have been treated by the people during his time as unnecessary and overambitious. Besides, since there was no practical ground for its realization, it would have been considered an exercise in futility.
If the Prophet (s) tried to determine in advance a specific form of government for every period, it would have required the writing of an encyclopedia of hypothetical forms of government in various periods and an explanation of their organizational structure. However, at that time since literate people were very few, let alone scholars who could discern these points and distinguish one from another, there was neither opportunity to deal with the subject nor the capability to preserve, publish and propagate it.
Government structures constantly change and evolve according to the circumstance of time and place as well as socio-cultural developments. One cannot determine a single form of government applicable for all times, places and conditions. The structure of government is part of the alterable and secondary laws of Islam that change according to the circumstances of time and place.[36] To identify and present them has been part of the duties of the Master of Affairs of Muslims [wali al-amr al-muslimin]. During the presence of an infallible Imam, he is the wali al-amr al-muslimin. During this period of occultation [ghaybah], his deputies shall be regarded as the wali al-amr al-muslimin.
Therefore, it was unfeasible for Islam to have specified beforehand the form of government suitable for every period and place. It is not an indication of Islam’s shortcoming. Yes, if Islam had not introduced a general framework for determining the forms of government under different conditions, we might have admitted that Islam is defective in this respect. Fortunately, Islam has set a way to determine the structure of government, in particular, and the alterable laws, in general.
As stated in the “legislation” part of the discussions, to determine and present alterable laws suitable to changing circumstances of time and place is part of the duties of the wali al-amr al-muslimin who presents those laws including the structure of government by basing them on the general principles and values of Islam, considering changing interests in every period and consulting experts and authorities. Thereafter, people are bound to act upon them. Given this solution offered by Islam, the people are saved from destruction and confusion, and differences and discord removed.
Skepticism on alleged temporal and worldly nature of government and obsoleteness of Islamic laws
Nowadays, those who are under the influence of Western culture, liberalism in particular, believe that administrative issues are temporal and worldly and have nothing to do with Islam, staunchly supporting and advocating it in their articles, speeches and discussions. They argue that Islam talks neither about a republican government, nor about a monarchical government, nor about other forms of government. So, it is clear that administrative issues are not among the issues that we expect religion to have dealt with and that God and the Prophet (s) might have talked about. Rather, these issues are related to the world and people themselves have to decide about them.
They also say: “People must determine not only the form and structure of government but even enact laws, except those laws that are against Islamic standards!” We ask them: "If administrative issues are part of the temporal and worldly affairs and relegated to people, why have many laws and decrees about administrative issues like those related to judiciary, taxation and penal laws been mentioned in the Qur’an and mutawatir[37] traditions?" This poses an impasse for them.
In a bid to bypass and evade this impasse, they assert that the administrative ordinances, judicial and penal laws mentioned in the traditions and Qur’anic verses have been related to the early period of Islam to meet the needs of the time. Islam had to get involved in administrative issues and introduce relevant laws only during the early period of Islam and the time of the Holy Prophet (s) because the people at that time did not have sufficient knowledge and capability to codify the laws they needed, and Islam had to address their needs.
Hence, laws and ordinances about the government, politics and judgment applicable only to that period have been mentioned in the Qur’an and traditions. Today, mankind has sufficient knowledge and capability to administer society and codify the laws they need, so those laws and ordinances are of no use anymore and must be discarded!
This is a contention of many of those feigning Islam. Sometimes, they categorically say: “The laws of Islam—including its social laws—have been confined to the early period of Islam. They are not applicable to our period and have not been revealed for this period at all.” At times, they make the abovementioned claim implicitly. Since they cannot dare to explicitly question all the social laws of Islam, they raise objection to some penal laws of Islam such as the amputation of the hand of a thief.
They say: “The law of amputation of the hand of a thief is meant to prevent theft which is a violation of the property of others and to maintain the financial security of society. If we have a better law and method of maintaining security in society, we have to apply them and not amputate the hand of a thief in every period or age. The purpose or goal of every law promulgated in Islam is the maintenance of order in society, and during that time there was no way of maintaining order in society but to amputate the hand of a thief. But nowadays we have better ways and methods of achieving this goal that are devoid of violence and do not trample upon human dignity.
Apart from being violent and harsh, amputating the hand of a thief is repugnant to human dignity and must be discarded. We live at a time when the phenomenon called “modernity” has emerged and social conditions have changed. Since modern life and society have new conditions totally different from the social conditions at the time of the Prophet (s) and the Imams (‘a), there is no more room for the implementation of Islamic laws.
Initially, they argued that Islam had not specified the form of government but delegated it to people.
Then, assuming that the determination of the form of government has been delegated to people, they concluded that in cases where Islam does not have a specific law, codification of law has been delegated to people. Thereafter, they went even further and said, “Even in cases where Islam has a pertinent law, it can be abrogated and changed!” Undoubtedly, in this case one must bid farewell to Islam.
Refutation of the above and the connection between Islam’s immutable and alterable laws
We have stated concisely that apart from immutable laws, Islam also has alterable laws because the laws of Islam are generally consistent with real good and evil and the life of man in the world depends on changing circumstances. The government also has secondary and alterable laws. To determine their form and framework in every period, to codify administrative laws and identify their suitability to the exigencies of time has been delegated to the wali al-faqih, who acts upon his duty within the framework and general principles of Islam.
It must be noted that to know the immutable and alterable laws of Islam and distinguish them from one another can only be done by a religious scholar who is technically called faqih or mujtahid. Since he is familiar with the spirit and sources of Islam, viz. the Book, Sunnah and conduct of the Prophet (s) and the infallible Imams (‘a), he can distinguish the immutable laws from the alterable laws and identify the characteristic features of each.
The mere fact that there are alterable laws in Islam does not necessarily mean that one can claim that all laws of Islam are alterable. If all the laws, ordinances and decrees of Islam were alterable, nothing specified in Islam would have remained. If all laws and decrees of Islam were mutable and Islam did not have any inalterable law at all, why did we stage a revolution, demand the implementation of Islamic laws and offer hundreds of thousands of martyrs along this way?
During the time of the Shah, by launching a reform and some changes the demands of the people could have been addressed and the ground for people’s enactment of laws be opened. If that is Islam and its changing laws are enacted according to the views and opinions of people, then we had no point in staging a revolution. We should have followed the nationalists and secured the interests of society according to their views. In that case, we would not have incurred all these losses! By following the nationalists liberal democracy, we could have conducted peaceful and fair elections. Through general suffrage, we could have sent our deputies to the taghuti Majlis and they could have changed unpopular laws according to the demand of people and their constituents! This is the gist of contentions inspired by alien ideas expressed today in some of those periodicals which are funded by our public treasury!
Some use allegory to influence the youth who do not have sufficient knowledge. For example, they say: “The Islamic government is a mere claim and has no objective reality because Islam deals with neither republicanism nor the separation of powers. Since Islam does not say anything about them, it is clear that Islam has no political program at all and everything is delegated to the people.”
Here we are dealing with those who believe in Islam, God, revelation, and the Qur’an, and not to those who play with the Islamic government, regarding it as an illusion. Addressing those who believe that there is God who has sent the Prophet (s) and revealed the Qur’an for our guidance, we would like to say that the Qur’an has explicitly mentioned laws, ordinances and decrees that are fixed, inalterable and immutable. Moreover, Islam and the Qur’an have repeatedly emphasized that they must not be changed and modified. Among them are the judicial laws of Islam.
Some issues are necessary and obligatory but they are mentioned in the Qur’an and traditions in plain and simple manner. Other issues, however, including judgment according to the laws and decrees of Islam, are emphasized and mentioned in such a manner that would make a person tremble should he intend to disobey or violate them. Somewhere in the Qur’an, God commands the Prophet (s) to judge according to the divine decree:
إِنَّا أَنزَلْنَا إِلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ بِالْحَقِّ لِتَحْكُمَ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ بِمَا أَرَاكَ اللّهُ...
“Indeed We have sent down to you the Book with the truth, so that you may judge between the people by what Allah has shown you...” [38]
Elsewhere, He mentions the duty of Muslims vis-à-vis the decree and verdict of the Messenger of Allah (s) and the need to obey him, saying:
فَلاَ وَرَبِّكَ لاَ يُؤْمِنُونَ حَتَّىَ يُحَكِّمُوكَ فِيمَا شَجَرَ بَيْنَهُمْ ثُمَّ لاَ يَجِدُوا فِي أَنفُسِهِمْ حَرَجًا مِّمَّا قَضَيْتَ وَيُسَلِّمُوا َسْلِيمًا
“But no, by your Lord! They will not believe until they make you a judge in their disputes, then do not find within their hearts any dissent to your verdict and submit in full submission.”[39]
As you can observe, God the Exalted, by using the phrase “but no, by your Lord” [fala wa rabbuka] which is an oath, considers as faithful [mu’min] only those who consult no one but the Prophet (s) in their disputes, differences and conflicts. But if they do not refer to the Prophet (s) to resolve their disputes and conflicts nor ask him to judge over them, or, if the Prophet (s) issues a fair judgment concerning their conflict, they regret asking him and are not pleased with his verdict, they are not faithful.
So, the faithful have to choose the Prophet (s) to judge and adjudicate and if he issues a decree against their interests they should not have an iota of displeasure in their hearts. They are supposed to totally submit to the Messenger of Allah (s). Those who acknowledge Muhammad (s) as a messenger of Allah but do not accept his decree and judgment, according to the statement of God, have no faith in the laws of God and the apostleship of the Prophet (s). They are indeed liars and hypocrites. How can a person believe in the apostleship of the Prophet (s) without accepting his decree and judgment?
Elsewhere in the Qur’an, in consecutive verses God introduces a person who judges contrary to the divine decree as transgressor, unbeliever and wrongdoer:
...وَ مَنْ لَمْ يَحْكُمْ بِما أَنْزَلَ اللّهُ فَأُولئِكَ هُمُ الْكافِرُونَ
“Those who do not judge by what Allah has sent down—it is they who are the faithless.”[40]
...وَ مَنْ لَمْ يَحْكُمْ بِما أَنْزَلَ اللّهُ فَأُولئِكَ هُمُ الظّالِمُونَ
“Those who do not judge by what Allah has sent down—it is they who are the wrongdoers.”[41]
...وَ مَنْ لَمْ يَحْكُمْ بِما أَنْزَلَ اللّهُ فَأُولئِكَ هُمُ الْفاسِقُونَ
“Those who do not judge by what Allah has sent down—it is they who are the transgressors.”[42]
Will anyone who reads these verses of the Qur’an with such a tone ever think that the judicial laws of Islam are only related to the time of the Prophet (s) and a maximum of twenty years thereafter, and after the expansion of Muslim territories and the annexation of Iran, Egypt and other countries, those laws were no longer applicable and were entrusted to the people? Will anyone who reads these and other verses of the Qur’an arrive at this conclusion? Or, will he conclude that those verses mean that under no circumstances of time and place should the divine decree be trampled upon?
By noticing the tone of the verses any rational and fair-minded person who has faith in God and believes in those verses as truly God’s words will definitely realize that it must be acted upon till the Day of Resurrection and that the laws of God must be the focus of attention and action and not be violated:
...وَمَن يَتَعَدَّ حُدُودَ اللّهِ فَأُوْلَـئِكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ
“…And whoever transgresses the bounds of Allah—it is they who are the wrongdoers.”[43]
Moreover, if some verses are ambiguous, it is the task of the religious scholar to determine whether their purport is confined to a particular time or meant for all times; whether it is limited to a particular community like the Arabs of the Arab Peninsula or encompasses all communities.
With the purpose of avoiding submission to the laws and decrees of Islam, satisfy their carnal desires and satanic demands and misguide the young generation, the transgressors allege that the sociopolitical laws of Islam are related to the early period of Islam and thereafter they are no longer applicable. It is true that we have chosen the label “Islamic Republic” but the Islam in it is only ceremonial. It is the people who choose and abide by what law they like, unless it is absolutely against divine decree! Unfortunately, some people have also unexpectedly expressed the same notion in their articles and speeches.
Divine laws’ jurisdiction encompasses all spheres of human activities
Thus, it is clear that the non-specification of the exact form of government in Islam does not mean that government, laws and ordinances are generally related to the judicial, legislative and executive powers and that other powers, to be possibly discussed in political philosophy theories in future, are all delegated to the people and God has no view about them. Rather, in all spheres of personal and social actions, including the realm of politics and governance, God has laws and ordinances.
We cannot find a case about which Islam does not have a general decree. To elucidate, some of the laws we know of are obligatory or mandatory, that must be acted upon. On the contrary, there are laws, prohibiting certain actions and items we know of, that must be abandoned. The rest are permissible, and laws pertaining to them are not mandatory. These non-mandatory laws are recommendatory [mustahabb], abominable [makruh] and permissible [mubah]. So, explicit actions and items are considered obligatory [wajib], prohibited [haram], mustahabb, makruh, or mubah. In any case, all of them are parts of the decree of God.
Therefore, if an action is neither mandatory nor forbidden, neither recommended nor abominable, the action of man is free. In the parlance of traditions it is absolute and free. In the jargon of the fuqaha, it is mubah, and mubah is also part of religious laws and divine decree. So, in the individual and social issues one cannot find a case which is excluded from the decree of God for every action or thing belongs to one of the five laws (wajib, haram, mustahabb, makruh, and mubah). Of course, in the legal and political usage, mustahabb and makruh have moral dimension and are not tackled as legal issues which are either wajib that must be observed, or haram that must be avoided, or mubah.
A concluding question: If we accept that Islam has a view about the essence of government, for example, stating the specific qualifications of the person heading the Islamic government, has Islam delegated to the people those affairs and issues about which it has no opinion, and that the decision about them is not related to the sacred religion, and the general understanding and perception of the people concerning them must be upheld?
At this juncture, even those who are acquainted with the juristic subjects of Islam to some extent sometimes use dubious expressions that can be exploited by others. For example, they say: “We learn from religion some of the issues in our lives and concerning them we refer to the Book, traditions and even the conduct of the Holy Prophet (s) and pure Imams (‘a). But regarding other issues we use our reason. In reality, we have two reference sources in knowing the proper way of living, viz. revelation and reason.” This nonchalant interpretation is sometimes adopted by those who are authorities and really religious people. Since it is not devoid of problems and causes others to err, I deem it fitting to assess it.
It is necessary to note that we have two terms for religious or divine decree:
1.The first term, religious decree—or devotional and divine decree—refers to the decree inferred from the Book and the Sunnah and is mentioned in the Qur’an and traditions as binding. According to this term, any decree deduced through another way, say, by means of reason, is not referred to as “religious decree” but it is called “dictate of reason” [hukm-e ‘aql]. If reason directly discerns a decree or ruling [hukm] and is convinced of it, and at the same time, religion says something about it, this religious view is an instructive [irshadi] statement and does not entail a religious or devotional decree. To elaborate, without external help our reason directly discerns certain things. For example, every person can understand and perceive that justice is good and injustice is bad. No one doubts this dictate of reason. Then, once justice is enjoined in a Qur’anic verse, according to the fuqaha this verse is considered “instructive” in nature. That is, it only guides and directs us to a decree which our reason can understand and discern.
The fuqaha’s use of this term for religious decree misguides others and makes them think that we are not in need of a religious decree for all the aspects and issues of our lives. In some issues the discernment and dictate of reason is sufficient. They think that if God does not say anything about a thing, He has not exercised His authority over it and delegated it to reason [to discern]. So, the domain of our lives is divided into two: The first section is where God exercises His authority and the second section is where our reason is the authority. This implies that God does not exercise authority in all places, and in everyplace we should not be concerned with what God has decreed. In fact, wherever God does not say anything, it is up to us to know His decree by using our reason.
As can be observed, some have exploited and misinterpreted the first term for religious decree and the nonchalant expression of the fuqaha on the basis of which religious decree is regarded as any devotional decree mentioned in the Book and Sunnah in contradistinction to the definite dictate of reason about which religion does not say anything, and in determining its ruling our reason is not dependent on religion which only offers an instructive decree. They have assumed that some aspects of our lives are beyond the authority of God and the reference authority in codifying pertinent laws is human reason.
2. The second term ‘instructive’ concerns the legislative will of God; that is, whatever God wants from us is in the obligatory or permissible form. So, whatever God definitely wants us to do is a decree of God. Sometimes, it is expressed in the Book, the Sunnah and other religious sources. At times, it is realized through reason. Accordingly, reason itself is one of the means of knowing and discovering the decree of God.
As such, we submit and follow the dictate of reason. By means of reason’s discovery of the divine legislative will, we realize that this decree is the very thing that God wants from us. If it is mentioned in fiqh that apart from the Book and Sunnah, we have another means of knowing religious decrees, i.e. reason, it is absolutely true that reason is also a means of discerning the decree of God.
In view of this interpretation and term for religious decree, all the actions and activities of man in individual, social, legal, judicial, internal and external, and international domains are included in the decree of God. Sometimes, the decree of God is established by the Book and Sunnah, and at times, through reason. Of course, the proof of reason must be so clear and definite that we can be certain that whatever is established by reason is the decree and legislative will of God.
Notes:
[35] It refers to the Constitutional Movement, Constitutional Revolution or simply Constitutionalism (1905-11) in Iran during the twilight of the Qajar dynasty. [Trans.]
[36] Contrary to the alterable laws of Islam are the inalterable laws that are fixed for all times and applicable everywhere.
[37] A mutawatir hadith is one which has been reported by so many different chains of transmission and such a number of narrators in every generation normally could not agree to fabricate a tradition without the fact of its fabrication becoming known. [Trans.]
[38] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:105.
[39] Surah an-Nisa’ 4:65.
[40] Surah al-Ma’idah 5:44.
[41] Surah al-Ma’idah 5:45.
[42] Surah al-Ma’idah 5:47.
[43] Surah al-Baqarah 2:229.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Presenting Some Questions Regarding Islamic Government
There are other questions regarding Islamic government which must also be addressed. Has Islam, only laid down the conditions and qualifications of the person who heads the government and not specified the form of government? That is, does Islam only recommend who must head the government and leave other things including the form of government to the whims of people and change according to the changes in social circumstances?
A more technical question which is comprehendible and understandable to those who are acquainted with juristic and legal discourses is this: Is the government a foundational [ta’sisi] or conventional [imdha’i] matter? A set of Islamic laws or juristic rulings is foundational. Before their actual forms are shown to the people, the sacred religion mentions these laws as well as describes their actual manifestations. For example, the ritual prayer [salah] is a foundational form of worship.
The religion of Islam has mentioned it and the manner of performing it has also been demonstrated to the people by God through the Prophet (s). Besides, before this obligatory act and the manner of its performance were conveyed to the people, no one had been aware of it. In general, the forms and manners of all ritual acts of worship are foundational as the people learned them from the Prophet (s).
For example, obligatory acts like fasting, Hajj pilgrimage and other devotional laws are all foundational.
In contrast to these foundational laws of Islam, there is a set of Islamic laws which in the parlance of jurisprudence [fiqh] is called ‘conventional’. That is, in their social interactions and intercourses, people have formulated a series of rules, regulations, contracts, and agreements, some of which are unwritten but people are bound to them; for example, trade and barter.
At the beginning the sacred religion had not ordered the people to engage in trade or barter whenever they needed a commodity. The people of wisdom knew of the necessity of this affair and they formulated the ways and manners of engaging in them. Then, religion approved this wise practice and gave it a religious credence, stating, for example:
وَأَحَلَّ اللّهُ الْبَيْعَ...
“Allah has allowed trade.”[34]
God allowed and made permissible [halal] the same trading and transactions practiced by people. This approval and permission of trade is a conventional [imdha’i] and not a foundational [ta’sisi] religious ruling. It is like the acceptance of a system formulated by people of wisdom on how to conduct their mutual transactions.
Now, this question is raised concerning government: Before God ordered people through the prophets (‘a) to abide by the divine government, had the people themselves founded a particular form of government which was later endorsed by religion? Or, did people also acquire knowledge of the form of government from God, and that if the prophets (‘a) had not ruled over people by God’s leave and permission and people were not obliged to follow and obey them, they would not have known the form of government?
In sum, once we say that the Islamic government is a well defined system with a religious legal standing and God has made it incumbent upon people to submit to it, the question asked is whether this government has been ordained and founded by God? Or, did the people themselves choose this form of government and found it on the basis of a social contract and God only endorsed and approved it, and therefore, this government has been considered Islamic as it has been endorsed, approved and sanctioned by God?
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Obligations of the Rulers in Islam
All over history, rulers, according to their qualifications, have played influential roles in the development and retardation of nations. The ideal, sincere ruler is he who governs his subjects on bases of leniency, justice, and equality.
The absolute ruler, on the other hand, is he who enslaves, humiliates, and exploits the subjects for his own interests:
The Prophet (s) said: "On the Day of Resurrection, a caller will cry out: where are the unjust rulers and their supporters, including those who provided them an inkpot, those who untied one of their bags, and those who sharpened a pencil for them. Join all these individuals to those rulers."
The unjust rulers will sooner or later suffer punishments that befit their acts of oppression. History is full of stories showing the bad results of the absolute rulers.
Al-Hajjaj ibn Yousuf ath-Thaqafi is the most hideous example of the unjust rulers. He ruled for twenty years during which he killed 120,000 individuals besides those whom were killed during his campaigns. In his cells, there were fifty thousand men and thirty thousand women…etc. Finally, this dictator was affected by canker and severe frost until he perished.
Rights of Subjects against Rulers
(A) Justice:
The absolute authority of the unjust rulers, in most cases, is the result of people's rebellion against and disobedience to the Lord:
The Prophet (s) said: "Allah says: I am Allah. There is no god but I. I have created the kings whose hearts are in My hand. I will make the hearts of the kings full of mercy towards the people who obey Me, but I will make them full of rancor towards the people who disobey Me. Do not engage yourselves in reviling at the kings. You must repent to Me so that I will make their hearts full of compassion towards you."
(B) Righteousness
Because most people try to imitate them, it is obligatory upon rulers to be characterized by righteousness and well behavior so as to act as good examples for their subjects. Likewise, the rulers' deviation and misconduct push most people towards deviation.
(C) Lenience
Rulers are required to govern people with means of lenience and avoid persecution because despotism is the most disreputable manner of the rulers and the most injurious act towards the subjects.
The Prophet (s) said: "Lenience will beautify anything it accompanies and will disfigure anything it leaves." (al-wafi; part 3 page 86 (as quoted from al-kafi).
Amir ul-Mu'minin (a) said: "Habituate your heart to mercy for the subjects and to affection and kindness for them. Do not stand over them like greedy beasts who feel it is enough to devour them, since they are of two kinds, either your brother in religion or one like you in creation. They will commit slips and encounter mistakes. They may act wrongly, willfully, or by neglect. So, extend to them your forgiveness and pardon, in the same way as you would like Allah to extend His forgiveness and pardon to you, because you are over them and your responsible Commander (Imam) is over you while Allah is over him who has appointed you through what He has given to you of the knowledge of His Book and the practices of His Prophet (s)."
Imam as-Sadiq (a) said: "The lenient can win anything he wants from people." (al-wafi; part 3 page 87 (as quoted from al-kafi).
Lenience is of no value unless it is done to the virtuous people. The evildoers who disturb the social peace do not deserve any sort of lenient treatment.
Aspects of Lenience
Aspects of lenience can be shown through the words and deeds of the rulers. Hence, the ruler must use good wording and avoid obscenity. He must treat the subjects with kindness through sympathizing with their pains and tragedies and hurrying for helping them in misfortunes and crises. Finally, the ruler must try his best to save the subjects from heavy taxes.
Results of Lenience
Lenience creates the subjects' love for their rulers and save them from the need for flattering and hypocrisy.
God praised His Messenger Mohammed (s) for his lenience:
"Only through the Divine Mercy have you (Muhammad) been able to deal with your followers so gently. If you had been stern and hardhearted, they would all have deserted you a long time ago. (3:159)"
(D) Selection of the Retinue
A ruler, no matter how well-qualified he is, cannot dispense with supporters who help him do his duties properly. Such supporters, in fact, have a great effect in guiding and conditioning the ruler's morals and opinions. From this cause, it is important for the ruler to select well-qualified and decent retinue so that they will positively help him and contribute in achieving the subjects' pleasure.
(E) Settlement with the Officials
Because most of them take pride in their authorities, officials usually challenge and treat people arrogantly and neglect their duties. Such behaviors will surely dissatisfy people with the ruling authorities. From this cause, it is necessary for rulers to supervise and call the officials to accounts so as to reward the dutiful and punish the negligent. By doing so, each individual will perform his duty towards the society properly, tragedies and varieties of flattering to the official will be eradicated, and all the social affairs will he prevailed by justice.
(F) Achievement of Social Happiness
The ruler is responsible for the moral and material development of the subjects. This happiness can be achieved when the ruler supervises the subjects, pays attention to their interests, secures their rights of security, justice, and luxury, raises their scientific, physical, social, moral, and structural levels, cares for the industrial, agricultural, and commercial development, and encourages the talents and abilities.
Rulers' Rights against Subjects
The ruler, in his capacity as the pioneer or the national development and civilization, enjoys definite rights imposed upon the subjects.
In the following words, Amir ul-Mu'minin (a) refers to the rights of the rulers:
"The ruled cannot prosper unless the rulers are sound, while the rulers cannot be sound unless the ruled are steadfast. If the ruled fulfill the rights of the ruler and the ruler fulfils their rights, then right attains the position of honor among them, the ways of religion become established, signs of justice become fixed and the Sunna gains currency. In this way time will improve, the continuance of government will be expected, and the aims of the enemies will be frustrated. But if the ruled gain sway over the ruler, or the ruler oppresses the ruled, then difference crops up in every word, signs of oppression appear, mischief enters religion and the ways of the Sunna are forsaken. Then desires are acted upon, the commands (of religion) are discarded, diseases of the spirit become numerous and there is no hesitation in disregarding even great rights, nor in committing big wrongs. In such circumstances, the virtuous are humiliated while the vicious are honored, and there are serious chastisements from Allah onto the people."
(1) Obedience:
Rulers enjoy the right of obedience against their subjects in the fields that achieve satisfaction of God. Obedience encourages rulers to treat their subjects sincerely while rebellion and disappointment are detestable manners that excite the rulers' rage and punishment.
Imam al-Kadhim said: "O Shia, do not humiliate yourselves by acting disobediently to the rulers. You should pray to Allah to perpetuate the just rulers and rectify the unjust. Your rectification will be achieved when your rulers are rectified. The just ruler is as same as the compassionate father. Hence, you should love for him that which you love for yourselves and reject for him that which you reject for yourselves." (Bihar ul-Anwar; Kitab ul-Ashara page 218 (as quoted from al-Amali).
(2) Support
A ruler cannot dispense with the support of his subjects who help him do his duties properly by means of intellectual and mental efforts.
(3) Advice
People of reason are encompassed by the duty of providing advices to the rulers when they tend to despotism enthralling the subjects. If such advices prove futility, then the intellectuals are not blamed. The Prophet (s) said: "The ruler is Allah's shadow on this earth and the shelter of the wronged. If the ruler governs with justice, he will be rewarded and the subjects must thank. If the ruler governs unjustly, he will be punished and the subjects must show tolerance until they are relieved." (Bihar ul-Anwar; Kitab ul-Ashara page 214 (as quoted from al-Amali).
Nowadays, the rulers have no longer accepted advices; therefore, the civilized governments have permitted criticizing the rulers by way of parliaments, press media, and memoranda.
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL NECESSITIES
Human being is the composition of two elements: body and spirit. These two elements are correlated and interacting. Man's happiness depends totally on the soundness of these two elements each of which has its own desires and necessities.
The physical necessities are the material factors that achieve growth, health, and vitality, such as food, drink, clothing, and other life necessities.
The mental necessities are the intellectual and spiritual desires, such as knowledge, freedom, justice, peace of mind, and the like.
For gaining sound body and soul, it is essential to respond to these necessities. For instance, weakness and ailment are the results of depriving the body of its necessities, while puzzlement, worry, and misery are the results of depriving the soul of its necessities.
Physical Rights
Briefly, the physical right is to attend to the health regulations, such as moderation in food and drink, evasion of alcoholic drinks and drugs, abstinence from sinful carnal desires, habituating to cleanness, practicing physical activities, treating of the ailments, following the physicians' advices, and the like matters.
Mental Rights
Many people ignore the mental health because they are far away from the spiritual values. Few groups of people, however, can realize the mental complications that appear in the form of recalcitrance, rebellion, inclinations to the commitment of sins, excessive fondness of materiality, and desertion of the mental values. In view of that, the treatment for the spiritual defects has been more difficult and more laborious. In the same way, scholars and intellectuals have paid a greater attention to self-discipline and mental education; therefore, it is necessary for people of reason to care for such affairs.
(1) Self-education
Self-education can be achieved by enlightening with the divine recognition and the true belief and supplying with the beneficial knowledges that lead to the right guidance. Naturally, human souls incline to the belief in God, tend to knowledge, and yearn for discovering mysteries of the cosmos and secrets of life.
(2) Well Intention
Man enjoys two forms: one is external and represented by his body, and the other is internal and represented by his mental and moral traits. Man's external form is the target of praise and dispraise, according to its beauty or ugliness. In the same way, the internal form is the target of praise or criticism, according to its goodness or evil.
Like beautifying the external forms, rational people are accustomed to beautify their internal forms by means of clinging to well intention and well behavior, and avoiding showing off, hypocrisy, envy, and the like vicious manners.
Amir ul-Mu'minin (a) said: "Scholars and wise people used to correspond to each other three statements only: As for those whose main concern is the (preparations for the) life to come, Allah will satisfy their worldly concerns. As for those who maintain their hidden intentions, Allah will maintain their public affairs. As for those who establish good relations between Allah and them, Allah will establish good relations between people and them." (Bihar ul-Anwar; 1/62 (as quoted from al-khissal, al-Amali, and Thawab ul-A'mal).
Imam as-Sadiq (a) said: "As for anyone who keeps secret a good deed, Allah will, sooner or later, reveal a good reputation for him. As for him who keeps secret an evil, Allah will, sooner or later, reveal an ill reputation for him." (al-wafi; 3/147 (as quoted from al-kafi).
(3) Self-control
Due to the charming instincts and desires, mentalities tend to deviation to take to the depths of corruption. Hence, it is essential to control and immunize oneself against sins:
"… And (I swear) by the soul and that (Power) which designed it and inspired it with knowledge of evil and piety, those who purify their souls will certainly have everlasting happiness and those who corrupt their souls will certainly be deprived of happiness. (91:7-10)"
"However, those who had feared their Lord and restrained their souls from acting according to their desires, Paradise will be their dwelling. (79:41)"
The Prophet (s): "The faith of those who enjoy three traits is perfect: those whose rage does not take them out of the right, whose satisfaction does not take to the wrong, and who pardon when they are powerful." (safinat ul-Bihar; vol. 2 page 550 (as quoted from al-khissal).
4. Self-Judgment
Self-judgment is to call oneself to account every day regarding the good-deeds as well as the wrongdoings. If the scale of acts of obedience overweighs the scale of acts of disobedience, we must thank God for such success. But if the scale of acts of disobedience overweighs the scale of acts of obedience, we must discipline ourselves by reproach and criticism for the irregularity and going astray from the courses of the obedience to God.
Source: Imam reza network
The Role of the Islamic State
As indicated in the theory of distribution, the Islamic State possesses the sole right of ownership of natural resources. Consequently, it has absolute control over all aspects of economic activities. The owner of natural resources or, primary commodities, according to Sadr, is the sole owner of the secondary commodities. Basically, the government of the Islamic State can determine the flow of wealth in society and define the economic process. The major objective of the Islamic State is to set up policies to develop the natural resources to the fullest extent to benefit the entire society.
To achieve such an economic objective, the State has the right to distribute social economic resources to attain the maximum amount of production that brings prosperity to all people. The State has the responsibility to provide for the minimum essential needs of society and ensure the economic welfare of the people. It is unlike the capitalist State, which leaves that function to the fluctuations of the market. Nor it is like the Marxist‑Leninist theory that advocates State control of all aspects of economic activities. The Islamic State sets the direction of economic activities, while giving individuals the right of private ownership to achieve the social goal. The government's role is to oversee and regulate economic activities. Accordingly, Islam has left the government with a high degree of flexibility in developing new regulations to meet any emergent economic circumstances. Sadr called the absence of restrictions in the Shari'ah as manatiq al-faragh (the discretionary sphere of the law), where the jurist; has the authority to make judgements and rulings according to the principles of jurisprudence. [33] He considers this area of legislation on the part of the lawgiver as a realistic approach to ensure the development of economic activities and the means of production. The leadership of the Islamic State then could initiate any new legislation and regulations that it sees as appropriate to the new emergent circumstances in order to meet the economic needs of the people and secure maximum utilization of economic resources. In other words, the Islamic government is free to adopt a wide range of economic policies from full control of the economy to free‑enterprise in order to achieve its social goals. In this case, the government must depend on the economists and experts to watch for tile best possible alternative policies to set the direction of the State economy (provided that it will not overrule tile theory of distribution.)
Such an unlimited role of government in the economy of the Islamic State is justified because of its substantial social involvement. The State is responsible for the social welfare of all people. [34] The economic resources in the Islamic State are distributed not only according to work and ability to produce, but also according to needs. Not all people in society are able to work, and some of those who do are not able to satisfy their needs. Sadr identifies three economic classes in society: (1) those who have the mental and/or the physical power to produce more titan their needs; (2) those who are able to work, but only to the extent of meeting their essential needs; and (3) those who do not have the mental or physical power to work productively. The government's responsibility is to provide for the needs of the latter two classes, which are not limited to essential human needs. The people in the Islamic State must live in dignity, i.e., their economic status must be raised to an acceptable general level. Therefore, the State must have the economic resources to be able to finance the social welfare programme.
Whatsoever spoils of war God has given to His Messenger from the people of the cities belong to God, and His Messenger, and the near kinsman, orphans the needy and the traveller, so that it be not a thing taken in turns among the rich of you. (59:7)
The verse, according to Sadr, indicates two things: first, the allocation of economic resources between the government and the needy people; second, die distribution of wealth in such a way as to prevent the rich from controlling the economy. Based on the above interpretation, Sadr argues that the main principles of Islamic economics are: (1) public (i.e., State) ownership of the means of production and distribution, and (2) centralized economic planning. It is only through the control of all the community's resources by society that the common need of social security is guaranteed and the essential economic rights of the individual are insured. Accordingly, the legitimate Islamic government has the responsibility to make longterm plans for serving the common good and overcoming instabilities of the market.
Islam recognizes differences of income between people, but strives to create an equitable standard of living. To realize such a socio‑economic condition, Islam, although it specifies fixed taxes to be collected from prosperous people, establishes a social and moral mechanism. A lavish and extravagant style of living is totally discouraged in Islam. Islam also forbids waste in production and consumption in order to direct the resources of the economy to produce commodities that satisfy the needs of all people and bring about social equity. The State also has the authority to regulate wages and prices so as to overcome the selfishness and greed of those who possess economic wealth and insure an equitable standard of living for all people. In sum, the major goal of the Islamic State is the prosperity of all citizens.
Notes:
[33]. The jurist, according to Sadr, shall not change any of the primary principles of Islam, i.e., the sphere of halal and haram, that which is obligatory and prohibited, respectively; but he may act within the realm of “secondary†matters, i.e the mandub and makruh, that which is â€کdesirable’ and â€کreprehensible’, respectively. The jurst may forbid any mandub action, or encourage any makruh ones.
[34]. Iqtisaduna, 607
Author: T.M Aziz
Source: erfan.ir
The Meaning of Wilayat al-Faqih
The words “Wali” and “Wilayat” have the same root (w-l-y). From it’s primary meaning of “to be near or close to someone or something”, is derived the general meanings “to be in charge”, “to govern” and “to exercise authority”. In Islamic juristic (fiqh) terminology, the term “Wilayat” has several usages. Some of these are as follow:
1. Wilayat al-Qaraba
This type of authority (Wilayat) is given to a father or paternal grandfather over minors and those who are insane (even after the age of adolescence). This authority to act as a guardian is based on relationship.
2. Wilayat al-qada’
According to Imami Jurisprudence, the infallible Imam originally possessed the sole authority to judge amongst the people based upon God’s law and revelation. At this time, however, a just and capable faqih may undertake this responsibility with the Imam’s permission.
3. Wilayat al-Hakim
In this case, authority is given to a regular administrator of justice (hakim), to supervise the interests of a person who is unable to take care of his own affairs; such as a fool or an insane person. Whoever does not have a guardian (Wali), jurists say: al-hakim is the guardian of those who have no guardian.
4. Wilayat al-Mutlaqa (The Absolute Authority)
According to textual evidences, such as verse 6 of Chapter 33 of the Qur’an, Imami scholars believe that the Prophet and Imams have divine authority over the people. The verse states that the Prophet has more rights over the believers than they have over themselves; thus his discretionary authority is effective amongst the people. This same authority, according to Shi’a beliefs, is also bestowed upon the Imams.
5. Wilayat al-Usuba
According to Sunni jurists, this authority is connected to inheritance; it encompasses a class of inheritors. This category of Wilayat is not accepted by Imami scholars.
According to Imami doctrine, absolute authority (Wilayat al- Mutlaqa al-Elahiya) remains with the Absent Imam, even during his greater occultation. Therefore, in order to exercise authority, every just and capable faqih requires the sanction of the Imam, who is in turn designated by God as the possessor of absolute authority and guardianship.
Although all Imami scholars generally agree upon the doctrine of Vicegerency (Niyabat) that emphasizes the role of capable jurists as deputies of the Absent Imam, who are entrusted with a degree of his authority. However, the crucial issue is the scope and extent of this vicegerency and in which affairs the jurists have authority.
In order to clarify the dimensions of this discussion, it is necessary to examine the traditional roles and functions that qualified jurists undertake as deputies of the Imam.
Author: Ahmed Vaezy
Source: al-islam.org
What is Wilayat al-Faqih?
The doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih forms the central axis of contemporary Shi’a political thought. It advocates a guardianship-based political system, which relies upon a just and capable jurist (faqih) to assume the leadership of the government in the absence of an infallible Imam. However, although the guardianship of a high-ranking religious scholar is universally accepted amongst all Shi’a theories of governance, any disagreement is focused on the details such as the role of the jurist and the scope of his authority.
Because the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih has emerged from Imamate - which constitutes a cornerstone of Shi’ism – it is necessary to understand this political doctrine within the context of this concept of leadership. By comparing it to the tradition political theory of Sunni jurists – the doctrine of caliphate – and characterizing it’s major features, we will be able to better understand and appreciate the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih.
In order to overcome the ambiguities surrounding the relationship between Wilayat al-Faqih and the position of an Islamic jurist as a source of guidance and imitation (Marja’a e-taqleed), it is necessary to discuss the various dimensions of guardianship in the absence of the infallible Imam. Also in order to respond to those who suppose that this doctrine is an entirely new thesis, which has only recently appeared in Shi’a jurisprudence, and argue that it opposes the traditional position of scholars and jurists, it is vital to briefly explain the historical background of Wilayat al-Faqih amongst the Imami Shi’a School of Islamic thought.
The Concept of Imamate
The political status of the Imams is an essential component of Imami Shi’ism. They are considered to be the true successors of the most noble Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), and those who subscribe to this Islamic perspective believe that any successor must be appointed by Allah, through his Prophet. However, there are those who attempt to reduce Imamism to a merely political attitude, a party that supports Imam Ali (pbuh) and his family as the sole legitimate successor to the Holy Prophet. Hence many Sunni scholars define Shi’ism as follows:
Shi’a are those who especially follow Ali and maintain his leadership and succession of the Prophet by his appointment (nass) and testament openly (publicly) or privately, and also believe that Ali’s authority (awla) never goes out of his descendants[18].
But the political authority of the Imams does not imply that their role and status are restricted to governance or leadership. For their followers, the Imams represent the highest level of piety and they embody the same qualities as exemplified by the most noble Messenger of God. As Anthony Black describes them:
The twelve Imams themselves, and above all the present twelfth or hidden Imam, were held to be necessary to the constitution of the Universe and of true religion. The Imam is God’s proof (Hujjah: guarantee), he is the pillar of the Universe, the ‘gate’ through whom God is approached. Knowledge of revelation depends upon him[19].
Some of the qualities attributed to the Imams, such as “proof of God” (Hujjah) and “the guardian” (Wali), which are discussed later, refer to their great authority and are essential to understanding Shi’a political thought. Ayatollah Khomeini described “proof of God” as follows:
A ‘proof of God’ is one whom God has designated to conduct affairs, all his deeds, actions, and sayings constitute a proof for the Muslims. If someone commits an offence, will be made to the ‘proof’ for adducing evidence and formulating the charge. If the ‘proof’ commands you to perform a certain act, to implement the penal provisions of the law in a certain way, or to spend the income derived from booty, zakat, and sadaqa in a certain manner and if you fail to obey him in any of these respects, then God Almighty will advance a ‘proof’ against you on the day of Judgment[20].
The Imams are considered to be the successors of the Prophet (pbuh) and the rightful recipients of his authority. This is not because they are from his family; rather, it is because they are pious, obedient to Allah and embody characteristics that are pre-required for this level of religious-political leadership. Equally so, they are not appointed by any popular consensus; Imamate is instituted by divine installation (nasb); only Allah truly knows who possesses the qualities required to fulfil this duty, therefore only He is capable of appointing them. Shi’a considers Imamate, like Prophethood, to be a fundamental belief, and obedience to the authority of their Imam a religious obligation. Other than receiving divine revelation, which is specifically for the prophets, the Imams have all the qualities, duties and authority of the Prophet (pbuh). Political and religious guidance emanate from them and they are guardians over the believers. This is a manifestation of Allah’s guardianship over human beings.
In addition to this, the concept of guardianship is another crucial element of Shi’a political doctrine.
Imam as “Wali”
In many verses of the Qur’an, God introduces himself as “Guardian of the Believers” (Wali ul-Mumineen):
Allah is the Guardian of the believers. [Chapter 3, Verse 68]
Allah is the Guardian of those who believe. [Charter 2, Verse 257]
Allah suffices as a Guardian. [Chapter 4, Verse 45]
And according to several verses of the Qur’an, this guardianship has been delegated to the Prophet, so his authority is rooted in the aforementioned Divine authority:
Only Allah is your Guardian (Wali) and His Apostle. [Chapter 5, Verse 55]
The Prophet has a greater claim on the faithful than they have on themselves. [Chapter 33, Verse 6]
Verses such as these illustrate that the authority and guardianship of the Prophet was originally established and legitimized by Allah’s appointment. Following this interpretation, the followers of the Imams provide a large number of traditions and historical evidence that confirm the delegation of the Imams, by Allah, through the Prophet (the doctrine of appointment) as “guardians of the believers” (Wali ul-Mumineen).
Although the consequences of this doctrine will be considered over the following pages, at this point it would be helpful to discuss the meaning of the terms “Wali” and “Wilayat” and their usage, especially with regards to jurisprudence (fiqh).
Arabic lexicographers have mentioned several meanings for the word “Wali”, such as:
(1) Friend
(2) Supporter
(3) Devoted
(4) Protector.
There are a series of words derived from the root of “Wali”, for instance “Wilayat”, “Mawla” and “Mawala Alayh”. By considering the context to which these are applied, it becomes apparent that they apply to the situation that someone’s affairs have been taken charge of by someone else. Therefore, whoever takes charge of these affairs is the latter’s Wali, and consequently it is often applied to governance as well[21].
When the term “Wilayat” is attributed to the Imams, it carries the implications of “mastership”, “sovereignty” and“lordship”. This is to indicate the authority of the Imam over the believers, who are subject to his guardianship. Imami theologians refer to the Qur’an (especially Chapter 5, Verse 55) and prophetic traditions to support the exclusive authority (Wilayat) of the Imams.
The absolute authority and guardianship of Allah (Wilayat al-mutlaqih) forms a central pillar of Imami political thought, which maintains that whoever wishes to exercise this authority must be appointed by Him. It is this idea that distinguishes Imamism from all other political theories and even other sects of Shi’ism; because although all schools of Shi’a thought agree that the Imam is subject to divine appointment through the Prophet, only Imamism tries to sustain this approach under circumstances when the infallible Imam is absent. In this doctrine, it is Allah alone who holds the absolute authority and He has explicitly appointed the Prophet and a number of believers (his family, i.e. the Ahlul-Bayt) as guardians (Wali), who are entrusted with authority over the Muslims.
Only God is your Wali and His Apostle and those who believe. Who perform prayer and pay alms while they bow. [Al-Qur’an, Chapter 5, Verse 55]
The last phrase, “those who believe”, according to Shi’a commentators refers to the Imams, whose Wilayat was instituted through their appointment by the Prophet[22].
However, what truly distinguishes the Imami political doctrine from all other forms of Shi’a political thought emerges from the Imami concept of leadership during the period of greater occultation; in which the Twelfth Imam is absent. The Imami creed adopts a system of vicegerency, whereby the authority (Wilayat) is entrusted to the just and capable scholar (faqih e-adil), who acts as a deputy to the absent Imam. Thus, the guardianship of a jurist is legitimized and his authority is related to the original and absolute authority of Allah. A clear distinction must be drawn, however, between the authority of Imamate and the guardianship of the scholars. The Imams, whose authority is established upon their explicit designation by the Prophet, delegate and entrust a degree of their authority to those who possess specific qualities (such as justice and jurisprudence in the case of the fuqaha). So whereas the Imams were specifically appointed as guardians of legitimate authority, the jurists (fuqaha) are not explicitly selected by name, but rather implicitly chosen as those who possess the correct qualities for leadership.
The scope of a jurist ‘s authority and the realm of his vicegerency constitute the most essential, while simultaneously controversial element of Imami political thought. However, before entering this crucial debate, it is important to distinguish Imami political doctrine from the political system advocated by the traditional Sunni Jurists, which is the doctrine of Caliphate.
The Theory of Caliphate
Despite the common disagreement amongst their schools of jurisprudence, Sunni jurists have traditionally advocated a specific theory of state known as Caliphate; a doctrine that, both as a political theory and significant historic reality, dominated the Islamic community for a considerable amount of time. In the interests of the present discussion, it is necessary to differentiate between the theory of Caliphate and the doctrine of Imamism.
Caliph essentially means successor, or one who assumes a position previously held by another. However, this word is not confined to the context of political authority, so a caliph may not simply be the successor of a previous governor, but also someone who is definitely appointed as a deputy and entrusted with authority by the person who appoints him, somewhat synonymous with ‘deputy’ or ‘vicegerent’[23].
Historically, the early Muslims are said to have applied the title of Khalifa to the first four rulers after the Prophet (Pbuh). In it’s most basic meaning, the Khalifa is one who exercises governance in place of the Prophet. Abu-Bakr was once approached by a man, who asked him “Are you the deputy of the messenger of Allah?” to which Abu-Bakr replied, “No.” The man asked, “So who are you”? Abu- Bakr answered, “I am the successor of the Prophet”[24].
Montgomery Watt writes:
Since Abu-Bakr was not appointed by the Prophet except to deputize for him in leading the public prayers, the phrase “Khalifa of the messenger of God” cannot have meant ‘deputy’. The primary meaning must have been merely ‘successor’[25].
Although many rulers of the Ummayid dynasty attempted to attach a divine status to the title of successor (Caliph), Sunni Jurists generally consider the Caliph to be a legitimate ruler who governs and directs the state and it’s society. His appointment is dependant upon specific qualities that the ruler must possess, however there is no universal agreement as to what these characteristics must be.
This source of disagreement initiated the first political divergence amongst the Muslims, which precipitated, sustained and continues to sustain a theological debate with focuses on legitimate leadership following the death of the Prophet (pbuh). However, the theory of Caliphate was not enshrined until the reign of the Abbasids, when it was devised and formulated by Sunni Jurists. Black writes:
An articulate community, traditionalist political theory was finally formulated in the first half of the eleventh century. Its doctrine of the vicegerency met the requirements of the emerging religious community by radically scaling down expectations placed on the deputy, while retaining the legitimacy of the ‘Abbasids as leaders of the Muslims. The first four rightly guided (Rashidun) deputies were now placed in a special category. The immediate motive was to safeguard the ‘Abbasids Caliphate against alternatives, Shi’a Imamism or Isma’ilism[26].
The first, and most significant Sunni Jurist who attempted to systemize the doctrine of Caliphate within an Islamic juridical framework was Abu’l Hasan Al-Mawardi (Basra 979 – Baghdad 1058). He was a Shafi’i judge in Nishapur, and later became the chief Justice of Baghdad. In his famous book “al-ahkam as-sultaniyya” (the laws of governance), al- Mawardi attempts to legitimize the authority of the Abbasid government, while striving to justify the use of coercion as an implement of governance. He argued that a caliph is divinely entrusted with authority in political, as well as religious affairs[27].
He writes:
God …ordained for the people a leader through whom he provided for the vicegerency of the Prophet and through whom he protected the religious association; and he entrusted government to him, so that the management of affairs should proceed (on the basis of) right religion…The leadership became the principle upon which the bases of the religious association were established, by which the well-being of the people was regulated[28].
When examining this perspective, it is important to realize that the traditional advocates of Caliphate are often inspired and influenced by the Ash’ari School of Islamic thought. This particular doctrine emphasizes divine predestination (taqdir) and the will of God as a unique agent in the world. Naturally, the fundamental principle of this doctrine brings them to the conclusion that one person, solely by the will of Allah, will succeed to gain political authority.
Abu’l-Fadl Bayhaqi (995-1077) writes:
Know that the Lord most high has given one power to the Prophets and another power to Kings, and he has made it incumbent upon the people of the earth that they should submit themselves to the two powers and should acknowledge the true way laid down by God[29].
Al-Ghazzali in his Advice to kings says:
God has singled out two groups of men and given them preference over others: one group is the Prophets and the other is kings. Prophets he sends to His servants to lead them to Him and Kings to restrain them from (aggression against) each other[30].
This outlook, which assumes that the authority of a Caliph includes everything and that they are naturally predestined according to the eternal will of God, is naturally compatible with the opinion currently adopted by contemporary Sunni Jurists, who argue that Allah and the Prophet did not appoint a particular person or persons as rulers over the Muslims. After all, the logical consequence of this concept of predestination and unique divine agency is that it doesn’t matter who governs or how he obtains authority, for in any case and circumstance it would be subject to the will of God. This is the first distinction between Shi’a political thought and the doctrine of Caliphate. For Imamites the legitimate authority must be designated - directly or indirectly - by God.
The second distinction that must be made, however, concerns the method of appointing a Caliph. Imami political theory maintains that there is only one legitimate means to designate authority; divine installation. Even the guardianship of just and capable jurists (faqih adil) is established upon this basis; they are the vicegerents of the absent Imam, whose divine leadership is established by explicit designation, and who implicitly entrusted them with the guardianship of his followers. All of this authority, of course, is bestowed by Almighty God who has absolute authority and guardianship over all of creation.
In rejecting the explicit appointment of a successor to the Prophet, Sunni Jurists maintain that there are several means by which a caliph may be elected, which means there is no unique way to legitimize political power. Instead, they accept the appointment of the first four caliphs following the Prophet’s death as a religious source to sanction political authority. Consequently, according to Sunni interpretations, a caliph may be elected either by a few of the elites (e.g. some outstanding companions of the Prophet), by the explicit designation of his predecessor, or by an appointed council (shura).
The fact that many of the contemporary political positions of that time had been secured by coercion and military power, created a serious obstacle for the theory of caliphate and many Sunni scholars attempted to find a means to justify these authorities. For example, Al-Mawardi attempted to legitimize the authority of de facto rulers by designating them as government ministers (wazir) and commanders (amir), whom the caliph had to recognize[31].
Finally, the third distinction arises, which is concerned with the qualities that a leader must possess. According to the doctrine of Shi’ism, an Imam is not merely a political leader; rather he is also a religious leader who undertakes the exposition of divine sciences. Like the Prophet, he must embody the highest moral and intellectual qualities, such as immunity from sin and infallible knowledge. However, there is a wide-ranging disagreement amongst Sunni scholars regarding the characteristics of a caliph. Commonly, they do not believe that a candidate must be sinless, or enjoy infallible knowledge. In some cases, justice and fairness are not considered necessary, and obedience is required of even an unjust or oppressive tyrant. Al-Ghazzali says:
An evil doing and barbarous Sultan, so long as he is supported by military force (shawka) so that he can only be deposed with difficulty, and that the attempt to depose him would create unendurable civil strife, must necessarily be left in possession, and obedience must be rendered to him[32].
A general and significant feature of Sunni political thinking is that there is no procedure for the people to depose an unjust ruler. Rather, the grounds on which he may be removed are considerably reduced. For instance, Al- Baghdadi (d. 1037) said that allegiance (Bay’a) might only be revoked on grounds of heresy, incapacitation, imprisonment or serious injustice; although the latter is not accepted as a cause for disobedience by most Sunni scholars[33].
Although Imami political theory does not require a Wali al- faqih to be sinless or infallible, it does mention characteristics such as justice, fairness and expertise in jurisprudence as necessary qualities. This is because the jurists (fuqaha) are not only moral and legal experts they are also representatives of the hidden Imam.
The Meaning of Wilayat al-Faqih
The words “Wali” and “Wilayat” have the same root (w-l-y). From it’s primary meaning of “to be near or close to someone or something”, is derived the general meanings “to be in charge”, “to govern” and “to exercise authority”. In Islamic juristic (fiqh) terminology, the term “Wilayat” has several usages. Some of these are as follow:
1. Wilayat al-Qaraba
This type of authority (Wilayat) is given to a father or paternal grandfather over minors and those who are insane (even after the age of adolescence). This authority to act as a guardian is based on relationship.
2. Wilayat al-qada’
According to Imami Jurisprudence, the infallible Imam originally possessed the sole authority to judge amongst the people based upon God’s law and revelation. At this time, however, a just and capable faqih may undertake this responsibility with the Imam’s permission.
3. Wilayat al-Hakim
In this case, authority is given to a regular administrator of justice (hakim), to supervise the interests of a person who is unable to take care of his own affairs; such as a fool or an insane person. Whoever does not have a guardian (Wali), jurists say: al-hakim is the guardian of those who have no guardian.
4. Wilayat al-Mutlaqa (The Absolute Authority)
According to textual evidences, such as verse 6 of Chapter 33 of the Qur’an, Imami scholars believe that the Prophet and Imams have divine authority over the people. The verse states that the Prophet has more rights over the believers than they have over themselves; thus his discretionary authority is effective amongst the people. This same authority, according to Shi’a beliefs, is also bestowed upon the Imams.
5. Wilayat al-Usuba
According to Sunni jurists, this authority is connected to inheritance; it encompasses a class of inheritors. This category of Wilayat is not accepted by Imami scholars.
According to Imami doctrine, absolute authority (Wilayat al- Mutlaqa al-Elahiya) remains with the Absent Imam, even during his greater occultation. Therefore, in order to exercise authority, every just and capable faqih requires the sanction of the Imam, who is in turn designated by God as the possessor of absolute authority and guardianship.
Although all Imami scholars generally agree upon the doctrine of Vicegerency (Niyabat) that emphasizes the role of capable jurists as deputies of the Absent Imam, who are entrusted with a degree of his authority. However, the crucial issue is the scope and extent of this vicegerency and in which affairs the jurists have authority.
In order to clarify the dimensions of this discussion, it is necessary to examine the traditional roles and functions that qualified jurists undertake as deputies of the Imam.
Making a Decree (Al-Ifta)
With regards to guidance in rulings and religious duties, it is necessary for those who lack sufficient knowledge of Islamic law and the legal system (Shari’ah) to refer to the opinions of a jurist (faqih). The jurist who issues legal and juridical decrees is known as a “Marja’a taqleed”, and the term meaning to follow or imitate their opinion is “taqleed”.
There is no disagreement amongst scholars regarding the application of this function by a well-qualified jurist. After all when a person has questions on a particular topic, it is only natural for them to refer these to an expert in this field, not only in the sphere of religion, but in all aspects of life. For this reason, although the jurist must possess certain qualities to assume this role, there is no need for the express permission of an Imam. In other words this function should not be mentioned as an example of the Imam ‘s authority and a type of Wilayat.
ii) To Judge (Al-Qada)
It is legally established that a just faqih is able to mediate disputes and judge in legal cases. Imamis believe that this function (Wilayat al-qada or al-hukuma) is encompassed within the Imam’s divine authority. Hence, only those who have his permission may assume this role. Imam as-Sadiq (pbuh) referred to the administration of justice (hukuma) as a constitutional right and duty of the Imam:
Beware of the Hukuma (administration of justice). Indeed, al-Hukuma belongs to the Imam who is knowledgeable in matters of judicial decisions (qada) and who is the just one (al-adil) among the Muslims, like the Prophet or his legatee[34].
Imami jurists commonly agree that this responsibility
(Wilayat al-qada) is entrusted to the just faqih as a deputy of the Imam.
Hisbiya Affairs (Al-Umur al-Hisbiya)
The Prophet (pbuh) said:
The sultan is the Wali of the one who does not have a Wali[35].
According to this hadith, the sultan is the guardian (Wali) of those who need a guardian to for a particular reason. For example, when the father of a minor or an insane person dies. Imami jurists extend this role to a set of affairs that require an authorized guardian to oversee them; these are known as al-umur al-hisbiya, and include religious endowments, inheritance and funerals (as well as those mentioned above). Although all Imami jurists accept the legality and necessity of this role, they disagree as to whether or not he is appointed by the Shari’ah or because he is naturally the best suited for the role. Some maintain that there is no expressed permission stemming from Islamic traditions to justify the authority of a jurist in such cases (hisbah). However, though the Shari’ah is silent, this does not mean that issues of hisbah do not need to be attended to. And a faqih who has knowledge of the Shari’ah and is just and pious, logically has priority over all others in these cases.
These three functions only form a fraction of the Imam’s authority; in the history of Imami Shi’ism, marja’aiyya (authorative reference) has largely been restricted to these central roles (especially the first). However, the religious authority and duties of an Imam as a guardian (Wali) extend far beyond the three functions mentioned above. Those who believe in universal vicegerency (Wilayat al-amma) maintain that the role of the faqih is not restricted to merely a few religious duties, but rather he has the same authority as the Imam. He has the right and duty to lead the Shi’a community and undertake the full function and responsibilities of an infallible Imam.
In addition to the administration of justice (Wilayat al-qada) and ‘hisbah’, the Imam also has the right to exercise governmental, juridical and economic duties. The political nature of these duties consequently implies that the Imam is the leader and ruler of Muslim society (Wilayat al-siyasiyya). Those who advocate Wilayat al-amma extend the scope of the faqih’s authority to the following duties:
1- Political- Devotional (Ibady) Orders and Prayers
Imami fuqaha emphasize that performing certain religious ceremonies, such as leading the prayers of Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr, in addition to the prayer of Jum’ah (Friday), can only be lead by an Imam or one who has been designated by Him. This view presupposes that leading the prayers is a political-religious position and a function of the true Imam. For instance, Shaykh al-Mufid[36] says:
It is well established that every imperfect being needs someone who can discipline him so that he will refrain from evil acts…He should also be the one who will protect Islamic territory and will assemble the people in order to convene the Jum'ah and the Eid prayers[37].
In addition, the formal affirmation of the new moon for religiously important occasions (e.g. Shawal for Eid al-Fitr), requires the endorsement of a just and capable Imam (Imam adil).
2-Legal Punishment (Hudud)
It is established in Islamic traditions that the application of legal punishment (hudud) requires the sanction of an Imam. Considering that some categories of legal punishment involve pain, injury or death, whoever is entrusted with this duty, must have the legitimate authority to deal with these issues. The administration of justice and application of legal punishment obviously require political authority, otherwise they are impossible to enforce both legitimately and consistently. Functions that involve the administration of justice, such as determining compensation (diyat), dividing inheritance and affairs such as retaliation (qisas), also belong to the Imam.
3 - Islamic Taxes
The collection and distribution of taxes is one of the most important functions of any government, therefore those who have the right to fulfil this duty also have political authority (Wilayat al-siyasiyya). Sunni jurists generally maintain that a sultan (deputy), who has political power, can receive taxes such as zakat. Imami fuqaha, on the other hand, believe that the Imam has the sole entitlement to receive Islamic taxes (zakat, sadaqa, kharaj) and decide how they should be spent.
4 - Jihad (Holy War) and Defense
Unlike a number of Sunni jurists, who consider fighting unbelievers for the expansion of the Islamic state as a form of “Jihad”. The scope of Jihad is not so broad amongst Imami jurists who, in order to prevent the abuse of this concept by corrupt political authorities, insist that the permission of the Imam is a necessary condition for Jihad. Shaykh Tusi says:
It is imperative that the Imam should be the one to commence Jihad against unbelievers (kuffar)[38].
Sachedina explains why there is no justification for Jihad without permission of the Imam in the Imami point of view:
The original purpose of Jihad, then according to the Imami, was not preserved under the Caliphate. What had caused the Jihad to drift away from the Qur’anic purpose was the coming to power of unjust and unrighteous authority claiming to undertake Jihad in the name of God. Of the two main purposes of Jihad, namely to call upon the people to respond to God’s guidance, and to protect the basic welfare of the community, the first purpose, according to all the Imami Jurists, required the presence of the just Imam or the person deputized by such an authority. This was to guarantee that Jihad against unbelievers was undertaken strictly for the cause of God[39].
These four categories of authority and function introduce an essential issue in determining the scope of a vicegerent’s authority. If an Imam has delegated his authority and duties entirely to a just and capable jurist (faqih) as his deputy during the period of greater occultation, the guardianship (Wilayat) of fuqaha would be universal (amma). Universal guardianship implies that the Islamic society is in need of a Wali to lead and organize it’s affairs, regardless of whether an infallible Imam is present or not.
Wilayat al-Faqih can be defined as an authority entrusted to learned fuqaha so that they may direct and advise the Muslim ummah in the absence of an infallible Imam. This authority is derived from the Imam, who is al-Hujjah (the proof of God), therefore it is incumbent to obey their commands as the only legitimate authority. However, there remains some ambiguity surrounding the scope of the authority (Wilayat) that has been delegated to the fuqaha.
The concept of Wilayat encompasses many degrees of authority. The highest form of authority (Wilayat) bestowed upon the faqih is the universal type (Wilayat al-amma), whereas the most basic form is embodied in the authority to undertake ‘hisbah’ and ‘qada’ (the administration of justice). Some people make the mistake of assuming that Wilayat al-faqih refers only to the universal authority, when in fact it refers to the total scope of the scholar’s vicegerency in the absence of an infallible Imam.
Some Misconceptions
At this point, it is necessary to address two common misconceptions surrounding Wilayat al-Faqih. Many people erroneously assume that it is something new and in essence distinguishable from the traditional status of marja’aiyya. This misunderstanding is caused by a lack of attention to the definitions of and the relationship between ‘Wilayat’ and ‘marja’aiyya’ and the distinction between ‘fatwa’ and ‘hukm’ (the commands of faqih as Wali).
The role of a marja’a taqleed is widely considered to be solely a juridical authority to whom the Muslim community may refer to in the case of religious questions and commandments concerning the practical side of Islam (fiqhi questions). However, this definition is not comprehensive; it concentrates exclusively on one of the legitimized functions of a jurist, while overlooking the others. As we mentioned previously, the faqih has at least three significant functions; as an expert in Islamic law and jurisprudence, he is entitled to undertake ‘ifta’. However, as an appointed deputy of the Imam, he has the authority (Wilayat) to exercise ‘hisbah’ and ‘qada’. Accordingly, every faqih is entitled to issue a decree (fatwa) and, at the same time, to be appointed as ‘Wali’ to undertake specific functions. When the jurist administers justice or acts as a legal guardian to a ‘mawla alayh’ (someone who is without a legal guardian) he is known as a ‘Wali’ or ‘hakim al-shar’ and when he is referred to in religious (fiqh) issues, he is usually called ‘marja’a taqleed’. A necessary distinction must be made between a ‘fatwa’ (decree) issued by a faqih in his capacity as a religious authority (marja’a) and a ‘hukm’ (order) issued by him as a Wali and ‘hakim’ (guardian or ruler).
A ‘fatwa’ is classified as a decree issued by the jurist based on his deductions from Islamic sources. He attempts to determine the position of the Shari’ah and divine commandments with regards to a specific issue, in which his opinion will be adopted by those who submit to his religious authority (muqalid). On the other hand, a ‘hukm’ is an order issued by a Wali regarding a particular set of circumstances, the Islamic legal system and interests of the Muslims. Therefore, it is not merely due to his deduction from a religious source, though he must respect the Shari’ah when issuing a hukm. The hukm is intended to effectively organize and resolve difficulties within Muslim society.
Another key issue concerns the relationship between the first function of the faqih, which is ifta, and the other duties that are subject to his Wilayat (guardianship). Theoretically, these two elements seem independent and entirely separable from one another, but can they really be disassociated?
Suppose that there were one hundred just and capable scholars, who fulfiled the qualities required to assume the role of Wali and marja’a. It is not obligatory upon all of them as an ‘individual duty’ (wajib al-ainy) to assume responsibility for all three functions of a faqih? The answer is negative. Performing these functions is a ‘sufficient necessary’ (wajib al-kefai), which means that if a number of them were to undertake these three duties, then the others would no longer be obliged to issue a ‘fatwa’, to judge or to act as a guardian (if the others are meeting the requirements of the community). In conclusion, although ever faqih potentially could become marja’a and Wali, only a few of them will effectively assume these functions.
At its highest degree, the universal vicegerency of the jurist (Wilayat al-amma) also encompasses political authority (Wilayat al-siyasiyya). Some adversaries of the doctrine maintain that the meaning of ‘Wilayat’ (guardianship) in Imami jurisprudence is essentially incompatible with political authority. They argue that, according to the Islamic legal system, ‘guardianship’ requires the existence of a ‘mawla alayh’ (one who is need of a guardian), which in definition refers to those who are impotent in their affairs, whereas political authority cannot presuppose that the subjects of a government fall into this category. Therefore the guardianship of a faqih is limited in scope and has no connection to political authority[40].
The term ‘Wilayat’ is used in two cases in the Qur’an and Islamic traditions; firstly there are circumstances when a ‘mawla alayh’ is unable to discharge his or her own affairs (in cases of insanity, incapacity or immaturity) – this is umur al-hisbah. The second involves the authority of the Imam to administer justice (Wilayat al-qada) and collect taxes. However this case does not presume any disability on behalf of the ‘mawla alayh’. Although people are generally able to manage their own private affairs, there remain matters in every society that require the existence of a reliable, credible and just authority to undertake and supervise them. The Qur’an introduces Allah, the Prophet and (according to the Shi’a perspective) the Imams as guardians (Wali) over the believers. Clearly these verses consider the believers (mawla alayh) in need of divine guidance and leadership, and not as impotents who need supervision in all of their personal affairs.
The authority and guardianship of the faqih is a social duty, which is delegated to them. Consequently it neither gives them an increased status in humanity, nor decreases the status of people who admit the guardianship of a just and capable faqih. Imam Khomeini says:
By authority we mean governance, the administration of the country and the implementation of the sacred laws of the Shari’ah. This constitutes a serious and difficult duty but does not earn anyone an extraordinary status or raise him above the level of common humanity. In other words, authority here has the meaning of a government, administration and execution of law, contrary to what many people believe, it is not a privilege but a grave responsibility[41].
The Historical Background
Universal guardianship (Wilayat al-amma) is undoubtedly the most fundamental element of Imami political doctrine in the era of occultation (ghaibat). Therefore, it is essential to understand what position the most learned Imami jurists have historically adopted regarding this concept. Moreover, it is often speciously conceived that Wilayat al-amma is a new development in Islamic thought, which has no origins amongst the early Imami jurists. However, a brief survey of its historical background in Imami jurisprudence reveals not only the weakness of this supposition, but it also illustrates that Wilayat al-amma is a concept widely endorsed by many outstanding jurists.
When examining a historical account of scientific studies, it is easy to overlook two important points. Firstly, we often assume that our predecessors approached a problem from the same perspective and with the same clarity as we do. However, this expectation is rarely validated with regards to debates on subjects such as politics, which encompass various dimensions that each constitutes an area of specialized research (such as philosophy and ideology).
Therefore it is hardly correct to suppose that political thinkers in the past necessarily followed the same problem or methodology as contemporary intellectuals. Secondly, although scholars today are freely able to write and express their own ideas, this often leads us to mistakenly expect that the social and political climate was the same for previous scholars, who in fact lived under illegitimate and often oppressive governments. They were thus often forced to practice precautionary dissimulation (taqiyyah) and were unable to explicitly state their opinions.
There are two strands of thought amongst the supporters of Wilayat al-amma. There are those who explicitly and directly insist that the vicegerency of a faqih is universal. While on the other hand, some scholars maintain that a learned jurist may be entrusted to undertake a number of duties in addition to the primary three of ifta, qada and hisbah.
The latter of these two opinions usually occurs in the early period of Shi’a jurisprudence. Until the emergence of the Safawid dynasty in Iran, the Shi’a community existed as a minority, without political power. Hence, the universal authority of a faqih, ruling and political jurisprudence had very little bearing on the circumstances of the Shi’a, which is why the fuqaha devoted less attention to discussing matters of political theory and the duties of a ruler.
When taking into account the opinions of these learned scholars, it is important to recognize that they not only state their personal opinion (ijtihad) concerning the scope a jurist‘s guardianship, but also maintain that this opinion is in accordance with the general consensus (ijmaa) of the Imami fuqaha. This reinforces the assumption that jurists who were historically silent regarding political issues, such as governance and universal authority, remained so due to the social and political circumstances of the time (taqiyyah).
Regarding the first school of thought regarding Wilayat al- amma, one of the most important Imami jurists, al- Muhaqqiq al-Karaki[42]says:
Imami fuqaha have consensus on the point that the fully qualified faqih, known as a mujtahid, is the deputy (nayib) of the infallible ones (peace be upon them) in all the affairs attendant upon the deputyship. Hence, it is obligatory to refer to him in litigation and accept his verdict. If necessary, he can sell the property of the party who refuses to pay what he is due...rather, if it were not for the Wilayat al-amma many of the Shi’a community’s affairs and needs would remain undone[43].
Shaykh Muhammad Hassan[44], The author of an encyclopedic work in Imami fiqh, ‘Jawahir al-Kalam’ writes:
…carrying out Islamic sentences and implementing religious injunctions is obligatory at the era of occultation. Being the deputy of the Imam (Pbuh) in many cases rests with the fuqaha. The faqih’s social status is the same as the Imam. There is no difference between him and the Imam (Pbuh) in this respect.
[The verdict of] Our fuqaha on this issue [is] unanimous; in their works they frequently underscore the idea of referring to a guardian/governor (hukm) who is the agent and representative of the Absent Imam. If the fuqaha are not to have the general vicegerency, all the affairs of the Shi’a will remain unattended. Those who surprisingly raise objections about the Wilayat al-amma of the faqih, then seem to be ignorant of jurisprudence and the words of the infallible ones; they have not pondered these words and their meanings[45].
Hajj Aqa Reza Hamedani[46] also maintains that Wilayat al- amma is a unanimous concept amongst Shi’a jurists:
In any case, there is no doubt that the fuqaha of integrity (Jame al-Sharayeti), who have all the perfect, necessary qualities to undertake the vicegerency are the deputy of the Imam of the time in such matters. Our fuqaha have testified to this in their works. Their statements indicate that they regard the vicegerency of faqih in all matters as indisputable so much so that some of them have taken consensus (Ijmaa) to be the pivotal proof of the faqih’s general guardianship (neyabat al-amma)[47].
As we discussed earlier, many jurists attribute duties to the faqih that require him to be entrusted with universal authority. The evidences regarding the appointment of a faqih as a deputy of them Imam cover many chapters of fiqh, the explanation of which would require many pages. However, in the interests of our discussion, we will examine only a few of them here. Shaykh al-Mufid (334-413 A.H) asserts that the application of legal punishment (hudud) is one of the key functions of a faqih:
It is the duty of the ruler of Islam (Sultan al-Islam) who is appointed by Almighty God to implement hudud. Sultan al-Islam is the infallible Imams from Muhammad’s (Pbuh) family or the rulers and governors (Hukm) who are designated by them. They have entrusted this duty to the fuqaha where possible.
Early Imami jurists applied titles such as ‘sultan al-Islam’, ‘hukm’ and ‘Wali’ to the Imams. Many of these, such as sultan al-Islam, originally belong to the infallibles (Prophet and Imams) and so seldom apply to others. However, the majority of them also refer to those who are the appointed deputies of the Imam as well. For instance, Fakhr al- Muhaqqiqeen[48] says:
The meaning of ‘hakim’ here is the just ruler (al- Sultan al-adil) or his deputy. When there is no access to the Sultan or his particular deputy, it is the role of a well-qualified faqih…so when the author (Allamah Hilli) says “when there is no hakim” he means by ‘hakim’ all these three [above][49].
Muhaqqiq al-Karaki also endorses the above interpretations of ‘hakim’. He writes:
In the era of occultation, the Imam’s general deputy (al-nayb al-amm) is the well qualified jurist…It should be noted that when the fuqaha use the term (hakim) unconditionally, it exclusively refers to a well qualified faqih[50].
It is important to remember that ‘judge’ is not synonymous with ‘hakim’. This is because the application and enforcement of legal punishments, in the view of Imami scholars, is delegated to the governor (hakim) and not the judge (qada). Hafs ibn Qiyas asked Imam as-Sadiq (pbuh): “Who is in charge of punishment, the ruler or a judge?” To which the Imam replied:
“The application of hudud is due to he whom has hukm (who governs)”[51].
This distinction clearly indicates that the application of legal punishments (hudud) requires full political authority; which in turn necessitates universal guardianship (Wilayat al- amma). A view that is supported by many Imami jurists, such as al-Karaki:
The reliable well qualified Jurist who can issue legal decisions is designated by the Imam. Accordingly his rulings are effective and it is obligatory to assist him in the administration of al-Hudud and al-qada, among the people. It is not proper to say that the Jurist is designated for administration of Justice and for giving legal decisions only, and that the Jum’ah prayer is a matter outside the scope of these two responsibilities. Such an opinion is extremely weak because the jurist has been appointed as al-hakim, by the Imams, which is well documented in the traditions[52].
As we discussed, the Jum’ah prayer is a political function, which, in the view of the Imami jurists, belongs to the Imam. Therefore, every Imami jurist who believes that the fuqaha are able to fulfil this function during the period of occultation (ghaibat), would also have admit to the validity of Wilayat al-amma.
Moreover, if the authority of the faqih is not confined to the role of legal arbitration and guardianship, then the Imami mujtahid may say that the fuqaha have the authority to collect Islamic taxes, which is an obvious indication of universal authority. The first shaheed (martyr)[53] says:
It is said that it is obligatory to give ‘zakat’ to the jurist during the occultation if he asks for it himself or through his agents because he is the deputy of the Imam, just as the collector of the taxes is. Rather, however, it is more appropriate to state that his vicegerency on behalf of the Imam is applicable in all those matters in which the Imam himself has authority; whereas the collector is the agent of the Imam only in a particular function[54].
The second shaheed[55] also believes that the Islamic taxes (zakat) should be delivered to the Imam, or to the trusted Jurist during occultation. He later explains why the zakat should be given to the faqih:
One must bear in mind that he (the faqih) is appointed in the interest of the public, and if he were to be dishonest there would occur harm to those who were entitled to receive the zakat[56].
In concluding the historical background of Wilayat al-amma, it is necessary to re-emphasize that this doctrine is widely supported by later Imami jurists. Who, explicitly and more clearly than their predecessors, support the universal authority of a faqih. A number of these jurists, and their works, are as follows:
(1) Mullah Ahmad al-Naraqi, in his work Awaid al- Ayyam, chapter ‘Wilayat al-fuqaha’, Page 529.
(2) Sayyid Mirfattah al-Maraqi in al-Anavin Page.355. Al-Bahr al-Ulum in Bolqatol al-Faqih, Volume 3, Page.231.
(3) Shaykh Abd al-Allah Mamaqani in Risala al-Anam fi hukm e-amwal al-Imam, Page 14.
(4) Mirza al-Nayyini in ‘Al-Makaseb wa al-Bai’, edited by Shaykh Muhammad Amali, Volume 1, Page 336.
(5) Sayyid Muhammad Hussain Borujerdi in al-Badr al-Zahir fi salat al-Jum’a, Page 71.
(6) Sayyid Muhammad Reza Gulpaayigani in ‘al- Hedaya ela man Lahu al-Wilayat, Page 46.
Multiplicity in Wilayat
Although according to Imami political doctrine, authority (Wilayat) is bestowed upon a deputy (Wali) by the infallible Imam, there is an important distinction between the specific designation of a deputy and the ‘general’ designation of a number of deputies.
While there was an explicit nomination for each of the Imams to undertake leadership, and for the vicegerency of the four deputies during the minor absence, the guardianship of the jurists during the greater absence is a ‘general’ designation. This means that no faqih is exclusively appointed as ‘Wali’ and deputy; all Imami jurists who are just and qualified in fiqh (ijtihad) have the right to exercise the Imam’s authority as his deputies. Accordingly, universal authority has been entrusted to many jurists in every age and generation. Inevitably, this multiplicity means that the Imami theory of leadership could be confronted by the problem of disturbances and conflict, as polarization between various sources of decision-making naturally results in differences and chaos. In the context of the present discussion, it is important to assess how the universal theory of guardianship might address such issues.
In most cases, multiplicity does not present any serious problem regarding the functions of the fuqaha. It is unrealistic to insist that all cases of ‘hisbah’ need to be undertaken by a single jurist. Likewise, there is no reason to expect uniformity in ‘Marja’aiyya’ and the administration of justice. The fundamental difficulty arising from multiplicity, however, is that of political authority and leadership (Wilayat al-siyasiyya).
The best way to approach this concern is to consider the status of the fuqaha who are entitled to political authority. Wilayat al-Faqih defines the criteria required of a ruler, and maintains that anyone who fulfils these qualities has the right to govern. In principal, authority (Wilayat) does not demand any extra conditions. However, to be practically applied such authority requires suitable political circumstances and the recognition of the people. According to Imami doctrine, if Muslims appoint a just and capable jurist as their leader, then other fuqaha are obliged to support him and obey his orders, so long as he fulfils the qualities of Wilayat. This situation is comparable to the relationship between judges; when one is responsible for a specific case, though other judges are entitled in principal to perform the same role, they have no right to interfere in his judgment. Shi’a traditions discuss the appointment of the fuqaha as deputies of the Imam, but they do not endorse or design a particular method to acknowledge or elect one or more jurists who possess the Wilayat. Article 107 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, suggests the following process:
The task of appointing the leader shall be vested with the experts elected by the people. The experts will review and consult among themselves concerning all the religious men possessing the qualifications specified in Article 5 and 109. In the event they find one of them better versed in Islamic regulations or in political and social issues or possessing general popularity…they shall elect him as the leader.
The Dominion of the Wali al-Faqih
When considering that Wilayat al-Faqih represents the keystone of Imami political doctrine in the Era of Greater Occultation, it is essential that we assess the scope and domain of its authority. For our present subject, we must take into account the power of other religious authorities amongst the Imamis; the marja’ai. Does the Wali al-Faqih have authority (Wilayat) only over those who accept him as their marja’a, or those who imitate marja’ai that support the idea of Wilayat al-amma?
Aside from the relationship between the Wali al-Faqih as a political leader and other fuqaha as marja’ai, it is also important to gauge the authority of the Wali al-Faqih regarding the Shari’ah. Is he only able to issue orders within the framework of the Islamic legal system, or is he fully authorized to make decisions even if they contradict the Shari’ah? In other words, is his license as a ruler defined by the Shari’ah, or is his authority above the Shari’ah and therefore absolute?
We can structure our analysis around two significant aspects; the people’s respect for his orders, and his respect for the Islamic legal system (Shari’ah). However, before proceeding with this discussion, we should review two important points.
Firstly, unlike Imamate, which is considered as a fundamental aspect of belief (aqueeda) in Shi’ism, Wilayat al-Faqih is a juridical (fiqh) subject matter. What distinguishes a fiqhi discussion from a theological (kalam) one, is that while the latter concerns issues of belief (disagreement upon which would render an individuals belief imperfect), the former is legal and thus subject to divergence of opinion even amongst the scholars of a particular Islamic sect (as disagreement in these issues does not invalidate belief). Hence, there can be disagreement on the universal authority of the jurist, as a juridical (fiqh) discussion and such disputes are not concerned with faith (iman).
Secondly, a necessary distinction must be made between a fatwa (religious decree) and hukm (order). As previously stated, a decree, deduced from Islamic sources and issued by a qualified faqih – fatwa – is valid and reliable for those who refer to him as their marja’a taqleed (religious authority), thus it is binding upon them to obey his fatwa. However, those who refer to other scholars as religious authorities are not obliged to observe this ruling. But an order (hukm) issued by the Wali al-Faqih is binding upon all Muslims, not merely his followers, regardless of how far his political authority might reach. Therefore, a command issued by a jurist as Wali al-qada in the administration of justice is obligatory for everyone, even other fuqaha, because the just and capable jurist is appointed as hakim (Wali). This opinion is supported by a tradition from Imam as-Sadiq (pbuh), in which Umar ibn Hanzala transmits that the Imam prohibited his followers (Shi’a) to recourse to a tyrannical or illegitimate authority (taghut) to resolve their affairs. Instead they are obliged to refer to one who relates the traditions of the Ahlul-Bayt and knows what is lawful and prohibited (i.e. a faqih). Imam as-Sadiq (pbuh) said:
I have appointed him a hakim over you. If such a person orders (judges) according to our ruling and the person concerned does not accept it, then he has shown contempt for the ruling of God and rejects us; and he who rejects us, actually rejects Allah and such a person is close to association [Shirk] with Allah[57].
In this tradition, Imam as-Sadiq (pbuh) addresses the role of a just faqih (hakim) who has been entrusted with authority by the infallible Imam. According to this hadith, the people are not allowed to recourse to an illegitimate or oppressive authority for the resolution of their problems. Instead they are required to refer to the Wali (hakim) and obey his decisions, regardless of whether or not he is their marja’a taqleed.
Such as solution, however, hardly seems convincing for those who do not accept Wilayat al-amma. One might argue that the Wali al-Faqih issues commands (hukm) based upon his own opinion (fatwa) that the authority of the jurist is universal (Wilayat al-amma), while according to the view of another marja’a the scope of a jurists authority is limited and he is not designated to undertake political affairs. According to this view, the tradition of Umar ibn Hanzala and others do not include these kinds of orders.
However, this reasoning presents obvious problems that extend far beyond the governmental orders (hukm) of a jurist. For instance, when administering justice (Wilayat al- qada) a faqih issues an order according to his own religious decree (fatwa), however there is no excuse for people to disregard or disobey his command on the grounds that he is not their marja’a. This is because the authority to judge (al- qada) and the authority to issue decrees (al-ifta) are independent of one another, thus the role of the judge cannot be infringed by the edict of a marja’a (as the marja’a is not the judge of that legal case). Furthermore, although the opponents of Wilayat al-amma maintain that the designation of the faqih as the Imam’s deputy does not extend to political authority (Wilayat al-siyasiyya), this surely cannot imply that if the people elect a just and capable faqih as their leader, instead of an unjust person, that his leadership is some how illegitimate and people are free to disobey. We will return to this point in the next chapter when examining the authority of a faqih endorsed by ‘hisbah’.
We noted earlier that the debate surrounding the authority of the Wali al-Faqih has two significant aspects. The second of these – the relationship between the faqih’s commands and Shari’ah – is a very new discussion in Imami political jurisprudence, whereas the first aspect has been discussed by many fuqaha. Imam Khomeini was perhaps the first Imami faqih who explicitly and publicly discussed the connection between governmental orders (ahkam al-hukmati) and Islamic laws (ahkam al-shari’). He firmly advocated the absolute authority of the faqih (Wilayat al-mutlaqa) and it is essential that we briefly clarify the definition of this term to avoid any misconceptions.
Al-Wilayat al-Mutlaqa
When one first encounters the idea that a jurist has an unlimited and absolute scope of authority (Wilayat al- mutlaqa) in issuing governmental orders, it is easy to dismiss the model of political regime as “absolutism”, which is defined in the Oxford political dictionary as follows:
Originally (1733) a theological concept referring to God's total power to decide about salvation. Extended to politics indicating a regime in which the ruler might legitimately decide anything. Usually applied to monarchical regimes of the early modern period[58].
This misinterpretation often leads to the false assumption that there are no controls, restrictions or limitations upon the powers of the faqih; his authority is unquestionable and he can exert himself without regard to the demands of the Shari’ah or the interests of his people. He has no duty to respect the various kinds criteria and standards for his governance.
This is similar to a dictatorial model of government, which is an absolute rule unrestricted by law, constitution or other political, religious or moral factors within the society and state. Clearly this interpretation of absolute authority is not correct even when considering the Prophet (pbuh) and the Infallible Imams. A faqih as Wali must meet certain criteria, one of which is justice.
The above conception of Wilayat al-mutlaqa obviously contradicts the idea of justice and such a person has no legitimate authority (Wilayat) over believers. The precise and correct understanding of ‘Wilayat al-mutlaqa’ has a close relationship to discussion about the nature and various kinds of ‘command’ (hukm) in Imami Jurisprudence, especially the faqih’s injunction as Wali (al-hukm al-hukmati) and its position among commands of Shari’ah.
i) Divine Laws (Al-Hukm as-Shari’)
This refers to a set of rules and commands legislated by God and expressed to people through the Prophet Muhammad and his successors. Hukm al-Shari’ is usually divided by Muslim Jurists into two divisions. The first part is called ‘al- ahkam al-taklifi’ which is the laws of duty and in turn divides into five divisions (obligation, prohibition, desirability, undesirability and permissibility or ‘mubah’). The second part is called ‘al-ahkam al-waz'i’ which establishes specific relationships and situations (waz') that are subject to particular divine laws. For instance, marriage, ownership, purity and uncleanness are all situations that the Islamic legal system endorses and defines in particular matters and circumstances - usually al-hukm al-waz'i is subject to particular laws of duty. Divine laws also are called the first order laws (al-ahkam al-aWaliya) because deeds and things by themselves - with no regard to temporal and unexpected accidents - are subjects to these laws and legislation of Islam.
ii) The Judge's Command (Al-Hukm al-Qadi)
Even though the legal decision of Judge (faqih) is issued with consideration of the Shari’ah and decrees of Islam, it is not a component of the Shari’ah. The judge’s role is merely the execution (tanfidh) and application of Islamic law to juridical cases. In administration of justice, the faqih as Judge does not deduce Islamic laws rather he attempts to apply the most appropriate laws to the situation.
iii) Governmental Orders (Al-Hukm al-Wilai)
Supporters of universal authority (Wilayat al-amma) do not restrict the orders (hukm) of the faqih to merely the administration of justice. As a hakim, the jurist may issue orders and it is incumbent upon all Muslims, even other fuqaha, to obey them. These include his edicts concerning the beginning of Ramadhan or the application of legal penalties (hudud). The best examples of orders that fall into this category are the governmental commands that the faqih may issue as the political leader of a society. The Wali al- faqih may issue orders regarding situations that he recognizes as affecting the interests of Islam, Muslims and Islamic laws and values. A situation may arise in which the Wali al-Faqih can issue an order based on the interest (maslahat) of the people, even though in principal the action would not otherwise be compulsory in Shari’ah.
Two crucial questions arise regarding these orders. The first concerns the nature of the order; whether the governmental command is categorized as the ‘first order’ of the Shari’ah, or as the ‘second order’ (al-akham as-sanavy). The second question concerns the scope of such orders. A faqih may issue an obligatory or prohibitive order regarding matters that are considered permissible (mubah) and for which there is no prior obligation (for doing or not doing it) in Islamic law. However, a dispute arises about whether or not the faqih may issue orders that disregard the commands of the Shari’ah. Since the answer to the latter of these questions emerges from the former, it is necessary to explain what we mean by ‘second order’ commands (akham as-sanavy).
iv) Al-Hukm al-Awaly and al-Hukm al-Sanavy
The actions that we commit according to our free will are subject to one of the following categories in Shari’ah, namely obligation (wajib), prohibition (haraam), desirability (mustahab), undesirability (makruh) and simple permissibility (mubah). These ‘first order’ laws (al-ahkam al-awaly) are determined by the law giver (hakim) upon considering the essence and natural status of deeds and things. However, in exceptional situations and under circumstances in which people should not or cannot respect previous legislations, new rulings must be issued. These temporal laws are legislated according to the demands made by exceptional situations, and are called laws of 'the second order'(al-ahkam al sanavy).
They are secondary and temporal because people must revert to obeying the first order laws as soon as the exceptional circumstances return to normal. For instance, according to Shari’ah it is not permissible for Muslims to eat “carrion” (dead animals) or the meat of animals not ritually slaughtered. It is a first order command, but in a dire situation when a person has nothing to eat at all, God permits him or her to eat such meat, this permission is a second order law. The Qur’an says:
He has only forbidden you what dies of itself, and blood, and flesh of swine, and that over which any other (name) other than (that of) Allah has been invoked, but whoever is driven to necessity, not desiring, nor exceeding the limit, no sin shall be upon him. [Chapter 2, Verse 173]
Fuqaha usually cite ‘necessity’ (ezterar), damage (zarar), distress and constriction (usr wa haraj), disorder of the Muslim's system (ekhtelal al-nidham) and compulsion (ekrah) as the major exceptional topics that demand and require second order laws, as reasons for reverting to laws of ‘the second order’. The prevailing conception amongst Imami Jurists emphasizes that the governmental orders should be issued by the faqih only in one of the aforementioned exceptional situations because al-hukm al- hukmati is but a second order command.
When we consider this opinion, the answer to the second question – which is the relationship between governmental order and Shari’ah - is very clear. In a normal situation, the faqih has no right to issue orders in opposition to obligatory (either haraam or wajib) first order laws, even if the interests (maslahat) of the Muslims demands thus. In other words, interest as such cannot justify governmental orders when they are on the contrary with Islamic obligatory laws.
However, situations in which the interest (maslahat) becomes so serious that ignorance of it could cause significant damage, distress and constriction or disorder, would allow the Wali al-Faqih to issue these orders.
Ayatollah Khomeini, in a revolutionary view, stated that although the implementation of Shari’ah is very important, it is not the ultimate goal. Islamic laws (Shari’ah) serve as a means to achieve the primary aim embodied in the protection of Islam and the extension of Justice. For him the Islamic State is not merely one part of Islam amongst others, but it is Islam itself. Consequently the significance of Islamic laws is overshadowed by the significance of protecting the Islamic system and the interest (maslahat) of Islam. He expressed the view during his lectures in Iraq - the seminary of Najaf - years before the Islamic Revolution in Iran.
After the Islamic Revolution in Iran he explored this view more explicitly. In his famous letter to Ayatollah Khamenei (the current Wali al-Faqih), he insists that the authority of the Prophet and Imams to govern is not only a first order divine law but also it has priority over others such as praying, fasting, Hajj and so on. He writes:
The government or the absolute guardianship (al- Wilayat al-mutlaqa) that is delegated to the noblest messenger of Allah is the most important divine laws and has priority over all other ordinances of the law. If the powers of the government restricted to the framework of ordinances of the law then the delegation of the authority to the Prophet would be a senseless phenomenon. I have to say that government is a branch of the Prophet's absolute Wilayat and one of the primary (first order) rules of Islam that has priority over all ordinances of the law even praying, fasting and Hajj...The Islamic State could prevent implementation of everything - devotional and non- devotional - that so long as it seems against Islam's interests[59].
Unlike conditional authority (Wilayat al-muqayada) that restricts the right of the faqih for issuing governmental orders solely in permissibility cases (mubahat), Wilayat al- mutlaqa, by definition, is a juridical view concerning the dominion of the just faqih to issue governmental orders even if it is in opposition with some obligatory Islamic laws.
As has become clear from the current discussion, the meaning of Wilayat al-mutlaqa is totally different from ‘absolutism’ and the establishment of a totalitarian and dictatorial government. Some qualifications and conditions are essential for the Wali al-Faqih such as justice, piety and the necessary socio-political perspicacity. So, if he fails to meet one of them, he will be dismissed. In the constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran a group of experts elected by people supervise and control the leader. This constitution in article 111 says:
Whenever the leader becomes incapable of fulfiling his constitutional duties, or loses one of the qualifications mentioned in Article 5 and 109, or it becomes known that he did not possess some of the qualifications initially, he will be dismissed. The authority of determination in this matter with the experts specified in Article 108.
As I indicated before, in Imami Political Jurisprudence ‘Wilayat al-mutlaqa’ is a new term. Imami fuqaha usually use other terms such as ‘Wilayat al-amma’ and ‘neyabat al- Amma’ to refer to the authority of faqih. Imam Khomeini applied the term publicly, then in 1990 it was enshrined in the constitution of Islamic Iran. Article 57 says:
The power of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute religious leader and the leadership of the ummah.
Wilayat al-Faqih and other Ideas of Guardianship
Perhaps Plato was the first political theorist who presented a comprehensive guardianship model of government. In the ‘Republic’, he states that political knowledge is a supreme art that aims to realize the good of the community. Attaining that knowledge requires serious training. Thus, men and women must be carefully selected and rigorously trained in order to achieve excellence in the art and science of politics. This serious training renders a few of them a class of ‘true philosophers’[60], who deserve to rule the society.
Therefore, the ideal Republic will come into existence if a class of guardians (Philosopher Kings) rules over it.
In the history of political thought, various interpretations of the guardianship model of the State have been suggested, Marxist-Leninism and all the political ideologies which believe in an organized group of revolutionaries, a vanguard, who possess the sufficient knowledge and commitment to overcome capitalism and to lead the working class to establish a socialist and non-class society are samples of the guardianship political theory.
Obviously, Shi’a political doctrine should be categorized as a guardianship model of government because it believes that only those who have specific qualifications (infallible ones or their deputies) have a right to govern the community. For Imamism the problem of leadership is not the question of people’s elections. People have to accept and believe in divinely designated leadership just like the Prophecy in order for it to be practical. Since the fuqaha are generally designated as guardians, the role of the people within the period of occultation increases. They have a duty to acknowledge their governor among the fuqaha directly or through a selected group of fuqaha. Nevertheless, this participation of people does not render Wilayat al-Faqih a purely democratic and non-guardianship theory of State. Robert Dahl is quite right when he states that:
No single interpretation can do justice to the variations among the many different visions of guardianship[61].
However, what he mentions at the beginning of his discussion could be recognized as the central point of the vision of guardianship:
The assumption by democrats that ordinary people are qualified, they, (advocates of guardianship) say ought to be replaced by the opposing proposition that rulership should be entrusted to a minority of persons who are specially qualified to govern by reason of their superior knowledge and virtue[62].
Indeed, the theory of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’, which is in embodied in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the first actual experience of Shi’a political ideology, is mixed between guardianship and democracy. While the authority of the faqih and the supervision of Islamic laws and values over all political and social functions of the government emphasise the guardianship dimension of this political system, the approval of representative democracy and the participation of people in electing members of the Assembly of Experts (who choose and can remove the Wilayat al-Faqih’), parliament, president and many parts and local
councils, show the democratic aspect of this political ideology. Article56 of the constitution emphasizes people’s sovereignty:
Absolute sovereignty over the word and man belongs to God, and it is He who has made man master of his own social destiny. No one can deprive man of this Divine right, nor subordinate it to the vested interests of a particular individual or group. The people are to exercise this Divine right in the manner specified in the following Article.
This chapter aimed to clarify the conception of Wilayat al-faqih and its historical background amongst Imami jurists. The next chapter will concentrate on the problem of justification and examine how the advocates of this political theory legitimize it.
Notes:
[18] Abdul-Karim Shahrestany, Al-Melal wal-Nehal, Cairo, 1956, volume 1, p. 131.
[19] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p. 41.
[20] Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, Hamid Algar (tr), Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, p. 86.
[21]Lewis writes: ‘vali and vilayat are the Turkish pronunciation of the active participle and verbal noun of the Arabic root w-l-y, ‘to be near’ and hence ‘to take charge of’; they mean respectively, governor, and governorship or province’. Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, The University of Chicago Press, 1988, no. 22, p. 123.
[22]For more information about the verse and some debates that have arisen by the verse among Shi’a and Sunni scholars refer to: Abdul Husayn Sharafud-Din, Al-Muraja’at, Yasin T. al-Jibouri (tr), World Ahlul Bayt Islamic League (WABIL), pp. 173-180.
[23] Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought, pp. 32-33.
[24] Ibn Assir, Al-Nehaya, Volume 1, p. 315
[25] Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought, p. 33.
[26] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p. 84.
[27] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p. 87.
[28] The paragraph is translated in: Ann K. S Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 85.
[29] Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, p.134.
[30] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p. 94.
[31] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p.88.
[32] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p.104.
[33] Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p.85.
[34] Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Just Ruler, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 129.
[35] Muhammad Baqer Majlesi, Behar al-Anwar (110 volumes), Tehran, 1985, Kitab al-Elm, Chapter 1, Hadith 29.
[36] Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Nu’man, known as Mufid is one of the greatest Imami faqih and theologian. He was born in Dujal, some sixty miles from Baghdad, in the year 949 or 950AD. His basic and elementary training and studies was under his father. He went to Baghdad at the age of twelve. Among his books in fiqh is al-Muqni’a, on which Tusi wrote a commentary-Tahdhib al-Ahkam (one of the four major books of Imami Shi°ism).
[37] Shaykh Al-Mufid, Al-Ershad, Tehran, 1972, p. 674.
[38] Muhammad ibn Hassan Tusi, Al-Mabsut fi Fiqh al Imamiya, Tehran, 1958, Volume 2, p. 9.
[39] Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Just Ruler, p. 110.
[40] Mehdi Haery Yazdi, Hekmat wa Hokumat, p. 177.
[41] Islam and Revolution, pp. 62-63.
[42] Ali ibn Abd al-A’l who is better known as Muhaqqiq al-Karaki or even the second Muhaqqiq-researcher- (after Helli who is famous as the first Muhaqqiq in fiqh) died in 937/1530. He was originally from Jabal Amel, south Lebanon. He like the first and the second shahid (martyr) completed his studies in Sham and Iraq and different centers of Sunni learning before coming to Iran during the reign of the Safavid denasty (Shah Tahmasb). In this period of Iran‘s history the authority of Imami scholars had been increased and Karaki had a great status in administration of justice. He established a great seminary (Hawza) in Qazvin and Isfahan consequently Iran once again became center of Imami jurisprudence. One of his famous books in fiqh is ‘Jame ul-Maqasid’ which is a commentary on the book of Allama al Helli-Qawaid.
[43] The articles (al-Rasayel) of Mhaqqiq al-Karaki, edited by Muhammad al-Hassun, the first collection (Al Ressala fi al-Salat ul-Jom’a), Qom, 1409AH, pp, 142, 143.
[44] He was of Arab descent and died in 1849. Shaikh Muhammad spent thirty years to complete his great work (al-Jawahir) which the last print of the book in Iran includes forty three volumes. It is a commentary on the book of Muhaqqiq al-Helli (al-Sharay‘).
[45] Muhammad Hassan, Jawahir al-Kalam, Tehran: Dar al-Kotob al- Islamiya, 1398AH, Volume 21, pp. 396-397.
[46] Died in 1904 the author of some significant books in Imami jurisprudence such as ‘Mesbah al-Faqih.
[47] Hajj Aqa Reza Hamedani, Mesbah al-Faqih, The Chapter of Khums, Volume 14, p. 291.
[48] He is Muhammad the son of Allama Helli. His famous book on fiqh is ‘Eidhah al-Fawaid’ which is a commentary of his father ‘s book (al- Qawaid). He died in 771AH.
[49] Fakhr al-Muhaqqiqeen, Eidhah al-Fawaid, Volume 2, p.624.
[50] Al-Jami ul-Maqasid, Volume 11, Kitab ul-wasaya, pp. 266-267.
[51] Shaikh Hur al-A’meli, Muhammad ibn Hassan, Wasael al-Shi°a, Qom: Ahl ul-Bait Institution, 1412 AH, Volume18, p. 220
[52] The Just Ruler, p. 196.
[53] He is Muhammad ibn Makki who was born in south Lebanon-Jabal Amil- in 734AH. Fakhr ul-Mohaqqeqin was one of his teachers. He was martyred as a result of a fatwa issued by a Maliki jurist, supported by Shafei, in the year 786.He has written some significant books in fiqh such as ‘Luma’h’, ‘Durrus’, ‘Dhikra’ and ‘Bayan’.
[54] Translated in ‘The Just Ruler’ from Jawaher al- Kalam, Volume 15, p. 422.
[55] Shaikh Zain ul-Din is one of greatest Shi°a jurists. He was born in 911 AH and was expert in Sunni jurisprudence as well. One of his important works is a commentary on the first Shaheed’s work (Luma’h) and it is a strange coincidence that the author and the commentator both were executed and martyred.
[56] Translated in ‘The Just Ruler’ from Jawaher al- Kalam, Volume 15, p. 422.
[57] Muhammad ibn Hassan al-Tusi, Tahzib al-Ahkam, Kitab ul-Qad’a, Volume 6, p. 218, Hadith 514
[58] Iain McLean, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 1.
[59] Sahife’ Noor (letters and lectures of Ayatollah Khomeini), Volume 20, p. 170.
[60] Grube maintains that Plato does not mean by ‘philosopher king’ the professional sense that at present the word ‘philosopher’ purport, he says: ‘Plato does not mean that the world should be ruled by pale metaphysicians from the remoteness of their studies, he is maintaining that a statesman needs to be a thinker, a lover of truth, beauty and the Good, with a highly developed sense of values’. Plato, Plato’s Republic, G.M.A. Grube (tr), Indianapolis, 1974, n 13, p.133.
[61] Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, Yale University Press, 1989, p 55.
[62] Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, Yale University Press, 1989, p. 52.
Author: Ahmed Vaezy
Source: al-islam.org
Islam’s capability of meeting all human needs
After proving that Islam has social laws and decrees, certain skeptical questions are raised: Is it rationally possible for all human needs in different eras to be contained in a single set? Can Islam whose sources are the Qur’an and authentic traditions, encompass all the elements needed by mankind throughout the different epochs and periods? The above questions have both theoretical and practical aspects and can be examined in both ways. Of course, it must be acknowledged that these questions are worthy of consideration. At the outset, it seems that answering them is not easy. However, in view of the explanations we have presented before, replying is not that difficult.
1. Examining the theoretical dimension of questions
The reply to the theoretical dimension of the question, “How can a set of laws be responsive to all human needs in all aspects of life?” is this: Certainly, human beings cannot enact a set of perfect laws for mankind in different epochs and periods because on account of their defective knowledge and intellectual limitation, they cannot examine all the facets and dimensions of human life and take into account an appropriate law for every case.
However, the One who has created human beings, knows “what was” [ma kana] and “what will be” [ma yakun], to whom yesterday, today and tomorrow are the same, is Omniscient of thousands of years before and after, it is possible to enact such a code of laws. Thus, it cannot be said that it is impossible to enact a code of perfect laws for all humanity throughout history that encompasses all aspects of human life, because the One who has full knowledge of the past and future and is well informed of all dimensions of man’s existence throughout history can do so.
2. Examining the practical dimension of questions
The practical dimension of the questions is this: “How can the essential elements attributed to God as mentioned in the Qur’an and authentic traditions—given their limited magnitude—meet all human needs throughout these epochs and periods?” The reply is this: It is impossible for us to present a specific law for every case in which all particular conditions of time and space are perfectly observed. This is because legal cases do not need limited laws. They favor laws of a general nature.
We cannot determine all legal cases as special and definite cases. It can thus be said: “Innumerable cases do not have innumerable categories.” Every set of these cases can have a general heading and the said heading can have a specific decree. So, “The general decree is fixed and limited but its cases are innumerable and varied.”
A case at a particular time may consist of a decree and assume a different form in a different time and condition and the ruling for it may change. So, issues and changes that take place in them are diverse and numerous, but the limited general headings are fixed. It is true that the aspects of human life are vast and regularly increasing on a daily basis. With the advancement and progress of human civilization and social living, new issues and concerns emerge all of which are in need of specific laws which address all needs. Yet, all these variable laws can have specific criteria. With the permission of the One who has sent down the general laws and taught their general criteria, those who recognize these criteria in fixed expressions can enact specific laws on specific cases.
By saying that the laws of Islam must be implemented in society, we do not only mean laws directly revealed by God in the Qur’an because these laws in the Qur’an are mentioned in general and absolute terms. What we mean is that the Prophet (s), the infallible Imams (‘a) and those who are acquainted with the spirit of these laws, are well-informed of the criteria and can distinguish the general laws from particular cases and determine the manifestations, ways of application and rulings of these general divine laws.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: Imam reza network
Islam and Theory of Separation of Powers
In this session our discussion is about the structure and form of the Islamic government. Along this line, I deem it proper to narrate a recollection from the Great Leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Hadhrat Imam Khomeini (q). During the beginning of the Revolution foreign reporters asked the Imam, “After overthrowing the monarchical government, what government and regime will you establish?” He replied, “A government like that of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a)”.
Defining and describing the Islamic government to reporters with a particular culture and social fabric and no mental preparation to grasp Islamic concepts in view of their fundamental differences with us in this context, required many hours. Yet, the Imam gave them a complete and convincing answer in one sentence, because by knowing the distinctive features of the government of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a)—which is known to both friends and foes, and to know which does not require much extensive study and examination—the model of our government could also be known.
This type of explanation and definition, i.e. evidential definition, is the simplest way of describing the nature of a thing to the masses because understanding intricate concepts is difficult for them, so by indicating external manifestations and samples, they understand better. For example, in order to explain electricity, we show them an electric light or an electric device. In this type of definition, the characteristics, properties and salient features of a thing are not mentioned. In the academic and scientific circles, however, the definition must be derived from the principal or secondary features which describe the genus and quality mentioned in logic. In this kind of definition, initially the general and broad meaning is mentioned and then the specific meaning that excludes other types.
Another way of identifying the nature of a thing is to consider the elements. That is, the essentials and features of a thing are examined and their totality serves as the definition of that thing. In view of the number and scope of the essentials and features, any person will conclude that any thing having those features has the nature under consideration.
The macrostructure of the Islamic government and its basic features, or the Islamic theory on politics can be defined in one sentence. The Islamic theory on politics is: all aspects of politics and government are divine, and inspired by the Source of revelation. This point determines the Islamic nature of the system and government.
In describing comprehensively the Islamic government it is necessary to consider the theory of separation of powers mentioned in the philosophy of law. During the last centuries there were intense disputes and conflicts among legal philosophers over concentration or separation of powers. These were on whether all powers should be in the hands of an individual or group, or powers should be separated from one another and every person or group should be concerned with only one power.
Finally, after the Renaissance, particularly after Montesquieu—who wrote a major treatise entitled “The Spirit of the Laws” (1748) in which he emphasized separation of powers—legal philosophers arrived at a consensus on separation of powers and their three divisions, viz. the legislative, the judicial and the executive. These were considered as the main branches of democratic and popular governments.[53][81] For each of the powers a distinct realm and area was taken into account so that none of the powers was authorized to interfere and meddle in another’s domain and their independence officially recognized. After the separation of powers, a definition was presented for each of them. We shall briefly mention their functions below:
1. Legislative power
One of the important pillars of government is the legislative. In view of the continuous change in social life and the need to formulate appropriate laws for every change, a group of individuals sit together, and, after discussion and deliberation, enact laws and regulations for the management of society, which are official and binding.
2. Judicial power
After the codification of laws and their official recognition and accreditation, there is a need to consider a branch of government and apparatus to adapt general laws to particular cases, to identify rights and duties, and to remove differences and disputes. In case of a dispute among citizens, or among organs, or between the citizens and the government, as well as in relation to the violation of the rights of people, the only authorized agency to adjudicate, attend to and adapt laws to those cases is the judicial power. Mere ratification of laws in parliament cannot solve any problem, because in times of dispute and discord, everyone deems himself rightful and interprets the law in his favor.
3. Executive power
Undoubtedly, In order to achieve its objectives, society is in need of law, but all people do not observe the laws. In fact, there are various motives to violate them. The law needs an executive power which possesses sufficient clout to implement the rules and regulations. The executive power is expected to implement laws, deter violations and implement judicial decrees passed in judicial courts. Along this line, if naked force is needed to implement laws and punish violators and criminals, disciplinary forces can be employed.
We briefly stated the theory of separation of powers in democratic and popular systems. We do not intend to explain the Islamic viewpoint on the theory of separation of powers but we deem it necessary to note that in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the principle of separation of powers has been accepted, while the principle of wilayah al-faqih, which emanates from the Islamic nature of the system, serves as the point of connection between the powers. Legitimacy of powers in the Islamic system lies in the Islamic and divine structure, and in a sense in their connection to the Origin of creation, but wilayah al-faqih is the system’s link to God and its basis of legitimacy.
Once we talk about the enactment and implementation of laws in the realm of Islamic political system and claim that the aggregate of approved laws and rules should be Islamic and religious, we make it clear that Islam is concerned not only with issues pertaining to prayer and fasting, worship and supplication, but it is a comprehensive code of life that embraces social law, corporate law, civil law, commercial law, international law and other laws needed by society.
Thus, as principle and rule, we have accepted that Islam has social laws that bind the government to regard them as credible and strive to implement them. According to Islam if a government neither regards the laws of Islam as credible, nor strives to implement them, it is an illegitimate government.
Skepticism on alleged impotence of Islam in social administration
Here the expressed skepticism is that man is increasingly in need of ample new laws. Indisputably, in the text of the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet (s) and the sayings of the pure Imams (‘a) not all the laws addressing the needs of the day can be found. Nowadays, man needs a set of laws whose subjects did not exist during the early period of Islam, for which specific rulings need to be issued.
For example, let us consider the laws pertaining to airspace and the air jurisdiction of countries. Does an airplane have the right to enter the air jurisdiction of another country with the permission of its authorities or not? Such laws basically do not exist in the Qur’an, the Prophet’s Sunnah and sayings of the Ahl al-Bayt (‘a) because at the time, there was no airplane to be discussed.
The same applies to traffic and driving rules as there was no car at the time as well as laws on seas and outer space and other subjects and there is a need for legal experts and legislators to enact appropriate laws for them after thorough examination and contemplation.
Given the fact that the said laws that address all needs of society do not exist in the Qur’an and the Sunnah, how can it be claimed that Islamic and divine laws must be implemented in society when in fact Islam has no law in so many areas?!
Society is in dire need of such laws, which we cannot find in Islamic sources. What options do we have? How can we consider ourselves as bound by Islamic laws?
What has been mentioned made those who have no faith in Islam express skepticism in religious laws as impractical and insufficient to administer society, and suggest more efforts be exerted on enacting and implementing man-made laws. In order to portray the subject as confusing and complicated, they expressed the above skepticism in various forms, and people also exacerbated it for different motives.
Undoubtedly, their goal is to undermine the Islamic government and to inculcate the notion that Islam cannot administer society. Therefore, the plant if the Islamic Revolution and Islamic government and emphasis on it is futile and the idea of “Islamization” of the government should be forgotten, because it is not feasible. Unfortunately, some sympathizers of the Islamic Revolution and followers of Islam have also been influenced by this skepticism. It is necessary to present an appropriate reply so that, they remain faithful to Islamic laws, and find solutions to cases in which society needs a law which has no precedence in Islamic sources.
Types of laws and necessity of enacting variable laws
In reply to the above skepticism, it is necessary to explain at the outset that law has a general and broad meaning which also includes natural laws such as laws on physics, Lavoisier’s[54][82] law on chemistry, Newton’s law of gravity and Einstein’s law of relativity. This group of laws that exist in nature and can be empirically proved are discovered by scientists and are not enacted. These fixed and actual laws are related to natural phenomena, and have nothing to do with legal, political and social laws.
Similarly, we are not referring to rational laws such as laws on logic, philosophy and mathematics. We are referring to enacted laws which are technically called “conventional laws” [qawanin-e i‘tibari]. Of these laws those that are credible and can be implemented, provided they are enacted by a credible authority, can be divided into three types:
1. The constitution
Constitution means a set of relatively permanent laws codified by competent authorities for a country in accordance with its culture and traditions. These relatively permanent laws are binding for a long period and considered as the basis and foundation of managing society. In view of their relative permanence and immunity from regular changes, these laws are general and limited; thus, the constitution of every country consists of some basic and important articles.
As such, in the constitution there is no room for detailed and specific laws which cover extensive and diverse needs, and are subject to amendment with the emergence of new circumstances. The Constitution is general and permanent in nature and detailed laws are not included in it except those detailed and limited laws which, on account of their importance and special status, give stability to it.
2. Laws ratified by parliament
The second type refers to the laws ratified in the Majlis or parliament. Since some countries have another house of legislation called senate or any other term, in addition to parliament, the laws ratified by the said house of legislation are also included in this type of laws. In our country, apart from the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) which passes bills needed to administer the country, the Council of Guardians, which is similar more or less to the Senate in other countries and to a constitutional court and consists of a group of jurists and legal experts, conforms the bills ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly with the Constitution and religious law. In case of inconsistency with the Constitution and the religious law, it refers these ratified bills back to the Majlis for review.
3. Laws ratified by cabinet
In addition to the laws ratified by parliament, in every country there are binding rules and regulations ratified by other organs, for example, the executive orders issued by the cabinet (executive branch). The constitution has rested authority to the cabinet to ratify laws in specific cases. Similarly, in certain cases the president can also personally take decisions. These executive orders and presidential decrees need not be submitted to parliament for ratification as they are automatically deemed legally binding. Also, bylaws and circulars approved by concerned authorities and officially communicated to offices and executive offices are also called laws and the government is bound to implement them.
Thus, in our country as in some other countries there are three types of laws: (1) constitutional, (2) legislative; laws ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) or parliament, and (3) executive orders, presidential decrees, bylaws and circulars approved by authorities legally authorized to do so.
At no time and nowhere in the world are these laws and bylaws ratified all at once; in view of changing circumstances, statutory laws and executive orders are amended and reviewed. Today, circumstances may require the Islamic Consultative Assembly to enact a law, and tomorrow circumstances may change and the said law might be amended and reviewed. In this manner, executive orders have to be amended and reviewed with change of circumstances. Also, when a new president assumes office, it is his prerogative to amend or annul previous executive orders.
Of course, those whose primary concern is the interest of society try their best to codify orders with utmost care to ensure that they are devoid of all possible errors. Naturally, when we say that the laws must be Islamic, it does not mean that all laws ranging from the Constitution to the statutory laws and executive orders must be explicitly derived from the Qur’an.
Meaning of Islamic nature of laws
In explaining the meaning of the Islamic nature of laws and orders, it is important to pay attention to the process of enacting common laws. For example, in codifying and approving bylaws and orders the cabinet or executive power must act within the perimeter determined for it by the Islamic Consultative Assembly and not go beyond it. In other words, the extent of the executive power’s prerogatives has been stipulated by the Constitution and the Majlis’s statutory laws, and the executive orders should be within this framework.
These orders should manifest the generalities reflected in the Constitution and the laws ratified by the Majlis. Thus, initially, generalities are described in the Constitution and statutory laws whose meanings the cabinet or the concerned authority in certain cases has to interpret within the framework of executive orders. The cabinet cannot act unconditionally on its own without any frame of reference. In fact, its executive orders must be within the framework of the Constitution and laws ratified by the Majlis.
The laws ratified by the Majlis, in turn, must be approved and endorsed by the Council of Guardians. That is, the Majlis must also act within the framework of the Constitution and in this way, its ratified laws will be considered credible, enjoying executive guarantee. Therefore, the credibility of executive orders and their being binding depend on their conformity with the Majlis’s statutory laws and the credibility of statutory laws means that they are within the framework of the conditional law of the country.
The credibility of the Constitution of the Islamic system is based on its consistency with the legislative will of God the Exalted. As such, the entire laws and decrees have a linear relationship and they are credible, provided that this hierarchy is observed in such a manner that it ends up in Islam and the legislative will of God. It is not in the sense that all the executive orders, circulars and statutory laws can be explicitly found in the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Since God delegated certain prerogatives to the Holy Prophet (s) to promulgate specific laws and decrees in certain cases, these laws and decrees are credible and binding because they are based on the permission and will of God. It is obligatory to obey and act upon them on account of the decree of God on the necessity of obeying and following him. Under the aegis of this decree of God, the laws and orders promulgated by the Messenger of Allah (s) are credible and, at the same time, it is obligatory on others to obey and act upon them; otherwise, merely to obey the orders of the Messenger of Allah (s) without divine sanction is not obligatory.
So, the laws which God, the Exalted, has directly enacted and explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an occupy the foremost degree and are intrinsically credible. The laws enacted by the Holy Prophet (s) in certain cases by God’s leave occupy the next degree and their credibility is equal to that of God’s command. Similarly, the credibility of the laws which the infallible Imam (‘a) enacts and the orders he gives emanate from the decree of God because God and the Prophet (s) consider it obligatory to obey the Imam.
Now, assuming that we were living in an Islamic territory under the reign of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), we would have considered it incumbent upon us to obey him. If the Imam (‘a) appointed a person like Malik al-Ashtar as the governor in our region saying, “Act upon his orders and do not defy them, for whoever obeys him actually obeys me,” the mere orders of Malik al-Ashtar would not be binding for the people because he was like other people, but obedience to him would have been obligatory and his orders binding because he was designated as governor by the infallible Imam (‘a) who, in turn, had been designated by God through the Prophet (s), and to obey him would be wajib.
However, laws and orders issued by a governor, designated by an infallible Imam, are considered laws of a third degree. As an analogy, the governor is like an appointed official whom the Islamic Consultative Assembly has granted powers on the basis of which he has authority to issue circulars and instructions, and on account of those delegated powers, his orders are binding. Similarly, the Majlis has acquired its credibility from the Constitution and its statutory laws acquire credibility under the auspices of the Constitution.
The credibility of the constitution in other countries emanates from the will of the people. But we believe in a higher station and reference with respect to the Constitution. We believe that the credibility of the constitution should emanate from the will of God, and the Prophet (s), an infallible Imam (‘a) or any person like Malik al-Ashtar, designated by one of the infallible Imams (‘a), has to endorse it. Therefore, the credibility of law should emanate from the words of God, the Prophet (s), an infallible Imam (‘a), and then any person designated by an infallible Imam. This is the logic and theory of Islam.
In the time of occultation [ghaybah] of the infallible Imam, since the wali al-faqih has been chosen through a general designation by the infallible Imam, his wilayah is endorsed by the Imam and acquired credibility, thus, his approval is the source of credibility of the constitution; otherwise, the constitution by itself is questionable. It is debatable as to where its credibility emanates from and who has the right to amend it. On what basis does a minority that has not voted for a certain law abide by it? And there are many other questions. However, when we say that this law has been declared credible by one formally designated by the infallible Imam, there is no room for any more questions.
Process of legislation in the Islamic government
It is clear in the theory of Islamic government that the original credibility of law comes from God, and the words of anyone, like the Prophet (s), who is credited by God, become binding. In turn, the words of anyone who is designated by the Prophet (s), or the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), are equally binding. Similarly, the laws and decrees issued by anyone who is designated by the infallible Imam (‘a) through a general or specific appointment shall be Islamic and sacred because they have been approved by God.
Of course, as we have said, in the Islamic government this approval may take different intervals. The credibility of approval of the wali al-faqih emanates from the approval of and endorsement by the infallible Imam (‘a) and the credibility of decrees and approval of the infallible Imam, in turn, emanates from the approval of and endorsement by the Prophet (s). Finally, credibility of the Prophet’s approval is confirmed through an explicit text [nass] of the Qur’an where God says:
يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَطِيعُوا اللّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَأُوْلِي الأَمْرِ مِنكُمْ...
“O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Apostle and those vested with authority among you...”[55][83]
and in another verse:
النَّبِيُّ أَوْلَى بِالْمُؤْمِنِينَ مِنْ أَنفُسِهِمْ...
“The Prophet is closer to the faithful than their own souls….”[56][84]
Thus, the aforementioned link has a perfectly logical foundation for the members of an Islamic society and those who believe in the truthfulness of God, the Prophet (s) and the infallible Imams (‘a). As we have expounded earlier, we have to talk on the basis of our audience’s convictions and beliefs and through their language. For this reason, if a person does not believe in God and in the truthfulness of the Messenger of Allah (s), or is doubtful of the infallible Imam (‘a), we need to discuss this issue in a different way.
Initially, we have to deal with the fundamental and essential principles of Islam, and then after proving them, tackle other subjects, including political and administrative issues, on the basis of those principles. Of course, this form of legislation, or the other usual forms can also be examined on the basis of their value for the benefit of society.
Legal status delegated in the Islamic government
In the Islamic political theory, besides the fact that all principles of law must be enacted by God, all laws and orders be approved by Him, the Messenger of Allah (s), an infallible Imam, or his general or specific successor, the implementer of the law also has to be designated by God to acquire credibility through this system of guardianship. (The judicial organ also has an executive function; it must be regarded a righteous reference authority in cases of disputes and differences and check the law prior to its implementation. Therefore, an independent and special status has been given to it.)
At the time when the Prophet (s) or an infallible Imam was present, he had to personally hold the reigns of government or designate someone to implement the law; for example, Hadrat ‘Ali (‘a) appointed Malik al-Ashtar as the governor of Egypt in order to implement the law there. However, in this period of ghaybah when the people have no access to the infallible Imam (‘a), the responsibility of implementing the law lies on the shoulders of the one who has been appointed by the infallible Imam through a general designation, and this will lead us to the theory of wilayah al-faqih about which we will discuss later, God willing.
It should now be clear that in Islamic political theory and administrative structure, just as the law should be linked to God, the implementer of the law should also be linked to God and be appointed by God either through a general or specific designation.
The judicial organ should be equally linked to God and the judge should be appointed by God either through direct, or indirect and general designation. In either case, if the judge has no link whatsoever to God, his decree shall have no credit at all. The Holy Qur’an has pointed out God’s direct designation of Hadrat Dawud (David) (‘a) to judge among men:
يَا دَاوُودُ إِنَّا جَعَلْنَاكَ خَلِيفَةً فِي الْأَرْضِ فَاحْكُم بَيْنَ النَّاسِ بِالْحَقِّ...
“O David! Indeed We have made you a vicegerent on the earth. So judge between the people with justice….”[57][85]
And regarding the Prophet of Islam (s), it says:
إِنَّا أَنزَلْنَا إِلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ بِالْحَقِّ لِتَحْكُمَ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ بِمَا أَرَاكَ اللّهُ
“Indeed We have sent down to you the Book with the truth, so that you may judge between the people by what Allah has shown you.” [58][86]
It also states:
فَلاَ وَرَبِّكَ لاَ يُؤْمِنُونَ حَتَّىَ يُحَكِّمُوكَ فِيمَا شَجَرَ بَيْنَهُمْ...
“But no, by your Lord! They will not believe until they make you a judge in their disputes.”[59][87]
In sum, in the Islamic political theory, sovereignty, legislation and the administration of society in all its dimensions and aspects must emanate from the legislative will of God.
Notes:
[60][81] Sometimes, in contrast to the common term “government” applied to the three powers, “government” is only applied to the executive power. Of course, this is a specific term which is used in limited cases. Usually, “government” is used in its common and broad meaning.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: al-islam.org
Station of Politics in Islam
In order to make clear whether or not the Qur’an talks about politics, we present an unequivocal definition of politics. Politics means the method of administering or organizing the society in such a manner that its interests and desires are realized. In simpler terms, politics means the rule of statecraft. What we mean by politics is not ‘real politic’, the concept with negative connotations, which is linked with chicanery, trickery, scam, and deception.
In the sphere of politics and statecraft, since the time of Montesquieu[4][13] the administrative body has been seen to be composed of three powers, viz. the legislative, executive and judicial. The function of the legislative body is the enactment of laws and decrees for the administration of society and formulation of rules of behavior for the people under different circumstances, in such a manner that justice is implemented, order prevails in society, and the rights of individual is not trampled upon. In general, society moves toward reform. The function of the executive body, the cabinet, is the implementation of laws and regulations enacted by the legislative body. The function of the judicial body is to adapt general laws and cases to particular and special cases and adjudicate and pass judgment on the disputes and differences among people.
Considering the above classification and functions mentioned for each of the powers, the opinion of Islam and the Qur’an about the station and legitimacy of the three powers must be examined. Do the Qur’an and Islam have specific orders and laws in these domains? It must, however, be noted that by “laws” we mean social laws and decrees, (not personal laws) whose existence in religion no one doubts.
The social laws include civil, penal, commercial, political and international laws. Once we take a glance at the Qur’an, we discover that all kinds of laws in the world for the administration of society, and the management of international relations can be found therein. Apart from the fact that civil laws; decrees on marriage and divorce; laws on trade, transactions, mortgage, loan and the like can be found in the Qur’an (which proves that issues on statecraft, like enactment and presentation of laws for the administration of society are taken into account in Islam), a special right for the Prophet (s) has been stipulated in the Qur’an to enact laws and decrees on particular cases based on circumstances of time and space, and the faithful are duty-bound to act upon the laws issued by the Messenger of Allah (s): “A faithful man or woman may not, when Allah and His Apostle have decided on a matter, have any option in their matter.”[5][14]
In this noble verse, the faithful have been deprived of the option to violate the decision of God and His Prophet (s).
Thus, apart from the orders of God and fixed divine laws, laws enacted by the Prophet (s) are also binding on all those living within the jurisdiction of the Islamic government. No one has the right to question these laws because whoever opposes them does not regard the Prophet as an emissary of God. We have no business with such a person. He who believes in the Prophet’s (s) right of legislation being delegated to him by God, but disputes about a truth, we will argue with him according to verses of the Qur’an.
Therefore, the Qur’an does not say, “An unbelieving man or woman may not…” but rather “A faithful man or woman may not…”As such, just as every ‘faithful’ living under the Islamic government acknowledges the apostleship of the Prophet (s) and regards the laws of God as necessary to follow, he should equally regard the orders of the Prophet (s) as necessary to follow. The necessity to follow God and His wilayah over all the faithful is established by such noble verses as: “The Prophet is closer to the faithful than their own souls...”[6][15]
According to the Qur’an, therefore, both the highest level of implementation of law and the right of legislation have been delegated to the Messenger of Allah (s). Whether or not such a right and station is also established for anyone other than the Messenger of Allah must be dealt with elsewhere. Presently, our concern is whether Islam has an opinion about politics or not.
Judicial laws in the Qur’an
Meanwhile, concerning the issue of judging after adapting general divine laws to cases where there is a dispute and discord among people, God says: “But no, by your Lord! They will not believe until they make you a judge in their disputes, then do not find within their hearts any dissent to your verdict and submit in full submission.”[7][16]
In the above verse, not only is the right of adjudication confirmed for the Messenger of Allah (s), but the acceptance of and acting upon his adjudication and verdict has been regarded as a requisite of faith. This point is accompanied by a very emphatic oath—“In their disputes the people must definitely make you the judge and arbiter, and after you pass a judgment they should not nurse any dissent and dissatisfaction in their hearts but should accept the judgment with full submission and obedience. Otherwise, they will not be truly faithful.
The true faithful is one who, if the Islamic court issues a decree against him, accepts it with open arms, realizing the possibility that his right is violated because the judge passes the verdict on the basis of external means of rendering justice, which the Messenger of Allah (s) explained thus: “Verily, I judge among you on the basis of proof and testimony.”[8][17] The testimony of a witness who is outwardly just is accepted although he might have lied in his testimony or committed an error therein. If everyone does not act upon the verdict of the judge, no progress can be made and the system will collapse.
What can be deduced from the Qur’an on penal matters, such as blood-money [diyah], qisas,[9][18] ta‘zirat,[10][19] and the like, testify that Islam is highly involved in politics, administrative affairs and society. Islam has gone to the extent of taking into account hudud[11][20] for criminals and corruptors in certain cases and of authorizing the judge to implement them even if there is no specific complainant. In such cases divine limits and rights have been violated and sometimes punishments are difficult to endure and accept. For example, the Qur’an says that in an Islamic society if an illegitimate relationship between a man and a woman is proved before the judge through the statements of four witnesses, both of them must receive a hundred lashes, and the Qur’an particularly admonishes the judge not to be influenced by emotion and have pity on them: “As for the fornicatress and the fornicator, strike each of them a hundred lashes, and let not pity for them overcome you in Allah’s law...”[12][21]
Undoubtedly, by implementing such a punishment the person will be disgraced, but society will acquire immunity. Regarding theft the Qur’an says: “As for the thief, man and woman, cut off their hands as a requital for what they have earned. [That is] an exemplary punishment from Allah and Allah is All-mighty, All-wise.”[13][22]
We conclude that the Noble Qur’an mentions adjudication, enactment of rules and regulations to preserve social order and secure the interests of society, and implement the hudud and ta‘zirat[14][23] rights of the Messenger of Allah (s). For a fair-minded person there will remain no doubt about Islam’s involvement in sociopolitical issues if he refers to the Qur’an as well as the authentic traditions of the Prophet (s) and the infallible Imams (‘a). Those who stubbornly deny these truths have chosen to do so no matter what the proof.
Universality of Islam and station of Islamic ruler
Apart from clearly explaining major political issues, the rule of statecraft, enactment of laws, their adaptation to particular cases, and their implementation, the Qur’an also clearly explains secondary and minor issues such as mentioning the months of the year, for example: “Indeed the number of the months with Allah is twelve months in Allah’s Book, the day when He created the heavens and the earth. Of these, four are sacred. That is the upright religion…”[15][24]
In the above verse, the division of the year into twelve months has been mentioned as an intrinsic and fixed affair in harmony with the system of creation. Mentioning such affairs in religion has been regarded as a symbol of its firmness, correctness and reliability. Regarding the sighting of the crescent moon, the Qur’an also says: “They question you concerning the new moons. Say, ‘They are timekeeping signs for the people and [for the sake of] Hajj’...”[16][25]
Social and devotional laws are in harmony with the system of creation. In addition, many legal laws have connected the beginning of the lunar month of Ramadhan, commencement of the Hajj season and other devotional laws with the sighting of the new moon. These are because the Qur’an basically presents religion as concordant with the nature [fitrah] and system of creation: “So set your heart on the religion as a people of pure faith, the origination of Allah according to which He originated mankind. There is no altering Allah’s creation...”[17][26]
Once the divine and religious laws are divinely codified, they are unchangeable. There are also changeable laws that depend on particular circumstances of time and space. To identify and deal with these laws has been delegated to the duly competent jurist who has acquired his legitimacy and authority from God. In the Qur’an this privilege and designation has been considered for the Messenger of Allah (s).
According to the Shi‘ah creed, the pure Imams (‘a) who have also been indicated in the Qur’an, have the same designation, which has been passed on to the wali al-faqih, which issue will be tackled at its appropriate time. Of course, a religion may exist in the world which is concordant with the above notion and outlook, but it is not within the scope of our discussion. We are talking about a religion which is even expected to state and determine the months of the year. In the area of transactions and financial relations among people, it clearly states that if a person gives a loan to another, he must ask for a receipt from him and give the loan in the presence of two witnesses.
If it is not possible to get a receipt and find witnesses, he has to take a retained pledge or mortgage a valuable thing in lieu of the loan.[18][27] We believe that such a religion has a program concerning politics and statecraft besides meeting the material and spiritual needs of people.
During the previous session, while rejecting that religion is only concerned with organizing the relationship between man and God, we said that religion, in its true sense, means the divine manifestation of human life. Such religion encompasses not only a portion of human life and behavior such as worship and the performance of devotional rites, but it embraces the totality of human life and the entire aspect of his existence.
He is created to organize his life in such a way that he attains eternal felicity by conforming all aspects of his life to the Divine will and commands. Thus, direct worship of God and conventional devotion are only a part of our religious duties. Our other mental and behavioral aspects of life must be in line with the will of God and they must somehow assume a form of worship [‘ibadah] so that the sublime and lofty goal of human creation can be realized: “I did not create the jinn and humans except that they may worship Me.”[19][28]
The purport of the verse is that the perfection of man is only possible under the aegis of worship and devotion to God. Therefore, all his movements and pauses must be within this framework. Even his breathing must be according to this program. If the life of a person acquires this divine baptism and color, and is attuned with this program, it means that he is truly religious. On the contrary, if he totally refuses to worship God, he is certainly irreligious and an infidel. Between these two frontiers, viz. the frontier of true religiosity and the frontier of infidelity, there are those, a portion of whose lives is not in conformity with the will of God and are, therefore, not truly worshipping God.
The religion of this group is surely defective. In view of the variety of religious deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that those who are truly religious and observe the divine laws in all facets of their lives, and those who observe only a portion of the laws are not on equal footing. Also, religiosity and faith has basically different levels and can grow and be perfect. As the Qur’an says: “As for those who are [rightly] guided, He enhances their guidance, and invests them with their God-wariness.”[20][29]
Elsewhere, it says: “The faithful are only those whose hearts tremble [with awe] when Allah is mentioned, and when His signs are recited to them, they (Allah’s signs) increase their faith.”[21][30]
Yes, there are those, whose faith is constantly moving toward perfection and they reach the highest level of faith and come closer to the station of the awliya’ [saints] of Allah, and even be included among the awliya’ of Allah. On the contrary, there are those who are moving backward from the station of religiosity. By listening and paying attention to the doubts spread by the foreigners and their admirers in the cultural domain of society, many abandon the religion they learned from their father, mother and teacher. This is because paying attention to the doubts will lead willy-nilly to misguidance of those who do not possess the ability to assess and study matters. In this regard, the Qur’an says: “Certainly He has sent down to you in the Book that when you hear Allah’s signs being disbelieved and derided, do not sit with them until they engage in some other discourse, or else you [too] will be like them.”[22][31]
Man has to first increase his learning as well as intellectual and rational foundation and empower himself with experience, analysis and response. He may then listen to doubt and skepticism. But the person who does not have the power to deal with the doubts should not place himself in the danger of misguidance by listening to doubts. Islam does not say that you should not enter the arena of wrestling. It says that you should wrestle with an opponent of equal weight and if you want to wrestle with a heavyweight opponent, you should first increase your weight and extend your training. Islam does not say that you should not listen to others’ words and misgivings.
It rather says that the attention paid to them should commensurate with the extent of your experience, analysis and discernment. First of all, one has to acquire divine gnosis [ma‘rifah] and learn the art of responding to doubts. Thereafter, one should discuss religion with others and listen to their statements so that they do not disarm you and impose their opinion on you.
Separation of religion and politics an extra-religious outlook
In propounding the separation of religion and politics, they say that they have consulted the Qur’an and are examining it through extra-religious lens. Before examining the sources of Islam and considering what the Qur’an says about politics, they pose this question: In essence, what is man’s need for religion? In what issues does he need religion to guide him? Regarding this matter, they have considered two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that in everything and in all aspects of life man is in need of religion. Things such as the way of preparing and consuming food, the way of acquiring and building a house, the way of contracting marriage, and forming a society and government are all the same.
They ask: Should religion solve all these problems and man no longer engage in scientific research? Should we have maximum expectation from religion and consult it for all information? Whenever we want to buy clothes, we need to see what Islam says about it. Whenever we want to eat food, we have to check which food Islam suggests. Whenever we want to consult a doctor, we need to know what Islam advises. Also, we have to find out what religion says about forming a government. Their other hypothesis is that religion has limited jurisdiction and we should have minimum expectation from it. Obviously, religion has an opinion in all matters needed by man, but no religion ever claims that it provides for all the needs of man.
After finding out that religion does not teach us the methods of cooking, curing diseases, engineering, and building airplanes and ships, the distinction between the issues dealt by and not dealt by religion must be examined, and in which areas and spheres religion has been involved. They arrive at the conclusion that religion is concerned only with affairs related to the hereafter and has nothing to do with worldly affairs, and that we should have the least expectation from religion. From religion we should only search for the path of eternal salvation and the means and ways that will make us enter paradise and save us from hell. We should learn from religion how to pray, how to fast, how to perform the Hajj pilgrimage, and other matters related to the hereafter.
They assume that they have solved the issue concerning the relationship between religion and politics by demarcating them and separating the jurisdiction of religion from that of politics. It has been stated that politics belongs to mundane affairs while religion is only related to the hereafter. Neither should religion interfere in the domain of politics nor should politics interfere in the domain of religion. Only knowledge and human accomplishments should interfere in politics which deals with the jurisdiction of this world and science. Fields such as physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, psychology, and sociology belong to the domain of science. Religion has nothing to do with them. Religion is only involved in matters pertaining to the hereafter.
The origin of this issue can be traced back to many centuries in the West. When there was conflict and dispute between the ecclesiastical authorities and the men of science and politics it led to wars and clashes between them, and finally to an unwritten peace. They agreed amongst themselves that religion should deal solely with otherworldly affairs and the relationship between man and God; the sole jurisdiction of mundane affairs i.e. political, social and academic, should be left to statesmen and scientists.
This happened in the West. Those who are impressed with the West suggest that such a division of labor also be done in our Islamic country. Religion should only be in the hands of religious scholars and interfere in otherworldly affairs only. Religion and the religious scholars should not meddle in worldly affairs. Politics should, therefore, be entrusted to the political scientists and statesmen, and not to the fuqaha and ‘ulama’. In this regard, many speeches are being delivered and lots of articles being written. In proving their theory, they leave no stone unturned in inculcating this notion in the minds of our youth, that the religion and politics are apart.
Unfortunately, some of those who are engaged in cultural affairs are unconsciously influenced by this notion and other cultural waves of the West. It is gradually being accepted that religion is the opposite of politics. Religion solves a part of human problems but worldly problems have nothing to do with religion. Erroneous and deviant ideas of our writers, orators and cultural figures pose serious threats to our religious culture.
Close-knit connection between this world and the hereafter
The fact of the matter is that our life is divided into this world and the hereafter. That is, we have a period of life which commences at our birth and ends at our death. Then, the second part of our life begins on entering purgatory [‘alam al-barzakh] and facing resurrection.[23][32] This division of life does not necessarily mean that our actions and behavior in this world shall be divided into two and viewed from two perspectives. At any rate, we are in the world of action. Religion is revealed to guide our actions in the world, through a series of commandments and ordinances.
Thus, the religious commandments are not only for after death. It is not correct to say that a portion of our fifty or sixty year-long lives is related to the hereafter while another portion is related to this world. Rather, we have nothing in this world which is not related to the hereafter. All our actions in this world automatically assume an otherworldly form. That is, our actions here may be beneficial or harmful for us in the hereafter. Since our actions affect our otherworldly lives, the religious and Islamic view is that life in the hereafter is settled in this very world: “Today is the time for action and not for reckoning while tomorrow is the time for reckoning and not for action,”[24][33] and “This world is the sowing ground for the hereafter.”[25][34]
So, we will reap in the hereafter the fruit and product of whatever we sow in this world. It is not correct to say that our worldly life is alien to our otherworldly life; that a part of our actions are related to the life in this world while another part is related to the hereafter; and that we have two distinct spheres of life for this world and the hereafter. Instead, all our actions in this world such as breathing, blinking, walking, sitting, rising, looking, social intercourse, speaking, listening, eating, marital relationship, and government-people relationship can be such that ensure our felicity in the hereafter, or bring harm to us. It is true that the style of cooking and consumption of food are related to this world but the same act of eating can send us to paradise, or throw us into hellfire: “Indeed those who consume the property of orphans wrongfully only ingest fire into their bellies, and soon they will enter the Blaze.”[26][35]
Anyone who fills his stomach with the property of orphans eats food and enjoys doing so, but the food he eats will become chastisement of the hell for him. Similarly, if a person eats food for the sake of worshipping God, the same act of eating will have a spiritual reward. The same word that a person utters for the sake of pleasing God will be a tree growing in paradise for him. The Holy Prophet (s) said to his companions: “For anyone who recites tasbihat al-arba‘ah[27][36] God gives him a tree that grows in paradise.” Some said: “So, we shall have many trees in paradise because we recite this dhikr [remembrance of God] frequently.” He said, “Yes, provided that you do not kindle fire to consume them.”
Thus, once our actions are done for the sake of pleasing God, they will bring about eternal felicity and rewards, and if they are done against the order of God, they will be the cause of perdition and chastisement in hell. It is not correct to say that our lives have two distinct divisions; one of which is related to the hereafter and is spent in the mosque, church, synagogue, and temple, while another part is related to this world and to ourselves and has nothing to do with the hereafter.
As we have said, this erroneous thinking was prevalent for the past centuries in the West among the followers of certain religions and occupied the minds of many in spite of the fact that neither Islam nor any other revealed religion ever endorsed such a notion. The contention of true religion is that man is created in order to secure his own felicity or perdition, and that his eternal felicity or perdition, as the case may be, lies in his behavior in this world. If his behavior is consistent with the command of God, he will attain eternal bliss, and, if otherwise, he will incur everlasting damnation.
The “minimalist” view on the question of expectation from religion is the result of a fallacy they committed. They imagined that expecting the maximum from religion meant they would have to seek all the information about everything from religion, including the style of cooking food and building a house, which information religion could not provide, so they said that they should not expect the maximum from religion. This is fallacious because the above issue does not have only two options. It has a third option which is the correct one, and that is, we do not expect that religion to say something about everything, including the manner of eating food, wearing clothes and building a house. No one has such a claim. However, since religion has left many issues to the realm of non-religious sciences, the same issues actually belong to the jurisdiction of religion. In this way, they acquire ideological value.
Ideological baptism of actions in this world
Once we consider the life in this world as linked to the life in the hereafter and believe that the totality of man’s actions and behavior plays a role in his perfection or downfall, it will acquire ideological value and we will give religion the right to judge each action. In simpler terms, religion informs us about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of our actions and not the manner of performing them.
Religion says that eating certain foods is unlawful [haram] and sinful. For example, eating pork and drinking wine are haram, but to say something about the manner of making wine and breeding pig is none of the business of religion. The reason behind religious permissions and prohibitions is their positive or negative effects in the otherworldly life of man, and it states the moral value of every action.
In other words, the path of man toward perfection begins from a point toward infinity. That which is useful for our perfection and provides the ground for the spiritual advancement of man is proportionate to the degree of wajib, mustahabb [recommended] or at least mubah [permissible] acts performed. The performance of haram and, to a lower degree, makruh [abominable] acts will keep him away from his true perfection and God. So, religion does not say what food to eat or how to cook it and how to build a house.
However, it says that you should not build a house on usurped land or you should not build a house in such a way that it overlooks the house of another and invades his privacy. It also says that you should build your house with halal income and not out of money earned through usury [riba’]. In reality, religion mentions the ideological manner of building a house. It also invites us to consume foods that are effective in our human and spiritual growth and avoid unlawful foods, alcoholic beverages, and narcotic drugs, which are unhealthy for us: “O you who have faith! Indeed wine, gambling, idols and the divining arrows are abominations of Satan’s doing, so avoid them, so that you may be felicitous. Indeed Satan seeks to cast enmity and hatred among you through wine and gambling, and to hinder you from the remembrance of Allah.”[28][37]
Hence, the permission and prohibition of religion is meant to expound the ideological value of all actions. To sum up apart from the worldly outcome of actions, religion also speaks about every action’s contribution to the doer’s admission to paradise or entrance to hell.
Radiant capability of intellect in discerning value of actions
The ideological value of action from the perspective of permissibility or prohibition is sometimes so clear and unambiguous that the human intellect can discern it well and there is no longer need for religion to state its ruling about it. In fact, the intellect alone can identify the decree of God. As such, concerning “rational independence” [mustaqillat al-‘aqliyyah], the fuqaha have said that in some cases the intellect can independently give a judgment and know the goodness [husn] or badness [qubh] of actions. Through the use of the intellect, we discern that the will of God is in the performance or abandonment of an act; we discern that God is pleased or displeased with a certain act.
Our intellect understands that taking out a slice of bread from the mouth of an orphan is an abhorrent act. In this regard, there is no need to state the religious ruling of law, though sometimes, in addition to the discernment of the intellect, the Qur’an and ahadith have also mentioned the religious rulings which actually confirm the judgment of the intellect. In most cases, nonetheless, the intellect does not possess the capability to understand that a certain action (depending on its being positive or negative, and how valuable) is obligatory [wajib], prohibited [haram], recommended [mustahabb], abominable [makruh], or permissible [mubah]. It is at this point that religion has to state the type and degree of impact of a certain act on our ultimate perfection.
Jurisdiction of Religion
Once we observe the commandments of religion, we will realize that the jurisdiction of religion is not restricted to personal matters. It rather deals with social issues such as those related to family, marriage, divorce, and commerce, and states the scope of halal and haram and their ideological values. By stating the ideological value of those things, religion actually explains their orientation—which form will lead toward God and which will incline toward Satan. This is something which science is incapable of dealing with.
Science mentions the amount and kind of elements needed to form different things and enumerates the physical and chemical properties, but it does not state how to use things in order to secure the real success of man. In this case, religion has to judge. Therefore, just as our personal action affects our felicity or wretchedness, our action in sociopolitical affairs has greater effect.
Meanwhile, in connection with the main axis of our discussion, which is social administration, can it be said that the mode of managing society has no relation with the ultimate success or failure of man and that the people in society are free to choose whatever form and method of administering their society, and religion has nothing to do with it? Who does not know that observance of justice in society gives success to man and that justice has a very strong positive value?
In this context, even if there is no pertinent Qur’anic verse or hadith, our intellect will discern that the observance of justice contributes toward the perfection, advancement and exaltation of man. When people do not regard their intellect as sufficient to discern ideological issues in these contexts, they have to resort to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Of course, we believe that the intellect can understand many of the ideological issues in sociopolitical affairs. This does not mean, however, that whatever the intellect understands is outside the realm of religion.
We have mentioned earlier the “discoverer” of the will of God, which expresses the divine will and wisdom and conveys to us what is pleasing to God. It makes no difference how we discover this thing. What matters is that we discovered the divine legislative will.
Sometimes, this discovery is through the agency of the Qur’an and the Sunnah while, at other times, through the intellect, for these three are the proofs and discoverers of divine decrees and religious laws. As such, the intellect [‘aql] is considered as a source of divine law. The fuqaha regard the intellect as among the proofs in proving religious decrees and settling religious issues.
So, there is no demarcation between the intellect and religious law [shar‘]—some matters belong to the intellect while some others belong to religious law. Rather, the intellect is a light which, owing to its luminosity, can also discover the will and pleasure of God, and whatever can be discovered by the intellect in this regard is a religious matter.
Relationship between Religion and Government
In view of the different forms of government existing in the world, especially the so-called Islamic governments formed during the Islamic period, it cannot be said that Islam has neither a positive nor negative view on the forms of government. If we try to compare the corrupt and oppressive government of Mu‘awiyah[29][38] and Yazid[30][39] with the just government of the Commander of the Faithful (‘a), can we claim that the religion of Islam treats the two equally and does not make any distinction between the government of ‘Ali (‘a) and that of Mu‘awiyah?!
Can it be said that everybody is free to choose any form and system of government he likes, and religion cannot interfere; that the performance of neither the government of ‘Ali (‘a) nor that of Mu‘awiyah has any effect on the ultimate fate of man because the form of government is related to politics and this world and has nothing to do with religion?! Could any reasonable person accept such a contention? Can it be said that the two types of government are equal in the sight of religion and that religion neither recommends nor discourages any of them?
The fact of the matter is that involvement in sociopolitical affairs is among the most evident areas in which religion must get involved. Religion has to explain the appropriate structure of government. Religion has to explain that the ruler has to think about the deprived and the downtrodden as well as about the consolidation of the pillars of his rule from the very beginning of his assumption of office.
Thus, the station of sociopolitical issues in religion, especially in Islam, is clear and eminent. One cannot consider them outside the jurisdiction of religion and believe that they have no effect in the felicity and wretchedness of people. Assuming that the hereafter, the Reckoning, the book of account, reward and punishment really exist, can it be said that the behavior of Mu‘awiyah, Yazid and the like has no effect on them?! Of course, even if some of our Sunni brothers have not yet resolved the issue of Mu‘awiyah’s uprightness, there are many tyrants and oppressors who have blackened the pages of history.
Can it be said that these tyrannical rulers are ideologically on the same footing as the just rulers? Today, are those who are butchering and bombing innocent women and children equal to those who are totally in the service of the deprived and the oppressed, and will live together in paradise? Which religion or nation supports this view? How then can sociopolitical issues be considered as outside the realm of religion? If religion were supposed to give its opinion about reward and punishment, halal and haram, positive and negative values, then sociopolitical issues are the most important issues about which religion must give its opinion.
Based on what has been stated, the scheme on the basis of which religious issues are separate from that of the world and religious issues are just related to God and the hereafter and are outside the realm of worldly affairs, is totally erroneous and inadmissible, and in no way consistent with Islam. The worldview presented by Islam and the life to which it invites us are repugnant to this way of thinking. This is not to mention the fact that those who are uttering such words essentially believe in neither God nor the Day of Resurrection. They are doing so with the aim of expelling religion from the scene. But we have nothing to do with their personal conviction.
Our only point is that separating mundane affairs and temporal issues from the jurisdiction of religion will lead to the denial of Islam and has no other outcome. As we have said, every action contributes to our felicity or wretchedness, as the case may be. So, we have to acknowledge that religion can give its opinion on all matters in our lives and state their ideological value. As the Prophet (s) said: “There is nothing that would draw you toward paradise and keep you away from hell except that I commanded you and there is nothing that would draw you toward hell and keep you away from paradise except that I prohibited you.”[31][40]
In the Islamic perspective, felicity without paradise has no meaning and wretchedness without being thrown into hellfire simply does not exist: “As for the wretched, they shall be in the Fire… And as for the happy, they shall be in Paradise.”[32][41]
Universality of Religion
In view of the statement of the Prophet (s), the other assumption is refuted, and to say that it is true that religion can state the value of actions and say what is halal and haram but it was the Prophet (s) himself who stated the values of some actions while some were delegated to the people, i.e., he stated whatever was related to his own time, delegating the rest to the people to identify what is halal and what is haram according to the circumstances of their time.
This statement means that the Prophet (s) did not state all that would give us felicity. This is what he said: “There is nothing that will ensure your felicity except that I have stated it.” Of course, this statement does not mean that he has stated all the minute details. He has rather stated the general rulings, so that, in all times after him, those who have authority can deduce from them specific laws; what is halal and haram according to the evidence, and present them as primary and secondary rulings or government decrees.
Undoubtedly, to identify the specific laws and evidence, which is called religious edict [fatwa’], is in accordance with the general principles mentioned in the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (s) and sayings of the infallible Imams (‘a).
Notes:
[33][13] Charles Louis de Secondat Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu (1689-1755): French writer and jurist, who explored in depth in his The Spirit of the Laws (1748; trans. 1750) the modern idea of the separation of powers as well as the checks and balances to guarantee individual rights and freedoms. Albeit not using the term “separation”, Montesquieu outlined a three-way division of powers in England among the Parliament, the king, and the courts, though such a division did not in fact exist at the time. [Trans.]
[34][32] Of course, another part of life prior to the life in this world can also be considered and that is the life in the womb.
Author: Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Source: al-islam.org
کمک و هدایای مالی به سایت جهت پیشرفت:
6037998157379727 (بانک ملی بنام سیدمحمدموسوی )
روابط عمومی گروه : 09174009011
شماره نوبت استخاره: 09102506002
آیدی همه پیام رسانها : @shiaquest
پاسخگویی سوالات شرعی: 09102506002
آدرس : استان قم شهر قم گروه پژوهشی تبارک
پست الکترونیک : [email protected]
درباره گروه تبارک
گروه تحقیقی تبارک با درک اهميت اطلاع رسـاني در فضاي وب در سال 88 اقدام به راه اندازي www.shiaquest.net نموده است. اين پايگاه با داشتن بخش های مختلف هزاران مطلب و مقاله ی علمي را در خود جاي داده که به لحاظ کمي و کيفي يکي از برترين پايگاه ها و دارا بودن بهترین مطالب محسوب مي گردد. ارائه محتوای کاربردی تبلیغ برای طلاب و مبلغان ،ارائه مقالات متنوع کاربردی پاسخگویی به سئوالات و شبهات کاربران ,دین شناسی، جهان شناسی ،معاد شناسی، مهدویت و امام شناسی و دیگر مباحث اعتقادی ،آشنایی با فرق و ادیان و فرقه های نو ظهور، آشنایی با احکام در موضوعات مختلف و خانواده و... از بخشهای مختلف این سایت است. اطلاعات موجود در این سایت بر اساس نياز جامعه و مخاطبين توسط محققين از منابع موثق تهيه و در اختيار كاربران قرار مى گيرد.